A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN ETHIOPIA: 1941 TO 2012

TEWODROS HAILEMARIAM GEDLU

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
2013
 ABSTRACT

A History of Nationalism in Ethiopia: 1941 to 2012

Tewodros Hailemariam

Ph.D. in History

Addis Ababa University, 2013

This dissertation investigates the history of nationalism in Ethiopia since 1941. Based
primarily on government archives, newspapers, magazines, student papers and other
publications of the period and oral informants, it traces the genesis and evolution of the
different conceptions regarding the Ethiopian nation. It also attempts to see how the
Imperial, the Military and EPRDF regimes had accommodated the national question. This
dissertation argues that in spite of the major ideological and power shifts of the period,
Ethiopian nationalism is more widespread and resilient than it was commonly believed. It
also underlines that state nationalism could create either an integrative national culture
and sentiment or a violent and militant reaction towards the state based on political,
social and economic factors. Nationalism for the historian is of interest not merely as a
problem in the history of ideas, but also as an urgent issue in current affairs. Therefore,
this study will be a contribution to the scholarly dialogue on the national question in
Ethiopia. The study may also benefit scholars from various disciplines and future
researchers on the subject as a starting point. Statesmen, social workers, policy makers
may utilize the findings for public benefit. Above all, this study is hoped to assist
Ethiopians to understand and arbitrate themselves with their past, and draw useful lessons
to fashion their future for the better.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I must begin by admitting that my original interest to investigate the history of

nationalism in Ethiopia from every possible angle was too ambitious, to say the least. It
would have been done in conditions of better financial and logistic support, less
politicized and suspicious atmosphere, and outside the rigidities of an academic calendar.
If I had achieved in this dissertation only a fraction of what I dreamt, the credit goes to
many individuals.

First and foremost would be to Professor Bahru Zewde, whom I cannot thank enough for
bearing all my irregularities and painstakingly honing my professional standards. I doubt
if I could have handled this without you. Professor James Mccann, I am very grateful to
you, not only for saving this project in the first place but also for courageously
contributing in a very difficult arrangement. Dear Sirs, I thank you both, respectfully!

I am also grateful to all my informants, named and unnamed, my hosts at various

localities and, most of all, to the librarians of the Ethiopian National Archives and
Library Agency, Archives and Legal Deposits sections.

Above all to my family, who were the ultimate bearers of the effects of a faulty education
and an ailing economy. My wife Tijo, my daughter Meqdelawit and my son Zeleul:
Hurrah, it is over!

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

ACRONYMS vii

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO HISTORIC ETHIOPIA 46

1.1 The Evolution of Historic Ethiopia 47

1.2 The Institutional and Symbolic Elements of the Nation 64

CHAPTER TWO: THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF

MODERN ETHIOPIANISM 83

2.1 The Italian Interlude (1936-1941) 89

2.2 The Foundations of Modern Ethiopianism 104

CHAPTER THREE: THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL AND

ETHNIC NATIONALISM 150

3.1 Ethno-National Challenges to the Ethiopian State 160

3.2 The Ethiopian Student Movement and the National Question 169

v
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ERA OF SOCIALIST NATIONALISM 201

4.1 The Genesis of Socialist Ethiopianism 206

4.2 The Nationalities versus the State 244

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ERA OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM 266

5.1 Ethno-National Empowerment and Redefinition of the

Ethiopian Nation 270

5.2 The Resurgence of Ethiopianism 308

CONCLUSIONS 331

BIBLIOGRAPHY 350

APPENDIX 380

vi
 ACRONYMS

AAPO All Amhara People’s Organization

AEUP All Ethiopians’ Union Party

AZ Addis Zemen

CUD Coalition for Unity and Democracy

EDP Ethiopians’ Democratic Party

EPF Ethiopian Patriotic Front

EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front

EPRP Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party

ESM Ethiopian Student Movement

ESUE Ethiopian Students’ Union in Europe

ESUNA Ethiopian Students’ Union in North America

GPNRS Gambella Peoples’ National Regional State

IES Institute of Ethiopian Studies

JOS Journal of Oromo Studies

MEISON All Ethiopian Socialist Movement

OLF Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council

SLM Sidama Liberation Movement

vii
SPNNRS Southern Peoples, Nations and Nationalities’ Regional State

TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TPLF Tigrean People’s Liberation Front

UJD Union for Justice and Democracy

USUAA University Students Union of Addis Ababa

WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front

viii
 INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is as old as the modern world but it gained an unprecedented momentum

during the 20th century, when it spawned very potent political and social movements,

became a driving force in the fight against colonialism and imperialism, and powered

genuine struggles for freedom and social justice everywhere. The international

community is organized in terms of nation-states and the politics of national interest. The

idea of the nation has become so normative that a person without nationality is a moral

and legal oddity. Almost all wars of the past century have been fought under national and

sub-national banners so that the world has entered the era of ‘identity wars’.1

Nationalism is today a maker or breaker of states, an agent of peace, stability and

progress as well as a cause of horrendous bloodshed, destabilization and destruction. The

most damning indictment of nationalism is its role in “promoting intolerance, communal

egoism, arrogant patriotism, racist tyranny, and genocide.” 2 In spite of its checkered

career and to the great dismay of political analysts, however, the 21st century has not yet

proved to be the threshold of the post-national era. On the contrary, “[n]ational

movements are regaining popularity, and nations that had once assimilated and

‘vanished’ have now reappeared.”3

1
This is in contrast to the ‘ideological wars’ of the Communist period. Susan L. Woodward, “The Political
Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia,” in Leon Panitch and Colin Leys (eds), Socialist Register.
Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism (London: The Merlin Press, 2003), pp.73-92.
2
Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1993 ),p.95.
3
Ibid, p.3. Other analysts such as E.H.Carr, Nationalism and After (1945), pp.36-37, and Eric Hobsbawm,
Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge University Press: 1990/2000),
p.258, have made the very same predictions almost half a century apart. Anthony Smith, Theories of
Nationalism (Great Britain: Camelot Press, 1971).

1
The growth in the international study of nationalism has closely followed the increase in

its relevance in the past century. Though nationalism had begun to draw academic

interest in Europe in the second-half of the 19th century, there was no systematic effort to

understand it as an autonomous phenomenon until the aftermath of the First World War

(1914-1918). 4 During the interwar period, the unprecedented intensity, duration and

destructiveness of the Great War directed attention to the investigation of the causes of

war in general. The question ‘why do nations go to war?’ led to an explicit analysis of

nationalism, which was considered as the major breeder of strife. The first coherent

scholarly works on the subject were written during this turbulent period.

Historians pioneered the field by recognizing nationalism’s diversity and by charting its

emergence as an ideological force.5 They constructed spatial, chronological and analytic

typologies and provided models and taxonomies. Philological and conceptual historians

attempted to distill the semantic confusion attending nationalistic rhetoric, conventional

usage and academic discourse. When scholars from other disciplines began to take

serious interest after the 1960s, they criticized the narrowly empiricist approach of

historians and introduced new analytical tools, theories and insights. They conceived

nationalism not only as a doctrine or ideology but also as a social movement with

4
Smith, Theories, p.258. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (St
Martin’s Press: 1996), pp.5, 6.
5
Credited as the twin founders of the academic study of nationalism, Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn
defined the general methodology and focus of historians. Kohn argued that a fruitful understanding of
nationalism can be gained from a comparative analysis of its individual and concrete manifestations
through time. Later historians have been as faithful to this dictum as a family business. The very titles of
their erudite books, A Historical Evolution of Nationalism (1931) and The Idea of Nationalism (1944),
respectively emphasize that the basic concern of the historian is understanding of the phenomena as an
Idea in transformation.

2
recognizable relevance to the larger issues of modernization and development.6 Current

theories and methodologies in the study of nationalism reflect the gradual convergence of

the reconstructionist/historicist and the constructionist/sociologist paradigms.7

The history of nationalism in Ethiopia is mediated by internal factors as well as regional

and global trends. The post-Italian period has been a period of soul searching for

Ethiopians, while Ethiopianists and anti-Ethiopian elements subjected the idea of the

nation to all kinds of scrutiny, speculation and propositions. During this period, history

became the main battleground and the handmaiden of embattled nationalism.8 Ethiopia

being among the few African states with claims to an ancient pedigree of nationhood, any

effort to understand the country and its peoples must accord due place to this aspect of its

history. In fact, certainly not as paradox to the above, it is the only post-colonial African

state which faced nationalist claims framed in terms of anti-colonial ideology.9

Over the past half century, Ethiopia has witnessed one of the fiercest and most

destructive civil wars in the world under contending nationalist banners. At the end of

these wars, the country has the unique distinction of being the only African state to be

6
Smith, Theories, p.258. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Balckwell Publishing: 1983/2006),p.xxxi.
7
Alan Munslow, Deconstructing History (1997), uses such taxonomy to classify historians into three:
‘recconstructionists’ who shun theories and rather try to reconstruct the past in the Rankean tradition;
‘constructionists’ who deal with history by means of explanatory framework or overarching theories,
including Marxists; ‘postmodernists’ who rather scorn both methods and question the very validity of any
historical enquiry beyond the personal level.
8
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1960/1993), p.137. John Markakis and
Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 1978/2006), pp. 99,101,271.
9
Sally Healy, “The Changing Idioms of Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa,” in I.M.Lewis(ed),
Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p.102.

3
reengineered by a radical ethnicist approach to the national question.10 The discrepancy

which developed between scholarly views, nationalist claims and ‘common sense’

perceptions underlines the significance of the debate about the history and destiny of the

Ethiopian nation. No one can ignore it without serious consequences.

In or outside the academic world, few subjects have been as riddled in irrationality,

skepticism, passion and divisiveness as the national question. Because, as part and parcel

of the overall debate on modernity, nationalism reflects the interests, ideologies and

traditions of stakeholder societies, institutions, classes, affiliations, etc.11 In addition, the

national question has proved to be a notoriously protean subject because nations and

nationalism are historically novel and fluid concepts that are hard to pin down by

permanent and universal criteria. The various criteria so far employed in characterizing

nations and nationalism, such as language, ethnicity and culture are themselves fuzzy,

shifting and ambiguous.12 Generally, the problems in the field spring from the historical

genesis and evolution of the modern state itself; and the impact of prevailing intellectual,

ideological and political trends in each epoch. Therefore, this introduction sets out to plot

10
Aregawi Berhe, “A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology
and Mobilization in Ethiopia,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Oslo, 2007), p.8:"In the history of Ethiopia,
no government other than that led by the TPLF since 1991 stretched ethno-nationalism to such a far-
reaching point, although ethno-national challenges steadily trailed the evolution of the modern Ethiopian
state." Dima Nogoo, “Contested Legitimacy: Coercion and the State in Ethiopia,” (Ph.D. Dissertation:
University of Tenesse, 2009), pp.164 (fn), also 203, 224:"The revolutionary regime attempted both
cultural and structural assimilation, but the post revolutionary regime seems to have returned to the pre-
revolutionary policies of the ethnically based hierarchical centralization of the state."
11
Rosa Luxemberg quoted in Horace B.Davis, Towards a Marxist Theory of Nationalism (New York and
London: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p.4. Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and
Nationalism (Zed Books: 1986), p.43.
12
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp.viii,5-6. Thomas H. Eriksen, Nationalism and Ethnicity (1993).
Gellner, Nations, p.3. Approaching nationalism from the international relations perspective Carr,
Nationalism, p.11, observed: “the vocabulary of this subject is notoriously full of pitfalls.”

4
the general theoretical/conceptual framework and the methodology used in the

dissertation by a comprehensive historical account of nationalism as an ideology and

movement; as well as a theoretical and methodological critique of the relevant

scholarship.

The Two Paths of Nationalism: Civic and Ethnic

The modern state as it emerged in late 16th century England differed from earlier human

political associations because of its explicit national character. The nation-state was born

through the coalescence of feudal principalities into territorially defined political units

that later claimed monopoly of power and sovereignty.13 At this initial stage, the state

attempted to make its political and cultural boundaries congruent and, in spite of social,

ethnic and other diversities, it was regarded as a national whole. This characteristic of

“homogeneity in diversity”14 has become a social norm in most states since. The new

state defined its individuality in terms of the historical and cultural claims of a ruling

class and symbolized its nationhood by the institution of the monarchy. The people were

accorded only symbolic equality and membership to the nation. This is what is termed as

etatism, the idea which aspired to forge a social nation out of a political state.15

13
Weber’s triple features of the modern state, i.e, defined territory, power monopoly and sovereignty,
did not acknowledge its nationality. Modern states have stubbornly claimed some form of nationality and
demanded this from their subjects. Max Weber, 1921/1928, p.54, quoted in Colin Hay, Michael Lister and
David Marsh (eds), The State. Theories and Issues (Palgrave Macmillan: 2006),p.8.
14
Richard Handler, “Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec,” in George E., Clifford Marcus and
James Madison (eds), New Directions in Anthropological Writing: History, Poetics, Cultural Criticism (The
University of Wisconsin Press: 1988),pp.6-8.
15
Peter Alter, Nationalism (Great Britain: 1985/1994).

5
If England had been the birthplace of the nation-state, France was the home of its

nationalism. This is because the French Revolution (1789) heralded the era of the ‘mass

nation’ by upholding popular sovereignty instead of dynastic claims as the basis of

national community. Underlying this fundamental change was 18th century

Enlightenment thinking centered on the concepts of liberty, humanity and universalism

applied within the framework of the nation-state.16 The revolution defined the nation as

the people of a state and for the first time established a necessary connection between the

“state as a political unit and the nation as a cultural one” and “the combination of these

two elements in a single political conception.”17

Hitherto the nation-state had been “a historical fact, now it became a theory. It was

embodied in the theory of nationalism, which posited as an ideal the identification of

cultural and political communities in a universal system of nation states.”18 There is again

a one to one congruence between state and nation though the state, now owned by the

people, consciously and programmatically strived towards forging a national community.

This original ideology of the nation-state was later identified as civic nationalism19 due to

16
Kohn, The Idea,p.455
17
Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (London: Collins, 1969), p.35. Carr,
Nationalism, pp.2, 6. Kohn, The Idea, pp.3, 6.
18
Ibid, p.36
19
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.87. The typologies of nationalism vary depending on the
perspectives of scholars. For example, Hechter’s typologies which coincide with the above two categories
are ‘state-building nationalism’ and ‘peripheral nationalism’ respectively, but he also adds ‘irredentist
nationalism’ and ‘unification nationalism’; Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford & New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000). Smith, on the other hand, based on the ethnic origin of nations has
‘territorial nationalism’ and ‘ethnic nationalism’ respectively. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Anderson’s typologies are ‘official nationalism’ and ‘vernacular nationalism’
respectively. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983/1991).

6
its emphasis on common citizenship rather than a unique culture or language as the

measure and substance of nationality.20

The above historical development in Western Europe was reflected in the early semantics

of nationalism. Even though the term ‘nation’ was a derivative of the Latin verb ‘natio,’

which in its pristine usage meant “place of birth or origin” and referred to “a group of

people who believe they are ancestrally related,” 21 it started to gain wider social and

political import with the genesis of the early nation-states in the 16th and 17th centuries.

During this period, notes Carr, the term ‘nation’ throughout Western Europe was “the

most natural word’’ for the state.22 This implied the homogeneous or national character of

the nation-state because, in contrast, the multiethnic empires of Central and Eastern

Europe were referred to by the legal term ‘state’. Though the designation ‘nationality’

was used for the various linguistic and cultural subjects of these empires, it had no

political significance until the currency of the principle of national self-determination in

the 19th century.

Next to evolve was an organic and ethnic conception of the nation based on the Romantic

Movement 23 (late 18th and early 19th century), which defined the nation in biological

20
Kedourie, Nationalism, p.51: “A nation, to the French revolutionaries, meant a number of individuals
who have signified their will as to the manner of their government.” Cobban, The Nation State, p.159:
“The essence of political nationality is the recognition of a single political authority, and common
citizenship...”
21
Kohn, The Idea, p.120. Kedourie, Nationalism, p.5. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism. The Quest for
Understanding (UK: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.94.
22 th
Carr, Nationalism, p.1. Connor , Ibid,p.94, also notes: “It was perhaps from the 17 century on that
th
nation came to refer to the entire peoples or citizens of a country. By the end of the 17 century it was
also employed as a synonym to the territorial state.”
23
This was a vast ideological orientation which also exalted the role of intellectuals in society, and made it
imperative for national communities to rediscover “their pristine origins and golden ages.” John
Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds), Nationalism (Oxford University Press: 1994),p.5.

7
terms. As originally articulated by German intellectuals, the nation was a unique natural

community or “a natural division of the human race, endowed by god with its own

character.”24 Gottfried Herder made the Volk (“the people”, “the community”) and its

language the basis of his doctrine and claimed that “human civilization lives not in its

general and universal, but in its national and particular manifestation.” “A group

speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a

state.” 25 Such ethno-linguistic entities were, therefore, regarded as the sole legitimate

foundations of any social and political association. Now it is not the state which defines

and forges the nation, but the ethnie that must form and constitute a state, an ethno-state,

Volkstaat. What is more, while the state is something artificial and accidental, the ethno-

nation is natural and essential.

This ideology wanted first to divorce the state from the nation and then overtake it, and in

its aspiration to do so made nation and state appear antagonistic. It shifted the concept of

national homogeneity from relatively wider historical and cultural similarities to sharply

specific boundaries of blood, speech and custom.26 The sovereignty of the people was

sidelined by the uniqueness of the people, and the basis of nationality became such

primordial markers rather than territorial and political bonds of citizenship. This

derivative ideology was termed as ethnic or vernacular nationalism due to its emphasis on

24
Kohn, The Idea, p.429.
25
Kohn, The Idea, p.429. Connor, Ethnonationalism, p.9. Goetfried Herder, “Nature produces families; the
most natural state therefore is one people(Volk) with a national character...” quoted in John Breuilly, “The
Sources of Nationalist Ideology,” in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith(eds), Nationalism, p.107.
Kedourie, Nationalism, pp.12-43, 51,62.
26
Clifford Geertz, “Primordial and Civic Ties,” in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (eds), The Ethnicity
Reader. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration (Great Britain: Polity Press, 1997/1999),pp.29-34.

8
championing the causes of a supposedly unique ethno-linguistic group in the context of a

nation-state. Its tenets were taken up and applied to politics with far-reaching results.

The rival redefinition of the nation as a volk community entitled to its own state brought

in its train semantic confusion regarding the terms 'nation', 'nationality', ‘nation-state’ and

‘nationalism’. As a result of its politicization, the nation became inextricably linked to

state power and commonly denoted those which have political autonomy or even aspire

for one. Nationalism in this primordialist conception was then loyalty to an ethnic group

and for its emancipation from an overarching state. 27 In some cases, the related term

‘nationality’ was reserved for self-defined cultural groups which were sufficiently

politicized, though they had not yet achieved their own state. Nationalities were

understood as something of a transition between the cultural and political continuum of

ethnies and nations.28

Since the emergence of ethnic nationalism, the civic nationalism of the “old continuous

nations”29 has been on the defensive. The rise of separatist and ethnic agitations after the

27
The democratization of the state by the French revolutionaries had resulted in the emergence of self-
determination of the people as a core principle of nationalism. In Central and Eastern Europe, this
developed into a principle of national self-determination which reached its zenith between 1848 and the
Second World War (1939-1945). The emphasis by the proponents of German and Italian nationalism on
the primordial and empirical attributes of the nation and their political success for statehood made ethnic
nationalism very appealing to the disparate peoples in Eastern Europe. In the Balkans it sparked
widespread struggle to achieve 'national' independence or autonomy which set the tone for
contemporary ethno-nationalist movements.
28
Eriksen, Nationalism and Ethnicity, pp.3-4: ‘Ethnic group’, a sociological jargon which is used
interchangeably with ‘nationality’, particularly in nationalist discourse, had its roots in the Greek word
‘ethnos’ or ‘ethnikos’ referring to a group characterized by common descent. Nevertheless, it was late in
the 1950s that ‘ethnicity’ was applied to communities which display linguistic and cultural boundaries vis
a vis others. Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp.40,100. Hayes, A Historical Evolution,p.6.
29
According to Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), pp.6-10, old
continuous nations are “those which had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the
formulation of the doctrine of nationalism.” The new nations are “those for whom two processes
developed simultaneously: the formation of national consciousness and the creation of nationalist
movements.”

9
Second World War (1939-1945) has become the principle of state-creation as a reflection

of three forces: decolonization, revolution and intervention of outside powers. 30

Multiethnic states, alternatively designated as multinational states, continued to exist side

by side reflecting a compromise between the civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism.

With the expansion of European model nation-states across the globe, ‘nation’ served as a

blanket term for all sorts of states. All modern states operate on the assumption of being

nation-states and “now owe their legitimacy to some version of the national idea” though

less than 10% of the world's countries are in any sense ethnically homogeneous.31 The

rest contain two or more ethno-cultural groups. So variegated is the process that nation

stands for any sovereign state, its territory (country), citizens, and specific ethnie. As a

result of this overlap in meaning of terms, both the assertiveness of the state and that of a

group within it have been called nationalism.32

30
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.131. The anti-colonial wars of independence, termed as
nationalist/liberation movements, and the establishment of national states in Africa and Asia, displayed
both the multiethnic and ethnic features of the state. The Cold War era made emerging states internally
weak and seedbeds of revolutions, and externally reliant on the superpowers and malleable to
interventions. Davis, Towards a Marxist, pp.3, 9-26,67. While Marxists generally adopted “a negative
definition of the nation as the superstructural reflection of the economic base of capitalism,” and
dismissed nationalism as ‘false consciousness’, and subordinated the nationalities question to proletarian
internationalism, they opportunistically kept the issue alive by embedding ethnicism in the state
structure.
31
Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p.59.

32
Hayes, A Historical Evolution, p.vii.

10
Theories and Methodologies: Primordialism, Modernism, Ethno-

Symbolism

The historical duality of nations and the evolution of nationalism along the above

trajectory continue to bedevil the field. An underlying assumption in the above narrative

is that states might be as old as history, even a few nations (as human groups) might also

have roots deep in history, but nation-states and nationalisms are modern European

innovations. This has stirred controversies among scholars regarding the nature and

manifestation of nations and nationalism. The first debate is over the characteristics and

dating of nations, what are they made of and whether they are antiquated or modern.

There are three views on the matter: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism.

Primordialism, which is the paradigm first adopted by ethno-nationalists but also includes

some theorists of nationalism, makes blood, speech, custom and kinship the basis of

national identity. Primordialists consider nations as organic, perennial, natural and

universal; some even characterize nations as ‘extended kinships’.33 In this view, nations

are intrinsic to human group formation, they can be found everywhere and in any epoch

of history and “the emergence of a new nation is, then, often explained as an ‘awakening’

of a dormant entity.”34 This view is anathema to most social scientists because it consigns

33
Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac(eds), When is the Nation? Towards an understanding of theories of
nationalism (London and New York: Routledge,2005), “Primordialism: Introduction”, pp.51-55.
34
Some primordialists such as Pierre van den Berghe and Edward Shills consider what is primordial as
socially constructed. Steven Grosby, “The Primordial, Kinship and Nationality,” in Atsuko and Gordana,
When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005), pp.56-78. Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Ethnies and Nations. Genealogy indeed,” in Atsuko
and Gordana, When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (London and
New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.113-118.

11
nationalism to the inescapable predicament of human nature. Methodologically, it places

nationalism outside the realm of historical investigation.

The modernist or ‘contextualist’ school sees nations as historical and constructed, and

prefers only economic, political and socio-cultural explanations.35 The Hayes – Kohn era,

the period between the two world wars, repudiated the assertions of 19th century scholars

that nations are ‘as old as history’. Nations and nationalisms are rather outcomes of a

specific stage of human development, namely that of modern industrial society.

Nationalism is an integrative response to systemic and socio-cultural disturbance in

traditional society caused by modernity. It had little significance in pre-modern times and

contexts because its emergence demands some unique structural and functional features

of modern society. But what aspects of modernity are more important in the emergence

of nations and nationalism: economic, political, or socio-cultural? This constituted the

second level of debate among modernist theorists.

Those who regard the changes in economic and political systems as more important in

engendering nationalism are called ‘system integrationists’. The economic view is

represented by Gellner, who considers nationalism to be rooted deeply in the distinctive

structural requirements of industrial society or in the economic logic of capitalism.

Economic factors of system disturbance such as rapid industrialization, urbanization and

technological advances make traditional structures dysfunctional. Such objective and

inescapable imperatives make industrial society mobile, culturally homogenous and

ideologically egalitarian. Nationalism emerges as an “external manifestation of a deep

35
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.3.

12
adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture.”36 Ethno-nationalist ferment

crops up when unmet egalitarian expectations are compounded with the existence of

separate symbols and diacritical marks between rulers and ruled. The expression of

discontent adopts a cultural aspect “by the fact that in industrializing societies

communication and hence culture assumes a new and unprecedented importance.”37

While Gellner makes the existence of a centralized state a necessary but not sufficient

condition for the emergence of nationalism, other system integrationists pay more

attention to changes in political structures, such as “military and administrative

expansions, centralization of government and a taxation system on the whole clearly

bounded territory of the state.”38 A central tenet of this latter view is that nations are mass

phenomena created by the modern state. It is the consolidated and functionally expanded

modern state which shapes the people into common political form and creates nations,

not the other way round.

‘Socio-cultural integrationists’ approach the issue from the perspectives of the social and

cultural reintegration of collapsed traditional society. They consider the roles of social

groups and the changes taking place at community level as more important in creating

nationalism. According to Hobsbawm, nations are constructed from above but they

cannot be understood unless viewed from below. Nationalism is important because it

36
Gellner, Nations, p.38 argues that the emergence of nationalism in history is tied to industrialization,
the structure of the modern state, and creation of ‘high culture’.
37
Ibid,p.72
38
Breuilly, Mann, Nairn, Tilly, Giddens, “in different ways, emphasized the modern state as a new kind of
power container which, in its relationship with its subject-citizens and with other states, turned the
people into the nation and the state into a nation-state in conflict with other nation-states.”John Breuilly,
in his introduction to Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (2006), p. xxxii.

13
performs useful social, cultural and even psychological functions in society. Anderson

maintains that nationalism is embraced not as a self-consciously followed political

ideology, not even as a result of any rational calculation, “but as a cultural system with

religious characteristics.”39 At a deeper non-material level, nationalism is important in

providing spiritual anchorage to a free-floating modern society. It becomes “a substitute

for factors of integration in a disintegrating society. When society fails, the nation

appears as the ultimate guarantee.”40 This provision of meaning, cohesion and continuity

to a crumbling religious and social world is what accounts for the emotional appeal of

nationalist ideology.

The socio-cultural integration theory overcomes three major limitations of system

integrationists. First, it attributes the emotional power of nationalist politics to factors

beyond pecuniary interests; nationalism has a psychosocial and ontological function to

perform. Second, it brings in agency to modernist accounts. Societies, groups and classes

are agents which take active part in the ideology and movement rather than being at the

mercy of structural imperatives. At various times in history, the aristocratic classes, the

middle-classes, intellectuals, and finally the masses have been the bearers of the national

idea. Third, and more important, nationalism becomes not an exclusive phenomenon of

39
Anderson, Imagined Communities,pp.5-7: The important question is, however, how and why at a point
in their history people come to ‘imagine’ themselves as members of a certain nation, and that with such a
passion? Can these be explained by a purely functional or economic reason? Anderson is concerned with
understanding the force and persistence of national identity and sentiment. “The fact that people are
willing to die for the nation,” he notes, “indicates its extraordinary force.”
40
Miroslav Hroch quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.175.

14
industrial society, “for wherever a system of status and power divisions is based on

nationality, nationalism is likely to flourish.”41

Integration, interaction, standardization and homogenization are the key concepts of

modernist theories. 42 There are certain points of convergence among modernists

regarding the emergence of nationalism on the global scene. First, all concede that

nationalism is an adaptive response to the transition from tradition to modernity. Second,

modernists give the state central role in creating nations and nationalism. Third, they also

agree that nationalism has some important social function to perform. Fourth, they

consider the creation of a homogenous national culture as a special feature of modernity.

Modernists do not deny the pre-modern roots of at least some nations but attempt to limit

their accounts to the historical genesis of nationalism than to the significance of pre-

modern nationalities, or rather to the relevance of any such claims for modern nations.43

41
James Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan, 1991),pp.23,.46.
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.206: The creation in the former Communist states of “ethno-
linguistic territorial ‘national’ administrative units, i.e ‘nations’ in the modern sense, where none existed
or been thought of...” was a “theoretical construct of ...intellectuals rather than a primordial aspiration of
any peoples.” Cobban, The Nation State, “Even dormant nationalities have been aroused to life.”
42
Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (the
MIT Press:1953/1966),p.91,96,98: It is the “range and effectiveness of social communication which serves
as a valuable index to the degree of integration of [a]people[s], to its stage towards becoming a nation.”
Effective communication enables a nationality to transcend economic and social differences and stand in
unison for the national ideal. Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.15,16. Kellas, Politics of Nationalism,
p.45. Among the socio-cultural integrationists the ‘instrumentalist’ view, which puts the intelligentsia at
the core of nationalist movements, is a powerful explanation. Kedourie, Nationalism, p.136, paying
particular attention to ethnic nationalism, argues that “nationalism is not some inarticulate and powerful
feeling which is present always and everywhere; and that neither is it a ‘reflection’ of particular social and
economic forces.” It is rather an intellectual project, a doctrine or an ‘ideological obsession’ first invented
and disseminated by German intellectuals. Nationalist intellectuals make the “excluded and marginalized
youth... a vehicle of mass mobilization around the concept of the nation as a culturally homogenous
community” and offer consolation in the struggle for national freedom. The nation then becomes a
community of care and destiny.
43
John Breuilly, “Dating the Nation. How Old Is a Nation?”, in Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac.(eds),
When Is The Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005),p.15, disputes the validity of national terminology prior to the modern era as applying to

15
They believe that “however long the real or ascribed historical continuity between

groups claiming the same name, earlier collectivities cannot be confused with the

modern, essentially class – or rather literacy – linked, concept of ‘nationalism’.” 44

Modern nation-states, which are political and secular, seldom claim common ethnicity. In

most cases sheer diversity and size of population preclude that option. In fact, very few

national movements start based on a strong sense of ethnic consciousness.

Modernist theories which attempt to explain social change based on structure and social

institutions are labeled by critics as ‘structuralist’ or ‘functionalist’. According to these

views, new social institutions replace old and dysfunctional ones by establishing

equilibrium “mainly at the level of the social system. In such explanation social

institutions themselves are seen as actors of social change.” 45 Hence nations and

nationalism become byproducts of broader social processes. Critics who consider some

modernist theories as ‘constructionist’ or ‘instrumentalist’ “emphasize their so-called

upward conflation, where the changes in social structure are explained by unconstrained

actions of agency...”46 Hence the nation is regarded to be a result of agents’ free will,

anything more than a small fraction of any society. “Rather it operates within elite discourses to underpin
narratives of civilizations or to justify conflicting political claims.” John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State
(Manchester: Manchester University Press,1993),p.76; any premodern discourse on the idea of the
nation, if it appeared at all, was subordinate to religious and monarchical principles.
44
As Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.79, remarks, discerning what concepts of the nation mean to
the mass of the population, beyond the opinions of those educated individuals for whom we have
records, is fraught with problems. It is difficult to penetrate the “denseness of the fog which surrounds
questions about the national consciousness of common men and women, especially in the period before
modern nationalism unquestionably became a mass political force”. This is a very pertinent concern. The
more so as the problem of paucity of records attains debilitating proportions in Ethiopia, which, though it
boasts thousands of years of literacy, possesses no matching wealth of archives.
45
Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac(eds), When Is The Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of
Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005),p.13.
46
Ibid, pp.12-13.

16
interests and agendas. Modernist theories then lack the useful balance between structure

and agency in accounting for social change.

Another critique of modernism questions the very outcomes of social communication.

Michael Hechter challenged that not just commonality but the opposite might as well

result from modernization and increased interaction, especially if it is attended by

regional disparities or perceptions of ‘uneven economic development’. Hechter advanced

a theory of ‘internal colonialism’ in which he argued that increased interaction among

peoples is as decisive in breeding nationalist discontent if coupled with a ‘cultural

division of labor’ between centre and periphery situations.47 This has been the most

widely embraced theory, especially among ethno-nationalist politicians as well as

academics of the Third World. Nevertheless, the internal colonial model is criticized for

assuming simple centre-periphery polarity across culture, economics and politics.

“Peripheral predicaments and politicization emerge out of the incongruity between

cultural, economic and political roles.”48 This means, there are instances where economic

deprivation might not produce nationalism, and where economically well-to-do regions

might still exhibit strong nationalist sentiment.

Another school called ethno-symbolism concedes that nations are perennial, and perhaps

universal, but denies their natural origin. This constitutes the third debate on the nature

and manifestation of nations and nationalism. Ethno-symbolists challenge the exclusive

modernity and Westernity of nations, because recent studies have indicated universal

47
Quoted in James Kellas, Politics of Nationalism, pp.39-40.Michael Hechter’s ‘internal colonialism’
model(1966/1975) has since been a favorite slogan of ethnic nationalists all over the world. Hechter
however has later modified his view on the matter.
48
Rokkan and Urwin, quoted in Kellas, Politics of Nationalism, p.41.

17
trends in the formation of states, nations and nation-states both in the West and the Rest.

The idea and vocabulary of the nation have existed in the non-Western world throughout

the previous millennia primarily as a religio-historical association with or without

necessarily implying common political background.49 Anthony Smith argues that though

nationalism as an ideology and movement is a wholly modern phenomenon, the nations it

worked upon or it gave rise to often have pre-modern ‘ethnic roots’. Many existing

nation-states have ethnic cores or noticeable dominant groups as bearers of the historic

nation. When such historical and cultural claims have relevance for modern nations,

either as models or raw materials, they may be termed as proto-nations, pre-nations or

ethno-nations, and their binding sentiments as pre-national sentiment or ethnocentrism.50

Nevertheless, both primordialist and modernist theories fail to account for the dualism in

most nationalisms: ethnic as well as civic, secularity as well as religiosity (of tone and

substance), homogeneity as well as diversity, modernity as well as antiquity. By pushing

nations further back in history, ethno-symbolists attempt to overcome the timelessness

and naturalness of the former as well as the narrowly Western and structural-functional

conception of the latter. The basic premise of the historical ethno-symbolic approach is

the centrality of symbolic elements in the formation and persistence of nations and in

analyzing their distinctive characteristics. Methodologically, it attempts to identify the

traditional and pre-modern content of national culture – the myths, epics, symbols,

heroes, etc., because they “are as valuable to the understanding of the ‘spirit’ and ‘shape’

49
Benyamin Nueberger, “State and Nation in African Thought,” in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith
(eds), Nationalism (Oxford University Press: 1994),pp.231-235.
50
Smith, Theories, p.59.

18
of modern nations as any analysis of social institutions and class formation.”. 51 The

ethno-symbolic approach is particularly appropriate in situations where the polity is not

consolidated and rival nationalisms of the state and its ethnic critics draw their

ideological myths and symbols from a certain ethnic past or pasts. It enables us to study

such cultural and social resources of nationalism from both perspectives.

The analysis of cultural elements over la longue duree has certain advantages over other

approaches. Firstly, it enables the treatment of nations distinct from the modern

ideological movement of nationalism. Secondly, it opens the way to the analysis of

(ethnic) past or pasts and the present across different epochs. Thirdly, by blending to

advantage history and sociology, it tells the ‘first-half of the story’ missing from

modernist accounts of when and how nationalism emerges.52 Ethno-symbolism integrates

the political and cultural dimensions of nationalism in a single framework.

The civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism are based on the relative emphasis each

place on the political and cultural attributes of nations rather than their exclusive

adherence to either.53 Many scholars have attempted to solve the problem by drawing

51
Anthony Smith, National Identity (USA: University of Nevada Press, 1991),p.20. The ethnie, his term for
predecessors of modern nations designating ethnic groups, has deeper roots in history than we concede.
If so, what is novel about modern nations and nationalism? Not much. With regard to human association
their major role lies in extending and entrenching “the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and
structures.” His methodology is what he called ethno-symbolism or rather historical ethno-symbolism.
Smith argues that “nations are not static targets, to be attained once-for-all. They are processes, albeit
long-term ones...” and “nations require ethnic cores if they are to survive. If they lack one, they must ‘re-
invent’ one...” Anthony Smith, “The Genealogy of Nations. An Ethno-Symbolic Approach,” in Atsuko Ichijo
and Gordana Uzelac(eds), When Is The Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism
(London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.98, 100-103.
52
Adrian Hastings, The construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge university press, 1997),p.11.
53
As his critics pointed out Smith fails to explain adequately the manner of transition from ethnicity to
nationalism, and why particular nationalisms vary in their strength or weakness. Anthropologists generally
view nationalism as a variant of ethnicity. Eriksen, Nationalism and Ethnicity, p.101: “Nationalism and

19
attention to the conceptual yarn between state and nation, by restricting the one to the

legal-political and the other to the social-cultural realm.54 Though the modern nation-state

claimed to combine these two attributes, its essential characteristics such as defined

territory, power monopoly and sovereignty were considered irrelevant to the concept of

the nation. But this conventional observation overlooks the very fact that nationalism has

always been aimed at making the political and cultural boundaries congruent, and,

historically as well as theoretically, it is no more feasible to keep state and nation apart.

Keeping a distinction between nation and nationality or ethnie, rather than between state

and nation, based on possession or lack of state power, is very important in untangling a

part of the confusion. If nationality is defined in terms of cultural or historical attributes,

then it only becomes nation when it establishes its own state (independent or

autonomous). The equality between nation and state automatically makes the former

political, whatever its cultural claims; it will accommodate both the civic and ethnic

conceptions of nationalism, and reunite nation and state in a single framework. This

means that, even if defined in political terms, states would have nationhood, and nations,

whether composed of one or many nationalities, would have statehood. Citizenship will

then denote political nationality in all kinds of states.

Methodologically, this approach would make all nations modern while giving

nationalities or ethnies more time depth. In addition, it delineates the relationship

ethnicity are kindred concepts, the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in character.” But there is no direct
leap from ethnicity to nationalism because the former has a largely cultural content while the latter is
political. “For ethno-symbolists, the relationship between ethnicity and nationhood is central.”
Nationalism and ethnicism are rather two poles of a continuum, “continuity but not identity.”p,118.
54
Seton-Watson, quoted in Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp.59-60, argued that a state is “a legal and
political organization with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens,” while a nation is
“a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture,
and a national consciousness.”

20
between the legal-political state and other sub-national units, be they nationalities, ethnic

groups, regions, etc. Nationalism would also be sufficiently extended to include the

integrative ideologies of a state, reformist social groups within it, or the demands of

constituent nationalities couched in both cultural and political terms. This would

overcome a hiatus in the conventional typology of nationalism as official/civic and

ethnic/vernacular, which is impervious to a third alternative outside the two brands. Civic

nationalism must not be exclusively limited to the state as official nationalism; it should

also include the nationalism of non-ethnic or supra-ethnic reformist groups.

The modernist and ethno-symbolist perspectives on nationalism can be synthesized in

that the ideology and movement incorporate political, economic and socio-cultural

dimensions. In the final analysis, whether the state embodied the nation or the nation

possessed the state, nationalism has always been an ideology about empowerment -

political, economic and cultural. It is not the mere existence of heterogeneous groups and

languages which determines the unity or destruction of national development, but more

dynamic processes such as social mobilization, cultural assimilation and political

integration.

This study regards nations and states as synonymous as argued above. The nation-state

unifies the political and cultural aspects as it is based on two kinds of community, “a

community of citizenship concerning the relations between citizens and the state

(including political, social, and economic rights and obligations); and a community of

sentiment, meaning a common language and a common cultural and historical identity

21
based on literature, myths, symbols, music, art, and so on.”55 Nation may be then defined

as “a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths,

memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture,

reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws

and shared customs.”56

Hence: nationalism is:

An ideology and movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity

and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it to constitute

an actual or potential ‘nation’57.

This perspective is valuable in that it overcomes the prevalent tendency among

nationalists and nationalism theories to associate nationality or ethnie exclusively with

primordialist bonds, mainly to language and linguism. It also combines the historical and

sociological perspectives of nationalism to advantage.

55
Georg Sorenson, “The Transformation of the State,” in Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh(eds),
The State. Theories and Issues (Palgrave Macmillan:2006),p.196. Carlton Hayes, Nationalism: a Religion
(1960), p.3, gives precedence to language as it “bespeaks both the solidarity and continuity of a people.”
Second is historical traditions which constitute a nationality and distinguish it from others even within the
same linguistic area. For Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, pp.2-5, the most important
factor for the development of nationhood from one or more ethnicities is “an extensively used vernacular
literature”. For Hroch the three irreplaceable factors in nation-building process are a memory of some
common past, a density of linguistic or cultural ties, and a conception of equality of all members. Miroslav
Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe,” in
Balakrishan Gopal(ed), Mapping the Nation (New York and London: Verso, 1996), pp.78-97.
56
Smith, “Genealogy of Nations”, p.98. Connor, Ethnonationalism, p.4, also accords primacy to the “self-
identification of a people with a group – its past, its present, and, what is most important, its destiny.”
Hroch, Ibid, p.79.

57
Gellner, Nations, p.1. Smith, Theories,p.171. Also Smith, Chosen Peoples (2003),pp.24-25 .

22
An Integrated Conceptual Framework

One serious gap in Ethiopian scholarship is perhaps the lack of an imaginative framework

which addresses the antiquity as well as modernity, unity as well as diversity, uniqueness

as well as commonality of the nation. In spite of its tangential relevance, Ethiopian

history has been treated within the colonial and post-colonial paradigm.58 A review of

the literature on Ethiopian nationalism indicates two major methodological trends,

‘reconstructionist’ and ‘constructionist’, which are also observed between historians and

other social scientists. Generally, in the good old ‘reconstructionist’ tradition, most

historians have so far avoided the acknowledgement, if not the use, of any explanatory or

theoretical frameworks in writing the history of Ethiopia.59

58
Edmond Keller, “Ethiopia: Revolution, class and the National Question,” African Affairs?, Pp. 519-549, is
premised on a question begging proposition and stretches ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ to the almost
meaninglessly universal. ‘Colonialism’ in the sense of one people dominating another is as old as human
society and this has no relationship with a historical context of Western colonialism and imperialism, to
which he refers as the ‘colonial era’. See for a similar argument Ezkel Gebissa, “The Lesser of Two Evils
Paradigm of Colonial Rule: A Comparative Study of Colonialism in the Sudan and Ethiopia,” JOS, VIII,
1&2(2001), pp. 1-34. Of the very few attempts to address the issue, that of Donald Levine and Teshale
Tibebu are outstanding. Ethnic nationalists, who often write from a predetermined ideological
positioning, have capitalized on this predicament and labor to justify the view that the country is no
different from other African nations whatsoever. This seems a self-defeating logic since they are at the
same time depicting Ethiopia as a ‘unique’ African colonialist power. Christopher Clapham, “Ethiopia and
the Challenge of Diversity,” Africa Insight, 34(1), (2004), p.53: "The new system likewise dismisses the
experience of Ethiopian nationalism as mere ‘Amhara chauvinism’, and denies a place in the political
order for those who wish to identify themselves simply as Ethiopians – a fact that is all the more peculiar
in that Ethiopia, despite the undoubted inequalities embedded in its historic political structure, does
indeed retain reservoirs of nationalism that have deep historic roots, and cannot be dismissed merely as
the preserve of a single group."

59
Alan Munslow, Deconstructing History (1997), uses such taxonomy to classify historians into three:
‘reconstructionists’ refers to historians who shun covering theories and rather try to reconstruct the past
based on empirical evidence in the Rankean tradition; ‘constructionists’ are, including Marxists, those
who deal with history by means of explanatory frameworks or overarching theories; ‘deconstructionists’
or ‘postmodernists’ are those who rather scorn both methods, and question the very validity of any
historical enquiry beyond the personal level. Most historians fall in between the two major trends,
reconstructionist and constructionist, while the postmodernist approach is rejected by many as
inappropriate for the Third World, which, according to the Subaltern school, did not yet transcend
modernity. For instance, the conventional demarcation for the birth of ‘modern’ Ethiopia, which is the

23
Academic concern with Ethiopian nationalism was coterminous with the national revival

and reunification efforts of the 19th century. The initial phase was a continuation of the

fascination with which medieval travelers, philologists, Semiticist scholars saw the

biblical antiquity of Ethiopia. 60 Ethiopian scholars also continued the mythology and

history in the hagiographic and chronicle writing tradition of the historic nation. Amharic

came of age as a national official and literary language mainly through the history writing

of the clerical scholarship. Narrative, chronological and genealogical histories were the

literary genre at this stage. When the earliest popular histories by Ethiopian writers began

to appear at the turn of the 20th century, their themes were ideologically allied to the

nation-building efforts of the modernizing state. 61 Italian scholarship during the

occupation period (1936-1941) outlined the future battle lines by shifting the emphasis

from the state to the peoples, from the nation to the ethnic groups, from politics to

cultures, from unity to diversity.62 Modernity and modern education in the post-Italian

period ushered in a more scholarly work on the history of the nation. With the expansion

of higher education and training of a new generation of Ethiopian scholars, boosted by

coronation of Emperor Tewodros II(1855), has an underlying modernist assumption of state consolidation,
expansion and continuity. Even ethno-nationalists like Tesema Ta’a(1986), Merara Gudina(2003), and
Negaso Gidada, Ye’Negaso Menged(Addis Ababa: 2004 EC), trace the roots of ethnic oppression to this
king. Surprisingly, Merara bases his claim on a letter of Emperor Tewodros, which has a single ethno-
stereotypic word and fails to distinguish between ethnicism and nationalism. Aregawi, “A Political
History,” p.1, pushes a little back the politicization of ethnicity in modern Ethiopia “at least from the so-
called ‘Era of the Princes’’.
60
Merid Wolde-Aregay, “Southern Ethiopia and the Christian Kingdom, 1508-1708. With Special
Reference to the Galla Migrations and their Consequences,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: SOAS, 1971), p.19:"For
most contemporary Europeans who wrote on Ethiopia it was still the country of the Prester John. As the
legendary king was believed to have under him many kings, princes and dukes, Ethiopia was shaped to fit
the legend by being divided into several kingdoms, principalities and dukedoms."
61
Taye (Aleqa), Ye’Etyopia Hizb Tarik (Addis Ababa: St.George Press, 1914E.C). Hiruy Wolde-
Silassie(Bilaten Getta), Ye’ Etyopia Tarik Ke’Negist Saba Iske Talaqu Ye’Adwa Dil (Addis Ababa: Central
Printing Press,1999E.C). Tekle-Tsadiq Mekuria series from 1933 onwards.
62
Conti-Rossini and Enrico Cerulli notably.

24
the international experience of scholarship students, came an ideological heresy regarding

the history and destiny of the Ethiopian nation. The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM)

and the subsequent revolution completed and stamped this generational as well as ethno-

national conception of Ethiopian nationalism. With the fall of the ancien regime, intra-

generational ideological battles solidified among factions within a Marxist–Leninist

universe. This phase witnessed the maturity of nationalist discourse along center–
63
periphery, or core–periphery, oppressor–oppressed, north–south dichotomies.

Academically, the trends were captured by the likewise antithetical paradigms of ‘Greater

Ethiopia’–‘Abyssinian Core’ schools.

The modernist and ethno-symbolic approaches have respective merits in explaining the

history of nationalism in Ethiopia. The modernist focus on the role of the state is an

appropriate starting point in delineating nationalist phenomena both in the industrialized

and non-industrialized world. The delimitation of the study period is based on the

transformation of the state from a proto-nationalist to a nationalist phase as evidenced in

the structure and character of the government, the condition of the economy, and the

emergence of new socio-cultural forces. State consolidation and functional expansion is

the critical moment for the genesis of nationalism, because the state has a very powerful

role in defining and redefining what ethnic or nationality boundaries are. It is the state

which primarily establishes the framework for ethnic and nationality issues.64

63
Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution: 1974-1987. A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a
Totalitarian Autocracy (Cambridge University Press:1993/1995),pp. 180-181. Aregawi, “A Political
History,” pp.192-193.
64
Pierre L.Van den Berghe, “Ethnies and Nations: a Genealogy Indeed,” in Atsuko Ichijo & Gordana
Uzelac, When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005) ,p.121.

25
The integrationist views can be profitably combined to balance the two poles of the

nationalist phenomena: ‘official’ or state-based nationalism from above and its impacts

on social groups ‘below’. Official nationalism operates through the fear of ethnic

nationalisms as threats to state integrity.65 Thus at the heart of the history and politics of

nationalism resides a tension between the state’s concern for political stability and the

centrifugal quest for group-differentiated rights. The pattern of contact between the

central government and the peripheral cultures determines group formation. Therefore,

the state and its nationalism as expressed in official ideologies, institutions, policies and

legal provisions will be one major concern of this study.

Nationalities or ethnic groups are not, however, passive receptacles of everything from

above. As ethnic and social nationalists emerge as critics of the status quo, the study of

nationalism will remain incomplete without the study of opposition movements and

groups. The reason why ethnic communities should be among the basic social units on

which any analysis of nationalism is anchored is due to the profound interrelation and

continuity, though not identity, between nationalism and ethnicism.66 The ethnie is a

mediate social category between the individual and the state which has a direct relevance

to the issue of nationalism. In polyethnic societies such as Ethiopia, the manner people

perceive their communal identity and destiny has a bearing on the conception of the

larger national community.

In addition, ethnic groups have come to attain increasing significance as ultimate units of

differentiation and rivalry, whether expressed in political or cultural terms, particularly so

65
Kellas, Politics of Nationalism,p.53.
66
Smith, National Identity, p.40. Smith, “The Genealogy of Nations”,p.99. Liah Greenfield, Nationalism:
Five Roads to Modernity (USA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

26
in recent Ethiopian history. 67 They are the foci over which official nationalism and

ethnic nationalism converge in the battle to win the hearts and minds of the people. In

this struggle both the state and the intellectuals of ethnic groups regenerate and invent
68
national and sub-national ideologies, traditions, ceremonies and symbolisms.

Methodologically, the fact that ethnic groups are relatively durable than other social

categories such as class, denominational, professional and ideological associations makes

possible the analysis of change and continuity over longer periods. It also enables one to

assess and use the people’s own sources and their self-perception in the context of the

wider world and in time.

Originally, this study had set out to take five ethnic communities with varying patterns of

relations to the central government and various degrees of ethno-nationalist expressions:

Raya’na Azebo (Tigray), Awi-Agew(Amhara), Sidama (Southern Nations, Nationalities

and Peoples Region), Oromo(Wollega, Oromia), and Anywaa(Gambella). This was

intended to provide the regional dynamic and analyze transformations ‘from below’,

particularly cultural and political expressions of identity - naming, symbolism,

ceremonies, institutions, mythologies, etc - in the selected areas. Two major factors have

limited the scope of investigation in the regions: the partial or total destruction of the pre-

1991 archives and the severe financial and logistics constraints of the project. As a result,

except for GPNRS (Anywaa) and to some extent the ANRS (Awi-Agew), the major

source for the remaining groups is the former Ministry of Interior archives in the National

Archives and Library Agency. In one respect, regional and national archives replicate

each other and both reflect official views which could be used alternatively without

67
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism,p.178.
68
Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 1983/2000).

27
significant gaps in the study. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the attempt to

supplement the study with extensive primary sources, such as newspapers, of the period

could not entirely overcome the national orientation of the dissertation.

The civic–territorial state does not define its relations exclusively with ethnic groups,

unless/even if it is ethnically structured. This unavoidable state–citizen interaction brings

into picture another aspect of nationalism, ‘generational’ or ‘ideological’, especially

conceived in terms of reforming the state rather than destroying or dismembering it. This

supra-ethnic social nationalism is missing form most accounts of Ethiopian nationalism,

which either ignore it altogether or subsume it under official nationalism of the state.69

This study adopts the concept of ‘social nationalism’ as distinct from the official/civic

nationalism of the state as well as the ethnic/vernacular nationalism of particular ethno-

linguistic groups. It is intended to emphasize the socially inclusive characteristics of

nationalist ideologies and movements in Ethiopia between the two extremes, the state and

the ethnie.70

The ESM started as a reformist generational critique of the ancien regime but its

moderate position was lost in the overbearing radicalism of the late 1960s and early

1970s and its original social nationalism remained in low key. The cardinal question of

the movement was ‘the national question’ framed as a Marxist problematic and captured

in the terse query ‘who is an Ethiopian?’ This is essentially a sociological question,

which is intertwined with a more historical question of ‘when was Ethiopia?’ The

69
Merara Gudina, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms in Ethiopia and the Quest for Democracy (2003), for
example is confused how to account for what he calls “the South and the Ethiopian Left” in his faulty
scheme of “contending ethnic nationalisms” in Ethiopia.
70
Adopted from James Kellas excellent book, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London:
Macmillan,1991).

28
answers may be categorized into two broad antithetical camps: ‘Ethiopia always was’ and

‘Ethiopia never was’.71 The ambiguity about the concept of the nation, or more precisely,

who belongs to it and when did it emerge means that it is always hostage to conflicting

interpretations as this dissertation attempts to show.

Even though the Marxist generation (‘The Generation’) was consciously anti-historical,

thus ahistorical and un-Marxist, the attitude towards the nationalities question was

ultimately decided by the political fortunes of contending groups at every stage of the

struggle. It is only partly true that the defeat and disarray of the multiethnic cosmopolitan

left constituted the defeat of Ethiopiansim.72 In the heat of the ideological and military

battles between the Derg regime and sundry ethnic liberation movements, even the very

idea of ‘historic Ethiopia’ was readily rejected by the latter in preference to the more

bizarre and derogatory appellation ‘Abyssinia’. The seemingly innocuous nomenclature,

which now permeates the literature, has, however, its consequence particularly in

obfuscating the understanding of the phenomena of nationalism. That the very term

‘Abyssinia’ was at best the result of European misunderstanding or, at worst, a deliberate

ploy by the colonial mindset intended to underscore the ethnic cleavages hardly needs a
71
Yonas Admasu, Narrating Ethiopia: A Panorama of the National Imaginary (University of
California:1995), p.5, quoting Gwyn Williams on the illusiveness of the concept of the ‘nation’ wrote: “To
the question when was Wales, it is possible to return several answers. One could say, with a measure of
truth within narrow limits, that Wales never was. It is equally possible to say, with equal truth within
equally narrow limits, that Wales always was.” The ‘antiquity’ versus ‘invention’ debate has similarly given
rise to widely divergent chronology of Ethiopian nationhood, from those like Sisai Ibssa, Tesema Ta’a and
Dimma Nagoo who demarcate Ethiopia’s origin to the post-WWII international recognition of its name
instead of the previously preferred Abyssinia, through those like Edmond Keller who make it no more
than a century old nation, to the traditional 3,000 years, and even to the likes of Lapiso Delebo who push
it back to 10,000 years and in extreme cases as far as Luci! Keller, “Ethiopia:Revolution,” p.524. Dimma,
“Contested Legitimacy,” p.100. Tim Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Ababa and Local
Governance in Harar,ca 1900 to 1950,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: Michigan State University,2001), p.7.
72
The mushrooming of national liberation movements in Ethiopia is regarded by some as a direct
consequence of the defeat of the Revolution. Assafa Endeshaw, ETHIOPIA: Perspectives for Change and
Renewal (Singapore: Seng Lee Press,2002), p.39.

29
reminder. 73 The Abyssinian thesis has been effectively used to deny the pre-modern

history and continuity of Ethiopia.

Ethiopian nationalists and scholars seem to have roles in the ‘ethncization of the nation’

by unquestioningly adopting the term. This is too surprising since no Ethiopian of

whatever station of life ever called his country ‘Abyssinia’ or himself and his people

‘Abyssinian’ as far as historical records go, at least prior to the 20th century. 74 The

hegemonic ideological and military battles of the past half-century resulted in standing

fissures among Ethiopian scholars and politicians over the nature and manifestation of

nationalism and its place in the country’s history. Nevertheless, on the main point of

divergence, that is, on the ‘national identity’ of the Ethiopian polity and the appropriate

scholarly approach towards it, two main trends which parallel the civic–ethnic typologies

of nationalism theories are observed.

73
The denial of the very self-name of the country ‘Ethiopia’, or the stubborn and often racist preference
for ‘Abyssinia’, has been a carryover from that tradition of Orientalist-Semiticist scholarship. Ethiopians
have been consistently against Habasha(Arabic) or its corruption Abyssinia as early as the medieval
period. Michael Geddes, The Church History of Ethiopia (London: 1696), p.113, relates an interesting
incident: Tsega Zab asserts that "...Neither is he[the King] ever called , as Matthew falsly[sic] reported,
Emperor of the Habassins, but of the Ethiopians; for he[Mattehw] being an Armenian did not thoroughly
understand our affairs, and least of all those relating to our Faith..." The appellation Habesha was
popularized in Ethiopia only in the post-Italian period. Aregawi, “A Political History,” p.245, however,
curiously mentions that besides Ethiopians “another common name that includes many of the people in
the central north of Ethiopia is ‘Habesha’, and elderly Eritreans, along with their kin to the south, are
often proud to be called Habesha." Dimma, “Contested Legitimacy”, p.100fn:'Ethiopia has been known as
Abyssinia (Habash in Arabic) until it adopted the name Ethiopia after the Second World War, though the
name Ethiopia existed in religious texts, as it is also mentioned in the Bible. Popular Arabic references to
Ethiopia still use the name Habash." This is a willful blunder since the name Ethiopia was used by its
th
people since at least the 11 century, and alternately with Abyssinia by outsiders perhaps a little later
than this.

74
Sven Rubenson (ed.), Acta Aethiopica, vols. I, Correspondences and Treaties: 1800-1854(Addis Ababa:
AAU Press, 1987); II, Tewodros and His Contemporaries: 1855-1868(Addis Ababa: AAU Press, 1994); III,
Internal Rivalries and Foreign Threats(Addis Ababa: AAU Press, 2000).

30
What may be termed as the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ paradigm is the earlier trend which might

be ideologically traced to the initiation of national revival and reunification efforts of the

19th century. It underscores the civic–territorial conception of the nation and its historic

continuity.75 The point of departure for this approach is the recognition that within the

geopolitical unit termed ‘Ethiopia’ different peoples have been coexisting in various

degrees of interaction and isolation. 76 For Levine, Ethiopia is not yet a full-fledged

nation. It is rather an evolving system, a multinational polity with some coherence or

unity. Hence full understanding can be gained by approaching the matter from the

perspective of individualities as well as interactions with other groups and peoples.77 The

‘Greater Ethiopia’ view adopts a dynamic and multilinear conception of history with very

important implications for the treatment of the history of nationalism in Ethiopia. By

integrating history with social theory it broadens the scope of investigation, enables us to

see changes and continuities and the interplay among diverse factors over a long period.

75
It must be underscored that, in spite of the often misconstrued adjective ‘Greater’, this view does not
advocate Ethiopian ‘greatness’ and all scholars who consider the country as some form of ‘unified’ entity,
at least conceptually, do not subscribe to identical propositions regarding the characteristics of the unit
and its political and historical import. Cf. Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia (Trenton, NJ: 1994).
John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge University Press: 1987). Addis
Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London:1975). Mandi Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in
Revolution(New York: African Publishing, 1978). Getahun Delebo, “Emperor Menelik’s Ethiopia 1865-
1916: National Unification or Amhara Communal Domination,”(PhD Dissertation: Howard University,
1974).

76
This view was popularized by Donald Levine (1974) who attempted to overcome the limitations of the
three major approaches in the study of Ethiopian history– the Semitic past, the ethnographic present, and
the modernist future. By combining the Parsonian theory of ‘total societies’ and the theory of ‘social
evolution’ with a good deal of historical data he attempted to reconstruct the “image of Ethiopia as a
complex sociocultural system that has evolved through determinate stages”(p:25). Levine’s work still
remains unsurpassed both in terms of theory and insights.
77
Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia (1994),p.4, for instance, discredits the theory of “a ‘pure’
Oromo tribe derived from a single founding father…” He maintains that the history of the Oromo people is
not a mechanical and unilinear compilation of the story of disparate tribes which had been taking place in
absolute seclusion. What is more, the Oromo are not exogenous but “one of the indigenous peoples of
Ethiopia”(p:xiii). Teshale Tibebu,The Making of Modern Ethiopia:1896-1974 (The Red Sea Press:1995),p.xi.

31
The second school is what may be termed as the ‘Abyssinian Core’ paradigm, which

emerged as a critique to the state and the traditional conception of the nation. Writers

under this category are even less unified in their subscription to the ‘Abyssinian Core’

thesis.78 Mainly represented by ethno-nationalists, this view approaches the history of

modern Ethiopia and its nationalism from an ethnically-specific vantage point.

‘Abyssinia’, which is the main concept of analysis of nationalism, has been conceived in

its discontinuity, mutation, or separateness from modern Ethiopia. 79 This paradigm

generally calls attention towards certain ethno-cultural and historical factors in

characterizing the state and attempts to reflect ‘peripheral’ perspectives in the study of
80
nationalism in Ethiopia. By employing historical ethno-symbolism, this study

endeavors to show that the attempt to present Ethiopia as a self-serving ethnic project is

at variance with history, theory and empirical facts. It argues that though ethnicity and

ethnic groups are the normal makeup of the country, the Ethiopian nation or appropriately

rendered as ‘Bihere Etyopia’ has from its inception been a supra-ethnic ideal.

78
The view was first popularized by Edward Ullendorf from what Teshale terms as the ‘Orientalist
Semiticist’ school (p.xii) or Levine’s ‘Semiticist’ school (1974).
79
For Gebru Tareke (1991),p.206, modern Ethiopia is not the successor state of ‘Christian Abyssinia’
because the former is an ‘Amhara dominated state.’ Furthermore, ‘Amhara Ethiopia’ is an ‘empire-state’
while ‘Christian Abyssinia’ is a ‘Christian nation’. There is, therefore, a ‘discontinuity’ in the genealogy of
the state since Menelik II’s assumption of power. For Adhana Haile, “Mutation of Statehood and
Contemporary Politics,” in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang(eds), Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry,
Nationalism and Democracy (London: British Academic press, 1994),p25, the change is rather the
‘mutation’ of Ethiopian statehood due to the subjugation and ‘denationalization’ of the historic ‘state-
nation’ by Menelik towards “an empire-state, with northern Shawa alone occupying the status of state-
nationhood.”. In other words, all the predicaments of nationalism in contemporary Ethiopia have their
genesis since 1889.

80
The most prolific advocate of this view is what may be conveniently termed as the ‘colonial school’.
Disproportionately represented by hardliner Oromo nationalists and a few expatriate scholars, this view
argues that modern Ethiopia is an ‘invention’ of the ‘Abyssinian core’ or specifically ‘the Amhara-Tigre
coalition’, and that Ethiopians/ Abyssinians and other ‘Southern’ peoples have always been separate
historically, politically, and culturally. It follows that these two entities must be treated distinctly.

32
Works produced by scholars with an ethno-nationalist bent are mostly primordialist,

propagandist and outward looking, written as a ‘counter-discourse’ to a real or imagined

insult. There is either too exclusive concentration on the state or the alleged dominant

group in accounting for the entire predicament of nationalism in the country or in the

respective ethnic groups.81 The problem in this respect leaps from the ‘Shoan Amhara

elite’ to the ‘Amhara elite’ in general and imperceptibly to the entire Amhara group. The

Ethiopian-Abyssinian-Amharan-Shoan conflation and obfuscation (often deliberately

propagandist), a reflexive ethnic dichotomization, and ‘North-South’ territorialization

have been hurdles in the way of understanding nationalism in its multiple forms.82 Many

works miss out the pluses, the salutary aspects, of nationalism in their exclusive concern

with its ethnic and confrontational dimensions. This study attempts to reconstruct the

ideologies of ethno-nationalists by analyzing the ways they attempted to refashion the

cultural and historical resources of the respective ethnic groups. It also attempts to

address the positive and integrative aspects of nationalism in the economic, political and

social life of the nation.

Observers’ ideological, academic and cultural perspectives also impinge on nationalist as

well as specialist discourses. Many expatriate scholars tend to see nothing but a collection

of ethnic entities in Ethiopia, often precluding apriori any supra-ethnic bonds and

81
Assafa Jalata, “The Emergence of Oromo Nationalism and Ethiopian Discourse,” in Assafa Jalata(ed),
Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse. The Search For Freedom and Democracy (Trenton: The
Red Sea Press, 1998a),pp.1,21. Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,” p.130.

82
Andargachew, The Ethiopian, pp.14-16, rather creates four layers of antagonism at the center of which
are Shoans contended by Tigreans, Amharas, and Southerners. He contradicts himself by first noting that
Amhara is not an ethnic term and then claiming that the northern Amhara do not regard the Shoans as
part of their ethnic group. See also Aregawi, “A Political History,” pp. 57-58, 71. Teshale, The Making,
pp.38-39.

33
sentiments. From this they draw the inevitable conclusion that national and ethnic

ideologies are antithetical.83 However, pan-Ethiopian movements cannot be regarded in

toto as enemies of ethnic-nationalism. Ethiopianism in this study is intended to stand for

all ideologies and movements which aim to maintain the unity and integrity of the

Ethiopian state and nation. Ethiopianism in this sense, which loosely translates as

Etyopiawinet or Etyopiawi Bihertegnet, had been tentatively used during the student

movement.84 Ethiopianism and ethnicism are not merely two countervailing arguments

but also the dual constitutive elements of the history of nationalism. The matter should

not be perceived in zero-sum terms. Affective ties to the state, though variable among

ethnic groups, can coexist with ethno-national consciousness.85 It is in such continuous

dynamism that the history of nationalism in Ethiopia must be sought.

It is assumed in this study that all modern nations represent an uneasy confluence of a

more recent ‘civic’ and more ancient ‘genealogical’ mode of social and cultural

organization. The territorial as well as functional expansion of the Ethiopian state has

necessitated the absorption or integration of newer elements into the old national

framework. This, in itself difficult task for a transforming state, was compounded by

external influences, such as the Scramble for Africa and African decolonization, the

international waves of socialism and revolutions, the alignment in the Cold War, and the

83
Keller and Young are perhaps the most notorious, who write in the Evelyn Waugh style with little
sensitivity to Ethiopia’s internal situation. Keller, “Ethiopia: Revolution,” pp, 519-549. John Young, Peasant
Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991 (Cambridge University Press:
1997), p.89, considers nationalism as an atavistic movement, nevertheless, rather than 'revolt' or
'rebellion', he uses the more purposeful and respectable term 'revolution' in characterizing TPLF struggle.
He also seems credulous in using the 'Shoan Amhara' thesis as self-evident.
84
See, for example, Yohannes Woldegiorgis in Struggle, II, 1(December 1967) and, more elaborately,
Abdul Mejid Hussein in Struggle, III,1(January 1969).
85
Connor, Ethnonationalism, p.81

34
intransigent enmity of the Arab states.86 This study attempts to reconstruct the cultural

and ideological bases of Ethiopian national identity under the various regimes since 1941.

It also assesses the role external contexts played in the ebb and flow of nationalism in the

country.

A singular aspect of modern Ethiopian nationalist struggle and scholarship is its dogmatic

adherence to Leninist–Stalinist teachings.87 Most works of the period favor ‘materialist’

explanations based on the concepts of ‘class’ and ‘modes and relations of production’.

Stalin’s definition of the nation has been a veritable checklist which enjoyed ultimate

reverence in the public law of the nation.88 Many of the theories so advanced, such as

‘relative deprivation’, ‘competition for scarce resources’, ‘ethnic division of labor’, ‘role

of elites’, ‘internal colonialism’, are empirically and theoretically deficient. 89 Single

factor explanations fail to explain the phenomena satisfactorily as nationalism may reflect

86
Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,” pp.183,234, observes “global changes have had far more serious impact
on Ethiopia than any other African state.”
87
Andargachew, The Ethiopian,p.30, "On the whole, it appears that the students' appraisal of the internal
Ethiopian situation left something to be desired. Certainly, student papers made an attempt at analyzing
such questions as feudalism and national self-determination; more often than not, however, they were
mechanical applications of Marxist concepts in the Ethiopian context. The earlier generation of young
Ethiopian intellectuals (Japanizers) produced a more objective and original literature of their period than
did the leftist radicals of the 1960s of theirs. It appears that the ESM was gripped more by an external
ideology than by the immediate circumstances which it was hard put to try and recast in the Marxian
mould." Aregawi, “A Political History,” p63: "Although a class-based ideological orientation was prevalent
among the student body, ethno-national mobilization was an additional and concomitant ideological
stance in the students’ movement.”

88
Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (1913), p.8. FDRE
Constitution,1994/1995.
89
Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,” p.103:“Though both the Christian Kingdom and the Moslem principalities
were historically multiethnic, the dominant form of struggle was always religious. The Oromo factor not
only relegated that form of struggle to a secondary one, but introduced a new form of struggle, what later
became known as the national question; in other words the rivalry and struggle between national
groups."

35
peoples’ desire for security, economic prosperity, as well as meaning. Hence, any

analysis must integrate the political, economic and cultural reasons for nationalism.

This study interrogates some of the core theses of nationalist politicians and

Ethiopianists, namely that ethno-nationalism in Ethiopia was engendered by “national

oppression”; that there is a homogeneous, an unchanged and unchanging national core;

that all ethnic groups outside the so-called ‘Abyssinian core’ per se are antagonistic to the

Ethiopian idea. 90 Merara claims that the southern vision of “unity in diversity in a

democratized Ethiopia” is something of an anomaly in Ethiopian national politics. The

southern region, where national oppression was believed to have been severe and even

compounded by class differences, had remained less confrontational to the state until the

collapse of the military regime. This study attempts to show that where such resistances

occurred in Ogaden and Bale they were mainly driven by external factors. If the ‘center-

south’ was a special object of ‘Shoan Amhara’ inequities, then why was the feeling of

alienation and resistance apparently more intense in the north? And more important, why

did not the south uniformly advance the ‘colonial’ thesis? Conversely, the ethnocentric

rigidity has prevented some students from explaining the very different views among

pan-Ethiopianists, and even in accounting for the intensity of ethno-nationalism within

the alleged core.91

90
This cannot be so because groups often decide their political loyalties pragmatically as seen in Belete
Bizuneh, “An agrarian Polity and its Pastoral Periphery: State and Pastoralism in the Borana Borderlands
(Southern Ethiopia),1897-1991,” ( Ph.D. Dissertation: Boston University,2008), p.153, showing the
Borana’s constant support for the Ethiopian state while the Somali and the Muslims of Arsi in the post-
Italian period were mobilizing anti-Amhara sentiment.
91
Keller, “Ethiopia: Revolution,” p.524(fn): "Amharization is a term which is well known and much used
among Ethiopianists. It merely refers to the acceptance of Amhara culture and custom by non-Amharas.
This process is facilitated through education, language, the Coptic religion and the taking of Amhara

36
Another serious pitfall in accounting for the genesis and manifestation of nationalism,

either from a historical or other perspective, from one or another paradigm, is the

arbitrary use of terms, concepts and typology.92 Many students of Ethiopian history have

characterized Ethiopian nationalism as ‘war nationalism’.93 This, while understandable, is

extreme reductionism which deems the phenomenon to be even narrower than patriotism.

Another loophole in nationalist literature is lack of sense of historical time, a telescoping

timelessness and anachronism. 94 Despite claims to impeccable scholarship, ethno-

nationalist ‘historians’ and ideologues seldom worried about critical methodological

approaches to source material or the substantive truth of historical legends. 95 Present

categories are projected backwards and past political orders are arbitrarily regarded as

precursors of nations to come. There is also an undue concern on the politics and

Christian names." Ethno-nationalists have two conspicuous silences: One is regarding the prevalent
presence of Oromo elites in the construction of modern Ethiopia. Menelik’s nomination as heir apparent
of Iyassu, with a Muslim and Oromo background, is something unimaginable and inimitable even in a
secularized and ‘democratic’ Ethiopia. The other similar silence is regarding the predominant and
pioneering role of 'Amhara' elite in the opposition of the imperial as well as the military regime.

92
I.M.Lewis, “Pre- and Post-colonial Forms of Polity in Africa,” in I.M.Lewis(ed), Nationalism and Self-
determination in the Horn of Africa (London: Ithaca Press, 1983),p.75, considers this in part a consequence
of the “almost overnight” transmutation of ‘tribes’ into nations, encouraging a wanton abuse of ‘nation’
as a status expression rather than a social category.
93
Teshale, The Making of (1995). Clapham, “Ethiopia and the Challenge,”(2004).
94
Merara, Competing Ethnic (2003) argues that Menelik’s conception of the Shoan Oromo elite was made
‘’on unequal basis”. What kind of equality, one might ask? Merara answers ‘proportional to their
numbers’! This is a glaring anachronism since democracy is the only political system based on ‘numbers’.
His assertion regarding the “vulnerability of the Yejju Oromo elite” in the power struggles of the Zemene
Mesafint likewise considers the rivalry as among the masses of the people rather than the politically
relevant classes. For all practical purposes Ethiopian political tradition has proved capable of
accommodating all kinds of contingencies – of blood, creed and region.

95
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” pp.8,9, deplores the "methodological naiveté” of the
counter-discourse, prominently of the Sisai-Holcomb and Assefa Jalata types, most of which are based on
secondary or tertiary literatures. Most others also fall in the same pits of Ethiopian historiography: a
progressive but hapless Iyassu; poor Tewodros who left to his name nothing except a worthless cannon;
Menelik the villain par excellence; Hailesilassie the epitome of evil and conspiracy, etc.

37
ideology of nationalism rather than on underlying cultural and historical processes; a bias

for normative rather than analytical aspects.

By employing a balanced interdisciplinary approach, combining historical and

sociological methodologies and concepts, this research intends to overcome the

limitations of ideological and disciplinarian straitjackets, unsubstantiated theorization and

dogmatic empiricism. Generally, it is assumed in this study that nationalism is a

reflection of historical dynamics and hence is not allied permanently to any social class or

single ideology. It may be constructive of new states or destructive of existing ones; it

may protect or destroy freedom, or it may be pacific or belligerent, exclusive or inclusive,

constitutional or unconstitutional, etc. The only dependable way to ascertain the nature

and characteristics of nationalism(s) in a given country is through a dialectic treatment

showing how it arises and evolves under particular contexts.96

Most scholars concede that national awakening originally emanates from a minority

social group, usually a disaffected or ambitious intelligentsia. However, it can take hold

among the broad masses through the vehicle of communication and social change.

Hroch(also Deutsch though not so articulately) has identified three stages in national

awakening among Western societies. The initial one is the time of inward looking or

reflection in which philological and historical investigations are aimed at digging into the

roots of the cultural community. The next stage is usually a longer period of fermentation

in which politicization of language, history and culture take root. The final stage

culminates in the awakening of the broad masses into the ‘reality’ of the nation.97 This

96
Kellas , Politics of Nationalism, p.33. Alter, Nationalism, pp. 47,48.
97
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.175. Alter, Nationalism, p.56.

38
study attempts to identify the various social groups involved in the civic, social and

ethnic nationalist struggles and reconstruct the processes in the history of nationalism in

Ethiopia.

In engineering the awakening process, nationalists employ various instruments. They

make plenty of promises. Nationalism abounds with promises couched in such slogans as

‘Through Unity to Freedom!’ This may be freedom from real or perceived crisis or ills;

emancipation from etatism, or more positive promises for personal development and an

active role in national community. They employ symbols appropriated from the cultural

and social resources of the group, artifacts such as flag, anthem, map, the tomb or

monument of the Unknown Soldier, etc, to personify various aspects of the nation.

Nationalists also establish cultural and political bodies of various sizes and degrees of

cohesion. While culture represents the totality of man’s life, only some features of it are

singled out and defined as crucial in boundary processes. Much of the rest, including

national history, is deemed as ‘invention’ and ‘annexation’.98

In arguing the fluidity of cultures and boundaries, the imaginedness of nations, and the

inventedness of traditions, however, we have to heed Smith’s warning about the danger

of overstatement. Nationalists do not simply fabricate their ideology, though a lot of

imaginativeness and creativity is involved. They rather build it on some pre-existing

cultural and historical material. In other words, nations cannot be created or invented ex

98
Hobsbawm in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Traditio,p.1, defines invented
tradition as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of ritual or
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which
automatically implies continuity with the past.” One of the outstanding instances of recent recreation of
heroes is that of Blatta Hailemariam Redda, a man who was even recruited by the Derg to suppress what
later became known as “the second Weyanne”, ironically he is being promoted as the founder of the “first
Weyanne”. Gebru Tareke, “Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia: the Case of the Weyanne,” The Journal of
African History, 25(1), (Cambridge University Press:1984),p.80.

39
nihilo. However, national identity may be submerged by the vagaries of history and may

have to be recreated by an active intelligentsia in the modern period.99 Historical ethno-

symbolism becomes useful in analyzing such cultural and historical resources and

symbols over time.

Nationalist movements can be identified according to their basic strategies. Some pursue

their aims overtly, advertizing themselves and sensitizing target groups. Others are more

covert and conduct underground and conspiratorial activities. Nationalist movements may

also be constitutional or reformist, struggling within the available legal framework and

advocating moderate reforms. Others may be revolutionary or radical in their demands,

often calling for independent statehood. In most cases, nationalists do not stop at

regenerating and elevating their nationality, but they take a negative and combative

stance against an imagined or real ‘Other’, often conceived in ethnocentric or racist

terms.100

As Greenfield noted, ethnic nationalism is often “inspired by a sense of collective

inferiority and resentment against societies (or social groups) perceived to be morally and

99
Day and Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism, p.63.
100
Aregawi, “A Political History,” p.201, relates about the systematic encouragement of anti-Amhara
sentiment within the TPLF and even in the post-Derg period. He accuses TPLF-affiliated writers such as
John Young (1999) of complicity and deliberate credulity, p.200(fn). Tim Carmichael, “Bureaucratic
Literacy, Oral Testimonies, and the Study of Twentieth-century Ethiopian History,” Journal of African
Cultural Studies , 18(1),(2006), pp.23-42, relates of the intensity of the anti-Amhara propaganda circulated
by government owned media in the early and mid-1990s and compares this with the anti-Jewish
propaganda in the Middle East.

40
culturally superior...”101 This becomes potentially dangerous because it feeds upon the

atavistic sentiments of the people. Merara considers the modern elite as “the catalyst for

the rise of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia.”102 This is a valid point. The study attempts to

assess how reflective of Ethiopian realities was the nationalist struggle, or how far it was

a turf war between disaffected intelligentsia of the various ethnic groups. It also takes

into account the stereotyping and counter-stereotyping involved in the rival ideologies,

the perception of the Ethiopian state, and the definition of nationalist groups in

contradistinction to the Ethiopian-Abyssinian-Amharan obfuscation and conflation.103

Therefore, the main areas of focus of this dissertation will be the economic, political,

ideological and cultural aspects of nationalism, horizontally and vertically, at national

and sub-national levels, of the ‘center’ and ‘periphery’, and at the level of various social

groups and classes. Structural, institutional, legal, and policy dimensions specifically

pertaining to nationalist aims will be addressed. This study also draws a distinction

between ‘nationalist politics or nationalism’ and the whole gamut of ‘national politics’.

101
Liah Greenfield, “Democracy, ethnic diversity and nationalism,” in Kjell Goldman, Ulf Hannerz and
Charles Westin(eds), Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Routledge,
2000),pp.34.
102
Lovise Aalen, “Institutionalizing the Politics of Ethnicity. Actors, Power and Mobilization in Southern
Ethiopia Under Ethnic Federalism,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Oslo, 2007), p.47: "By taking over the
ethnic agenda, the EPRDF has been able to keep other key issues out of the political limelight."
103
Noted leaders of the ethno-nationalist struggle seem to be confused and reassessing their views on
the matter. Aregawi, “A Poltical History,” for example writes that the struggle of Tigray people had
genuine grievances, both historical and existing(pp.50-51); he also seems to regard this more as ethno-
symbolic rivalry between the Tigre and Shoa ruling houses(pp.56-57); and again as a deliberate maneuver
of the modern elite. He also deplores, p.250, "True, as Tesfatsion Medhanie (2007: 132-133) wrote
‘History has been badly abused in the course of the liberation struggle. It has not merely been
misconstrued, but has also become the subject of fraudulent discourse’." Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,”
p.221, also notes: “The ethnicization of politics and the politicization of ethnicity, besides igniting or
reigniting inter-communal conflicts in many parts of the country, satisfied neither national groups
demanding greater rights and a fair say in the affairs of the state, nor those who believe in the unitary
conception of Ethiopian identity and the state."

41
Carmichael observes: "What is needed now is less re-interpretation at the national level

and more work in the provinces, work that will generate data and ideas that can be used

to reinvigorate or recast the nationalist debates."104 This dissertation is an attempt to rise

to that challenge and to show that an extensive quarrying of data and reinterpretation are

integral to each other.

The remaining body of this dissertation is structured into five chapters dealing with the

pre-national background to Ethiopian nationalism, the genesis of modern Ethiopianism,

the genesis of ethno-nationalisms in the country, the era of socialist nationalism and the

era of ethnic nationalism. The first chapter gives a historical background covering the

period prior to 1941, which is regarded in this study as a proto-nationalist or formative

phase of Ethiopian nationalism. Though the 19th century is still regarded as the time of

the birth of the modern nation-state, the historical, cultural and ideological roots of the

nation are traceable back to the mists of antiquity. In this chapter, changes and

continuities of the mythology, symbolism and memory of the Ethiopian nation are traced.

Simultaneous semantic evolution in the conception of the nation, its dialectics with the

state, the people and the social and territorial boundaries of the nation, and the concept of

citizenship will be analyzed. Hence the analysis of ethno-symbolic elements over this

long expanse of time will be invaluable in reconstructing the proto-nationalist ideology

and the layers of the historic nation.

The second chapter begins by a reconstruction of the interethnic situation up to and

including the Italian period. The post-1941 period is assumed in this study to be the era of

104
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” p.9.

42
modern nationalism in the country. Thus, chapter two deals with the process of rebirth of

the Ethiopian nation-state, especially attempts of the restored monarchy to fashion a

rejuvenating ideology from the values of the historic nation as well as the challenges and

opportunities of the new post-war contexts. It outlines the civic–ethnic duality of

renascent Ethiopianism; the state’s efforts in practicing an evolving nationalism,

disseminating the core ideals, memories, values and culture of the historic nation; and the

legal and institutional frameworks in this endeavor. Here attempts will also be made to

relate the economic, political and cultural contexts with the emergence of new social

relations and classes and their role in expanding and modernizing the national idea and

community.

The third chapter deals with the emergence of a generational and ethnic critique of the

traditional nation and the evolution of social and ethno-nationalisms. The ESM was the

ideological womb of both the social and ethnic varieties of nationalism. Here attempts

will be made to reconstruct student ideology during the imperial period, the internal and

external resources and contexts for its fatal bifurcation. Moreover, analysis will be made

at societal level how popular local resistance and articulation of ethnicity, cultural and

religious expressions of opposition found early institutional expressions through self-help

associations and other informal bodies. The chapter will also assess the imperial state’s

attitude toward this burgeoning ethno-nationalism; and the place of the nationalities issue

in the Ethiopian Revolution.

The fourth chapter is concerned with the period of the military regime or the Derg (1974-

1991) and its attempts at redefining the nation-state and socializing it among the broad

masses. This involved emphasizing the ‘civic’ nation, the inviolability of its national

43
territory, the regime’s attempts at handling the vexed issue of nationalities and

citizenship, and refashioning national values and symbols along socialist lines. Analysis

will also be made of the ideological and structural underpinnings of socialist

Ethiopianism: political socialization, initiating the masses into membership of the nation;

the role of public education; the mass media, legal and institutional frameworks to

accommodate the nationalities demands.

Chapter four also analyzes the nationalities struggle and its articulation: contesting the

Ethiopian idea, delineating the ‘question’, transformations from reformist to combative

nationalisms, and ideologies of justifying the war of ‘liberation’. There will also be

concern on strategies of ethno-nationalist groups at mobilizing the ethnic community: the

cultural and ethno-symbolic ways of articulating opposition; the uses and abuses of the

past; forms of organization and struggle, and the dissemination of ethno-national

ideologies among the respective masses. Assessment will also be made of the varying

ethno-regional outcomes and the role of external factors in the ultimate outcome of the

nationalities wars.

The fifth chapter deals with the EPRDF period (1991-2012), the heyday of ethno-

nationalism, and documents the place of social nationalism in the new equilibrium. It

considers how the new regime attempted to resolve the nationalities question: redefining

the nation-state into a multi-national state, nationalism without national identity; the

translation of military victory into legal and political structures, and the ideological and

political rationale. It also assesses the transformation of ethnic nationalism into an

ideological tunnel of linguistic nationalism and linguism, or ‘billboard nationalism’; and

the accompanying proliferation of ethnic entrepreneurs; the legal and institutional

44
frameworks. It pays attention to the ethno-symbolic processes of reinventing or inventing

ethnic nations: mobilization of ethnic communities into nationhood; re/inventing history,

myth, memory, culture, even language and names; defining homelands.

Another major concern of the fifth chapter is the gradual reorganization of supra-ethnic

ideologies and resurgence of Ethiopianism as a critique of the ethnic-nation. It deals with

the ethnocratic nature of the state and the denouement of zero-sum politics; the

realignment of forces and widening the bases for countering ‘ethnonationalism’; forms of

the pan-Ethiopian ideology and struggle; the social classes and groups involved; and

grassroots or popular expressions of pan-Ethiopianism. It also deals with the internal and

external contexts which led to the reformation of official nationalism toward instrumental

Ethiopianism: threats to the state’s power and integrity; regional wars and geopolitics; the

problem of rising expectations, proliferation of ethnic demands and conflicts; and the

selective reaffirmation of Ethiopianism.

The last part of the dissertation constitutes concluding remarks on changes and

continuities in the politics, ideology, culture and symbolism of the history of nationalism

in Ethiopia over the past century. Some of the cardinal theories and thoughts on the issue

will be evaluated. Have the nationalist struggles and ideologies expanded and found new

inclusive bases of Ethiopianism, or have they remained fossilized behind the pragmatic

and opportunistic rhetoric of factional interests? Official, social and ethnic nationalisms

will be reconsidered here, and closing reflections on the vexed question of “who is an

Ethiopian?”

45
 CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO HISTORIC ETHIOPIA

“Too sharp a repudiation of the aristocratic-clerical past may destroy Ethiopia’s raison

d’etre if the borders are not to be redrawn.”1

When does the Ethiopian nation come into existence? Who are members of the nation?

What does the name Ethiopia signify to different peoples? Is ‘historic Ethiopia’ an

appropriate designation? What is the exact relationship between historic and modern

Ethiopia? These questions underline that perhaps the central issue in our understanding of

nationalism is the role of the past in the creation of the present. The challenge for

scholars as well as nations is to present the relationship of the pre-national past to modern

nations more accurately and convincingly. In this continually renewed interface between

the past and the nationalist present lies the secret of the nation’s lifeblood which

nourishes it through the vagaries of history.2

The main concern of this chapter is, therefore, the nature and variety of the historical,

cultural and symbolic elements in the formation and persistence of the Ethiopian nation,

and their social and institutional linkages with prior ethnies, their traditions and

sentiments. To this end, it is first necessary to identify the historic nation’s conception of

itself via its ideologies, myths, memories, social organizations and belief systems. The

claim that a sense of continuity and belonging to the historic nation was shared by a large

1
Smith, National Identity, p.105. Smith is the most perceptive of nationalism theorists regarding the
genesis and evolution of Ethiopian nationhood.
2
Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations,” Nations and
Nationalism, I,1(1994),pp.18-19.

46
cross-section of Ethiopians is central to the arguments of this chapter. I endeavor to show

that in pre-modern Ethiopia state-making, wars, the threat of invasion (both military and

ideological), and the fusion of religious and national interests have generated enduring

and widespread national consciousness. The state and, more importantly, the ‘national’

church had also made vital contributions towards promoting and sustaining such evolving

national identity.3

1.1 The Evolution of Historic Ethiopia

Ethiopia is neither eternal nor invented. A nation is a large social group integrated not by

one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political,

linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical) and their subjective reflection in

collective consciousness.4 The most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism is, however,

“the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity.”5 This is

what is otherwise called the ‘historic nation’. It is that identification with thousands of

years of recorded and uninterrupted statehood and its institutional and cultural legacy that

we call historic Ethiopia. A foundation which is provided by the traditions and memories

3
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” p.7. Critiquing of the Greater Ethiopia approach generally,
and specifically of Marcus, he reiterates the conventional observation: "...Nevertheless, its central
hypothesis about Ethiopia's historical continuity remains unproven, and the quest to unite the historical
myths of Ethiopia's ruling classes and present-day nationalists upon empirical ground remains unfulfilled."
What kind of proof does the author have in mind? Ethiopia’s historical continuity is relatively well
documented and shouldn’t be needing proof in the first place. As to national mythologies, what really
matters is the symbolic rather than the empirical.
4
Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in
Europe,” in Balakrishnan Gopal(ed), Mapping the Nation (New York and London:Verso,1996),p.79.
5
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism,p.73.

47
of ancient and medieval Ethiopia has evolved into the national culture of modern

Ethiopia and it has been vital for its survival.6

A number of authorities on nationalism have pointed out striking parallels between nation

formation in Ethiopia and classical nationalism in Europe. The similarities range from the

paths taken towards nation formation, the civic – territorial nature of the nation, the

process of self-definition, social organization and other particulars. Smith identifies two

broad types of ethnie, ‘lateral’ and ‘vertical’, and respectively two paths of nation

formation, ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘demotic’. In the case of lateral or aristocratic ethnie, which

Smith attributes mainly to Western Europe, the nation emerged as a result of gradual

transformation in administrative /military, economic and cultural spheres of life. It is the

state controlled by a ruling aristocracy which forged the nation. In this model, found

outside Europe in a few countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, Burma and Ethiopia, the

culture of a core group served as the basis of the new national identity and community

“especially where the culture in question can claim to be ‘historic’ and ‘living’ among the

core community.”7 While this generally holds true for the genesis of modern Ethiopia, a

6
Clapham, “Ethiopia and the Challenge,” p.55:"There are nonetheless roots to Ethiopian nationalism that
run deeper than those of African states that owe their origins to colonialism. There is a real sense of
history, and a pride in Ethiopia’s past, that is not solely the preserve of a single group. A national culture
has indeed developed, of which the near-universal use of the Amharic language as a lingua franca is the
most obvious expression." Perhaps the only thing Amharan in what is often cited as ‘Amharaization’ is
Amharic language. See Keller, “Ethiopia: Revolution,” p.504. Holcomb and Sisai’s book The Invention of
Ethiopia(1990) is a highly polemical and propagandist text. Its title is intended to convey the social
constructionist position on the matter. Day and Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism, p.10.
7
Gellner, Nations, pp.81-82, is representative of the general tenor of this argument: “[T]he Horn of Africa
is also the area with the best examples of what may be called classical nationalisms.” In this region “the
Amharas and the Somalis possessed both gun and Book...”and used these cultural equipments in state-
formation. “[T]he Amharas created in Ethiopia the one really convincing African specimen of feudalism, a
lose empire with local territorial power-holders, linked to a national Church.“ Smith, National Identity,
p.55, also notes: “A few aristocratic ethnies managed to retain their identity for many centuries, even
millennia, partly through strict adherence to distinctive forms of religion, but also through the inclusion
within their political boundaries of other ethnic groups and by a limited diffusion of their religious culture
down the social scale. The efforts of the Amhara kings of the medieval ‘Solomonic’ dynasty to incorporate

48
closer look at earlier nation formation discloses that the parallels cannot be stretched

beyond a few superficial similarities.

Self-definition is the starting point in the formation as well as in the analysis of historic

Ethiopia. It refers to a growing sense of identity in a population, including self-naming

and naming by others, which gradually delimits the group’s boundary and reveals to the

members a progressive understanding of ‘who they are’.8 A nation, as we have noted

above, is constituted primarily by subjective “self-definition of a people with a group –

its past, its present, and, what is most important, its destiny.” 9 The historic nation

Etyopia, whose very self-name is shrouded in mystery, is defined as biher (a Geez

equivalent to nation), and fully rendered as Bihere Etyopia.10 This concept of the historic

nation embodies the fundamentals of its self-perception, of being a descent community, a

culturally and politically unified nation among nations, endowed with its own unique

territory, history, civilization and statehood.

The Kibre Negest (Glory of Kings) being the most coherent exposition or ‘the founding

charter’ of historic Ethiopia, it outlines the origin, identity, sovereignty and destiny of the

outlying regions and lower strata into their Monophysite ethnic culture met with only partial success, but
was enough to ensure their own survival in the face of Muslim onslaughts and subsequent European
encroachments, at least in their heartlands.”
8
Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp.103, 104: “While an ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined, the
nation must be self-defined.”
9
The attempt to define an ethnic group by means of objective cultural or other traits is futile. For
instance, who are the Tigrians(or Amharas, Oromos, Gurages,etc)? This cannot be clearly delimited either
by means of language, which is a common characteristic of Eritreans, or religion, or even territory, etc.
This is why anthropologists regard ethnicity as an "emic category of ascription": Eriksen, Nationalism and
Ethnicity,p.12. Connor, Ibid.,p.4. Yonas Admasu, Narrating Ethiopia, p.10.
10
Gedes, A Church History, p.1, claims that Abassia, or Ethiopia Alta, or Ethiopia super Egyptum are all the
same. He also notes, p.7:"There is a great mixture of People in Habassia, from which the Countrey[sic] is
said by some to have had its Name."

49
national community. The Kibre Negest makes the first clear expression of Ethiopian

nationhood. Its reference to Bihere Etyopia, which translates as the ‘Ethiopian nation’,

has striking semantic similarity with the concept of natio in the Western nations. The

term ‘biher’ originally referred to place of birth or descent; in the Kibre Negest it attained

wider significance by variously standing for the nation, its people, the country and the

state. Most references to Ethiopia in the document are prefixed by the term ‘bihere’ and

less often by ‘hagere’ and ‘hizbe’, alternately denoting an identity between the state, its

territory and even its people as one whole. The grand mythology of the document is

engaged in the recreation of a national community by bonding these core elements. The

Kibre Negest states in unmistakable terms that Ethiopians were the children of Kam; a

black race; backward; and a race destined to enslavement. It is only through the advent of

the elder sons of the Israelites accompanying Menelik I that Ethiopia, or better its ruling

aristocracy, attained a Semitic pedigree. This was, however, extended to the whole nation

through a political and cultural bond between sovereign and subject.

The Kibre Negest is, however, an abbreviated statement of long processes of historical

development rather than merely the beginning of a new one. Its mytho-history integrates

supposedly key memories and events within the secular and spiritual concerns of the

nation. The value of this document lies not in its empirical and chronological precision

but in its depiction of the history and mythology of the nation in easily memorable

tableaux. It is appropriate, for obvious empirical and theoretical reasons, to delimit the

origin of historic Ethiopia to the Aksumite period. It scarcely matters whether there was a

pre-Christian Aksum or pre-Aksumite states. What matters most is that the national

imaginary traces an uninterrupted historical continuity from here. The Aksum of popular

50
memory is removed from that of the history books by a thousand years. In this apparently

‘unscientific’ claim lies the antiquity of historic Ethiopia.11

It is in Aksum that pagan and Christian Ethiopia blend; in Aksum that Ham and Shem

rejoin; that the nation, Bihere Etyopia, is born as God’s chosen, or ‘God’s first born’. 12 It

is also by virtue of their filiations to the scions of Solomon and Sadoq or, more properly,

to the Aksumites Menelik I and Azarias that the institutions of the monarchy and the

church draw their legitimacy. It is on this divine intervention in the creation of Bihere

Etyopia that the entire socio-political edifice of a nation is erected. The supra-ethnic

character of historic Ethiopia is founded in this identification with a cultural and

ideological descent of the community. 13 In a word, Aksum is the birthplace of the

Ethiopian nation, the origin of its civilization and its spiritual navel. But Aksum is not the

11
There is a readiness among students of Ethiopian history to dismiss out of hand this mythology as
falsehood and fabrication, which misses its significance in the national history. Yonas Admasu in Narrating
Ethiopia, pp.46-47, contends: “The validity of such national narratives as the Kebra – Nagast lies not in
their correspondence to objective truth(historical truth) but , as Soyinka aptly observes, in their
‘fulfillment of one of the social functions of literature: the visionary reconstruction of the past for the
purpose of social direction’, one fundamental functions attaching to myths in general.”
12
This expression is borrowed from Liah Greenfield’s account of English nationalism, ‘God’s First Born:
England’ in her superb book Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (1992), p.44. I think it is equally or even
more appropriately applicable to Ethiopia.
13
Wudu Tafete, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian State, and the Alexandrian See:
Indigenizing the Episcopasy and Forging National Identity, 1926-1991,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champain, 2006), p.7, regards the transfer of the Ark of the Covenant from Solomon's
temple to Aksum Seyon church as a key symbolic element in this 'invention of tradition'. "Because of this
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians claim that they are God's chosen people. The concept of the chosen people
has been appropriated to strengthen the political state." The tradition also "gives a divine origin to
Ethiopian kings" and therefore its "principal objective" was “to give political legitimacy to the 'Solomonic
dynasty'..." Like most other observers Wudu fails to underscore the 'national' dimension of this very
tradition by elevating not only the kings but also the clergy and the 'people of Ethiopia', and binding them
in history and destiny. The genealogical tradition was an offshoot of this myth of national origin. Wudu
uses religious nationalism in the narrow sense of the Ethiopian Church's struggle to achieve independence
from the Alexandrian See(Chapter II). In that sense he traces the historical roots of religious nationalism
from king Harbe and Lalibela of the Zagwe, (pp.28-29), Amde Seyon and Zera Yaqob of the Solomonic
kings(pp.29-30).

51
nation; it is not even the name of the historic nation! It is the sanctuary of the defining

symbol of historic Ethiopia, the Ark of the Covenant or the Tabernacle of Zion. If the

celebration of the three-thousandth anniversary of the advent of the Tsilate Musse (held

on 26th January 2009) looks somewhat out of touch, this is but the way of nationhood!

Nevertheless, the earliest extant material evidence regarding the tentative adoption of the

name ‘Etyopia’ by the Aksumites to denote themselves and their country dates back to

the mid 4th century AD. This was the famous inscription of Ezana on which “...the Greek

translation uses the term Ethiopia to describe the country of the Aksumites where as the
14
Geez translation is Habashat.” This important event is coterminous with the

introduction of Christianity to Aksum as well as the full vocalization of Geez. The

identity of the nation was internalized in the subsequent centuries through these two

cultural milestones so that, according to Tekeste, by the 6th century the Aksumites could

be safely called Ethiopians.15 Besides the birth of a self-identified nation called Ethiopia,

its personality was materialized by outlining its territorial extension in deliberately vague

but nodal strategic, rather than geographical, references. The Kibre Negest locates

Ethiopia somewhere south of Israel and the Gaza. During the medieval period, the

political boundary of Ethiopia had been elastic depending on the fortunes of the state, at

its widest extending to its present size (including Eritrea) and at its smallest shrinking to

the northern and central highlands.16 Nevertheless, these gains and losses had been made

14
Tekeste Negash, “Ethiopic Script: A brief history of its origin and impact,”(forthcoming in Scripts
Mundu, UNESCO), p.3. I am indebted to Professor Tekeste for drawing my attention to this earlier period.
15
Ibid., p.9.
16
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.86. Hiruy Wolde-Silassie’s Ye Ethiopia Tarik (1999EC) begins the
narrative exactly 1013 years before Christ, from the reign of the ‘Queen of Saba’ who apparently had no
known proper name. Saba, he contends, is a place near the current site of Aksum. The queen’s empire
included Yemen in Arabia and stretched “in the east up to Madagascar, in the north and west up to Egypt

52
a part of the national memory and kept alive a spirit of reconquista. In later times,

Ethiopian sovereigns claimed territories ‘between the seas’ as lost to the empire

sometime in the past.

It was perhaps during the medieval period that the superlative expression of the nation,

‘Tallaqitwa Etyopia’ (Greater Ethiopia), appeared as combining its civilizational

superiority, glory of the state and extent of its territory. Ethiopia is then no mere

geographical expression but a homeland, a reservoir of national memories.17 The national

territory is not only defined but also revered and bestowed upon sacrality. This

historicization of territory and naturalization of history is reflected in the poems, stories,

arts, settlement patterns and nomenclatures of the nation. As ‘enat hager’(Mother Land)

Ethiopia becomes the ultimate source of life and identified with Mother Nature herself.

The Debir becomes in historic Ethiopia not only a site of monasticism, like numerous

sites between Debre Bizen and Debre Libanos, but also a sanctuary of Ethiopian religious

pride and identity. The Amba is likewise more than a mere place of settlement,

confinement and defense. It is a connective between nativity and nationality, a means of

territorializing memories. Historic Ethiopia is a ‘natioscape’.18

and Nubian border, in the south to what is today called Lake Victoria, Nianza”p.11. Yonas, “Narrating
Ethiopia,” p.22, rightly observes: “...the modern political concept of territory stands (primarily , one might
even venture to say) as a metaphor of ‘identity’, as a figure for marking-off of one community (or nation)
from another. This function of territory...as symbolizing the identity of a given nation viewed to be
distinct from that of another is what is essential to the project of narrating the nation”.
17
Geddes, A Church History, p.70, mentions that Ethiopia was also called the ‘Great and High Ethiopia’.
Also Bilata Gebre-Egziabher’s letter to Emperor Menelik (1889EC), quoted in Shumet Sishagn, ‘Ye Eritrea
Hizboch Yandinet Tigil’, Wiyiyit(Amharic), vol.I,No.2(Addis Ababa: Nehassie 1984),p.1.
18
I have adapted this expression from Steven Grosby’s ‘ethnoscape’. The author argues that memory is
territorialized “by historicizing nature and making it part of the development of the ethnic community.”
What then emerges is an ‘ethnoscape’ in which “a people has its land and a land its people,” Steven
Grosby, (1991), p.240.

53
National identity is a form of life which is daily lived. In fact, due to its socio-cultural

bases it is a total way of life. As there was little cultural difference across social classes,

the identity of Bihere Etyopia had been ingrained in the life of every member of the

community. This includes being situated physically, legally and socially. “Identity

conferring features would include: ways of doing things, forms of landscape, attitudes of

mind, tastes in popular culture, typical objects, cultural symbols, administrative

regulations, and so on.” 19 This aspect is concisely expressed by Aleqa Taye, who

identified eleven peculiar characteristics of the Ethiopian nation: ‘never mixed with

others in matters of food, drink and matrimony’; ‘evidences abound in historical records

in different parts of the world’; ‘prophesies in the Bible’; ‘[matters of ] religion;

‘circumcision’; ‘[unique] phenotype’; ‘demeanor’; ‘their language’; ‘their names’; ‘the

name of their country’ and ‘the customs of their country’.20 The overall process of self-

definition and location is in many ways the key to national identity.

National identity also has international and universal dimensions. The establishment of

Ethiopia’s place in the cosmic order of nations is symbolically expressed by a ‘myth of

election’, which is another cornerstone of nationness. The main narrative of the Kibre

Negest elaborates how God’s promise for David had been transferred to Ethiopia as a

result of the fall of the Israelites from grace. It is here that the great story of the Queen of

Sheba (also variously referred as Saba, Azeb, Makeda) fits in. The sojourn of the

‘Ethiopian’ queen to Solomon the Wise was God’s special plan to realize his eternal

promise. Ethiopia, therefore, enjoys the Almighty’s favor through the outcome of this

19
Day and Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism, p.100.
20
Taye, Ye’Etyopia Hizb Tarik,p.21.

54
phenomenal tour.21 By virtue of chastity and thirst for divine wisdom (as symbolized by

the virgin queen), the possession of the Ark and a ready profession to Christianity,

Ethiopia attains seniority among nations, ranking above Rome and Israel. Asceticism and

devotion to ‘Tabot Christianity’ become most cherished, enduring, defining and ‘non-

negotiable’ values of historic Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been portrayed by generations of

nationals till today as a chaste beauty in search of wisdom.22

Even though it is enfolded by the mythology of putative kinship, like filiation from the

house of David, or religious and cultural ideologies as Orthodox Christianity and ‘Geez

civilization’, the determinant factor in the formation of Bihere Etyopia is the

internalization of these elements of national consciousness and definition.23 This is a long

and complex process in which a nation, metaphorically, passes through rites of birth,

growth and maturity all along picking, blending and discarding the elements of its

identity. A nation can lose or alter any or all of its outward characteristics without losing

it sense of continuity. Several factors are at work in this process to historicize all gains

and losses and to create a sense of invariance and immutability.24 While customs at the

grassroots change constantly, popular memory bestows upon them an aura of

unchanging, time-honored tradition. The formation of distinct national characteristics or

21
The Kibre Negest, p.5. While many countries claimed this queen as their own, no comparable claim has
been raised over the national identity and name ‘Ethiopia’.
22
Afewerq Gebre-Yesus, Tobia; Hadis Alemayehu, Fiqir Eske-meqabir; Dagnachew Worqu, The Thirteenth
Sun, among others, allegorically identify their main character with the nation.
23
Eriksen, Nationalism and Ethnicity,p.12 :Nationness in anthropological parlance is ‘an emic category’.
24
Smith, National Identity,p.25: “Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over
generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of
population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions
entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture.”

55
what is termed as ‘the national habitus’, i.e, the set of dispositions and embodied social

learning, is a result of the deposit left by a shared history.25

The creation and cultivation of distinctive myths, memories, traditions, values and

symbols mark a nation out from those outside its boundaries. The significance of national

myths and historical backgrounds is that they become carriers of identity and memories

over time.26 Myths of election or the idea of ‘the chosen ones’, as pointed out by many

observers, was a cardinal feature of historic Ethiopia and a great spiritual force which

sustained her through the ups and downs of history. The Kibre Negest narrates Ethiopia’s

special covenant with God, which is a promise of conditional salvation attainable

provided that both sovereign and subject fulfill certain moral and ritual obligations, and

that they maintain the religious purity and devotion of the ancient community. 27 The

national mythology undergirds Ethiopia’s infallibility and unconquerabiltiy in matters of

war, though time and again she faces reversals. Any defeat and tribulation the nation

suffers is accountable in terms of admonition of God for going astray the sacred ways.

Wars, natural disasters such as epidemics and famine, and even personal tragedies are

readily attributed to divine reprimand.

25
Elias, quoted in Day and Thompson, Theoriziang Nationalism, p.96. Two outstanding attempts by
historians to reconstruct the continuity of Ethiopia are that of Tadesse Tamrat’s Church and State in
Ethiopia,1270-1527(1972) and Merid Wolde-Aregay’s “Southern Ethiopia and the Christina
Kingdom,1508-1708”(1971).

26
Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, pp.4-5: The creation of an ‘ethno-history’ which provides a single
panorama of the ethnic past “becomes a potent resource, because, unlike the kind of ‘objective’ causal
historical enquiry fostered by professional historians, an ethno-history presents a developmental series of
historical tableaux, which highlight in easily memorized terms the ‘key events’ and turning points of the
ethnic past or pasts.”
27
Taye, Ye’Etyopia Hizb Tarik, p.21.

56
The revitalizing effects of the myths of origin and election could be traced throughout

Ethiopian history. It has always been a matter of pride to affirm that “We are among the

first Christians that received Baptism, that Sacrament having been brought among us by

the Eunuch of Candace Queen of Ethiopia, who is spoke of in the Acts of the

Apostles...”28 Adrian Hastings succinctly sums up this: “Here is a state [Ethiopia] with a

continuous history of 1500 years, with a literature, including the Bible, in its own

vernacular, Geez, and an extraordinarily strong and enduring sense of its identity,

political, religious and literary. If there is one people in history to have been shaped in its

own self-consciousness by the Bible, it is the Ethiopians...” 29 Haymanot(religion),

mengist(state), netsantet(freedom) and rediet(God’s succor) have been the bulwarks of

this self-conception.30

A crucial question we posed at the outset of the chapter is regarding the delimitation of

national membership. In other words, who is inside or outside of its boundaries? Social

28
Geddes, A Church History, p.96. The Jesuit priest Rodriguez’s account regarding Emperor Gelawdiwos's
stand on submission to the Roman See is also related, p.166: "He said, He was no friend to Disputations,
but there was one thing he was certain of , which was that Ethiopia had always held the same Faith that it
did now, or at least that it had for above a Thousand years; that Disputations were never to be sued but
with Heathens, and that his Faith being thus Ancient, there was no body before me had ever presumed to
say it was Erroneous." When asked by the same priest whether he would accept prelates sent by the king
of Portugal, the Emperor, pp.167-8, "said he had learned Friars enough in his Kingdom, and that it was
needless for the King of Portugal to trouble himself to send him any more;... Concluding, That he was
resolved never to yield Obedience to any Patriarch, but the Patriarch of Alexandria, whom he would
always obey, as all his Ancestors had done before him." Messay Kebede, Survival and Modernization.
Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present: A Philosophical Discourse( NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1991), p.57: “The founding
myth of Ethiopian society and history, enshrined in the Kibre Negest, was based on the notion of divine
election. Not to relate this notion with the record of survival is to miss the essential point. Only the
perception of this reality can enable us to understand how profoundly the Ethiopian mentality was
shaped by the idea of entrustment, of guardianship of the truth faith, which is none other than Orthodox
Christianity. The unity of Church and state, the social organization, and the commanding ideology were all
organized in such a way to serve the cause of survival, readily perceived as the fulfillment of God’s
assignment.”
29
Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge
University Press: 1997/2007), p.150, quoted in Tekeste, “Ethiopic Script,” p.9.
30
Taye, Ye’Etyopia Hizb Tarik, p.21.

57
identities are constructed in relationship to others. Nations also define themselves in

contrast to significant ‘Others’. Anthony Marx more specifically contends that “nations

have all too often been built through purposeful racial, ethnic, religious, class, or other

internal exclusions...Such exclusion of specified others has been central to nation-state

building, rather than tangential.” 31 The inclusion and exclusion criteria of historic

Ethiopia rested on two pillars of its cultural identity: religious purity and civilizational

superiority. Ethiopianness emerged out of the profession of the ‘true and original’ faith

which was held in contradistinction with the Jews, other Christian denominations, Islam

and traditional faiths. It prided itself on the achievement of Aksum, Lalibela and Gondar,

the possession of a script and literature, the ceremony and glory of the monarchy, the

culture and erudition of its religious establishment, the invincibility of it heroes, etc.

The aremene(heathen or pagan and barbarian) a Geez term which captures both aspects

of the criterion from antiquity, refers to internal others fit to be conquered and enslaved.

Jews and Muslims were also to be subjugated, persecuted and excluded from certain

benefits of the polity, while Islam was regarded as a permanent ideological menace. In

spite of this, the political system operated on pragmatism and it did not override

grassroots social and environmental interactions between different communities. Rival

religions have been overlain on a bedrock of long history of cultural and political

commonality. Much of the southern, eastern and western territories of present Ethiopia

had been integral parts of the historic nation during the medieval period. Many of the

medieval Muslim sultanates such as Ifat had residents who were Muslim Amhara and

Argobba; the Adari and the Harla also had Semitic ties to the nation and were allied with

31
Quoted in Day and Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism, p.148.

58
the sultanates of Adal with marriage and political alliances. In much of the areas north

and south of Fatagar Christians speaking Amharic, Gurage as well as Argobba lived

interspersed. Although it is probable that Christian communities might have lived as far

as the Goba area even prior to the fourteenth century, Christianity seems to have made a

real impact only after the mid-14th century when Christian regiments were garrisoned in

the different parts of the province.32 By the 15th century, there also appears to be a well-

established religious bond as far as the Gamo highlands in the south.

During the early modern period, the ‘Turk’(sic) and the Galla(sic) signified the outer

limits of this religious and civilizational boundary. The nation was strategically defined

vis-a-vis its arch external threat as a ‘Christian island in a Moslem sea’.33 In his letter to

King John III of Portugal in 1524, Lebene Dengil notes, “[We] are besieged on all sides

by Wicked Mahometans, and Moors: The Turks and Moors can assist one another, and

their Kings and Rulers do all agree together: I have a Mahometan for my neighbour, who

is constantly supplied with Arms, Horses, and all Military Weapons, by Princes of his

own sect, namely , the Kings of India, Persia and Egypt..."34 Nearly three centuries later,

in a letter to King George III( written in April 1810), Ras Woldesilassie of Tigre

reiterated the age old attitude of the historic nation and its internal dimensions: “...Henry

32
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” pp.42-47, 46-47.
33
Christopher Clapham, “War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in ICES (2002),p.1422.: “The
self-identity of Ethiopia as ‘a Christian Island in a Moslem Sea’ did help to consolidate a sense of territorial
nationalism, but only during the Jihad of Ahmed Gran(1527 – 1543) did this seriously threaten the State.”
th th
“...And ideologically, from the mid-16 to the mid-19 centuries, it did not foster the growth of any
‘national’ sentiment, because it was almost entirely internal rather that external: there was no significant
‘other’, against which national identity could be defined.” “The process of territorial expansion of
[modern Ethiopia], however, rested on inherently discriminatory social and religious formulae, and the
forcible incorporation of large Islamic populations diluted any previous sense of nationhood...,”p.1423. In
my opinion, the threat of Islam had become a persistent concern throughout the medieval and early
modern periods rather than a one-time phenomena. Clapham also seems to miss the internal aspect of
dichotomization into ‘us’ – ‘them’ and the characterization of a civilizational and cultural ‘other’.
34
Geddes, A Church History, pp.69-70.

59
Salt did not go to the King, for there is[ at present] no Orthodox king. And I, on my part,

have quarreled with the one who is named Gugsa, a man not identical with us in faith. He

has coronated a king who is not Orthodox in faith. For this reason, I have quarreled [with

him]...” “... Infidels are before me, infidels are behind me, infidels are on my right hand

and on my left; I am completely surrounded, all who are on the seacoast are infidels...”35

A crucial point regarding the above is the relationship between the national core and

other peoples and faiths in and adjacent to the state. In this perpetually ‘besieged’ land

Islam and Turk are made synonymous, most likely after the Gran Wars (1527-1543).

Following the great Oromo migrations or movements, Ethiopianness was internally

defined through the perceptions of difference from the ‘barbarian’ Galla(sic). It later

evolved into a generic name for uncivilizedness and unruliness. The term ‘turk’ clearly

did not refer to Ethiopian Muslims who have been in uneasy cohabitation for several

centuries. The Galla was similarly seldom applied to Christianized and integrated

Oromos of Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo and Shoa. Both Muslims and Oromos are so to say

between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. They are ‘in’ historic Ethiopia physically and socially (as part

of the local culture), but not ‘of’ historic Ethiopia ideologically and nationally.

Dejazmach Wube’s letter to Louis Philippe (May 1845) expresses this: “...I sent you a

message seeking your friendship and that you be a guardian for me and Ethiopia. For the

‘turk’ is ready to assist Muslims living in Ethiopia and to destroy Christianity.”36 Emperor

Yohannes IV also wrote almost verbatim to Ferdinand I [August 1872]: “...in my country

there is a region of a Galla Moslem called Azebo. And you might know that Ethiopia is

35
Rubenson, Acta Aethiopica, vol.I, pp.4-5.
36
Ibid., p.114, italics added.

60
like an island, encircled by Ismail Pasha, the Turk.”37 It did not matter that there were

Muslim Amhara or Tigre (which until very recent times seemed a contradiction in terms),

they achieved ethnic and national membership only on condition of conversion to

Orthodox Christianity. In sum, the characterization of the internal or external ‘others’ as

‘somewhat’ different and ‘too different’ from ‘us’ indicates that contemporaries had a

sense of Ethiopia as superior in culture and values.

The historic nation embodied in one the cultural as well as political dimensions. The

cultural dimensions of this nation, as mentioned above, were religious purity and

civilizational superiority, whereas its political dimensions were identification with a

monarchy, with an ancient and uninterrupted tradition of statehood. As Messay expressed

it, “[t]o be a Christian in Ethiopia was not simply to adhere to a creed; it was also

naturalization, admittance to citizenship by way of allegiance to a secular power.”38 The

most serious and unpardonable crime in historic Ethiopia was conspiracy against the state

and the burning of churches. As the saying goes, "awaj afrash, betekrstian

tekuash"(transgressor of the law, destroyer of the church). In historic Ethiopia there was

an apparent equivalence between the borders and character of the political unit on the one

hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other.

One important feature of historic Ethiopia which eludes many scholars pertains to the

identity of the national core. The usual components in the literature are Tigreans, Agaws,

37
Rubenson, Acta Aethiopica, vol.III,p.121.
38
Messay, Survivial and Modernization, p.99. Hiruy, Ye’Etyopia Tarik, p.105, mentions an incident in
which Negus Menelik had given his consort woizero Bafena’s daughter, woizero Manalebish, to Imam
Mohamed Ali of Wollo. Hiruy notes public consternation as this was an unusual event in which “an
unbaptized Muslim was married to a Christian woman”.

61
Amharas, and sometimes the Oromos. 39 This stems from a misleading application of

European categories and experiences to Ethiopia. In the classical nationalisms of Europe

a state’s ethnic core often shaped the character and boundaries of the nation. Many

polyethnic states or nation-states “have been formed in the first place around a dominant

ethnie, which annexed or attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to

which it gave a name and a cultural character.” 40 From this, some observers see the

‘Abyssinian core’ as the homogeneous ethnic core of Ethiopia. Historians also argued

that the ancient Ethiopian state and culture was based on an Agaw substratum, and the

national nucleus was formed by the descendants of Ge’ez speakers who later evolved into

speakers of several dialects.41

Nevertheless, the linguistic criterion which is often used to identify the national core and

its political class as “Semitic-speaking” sharply contrasts with the traditional conception

of the nation. Ethiopia embraced from its inception a national community unencumbered

by any single ethno-linguistic group. It evolved as a nation constituting various ethnic

groups bonded by common faith and traditions. The fact that this proto-nation all along

maintained a supra-ethnic ideology and a social system very permissive at its margins is a

particular feature of its national make up. Its history and development were joint

39
Donald Levine, though he conceived Ethiopian national history as an Amhara thesis and Oromo
antithesis. Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience (USA: Transaction
Publishers,1997/2005),p.14. Teshale, The Making of, p.4.
40
Smith, National Identity, p.39.
41
Tadesse Tamrat, “Ethnic Interaction and Integration in Ethiopian History: the Case of the Agaw,” The
Journal of African History, 29(1),(Cambridge University Press: 1988),pp.5-6,10: “It is clear that political
leadership was mainly in the hands of Semitic speakers, especially those who spoke Ge'ez or some other
language directly ancestral to Ge'ez, which was used in the early inscriptions and later became the literary
language of the country. Speakers of other dialects which later developed into Tigre, Tigrigna, Amharic,
Argobba, Harari, Gafat and Gurage probably formed integral parts of this nuclear Semitic-speaking
population, spreading originally over a continuous territory extending from the coastal and central parts
of Eritrea to the Tigrean plateau." Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.296.

62
achievements of various linguistic and cultural communities, who inhabited the highland

region consisting of the long north-south corridor between Hamassen and Shewa as well

as the hinterlands in the south, east and west of the country. Its history and development

were joint achievements of various linguistic and cultural communities, who inhabited

the highland region consisting of the long north-south corridor between Hamassen and

Shewa as well as the hinterlands in the south, east and west of the country.

Bihere Etyopia identified itself in terms of one overarching nation, no particular ethnic or

linguistic group. It is true that one or the other of the constituent groups, or more

accurately their aristocracy and nobility, took turns at the helm of power, but none of

them monopolized the nation or gave it their name. 42 Admission into national

membership never made it mandatory to speak any single ‘national’ language, but

profession to a faith and a monarchy. Aleqa Taye, in identifying the Amhara, Tigre and

Agew as distinctive from among the six founding groups of Semites in historic Ethiopia,

has rather the traditional criteria in mind: “which accepted the Old Testament, later

professed Christianity, who preserved in the faith, and had uninterrupted statehood from

ancient times, never ruled by outsiders, never lost God’s providence.”43

The unified wholeness of historic Ethiopia with the monarchy at the apex of social life,

the Orthodox Church closing ranks as a kind of ‘Second Estate’, and the common people

at the bottom of the social pyramid expressed an identity of character between state and

42
Contrast with France of the Franks, Germany of the Germans, Russia of the Russians, England of the
English, etc.
43
Taye, Ye’Etyopia Hizb Tarik, p.21. In contrast, the Abyssinian core thesis has a false linguism behind it.
Dimma, “Contested Legitimacy,” p.176:"Even historically, Abyssinia was never able to forge itself into a
nation and has always had the feature of a multinational empire.”

63
people. The people were seen not simply as ‘subjects’ of the monarchy but as

horizontally bonded to it and to whom the state in a sense belonged. In some way, the

state’s sovereignty was inherent within the people, expressive of its historic identity as

the literal meaning of the term biher indicates. The Geez-Amharic term ‘mengist’ has

quite similar meaning to the original concept of state elsewhere, which denoted status,

mark of kingship and royal authority. 44 Later, this was also extended to include the

functions of government, the territory or the realm of the state, and the subject peoples.

1.2 The Institutional and Symbolic Elements of the Nation

The monarchy, the church and the army were the cardinal institutional expressions of the

nation. The monarchy of Bihere Etyopia was neither hereditary nor divine as commonly

held. It was a dynastic monarchy in which the king had no divinity either in his person

(only sacrality) or in his functions. Kingship was bestowed to a ‘House’ not a particular

ethnic group or family. Nor it was passable from father to son if there were other

successful claimants in the Solomonic universe. The uniqueness of the monarchy, its

extraordinary longevity in adversity and the support it enjoyed from various ethnic

entities emanated from its national dimensions. 45 Within limits, the crown could be

‘usurped’, as in the case of the Zagwes, provided that there were demonstrable

religiosity; or it might be shorn of political power by regional magnates, like the Wara

44
Hay and Lister, The State, pp.4-8.
45
Messay, Survival and Modernization, p.81:“To belong to the Solomonic dynasty meant to be above
ethnic or regional loyalties or, which is the same thing, to share what is common to all the ruling elites of
Ethiopia over and above their ethnic difference. The emperor is acceptable to the ethnically diverse
people of Ethiopia by the supervenient Solomonic reference which elevates him above ethnic and
regional ties. The Solomonic dynasty is more a nationalistic notion than a hereditary or ethnic principle.”

64
Sheh, as long as there were (nominal) conversion. This pattern attains its most instructive

phase in the nomination of Lij Iyassu as Menelik’s heir. Whatever power that did not opt

to operate within the cultural and religious parameters of historic Ethiopia, however,

passed as invader and scourge in the annals of the nation, as ‘Gudit’ and ‘Gran’

epitomized death and devastation.

Like the monarchy, the ecclesiastical establishment had been the mutual trust of the

nation. Bound by a common doctrine, dogma and truth language (Geez, through which

God’s will is supposedly revealed), the clerical class was more unified than the nobility.

In fact, it was the most consolidated and the only educated stratum as well as the

originator, promoter and unflagging bearer of the national idea. Traditionally, the ranks

of the clergy were filled more often by the sons of the common man than those of the

aristocracy and royalty who had a better prospect for government tenure. By preaching

the divine origin and mission of the nation, its eternal favor and succor from the

Almighty, the Orthodox Church has played a vital historical role.

The church had been at the center of the social and political life of the nation and

Ethiopian rulers have always seen it as a symbol of national cohesion to be jealously

guarded from internal and external forces. Spiritual unity was their cardinal principle as

any fissure in the church would have national repercussions. Hence, traditional rivalries

and philosophical controversies were solved by national councils often headed by kings

from Zera Yaeqob(1434-1468) to Haile Selassie I.46 The factional upheavals of the 17th

century within the Orthodox Church and the attempts of kings and regional nobles to

46
Wudu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church,” pp.30-31, the phenomenal rivalry between the two monastic
traditions of Ewstatewos(c.1273-1352) and Tekele-Haymanot has continued at least from the reign of
Zera Yaqob to Yohnnes IV.

65
exploit this situation demonstrates how the secular and spiritual were firmly intertwined

in the life of the nation. The exceptional attempt of Susenyos to disestablish the church

had posed a serious danger to the monarchy as the sovereign himself admitted at last.47

The self-serving meddling of kings in the debates between the Qebat (Unction) and

Tewahdo (Unity) factions, or even between the radical and moderate wings of these, the

long-standing rivalries between the House of Ewostatewos and that of Tekle-Haymanot,

was a constant threat for the Orthodox Church since the medieval period.48 There were no

clear cut ethnic and regional alliances in these doctrinal controversies. For instance,

during the 17th century, Qebat doctrine was upheld by the majority of the people in

Gojam, Bagameder, half of Tigre (particularly in Aksum), and in the regions of the Bahre

Negash. Tewahdo was supported by those of Waldebba, Sagade, Wag, Lasta, Angot and

parts of Amhara, and parts of southern Tigre.49 During the reign of Emperor Yohannes

IV, this had changed with most of Tigre and Gondar supporting Tewahdo, and Gojjam

and Shoa dominated by the Qebat and Tsega (Grace)factions.

Ethiopian rulers appear more concerned with the internal unity of the Orthodox Church,

which they forced by meting out severe punishment, than the forceful conversion of

Muslims and other believers. "Aleqa Hasetu [Menelik's baptismal father] replied that in

Ethiopia both Islam and Amhara live[together]. Therefore, he would either live

respecting his own belief [Tsega] or go back to banishment."50 Neither the Ethiopian state

nor the Orthodox Church pursued aggressive proselytization in the southern and central

47
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” pp.479-481.
48
Ibid, pp.559,568.
49
Ibid, pp.568-569.
50
Sergew Hable-Silassie, Atse Menelik(Addis Ababa: nd), p.142.

66
parts of the empire. Conversion to Christianity was often a means by which peoples in

this part of the country ensured themselves protection by the state from raids by the

soldiery as well as the incursions of the Oromo.51

Another institution of historic Ethiopia which had an even more integrated nature was the

army. The army provided the third institutional pillar of the nation’s integrity. The system

of regimentation in the medieval armies of Ethiopia was the legacy of the Aksumite

kingdom. The imperial armies were composed of regiments conscripted from diverse

groups from various parts of the country - Damot, Enarya, Hadya, Ifat, Amhara, Agaw,

Tigre, Muslims of Adal and Harar, and Oromo, etc.52 The soldiery might not have been

as cultured and persuasive as the clergy, but it was undoubtedly a much greater

transgressor and expander of social boundaries. Therefore, it is hard to imagine, as

conventional wisdom has it, that the national idea in pre-modern times had been an

exclusive monopoly of uprooted clerical and secular elite or the so-called ‘political

nation’. 53 The national idea can only be sustained for any span of history if it gains

acceptance by the people at large. Whatever we glean from our historical records, within

certain limits, indicates that a sentiment of loyalty to the Ethiopian state was shared by a

significant portion of the population across social and regional boundaries.

The three main institutions of historic Ethiopia - the monarchy, the church and the army -

were bound by a national ideology and culture which was not an exclusive monopoly of a

single ethno-linguistic group. What was strictly Amharan in the culture of historic

51
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” pp.298-299, 302,303.
52
Ibid, pp.81-82, 294.
53
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p.86.

67
Ethiopia except Amharic? A related debate among nationalists and students of

nationalism is the ‘mystery’ of non-ethnic, or non-descent (or rather non-genealogical

descent) character of being Amhara. The metaphor of ‘islamina-amara’ or ‘galana-

amara’ perhaps seems to indicate the gradual identification of the attributes of historic

Ethiopia with a particular linguistic group. Though it is impossible to speak with

certainty, this polarized expression most likely is a comparatively recent or ‘modern’

phenomenon, perhaps after the abandonment of the roving courts following the

establishment of Gondar. This period was coterminous with the long succession of

Amhara rulers on the throne, and the emergence of Amharic as ‘lisane nigus’ (king’s

tongue).54 As the reigns of the Zagwe kings, the lords of the Zemene Mesafint and the

final years of imperial Ethiopia amply demonstrate, political dominance of an ethnic

aristocracy does not presuppose its cultural dominance.

The singling out of ethnic/linguistic groups as exclusive preserves of the national idea

and sentiment misconstrues the historical reality in which the nation was identified with a

supra-ethnic cultural-religious/ideological ethos. One outcome of this ethnocentric view

is the projection of recent or current ethnic formations backwards and conflation of

rivalries between regional power contenders with existing ethnic rivalries. As Professor

Merid has summed it up, "[t]o see in the frequent rebellions of the nobility symptoms of

54
The current attempt at the ‘ethnicization’ of the Amhara and the emphatic resistance of this group to
embrace ethnonationalism is but a living example of the spirit of historic Ethiopia. This incidentally
constitutes the reigning crisis in Amhara identity. Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,” p.175, contends:
"Compared to most African states, the issue of national identity has been one of the problematic features
of Ethiopian politics. This has to do with policies of the dominant political cultural formation, Amhara. As
we have seen Orthodox Christianity has been an important part of the identity of the state. Moreover,
and most importantly, Amhara is a linguistic and cultural identity to which potentially anyone can be
assimilated.”

68
separatist tendencies or even of regional and tribal restlessness would be to

misunderstand seriously the political history of Ethiopia. The contention between the

nobility and the monarchy had been primarily for the control of the revenues from the

districts and regiments in them."55

Historical traditions are also important elements constituting a nationality and

distinguishing it from others. These comprise an accumulation of remembered or

imagined experiences about people’s religious, territorial, political, military, cultural and

economic past. The most important way in which historical continuities are justified by

nationalists is when the nation’s past is chronicled, either by contemporaries or later

generations. Literate societies in this respect enjoy incalculable advantages in

historicizing their existence.56 ‘Golden ages’ are a genre of the national narrative which

were frequently invoked in the political struggles of the historic nation. The so-called

‘Solomonic myth’ and the prophesies of Fikare Eyesus are but two examples of the idea

of golden ages.

Fikare Eyesus is a document which blends the secular with the religious, the historical

with the apocalyptic by taking a historic figure, King Tewodros I, and a lost golden age in

its messianic message. As such it provided a foundation for an ideology of

millenarianism in historic Ethiopia. During the reign of Susenyos, for instance, a certain

pretender by the name Walda Qebryal (Gabriel) had risen in Shawa and adopted that

55
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.354. He also scolds Conti Rossini for insidiously projecting back “deep
th
rooted Tigre particularism and inherent resistance to the Amhara” from a 19 century observation,
pp.260-262.
56
Smith, National Identity,p.68: “to see oneself as potentially ‘an holy nation’ is to link chosenness
indissolubly with collective sanctification. Salvation is accessible only through redemption, which in turn
requires a return to former ways and beliefs, which are the means of sanctification.”

69
apocryphal king’s name of Tewodros. He had made his throne name Tewodros Sahay.57

In more recent times we recall the trajectory and ideological context of Kassa Hailu’s

ascent to power, both as inspiration for national renaissance and justification for the

‘second restoration’ of the Solomonic dynasty. Historical memories and traditions,

therefore, played formative and regenerative roles endowing Ethiopia with a vivid and

widespread sense of its past. Ethiopians are among a few antiquated nations, like the

Greeks, Armenians and the Irish, which kept a sense of filiation and cultural identity with

an ancient original community. 58 Such nations are likely to be more unified and

distinctive than those which lack that sense.

In the annals of Ethiopia, the national identity, its basic patterning of cultural elements

and the very existence of the nation has been continually challenged by traumatic

phenomena such as war and conquest, major population movements and religious

conversion. Historic Ethiopia weathered these trials and tribulations not only by dint of

its cultural and ideological resources but also by reinforcing the national bond through

political, economic and social integration. A prominent integrative socio-economic

institution and a foundation of historic Ethiopia was the custom of landholding and the

entire system of tributary relationship across the social pyramid. This had its origins in

the process of formation of the nation, and it all along served as a chief element of

demarcating the boundaries of national membership.

57
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.494. Smith, National Identity, p.33.
58
Smith, National Identity, p33. Among these peoples “there is a felt filiation ,as well as cultural affinity,
with a remote past in which a community was formed, a community that despite all the changes it has
undergone, is still in some sense recognized as the ‘same’ community.”

70
In addition to this, historic Ethiopia was integrated by distinctive public culture, legal

tradition and educational systems. The public culture was ingrained in the Orthodox faith.

The national calendar, dresses and artifacts, art and architecture, public holidays,

educational establishment and the entire ‘national’ way of life was grounded in religion.59

Another feature of its integration was the existence of a supra-ethnic national language.

In spite of the coexistence of varieties of vernaculars, Geez had served the purpose of

creating an overarching sense of unity among the national elite initially as an official

language and later as a liturgical and educational medium.

Many scholars consider the development of vernacular literature, to mean a literature in

the common spoken language, as a most important mark of nationhood. 60 Geez had

maintained centuries of influence as the only written language until the mid-19th century.

Moreover, the Geez alphabet has continued to underscore a common legacy among the

various groups of the historic nation. Even the emergence of Amharic during the late 16th

or early 17th century as “the court-language, and which is spoke[n] by all persons of any

quality," 61 and the universal transformation of the official medium from Geez to

Amharic during the 19th century were logical outcomes of this pattern.62

59
Wudu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church,’ p.4: "The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the repository of
Ethiopian tradition and culture. It is not only a religion, but also a way of life. The church contributed to
the development of the country in the fields of education, literature, bookbinding, architecture, building,
painting, and music. Ethiopian clergymen translated Arabic and Coptic works into Ge'ez. They wrote
chronicles of kings and hagiographies, which help to construct the history of the country."
60
Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, p.20. According to Anderson, one of the reasons why a
language becomes an important element of protonational cohesion is “it creates a community of
intercommunicating elite which, if it coincides with or can be made to coincide with a particular territorial
state area and vernacular zone,” could serve as a leaven.
61
Geddes, A Church History, p.7.
62 th
The transformation of Ethiopian official language from Geez to Amharic in the last decades of the 19
century was very swift. Rubenson remarks: “It is interesting to note that there seems to have been no

71
The Ethiopian state has played a vital role in the formation of the national community

along civic-territorial lines. The state integrated political and social resources capable of

unifying ethnically, regionally and culturally heterogeneous population in its domain. The

state has demonstrated its prominent capacity in defining the masses not only as members

of the nation but also as its defenders.63 It did this by keeping peace and order, extracting

resources, subjecting people to a framework of legal and political interaction, as well as

waging war and conquest. One major hurdle against the integration effort of the

monarchy was the ruggedness of the highlands which hampered communications

between communities and regions. Therefore, “although the political foundations of the

empire had been laid as early as the third century by the kings of Aksum, the creation of a

culturally homogeneous state was only partially achieved by the beginning of the

sixteenth. The division of the empire into provinces followed to a great extent the ethnic

particularities preserved by the difficulties of communications."64

Another formidable obstacle to the political integration effort was the existence of vested

regional nobles, who jealously guarded their traditional privileges by opposing any

centralizing efforts of kings. These were key players in the politics of the nation to the

extent that sometimes their ambitions threatened the very integrity of the state. The

Solomonic universe was so vast and confusing that regional nobles and clerics took direct

significant difference in this respect between Tigray on the one hand and Gonder and Shewa on the
other,” Acta Aethiopica, I, p.xi. Donald Crummey’s claim, “Tewodros as a Reformer and Modernizer,” The
Journal of African History, X,3(Cambridge University Press:1969), p.466, that the push, or at least the
hope, for the introduction of Amharic as a liturgical language was on the national agenda during the time
of Tewodros in this respect seems groundless.
63
Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (1982),p131.
64
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.27.

72
interest in the coronation of a king. 65 In fact, this was a major instrument in gaining

political leverage against the monarchy. Official post, at least theoretically, was the

prerogative of the sovereign and he could appoint any person from any part of the

country over any part of the domain. The offices of the Baher Negash, Gagn Negus,

Gojjam Negash, or the Tshafelams of Shoa, Amhara and Damot could be given to anyone

whom the king favored.66 Many kings, such as Amd’e Seyon, Yeshaq and Zera Yaeqob

attempted to weaken the financial position and political influence of regional opponents

by granting more powers and privileges to district officers. Through intermarriage and

appointment, most of the districts in the provinces were brought under direct imperial

control by early 16th century and the provincial administration had been fully

centralized.67

Some particulars of Ethiopian history have also left their intended or unintended imprints

on its national evolution. The mobile courts of medieval monarchs coupled with

continuous territorial expansion seem to have assisted in the establishment of a national

framework of administration, legal system and taxation. At the social level, this practice

expedited the interchange of customs and traditions, and the combination and

recombination of various communities and their boundaries. Amharic’s attainment of

national significance seems a direct outcome of this imperial mobility. This tradition

might have hampered the development of large cities, but where such cities as Aksum,

Roha and Gondar were built, they became hubs of cultural interaction and foci of national

integration.

65
Ibid,p.396.
66
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” p.65-67,72.
67
Ibid, pp.66, 70-71,74.

73
Throughout its long history, the holy city of Aksum has served as the spiritual metropolis

of Ethiopia. Even in the period when incumbent monarchs abandoned the ancient

tradition of coronation in Aksum Tsion, or attempted to divert it to places like Lalibela,

and during the political impasse of the Zemene Mesafint, this city retained the symbolism

of the nation’s cultural and spiritual unity. On the other hand, the establishment of

Gondar as a national capital needs to be seen as among the indispensable factors for the

coming to power of the Wara Sheh. This is not merely because of the weakening of the

Gonderine court due to the corrosive effects of extreme royal luxury, but also as a result

of the opportunity for sustained and intensive interaction and adaptation of group

boundaries in a linguistically and religiously heterogeneous setting.68 This seems a more

plausible explanation to the ‘anomaly’ of the Zemene Mesafint which history has to

contend with again in the reign of modern Shoan sovereigns.

Legal standardization, that is the creation, dissemination and enforcement of common

laws and shared customs and their growing observance by increasing members of the

community, is another integrative institution of the nation. The writing and translation of

the traditional constitutions of historic Ethiopia, the Kibre Negest, Fetha Negest(Justice

of Kings), and Hege We’serate Mengist (Laws and Procedures of the State) were major

attempts to found a national legal framework. These documents were produced along

with the phenomenal power shifts in the annals of the nation and the subsequent

68
Shiferaw Bekele, “The State in the Zamana Masafent(1786-1853). An Essay in Interpretation,” in Tadese
Beyene,etal(eds), Kassa and Kassa. Papers on the Lives, Times and Images of Tewodros II and Yohannes
IV(1855-1889),(Institute of Ethiopian Studies: AAU, 1990),pp. 25-68

74
trajectories of expansion and consolidation of the state. The main preoccupation of each

indicates the burning needs of their times.

The Kibre Negest, which most probably originated during the Zagwe period or before, is

passionately preoccupied in the formulation and justification of a national community

centered on a ‘divine’ monarchy. Its twin objectives appear both the reconstitution of

Bihere Etyopia and the legitimization of the Solomonic dynastic claims against the

Zagwes. The substance and structure of the Kibre Negest clearly indicates an intention to

lay out a national constitution. It mainly deals with the political aspects of ancient

Ethiopia: of sources of authority of government; of criteria for legibility for office; of

division of powers and responsibilities among departments; of rights and duties of the

general populace; of relationships between rulers and ruled; of basic laws of the nation;

its territory; of Ethiopia’s foreign relations; and of the Ark of Tsion, which is of special

significance and power for Ethiopia, etc. The Kibre Negest rules that the basic source of

authority for the monarchy is divine endowment. 69 The document has served as the

69
When was this document written? There are widely divergent views on this dating. Until very recently,
many Ethiopian church scholars believed that the Kibre Negest was written during the reign of King
th
Solomon. Among historians, Tekeste assigns the earliest origin to this document to the 6 century,
“Ethiopic Script,” p.1. Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,”, p.60, believes that Yekuno Amlak had caused the Kibre
Negest to be written both to legitimize his rule, to abolish dynastic factions and to unify the nation behind
him. “The need for national reconciliation and unity was so pressing that he had little difficulty in making
his leadership acceptable." This conventional narrative obliges us to raise two important questions: why in
Arabic if it dealt expressly with Ethiopia, unless it was written by Egyptian Copts who opposed the Zagwe?
Or it was an only Arabic translation from a Ge'ez original (perhaps the Egyptian prelate’s copy) which
survived the destruction of the book by the Zagwe? If it is an anti-Zagwe book it must have been written
sometime during the Zagwe period. There are some evidences indicating the existence of the Kibre Negest
prior to the reign of Lalibela, perhaps in other languages. It is probable that this original work might have
been prepared by the order of Egyptian patriarchs based on the widely circulated stories in Ethiopia. The
reason it waited years to be rendered in Geez after it was translated into Arabic from the Kebtie(Coptic)
original might also be political. The Kibre Negest explicitly forbids all except the issues of Solomon from
ascending the throne. Hence, Nibureid Yishaq and his Aksumite compatriots translated and expanded the
book after the ‘restoration’ of the Solomonic dynasty. Kibre Negest, pp.5,7,8,9,11.

75
national ‘constitution’ par excellence, at least for about 700 years, regulating the

ascension to power of the medieval and modern emperors of Ethiopia.

In stark contrast, the Fetha Negest, though once again seems to address the kingship,

scarcely mentions Ethiopia, either its state or people. It is entirely devoted to legal and

technical procedures. This suggests, in addition to its exogenous origin, a kind of

paradigm shift in the empire, from an emphasis in the religious constitution of the

national community to its secular governance and administration. Throughout its

existence in Ethiopia the Fetha Negest was held in very high esteem among Ethiopian

ecclesiastics and was preserved and studied meticulously in reputable monastic schools in

the country as a specialized branch of learning known as the Gubae Liqawnt. Those

versed in this science of jurisprudence were honored as Liq or superior. 70 The Fetha

Negest also had a great influence not only as a source of learning or legal science but also

as a functioning law. Its introduction did not overthrow, but was superimposed on, the

customary legal systems of Ethiopia. The migratory nature of the medieval monarchy

might have required the existence of such governing document to deal with local

exigencies.

Even though the period until the late 16th century is generally barren of pertinent

historical records, or of instances of court cases, it seems plausible to suggest that the

70
The exact date of introduction of the Fetha Negest is not certain, but according to Ethiopian tradition it
might have been during the reign of emperor Zera Yaeqob(1434-1468); Wudu, “ The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church,” p.37, concurs. It was translated from Arabic into Geez allegedly by a certain Petros Abda Sayd.
However, the earliest historical record about its applications dates from the time of emperor Serse
Dengil(1563-1597). The document was originally known as ‘Collection of Canons’ but it was rendered as
Fetha Negest laying emphasis in its secular parts. It makes only two references to the country, and both in
unfavorable lights: one denying the independence of the Ethiopian Church and the other scolding
Ethiopian and Nubian tradition of maiming faces as despicable malpractices. Fetha Negest, pp. xvii, xxi-
xxvi, xxvii.

76
tradition of the exclusive application of these historical documents in the imperial court,

which became evident later, might have been firmly established in the intervening period.

The fact that the Fetha Negest was considered and applied as law is evidenced by extant,

though sparse, records from the time of emperors Serse Dengil(1563-1597),

Susenyos(1603-1632), Iyassu II(1730-1755), Yoas(1755-1769), TewodrosII(1855-1868),

Menelik II(1889-1913). As clearly recorded in the chronicle of Emperor Menelik II, the

Fetha Negest was not only a document of peace but also an instrument of war.

Hege We’serate Mengist was another document which explicitly dealt with the

administrative and legal functions of the state. It was originally a digest of the

administrative and military reforms made by Amda Seyon. However, it was revised

twice, first during the reign of Serse Dengil and then during that of Iyasu I (ca.1681-

1705). This interesting document reflects the radical changes which the political and

military institutions had undergone during the eventful sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. 71 Whatever the case may be, these national documents had vital roles in

encouraging some kind of universality of laws and customs, perhaps not so much in the

fact of their application as in providing a sense of legal and traditional interconnectedness

among various classes and regions. In a letter to Louis Philippe [March 1840], King

Sahle-Selassie of Shewa proudly boasted of the value of his gifts of Sinksar

(Sinacsarium) and Fetha Negest: “...they are products of our craftsmanship which I want

to show you.”72 Emperor Yohannes also implored Lord Grnville [August 1872] to send

71
Merid, “Southern Ethiopia,” pp.61-62. Rubenson, Acta, I,p.43:
72
Rubenson, Acta, I, p.43.

77
him the Kibre Negest as the most important book which constituted provisions about the

law of the land.73

The most distinguishing aspect of historic Ethiopia was its religiosity. Therefore, its

national idiom was a religious idiom; its symbolism was embedded in deep sacrality.

‘Tabot Christianity’ 74 undergirded the cultural and political universe out of which

Ethiopian nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and provided a crucial

ingredient for the particular history of the nation. It is usually these symbolic

representations that establish continuity between the historic and the modern nation, as

we shall see in the subsequent chapters. Adrian Hastings maintains that “when religion

played an influential role in the construction of nationhood, as it did in Western Europe,

nationalism was more likely to assume a religious character, most notably where

threatening foreign powers adhered to a different faith.”75

Ethiopia’s national personality has been symbolized in various ways including the use of

names, descriptions, images, artifacts and ideas.76 Ethiopia is, therefore, ‘tafrana tekebra

yenorech hager’ (a country feared and respected); ‘netsanetwan’na haymanotuan tebqa

73
Rubenson, Acta, I,p.118.
74
Teshale’s term with reference to the unique features of Ethiopian Christianity in his The Making of
Modern Ethiopia(1995).
75
Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, p.11. Eriksen, Nationalism and Ethnicity,p.45: In many ways
national symbols, customs, and ceremonies are the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism. This
is perhaps because “political man is also symbolic man.” Smith, National Identity, p.77: “Like other
ideologies, nationalism lays claim to symbols which have great importance for people, and argues that
these symbols represent the nation-state.”
76
Eriksen, Ibid., p.103; pp.108-109: “The use of presumedly typical ethnic symbols in nationalism is
intended to stimulate reflection on one’s own cultural distinctiveness and thereby to create a feeling of
nationhood. Nationalism reifies culture in the sense that it enables people to talk about their culture as
though it were constant.”

78
yenorech hager’ (a country that has preserved its sovereignty and faith); ‘yekrstian

desset’ (a Christian island); ‘Etyopia ejochuan wede Egziabher tizeregalech’ (Ethiopia

shall stretch her hands unto God). Emperor Yohannes’ declaration as he mobilized his

troops for the Saati campaign in 1878 beautifully illustrates this symbolization of the

nation: “Ethiopia is first, your mother; second, your crown; third, your wife; fourth, your

child; fifth, your grave...”77 Emperor Menelik’s proclamation at Adwa reads almost the

same: “...Now an enemy has come to destroy the country that God has given us bordered

by the Sea, to change religion... Therefore, follow me to fight for your country, wife,

children and religion...”78

Flag is one such universal symbol of modern nations which links them to the pre-national

past. The national flag of modern Ethiopia best illustrates the role of signifiers in

representing the national community in terms of supposedly typical symbols and creating

a sense of connectedness and continuity with a revered past. The key difference between

the ‘moa anbessa’ flag and the variations introduced by the post-revolution regimes is the

‘national lion’. The symbolic use of a lion figure in Ethiopian heraldry perhaps dates

from the early medieval period. During the Gonderine period, the full Royal Arms was a

lion holding a cross on which was inscribed the motto ‘Moa Anbessa Ze’emnegede

Yihuda’ (The Lion of the Tribe of Judah is Victorious).79 Nevertheless, in the late Zemene

Mesafint period this practice attained national significance.

The lion figure, initially bareheaded and later bearing a crown topped by a cross, was

reinstated in royal seals during the reign of Emperor Tewodros II. In the period of

77
Hiruy, Ye’Etyopia Tarik, p.169.
78
Ibid,p.234.
79
Geddes, A Church History, p.7.

79
Emperor Yohannes IV, the crown was further embellished with a legend reading ‘mesqel

moa negede Ismail’. This motto symbolized the pedigree of the Solomonic line as well as

Yohannes’s victory over the Egyptians, and the victory of Christianity over Islam in

general. Emperor Yohannes also added ‘Tsion” in his full royal title underlining a special

connection not only with the history and civilization of Aksum, but also via this to a

favored position to the legacy of the Ark of Zion.80 The crowned Lion of Judah was again

established as the symbol of royalty with return to its medieval heraldry as ‘moa anbessa

ze-emnegede yehuda’ in the reign of Emperor Menelik. Yet it was limited to royal seals.

The moa anbessa figurehead was popularized in the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I

when it started to adorn the national tricolors. This quintessential symbol underlined the

biblical pedigree of the monarchy as well as the status of Orthodox Christianity as the

national church, thereby uniting nation with state and religion in a single symbolism. The

Ethiopian revolution consciously attempted to break with the past and leveled sustained

attack on the ancien regime and its idea of the nation. This seemed appropriate for the

national ethos was implicitly partial and left out a good part of the people from partaking

in the communion of national fraternity, if not from legal membership (citizenship).

Therefore, while the green–yellow–red standard was maintained, one of the longest

surviving monarchies along with its Lion was consigned to the dustbin of history.

The flag, stripped of its diacritical marker, was preserved as a symbol of a new national

community both by the Derg and the current regime. Nevertheless, the national lion was

not entirely abolished from the symbolism of the two republics. It was engraved on the

80
Rubenson, Acta, III,pp. xii-xiii.

80
reverse side of each coin and denomination gaining a household intimacy with every

Ethiopian. Every Ethiopian child knows what ‘zewd’ (obverse) and ‘goffer’ (reverse) side

of the coin means although the Lion came to be visibly decrowned half a century ago.81

Traditions are very tensile. The paradox is that many Ethiopians think that the flag is at

least as ancient as the imperial state. But in its present colors, it has been instituted in the

time of Emperor Menelik. It is rather the claim of the Orthodox Church that the ‘rainbow

color’ is a sign of God’s covenant with Noah, by default symbolizing the Almighty’s

favor for Ethiopia, which bestowed upon it an aura of antiquity. This is one instance of

national symbolism and reification of culture at work.

In the final analysis, symbolic elements of nationhood and the general processes of

national formation enable the crystallization of the cultural resources of national identity.

A part of these resources are then considered as both ‘sacred’ and ‘usable’, meaning they

are highly revered but may also be used for political purposes. The invoking of the ideals

of historic Ethiopia, such as myth of election, messianic destiny, territorialization of

memories, reminiscences of a golden past, has been a constant feature of the national

survival. During the pre-Italian period, Ethiopian monarchs attempted to ‘modernize’ not

only the country but also the idea of the nation. The state did not aggressively employ its

resources to impose its cultural and ideological values or homogenize the nation as is

often accused. While the first three emperors continued to give more emphases to the

doctrinal and organizational unity of the Orthodox Church, rather than to the conversion

of other believers, Ras Tafari/ Haile Selassie initiated tentative attempts to lay the

foundations for a legal community or civic nation in the pre-war period. The 1930

81
This is particularly true of Ethiopians during the Imperial and Derg periods, but also holds to some
extent to the generation during EPRDF period.

81
nationality or citizenship law and, more importantly, the 1931 constitution were the first

explicit attempts towards extending national membership to every individual in the

country. Nevertheless, the entrenched social distinctions inherent in Ethiopia's semi-

feudal society militated against the ideal of forming a nation (and inspiring nationalism)

in terms of a legal community.82 This theme will be the concern of the next chapter.

82
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” pp. 114,120,121. Wudu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church,” p.1, sets out to investigate "how the imperial government attempted to create a homogenous
society and an Ethiopian identity by integrating Muslims and non-Christians into the state within the
framework of 'religious uniformity' under the Orthodox Church, and Amharic as a national language." The
study, p.19, "contends that this was the result of Christian Ethiopia's 'siege mentality', and the notion that
Ethiopia was a 'Christian island in a Muslim sea'." This is an outrageous accusation, since it runs against
the very character of the Ethiopian state now more than ever. It is naïve to think that the state, any
modern state for that matter, would aim at such unrealistic goals as ‘religious uniformity’. ‘Siege
mentality’ is an overworn and perhaps also anachronistic metaphor!

82
 CHAPTER TWO

THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF MODERN ETHIOPIANISM

From the perspective of Ethiopian nationalism, the first quarter of the twentieth-century

marks the passing of an era and beginning of another. It was a period of transition from

the historic to the modern nation, bearing elements of future social, ideological and

political trends. The complicated power rivalries following the nomination of Lij Iyassu

were in the tradition of Ethiopian court politics, interlaced with regional and religious

overtones. However, the fierce struggle between Lij Iyassu and Ras Teferi differs from

similar previous incidents in that it embodies new internal and international dimensions

of a modernizing nation. The former’s zeal for reforming the political culture of the state,

especially his attempts to dissociate the monarchy from its historic religious and regional

identification was perhaps premature and impulsive, but it was the first radical attempt to

address a question which would in a generation attain center stage in Ethiopian

nationalism.1

Ironically, the future modernizer Teferi did rally the support of the secular and

ecclesiastical elite, though not as well from the common people, by presenting himself as

the champion of the historic nation, especially its religious purity. 2 His party accused

1
Aleqa Gebre-Egziabher Elias in his Biographies of Iyassu and Zewditu(Meskerem 1937) notes that Lij
Iyassu wanted to eradicate Catholicism and Protestantism from the country so that he met harsh
punishments on Ethiopian students of mission schools, pp.32, 47. The prince is also reported to have
reminded the Somalis in his 1915 visit to Ogaden, p.49, that: “My utmost wish is that all Ethiopian born
would guard the country’s borders in one spirit. Eventhough we are different in matters of religion, you
won’t forget that to unite in the love of our country is absolutely necessary.”
2
Aleqa Gebre-Egziabher offers a very interesting analysis of the support base of the three contenders to
power, namely Zewditu, Teferi and Iyassu, p.121: “The first group comprises of older men and clergy
above forty as well as minors. The second group is those of clerks, youngsters, and wise men versed in

83
Iyassu of apostasy and a design to Islamize Ethiopia, leading to the deposition and

excommunication of the latter on the day of Mesqel, 27 September 1916.3 The power

struggles for Menelik’s crown had not been conducted, as the conventional view has it,

‘Shoa versus others’ but in terms of political and ideological legitimacy to the historic

nation. Surprisingly, other regions such as Tigre, Agaw, Gojjam, did not stake significant

claim in this phenomenal power rivalry and Wallo itself was dragged in after the

abrogation of Menelik’s nomination. And the fact that, technically, Ras Teferi was not

even based in Shoa is a unique phenomenon which set the stage for the future politics of

the nation.4

Internationally, the conduct and conclusion of this power struggle had elicited two

responses bearing on the country’s nationalism. The rise of Ras Teferi to the pinnacle of

Ethiopian politics seems to have taken many contemporary observers by surprise as it

continues to baffle later historians. In the initial years, few among resident Europeans

trusted his capability to restore peace and stability and save the nation from

fragmentation. This was in line with the thinking of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906.

Actually the Italians had made some overtures towards Tigrean princes to exploit the

apparent confusion and reduce Ethiopia to their protectorate. The religious element in this

rivalry, especially Lij Iyassu’s preference for a coalition with a Muslim power in the

foreign languages. The third is made up of conceited and idle lords living by raiding and looting. However,
merchants and peasants are autonomous people who were not obliged to take sides. Who ever is
crowned or invested as pope, they only wish for a peaceful shepherd.” Oral Informant: Tedla Zeyohannes,
relating the popular sympathy to Lij Iyassu in Shoa, particularly during the patriotic resistance.
3
Ras Teferi’s correspondence with Abba Andreas, draft letter to the German emperor Ghiom II, 27 Hidar
1909( 6 December 1916). Ras Teferi draft letter to the Turkish sovereign Sultan Mohamed V, 27 Hidar
1909(6 December 1916). Bahru Zewde, Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia (AAU Press:2002), p.167, quoting
an unpublished autobiography of Bejrond Teklehawariat for similar views.
4
In the latter part of his political career Emperor Haile Selassie had consolidated his power base outside
this region. This as Mesmaku mentions was a Harrar based handpicked group at the helm of political
power. Mesmaku Asrat, “Modernity and Change”, p.90

84
Great War, coterminous with his internal policy, had also drawn on his side Turkey and

other Arabs, particularly the Caliphate of Mecca, portending the future role of Muslim

and Arab states in Ethiopian nationalist politics.5

Teferi, however, portrayed himself as a secular statesman with a progressive view of

Ethiopia for all its citizens. Even after defeating his arch rival and assuming de facto

power in 1916, he took great care not to alienate others who, for regional, religious or

political reasons, sympathized with the disgraced prince. He also took a longer course to

let Iyassu fade out of popular memory and perhaps could have succeeded had it not been

for the interregnum of the Italian occupation. Particularly, Teferi’s unprecedented exile

made a serious dent on the legitimacy and national image he meticulously built and gave

ammunition for his detractors. The patriotic struggle revived the issue of Iyassu who was

survived by his numerous sons, at least one of whom was allegedly crowned by regional

factions of the patriots.6

Teferi’s progression to Haile Selassie laid the blueprint for modern Ethiopian nationalism

as an integral component of his modernizing drive. Some of the institutions which had

incalculable significance in a burgeoning nationalism include the establishment of

Birhanena Selam Printing Press in September 1921, mainly concerned with Ethiopian

internal affairs; Kesate Birhan Printing Press in the same year, focusing on European

affairs and literature; and the foundation of a national paper Berhanena Selam in 1924,

giving rise to a fledgling intelligentsia which was very articulate on secular national

5
Abba Andreas to Ras Teferi, 27 Tahsas 1909(5 January 1917).
6
Oral Informant: Tedla Zeyohannes, see below on the coronation of Engedashet Iyassu as Melake-Tsehay
Iyassy. There were also attempts in Gonder and Wello to crown another son of Lij Iyassu, Yohannes
Iyassu, supported by Bilata Takele and Bilata Deresa. Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, p.31.

85
subjects.7 This reformist class was thoroughly grounded in tradition and had unequivocal

confidence in putting high the idea of modern Ethiopianism on the national agenda. It

advocated the abolition of class, ethnic and religious discrimination, respect for freedom

of worship and the separation of church and state.8

There had even been a rare treatment of the nationalities question in terms of Amhara–

Oromo protagonism and prescribing union by assimilation as vital to the survival of

Ethiopia. Tedla Haile’s very interesting recommendations in this respect include:

education (secular and religious) and the army as the key institutions of assimilation. He

argued that administrative, judicial and economic actions of government should be tuned

to assimilation; which could be done by redrawing of provincial boundaries,

encouragement of settlement and appointment of governors across regions. 9 When

modern Ethiopian historiography was born in the prewar period, Ethiopianism was

conceived with Emperor Menelik as its model thus inspiring two important books of

similar title but divergent thrust, Dagmawi Ate Menelik and Ate Menelik’na Etyopia

(1901 and 1912 respectively).10 Hence, the prewar intelligentsia was also a pioneer of

modern Ethiopianism and the social nationalism of the postwar period.

The erection on 1 October 1930 of Emperor Menelik II’s monument was a form of

modern expression of nationalism intended to symbolize the place of the monarchy in the

7
Bahru, Pioneers, pp. xi, 188.
8
Ibid., pp.120-137, 188-194.
9
Tedla Haile(1930) quoted in Bahru, Pioneers, p.133. Tedla may be considered as a pioneer of the
assimilationist school and his analysis of Ethiopian national issue had anticipated the likes of Levine and
Teshale. Also, pp.194-200.
10
Bahru, Pioneers, pp.51, 66, 67. Aleqa Taye, who is appropriately regarded as among the pioneers of
modern Ethiopian historiography, was commissioned by Menelik to write the history of Ethiopia. The
outcome was Ye’Ityopia Hizb Tarik (1910 E.C).

86
history and destiny of Ethiopia. The drawing of the new Criminal Code in 1930 was a

first significant step in the foundation of a modern legal system; and within it

demonstrated consideration of language in the dispensation of law. 11 The Ethiopian

nationality or citizenship law was also promulgated in the year 1930, as part of the

attempt to establish a nation on the basis of a legal community. After elaborating the

judicial system in Harar between 1915 and 1925, Carmichael concludes that his findings

"...undermine the idea that the court system in Harar was actively employed by the state

to impose its cultural values or ideology during the period. Rather, it would seem that the

'just' and 'fair' legal system Ras Tafari often spoke idealistically about...had taken root in

his model province of Harar, and the fruits he envisioned had begun to appear."12

The inauguration of the first written Constitution on 16 July 1931 is perhaps the single

most important event in the prewar period which demonstrates the national program of

the state. Emperor Haile Selassie’s efforts to overhaul the legal and institutional

foundations of the state towards a truly national form could be regarded as progressive,

even revolutionary, especially in instituting a national legal framework, a national

political forum, a national educational system, a national ideology, and even a national

intelligentsia. It was during this early period that modernization evolved from mere

curiosity of enlightened sovereigns into a defined system with national dimensions, and

nationalism surpassed bare patriotism into purposeful and inclusive ideology to refashion

11
Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (1969), pp.140-41.
12
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” p.114.

87
a modern nation. Haile Selassie laid the groundwork that could bind and integrate the

disparate regional, ethnic and cultural elements into a modern nation state.13

The northern and central regions were more unified politically and culturally, and bound

by a common pre-national ideology of the historic nation. Characteristically, this was a

system maintained by a fine balance between strong regional interests and overarching

national institutions and loyalties. Any measure to alter this equation would have elicited

formidable reactions making this region politically unpredictable. In the eastern, western

and southern areas of the country, the main problem emanated from the capacity of the

state or the precariousness of its administrative and political presence. This vast and

ethno-culturally diverse region had been a geopolitical, cultural and historical part of

Ethiopia, the differences within the region no less diverse than between it and the rest of

the historic nation. The region had also been exposed to a unified political and

administrative framework, a paramount national structure with which the constituents had

come to identify themselves. The administrative centers dotting the various provinces

were veritable nuclei of sociopolitical interchange and integration. At the social level

there had been ongoing cultural influences in the spread of Amharic, Orthodox

Christianity to a limited extent, as well as etiquettes and lifestyles among various classes,

which was not hampered by the apparent rigidity of social boundaries of a town-based

regional aristocracy.14

In the peripheries, there was the barest minimum of government in the prewar period;

hence the questions of maintenance of peace and order, regulation of border fluidity and

13
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, pp.65-66.
14
Belete, “Agrarian Polity,” pp.43, 47. Tesema, “The Political Economy,” pp.157, 171, 172-173.

88
cross-border ethnic conflicts, and overcoming divided loyalties through pressures of

citizenship provided a common framework. However, even in the southern and peripheral

regions there were few signs of pan-ethnic resistance, let alone ethno-nationalism, though

expressions of local/ decenterd ethnicity had been a normal makeup of daily life. At this

early stage the government was partly successful in integrating regional balabbats by

granting feudal titles and privileges, defining political loyalties from the remotest corners

of the Ethio-Sudan frontier to the national center at Addis Ababa.15

2.1 The Italian Interlude (1936-1941)

Italy had emerged as the most intractable challenge to Ethiopian national aspirations in

the region after acquiring foothold over Assab in 1871. In the subsequent period it used

its coastal possession, which had come to include the important port of Massawa, as a

launching pad for subterfuge and infiltration in Ethiopia. This episode ended up in the

Battle of Adwa (1896). In 1935, Italy made another military bid in a spirit of revenge,

this time driven by the new ideology of Fascism, which itself was a form of aggressive

ultra-nationalism. Besides the military preparations, the Italian campaign had taken years

of meticulous planning, careful studying of the political, social and cultural patterns of

the country, and cultivation of covert alliances among dissenting regional, religious and

political groups. Italy used its colonies in Eritrea and Somaliland as springboards for

subversion; inside Ethiopia it established consulates at Adwa, Gondar and Dessie as

centers of espionage and subterfuge.

15
Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS) Archives: No. w 8/1, Yegambella Awraja
Balabatoch. w-229, Balabatoch.

89
In addition to this, Italy waged intensive propaganda campaign, on the grounds of alleged

backwardness, border raids, slave trading, arms dealing, etc., to ostracize Ethiopia among

the global community of nations, to deprive her platform for sounding grievances and

close off her sources of armaments. This double-edged policy was intended in the short

term to divide and paralyze the Ethiopian government, to minimize the costs of the

colonial war, and in the long term to quash any popular resistance to colonial rule.16 The

ultimate target in this endeavor was Ethiopian nationalism, which Italians recognized to

be a formidable reality behind the veneer of feudal divisions. They reaped the fruits of

their diligence when on the eve of Maichew (1936) many prominent regional nobles of

Tigre, Gonder, Gojjam, Wallo, Jimma and Wollega one by one betrayed the king and

rose against what they called Shoans or Amharas. Though political opportunism and

conspiracy with the powers that be had been part of feudal realpolitik, its magnitude

seems unprecedented in Ethiopian history.

The Ethiopian government was sufficiently aware of Italy’s persistent colonial ambitions

over a part or whole of its territory. It knew the covert sabotage, espionage and

infiltration orchestrated by the consulates inside the country and the behind-the-scene

diplomacy threatening the national interests of Ethiopia. On the eve of the war, “Tedla,

who was Ethiopian consul at Asmara, urged not only close surveillance of the Ethio-

Eritrean boundary but also active support and encouragement of the anti-Italian sentiment

prevalent among Eritreans.”17 Haile Selassie, perhaps more acutely than his predecessors,

16
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, pp.20-21, relates his personal experience regarding the extent of Italian
propaganda and its effects in Ethiopia, particularly in Addis Ababa, on the eve of the war.
17
Bahru, Pioneers, p.134.

90
was aware of the precariousness of Ethiopia’s unique independence in the face of strident

European colonialism and ultra-nationalism.

External sovereignty, which regards a state’s recognition by the global community of

nations on equal footing, is a crucial aspect of modern nationalism. 18 One of the

distinguishing marks of the government of Emperor Haile Selassie in the prewar period

was the maintenance of an active foreign policy based on a reasonably accurate grasp of

existing international situation and Ethiopia’s place in it. Haile Selassie’s success in

securing admission of Ethiopia into the League of Nations (1923) and his visionary

approach to international diplomacy were aimed not only at keeping the surrounding

colonial powers at bay and procuring an outlet to the sea, but also at building up the

country’s global standing and capacity. The modernizing nation cannot afford to be a

bystander, as in former times, and merely react to the fait accompli of European

diplomacy. It had to take the initiative and generate its own intelligence, cultivate its own

alliances, make its own treaties and bargains.

As a prime mover of this radical foreign policy direction in Ethiopian history, the Regent

and Emperor was unavoidably swayed by the optimism of liberal idealism reigning in the

international politics in the aftermath of the First World War(1914-1918). When that

exuberant optimism in the capacity of humanity to avert future wars foundered on the

rock of economic depression and social uncertainty setting in the late 1920s, the world

was again drawn into another round of carnage. The fact that Ethiopia became not only

18
Jorge Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations (1993), pp.32-33.

91
the first casualty of the Second World War(1941-1945) but also the first to be liberated

with an international assistance was a vindication of Haile Selassie’s prewar diplomacy.

Why did the imperial army seem less unified than that of a generation ago? More

significant even, why did Ethiopians, who had an apparent reputation for deferring their

quarrels in the face of national threats, this time easily resign themselves to colonial rule

than fight for king and country? There were long-term and immediate, internal and

external reasons for this state of affairs. The most important factor was Haile Selassie’s

overconfidence in collective security to shield Ethiopia from Italian (or any other

European) invasion and his procrastination to prepare for the eventuality of a military

threat.19 In fact, the Emperor’s vital diplomatic decisions on the eve of the war seem to

indicate his underestimation of Italy’s ambitions. Even the desperate effort to counter

Italian propaganda by establishing Ye’Etyopiawian Hager Fiqir Mahber in 1935 was

initiated by patriotic citizens after the news of the Walwal incident in Ogaden. 20 For

defecting regional lords, perception of Ethiopia’s weakness vis-à-vis Italy’s superiority

might have appeared like accepting the inevitable.

Another factor which could account for Ethiopia’s defeat was Italian success in

weakening Ethiopian patriotism. Spreading ethno-regional dissension, particularly Shoa

versus others, was a corner-stone of about half-a-century of Italian diplomacy and politics

in Ethiopia. There has never been any exclusive, or as some Europeans would say

‘traditional’, Shoa-Tigre rivalry prior to the advent of Italians and their maintaining so-

called ‘Shoan’ and ‘Tigrean’ policies. This divisive policy was set in motion in 1876

19
Oral informant: Tedla Zeyohannes.
20
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, p.22.

92
when the first Italian mission to Ethiopia led by Marcus Oratio Antinori was granted a

quarter at Lit Marefya in Ankober. Modern Shoa was ideologically created by Italians, as

was modern Tigre, and vigorously pursued after Italy’s perception of Shoan-inflicted

wound at Adwa. Italy also employed the Catholic religion in the propagation of the

colonial ideology, as the relatively small Ethiopian converts proved their faithfulness

during the occupation period. Even among the prewar intelligentsia those who had

professed Catholicism were the most vulnerable to indulge in the criticism of the

Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Shoan kings for alleged inequities on other peoples in

the country. It is not surprising that they were the earliest to go over to the Italians.21

So on the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war pro-Italian tendencies of the principal nobles in

Tigre, Begemedir, Gojjam, and Wallo, had become common knowledge in the capital.

Most of the renegades had also found one or another grievance against Shoa to justify

their decisions. In Tigre, the success of the ‘Tigrean Policy’ was demonstrated by the

betrayal of almost all the notable lords of the region, as far as bringing together rivals Ras

Mengesha and Dejazmach Hailesilassie Gugsa to stand in anti-Shoa front. The latter

attempted to justify his actions in terms of a regional bid for power: “The motives which

have made me to part from the Negus [Haile Selassie] is not because he has hurt me but

because the whole Government has been taken away from us after King John’s death.

Since then the Scioa Government has ruled even the Tigrai in a very bad manner trying to

squash it as they know that we have not given up hoping to rule again. I can illustrate it:

21
Bahru, Pioneers, pp.95-98, 131, 144.

93
During the Ethiopian Empire from Menelik to Negus 50 years nobody [from] the Tigrai

has been given a chance by the Negus. Government was exclusively Scioa.”22

Similar sentiments regarding monopoly of power by Shoans were expressed in Gojjam by

Ras Hailu Teklehaymanot, who was already alienated as conniver and sympathizer to the

party of Lij Iyassu. It was in this spirit that the Gojjame lords Dejazmach Gesese Belew,

Fitawrari Tamrat, Fitawrari Gesese Niguse, Fitawrari Zeleke Kassa, Fitawrari Zeleke

Welle, Qenazmach Ayele Hailu, Qenazmach Merid Wasse, and Qenazmach Zeleke

Asege betrayed the king and returned home soon after the outbreak of the war, in early

December 1935. The Emperor seems very much incensed by the crumbling of his flank

prior to the decisive battle at Maichew; so much so that he immediately issued a

declaration against the perpetrators, and Abune Qerlos followed this with anathema (27

December 1935). In Wallo the grievance against Shoa was sharpened by the fate of Lij

Iyassu, though the dynastic and distinctive religious overtone was not yet pronounced in

terms of explicit Orthodox–Muslim or Amhara–Oromo dichotomy.23

In general, the power rivalries between regional nobilities did seldom have pan-ethnic or

anti-Ethiopian aspirations. But resentments against the political center gradually

arrogated to Shoa an ethnic character and nurtured an anti-Shoa ideology which matured

during the Italian interregnum. In many places both in the north and south the betrayal

was not limited to mere surrender to Italians but included active hostility and attack

against the Ethiopian army. The peasants of Maichew, Yejju and Wajirat, for instance,

attacked and robbed the retreating Ethiopian army after the Maichew debacle. In the

22
MoI Files: Guksa File, p.1.
23
Tedla Zeyohannes, Italia Be’Etyopia (Addis Ababa:2004E.C), p.64.

94
Ogaden, the Italian indigenous army led by a Somali chief Welol Jille fought the army of

Dejazmach Beyene Merid. The conquest and pacification of Ethiopia was achieved with

vital assistance by Raya irregulars, Somali and Hamassien askaris as well as indigenous

banda. Everywhere, the disoriented imperial army was harassed and much of the job of

hunting down and exterminating patriots during the course of the occupation was done by

Ethiopian renegades.24

The Italians inflicted in five years a damage which still haunts the Ethiopian nation.

Italian ideology was not a mere replica of the ‘divide and rule’ of benign colonialism, but

a reflection of the new Fascistic phenomenon which was based on the belief in brute

force, quasi racial theories such as Social Darwinism, and genocidal tendencies. Their

administrative policy was singularly devoted to foment communal hatred, conflict and

crisis by dividing Ethiopian people on several planes: ethnic, linguistic, religious,

regional, class, generational and occupational. Accordingly, the first major category

consisted of the so-called Semitic-Cushitic dichotomy based on quasi racial and linguistic

criteria of origin. The Semites were the peoples of “Tigre and Shoa, Gojjam and

Begemedir, and the entire Amhara”, while the Cushites were “those located in the

western and southern parts of Ethiopia such as Wollega, Jimma, Sidamo, Arusi and

others...”25 The second major division was that between the Amhara and non-Amhara,

which contextually had both ethnic, linguistic, regional and even class implications. A

crucial variation of this was Shoa, which sometimes overlapped with Amhara but often

constituted an exclusive group with regional and class dimensions, administratively

24
Belete, “Agrarian Polity,” p.88, on the Italian distribution of armaments to the Somali and other Islamic
populations of the region such as the Arusi Oromos during an impending defeat in 1941.
25
Tekle-Tsadiq Mekuria, YeEtyopia Tarik Katse Tewodros Iske Kedamawi Hailesilassie(Addis
Ababa:1936E.C), pp.306-307.

95
defined even in contradistinction with the Amhara. The third major dichotomy was

between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, which roughly overlapped with the above

divisions.

In addition to destroying the social fabric of the nation, Italian colonial ideology was

aimed at wiping out any traces of Ethiopian nationalism, its history, values, symbolisms,

institutions and the social classes that were considered as its carriers. It attempted to erase

the very name Ethiopia from history and memory by subsuming the country under Italian

East Africa and setting up ethnic regions instead. The Italians waged propaganda to

discredit the Emperor and the entire institution of the monarchy in the eyes of the

Ethiopian people. 26 They set out to destroy, remove, or ship off national heritages,

statues, monuments, pictures and documents. They replaced the Ethiopian flag by their

own, denigrated the national lion and symbolized the conquest of Ethiopia by erecting the

Lion of Judah statue and the historical Aksum Obelisk in their city squares. These

symbols had resonance in the national imagination so that even the lions in the city zoo,

considered as signifiers of the nation, were killed by patriotic Ethiopians immediately

before the Italian entry.27

The Italians also targeted for cooption and ultimate destruction particularly two social

classes. The first and most entrenched constituted the ruling aristocracies throughout the

country, not even sparing minor clan chiefs in the peripheral areas. In Gambella, for

example, the initial Italian approach as liberators from Ethiopian rule, coupled with their

generous distribution of food and clothing to the chiefs and the common people, had

26
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, pp.30-31.
27
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.69.

96
gained them cautious support. Many Anywaa and Nuer also joined the colonial army for

its attractive pay. However, the native people began to turn against the Italians when the

latter mistreated and executed Anywaa and Majangir chiefs on the slightest of pretexts,

often considering them as mobilizers of traditional resistance.28 The second target was an

urbanized miniscule class of modern intelligentsia, which, despite its small size and urban

‘softness’, staged a determined and heroic resistance at all phases of the Ethio-Italian

conflict. It is a testimony to Italy’s deliberate genocidal intent that this fledgling class was

nipped in the bud during and subsequent to the 19 February 1937 massacre.29

Italian ethnic policy was also aimed at destroying and demoralizing what had been

regarded as the twin pillars of Ethiopian nationalism, the Amhara and the Orthodox

Church. Italians deliberately cultivated anti-Amhara sentiments recasting local grievances

in ethnic terms and calling for historical redress. In southern and western parts of

Ethiopia, what had been a cultural-religious conception of Amhara as a dominant

Christian minority also attained ethnic connotation, and the military administrative

‘neftegna’(a multiethnic elite class composed of mainly ethnic Amhara, Tigre including

Eritreans, Oromos and other groups of Shoan origin) was arrogated to the Amhara.30 In

some of the peripheral areas, this highlander community was denoted by a broader

derogatory term, ‘Abesha’. Interestingly, in what was delineated as Amhara region

Italians emphasized Shoan ‘racial impurity’ vis-a-vis, and its inequity against, ethnic

Amharas. Hence, the anti-Shoa ideology overlapped with a wider anti-Amhara sentiment

28
Oral Informant: George Nicolas. Evans-Pritchard, “Further Observations,” pp.63, 73.
29
Bahru, Pioneers, p.35.
30
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.99, 259: The highlander community was isolated and exposed to ethnic
attack in southwestern regions Jimma, Illubabor and Wollega. The most brutal reprisal occurred in Jimma,
where Abba Jobir declared to reward thirty birr for one Amhara head.

97
during the Italian occupation. This deliberate ethno-phobia laid the basis for the future

homespun ethno-nationalist ideologies and hate theories as the subsequent chapters

would attempt to illustrate.31

The Italians were also the first to introduce an administrative structure based exclusively

on ethnicity, again mainly concerned with ensuring the ethnic divisions of the historic

nation by bringing all Tigre, Somali, and most of the Amhara under respective

administrative structures. According to Sbacchi, in applying ethnic principles in the

structuring of the Italian East Africa "the main Italian concern was the elimination of the

Amhara’s claim to superiority over other populations. [They] framed the division of

Ethiopia into Governorships in such a way that [this] hegemony was eliminated.

Employing Amhara in government offices and using the Amharic language in non-

Amhara territories was prohibited."32 But the country’s diversity posed a challenge, as it

still does, against cantonizing/balkanizing it along a clean ethnic formula. This was

among the reasons for resorting to the Semitic – Cushitic dichotomy by lumping the

greater half of the country into a Galla – Sidama administrative region. In addition, they

applied the laws of Eritrea in the Amhara and Shoa regions, whereas that of Somalia was

applied in Harar and Galla-Sidama regions.

While the structural framework had the long term objective of giving it a life of its own,

the separation of Shoa was based on the isolation and insurance of control over the

31
It is hard to find redeeming qualities in Fascist administration, say, for instance, the abolition of slavery
and serfdom, which obviously was a prelude to the bondage of the entire nation. Colonialism and
democracy are incompatible ideologies, and the sadly overlooked part is that Fascism in Ethiopia has
committed atrocities with the same intent and purpose, if not scale, to contemporaneous German
Nazism.
32
Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London: Zed Books,
1985), p.159.

98
heartland of Ethiopian nationalism and resistance. A concomitant of the ethnic policy was

the encouragement of local languages to rival Amharic and weaken its role as instrument

of national integration. Hence Italian, Amharic, Tigrigna, and Arabic were made the main

administrative languages in Africa Orientale Italiana. 33 In the southern part of the

country, Arabic as well as Oromina and Kaficho were made legal and instructional

languages. 34 The overall ethnic and language policy left its indelible mark on the

subsequent ideas of Greater Tigray or Tigray – Tigrign, Greater Somalia, and even

Greater Oromia, all of which were conceived in contradistinction with a ‘Shoan-

Amharan other’. The British had too attempted, in addition to encouraging the idea of

Greater Somalia, to perpetuate the idea of ‘Greater Tigray’ by continuing to administer

Tigray from Asmara rather than Addis Ababa in the early period of liberation.35

Ethnic and religious balkanization, however, did not fare well as a policy of governance

as it did as a war strategy. General Rodolfo Grazziani’s plan to terrorize and punish

Ethiopians, by replicating his brutal measures in Libya, worked against Italian

administration by intensifying more determined, widespread and coherent resistance in

the country. The exiled Emperor prophetically noted in his speech at Geneva on 30 June

1936 the turn of events: “Italian aggression forced Ethiopian nobles/officials to come

closer around their monarch more than ever.“ 36 The 19 February 1937 massacre

ultimately revealed the true character of Fascism, as it did not spare any Ethiopian and

33
MoI Files: No., 1.2.70.19, Governo Generale Dell’Africa Orientale Italians, 1939.
34
Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under, pp.160-61.
35
Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power,” p.121.
36
Emperor’s speech at Geneva.

99
did not make the usual distinction between class or creed, region or race, etc. This

became a watershed event determining the course of the patriotic resistance.

The patriotic struggle was an outstanding achievement, without doubt the first of its kind

in the nation’s history, which once again proved that Ethiopian nationalism has deeper

historical and social base than its detractors would acknowledge. The patriotic war has

occasionally been misrepresented as a self-serving war of a section of the feudal nobility,

and a less brazen interpretation accords to the British forces a vital, even indispensable,

role in the liberation of Ethiopia. 37 The resistance was, however, a truly national

phenomenon both in its scale, geographical spread, and political objectives. As Italians

themselves acknowledged it was the tenacity of the internal resistance which ultimately

wore down their administrative and military efforts. What did the patriots fight for and

pay dearly in life and limb? Did they have a supreme unifying ideal or was the whole

endeavor a spontaneous resistance with petty causes?

The total conquest of Ethiopia had been as terrifying as the wars of Gran and sent

shockwaves throughout the nation. As Tedla described it “the Ethiopian army

disintegrated seeming never to reconstitute again. There descended great calamity and

sorrow on the country and the people. Nobody could be found who knew the solution.”38

From the initiation of a propaganda campaign against Italy on the eve of the war to the

conclusion of the patriotic resistance in 1941, Ethiopian nationalism demonstrated its

resilience and supra-class, supra-ethnic, supra-regional and supra-religious nature. Shoa,

37
Similar counterfactuals are veritable grist for the mills of ethno-nationalist writers.
38
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.67.

100
which had for ages been an emporium of socio-cultural interaction and integration, once

again proved these true attributes of Ethiopian nationalism.

At the outset, the resistance did face several seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the

most important of which was how to convince the peasantry to accept the struggle in

terms of nationalism. From firsthand experience in Bulga, Mugere Zale area, Mitte

locality, Tedla Zeyohannes reminisces:"...For a peasantry, country is its immediate

locality. To elevate the concept of country from this narrow sentiment to the level of

Ethiopia became a serious problem. If it surpassed Mitte, it refused to go beyond Mugere

Zale. After lengthy deliberations [however] a general consensus was reached on not to

submit to the enemy.”39 Then the resistance to Italian occupation began on the parish

level, organized in traditional units called Ye’gobez Aleqa, and was enforced by public

opinion and communal punishment such as ostracization. 40 Local churches served as

centers of anti-Italian propaganda and rendezvous for patriots and supporters.

The localized(Yegobez Aleqa) and multiethnic nature of the guerrilla war was a serious

hurdle for the creation of a national front under a supreme command and unifying ideal

specially during the first there years. Regional, ethnic, religious, even personalities

interfered in the relationship between the various armies.41 Especially among the patriots

39
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.67. Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, pp.22,29
40
Oral Informant: Desta Gebremariam. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.76-77, 496-497, relates an interesting
incident about a man named Habte-Eyesus who refused either to fight the Italians or even stay neutral.
The community passed “ a decision to ostracize him, to refuse him fire, burial in the parish graveyard,
passage of himself and his cattle anywhere except ‘king’s road’. Then, realizing the determination of the
neighborhood, he repented and asked for mercy on the third day. He stood with the people.”
41
For example, the souring of relationship between Lij Wessen Hailu of Wag and Dejazmach Negash
Worqneh of Simen had brought the two leaders to the brink of war in early 1940. This incident was
allegedly aggravated by the former’s ambition to assert himself on the overall command of the northern
front. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.252,348. There were also several instances, between Lij Hiwot Haderu
and Dejazmach Bire, and Dejazmach Yohannes Iyassu and Ras(Amoraw) Wubneh in Gonder; between Lij

101
of Shoa, the question of a paramount leader had been circulating, though initially it did

not get serious appeal because of the oddity of crowning another king while the

incumbent is alive. However, by mid-1937, a number of factors moved the patriots

towards appointing a national leader. Among these were the failure of the 1936 attempt to

takeover Addis Ababa, and the 1937 Graziani massacre at Addis Ababa, Debre Birhan,

the monasteries of Debre Libanos, Zena Marqos and Ziquala, which made evident the

brutality of Italian rule. Therefore, after deliberating for four days from 26-30 August

1937 Shoan patriots crowned the son of Lij Iyassu, a fifteen years old youngster named

Engdashet, as Melake Tsehay Iyassu who, however, died on 7 October 1938.42

The death of the prince on the one hand put to rest the question of two kings under one

sky, on the other it revitalized the demand for an overarching patriotic organization to

continue the struggle. Hence the predecessor of the Tintawit Etyopia Jegnoch Mahber

(Ancient Ethiopia Patriots’ Association) was conceived on 2 November 1938 at a place

called Anqelafagn in Tegulet. Deliberately or fortuitously coinciding with the coronation

anniversary of Emperor Haile Selassie, the association’s foundation charter pledged

unwavering faithfulness to the imperial state.43 A declaration on 21 December 1938 by

Ras Abebe Aregay, who emerged as the overall commander of the patriotic resistance,

also indicates the attempt to perform simultaneous administrative activities, to protect the

Hailu Belew and Dejazmach Belay Zeleke, and Bitweded Negash Bezabih and Dejach Mengesha Jembere
in Gojjam, between the various leaders in Shoa including Ras Abebe Aregay, Qenazmach Hailemariam
Mamo and others, etc. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.337-346.
42
Oral Informant: Tedla Zeyohannes. There were also attempts in Gonder and Wello to crown another
son of Lij Iyassu, Yohannes Iyassu, supported by Bilata Takele Wolde-Hawaryat and Bilata Deresa Amente.
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, p.31.
43
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.215.

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peasantry from the predatory lawlessness of the early phase and bring some kind of order

into the dispersed resistance effort.44

The five years of heroic struggle was based on the capacity of Ethiopians at the

grassroots for self-regeneration. Not only the readiness of Ethiopians to sacrifice for the

‘Mother Land’, the Flag and the King, but also their faith in the restoration of liberty of

the nation, their perseverance in the fight against all odds and in the absence of a

paramount national leader, and their ultimate success in reorganizing the resistance across

regional and personal divides was a telling tribute to the virility of the national idea and

its deep roots among the common people. In fact, it was the search for a unifying

ideology which led to selective recreation and revival of a truly national sentiment

expressed in terms of country, flag and king. A declaration by the patriots in August 1938

demonstrates the national conception of the struggle and its objectives.

ስማ ስማ የኢትዮጵያ ተወላጅ የሆንህ ሁሉ!

…የኢትዮጵያ ልጆች አማራ፣ ጋላ፣ ሱማሌ፣ አዳል፣ ሻንቅላ ሳንባባል ሁላችንም ለኢትዮጵያ ልጆቿ እኩል ወንድማማች ነንና

ወዳንድ በኩል ተደባልቀን የጋራ ጠላታችንን አብረን ማጥፋት የተገባን ነን፡፡…

እንግዲህ አይዟችሁ በርቱ ፣ ኢትዮጵያ እናት አገራችን እንደገና ልትታደስልንና በየርስታችን እንድንገባ ነፃነታችን ሊመለስልን

ነው፡፡ በያባቶቻችን ርስት ገብተን፣ በሃይማኖታችን ጸንተን በሥራ ላይ እየተባበርን ጥቅሙ ለሁላችንም እንዲሆንና

እንድንረዳዳ፣ እንድንፋቀርም፣ ለአንድ ለኢትዮጵያ እናት አገራችን በእውነት እንድናገለግላት ያድርገን አሜን! ::45

44
MoI Files :No. SH¨m 07.11 Ye’Arbegnoch Awajoch: 1930-33 EC. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.125, 285.
45
MoI Files:No. SH¨m 07.11 Ye’Arbegnoch Awajoch 1930-33 EC.

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 “Hear You, Hear You, all the sons of Ethiopia!

All the children of Ethiopia, without calling each other Amhara, Galla, Somali,

Adal, Shanqilla, are equal brothers and it is appropriate that we shall unite to

destroy our common enemy.

Now take heart that our Motherland Ethiopia is to be renewed, our freedom

restored and our inheritance to be reinstated. May God help us reclaim our

fathers’ heritage, persevere in our respective faith, work hand in hand for common

benefit, help and love each other, and truthfully serve one Ethiopia our

Motherland. Amen!”

2.2 The Genesis of Modern Ethiopianism

As it was a pillar of a reviving modern Ethiopian nationalism and pride, the patriotic war

had borne in it the seeds of future social and political divisions. For example, the

overwhelming dominance of Shoan patriots at all stages of the war and the proportionate

claims they made had generated a postwar crisis which Haile Selassie found hard to put

down. This was Ethiopia’s first test of a government taken hostage by liberation

legitimacy.46 The division into arbegna, sidetegna, and banda was based not merely on

one’s stand regarding Italian rule or on loyalty to the Emperor but on the very loyalty to

the national idea and its dismal rewards immortalized in the following couplet.

ሀገሬ ኢትዮጵያ ሞኝ ነሽ ተላላ፣ የሞተልሽ ቀርቶ የገደለሽ በላ፡፡

46
For example, in his Ye’Etyopia Tarik published three years after the liberation, pp.307-310, Tekle-Tsadiq
enumerates the most renowned patriotic leaders: from Shoa (including Amhara, Oromo and Gurage:75),
Tigre(3), Gojjam(12), Seqota(3), Gondar(1), Begemedir(5). Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, pp.33-35.

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The patriots were of two main categories. The first group was those who fought for the

liberation of the country and restoration of the state, though not necessarily of the

Emperor. At the center of this group were prominent Shoan patriots whose determination

saved the fragmented resistance and served as the core of a national patriotic front. The

second group consisted of those who fought a local war with local objectives, and

continued throughout the period of occupation in the fashion of a traditional bandit.

Sbacchi, for instance, goes as far as saying that Belay Zeleke was “a professional shifta

who...was not fighting for Ethiopia but for the independence of Gojam.”47 This assertion

seems to emanate from a misreading of the subtle and often contradictory interplay of the

personal, regional and national spheres at various stages of the struggle. Nevertheless, it

draws attention to this unreliable category, which also included those who at some stage

of the war shifted sides back and forth, and as fiercely fought other patriotic groups on

sundry pretexts as they did the Italians. Over and above these two were also the so-called

‘Ye’wist arbegna,’ an entitlement practically open to anyone who could muster an

affidavit.

The renegades were also of two categories. The banda, who to the end stuck to the

Italians and feared reprisals from the Ethiopian government and the patriots. Especially

the renegade nobilities of the northern regions were apprehensive of their unenviable

position and the intensity of public opinion against them.48 Hence they attempted to avert

the inevitable by either seeking in the name of ‘their people’ protection from the British

47
Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness. Ethiopia and Fascist Italy: 1935-1941(1997), p.183. Tedla, Italia
Be’Etyopia, p.243, also relates an incident about Belay Zeleqe’s indifference to the Italian army retreating
from Gojjam to Wello while he had fought its attempt to enter Gojjam from Wello. This issue had been
later used in the allegations against Belay.
48
Dejazmach Hailesilassie Gugsa and Ras Hailu Tekle-Haymanot belong to the first category, while some
like Ras Seyoum Mengesha and Dejazmach Ayalew Biru relented at the last minute.

105
or even from the departing Italians, or in some cases even the Somalis and international

organizations. All of these failing, most were bent on creating as much instability to the

government as they could muster among their peoples. The second division consisted of

some ethno-religious groups such as the Raya’na Azebo, Wajirat, and Welene which, as

auxiliaries to the Italians, committed attacks on the retreating Ethiopian army, hunted and

harassed the patriots, and even used Italian equipped armaments to continue traditional

raids on neighboring communities.49 These feared reprisals not only from the state and

the patriots but also from their neighboring communities.

The Emperor himself belonged to a third category, Sedetegnoch (Exiles), which he

attempted to use as a voice of moderation and reconciliation. In the immediate postwar

period he was confronted with a conundrum of social and political forces created by the

Italian occupation and the patriotic resistance. This was a historic moment which defined

the future of modern Ethiopia and the forms its nationalism adopted. Why do historians

maintain that the Italian war had been indirectly advantageous to the restored Emperor by

removing most of his cardinal regional rivals? How is this so? On the contrary, the war

seems to have made Haile Selassie weaker, as his exile destroyed whatever political clout

the Emperor established, created new rivals who based their claims on achievements in

the patriotic wars, in addition to preserving intact the major regional hereditary rivals as

collaborators and bandas. 50 Haile Selassie’s formidable initial task was to establish a

working order in the government which could accommodate the melee of claims and

counter-claims from these rivals.

49
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.129, 131, 209.
50
Some patriots like Dejach Fikremaryam and Blata Takele had considered the Emperor’s exile as
treasonous act which will blacken Ethiopia’s honour. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.66.

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Throughout the war, Emperor Haile Selassie had maintained links with various patriotic

groups in the country and abroad. Now, he made his redemption known to the people of

Ethiopia in a radio broadcast as soon as he set foot in Khartoum. On 9 July 1940, the

first written declaration was aerially distributed urging Ethiopians to persevere in their

liberation struggle. An Amharic weekly named Bandirachin was founded in the Sudan by

Ato (later Professor) Tamrat Amanuel and Blata Sirak Hiruy and its copies were

distributed by airplane along with other pamphlets and flyers. When victory seemed

within sight, on 20 January 1941(12 Tir 1933), the Emperor addressed his message to

“the People of My Country Ethiopia” and reminded all citizens to look forward to the

promises of the future rather than the bitterness of the past. In that spirit he granted

pardon to all who knowingly or unknowingly collaborated with the Italians to “destroy

the Ethiopian state and people.”51

Again the opening lines of his victory speech on 5 May 1941 projected a new national

image: “...What I want to tell you before everything else and desire you to understand is

that this is the day heralding a new historic era for the new Ethiopia...In the new Ethiopia,

We desire you to be a people who will never be discriminated, who have equality and

freedom before the law...It is Our foremost desire and objective to do a work that benefits

people and country by establishing in Ethiopia a government which respects and protects

religion, and by permitting the freedom of conscience to the people...“52 In short, Haile

Selassie’s restoration promise was: a new Ethiopia where liberty, equality and fraternity

will prosper.

51
MoI Files: No.1.2.4.15: The Emperor’s declaration to the people of Ethiopia, Tir 12, 1933/ 20 January
1941.
52
Tekle-Tsadiq, Ye’Etyopia Tarik, pp.335, 341, 342.

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Accordingly, the initial political measures were intended to allay peoples’ fears and

grievances created by the power vacuum. On 12 June 1941, the imperial state issued a

declaration to the people of Wollega noting Italian ethnic and religious divisiveness and

the government’s renewed determination to bring about ethnic equality in Ethiopia. On 3

November 1941, another declaration outlined significant administrative reforms in Tigre

(abolishing regular tiklegna, continuing only the usual ‘fixed tax’, provisionally assigning

three judges per awraja to be elected by the governor, and prohibiting billeting of

soldiers), which was tantamount to affirming the traditional autonomy of the region.

These were among the moves intended to reassure the people of the various regions, as it

was to the respective ruling aristocracy, and to counter Italian propaganda.53

There have been widely divergent views regarding substance and direction of the national

ideology and policy of the imperial state after restoration. The ‘assimilationist’ school

regarded the overall objective as one of creating a homogenous nation by directly or

indirectly imposing a single language (Amharic), a single religion (Orthodox

Christianity), and a single culture (that of the Amhara) over the diverse peoples of

Ethiopia. This is dubbed by ethno-nationalist ideologues as ‘Amharization’ of

Ethiopians.54 The ‘integrationist’ view, on the other hand, considers the overall attitude

and effort as rather one of building up a unified national society, not in a consciously

promoted policy of assimilation but as a byproduct of centralization and modernization.55

Ethnicity was, therefore, stringently censured by government and integration was rather

53
MoI Files: Emperor’s edict to the people of Tigre, 24 Tikimt 1934/ 3 December 1941. Tedla, Italia
Be’Etyopia, p.111.
54
This appears a dominant view held not exclusively by ethno-nationalists but also other indigenous and
expatriate scholars. See, for instance, Edmond Keller, “Ethiopia: Revolution” and Wudu Tafete, “The
Ethiopian Orthodox Church.”
55
John Markakis, “Social Formation and Political Adaptation in Ethiopia”, JMAS, II,3(1973),pp.361,370.

108
implicitly pursued. 56 The crucial media of cultural and national integration were,

according to this view, the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity and a standardized

national education. Social mobility was another instrument of national integration, an

abiding feature of the historic nation which became more relevant in the context of a

modernizing drive.

Haile Selassie’s primary efforts even before the Italian occupation were centralization of

power, economic modernization and laying out the legal and institutional infrastructure

for national integration. These were the cardinal prerequisites of modern nationalism

which became more urgent in the period following liberation. In other words, the

insurance of Ethiopia’s survival must be followed by the rejuvenation of its nationalism

and in this respect the government was dealing with the main challenges faced by

modernizing states: “...identity: fostering a common sense of purpose among culturally

diffuse groups..” and “...integration: the creation of a coherent set of relationships among

the many groups and interests competing for access and control within the new state

framework.”57

How did the state attempt to create a unified national community and a pan-Ethiopian

sentiment? Or, how did it attempt to bridge the historical, social and cultural divides

among various groups and inculcate a supra-ethnic ideology of Ethiopianism? The

overall process of creating a national polity with a ‘higher culture’ which could be called

‘Ethiopian’ was mainly pursued at the political (including legal and administrative) and

56
Ibid, p.372. Christopher Clapham, “Centralization and Local Response in Southern Ethiopia”, African
Affairs, 74, 294(Oxford University Press: 1975), p.78. Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” pp.120
& 121.
57
Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: an Introduction (University of Wisconsin:1985/1988), p.16.

109
cultural (including public education and mobilization) levels. It is appropriate to analyze

this by looking at the symbolism, mythology and history employed in the task, as well as

the simultaneous legal and organizational restructuring, and the formal and informal

means of dissemination of the national ideology.

Symbolizing the Nation

The Ethiopian state, as we have seen in the previous chapter, has a wealth of traditions,

values and symbolisms firmly based on the ideology of the historic nation. Among the

paramount institutions of the nation, the Crown stood for the continuity and glory of the

state, the Church for its religious purity, and both enjoyed a symbiotic relationship

through the ages. In the tradition of Eastern Orthodox churches, the monarchy was the

titular head of the church and a symbolic embodiment of both church and state.

Therefore, any serious challenge to Ethiopian nationalism primarily affected these two

institutions. The decision to preserve the monarchy as the symbol of Ethiopian unity was

at the very heart of Emperor Haile Selassie’s exile during the Italian invasion. As

supporters of the measure said: “ግርማዊነትዎ ህያው ከሆነ ኢትዮጵያም ህያው ትሆናለች፡፡“58

The tentative expressions of modern Ethiopian nationalism in the prewar period

underscored the inseparability between the nation’s political and spiritual sovereignty. As

early as the 1920s, there was a perception that the national independence of Ethiopia

could not be completed without its independence from Egyptian religious hegemony.

This had initiated an official campaign which resulted in the consecration of four

58
Tekle-Tsadiq, Ye’Etyopia Tarik, p.289.

110
Ethiopian bishops in Alexandria in 1929, and culminated in the full autochthonous status

of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in 1959 by the consecration of the first Ethiopian

patriarch.59 In the prewar period, Haile Selassie established the Ethiopian flag as a formal

symbolic expression of the nation. The ceremonial display of the flag as a component of

state etiquette was evident soon after Teferi’s ascent to power. On several important

occasions the flag was used to decorate the streets and buildings of the city: on 27 Tikemt

1909 (6 December 1916) heroic welcome to Teferi after the Segele victory over Nigus

Michael; on 3 and 4 Yekatit 1909( 10 and 11 February 1917), on the occasion of

Zewditu’s coronation; on 29 Nehassie 1916( 4 September 1924), on Terferi’s return from

the European sojourn.60

After restoration, the imperial state’s efforts in creating, recreating and systematizing

national symbolism and ideology was centered on the proto-nationalism of the historic

nation. One of the most elaborate expressions of such exercise was the Ti’emirte Mengist

(Symbol of the State), an artistic representation of the throne called Menbere Mengist

(Seat of Government) symbolically encapsulating the entire ideology of Ethiopian

nationhood. Though Ethiopian kings have been known to use royal insignias from time

immemorial, the modern Ti’emirte Mengist is believed to have been designed by an

Ethiopian intellectual named Hailemariam Serabion at about 1904/05(1897 E.C.). During

the reign of Emperor Menelik II, this design of the throne was printed in Europe and

displayed at various places in Ethiopia.61

59
Brehanena Selam, 10/3/27. Wudu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church”, p.205.
60
Aleqa Gebre-Egziabher, Biographies, pp. 78-79, 85, 149.
61
MoI Files: No. 63.1.15.18, Ye’ti’emirte Mengist Tarik, 1937EC.

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Each figure in the design of the Ti’emirte Mengist was intended to convey specific

messages which added up into a complete narrative of national value, culture and history.

The globe figure at the center declared that Ethiopia is one amongst the nations of the

world; the crown represented the glory of its kings and statehood. The cross symbolized

Ethiopia’s belief in the name of God and his ordinance; that God preserves her due to the

purity of her faith. And His promise and mercy for Ethiopia is represented by the rainbow

arch. The lion stood for the heroism of Ethiopians as well as its kings; and the heraldry

‘Moa Anbesa ze’Imnegede Yihuda’, which is an allusion to Christ (Revelation: 5:5), also

denoted the Judaic origin of Ethiopian emperors. The lion carrying the national flag

indicated that Ethiopia has believed in Christ and been preserved by His succor.62 This

meta-symbol remained an expression of the unity of nation and state until 1974(see

appendix I).

The unifying symbolism of the national flag, which is an artifact of modern nationalism,

was very important in rallying the patriotic struggle. It was the paramount emblem of

national unity in the highly uncertain couple of years after the Emperor’s exile. The

patriots erected the flag whenever they held court, and throughout the war it represented

the freedom, patriotism as well as the continuity of the Ethiopian nation. The symbolism

had even sparked international reaction as witnessed in the pitched resistance of

Ethiopian monks at the Jerusalem Monastery to foil Italian attempt to lower the national

62
MoI Files: No.63.1.15.18: “›”ud¨< ¾›=ƒÄåÁ” c”Åp ¯LT SgŸS< ›=ƒÄåÁ u¡`e„e ›U“ u[É›?~ }Öwn
S•`ª” ÃÑMéM:: Ÿ²=IU uk` ¾›=ƒÄåÁ ’ÑY ƒ ŸÃG<Ç ’ÑÉ Ÿ}¨KŨ< ŸÇ©ƒ MÏ ŸcKAV” }¨LÏ’ƒ eLL†¨<&
›”ud¨< ¾”Ñ<W ’ÑY~ UdK? J• ¾›=ƒÄåÁ” c”Åp ¯LT Öwq ›eŸwa uT•\ Ã}[ÔTM:: When the Italians took
Haile Selassie’s throne to Rome, they cut out the flag from the paws of the lion. The repatriated throne which is now displayed in the
National Museum has the lion without the flag.

112
flag and overtake the monastery.63 Emperor Haile Selassie’s war propaganda, in contrast

to Yohannes’ and Menelik’s, embodied the flag and the king as the symbolic duo of

Ethiopian nationalism. His first act as soon as he set foot on Ethiopian soil on 20 January

1941 was to hoist the national flag at Omedla. Again on his arrival at Debre Marqos on

30 March 1941, he reminded the patriots that they had been able to see in Gojjam the two

eternal symbols of the freedom they had fought for, i.e flag and king.64 In Addis Ababa

the power of this symbol had been strongly expressed when the victorious British hoisted

the Union Jack in the Jubilee palace on the morning of their entry on 5 April 1941. The

intensity of public indignation forced the British to hoist the Ethiopian flag on the same

afternoon in the precincts of the old palace.

For the first time in Ethiopian history, the flag attained prominence in national

consciousness during this period of national ordeal. We don’t find any comparable

emphasis even a generation earlier at Adwa. Though the color and design of the

Ethiopian flag were drawn from past cultural, religious and political values, the very

meaning of the term ‘ሰንደቅ ዓላማ’ translates into a sacred objective or destiny of the nation:
65
ተመልከት ዓላማህን፣ ተከተል አለቃህን፡፡” This marked a shift from the trinity of the historic nation -

country, religion and wife - to the symbolism of the modern nation. Even the postwar

national anthem differed from the prewar by the latter’s emphasis on these two elements

of king and flag.66 In the postwar period, the national flag became not only a symbol of

63
Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, pp.131, 319.
64
Tekle-Tsadiq, Ye’Etyopia Tarik, p. 329: “eƒÒÅK<Kƒ K’u[¨< ’é’ ‹G< kªT> J• ¾T>Ád¾¨<” G<K~” UM¡ƒ
uÔÍU KT¾ƒ un‹G< ›K<::”
65
eÒÄ” K”Ñ<Y ’õc?” K¡`e„e cØŠ }ªÓ‰KG< KUKT>~ v”Ç=^ c”Åp ¯LT‹” }SKc .c”Åp ¯LT‹G<”
d Øñ K›Ñ^‹G< ¾}ªÒ‹G<::

66
Berhanena Selam, 9,8,28. Contrast with Tarikna Misale.

113
national survival, independence and identity, but also an integral part of social life and

sentiment honoring most intimate and vital social events such as weddings, burials and

public holidays. It even served as an injunction to call somebody to account: ‘wedqo

betenesaw bandira!’, ‘be’bandiraw amlak!’, or ‘ere be’bandiraw!’ The Ethiopian flag

has additional global dimension by becoming an inspiring symbol for colonized people,

adopted first by pan-Africanists and later by many independent African states with some

variation.

Modern Ethiopian nationalism drew a part of its ideology from the period between Adwa

and the patriotic resistance by being defined vis-a-vis Italian colonialism as the

‘significant other’. This experience has left its mark on the articulation of the key

concepts and symbols of the nation. For instance, the now popular term ‘bandira’ is of

Italian origin and it gradually became common after the battle of Adwa, though it was

sparingly used prior to the five years of the Italian interlude. Gradually, ‘bandira’ even

permeated official discourse and almost totally replaced ‘Sendeq Alama’ in popular

usage. Another term “Guh “, also known and rejected by generations of Ethiopians,

featured first in folk poetry after the battle of Adwa and became increasingly common

after the Italian interregnum.67

In the literary works after the liberation, Habesha was used by Ethiopian writers to

satirize the national character, especially its ‘backwardness’ or ‘uncivilizedness’, like

‘y’abesha neger’ and ‘y’abesha ketero’. In his book Tarik’na Misale (Narrative and

Allegory) Kebede Michael had a lengthy poem titled “Eroro”(Litany) which related an

67
The Arabic term ‘›uh ‘ to denote Ethiopians is, to my knowledge, for the first time used in popular
poetry after the Adwa victory: ‘U’>M¡ }¨MÊ vÁ’d Òh& Ów\ ”lLM ’u` ÃI” Ñ>²? ›uh::... uc^¨< ¨Úö
vSר< `de& }ðÖS ×K=Á” ›uh ”ÇÃÅ`e::.. ›uh Ñ<É ›K ×K=Á” ¨}¨}& ®Ã’ Ø\¨< } i ÁK¨< ›v}::

114
imaginary exchange between an Italian officer and the author-character, the former

repetitively and condescendingly employing Habesha to denote Ethiopians. The wisdom

being a wakeup call for Ethiopians, it is but one of the ironies of history and social

psychology that Habesha was embraced as an alternative name for Ethiopia/n after the

departure of the Italians and at the very time when the Ethiopian state was striving to

erase the term ‘Abyssinina’ from international use.68

Emperor Haile Selassie was personally concerned with the task of instituting national

symbolism as an ideological expression of a reviving and modernizing state. The main

challenge in this endeavor was how to widen the proto-national ideas and symbolisms in

order to accommodate new concepts of citizenship and political liberalism. These

concerns were raised when a new ordinance for flags was issued in 1943/44(1936 EC). A

memorandum prepared for the Emperor in 1945/46(1938 E.C), after noting the antiquity

and sacrality of the Ethiopian flag and the religious significance of its rainbow colors,

elaborates the additional meaning it has acquired as a national symbol: the green

represents fertility, the yellow religion and hope, and the red blood or patriotism. In other

words, “ለምለሚቱ አገራችን በኃይማኖት ተስፋ የሚኖረው ህዝብሽ ደሙን ያፈስስልሻል ማለት ነው፡፡ “ 69 This is a

conception which is at one and the same time religious as well as secular, uniting country

and people in faith and patriotism. However, the religious element was gradually toned

down (by not explicitly referring to any particular religion) in the emerging public

interpretation and discourse of the postwar period. The textbook definition of the national

68
]¡“ UdK?&1— SîNõ& ŸƒUI`ƒ“ Y’ Øuw T>’>eƒ` }íð&(1934¯.U& ›Ç=e ›uv)::
69
Translates as “Our fertile country, your people who live on religious hope will spill their blood for you.”
MoI Files:No. 63.1.31.09, Yesendeq Alaman Sira’tina Yeaseqaqelun Endihum Yemiseqelbachewin Ba’ilat
Chimir Yemigelts Tarik, 1938 EC. A handwritten memorandum to the Emperor.

115
flag conveys that secular conception: “Our flag is a tricolor of green, yellow and red.

They symbolize: the green hope, fertility and wealth; the yellow religion, flower and

fruit; and the red love, sacrifice and patriotism.”70

After the 1950s, the national flag becomes a purely secular emblem symbolizing national

aspiration. In the 1950s, for instance, the imperial state formulated a system of

representation, protocol and ceremony for its major institutions based on the national

flag. The flags of the royal family comprised that of the Emperor, Empress and Crown

Prince. What were considered as flags of the State consisted of the National Flag, the

Army (Ground Forces) Flag, the Air Force Flag, the Navy Flag, the Maritime Division

Flag, and the Posts Flag. The most important of all these is the National Flag, which was

carefully designed to convey the core values of the historic nation, particularly reflecting

the unity of State, Crown and Church in a single national symbolism: በቀኝ በኩል ዘውድ የደፋና

በቀኝ መዳፉ ይዞ ቀራንዮ መስቀል የተሸከመ አንበሳ ገጽታው ወደ ተውለብላቢው በኩል ሆኖ በዓላማው መካከል ተስሎበታል፡፡

በመስቀሉም ላይ በጥብጣብ አምሳል የተሰራ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄራዊ ዓላማ ይታይበታል፡፡ This was the famous Moa

Anbessa figure: “At the center of the flag is drawn a crowned lion on the right side and

holding in its right paw the Holy Cross while looking towards the waving part. And on

the tip of the Cross is displayed the Ethiopian national flag drawn in the form of

strings.”71

This period saw some significant improvements particularly regarding the institution of

the flag vis-a-vis the new conceptions of national citizenship. One of these was the

symbolic separation of the crown from the state by assigning different flags for the two

70
]¡“ UdK?&1— SîNõ& ŸƒUI`ƒ“ Y’ Øuw T>’>eƒ` }íð&1934¯.U& ›Ç=e ›uv::
71
MoI Files: No. 1.2.70.17, Sile Sendeq Alama, p.70.

116
institutions. In addition, attempt was made to overcome the explicit partiality in the

symbolism of the national emblem, particularly that of the Cross-carrying lion for the

non-Christian population, by providing that: ህዝብ በታላላቅ በዓላት ቀን ስለበዓሉ ክብር በየቤቱ የሚሰቅለው፣

ወይም ህዝብ ዓላማ ይዞ እንዲሰለፍ በታዘዘ ጊዜ ይዞት የሚሰለፈው የኢትዮጵያ ብሄራዊ ዓላማ አንበሳ ሳይጨመርበት ልሙጥ ሆኖ

ሊሰናዳ ይችላል፡፡ “That the Ethiopia national flag which is hoisted at home by the public on

the occasion of major holidays or that the public carries when officially ordered to march

could be prepared plain, without the lion figure.”72 This indicates an attempt to extricate,

or at least to play down, the monarchy and the national flag from their exclusive

association with the traditions and values of the historic nation and give both supra-ethnic

and supra-religious aura. What consolidates this point is the fact that the flag of the

Ethiopian Orthodox Patriarchate, which was different from that of the state, was assigned

a green color, in spite of the church’s traditional and ideological prerogatives over the

‘rainbow’ colors.73

The Legal and Administrative Frameworks of Nationalism

Haile Selassie’s understanding of statesmanship and nationhood is arguably the first

which could be properly regarded as ‘modern’, as can be seen from the proclamation of

the written Constitution of 1931. A core element in this document was the establishment

of a stable monarchy, an institution that is free from the chaos and uncertainty of power

rivalries which had for millennia been a bane of the historic nation. The often criticized

restriction of the crown to the descendants of the Emperor (Articles 3 and 4), which

72
MoI Files: No. 1.2.70.17.
73
MoI Files: 1.2.70.17.

117
perhaps backfired due to the reality of the Italian interregnum, seems way beyond

personal glory and power play a rational measure which could have assured the

continuity of the monarchy as the unifying symbol of a modernizing nation. The Emperor

had clearly explained the reason for this decision: “In order to prevent any uncertainty as

to the succession to the Throne and avoid the gravest injury to Ethiopia, the right to the

Imperial Throne is, by the present Constitution, reserved to the present dynasty.”74

The reservation clause could also be regarded as a bold step to divorce the monarchy

from its exclusive association with the historic nation, and logically the fiercest

opposition to it came from this direction. Haile Selassie’s staunchest rivals were regional

dynasties in the northern and central parts of the country - in Tigre, Wag, Lasta, Gojjam

and Wollo - where the main demands were the preservation of traditional and historical

privileges, and the acquisition of more share in national politics. This was the region

where there had been basic consensus on the ideals of the historic nation while

simultaneously posing serious challenge to hegemonic state nationalism.75

The other very significant aspect of the 1931 Constitution was the introduction of a

modern concept of Ethiopian citizenship and nationality, a civic-territorial concept which

accorded legal equality to all peoples within the boundaries of the state. “The territory of

Ethiopia, in its entirety, is, from one end to the other, subject to the Government of His

Majesty the Emperor. All the natives of Ethiopia, subjects of the Empire, form together

74
The 1931 Constitution: “G<Ÿƒ ”ÇÃ’d“ K›=ƒÄåÁ Ñ<ǃ ”ÇÁS×& ¾›=ƒÄåÁ ” W ’ÑYƒ SŠ¨<”U u=J”
u²=I IÑ S”ÓYƒ Ÿ}ðçSuƒ ƒ¨<MÉ ”ÇÃ¨× }¨e M::“

75
The Emperor mentions in his book, Hiwetena Ye’Ityopoia Ermija, I, p.147, his intention to issue a
constitution prior to his assumption of the throne. It is almost tempting to think what place the
reservation clause would have in it in light of the accusations of personal aggrandizement later attached
to the constitution of 1931.

118
the Ethiopian Nation.”76 The Amharic term of Geez origin, zegnet, which in the historic

nation stood for ‘subject’ had been a concept which did not embody the attendant rights

and duties of citizens.77 This constitution attempted to introduce modern ideas of duties

and rights of citizenship, however rudimentary in nature. By attaching nationality to the

territory of the empire, the constitution seemed to suggest a jus soli concept of

citizenship.

In his speech on the occasion of the signing of the constitution, on 16 July 1931, Emperor

Haile Selassie had outlined the key elements of the new law in seven points, the very first

of which was equality of all citizens before the law and the foundation of the Ethiopian

nation on a common unifying interest: “ኢትዮጵያ ወገን ያልተለየባት አንድ ቤተሰብ ሆና፣ ህዝቡ ባንድ ህግ ተወስኖ፣

ባንድ ንጉሠ ነገሥት ተገዝቶ በመተባበር እንዲኖር፣ ይኸውም የመተባበሩ ኃይል ለዘለቃ በሚያስተሳስር ጥቅም ተጠብቆ እንዲኖር፣

ለሰውም የግል ጥቅሙ ሳይቀርበት የመተባበር ኃይል እንዲያመዝንና የበለጠ እንዲሆን፣ ለያንዳንዱ ለየራሱ የሚሆነው ጥቅም ሳይቀርበት

የተለያየ ግለኛነት ፈላጊ እንዳይሆን ለማድረግ ነው፡፡“ “Ethiopia must remain united and undivided like the

members of a family. The country must be subjected to a common rule by a Constitution

and governed by an Emperor. The strength of this accord must be based upon community

of interests, in such a way that the individual, whilst renouncing every ambition of a

personal character contrary to the common weal, may understand the power of the union

and the advantages he can derive from it for safeguarding his personal interests, without

any surrender or prejudice to himself.”78 In this conception of nationalism, state, country

76
The 1931 Constitution, Article 1.
77
This term is used for instance in the Amharic version of the famous Wuchalle Treaty and many other
th
documents of the 19 century.
78
Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, p,424.

119
and people were bound together by a single law. “The Imperial Government assures the

union of the territory, of the nation and of the law of Ethiopia.”79

The Revised Constitution of 1955, which was promulgated on the occasion of the

Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Haile Selassie’s coronation (4 November1955), introduced

further provisions and refinements on national territory, citizenship and sovereignty. In

addition to outlining the extent of the national territory and introducing the concept of

national sovereignty, as distinct from the sovereignty of the Crown, the law emphasized

the indivisibility and inalienability of the two. But the national territory or the country

was not a purely physical expression because as ‘Empire’ it was integral to the crown.

Now, according to a Jus Sanguinis conception of citizenship, the Ethiopian people were

not only those who resided within the limits of its territory but also those Ethiopian born

and living outside the empire.80

Other vital introductions regarding nationalism were the provisions on the definition of

the national flag and the institution of Amharic as the official language of the empire.81

The emphasis on the secular and inclusive attributes of the national flag found legal

assurance by limiting it to a bare tricolor of green, yellow and red without the symbols of

the historic nation. The provisions for civil and religious rights also legalized what the

government had de facto been practicing. “There shall be no interference with the

exercise, in accordance with the law, of the rites of any religion or creed by residents of

79
Article 2 of the 1931 Constitution. Perham, The Government, p.425.
80 th
The Revised Constitution of 1955, NEGARIT GAZETA, 15 Year, No.2, Addis Ababa, November 4, 1955:
article 1; article 21.
81
Ibid.: Article 124:“The Flag of the Empire consists of three horizontal bands, the uppermost green, the
middle yellow and the nethermost red, in such detail as is determined by law.”Article 125: “The official
language of the Empire is Amharic.”

120
the Empire, provided that such rites be not utilized for political purposes or be not

prejudicial to public order or morality.”82

In a rather retrogressive step, however, the revised constitution reinstated the church as

an inseparable part of the monarchy. The Emperor and royal heirs were not only obliged

to profess the Ethiopian Orthodox faith, but also required to declare this formally in the

oath of coronation. The constitution further stamped the unity of church and state by

acknowledging the Emperor as the overall head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,83 as

well as by declaring the latter as the established religion of the empire and eligible to

support from the state. 84 It also completed the absolute character of the monarchy by

making the Emperor not only the supreme authority in all internal and external affairs of

the state but also making him the sole embodiment of political sovereignty, responsible

for ensuring the defence and integrity of the Empire and protecting the welfare and safety

of citizens.85

After a lapse of two decades, the 1974 Draft Constitution perhaps indicates some of the

changes and continuities in the conception of Ethiopian nationalism, particularly the core

elements of national territory, sovereignty and citizenship. This document reintroduced

the historical concept of the Ethiopian nation ‘Bihere Etyopia’ instead of the Ethiopian

Empire and gave the nation a modern territorial definition entirely divorced from the

Crown. “ብሔረ ኢትዮጵያ በኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ሙሉ ገዥነት ስር የሚገኘውን አገር ሁሉ፣ ባህሩን፣ ደሴቱን፣ ጠፈሩን ጭምር

82
The Revised Constitution, Articles 38 and 40.
83
Ibid., Articles 21, 127.
84
Ibid. Article 126. “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, founded on the fourth century, on the doctrines of
Saint Mark, is the Established Church of the Empire and is , as such, supported by the State. The Emperor
shall always profess the Ethiopian Orthodox Faith. The name of the Emperor shall be mentioned in all
religious services.”
85
Ibid: Articles 26, 30

121
 86
ያጠቃልላል፡፡“ It preserved the previous definition of the Ethiopian people, but made

popular sovereignty, rather than royal sovereignty, the sole and supreme expression of the

nation state. It also underlined the indivisibility and inseparability of the full sovereignty

of the country and the people, making the Ethiopian nation the sovereign unity of people

and territory. The constitution declared that Ethiopia will be administered by a

constitutional monarchy and preserved the Emperor as head of state and symbol of

Ethiopian unity and history. Article 23 introduced both the Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis

concepts of citizenship, that anyone born of any one of Ethiopian parents is Ethiopian and

that citizenship shall be inalienable except under extraordinary circumstances.87

The imperial government’s concepts of citizenship were seriously challenged in the

peripheral regions such as Borana and Gambella. In both regions, the claims of

indigenous status by Ethiopia-based groups such as the Borana and the Anywaa were

rivaled by mainly outside based ones such as the Somali and the Nuer respectively.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the imperial state gave primacy to the Borana and Anywaa

but did not deprive the Ethiopian Somali and Nuer their citizenship rights. The Ministry

of Interior rather tightened its control over the border and ordered regional governors to

use various ways to urge trans-border Somali and Nuer to accept Ethiopian nationality.

Emperor Haile Selassie, for instance, confirmed Ethiopia’s commitment to its Somali

citizens in his 1956 speech in the Ogaden: ‘We remind you finally that all of you are by

race, colour, blood and custom, members of the great Ethiopian family’.88 In 1960, a

commission formed to solve the rival claims between the two groups decided "...that the

86
The 1974 Draft Constitution, Article 1.1.
87
Ibid., Articles 1.2, 1.3, 5, 7, 23.
88
Ethiopian Observer, December 1956, cited in Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power,” p.116.

122
Somali of Borana were Ethiopians by virtue of their residence in the national territory

thereby ignoring the Borana argument that residence inside the country did not turn them

into Ethiopian citizens."89

Again most surprisingly, the provisions about the Emperor’s faith (Articles 9.1 and 9.2;

and article 13) as well as the succession clauses were retained with minor changes in the

1974 draft (Articles 10, 11.1, and 12). This draft also confirmed the Ethiopian flag

(Article 2) and maintained Amharic’s official status (Article 4). Nevertheless, it

attempted to accommodate new ethnic and linguistic concerns: by providing in articles

32.2 and 33.2 for the right to be judged in the language one understands; and, more

importantly, declaring in article 45 the right of Ethiopian tribes and clans to preserve,

cultivate and develop their languages and cultures: “የዚህ ህገ መንግሥት ሌሎች አንቀጾች እንደተጠበቁ
90
ሆነው፣ ኢትዮጵያውያን ነገዶችና ጎሳዎች ቋንቋቸውንና ባህላቸውን ለመጠበቅ፣ ለማዳበርና ለማሻሻል መብት አላቸው፡፡“

Ethiopia’s administrative structure had evolved through millennia as interplay of

geography, history and dynastic politics as noted above. The rationalization of provincial

administration was one of the concerns of the prewar intelligentsia; particularly notable in

this respect were Tedla Haile, Gebrehiwot Baykedagn and Teklehawariyat Teklemariam.

On the eve of the Italian invasion, Ethiopia was divided into 32 ‘Ghizats’.91 We have

seen above how the Italians attempted to institute a radical reorganization of the

89
Belete, “An Agrarian Polity”, p.256. Also pages 246-7, 250-51, & 255. For a strikingly similar
development in the Gambella region, see Tewodros, “Gambella: A History of Integration.”
90
The 1974 Draft Constitution.
91
Bahru, Pioneers, pp.117-120. Asmelash Beyene, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Regional
Administration in Ethiopia,” in Peter Treuner, etal(eds), Regional Planning and Development in Ethiopia, I,
(Addis Ababa: IDR and Instutut fur Raumordung und Entwicklungsplanug, 1985), p.130. Daniel Gemechu,
“A Nation in Perpetual Transition: the Politics of Changes in Administrative Divisions and Subdivisions in
th
Ethiopia,” 12 ICES, II,(1994),p99.

123
Ethiopian state. Haile Selassie has not even taken the full reins of power when he

annulled the Italian administrative structure by issuing the first “Ye’wist Agezaz Denb”,

on 25 November 1941, for governing what had so far come under his right.92 When this

was issued as Decree No.1 of 1942, it constituted a major step towards reorganization and

centralization which the state resumed with an unflagging zeal.

The imperial government was acutely aware of the ethnic basis of the Italian

administrative set up so that it consciously attempted to destroy any residues of that

structure. The new administrative configuration even did not entirely revert to the prewar

constitution of the empire. While maintaining the main regional outlines whenever

administratively feasible, it also tried to dilute the ethnic character of the subunits by

making constant readjustments. Decree No.6 of 1946 elevated the Awraja Ghizats to

Teklai Ghizats, Woredas to Awraja Ghizats, Meslenes to Woredas and also created

Meketel Woredas.

The internal administration regulation of 1948(1940 EC), which replaced the 25

November 1941 order, further enunciated the political organs and their constitution. For

instance, the provision regarding the Teklay Gizat Council(section V, no.24) stated:

“Seated at the Teklay Gizat’s capital, under the chairmanship of the Teklay Gizat

Governor, councilors which deliberate on development, public interest and good

governance will be selected from among local landlords and elders, one from each

awraja. The meeting of these is called the Teklay Gizat Council.” Similarly, while the

Teklay Gizat governors and deputy governors (section III, No.3,19,), Awraja Gizat

governors and directors (section X, no.52,54) , and Woreda Gizat governors and

92
MoI Files: No.1.2.68.05, Yagezaz Denb, a handwritten 75 pages document, 1940 E.C.

124
directors(section XV, no. 79, 91) are all appointed by the Emperor, the provision for local

administration(section XX, no.114) states that the Atbia Shum in every locality is selected

from among local landholders and resident personages of good standing by woreda

governor and appointed by Teklay Gezhi.93 All in all there were 12 Tekla Ghizats, 87

Awrajas, 387 Woredas and 1086 Mikitil Woredas. This structure was continuously

reformed based on various criteria, such as administrative efficiency, security,

development potential, history and culture. However, it remained as the basic framework

throughout the imperial period, only undergoing major change in 1962 with the split of

Hararghe (into Hararghe and Bale) and the addition of Eritrea.

While control is one legitimate concern of states, the innovations during the imperial

period were mainly concerned with the twin objectives of development and integration.

For example, the abolition of Mikitil Woredas, which constituted the lowest level of

formal authority from 1946 to 1960, was justified on the basis of administrative

efficiency, i.e, to cut the bureaucratic layers. Various instances of restructuring were tried

at woreda and awraja levels taking into consideration local as well as national concerns.

For example, in border areas the two major concerns were security and administrative

efficiency. 94 Haile Selassie’s experimental approach to development and simultaneous

efforts to earn the allegiance of various peoples had begun in the prewar period. Jigiga,

Chercher, Guma and Gera were among the provinces selected to be developed as models

of modern administration. 95 The Ministry of National Community Development and

93
MoI Files:No.1.2.68.05.
94
Asmelash, “Some Notes,” p.131.
95
Bahru, Pioneers, pp.60 & 61.

125
Social Affairs was established in 1957, originally to promote development in “special

localities” where natural conditions hampered progress.

In the continuous reformation of the national administrative policy and structure there

have been pressures to carry the decentralization upwards of the system. In 1962/63(1955

E.C.), attempts to set-up awraja self-administration failed as a result of Parliament’s

failure to approve the legislation that was to provide for their revenue sources. The

general pressure by the Ministry of Interior towards decentralizing the system at the

awraja level, however, resulted in the Awraja Local Self-administration Order No.43 of

1966. However, this met opposition by parliament deputies from two directions and for

different reasons. Local elites were primarily concerned about cost due to existing

disparities of awraja revenues. Nationally minded groups feared that this decentralization

would encourage the growth of regionalism and parochialism. “Deputies also argued that

the country was unintegrated and that the creation of ‘autonomous’ awrajas before ‘the

people knew one another’ would encourage separatist tendencies.”96 The dilemma was

between national development and national unity, the twin objectives of the imperial

state. The push for decentralization was so persistent among higher officials that the state

set in action its plans in 1973 by launching a pilot project which included 14 awrajas, one

from each province. Most of the appointed administrators were considered progressives

and oriented to development in the areas. This brief experiment was interrupted by the

1974 revolution.97

96
John M. Cohen and Peter H. Kohen, Ethiopian Provincial Government: Imperial Patterns and
Postrevolutionary Changes, Monograph No.9, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1980),p.56.
97
Ibid. p.58.

126
Educating for Citizenship

The earliest foundations of popular education, that is formal governmental, non-

governmental (community) and public schools as well as rudiments of a modern mass

media, were laid down in the prewar period. As every aspect of Haile Selassie’s postwar

achievements, the establishment of modern educational system with defined policy and

objectives, Ethiopianized and standardized curricula and textbooks, was initiated during

this period. The prewar intellectuals argued for a national educational system with

Ethiopian instructors, based on the Geez alphabet, Amharic as language of instruction,

and Ethiopian history as one subject. “Ethiopians should be imbued with the love of

Ethiopia and nothing else. Missionaries are most often nothing but agents of European

imperialism.”98

During this period, the example and encouragement of Ras Teferi by establishing Teferi

Mekonen School in 1925 set in motion a nationwide movement for the expansion of

modern schools. If the opening of Menelik II School in 1908 had a defensive character,

that of Teferi Mekonen remained in line with Haile Selassie’s lifelong faith in modern

education. Teferi’s historic tour of 1924 had been described by himself as designed to
99
restore Ethiopia’s ancient glory through the expansion of modern education.

Nevertheless, it was only in the establishment of the Ministry of Public Instruction and

Fine Arts in 1930 that the educational undertaking got a responsible government body.100

98
Tedla Haile(1930) quoted in Bahru, Pioneers, p.140.
99
Bahru, Pioneers, p.171.
100
Ibid., pp.23,25, 33, 76.

127
After liberation the state proceeded with a policy of thoroughly secularizing education

but, like the favored model Japan, with caution and moderation. The merit of secular or

modern education over religious or traditional education has been one of the most

debated issues in the prewar period. 101 After liberation the case for secularization of

national education was argued by Haddis Alemayehu thus: “For ancient Ethiopian

schools had restricted their instructions to religion and social etiquettes and abandoned

instructions in economics, administration, political, military, technical and other arts,

their educational output could not satisfy the demand of the society.”102

In the early 1940s, the National Education Commission was busy identifying aspects of

the Orthodox Church educational tradition that could be integrated in the preparation of a

modern national syllabus.103 The initial lack of trained teachers in the period had made it

necessary to recruit staffs that have Christian backgrounds, both expatriate and

indigenous, the latter particularly for teaching the two subjects concerned with

citizenship: Amharic and Ethical Education or Gibre’geb. In addition, throughout the

imperial period the Orthodox clergy maintained traditional schools, known as Qes

Timhirt Bet, giving children literacy.104

Even in the remotest corners such as Gambella, schools were open for all Ethiopian

children and the state made it a priority to attract children of peasants to school through

101
Ibid., pp.95, 177.
102
Haddis Alemayehu, Ye’timhirtna Ye’temaribet Tirgum(Addis Ababa:1948E.C.),pp.122, also 108.
103
MoI Files.:No. SH¨m 63.1.12.04 , Ke’Bilata Mersie Hazen W/Qirqos Lebiherawi Timhirt Komission
Yeqerebe Yebetekihnet Timhirt Meglecha, 1937 EC. N0. SH¨m& 63.1.12.03 , Silemimetaw Zemen Bete
Timhirt Le’Amarigana Le’Geez Timhirt Yemiasfelgewn Eqid Lememermerna Lemastewaweq Yetemerete
Komitte Yemejemeria Sibseba, 1937 EC.
104
MoI Files: No.08.09,Yemengistin Astedader Meshashal Lematinat Yetequaquamew Komitte Yazegajew
Yemejemeria Rapor, Addis Ababa, Ginbot 1957 EC.

128
various incentives. In addition to the regular schools, the state initiated literacy schools

from 1948 onwards to extend its outreach. 105 Schools were from the very beginning

accorded paramount importance as centers for cultivation of future generations in line

with the modernization objectives of the state. The aim was to produce responsible

citizens with common national aspirations and values, grounded in the tradition and

history of the nation and unencumbered by traditional and primordial loyalties. While

there has never been a systematic effort to make schools centers of brainwashing and to

manipulate curriculums to reflect an exclusive culture and religion, however, there were

conscious attempts throughout the imperial period to cultivate more inclusive and

representative values and symbols all over the country. The central government, for

instance, strongly urged schools to adhere to the performance of the national anthem from

the early 1950s.106

Tarikna Misale, one of the earliest educational materials prepared under the direction of

the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts from 1941 to the late 1960s, is representative of

the nationalist conceptions and goals of the state. From the very cover design, the entire

content of this series is concerned with the definition of key components of nationalism:

country, people, flag and king. It is interesting to see that such textbook definitions were

more elaborate and wider while at the same time combining the legal and traditional

conceptions, values and symbolisms. They were secular and civic but with a mix of

primordial elements. For example, people were defined as humans who, in addition to

being related by birth, language, religion, common history and destiny, “live together

105
GPNRS Files: The 1953(1945 E.C) Annual Report of the Awraja Governor’s Office, No.232/ G/2,
Nehassie 24/1945.
106
GPNRS Files: Letter of the Imperial Ethiopian Government to the Gambella Awraja Schools
Administration, No.1083/2/19, Hidar 21/1944.

129
under the umbrella of one country, one state, one flag and one law.”107 A country was not

defined in its crude territoriality but as “a part of the world in which” such homogenous

community lives. Like the traditional symbolism, a country also meant an ancestral

‘graveyard’ in which the soil and the people are united; it is a ‘mother’ who nurtures and

whose love inheres in the blood and flesh, and instills love and yearning.108

Flag “is a symbol of freedom, a people’s stamp, and a tough cord which secures unity.”

King was also defined in terms of its political functions (as fountain of power, glory,

justice) and symbolic attributes (bond of unity, pride of country, junction of history).

There was also an attempt to outline desirable qualities and precepts of a good Ethiopian:

the preeminence of sacrifice for king, flag, country and freedom, or to eradicate what is

harmful to them. To love one’s country means to do what benefits her, to stand by fellow

countrymen, to understand the worthlessness of individual wealth and joy without the

greatness of one’s country and the co-prosperity of fellow Ethiopians. A good citizen is

dedicated to thinking and striving to make his country catch up quickly with other great

civilizations.109

Another important aspect of national concern was the promotion of Amharic as a

language of instruction, particularly at the early primary level, and as a compulsory

subject throughout the other levels too.110 When Teferi Mekonnen School was opened on

19 Miazia 1917(27 April 1925), the first curriculum consisted of English, French, Geez,

Amharic, Art, Sport and Technical Education. In fact, students were more interested in

107
]¡“ UdK?&1— SêHõ& 3— ¡õM&(›Ç=e ›uv&w`H”“ cLU T}T>Á u?ƒ&1934¯.U) kÇTà Ñê G::
108
Ibid.
109
]¡“ UdK. 1— SêHõ& 3— ¡õM&(›Ç=e ›uv&w`H”“ cLU T}T>Á u?ƒ&1934¯.U).
110
MoI Files: No. SH¨m 63.1.12.04. No. SH¨m& 63.1.12.03.

130
learning English and French than Geez and Amharic. Naturally, the person most

concerned about the indigenous subjects was the headmaster Hakim Workneh. 111 The

Ministry of Education and Fine Arts commissioned various literary texts and

disseminated them throughout the school system; it even encouraged and sponsored the

publication of Amharic – Tigrigna dictionary to be used in Asmara secondary schools.112

In 1965, for example, Afeworq Gebbreyesus’s Lib Weled Tarik(1908) was reprinted as

Tobia to serve as Amharic textbook. The state was determined to make Amharic’s utility

complete by pushing it upwards to higher learning, beyond being a compulsory subject

for admission. The Third Five Year Plan (1960–1965 EC) provided a basis for the

development of Amharic, particularly as language of instruction for science and

technology.113

The Ministry of Education and Fine Arts had planned to do this task in cooperation with

the Haile Selassie I University by establishing a special institution called Ye’Amarigna

Merha Lisan or National Amharic Language Academy. The ministry set out in 1968/69

to prepare a list of nominees for the academy but it did not go further than that. Then in

February 1971, there was more determined effort which resulted in the establishment of a

special committee with members from the University and the Ministry of Education. This

body finally nominated 48 distinguished scholars from various disciplines, regardless of

ethnic and religious backgrounds, to serve as founding members of the academy. The

111
Mersie-Hazen Wolde-Qirqos, Amarigna Sewasew(Addis Ababa: 1948 E.C), p.3. Though prepared in the
prewar period, this book was published in 1955/56 with the assistance of MoEFA.
112
MoI Files: Abba Yohannes Gebre-Egziabher’s application to the Gibi Minister, H.E. Tsehafetezaz Tefera
Worq, Tahsas 19/1951(28 December 1958). It was in 1957 that Amharic replaced Arabic and Tigrigna as
Eritrea’s working language. Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, p. 61.
113
The Third Five Year Plan: 1960-1965 EC, p.421, No.9. This idea had been part of the proposal of Ernest
Work in the prewar period, and even the merits of establishment of Amharic language academy were
debated during the Italian occupation. Bahru, Pioneers, pp.34, 160.

131
express aim of the Ye’Amarigna Merha Lisan, which formally started functioning in

1971/72(1964 E.C), was to base modern education on the cultural and traditional

heritages of the country.114

This belated attempt is otherwise a testimony to the imperial state’s supra-ethnic and

pragmatic attitude towards using Amharic as an efficient national medium of education

and integration. Besides its widespread use and literary development, this was a logical

decision for a poor state which also has an additional task of unifying a nation. In fact,

the impact of formal instruction of Amharic as a means of national integration remained

marginal because of its restriction to the elementary level. Students picked up their

Amharic skills not so much in the classrooms as in the day-to-day interactions of urban

setting, where most of the higher level schools were situated. Neither in the recruitment

and training of teachers nor in their assignment did the state adopt ethnic or religious

criteria. In remote areas such as Gambella, where qualified teachers were hard to come

by, the state encouraged local students to join the teaching profession in the above spirit.

What is more, the introduction of Amharic as official and instructional medium elicited

no overt reaction because language, especially its symbolic significance, had not yet been

politicized and the state did not consider it relevant to proclaim Amharic’s legal status

until 1955. In spite of the state’s belief that a nation ought to be linguistically unified or

bonded, linguistic homogenization was not confused with cultural homogenization. The

language policies, laws and actions of the state were never intended to Amharize, which

could not have been done by imperial fiat anyway, but to Ethiopianize, to create an

114
MoI Files:No.1.2.54.07, The National Amharic Language Academy, Mengistu Lemma to H.E
Tsehafetezaz Tefera-Worq Kidane-Wold, Nehassie 3/1964.

132
integrated national community by consolidating Amharic as a national lingua franca,

which it had de facto been before or since.115

The government allowed religious institutions to open schools and take part in the

national effort of spreading education. Nevertheless, church schools remained a

responsibility of the religious establishments, including the Orthodox Church which had

been constitutionally pledged state support. 116 The state also retained the right to

supervise and monitor their activities and, for instance, prohibited them from openly

reflecting religious, ethnic and other political ideals detrimental to unity of the people and

stability of the state.117 It even intervened and banned attempts of some mission schools

to teach in local languages and introduce writings based on the Latin alphabet. The

government did not oppose translation or teaching in local languages as such, but it

wanted the Geez script to be used for all languages in the country.118 Nevertheless, the

nationalist objective of education did not get a constitutional expression throughout the

period; and it was the 1974 Draft Constitution which explicitly provided that the

education given in Ethiopian schools shall be based on the literature, culture, history and

nature of Ethiopia.119

115
Tedla Haile and Sahle Tsedalu were the foremost proponents of employing Orthodox religion and
Amharic language as means of assimilation and unity. The latter’s 1933 proposal for a national
educational system(quoted in Bahru, Pioneers, pp.140-141) is worthy of note specially as he was then
minister of education, but perhaps too radical to be considered seriously by the state throughout the
imperial period. Even this could be regarded as ‘ethnocentric’ or ‘chauvinist’ only on the narrowest
consideration of ethnicity and that retrospectively.
116
GPNRS Files: Letter of the Awraja School Administration, No.233/1/2, Tahsas 12/1961, regarding the
opening of a primary school sponsored by and located in Gambella Kidane Mihret Church compound.
117
Bahru, Pioneers, p.25. The Revised Constitution of 1955.
118
GPNRS Files: Report’na Iqid: 1947-1976 E.C.
119
The 1974 Draft Constitution, Article 56.3.

133
The state attempted to encourage the burgeoning literary culture by establishing a public

library in Addis Ababa, known as Hizb Bete Metsahift Wemezekir(Public Library and

Archives), which, in addition to providing easy access to a reading public, performed the

important task of being custodian of archives, manuscripts, and all published works in the

country. In 1946(1939 EC) another institution of excellence, known as Tequame Timhirt

Wetibebat (Institution for Education and Arts), was established which after a year (1947)

was merged with the Public Library and Archives as Hizb Bete Metsahift Wemezekirina

Tequame Timhirt Wetibebat.120

As part of the evolving nationalism, there were growing concerns from both the state and

individuals to protect and preserve cultural and historical heritage of the country. The

National Museum was established as custodian of the heritages of the various peoples in

the country. There had been continuous efforts to define the institutional and legal

boundaries between local/individual and national interests, duties and responsibilities.

Thus various laws were proclaimed, for instance in 1947 and 1952, though the first

comprehensive legal provision came out in January 1966.121 While the 1955 Constitution

made only the regalia and property of the emperor the historical heritage of the

Empire,122 it was again the 1974 Draft which introduced a visible concern for historical

and cultural heritage: “በመንግሥት፣ በግል ሰዎች፣ በኃይማኖትና በሌሎች ዘርፎች ይዞታ ስር የሚገኙ ባህላዊና ታሪካዊ

120
MoI Files: No.12.15.05, verbal of the meeting held on Tikimt 10/1940.
121
MoI Files: No.13.18: 25— ¯Sƒ lØ` 7& ›Ç=e ›uv Ø` 21 k” 1958 ¯.U& ¾›=ƒÄåÁ ”Ñ<W ’ÑYƒ S”ÓYƒ
’Ò]ƒ Ò²?×:: lØ` 229/1958 ¯.U& YKØ” © ]Ÿ© p`f‹ ¾¨× ›ªÏ::

122
The Revised Constitution of 1955, article 19.

134
ቅርሶችና ሥፍራዎች የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ የተከበሩ ቅርሶች ስለሆኑ፣ ህግ በሚወስነው መሰረት መንግሥት መዝግቦ አስፈላጊውን ቁጥጥርና
123
ጥበቃ ያደርጋል፡፡“

Like its educational institutions, the development of proper scholarly studies of Ethiopia

is Western-inspired but essentially indigenous in its essence and direction. Serious

academic work on colonial Africa had set off at the turn of the 19th century: Journal of the

Royal African Society (JRAS) was established in 1901. At about 1910 Britain launched

an ethnographic survey in its colonies of the Sudan and Kenya. In 1918 the first issue of

Sudan Notes and Records (SNR) was published and for a long time it remained the only

source for the frontier peoples in southern and southwestern Ethiopia. The International

Institute of African Languages and Cultures(IIALC) was founded in 1927, with the

objective to coordinate and focus the results of the work and research that was being done

by different individuals and European nations; or in the words of Frederick Lugard to

establish “a closer relationship between scientific research and practical work in Africa.”

Much of the work done by Europeans in Africa during the first half of the twentieth

century was ethnographic and anthropological in nature, concerned with tribes and aimed

at providing information for colonial administration.124

Ethiopia was, however, at the margins of colonial scholarship of the period though it had

for long been part of the Semitic studies based in Europe. A serious home-based

academic study of the country and its people started with the establishment of the first

123
The 1974 Draft Constitution, article 139.
124
The IIALC, for example, launched in 1934 its first ‘Five Year Plan of Research’ which was aimed at
investigating the impacts of colonialism and attendant modernization processes on African societies.
rd
Diedrich Westermann, The African Today and To-morrow(3 ed), (Oxford University Press:1934/1939),
pp.v-viii. The preparation and publication of the monograph Ethnographic Survey of Africa began in 1945
in order to provide British colonial administration with information on the culture and history of its
subjects. Lord Frederick Lugard(1858-1945) was a man who played an important role in the formulation of
the so-called ‘indirect rule’, a British colonial policy of administration through indigenous institutions.

135
higher educational institution, the University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA), on 20th

March 1950. On 1 January 1963, the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) was established

on the main campus. The Journal of Ethiopian Studies (JES), an organ of the IES, was

first published in this year and continued to come out twice a year until 1976. In the

period up to the revolution 22 issues were published in 12 volumes, with a total of 179

articles and book reviews, of which 120 ( 67%)were on history, and 29(16% ) book

reviews and source materials were also historical. Thus all in all about 83% of the papers

were concerned with various aspects of Ethiopian history.

In contrast to the above, the overseas branch of Ethiopian studies was a few years older

and it also had important difference both in the selection of research theme, the

participation of Ethiopian scholars and their professional orientation. The first

International Conference on Ethiopian Studies (ICES) took place in Rome in 1959,

initiated by none other than Enrico Cerulli, and was brought home when the third ICES

took place in Addis Ababa in 1966. The late 1960s and early 1970s were periods of

acceleration of social and historical research in the south of Ethiopia. Until 1988,

according to the analysis made by Shushma and Davendra, only a quarter of the papers

were contributed by Ethiopian scholars. And of all the total papers in the period, 30%

were on the history Ethiopia while the rest were concerned with language, culture, law,

politics, etc of the country.125

125
Shushma Gupta and Davendra Gupta, “Research Trends in Ethiopian Studies: Literature Analysis of
th
International Conferences of Ethiopian Studies, 1959-1988,” 12 ICES, II,(1994), pp.940-950. Bahru
Zewde, Baye Yimam, Eshetu Chole, and Alula Pankhurst, “From Lund to Addis Ababa: a Decade of
Ethiopian Studies,” JES, XXIV,1,(1994),pp.1-28.

136
The most important contribution to the development of Ethiopian studies in the period

was done by the staff and students of Addis Ababa University. Particularly dynamic and

immense contribution was that of the Department of History, which from its foundation

in 1963 under the Faculty of Arts assumed a leading role in the scholarly study of

Ethiopian history. Bahru considered the late 1960s and 1970s as the highpoint of

department research, identifying two major limitations of the works of the period: i)

temporal, restricted to the 19th century, the 20th century being considered as a kind of

taboo; ii) thematic, bias towards religious and politico-military issues. Methodologically,

the researches lacked proper interpretive schemes (theory) and were then more narrative

than analytical. There were also financial and administrative challenges. Merid noted that

only a few of these works saw the light of publication; hence historical research remained

within the narrow confines of the academic world.126

There was of course another serious problem which Ethiopian studies had encountered

due to its distinctively national character. First and foremost, it did not conform to the

ethnographic and anthropological tradition or to the wealth of materials amassed on

ethnic groups elsewhere in Africa. Hence the genesis of modern scholarship in Ethiopian

history and society faced a formidable center-periphery tension, of being ‘center-

centered’ even before the ‘center’ was properly born. The false urgency in regarding the

study of the so-called ‘periphery’ as long overdue denied the useful balance that could

have been established in Ethiopian studies. This was confounded by the politics of

marginalization and ethnicization over-emphasized by the ESM, the Ethiopian

126 st
Bahru Zewde, “Research Projects of Departmental Members,” 1 Annual Seminar of the Department
nd
of History(1983),pp.305-307. Tadesse Tamrat, “Research Priorities,” 2 Annual Seminar of the
Department of History, II,(1984),pp.64-69. Merid Wolde-Aregay, “Research Trends in Ethiopian Studies at
th
AAU Over the Last Twenty-Five Years,” 8 ICES (1984),pp.xxv-xxviii.

137
Revolution and all subsequent ideological battles. The usability of history, its role in

informing public opinion, if not in particularly contributing to the nation-building effort,

was thus sequestered from its infancy. This hiatus was filled by the growth of interest

among the literati to prefer historical themes in the fledgling national discourse and

literature.

Popular Expressions of Ethiopianism

The informal channels of popular education and expression were more diverse in nature

and less amenable to direct state guidance and control. The newspapers were the most

important channels of voicing and shaping public opinion, which for the first time had the

power of creating a particularly articulate intelligentsia and what may be called a national

conscience. The more persuasive and appealing to the common people were, however,

artistic works such as poetry, drama, theatre, painting, musical performances and songs

whose major concerns were historical themes, the recreation of national heroes, definition

and redefinition of the national ideal and the national agendas of modernization and

Ethiopianism. The 1960s witnessed the flowering of Amharic literature by producing

historical novels and theatres still unsurpassed in literary excellence.127

The Ethiopian National Theatre was initially established as Haile Selassie I Theatre

(HSIT), shortly after the 25th Anniversary, on 13 December 1955. The establishment of

the theatre was inspired by civic and cultural considerations. During the late 1940s,

127
Fikre Tolosa, “Realism and Amharic Literature (1908-1981),” (Ph.D .Dissertation: Bremen University,
1983). Assefa Aregahegn, “The Origin and Development of Amharic Literature,” (M.A. Thesis: AAU, 1981).
Birhanu, Qesar’na Abyot, p.25.

138
nationally-minded intellectuals felt that Ethiopia was experiencing the impacts of

Western cultural influx through music, cinema, consumer goods and lifestyles. They

wanted to stem this invasion while at the same time leaving a window of learning from

global artistic progress. They believed that it was imperative to develop indigenous

artistic fields and ‘modernize’ them. Simultaneously, the government was convinced of

the power of musical and theatrical performances in smoothly promoting national ideals

and values such as citizenship, patriotism and love of country among the people. The

conjunction of these two objectives gave rise to the establishment in 1947/48(1940 E.C)

of a body for the expansion of theatre, known as Ye’tiatr Masfafia Drijit, followed in

1950/51(1943 E.C) by a music and theatre troupe, both under the Addis Ababa City

Municipality (AACM). These were the precursors of the HSIT.

The HSIT was inaugurated in 1955 by bringing the above two departments together, thus

opening the formative period for modern Ethiopian theatre and music. The state’s

emphasis on the educational value of this institution was evident in the fact that in 1959

HSIT’s administration passed from AACM to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts.

Until this time, the dominant themes of plays staged were religious and historical, but

with the advent of educated Ethiopians to the profession after 1960 these gradually

shifted to social issues. The simultaneous improvement in artistic quality inaugurated the

classic period of Ethiopian theatre. The first two historical plays, Hannibal(Kebede

Mikael) and Tewodros(Girmachew T/Hawariat) were performed in 1955/56(1948 E.C.),

and until 1974 some of the most popular pieces were based on Ethiopian history:

Almotkum Biye Alwashim (Bitweded Mekonnen Endalkachew, 1952 E.C), Nigist Azeb

(Balambaras Ashebir, 1953 E.C), Petros Yachin Se’at (Tsegaye G/Medhin, 1961 E.C),

139
Ye’dil Atbia Arbegna (Negash G/Mariam, 1965 E.C), Alula Aba’Nega (Mamo Wudneh,

1966 E.C).128

The folk music department of the HSIT, which began in 1958/59(1951 E.C) with a band

known as Ye’hagereseb Musika Kifil, was another significant step in the recognition and

promotion of the country’s cultural diversity. Like the theatrical department, the music

department was not encumbered by external censorship in the choice of themes or

cultural groups. Its guiding mission from the very inception was to accommodate equally

traditional songs and performances of all ethnic groups of Ethiopia. Accordingly, it

strived to represent them as faithfully as possible by conducting observations and

researches in rural areas, again producing some of the timeless performances. This

department also played a significant role in introducing Ethiopian folk music to the

outside world; for instance, it performed in nine countries between 1960 and 1968:

Sudan, Soviet Union, China, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, Canada and Mexico.129

In the postwar period, the nomenclature of institutions, public squares, roads, buildings,

even airplanes and ships, etc very much reflected the liberation such as Addis Zemen,

Netsanet Priniting Press (Dessie), national symbols like Sendeq Alamachin, Orchestra

Ethiopia, Hager Fiqir Theatre, the glorification of historical figures or heroes (Tewodros,

Yohannes, Menelik, Alula), national battles (Meqdela, Maichew, Adwa), etc. It was a

novel phenomenon and Emperor Haile Selassie seemed determined to put his personal

mark in this endeavor as everything of significance, hospitals, schools, stadium, theatre,

128
Bitweded Mekonnen’s play is also published in book form with same title. The two Austrian nationals
who played decisive role in this formative period, by directing music and theatre performances, were
Francis Zelveker(upto 1958 EC) and Richard Ager(after 1960 EC).
129
In 1976, this cultural team was renamed as Izra Ye’hagereseb Muzika Kifil. ðnÆ ð“ ’i ŸX&
¾›=ƒÄåÁ wH@^© ›ƒ` ›ß` ]¡“ ¾T>c׆¨< ›ÑMÓKA„‹& c’@ 2000 ¯.U::

140
university, came to bear his august name. 130 The general reawakening of national

sentiment and patriotism was also reflected among the common people, particularly in

the various cities and towns, following similar trend in naming private and community

institutions, associations, daughters and sons after national heroes. Emperor Tewodros

was resurrected as the father of Ethiopian unity, epitome of its patriotism, and a model

for Ethiopian leadership. The personal name Tewodros is arguably the most popular

name across the ethnic divide with its initial heyday in the 1960s. This was perhaps

matched by another name Etyopia which, though sometimes given for males, was a

popular personal name for females.131

A more organized form of expression was the establishment of various voluntary

associations or mahbers with express aims to promote Ethiopian patriotism, unity and

integration. 132 The Italian war had brought to life several such organizations as

Ye’Etyopia Hizb Ye’hager Fiqir Mahber (Ethiopian People’s Association for Love of

Country,1935), Tikur Anbessa (Black Lion, 1936), Ye’Etyopia Gegnoch Mahber

(Ethiopian Patriots’ Association,1938), Tesfa (Hope, an association founded by the

Ethiopian monastery at Jerusalem which helped Ethiopian exiles, served as a link

between the patriots and exiles in Europe), the Young Ethiopia Society, 133 Menelik

130
MoI Files:No.›/¨/Ó 092.01, Addis Ababa Municipality to the Crown Prince Office, No.S/579/32, 10
Tikemt 1941. Announcing the decision obliging all civil servants to contribute a month’s salary in a year’s
time for the construction of a monument as a tribute to the Emperor.
131
The annual Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination result list. The name Tewodros becomes
frequent after 1985, most of these from Addis Ababa and Eritrea.
132
Perhaps the model for Ethiopian self-help associations was the Love and Service Society founded by
Hakim Werkneh in 1925 to deal with the problem of rehabilitating children of manumitted slaves.
Berhanena Selam, 27,5, 26. Bahru, Pioneers, p.39. Tedla, Italia Be’Etyopia, p.319.
133
Bahru, p.83, this association and its women counterpart were founded by Blata Kidanemaryam Abera
to oppose Italian aggression and occupation.

141
(September 1936, a club which was founded by Melaku Beyan and its mouthpiece

Ye’Etyopia Dimts), Ye’Etyopiana Ye’Eritrea Andinet Mahber (Association for the Unity

of Ethiopia and Eritrea,1943) and its affiliate Ye’Eritrawian Merja Mahber (Association

for the Assistance of Eritreans,1944) were a few among the many. Of the above

organizations, Ye’Etyopiana Ye’Eritrea Andinet Mahber and Ye’Etyopia Hizb Ye’hager

Fiqir Mahber, had played very prominent role in the postwar period so that it would

appropriate to note some of their records.

The struggle for Eritrea’s reunification with Ethiopia was the most concentrated

expression of Ethiopian nationalism in the entire postwar period both in its popular and

official forms. Until it failed prey to Italian colonialism in 1890, highland Eritrea had

been an integral part of Ethiopia, reflecting the multifaceted historical, religious, cultural

and political bonds. The Italian period did not entirely severe these attachments, while

there were also ethnic and linguistic factors bonding various peoples including the Tigre,

Agaw, Kunama, Afar and Irob groups to their kins in Ethiopia. Throughout the Italian

period, Ethiopia remained a motherland for Eritreans who enjoyed full citizenship rights.

The people on both sides kept the spirit of fraternity, and the imperial state remained

always vigilant for opportunity to reclaim the province. During the liberation war in

1941 British authorities were well aware of the strength of the reunification sentiment

among Eritreans so that they enticed the latter, some of it in the name of Emperor Haile

Selassie, to desert Italians with the promise of speedy unification with Ethiopia.

In 1941, when “the British Administration summoned a native Council to act as

intermediary between them and the population, all members of the Council proved to be

142
strong advocates of reunion.”134 Immediately, the Eritrean organization known as Mahber

Fiqri Hager or Association for the Love of Motherland was formed and branched out

throughout Eritrea. This was the so-called Unity Block (commonly known as Ye’hibret

Kifloch), a major driving force of Ethio-Eritrean unity which represented the greater part

of the Eritrean population. The delay in the process of unification gave rise to a more

militant youth wing of the unionist movement called ‘Andinet’ which, according to the

testimony of Chief British Administrator Brigadier Drew, in the 1940s was active and

gained the support of many Eritreans.135

Italy, seconded by Britain, remained most staunch opponent of the reunification struggle.

Italy strove to regain through international diplomacy what she had lost in war, and when

this failed resorted to obstructionism. Italy urged immediate independence of all her

former colonies and organized in Eritrea the so-called Bloco Independente, comprising of

Italian settlers, half-castes, and ex-askaris. This group also included the Muslim League,

a group which had its strongholds in the Muslim-inhabited lowlands, and the Liberal

Progressive Party, a British creation advocating Greater Tigre by including all Tigre-

speaking peoples in independent Eritrea.136

The struggle between the two major fronts of Unity and Independence was popularly

perceived and characterized as one between ‘pro-Ethiopian’ and ‘anti-Ethiopian’

elements. As the Abun of the Asmara Orthodox Church succinctly expressed it when he

enjoined pro-unity groups in February 1950 “never to buy goods from the shops of the

134
MoI Files: E. Sylvia Pankhurst(Hon. Secretary),The International Ethiopian Council for Study and
Report, ‘Speakers’ Notes’, Essex, p.4
135
MoI Files: E. Sylvia Pankhurst, p.7.
136
Ibid,pp.1, 2-.3.

143
Muslims who hating Ethiopia became Bloco Independente and rose to destroy Eritrea’s

chance and fought against us.” When the tension between the two groups escalated on 21

February 1950 to a two-day violence(21 to 23/1950) in Asmara, it started as a war of

flags, Unionists barring the funeral procession for a member of the Bloco claiming “
137
!" # $%&&”.

In addition, the opposition completely identified the pro-unity movement with Ethiopia as

the conciliatory letter written by Muslims who had fled to the Italian quarters stated

“ኢጣልያኖችም፣ እንግሊዞችም አረቦችም ይሄዳሉ፡፡ በአገራችን ላይ የምንቀረው እኛ መሆናችንን እያወቅን ለምን እንገዳደላለን
138
እንታረቅ፡፡”. The conclusion of this conflict shows that at least the Muslims of Bloco had

no tangible internal cause to part from Ethiopia. On reconciliation between the two

groups, which took place on 25 February 1950 in the presence of the governor, the Abun

and the Qadi, the Bloco’s sole condition to unify with Ethiopia was a constitutional

guarantee for religious freedom expressly declared in Arabic, Amharic and Tigrigna by

the imperial state. The Bloco was, therefore, a colonial creation and the Muslim League

did not represent the aspiration of Eritrean Muslims who like their Ethiopian

coreligionists were not without a nationalist sentiment.

Inside Ethiopia, the struggle for unity was conducted by Ye’Etyopiana Ye’Eritrea Andinet

Mahber, established in 1943/44 (1936E.C). The organization’s logo was the African map

where Ethiopia is indicated and encircled by the motto ‘Eritrea with Ethiopia, One

137
While the pro-Ethiopian groups had the Ethiopian flag, the anti-Ethiopian group carried an emblem of
green and red similar to what has now become the national flag of independent Eritrea.
138
MoI Files:No.›/¨/Ó, 049.11: Keyekiflu Yetelaku Andand Yemistir Mastaweshawoch. Cover letter Captain
rd
Asefa Wolde Silassie, the second army corps leading officer, 3 Intelligence, to Crown Pince Merid
Azmach Asfa wossen, Yekatit 20/1942, Dessie. The second army corps headquarters, Dessie, intelligence
report regarding the situation in Asmara, to the imperial army intelligence officer, Addis Ababa, No. 2—
¡Ù/ªS/0037/790, Yekatit 20/1942,p.1.

144
Ethiopia’ or ኤርትራ ምስ ኢትዮጵያ፣ ሃንቲ ኢትዮጵያ፡፡ ኤርትራ ከኢትዮጵያ፣ አንዲት ኢትዮጵያ፡፡ Its declared mission

was to inspire all Ethiopians to the unification of the two people, and addressed its

messages “Ye’Etyopia Lij Hoy”, though more directly referred to Eritreans residing in

Ethiopia.139 Particularly, there were widespread rumors about the hatching of anti-Ethio-

Eritrean unity activities in Dessie and Gonder towns with a possible link to Hammasien

(Eritrea), the British, and some Ethiopian notables such as Gobeze Tafete in Dessie.140 Its

affiliate Ye’Eritrawian Merja Mahber was the earliest self-help association in the postwar

period, which aimed at assisting the rehabilitation of Eritreans in Ethiopia. Though the

main concern of both associations, and understandably their membership, was that of

Eritreans in Ethiopia, there were attempts to give the Andinet Mahber a national

dimension by making its membership open to any Ethiopian citizen or organization.141

The Ethiopian People’s Association for the Love of Country was founded by Ethiopians

on the eve of the Italian invasion with the aim of countering Italian propaganda by

fortifying public psychology and patriotism. In the post-war period it emerged as an

institution playing key role in various social and cultural events aimed at creating

national integration and harmony.142 One of its major activities after its reconstitution in

1941 was the coordination of the annual celebration of the Muslim holidays of Araffa and

Ramadan as solemn national events. The imperial state was careful not to alienate its

139
MoI Files:No. ›/¨/Ó, 019.01: Ye’Etyopiana YeEritrea Andinet Mahber, Addis Ababa, Nehassie
1/1937E.C.
140
MoI Files: Nos: 026.19 and 027.51.
141
MoI Files:No. ›/¨/Ó, 019.01, the association’s charter, Article 4.
142
Bahru, Pioneers, p.74. Lij Mekonen Habtewold dominated this association in both periods. This
association later gave rise to Hager Fiqir Theatre.

145
Muslim communities and used every opportunity to integrate them into an inclusive

modern nationalism.

Especially during the postwar period, the state had in practice recognized the major

Muslim holidays as national events, formally celebrated in the royal palace, hosted by the

Emperor, with full solemnity and ceremony (including gun salute on the eve and dawn of

the holidays) and requiring the attendance of prominent officials, dignitaries and religious

personalities. This event was simultaneously held in major Muslim-dominated cities

outside the capital, and was intended to emphasize the state’s de facto recognition of the

two main Muslim holidays in par with similar Orthodox holidays.143

The government also censored at all levels any explicit religious propaganda or negative

teaching against Islam or any other religion. The Emperor, though in 1955 ironically

established the Orthodox faith as the state religion, himself took a direct interest on this

indicating the gravity of the issue. In 1952, for example, Abune Gebriel’s sermons and

teachings had become so inflammatory to the Muslim community in Wallo that the latter

appealed on the matter to state officials. When the Abun refused to comply with the

intercession of regional governors, the issue, corroborated by Addis Ababa resident

Muslims of Wallo, was forwarded to the attention of the Emperor. The latter in turn

called the Patriarch Abune Basilios to address this with Abune Gebriel.144 This policy of

143
MoI Files: Nos. 1.2.77.10 and 1.2.77.11.
144
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó 090.18, Sile Abune Gebriel, Wollo Governorate General Deputy to Crown Prince
Merid Azmach Asfa Wossen Special Office, Speical No. 44/44, 29 Megabit 1944.

146
religious freedom was also expressed with more positive and substantial support by

granting land, money and construction of mosques with government budget.145

Wallo, like Eritrea, is a showcase to the fact that the pan-Ethiopian idea is wider than the

traditional concept of the nation and overrides even religious divides. Located at the

center of the historic nation, this region had developed an identity and sentiment mainly

based on the unifying ideology of Islam and traditional ruling houses. 146 In postwar

Wollo such sentiments were expressed as conspiracies and plots spun around alleged

heirs of Lij Iyassu, even though the Crown Prince Asfa Wessen was the governor of the

region. Throughout the 1950s, for example, rumors and false prophesies implicating as

sources some notable personalities such as Gobeze Tafete circulated in the region.147 This

exclusive ‘Wolloye’ ideology of regional dissent is captured in a popular couplet of the

time: “በስተ ሃውሳ በኩል የምትዘልቅ ወጠጤ፣ እስከ አንድ ዓመት ጊዜ ትባላለች አጤ፡፡”148 It was also articulated in

the idioms of Ethiopian political discourse. One such instance of historicizing and

revering memory is related to the alleged inviolability of Meqdela Amba (Meqdela

Fortress) in par with Aksum and Gondar: “በዘመኑ የወረሂመኖ አውራጃ ገዥ የነበሩት የተከበሩ ደጃዝማች ዓሊ

145
MoI Files: Ÿ.}.12.06, Netsanet, A Review published by the Office of the Representative of H.I.M in
Eritrea, Press Department. The Mosque of Aqordat, cost of works 318,000 Ethiopian birr, constructed by
the order of His Imperial Majesty.
146
Hussein Ahmed, Islam in Nineteenth-Century Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform and Reaction
(Netherlands: 2001), pp.119-130, 135, 141.
147
MoI Files:No. ›/¨/Ó, 047.09, Keyekiflu Yetelaku Yemistir Debdabewoch, Zeleqe Tachbele, Yeju Awraja
Gizat Office, to the Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, Nehassie 15/1940, regarding the unrest in Yeju Awraja.
“›”Ç”É kà MÏ c=ј ¾MÏ ›=Ác< MÏ ’¨< KS”ÑY Ñ>²?¨< Å`'M“ }Ÿ}M ›ÁK< I´u<” ›LÓvw ›¾cuŸ< ›Øóƒ
¾T>ÁÅ`c<ƒ ƒLMp c−‹ dÃJ’< ›Ãk\U: ¾²=I”U ›Ã’ƒ ewŸƒ ÁK¨< u¨KA Ó³ƒ w‰ ’¨< ›”Í= uK?L Ó³ƒ
›M}cTU: ÃMl”U MÏ ›=Ác< ›w³—¨<” Ñ>²? ¾T>•\ƒ ugª J• M͆¨< ¾VL¨< Ó” u¨KA Ó³ƒ w‰ ’¨<::”

148
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó, 047.09, Ameneshewa Tadele Worq to the Crown Prince, No.68, Megabit 18/41.

147
ገብረየስ መቅደላ የሚባለው አምባ ግቢ እንደ ጎንደርና አክሱም ህንጻ አይኑርበት እንጂ እንደ ቤተ መንግሥት የሚቆጠር ሆኖ ከጥንት
149
ጀምሮ እስከ ንጉሥ ሚካኤል ድረስ ተከብሮ በዘበኛ እየተጠበቀ የሚኖር ሲሆን…”

Historically, Wallo had been a region very much squeezed by the religious zeal of

indigenous Muslim orders and clerics as well as Christianizing Ethiopian emperors for

centuries. The political map of the region has never been contiguous with its cultural,

religious, and linguistic composition, which naturally made it an emporium of tolerance

and co-existence, a unifying rather than a divisive factor. In the modern understanding of

Ethiopian nationalism, therefore, Islam has been a force of national unity rather than

fragmentation. Muslim clerics had established Amharic as the second most important

media of teaching Islam and writing of religious texts during this period. 150 This is

possible partly because Ethiopian Islam, in contrast to later Islamic factions and fronts,

has been firmly based on indigenous time-honored traditions, values and institutions,

intercommunicating elites, and a supra-ethnic ideology and culture spanning the north-

south, center-periphery categories.151

In sum, the decades between 1940 and 1970 were a period in which Ethiopia came ever

closer to an integrated modern nation state. The role of the postwar intelligentsia in the all

round activities of forging a nation from a war torn polity was indispensable. Especially

grilled by the hardships of occupation and emerging with keener appreciation of the

values of national freedom and unity, and the merits of gradual reform over radical

149
MoI Files:No. ›/¨/Ó, 061.14, Fitawrari Minase Tedla, Deputy of the Crown Prince’s Special Office, Addis
Ababa, No.22404/5/400, Nehassie 25/1959.
150
Hussein, Islam in Wallo, p.178, notes that the first indigenous Muslim cleric to have used Amharic in
religious teachings was the Argobbe Shayk Talha b.Jafr(1850-1936).
151
MoI Files:No. ›/¨/Ó 084.02, No.1054/9, 26 Yekatit 1956. ¾¾Ì ›¨<^Í ¾¨MÇ=Á Ÿ}T I´w ¡`e+Á’<“
eLS< u›”É uSJ” u1956 ¯U ¾}Å[Ѩ<” ¾fTK? ¨[^ uT>SKŸƒ ¾}cT¨<” lד ŸS”ÓYƒ Ô” uSqU
Seª°ƒ’ƒ KS¡ðM l`Ö˜’~” ¾ÑKçuƒ:: Hussein, Islam in Wallo, pp.31, 186, 188, 189, 193.

148
destructiveness, this class raised its constructive and critical voices through subtler

means. This was a generation responsible for the flowering of Ethiopianism, a generation

which strove to establish the nation on firm pedestals. It was a generation which aspired

to link the lessons of history with the forces of the future, an active generation whose

achievements still glitter across time. Ironically, this generation is considered as barren,

submissive and ‘missing’ and its achievements as immaterial.152 Nevertheless, between

the tentative reformism of the prewar period and the disillusioned radicalism of the

revolutionary era lies a pragmatic nationalism of the postwar generation.

152
Bahru Zewde(ed), Documenting the Ethiopian Student Movement: An Exercise in Oral History (Addis
Ababa:2010),p.1, seems to imply this black hole when he regards the late 1950s as the beginning of the
second period of intellectual intervention, the first being the prewar period.

149
 CHAPTER THREE

THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM

The modernization process in the post-Italian period involved interrelated political, social

and cultural transformations which inevitably led to systemic shifts in the structure and

outreach of government, in power relations from regionalized feudal aristocracy to

centralized imperial state, in the political influence of a burgeoning class of modern

intelligentsia and urban petty bourgeoisie, and in the increasing isolation and ultimate

abolition of the monarchy. The reviving nationalism of the period also underwent

concomitant changes: in the reformation of the proto-national ideology, tradition and

symbolism, in the creation and propagation of a more inclusive national culture across

social classes, creeds and regions. As the early 1960s witnessed the zenith of

Ethiopianism, however, the end of the decade saw the consolidation of social and ethnic

antitheses to the imperial state and its nationalist ideology. The conflation of hope and

disillusionment was captured in the best Amharic novels of the period, Fikir Eske

Meqabir(1965/66), Ye’Tewodros Enba(1965/66), Kadmas Bashager(1969/70), and

Adefris(1969/70).1 These are the best indices of a blooming and confident nation as well

as the burgeoning contradictions in the social system.

Traditional social opposition in Ethiopia had been spontaneous and localized in nature

and took communal, regional, religious and class forms. The major expressions of

discontent and resistance in the post-Italian period combined one or more of the above,

conditioned by the divisive propaganda of Italian colonialists and British caretakers;

1
Tewodros Gebre, “Amharic Novels of Disillusionment” (M.A. Thesis, AAU:2004).

150
abundance of armaments and feeling of social insecurity; perception of weakness in the

state’s political and coercive powers, its administrative inefficiency and inability to stem

widespread corruption; and attempts by social and regional malcontents as well as foreign

powers to exploit the situation. Generally, the major forms of opposition in the period,

peasant rebellions, were all localized or regional in origin and objective, and had little

pan-ethnic or anti-Ethiopian element, perhaps except in the case of the Bale rebellion.2

The Weyanne(1943) and Gojjam(1968) rebellions were similar in their spontaneity and

briefness, in the lack of defined political objectives beyond specific local grievances, in

the leadership provided by regional nobles to masses of peasantry, and in the element of

anti-Shoanism in their articulation. Both were traditional expressions of discontent to

centralizing and modernizing drives of the state, and as such did not aim either to take

over the state or separate from it though in the case of Weyanne there was some

preference to Italian rule. However, from the perspective of nationalism, their

significance obtains in the long term impact they had on the genesis and evolution of the

national question in Ethiopia, especially shedding light on how oppositions evolve into

either ethnic or social nationalism.

The 1943 rebellion of the Raya’na Azebo and Wajerat peasants against the imperial

regime, so-called ‘Weyanne’ from a traditional feud war between various ethnic

communities (Oromo, Amhara, Agaw, Tigre) in northern Ethiopia, was both in its

inspiration and objective a continuation of the Italian period, and even a little belated

2
We have to take exception for Bale, as it was an appendage of the Greater Somalia ideology rather than
an autonomous development with indigenous objectives.

151
phase of the colonial war.3 A British report of April 5, 1941 indicates a resurgence in the

traditional rebelliousness of the Raya’na Azebo, who allegedly declined to accept the

overlordship of Tigrean rulers “...saying that they had chiefs recently appointed by the

Italians and that the British are still far away from them...”4 Likewise, they were reluctant

to acknowledge the authority of the restored central government.

In fact, the Raya had grievances over the state’s punitive expeditions in 1929 for their

repeated raids on the neighboring Afar. By way of vengeance, Raya’na Azebo irregulars

had allied with the Italians in the attacks against the retreating Ethiopian army in 1936, as

well as in the fight against the patriotic forces, and in the harsh suppression and

pacification of resistant communities during the occupation, particularly in Shoa.

Similarly, several prominent members of the Tigrean aristocracy had gone over to Italy

during the war and were now apprehensive of what was to come. On the fringes of this

was Italian-inspired anti-Shoa ideology of the Tigrean nobility claiming to reassert lost

privileges and Tigray’s political centrality. Hence the temporary unity struck between

some Tigrean nobilities and the lowland Raya peasantry was based on anxiety and fear

over past misdeeds than any common future objectives. It is the apparent weakness of

the imperial state rather than its centralizing drive, as Gebru maintains, which made the

Weyanne revolt possible in the immediate postwar period.5

3
Oral Informant: Geleta Tasew. The annual Weyanne conflict, a demonstration of bravery and manliness,
between neighboring communities in Merhabete is said to have been banned by Lij Iyassu. This battle was
called ‘Ye’weyanne torinet’. Ephrem Betrewerq, Bihrere Hiyawan, a historical novel (ZA Printing
press:2005 EC), p.25.
4
MoI Files: No.1.2.8.15, Guksa File.
5
Gebru Tareke, “Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia: the Case of the Weyane,” Journal of African History,
25(1984), p.79. Gebru, pp.82, 84, maintains that the 1941 reformed taxation introduced by Haile Selassie,
though much less onerous than the pre-Italian period, "was apparently contrary to peasant expectations
and certainly proved an unpopular act." Peasants also feared loss of autonomy and resented the state’s

152
In spite of its initial conciliatory approach, when the Weyanne rebellion escalated in May

1943, the restored state wanted to use this opportunity to “punish Tigre and Raya” by

way of settling past scores as well as discouraging future ambitions. The punitive force

led by Ras Abebe Aregay, which consisted of 18 battalions assembled from Dessie,

Debre Birhan, Ambo, Addis Ababa, Adama, Jimma, plus the regional army of Wag, was

easily able to repress the rebellion between May and October 1943.6 As the conflict itself

had limited immediate significance, this incident was later incorporated as expression of

gallant Tigrean resistance to Shoa-Amhara oppression and an inspiration for ethno-

nationalism in the region. The rebellion was limited to a few areas of eastern Tigray

outside the Raya’na Azebo woreda, but the self-proclaimed ideological successor, the so-

called “Kaliay Weyanne”(Second Weyanne) movement, assumed pan-Tigrean form by

subsuming the Raya under Tigrean ethno-nationalism. In sleight of hand, Blatta

Hailemariam Redda was also redeemed in Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)

discourse as a ‘national’ hero and founding-father of the movement. This canonization is

the more surprising since Hailemariam had been appointed by the Derg as leader of the

regional militia force set to suppress the Second Weyanne.7

interference in their traditional raids and considered the Italians as preferable to the restored state. This
does not seem a plausible explanation to provide a common objective between the Raya and the Tigrean
nobility, as he himself notes that the revolt was only limited to a part of eastern Tigray. Bereket, Conflict
and Intervention, p. 90, maintains that there was a failed attempt to unify Tigreans and Eritreans under
Ras Mengesha in the early 1940s.
6
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó 019.09, Demisse? to Fitawrari Birru W/Gebriel, Minister of War, no date, a table
which lists the commanders of the battalions and regiments, their command centers, with a heading
“Tigrena Rayan Lemektat Yetazezew Yeseletene Wetader”. Emperor Haile Selassie’s letter to “KªÓ
S ””ƒ“ I´w “ dated Meskerem 19/1937, signed by Tsehafe Tezaz Wolde Giorgis. The emperor thanks
the lords and people of Wag for their assistance in punishing the rebels in Tigre.
7
Gebru, “Peasant Revolt,” p.80.

153
Similarly, the Gojjam peasant rebellion of 1968 is important from the viewpoint of

nationalism in the manner it was ex post facto articulated as an anti-Shoa struggle.8 The

instigators of the rebellion were local feudal rulers who resented the abolition of the gult

system of tenure, but incited the peasantry against the state using as pretext the

enforcement of the agricultural income tax instituted a year before. Again like Tigre,

many of the members of the Gojjam nobility had unpropitious roles during the Italian

invasion and the occupation period, which naturally made them extra-conscious to the

slightest imposition from the center.

In addition, the anti-Shoa sentiment of a section of the regional nobility might have

resonated with the common people because of the tragic end of Dejazmach Belay Zeleqe,

whose outstanding patriotism was repaid by the injustice of depriving a part of his fief

Bechena (loss of Motta and Debre Marqos) and the indignity of elevating his arch rivals

above him, to wit Lej Haylu Belew to Ras as Governor-General of Gojjam and

Dejazmach Mengesha Jembere to Bitweded as Deputy Governor-General. Therefore,

Belay’s name later carved a place in popular memory as the ‘Gojjame’ hero par

excellence, outshining all other equally illustrious patriots in the region, due to the

symbolic significance of his life/death both as regional challenge to Shoan hegemony and

as the Tewodros-like bravery of a self-made man. Belay Zeleqe, however, was a patriot

who later gained a rightful place among the national heroes of Ethiopia. What is more,

8
Markakis and Nega, Class and Revolution, p.41, trace the opposition to Shoan highhandedness from the
appointment of Dejazmach Kebede Tesema in 1950 to that of Dejazmach Tsehayu Enqusilassie in 1968.

154
unlike Tigre, Gojjam regionalism did not evolve into an ethno-nationalism threatening

the very integrity of the nation.9

Perhaps an unprecedented ideology which directly emanated from the questioning of the

restored Emperor’s legitimacy was the idea of establishing a republic in place of a

monarchical state. This idea had been floating during the patriotic struggle and debated

openly until the Emperor was redeemed in the final years. Haile Selassie’s restoration

after a period of ‘desertion’ of the country amounted to some as treasonous in its

unprecedentedness. In the postwar period, this feeling was aggravated by the patriots’

perception of unfair honors and privileges accorded to the collaborators and other exiles.

The fact that the arch proponents of this republicanism, who perhaps wanted not only to

unseat the Emperor but also to abolish the monarchy altogether, were men as different in

region, social background and personality as Wagshum Wessen Hailu, Bitweded Negash

Bezabih, and Blata Takele Wolde-Hawaryat testifies to the widespread appeal of the idea.

Wagshum Wesen began to sound views about the merits of a republic as an expression of

discontent over postwar administrative reforms which eroded the traditional status and

prerogative of his fief, Wag. He was particularly against the inclusion of Wag Awraja

under Wollo Governorate General according to the 1948 administrative reconfiguration.

He was, therefore, suspected of allegedly conspiring to incite rebellion in Wag, Seqota,

9
Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam in Tiglachin, (Addis Ababa: Tsehay Pub., 2004 EC) reminisces the intensity
of Colonel Atnafu Abate’s hatred for Emperor Haile Selassie and his pressure for summarily executing the
latter. Regardless of its credibility, this story gives clue to the currency of the regional sentiment among
various social classes. Again, however fleeting and ridiculous it seems, this was the only Amhara region
which saw a separatist claim, the Felege Ghion party, in the chaotic days of the early 1990s.

155
Raya’na Azebo, Yeju, Simen and Tigre.10 It was reported that in September 1948 the

Wagshum had gathered 15 elders from various localities in Wag and asked them whether

they were happy with the existing regime, to which the latter replied that it was good and

as long as Haile Selassie is alive they wouldn’t complain. Then the Wagshum urged:

“የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ባይማርና ባይሰለጥን ነው እንጂ፣ በያለበት ተከራክሮ ባንዲራውን ካቆመ በነጮች አገር ደንብ ህዝብ በመረጣቸው

ሚኒስትሮች ይገዛል እንጂ ባንድ ንጉሥ መገዛት የለበትም፡፡ በጌምድርም እኮ እንዲህ አይነት አገዛዝ ቢጸናበት ነው ፀጥታን ያበላሸ ሲሉ

ሰበኩ፡፡“ “It is but due to the lack of learning and civilization of the Ethiopian people that,

after having fought and erected its flag, according to the norm in Western countries, it

would have been ruled by ministers of its own choosing rather than by a single monarch.

He preached that Begemidir had rebelled due to the imposition of such kind of rule.”11

State officials in the region warned that the conspiracy in Wag could spread to Lasta and

Yeju because of which the Ministry of Interior ordered the Director of Wallo

Governorate General to closely follow up the matter and report regularly.12

The Wagshum considered Wag’s subservience to Wallo as demeaning to its historical

distinction and pride and filed in 1949 a petition to the Emperor on behalf of his people,

in which he traced the region’s autonomy, its special privileges as well as patriotism in

Ethiopian history from the time of Menelik I. What is remarkable about the petition is the

explicit attempt to exploit the alleged Shoa – Tigre rivalry by drawing attention to special

10
MoI Files: Colonel Kifle Ergetu, Director of Public Security, to Fitawrari Kifle Dadi, Wollo Governorate
General Director, No.7/2729, Hidar 6/1941 Addis Ababa. The Wagshum was even accused of spreading a
prophesy about his imminent kingship.
11
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó 049.06, Sile Wag Awraja Gizat Hunate Yetesafu Debdabewoch,1942 EC. No name,
addressed to the Crown Prince, confidential, Yekatit 1/1942. He is referring to the peasant insurrection in
Begemdir the previous year.
12
In the same file another confidential letter by Dejazmach Mengistu Gebresilassie, Wag Seqota, to the
Crown Prince, dated Tahsas 8/1942.

156
ethnic and historical ties between Wags/Agaws and Shoans, more than the former’s

relations with their neighboring peoples(meaning the Tigre).

“... !"
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78)9:; + *< 0 =) 9 0 > <? ,%@ AB $ C DAE
8FG , G H0 +%I HJ !KL M ! N % OO… 5 ! 6
?PH Q ?PH () )+ . ) $ R + L+ SL
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“...We the people of Wag, rather than kings crowned in our neighborhood, have
positive attitude and special amity with those crowned in Shoa due to our
genealogical ties...” “...On his way to the encampment of Prince Ras Mekonnen,
Ras Mengesha saw the army of Wag on the left and right and, as is still openly
told, exclaimed that ‘we Tigreans cannot achieve our goal so long as these Agaws
were there’...” “...Prince Ras Mekonnen went[when the army of Wag asked to
follow him to Hararge after Adwa] after observing that as the people of Wag is
bonded with the people of Shoa by blood and love, you are our gatekeepers of
Tigre and it would be better to help us by staying in your own land...”13

In other words, what this meant was Wag is still indispensable in curbing any anti-Shoa

or anti-state ambition which comes from the Tigreans.

Whereas Wagshum Wessen was dabbling with republicanism to advance a personal and

regional objective, Bitweded Negash Bezabhih and Blatta Takele Welde-Hawaryat,

despite differences in regional and social background, contemplated the republican idea

perhaps driven by burning patriotism rather than any defined nationalism. The former

13
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó 049.06 , Sile Wag Awraja Hunate Yetetsafu Debdabewoch, 1942 EC. From internal
evidence it is possible to discern that this eleven-page document was written by the Wagshum himself.
The petition details instances of Wag’s loyalty and achievements: the first to pay homage to Menelik II at
Boru Meda in 1889; the role of Wag’s army at the Battle of Adwa as well as during Ras Mengesha’s
rebellion, both under the commandership of Ras Mekonnen; during the Raya’na Azebo uprisings in 1929
and 1943, etc.

157
was a grandson of Negus Tekle-Haymanot of Gojjam who, beyond the regional and

dynastic mould, connived to assassinate the Emperor and proclaim a republic with Ras

Imru Hailesilassie at its head, which landed him in jail in 1951. Blata Takele, a Shoan of

humble background, was a one-time protégée who turned into unrelenting enemy of the

Emperor from the very moment of the latter’s decision to go into exile after the Maichew

debacle. Takele was, however, a monarchist at heart and his initial attempt was to

obstruct Haile Selassie’s restoration by posing Yohannes Iyassu as a legitimate rival, a

plan which did not get off the ground during the resistance. Takele thus remained a

virtual nemesis to the Emperor until his death in a shoot-out with the police in November

1969. 14 Though the two attempts may have elements of social nationalism in their

aspiration of supra-ethnic and supra-regional ideal, their personalized, conspiratorial and

adventurous nature puts them in the category of the traditional shifta. Again like Belay

Zeleqe, it was in Blata Takele that a new generation of student radicals found a becoming

hero of the humbler classes.15

A more organized and articulate effort to transform the historic nation was the abortive

coup of 14 December 1960, known commonly as Ye’tahsas Girgir (The December

Ruckus). This was a moderate aspiration, compared to the burgeoning republicanism

discussed earlier, to make Ethiopia a constitutional monarchy with Prince Asfa Wessen

as head of state and Ras Emiru as premier. The coup had involved three major branches

of the coercive arm of the state, the Imperial Body Guard, the National Security and the

14
In the prewar period, Takele was among the loyal followers of Tafari who played a role in earning the
support of the Mehal Sefari to the prince; and on the eve of the war he was director of the Addis Ababa
Municipality. Takele was one of the three persons who opposed to the idea of the Emperor’s exile, the
others being Blatengeta Hiruy Woldesilassie and Dejazmach Yigezu Behabte. Bahru, Pioneers, p.73.
Birhanu Dinqe, however, rather includes Hiruy in the opposite group, Qesar’na Abyot, p.24.
15
Note the highly polemical treatise entitled ‘Tilahun Takele’.

158
Police Force, at least through their respective leaders Birgadier General Mengistu Neway,

Colonel Worqneh Gebeyehu and Birgadier General Tsige Dibu. The coup makers had

also declared their ultimate objective in the dialect of the historic nation – “to restore

Ethiopia’s glory” – though by limiting their goal to enabling the country “catch up with

the rest of Africa” they acknowledged existing deprivation of even by continental

standards.

The 1960 coup is as debatable as many of the themes in modern Ethiopian history, which

had a knack for earning distinction in the manner of their failure than they would have in

their success.16 Nevertheless, this attempt marked a transition into the epoch of modern

political opposition in the relative articulation of its objectives, in the overt manner of its

coordination and manifestation. The attempt might have dispelled the invincibility of the

Crown and proclaimed the rise of new classes of power contenders, a modern military

elite and a disgruntled intelligentsia, which, in concert or independently, would stake out

more unequivocal generational claims in the near future. Due to this, the 1960 abortive

coup could be regarded as the first clear example of social nationalism of its kind in

Ethiopian history.

Its distinctive feature cannot be overemphasized, however, for it was still essentially a

family affair in its leadership, part conspiratorial and adventurous in its execution, and

even suicidal and tragic in its conclusion. Again, the brothers’ massacre of senior

government officials they detained in the Genete Leul Palace and their cynical

justification of the act with “no absolution without blood” set a precedent and rationale

for bloody coups and revolutionary killings. As Bahru noted, Germame Neway, the

16
Say, for instance, in contradistinction with the success of the Derg in ousting the regime.

159
intellect and “the moving spirit behind the attempted coup” and the more radical of the

two brothers, was like a bridge between the pre-war intellectuals and the student radicals

of the 1960s and 1970s.17 This metaphor could be stretched to the manners of displaying

a high sense of civic responsibility and concern for the underprivileged, and even to the

marked irreverence (perhaps utter disdain) for tradition per se, which becomes the

hallmark of the latter.

3.1 Ethno-national Challenges to the Ethiopian State

The major challenge to the Ethiopian state in the immediate postwar period was the

proliferation of ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts all over the country. Much of

this was the result of Italian propaganda similar to the Weyanne case above. For instance,

by the time the prospect of defeat was looming in 1941, the Italians had distributed

armaments to their loyal supporters in Borana area. "The most important recipients of

these Italian arms were the Somali and a few other non-Somali but Islamic populations of

the region such as the Arsi Oromo."18 Similarly in Gambella, the Italians attempted to

enlist the help of the Nuer by arming and supporting their claims against the Anywaa.19

The Italians had promised to their loyal subjects that they would eventually reverse the

tables and come back triumphantly. In the meantime, the latter were encouraged to resort

to insurgency and harass the restored Ethiopian administration.

17
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia:1855-1974(London: James Currey, 1991), p.213.
18
Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, p.88.
19
Evans-Pritchard, “Further Observations,” p.73.

160
Such revolts in the early period (1942-3) were framed as opposition against 'Amhara rule'

and united the Somali of Borana and the Muslims of Arsi. The Borana Oromo, however,

stood on the side of the state. The mutiny of Mesqan Gurage Territorial Army in 1944, a

contingent constituted from ex-bandas and Italian irregulars, "also reveals the negative

effects of the Italian occupation in the inter-ethnic relations between Ethiopian Muslims

and the state." 20 The mutineers killed Christian soldiers within their company, even

reportedly hoisted an 'Islamic flag' and postured as avengers of Lij Iyasu in their rhetoric.

The controversy over grazing and territorial rights between the two main ethnic groups in

Borana region, the Borana and Garri, is in many respects similar to that of the Anuak and

Nuer in Gambella, including the correlation between settlement pattern and claims of

indigenity, the degree of allegiance to Ethiopian citizenship among rival groups, and the

perception of regional officials regarding the loyalty of subject groups.21

Eritrea and Ogaden were the two major challenges which emerged coterminously with

the genesis of modern Ethiopian nationalism. The Italians were the foster parents who

created and institutionalized Tigrean ethno-nationalism and Somali irredentism, while the

British were the midwife who gave political expression to both. In the decade after

liberation, the latter promoted the ideas of Greater Somalia and Greater Tigre as ethnic

antitheses to Greater Ethiopia. They wanted to append Ogaden to British Somaliland and

merge this with the former Italian Somaliland – christened as Greater Somalia. Eritrea

was to be divided and its lowlands to be joined to the Sudan while the highlands were to

be merged with Tigre as a separate Greater Tigre state, reviving the traditional Tigray-

20
Belete, “Agrarian Polity,” pp.159, 160-61.
21
See Tewodros, “Gambella: a History,” Chapter III.

161
Tigrign idea. It took over a decade of diplomatic wrangling to resolve the issue of these

territories in favor of Ethiopia.

The Ogaden question was born in 1943 when the British supervised the formation of

Somali Youth Club (SYC) with an explicit territorial claim to the Ogaden region. In the

mid-1940s, Ethiopian officials begun to worry about such developments and weighed the

possible fallouts on regional peace and stability.22 The 1945 London Conference of the

Allied Powers rejected Ethiopia’s claims to both Eritrea and the Ogaden regions. The

SYC, which was reconstituted in 1947 as the Somali Youth League (SYL), maintained

the irredentist aspirations in a nine-point declaration aiming “to end colonialism in all

Somali lands, and then to make the people live in unity under one government and

flag.”23

The Ethiopian state was very anxious to curb any expressions of pan-Somali nationalism

in the region, including the symbols such as “pins, shoulder sashes, hats, flags and

language.”24 The use of Arabic, Somali, English and Italian languages encouraged by

Italy and Britain was considered as detrimental to Ethiopian nationalism. This was a

legitimate concern since the anti-Ethiopian slogan of the SYL, “Somalia Hanolato,

Ethiopia Hadimato,” (Long Live Somalia, Death to Ethiopia!) had simultaneously gained

resonance with many Hararis who started in 1948 the so-called Kulub movement

opposing Ethiopian rule. The Ethiopian government seems to have at the time a very

22
MoI Files: No. 1.2.15.07, Sile Ethiopiana Engliz, an anonymous confidential memorandum, dated Miazia
8/1940, speculates that Britain had decided to establish a Somali state as a revenge for Ethiopia’s
contracting an American company for the Ogaden gas, p.2.
23
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” p.199.
24
Ibid. pp.204, 209,210.

162
intimate knowledge of developments in the Ogaden, while it had no comparable

knowledge about the Harari. In fact, it was surprised to find that the latter had ganged

with the Somali in their opposition against Ethiopia.25

In 1948, however, the British suddenly agreed to withdraw from parts of the Ogaden,

retaining only the Haud (northeast) and the so-called Reserve Area between the Haud and

the border of French Somaliland (later Djibouti). This reluctant decision further provoked

Somali ire, which gained a state backing with the creation of an independent Republic of

Somalia in 1960. A meeting of the Imperial War Council held on 25 May 1961 at the

Genete Leul Palace, in the Shekla Bet, and presided by the Emperor acknowledged the

gravity of the Ogaden situation and its threat to national security.26 The appropriateness

of this concern was proved when the first Ethio-Somalian war ignited in 1963.

Somalia was one of the three African states, along Togo and Ghana, which opposed

OAU’s decision, AHG/Resolution 16(1) adopted by the second summit in Cairo in 1964,

on the retention of colonial boundaries. It argued that maintaining the status quo would

split ethnic groups into various territories and sought to have them drastically altered.

Ethiopia countered by advocating respect for existing boundaries and underlining the

inapplicability of the principle of self-determination to groups within the boundaries of

newly-independent states. “Somalia pursued irredentism by both diplomatic and military

means. It sought to enlist international support for its goal, capitalizing on its cultural and

religious affinity with the Arab world, the Sudan’s conflicts with neighboring Ethiopia,

25
Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History,” pp.216, 218, 225, 226,227, 232, 238.
26
MoI Files: No. 1.2.15.02, Letter of the Imperial special etamajor, Birgadier General Woldesilassie
Bereka, to the various dignitary members of the Imperial War Council, attaching minutes of the IWC
deliberations, Ginbot 1953.

163
and the strategic interests of the Soviet Union...” 27 In addition to the strategic

encirclement of Ethiopia, Somalia created and hosted all kinds of anti-Ethiopian elements

from the 1960s. In the very year of its establishment Somalia set up a so-called United

Liberation of Western Somalia (ULWS), this claimed all of Hararge, Arusi, Bale and

southern Sidamo in its definition of Western Somalia. In 1963, another group called the

Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) replaced ULWS. In 1964, Ethiopia and Kenya entered

into a political – military alliance and coordinated their anti-guerrilla activity.

A direct outcome of Somali irredentism was the Bale rebellion (1963-1970), the only

serious peasant insurrection in the period which occurred outside the central and northern

territories of the historic nation. In addition to its more conventional, rather than

spontaneous, nature, the rebellion differed from contemporary incidents in its

protractedness, external inspiration and support, and secessionist objectives. Whatever

internal reasons there were, such as the aggravation of tenancy after the institution of

qalad in 1951, large-scale land alienation and increased taxes due to the introduction of

land measurement in 1963, or inequities of government officials, the rebellion was not

aimed at addressing such genuine peasant concerns, which actually did not differ

significantly from those elsewhere in southern Ethiopia.

Insurgency began in El-Kere, led by Kahin Abdi, and spread to Wabe, Dollo and Genale

the same year the Ogaden Liberation Front was established. The Somalis named the

movement as the Liberation Front of Western Somalia – with Waqo Gutu as ‘General of

Western Somalia’. "To downplay the potential for conflict between Somalis and Oromos,

27
Saadia Touval, “Partitioned Groups and Inter-State Relations,” in A.I. Asiwaju(ed), Partitioned Africans.
Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries: 1884-1984(Lagos:1984), p, 228.

164
the Somali government encouraged the insurgents to emphasize Islam as a common

denominator and picture their struggle as a jihad against Christian Amhara domination."28

Thus it will be appropriate to consider the Bale rebellion as a sideshow of Somali

irredentism for its fate was inextricable to the political context in Somalia than in

Ethiopia. This is evident in the fact that the insurgency collapsed from 1967 onwards due

to the withdrawal of Somalia’s support as well as the massive Ethiopian government

offensive.

The Somalis served as the promoters of the age-old anti-Ethiopian thesis of Abyssinian

colonialism, later adopted and modified by indigenous ethno-nationalists as ‘internal

colonialism’ or ‘settler colonialism’. Like all other ethno-nationalist movements in search

of historical precedent, the Bale rebellion was later glorified as the origin of Oromo

ethno-nationalist struggle, though neither Waqo nor his followers thought themselves as

ethnic Oromos, and in spite of the fact that the insurgency was opposed by Waqo’s

brother himself and finally crushed by the Ethiopian army led by General Jagama Kello.29

In fact, Somali irredentism remains a serious complicating factor for Oromo nationalism

due to the overlap in territorial claims between the two. Curiously enough, the anti-Shoa

ideology also featured in the scholarship which correlated the peaking of discontent in

Bale to the appointment of Fitawrari Worqu Enqusilassie as provincial governor in 1963,

just as his brother is alleged to have elicited similar uprising in Gojjam in 1968.30 This is

28
Paul Henze, “Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia. Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime, A Report
Prepared for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defence” (Rand Corporation:1985), p.31.
29
Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, pp.326-27, 336.
30
This is the main thesis of Gebru Tareke in his excellent book Ethiopia: Power and Protest. Peasant
th
Revolts in the 20 Century(Lawrenceville: the Red Sea Press, 1996). See for similar views Markakis and
Nega, Class and Revolution, pp. 41 and 42.

165
implausible since the rebellion had already been brewing at least a couple of years before

and it was evident that a more direct contemporaneity than this fortuitous appointment

would have been the Ethio-Somali war of 1963.

Eritrea is an integral part of historic Ethiopia and the genesis and development of its

nationalism takes many of the forms and ambiguities of Ethiopian nationalism. Eritrea is

a major casualty to Ethiopian nationalism in the days of imperialism. Though Italian

military adventure in Tigre and Mereb Melash resulted in two defeats at Dogali (1887)

and Adwa (1896), which featured high in the nationalism of modern Ethiopia, these

inconclusive Ethiopian victories did not save the province from falling prey to Italian

colonialism as Eritrea between 1890 and 1941. The half-a-century’s rule laid the ground

for Eritrean identity which tentatively emerged as a rival to Ethiopian nationalism about

the time of the region’s liberation. Eritrean separatism was born in this period, making

Adwa, which is the pinnacle of Ethiopian national independence and sovereignty, a blot

in Eritrean history and a mark of its bondage.

What may be called the Adwa complex easily lent itself to the ideologues of Shoa-Tigre

particularism. First, by promoting among some Eritreans a sense of betrayal by Ethiopia-

Menelik-Shoa, it served as legitimate reason to reject any claim for reunification between

the two countries. Second, by consequently attributing to Menelik-Shoa an evil design to

divide and weaken the Tigre ethnic group, it indirectly rendered the idea of Tigray-

Tigrign credible and worthy of pursuit.31 Hence, in the struggle for unification inside

31
IES Ms. No.2171, ‘Ze’Metsehaf’. Bahru, Pioneers, p.66, considers Gebre-Egziabher, the foremost
proponent of this view, as “someone who anticipated the unionist movement in Eritrea by more than four
decades.” It would be more consistent to Gebre-Egziabher’s Italo-philic attitude to consider him as a

166
Eritrea, the anti-unity front’s minimum and maximum demands were reflected even

within families, as Dejach Abraha Tesema, for instance, supported reunification with

Ethiopia provided that Eritrea is given administrative autonomy “lela yeshewa tewelaj

sayshomibin”(provided that no Shoan born is appointed over us), while his father Ras

Tesema was adamant on unconditional independence.32 It was the genuine nationalism of

the Unity block in Eritrea which made possible reunification with Ethiopia.

The unification effort inside Ethiopia started later (1943/44) and remained rather slack

and ambivalent. The early evidence of this attitude was evident in the 1944 decision of

YeEtyopiana YeHamassien Andinet Mahber (Hamassien KeEtyopia) to change its name

to YeEtyopiana YeEritrea Andinet Mahber(Eritrea KeEtyopia) and retain a common

supra-ethnic reference to the region, perhaps a hint of ‘national’ aspiration even within

the forces of unification.33 One grave factor which sat uncomfortably on the conscience

of Eritreans as well as Ethiopians in the period was the fresh memory of the role of about

100,000 Eritrean askaris in the conquest and occupation of Ethiopia. We don’t find

among Eritreans in Ethiopia the popular enthusiasm of their counterparts in Eritrea.

In fact, overt and covert anti-unity activities were evident in some regional towns such as

Dessie and Gondar, where the postwar atmosphere had created tensions that made routine

administrative and legal mishaps easily escalate into ethnic conflicts. For example, a

predecessor of the Bloco, though Bahru attributes Gebre-Egziabher’s preference to disappointment with
Ethiopian leaders?
32
MoI Files: No. ›/¨/Ó, 049.11: Keyekiflu Yetelaku Andand Yemistir Mastaweshawoch,Cover letter Captain
rd
Asefa Wolde Silassie, the Second Army Corps leading officer, 3 Intelligence, to Crown Pince Merid
Azmach Asfa wossen, Yekatit 20/1942, Dessie. The second army corps headquarters, Dessie, intelligence
report regarding the situation in Asmara, to the imperial army intelligence officer, Addis Ababa, No. 2—
¡Ù/ªS/0037/790, Yekatit 20/1942.

33
President of YeEtyopiana YeHmassien Andinet Mahber(Hamassien KeEtyopia) to the Crown Prince Asfa
Wossen, No.293/29, Nehassie 10/1937, Addis Ababa.

167
decision in 1946/47(1939 E.C)by Gondar town municipality allegedly to demolish a

Catholic Church and use the land for other purpose had provoked violent reactions

among Eritrean residents, many of whom boycotted work and were detained and tried in

court. The Mahber president advised the Crown Prince to be moderate and conciliatory

towards the instigators as this kind of measure would be inimical to Ethio-Eritrean

unity. 34 This incident was a sign of urban ethnicism, which in the subsequent period

became progenitor of one branch of Eritrean nationalism, especially that affiliated with

the ESM.

In general, it would appear near the mark to say that the imperial state was ambivalent, or

perhaps not too enthusiastic, about the aggressive pursuit of Ethio-Eritrean unity. It rather

maintained pressure on the diplomatic front and closely watched the movement in Eritrea

to take its natural course. The federation was tolerated by many of the anti-Ethiopia

elements in Eritrea and Ethiopia. However, full unification seemed an affront not only to

successors of the Bloco in Eritrea but also many pro-unity Eritreans in Ethiopia, which

swung the very generation into a deadly enemy of the nation. An epitome of this

transformation was Woldeab Woldemariam who in the late 1960s conspired with

Egyptians and other anti-Ethiopian elements in the region to gear up support for Eritrean

independence. According to a contemporary observer, Woldeab’s aim was to establish a

Tigre state, if possible including Gojam and Begemedir, if not only Hamassen and Tigre.

His intention was not only to disintegrate Ethiopia but also to incite a civil and religious

34
MoI Files: Nos: 026.19 and 027.51. The UN decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia, Resolution 390
A(v), 2 December 1950.

168
war, and at the head of all this is Nasir.35 The rise of Ba’athist politics firmly aligned

Arab states of the Middle East behind the Eritrean secessionist struggle thus making the

Muslim factor decisive in the early phase.

3.2 The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) and the National Question

The ESM is the single most important factor influencing the direction of Ethiopian

history since the late 1960s.36 The birthplace of the movement was the University College

of Addis Ababa (UCAA), which was founded on 20th March 1950 and expanded within a

decade by opening a total of six branch colleges, two of which, Alemaya (1951) and
37
Gondar (1954), were outside Addis Ababa. The production of a homegrown

intelligentsia was supplemented by sending many students abroad to pursue higher

education. This constituted the first phase of the ESM in which student organizations

emerged inside and outside Ethiopia, originally to deal with intracampus and living

concerns. The new generation of educated Ethiopians then began to worry about the

country’s backwardness even by African standards; they raised general economic, social

and political issues.

This led to the second, reformist, phase that set in after 1960 with students’ critical self-

appraisal of their historical role in alleviating the predicament of the nation.38 As the

influence of African scholarship students in the late 1950s and early 1960s was

35
MoI Files: No.30.02.04. An anonymous letter to Dejazmach Zewde G/Silassie, written from Hamburg on
17/1/64 E.C, in reply to the latter’s letter of 13/1/1964 E.C.
36
Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.2.
37
MoI Files:No. 1.2.47.08, Margaret Gillett, Registrar, HISU Office of the Registrar, Prospectus 1963-1964,
published in June 1963.
38
Challenge, V,1, March 1965.

169
instrumental in making UCAA students aware of their African identity and international

duties, the abortive coup of 1960 opened their eyes to domestic civic responsibilities.39

The students were practically jolted by the coup and things were never the same again.

Campus-based unions began to consolidate with the establishment of the National Union

of Ethiopian University Students (NUEUS) in 1961. Ironically, it was almost a year after

the abortive coup, on 18 December 1961, that Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) was

formally inaugurated and the Emperor donated the Genete Leul Palace grounds for the

main campus of the new university. The same year, the College Day presentation of a

critical poem entitled Dehaw Yinageral soured relations between students and the palace,

as the latter demanded in 1962 a preview of contesting poems to avoid another such

embarrassment.40

The amalgamation of unions at continental and national levels was driven by the increase

in student commitment and their understanding of their roles, which was indicated in the

very names and preoccupations of their journals. The concern then surpassed discussion

of how to break the vicious circle of poverty and ignorance in Ethiopia to filing petitions

to the government demanding reforms. When these entreaties fell on deaf ears, students

became openly critical of the Emperor’s autocratic powers, the absence of civil and

democratic rights, the rampant corruption and incompetence in the government. They

demanded more roles for the educated, autonomy for courts, and freedom of press and

thought for citizens. 41 Progress became a key term in the student lexicon, and

39
Bahru, Documenting ESM, pp.11, 22.
40
Bahru, Documenting ESM, pp.12, 25. Mulugeta Bezabih’s craving “to expose His Majesty to public
redicule”,p.46, became a measure of one’s radicalism.
41
Tiglachin, Special Edition, Meskerem 1963 E.C.

170
progressives were determined to fight everything that was deemed conservative,

opportunist and reactionary.42

The third, radical and revolutionary, stage was marked by the rise of the ‘Land to the

Tiller’ question on 24 February 1965. Thereafter, students intensified their opposition and

struggled for nothing less than change of the entire system itself. 43 Now the main

questions were how to overthrow the imperial government; what kind of system to build

upon its grave; what roles students should play in this revolutionary endeavor, etc.44 The

general consensus among student activists in and abroad on the inevitability of the armed

struggle echoed the spirit of the abortive coup: “no absolution without blood.”45 As the

years passed by, students became more determined, confrontational, radicalized and

divided. The establishment of USUAA and the publication of its mouthpiece Struggle on

23 March 1967 marked the fall of the home front under radical elements.

The USUAA from the outset acted more as a political party than a civic association with

student concerns, and, judged by its publications, at least the most articulate section has

already adopted the radical rhetoric of the left in 1967.46 Evidently, domestic students

42
Andargachew Asegid, Bachir Yeteqeche Rejim Guzo. Meison Be’Etyopia Hizboch Tigil Wust (Addis
Ababa: Central Printing, 2000) , pp.32. Challenge, V, 1, March 1965. Dessalegn Rahmeto, in ‘Art Betrayed’,
rebuking Afework Tekle for advocating his ‘opportunist and reactionary’ view for an Ethiopian audience,
at Phillips Brooks House, Harvard University, on 5 December 1965. The next issue contains a rejoinder by
Hailu Fulass criticizing Dessalegn.
43
Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.1, notes the general consensus on this demarcation.
44
Alem Habtu in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.65, notes: “It would seem that it was at this time that the
union began its left-wing trend.”
45
Tiglachin, Special Edition, Meskerem 1963 E.C. Yeraswork Admassie in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.57.

46
Struggle, I, 1, March 1967. Struggle, II,1, 1967. Struggle, II, 2, January 1968. According to Bahru,
“Intellectuals and Soldiers: the Socialist Experiment in the Horn of Africa,” Paper prepared for CODESRIA’s
th
30 Anniversary Conference, Dakar, 8-11 December 2003, p.3, a “surrogate proto-Communist cell” called
Crocodiles, which was established in 1964, introduced the socialist ideology among students and
radicalized them between 1968 and 1970.

171
had to reckon with financial, administrative, political, security and intelligence matters

and did not have the freedom their counterparts abroad enjoyed. Besides such

constrictions, bearing the brunt of government repression and reprisal might have

contributed to making them prone to passion and violence. Hence they were dismissive of

peaceful ways of struggle and when they applied themselves to the investigation of global

issues, they invariably drew radical lessons. The key terms which fully described student

ideology after 1967 then became: ‘struggle’ through ‘guerrilla warfare’ to bring about a

‘revolution’ in the country.47 A crude drawing of a rifle-wielding arm became a favorite

symbol in the movement, apparently prescribing the same medicine to Ethiopia’s ills.48

The radicalization pace was paralleled by drives for some spectacular action to show off,

the more sanguine boldly claiming “our country needs turning upside down. Even a small

minority can do it, but it takes faith and courage.”49

Tribalism, Regionalism, Nationalism

The place of nationalism in the ESM was a direct outcome of the radicalization of the

movement due to global and domestic factors. The intensification of anti-colonialist

struggles, the concomitant influence Marxism came to wield in the Third World as a

liberation ideology, the Cold War atmosphere, the global student revolutionary

movement all constituted the international contexts for the ESM. Internally, besides the

47
Struggle, I,2, 1967. Struggle, II,2, January 1968. Struggle, II, 3, March 1968.
48
Struggle, II, 5, December 1968.
49
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969. Struggle, V, 1. Struggle, V, 2, November 1969. The imperial state’s
leniency in the face of such open treasonous agitations is truly remarkable, though it went down as a
textbook example of political suicide.

172
inspiration of the 1960 abortive coup, the decade witnessed the proliferation of ethnic and

regional insurgencies in various parts of the country, mainly in Ogaden, Eritrea, Gojjam

and Bale.

During the reformist phase of the ESM nationalism was understood as love, loyalty and

patriotism to Ethiopia and its people, ideals which constituted the raison d’être of the

various unions. Students, therefore, strongly opposed any rival and sectarian elements

such as the so-called Ethiopian Orthodox Students’ Association in Europe.50 They also

denounced signs of ethnic exclusiveness as ‘tribalism’ and were firm in the conviction

that “...Ethiopia is one and indivisible; its people will remain one and earn their freedom

in unity.”51 During the early 1960s, the apparent disunity in the student body and the lack

of “awareness of genuine nationalism like the youth of its generation elsewhere...” was

explained in terms of excessive egoism and conservatism in its national trait. The

studentship was considered uninspiring because “it is not yet Ethiopian, but Tigre,

Galla(sic) and Amhara serving those whose interest cannot flourish without accentuating

the differences implied by these labels.”52

Nevertheless, gradual manifestation of sectarian tendencies prompted ‘the Question of

Tribal Differences’ as a discussion topic for the 13th Congress of ESANA, held at

50
Challenge, V,2, August 1965, editorial expresses admiration for Ethiopian students in Europe for
“heroically repulsing and discrediting such sectarian elements as Ethiopian Orthodox Students’
Association in Europe and the so-called Eritrean Students’ Union Abroad” and concludes that “...Ethiopia
is one and indivisible; its people remain one and earn their freedom in unity.”
51
Challenge, V, 2, August 1965. Bahru, Pioneers, p.84, considers Tedla Haile’s MA thesis(1930) as “the
first serious attempt to address the issue of national integration in Ethiopia, albeit from an unabashedly
chauvinistic standpoint. The central theme of the thesis is the need for the assimilation of the Oromo.”
52
Challenge, V, 1, March 1965.

173
Harvard from 6 to 12 September 1965. 53 At home, ethnicism alias ‘tribalism’ or

‘regionalism’ had by 1967 ranked among the immediate concerns within the movement.54

By 1968, awareness of ethnic identity and representation has permeated all aspects of

campus life, as some expressed dismay at the college talent show in which only Amharic,

Tigrigna and English songs were performed while the numerous ethnic groups were
55
forgotten. There was a general apprehension about the divisive potential of

ethnocentrism, threatening not only students’ internal unity but also national integrity, so

that activists attempted to ward off its ascendance by drawing attention to the

consequences of tribal conflict elsewhere in Africa. 56 They called for tolerance, for

renouncing petty tribal, linguistic or religious differences, and for the creation of a united

front under Ethiopianism: “So long as the spirit of Ethiopianism abides within us, so long

as we continue to think and work within the Ethiopian context, success will always be on

our side.”57

As a form of national soul-searching, students had to contend with the traditions and

conceptions of historic Ethiopia, at least from a tactical aspect. Two of the most

important bones of contention in this respect were the fate of the monarchy and the

pertinence of the Orthodox Church to Ethiopia’s national ideology. Many believed that

the monarchy was a unifying institution binding diverse elements of the nation and its

abolition would spell the country’s disintegration. What is more, the self-perception of

Eritrean liberation organizations as part of the Pan-Arabic Movement was incompatible

53
Challenge, V, 2, August 1965.
54
Struggle, I,3, October 1967.
55
Struggle, II, 4, 1968.
56
Struggle, I,3, October 1967.
57
Struggle, II,1, 1967. Struggle, II, 5, December 1968.

174
with the prevailing view of Ethiopia as a Christian island in a Moslem sea, and any

explicit affiliation with such elements would incur the student movement a political

risk. 58 A part of the radicalization process was evident in activists’ attitude towards

religion, which was generally unfavourable but particularly hostile to the Ethiopian

Orthodox Church.59 The Orthodox Church was accused of complicity with the imperial

regime and some called for a revolution to purge it. 60 Nevertheless, there were no

parallel analyses whatsoever of other faiths, such as Islam or Catholicism, or on the

general history or theory about religion and its place in the future of the nation.61

Again there was little evidence of serious application to understand Ethiopian history and

culture to corroborate the apocalyptic assertions that the generation has been born “...at

the crossroads of Ethiopian history: a turbulent period of social dislocation and

readjustment. Old values are collapsing and new values are being formed.”62 Activists

hammered the irreplaceable role students would play in liberating the masses from

bondage and leading them to welfare, freedom, unity and progress.63 This generational

confidence infused a cynical attitude towards history which some ridiculed as “regressive

appreciation of days past.” Therefore, whatever engagement with Ethiopian history there

was, it was revealed only in highly eclectic and propagandist application to buttress an

argument.64 The main objective at this point seems to oppose and agitate rather than

58
Kiflu Tadesse, Ya’Tiwlid II.Yelewt Maibel Be’Etyopia(USA: Independent Pub., 1999), pp.50, 52-53.
Andreas Eshete in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.104.
59
Struggle, I,2, 1967. Struggle, I, 3, October 1967.
60
Struggle, II,2, January 1968. Struggle, II, 3, March 1968. Struggle III, 1, January 1969.
61
Struggle, II, 2, January 1968.
62
Struggle, II, 2, January 1968.
63
Struggle, II, 5, December 1968.
64
Struggle II, 5, December 1968.

175
understand and enlighten. As Desalegn reminisces “...we were at sea in the sense that we

could not identify properly the problems confronting us, much less seek solutions for

them. We were too obsessed with fad expressions...mostly ‘isms’...to correctly address

out problems by examining the relevance of these slogans to our country.”65

In spite of undercurrents and underground activities, nationalism per se was not tabled for

open discussion by USUAA until the late 1960s. In late 1967, for example, an observer

wished that “the university is not flooded by words ending with ‘ISM’ – (Nationalism is

an exception!).”66 Yohannes W/Giorgis’s “Nationalism” was the first of such title in this

series which directly attempted to grapple with the definition of nation and nationalism:

“A nation is a conglomeration of tribes, religion and groups bounded by economic

interest. Historical background and geographical conditions of a particular place

determine the kind of life people lead as one large group, i.e, a nation.” “Nationalism is

the state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt due to the nation

state.”67 This rudimentary understanding does not bear an ideological brand in spite of its

Marxist-like emphasis on the economy. It is, however, representative of the original

conception of unity between Ethiopianism and nationalism. ‘Tribalism’ was

condescendingly reserved for primordial ethnic, linguistic and religious sentiments,

whereas ‘nationalism’ seemed a more respectable equivalent to ‘Ethiopianism’.

The intensification of ethno-regional movements in the country and their growing

influence on the ESM itself again compelled the adoption of ‘regionalism’ as a

compromise between ‘tribalism’ and ‘nationalism’. Both the 1968 ESUE congress at

65
Desalegn Rahmeto in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.38.
66
Struggle, I,3, October 1967.
67
Struggle, II,1, 1967.

176
Zagreb and the 1969 ESANA congress at Philadelphia raised the question of regionalism

in Ethiopia and passed unanimous resolutions. In fact, the latter’s resolution considered

separatist movements as counter-productive and reactionary. 68 At home, the general

demand for an orderly treatment of nationalism in order to clarify the blurred hierarchy of

loyalties between internationalism, pan-Africanism, Ethiopianism, regionalism and

tribalism continued throughout 1969. Some even openly expressed their wish to see the

day when Ato Mesfin W/Mariam will write on these issues, so that the 1969 panel

discussions and lectures were tuned to subjects such as tribalism, nationalism and African

socialism.

Unfortunately, none of the panelists of the year presented theoretical and/or historical

treatment of nationalism and, perhaps driven by the exigency of saving the movement

from disintegration, dwelt on its ancillary aspects and outward manifestations like

tribalism as “a feudal tactic of divide and rule.”69 Students were dissatisfied so that they

attempted to contextualize nationalism in terms of Ethiopianism or Ethiopian

nationalism, as “nationalism alone does not mean anything these days.”70 Abdul Mejid

Hussein, for instance, defined Ethiopianism as “the concept that transcends personal,

tribal, and regional loyalties. It is a belief held by the Ethiopian who thinks in terms of

the people as a whole.”71 So far, the dominant conceptions of nationalism in the student

68
Andargachew , Meison, pp.20-22, 40-42. Challenge, X, 1, 1970.
69
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969. The panel by Ato Eshetu Chole, Dr. Haile-Gebriel, Dr.Tadesse, Tsegaye
G/Medhin and Gebru Gebrewold addressed issues of tribalism and the state’s role in aggravating it. In
fact, Gebru’s titile was “Tribalism as a Feudal Tactic of Divide and Rule”. The panelists on African Socialism
were Ambassador Sahnoun, Ato Mesfin Woldemariam, Dr. John Marikakis, Dr.Low, Dr. Richard Caulk, and
a certain professor from Ghana. Struggle, V,2, November 1969.
70
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969.
71
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969.

177
movement, inside and abroad, remained generational or social, aiming to takeover the

state and reform it rather than demand for its dismemberment.

Ethnicity is, however, characteristically opportunist and able to adapt itself to any

situation and ideology until it finally reigned supreme over it. This chameleonic nature

was bound to be aggravated with the gradual leaning of the student body towards leftist

ideology and the obsessive factionalism inherent in the latter. Therefore, divergent views

on the application of Marxist-Leninist theories to explain Ethiopia’s political system,

such as “oppressor versus oppressed” nation, “class versus national” rule, “regional

versus national” distinctions, and “cultural autonomy versus political secession” escalated

dangerously. 72 According to a “News and Notes” report, the 1968 contest between a

‘leftist’ Tilahun Gizaw and a ‘reformist’ Mekonnen Bishaw for the presidency of the

USUAA was decided in favor of the latter due to a malicious ‘secessionist’ and ‘tribalist’

allegation spread against the former.73

The understated ‘tribalist’ rift here referred to the traditional Tigre-Amhara rivalry

represented by the contenders as well as the perception of a radicalized anti-Amhara

front, which was evident in its sympathy to secessionism and ethnic rather than class

explanations. After Tilahun’s defeat, the acrimony in the student body was

institutionalized between the presidency and the mouthpiece, and disagreement on the

control of Struggle continued between USUAA and the editors. The paper itself became

brazenly biased towards Tilahun, so much so that by October 1969 it openly called for

72
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969.
73
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969.

178
Mekonen’s resignation from the USUAA presidency, notwithstanding his election by a

majority vote.74

The imperial state had been closely following developments, especially so from 1965

onwards, and was alarmed by the increasing politicization and radicalization of university

students. However, it generally maintained a low-key stance on the repeated protests

characterizing them as attempts to sow seeds of dissension between peasants and

landlords (1965), between the people and the government (1966), and perhaps also

masterminded by ‘foreigners/outsiders’(1967). The government was apprised of the

sinister developments, especially its Marxist leanings and ethnic underpinnings. It also

knew that Ethiopian students abroad published and sent for dissemination at home

bulletins and papers which allegedly incited tribal dissension, opposed the existing

administration and agitated the masses towards grave social unrest. Intelligence sources

reported that students on national university service in various provinces used this

opportunity to spread unrest among the peasantry, workers and civil servants.75

Until late 1968, the government had shown remarkable caution and restraint, perhaps

interpreted by students as evidence of weakness and inviting ever bolder confrontations.76

However, the March to April 1969 unrest was alarming in its duration, intensity and

scale, showing the spread of the movement to secondary schools and with possible links

to the international branches. The imperial government had also anticipated that the year

1968/69 would witness the dissemination of the movement to other regions in the

74
Struggle, V, 1, 1969.
75
MoI Files: No . 17.2.462. 07.
76
Struggle, II, 4, 1968. Struggle, II, 5, December 1968. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462. 07.

179
country. Therefore, a detailed security plan was prepared in advance to be jointly

executed by the army, the IBG, regional police forces and the national army in all

governorates general except Eritrea. The plan was approved by the Emperor.

Then an opportunity offered itself when the Ministry of Education (MoE) issued a news

release, which in brief noted that out of the 10,000 students sitting for the national school

leaving examination that year, the university had capacity to accommodate only about

1,500. Student activists realized that if this matter was pumped-up, it would have wider

resonance since it also concerned about 75,299 students above the 7th grade. Accordingly,

they held a large demonstration on 3 March 1969 and circulated pamphlets demanding

improvement of the educational system, denigrating the administration and leadership of

the imperial state.77 The government quickly denounced student actions as irresponsible

and dangerous for the unity of the nation. The interior minister’s advice and ultimatum, 3

March 1969, opened with the following words: “ከጥቂት ዓመቶች ጀምሮ በየትም አለም ተደርጎ በማይታወቅ

ልማድ በያመቱ የቀዳማዊ ኃይለሥላሴ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ተማሪዎች ገና ባልተረዱትና ባላመዛዘኑት ፖለቲካንና አስተዳደርን በሚመለከት ጉዳይ

በየጊዜው የሚያደርጉት እንቅስቃሴዎችና ሙከራዎች ሁሉ ለብዙ ዘመን ጸንቶ የኖረውን መሰረተ ባህልና የአንድነታችንንም ኃይል

የሚያደክም ከህግና ከሥነ ሥርዓት ውጭ በሆነ መንገድ የተፈጸሙ መሆናቸውን ታውቃላችሁ፡፡ ...“ “In recent years, in an

unprecedented manner anywhere else in the world, the Haile Selassie I University

students have been annually making attempts and insurrections on matters of politics and

government which they did not yet grasp and weigh, and you know that these illegal and

77
Statements issued by various government bodies: Yekatit 21/1961 by the MoE; Yekatit 24/1961, Yekatit
27/1961 and Megabit 2/1961 by the MoI; Yekatit 25/1961 by the Police Force. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07.

180
undisciplined activities would be inimical to our longstanding cultural foundation and

strength of unity.”78

On the same day, 3 March, the government ordered the temporary closing of the

University and all secondary schools in the Addis Ababa.79 Simultaneously, it attempted

to mobilize public opinion against the movement. Various committees representing Addis

Ababa residents, parents of students, the University President and the Board of Directors,

and even the Prime Minister himself made several unsuccessful overtures to start

discussion with the student body. Students adamantly refused even when asked to present

their case to the Emperor. Now the situation seemed to go out of control and

compromise so that the government decided to harden its stance. On 7 March 1969, the

Emperor made a televised speech noting, similar to the above, that the irresponsible acts

of university students would no more be overlooked and vowed to take appropriate

measures on perpetrators and their accomplices. 80 While he toned down the official

propaganda about the imminent threat the unrest posed for national unity, yet he scorned

students that their premature actions would be dangerous for nations like Ethiopia:

“... T ,!U(V+ 3A7W$ X + Y6Z [0\]G ] $ ^_ $G?)$ A 8N`

E 70 ,aGC E b )Gc 0 . $ ` dM 0 G 4 Y$_e /B AU

81
E? 9 I 34 +f 0 ; ?Pg ,4% % H !8 ( OO”

78
MoI Files: No.17.2.462.04, Ye’temariwoch Selamawi Self Tiyaqe. This is a very important file which
contains several security and intelligence reports on the student unrest throughout the country, including
letters, pamphlets, resolutions, manifestos, ultimatums, legal orders, summaries of measures taken and
plans to quash the uprising by the government, etc.
79
MoI Files: No.17.2.462.04.
80
MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07.
81
Translates as: “It is necessary to recognize the fact that to attempt to resolve intractable and complex
social, economic and political problems even before completing one’s education, with premature

181
Again when its attempts to defuse the standoff by reopening classes were opposed, the

government issued another ultimatum on 13 March 1969 to punish students of the

university and high schools who sabotaged efforts to bring peace and order by agitating

and intimidating others to stay out.82 Nevertheless, after a month’s intermittent boycott

only part of the university students registered by “apologizing and signing statement of

guarantee”; some among these resumed inciting unrest in the campus while the

unregistered mobbed around schools and threw stones from outside. Finally, on 3 April

1969, registered students were forced to evacuate and the university and all secondary

schools in Addis were closed again.

The following figures might give a clue to the regional dimension and intensity of the

student movement in this particular period. In the three months of unrest, from 3 March

1969 to 7 June 1969, government estimates show that a total of 92 schools and about

76,513 students had taken part throughout the country. At the vortex of the unrest, in

Addis Ababa, an overall 49, 995 students from 28 schools had actually taken part. What

is more, even those who did not actively participate had created security problems by

supporting the unlawful activity and swelling the demonstrations. According to this

report, about 3,212 students were apprehended by the police in Addis Ababa, Shoa,

Arusi, Keffa and Wello. More than 85% of these were from Addis while Shoa and Addis

Ababa together constituted about 95% of the total. During the eight years this disturbance

has been going on intermittently, students of mission and private schools have seldom

taken part in protests.

mentality and reckless measures is especially dangerous for peoples like Ethiopia who are making
transition from tradition to modernity.” MoI Files: No.17.2.462.04.
82
MoI Files: 17.2. 462.04.

182
Most of the detainees were immediately released after appearing in a court of justice and

only a few ringleaders were sentenced various prison terms. On New Year’s Eve, 10

September 1969, the Emperor gave general pardon for all by commuting their sentences

to parole, and those from the university were allowed to continue their studies according

to the directives of the University Board.83 The students, however, did not show any sign

of remorse and in 1969/70 they resumed agitations and protests. This was the critical

period which emboldened the hardcore radicals to openly come out with heretical views

about the nationalities question. Up to this point, the student body had been striving to

exorcise itself from the ominous spirit of ethnicism, to purge it as a feudal legacy and

acknowledge instead internationalism which knows no boundaries.

In early 1969, the regionalist school within the USUAA tentatively aired the first explicit

denial of Ethiopia’s national status as well as the existence of socially, linguistically,

economically and culturally unified tribes in Ethiopia.84 Throughout the year, however,

nationalism remained in the background of student activism. Walelign’s provocative

piece “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia” was a climax of this intellectual

ferment, which broached the question so far kept discreet for two major reasons: firstly,

because of fear that “it may alienate certain segments of the student population...” and

secondly, the “government may take advantage of an honest discussion to discredit the

revolutionary student movement.”85 The first reservation was so far prompted by the need

to mitigate the political risks of a hardening anti-Amhara stance within the radical

section, which Walelign was willing to incur by endorsing the ‘tribal rule’ viewpoint and

83
MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07.

84
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969.
85
Struggle, V, 2, November 1969.

183
denouncing the Amhara (and “to some extent Amhara-Tigre”) masquerade going by

Ethiopian culture. He quoted Marxist literature to the effect that “...cultural domination

always presupposes economic subjugation...”(sic) and demanded economic as well as

cultural equality for all. Walelign’s essay was not only an exposition but also a

prescription in which he dismissed a military coup as a solution to Ethiopia’s problem

while curiously subscribing “violence...and revolutionary armed struggle” as the only

way to establish a “genuine egalitarian national state.”86

All other pieces published along with Walelign’s article were evidently intended to
87
reinforce its main arguments. Tagel’s editorial was entitled “Yetecheqonena

Yetebezebeze Hizb Mamets, Biret Mansat Gidetaw New” (it is inevitable that an

oppressed and exploited people should rebel and take a rifle) and underlined the

imminence of the armed struggle. Abraham Gebregziabher also wrote “Hizb Weys Ahzab

in Ethiopia?“ (people or peoples in Ethiopia?) in which he dismissed the idea of one

Ethiopian people: “there is nothing as such called an Ethiopian people; it is rather rulers’

dogma.”88 A little earlier Tiglachin had elaborated on the question of Ethiopian unity,

albeit in the form of a later favorite distinction between territorial and popular unity, or

the people or peoples argument. 89 Another piece “Yesost Shih Amet Yenetsanet

Firewoch” (fruits of three-thousand years of freedom) attempted to prove Amhara

86
Struggle, V, 2, November 1969.
87
Abdul Ahmed’s account in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.15, regarding the genesis of Walelign’s essay
during his detention at Alem Baqagn seems debatable in this respect. His exasperation was evident even
before this as his ‘Le’awaju Awaj’ indicates. The question of nationalities was Walelign’s harshest revenge
on the state, hitting out where it most hurts. Abdul himself observes such developments in Bahru,
Documenting ESM, pp.97, 100
88
Perhaps an echo of a more elaborate essay in Tiglachin, no.1, Meskerem to Tahsas 1962 E.C.
89
Tiglachin, no.1, 1962 E.C. : “...¾›=ƒÄåÁ I´w ›”É’ƒ ›K¨< wKA T¨<^ƒ u_ ¨KÅ wKA ¾S“Ñ` ÁIM ’¨<::
u›”É’ƒ SÚq’<”& u›”É’ƒ Su´u²<” ›”É’ƒ ŸL‹G<ƒ “”} ¨<nL‹G<::”

184
oppression by quoting statistics on regional distribution of hospitals, doctors and child

mortality rates, which contrariwise showed the extent of deprivation in Amhara

provinces.90 There were also several revolutionary quotations from Che Guevera, Frantz

Fanon, Lenin, Marx and Engels, marking the tradition of citing quotations as a distinctive

trait of student subculture.

Did Walelign introduce any novel or original thought in his essay? A close reading of

student publications during the 1960s reveals that there was little in his piece which had

not been implicitly or explicitly touched upon, more coherently and dispassionately so by

the overseas front. Walelign’s tentative summary earns distinction in rather for the first

time ascribing nationhood to ethnic and regional groups instead of Ethiopia as a whole.

In this respect, he stuck to the Leninist rather than the later Stalinist dogmatism adopted

by the movement.91 Walelign also did not define his terms even when he proclaimed that

Ethiopia is not a (homogenous) nation, and then, like his compatriots, he became self-

consciously bogged in the ideological swamp between nationalism and secessionism.

“There is nothing wrong with secessionism as such,” he echoed the ‘party’ line, without

establishing first what constituted Eritrean national status. After applauding reactionary

movements such as Gojjam and Bale peasant revolts, he nevertheless insisted that the

sole criterion for judging any movement is whether it is socialist or reactionary, not

whether it is secessionist or not. 92 Therefore, rather than coherence, originality or

90
Struggle, V, 2, November 1969.
91
Perhaps one major difference in the nationalist theories of Lenin and Stalin, which is relevant in this
context, emanates from the determinist definition of the nation advanced by the latter and its
overwhelming influence among the revolutionaries in the Third World.
92
Struggle, V, 2, November 1969.

185
brilliance, the power of Walelign’s essay seems to lie in its sensationalism as a timely

battle cry for a desperate youth.

A very surprising aspect of the ESM was its inability to extricate itself from the Eritrean

question, which ultimately sounded the movement’s death knell. Initially, students had

welcomed regional and ethnic insurgencies and oppositions as signs of crack in the

moribund imperial state and aspired to harness them in the struggle to overthrow the

regime.93 When the International Union of Students (IUS) passed a resolution in support

of Eritrean independence tabled by Arab students in 1966, NUEUS had rejected it on the

grounds that it was inspired by student unions which were protégés of the Syrian Baathist

Party. The 1967 NUEUS congress also reinforced this stand by condemning the

protagonists of secession and calling on the IUS to disown the resolution at its

forthcoming congress.94

In 1968, the WWUEUS regarded the Eritrean struggle, like the Bale and Gojjam

insurrections, essentially as a peasant rebellion and displayed no explicit commitment to

the principle of self-determination.95 Within the USUAA it was Tilahun, who, following

his defeat in 1968, first made a clean breast of the tactical justification for the secessionist

stand. He urged students to tolerate secessionist movements “...only in so far as they

weaken the regime and can serve as the basis for revolutionary action with the aim of

emancipating the whole people of Ethiopia in unity and not in diversity(sic).” 96 Still,

93
Andargachew, Meison, p.58. Kiflu, Ya’Tiwlid II, pp.50, 52-53. Also regarding cracks within the EPRP,
pp.154-156, 160. Struggle, V, 1, 1969.
94
Hailu Ayele in Bahru, Documenting ESM , pp.54, 55. Also Melaku Tegegn, p.108.
95
Tiglachin, Special Edition, Meskerem 1963 E.C.
96
Struggle, III, 1, January 1969. Andargachew, Meison, pp. 40-42, 58.

186
however, the ‘socialist’ camp vacillated between political separation and cultural

autonomy, partly not to give the state ammunition to attack the movement.97

After Walelign’s paper, the state intensified its propaganda portraying the movement as a

threat to social harmony and national unity: “በአጉል መንፈስ ተመርተው ህዝቡ አምኖ የተቀበለውን ሥርዓት

ለመሻር፣ የቆየውንና የኖረውን ልማድ የሚያኮስስ፣ ኃይማኖትን የሚያቀል፣ አባቶችን የሚያዋርድ፣ ኢትዮጵያን በኃይማኖት በነገድና በጎሳ

የሚከፋፍል፣ አንድነቱን የሚያናጋ፣ ሥርዓቱን የሚያቃውስ፣ ባህሉን የሚያራክስ፣ የህዝቡን ጸጥታና ሰላማዊ ኑሮ የሚያደፈርስ ዓላማ

ይዘው ተነስተዋል፡፡“ “They have been driven by evil spirit to destroy the system which was

willingly accepted by the people; they have risen with an objective to erode time-honored

tradition, undermine religion, denigrate fathers, divide up Ethiopia religiously, tribally

and ethnically, threaten its unity, destabilize its order, demonize its culture and disturb the

security and peaceful life of the people.” 98 The government believed that communist

inspired rhetoric reflected in student publications confirmed the assumption about the

involvement of a foreign hand in this unrest.99

Following that, USUAA president Tilahun Gizaw was mortally wounded on the night of

28 December 1969.100 After his death was swiftly rumored in campus, a group of students

wrested the corpse by force from Yekatit 12 hospital and carried it to the university

compound. On 29 December, students declined requests from the deceased’s family and

the police to handover the body; and conducted postmortem exam in the university clinic.

In response to the call distributed to all schools in the city, about 15,000 students flooded

97
Struggle, V, 1. “Interview with a Socialist” presents a conversation with a Mr X clarifying “some
misunderstandings” about the socialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
98
MoI Files: No.17.2.462.04.
99
The repeated allusion to ‘foreign hand’ meant outside help which was generally accurate. Bahru,
Documenting ESM, p.55. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07.
100
Tiglachin, 1, Meskerem to Tahsas 1962 E.C. Walelign’s tragic end came in December 1971 when he
along with other compatriots was shot dead while attempting to hijack an Ethiopian airplane.

187
the university compound carrying various slogans and chanting “Wendimachin Tilahun

begif tegedele be’hagerachin”(Our brother Tilahun is brutally assassinated in our

country).101 After declining repeated entreaties to handover the corpse to his family, it

was decided that the IBG should take it back by force. Students jeered at the soldiers

crying “Soldier ready, shoot, finish us!”102

On police interrogation, three of the ringleaders gave similar accounts of Tilahun’s

assassination, surprisingly at variance with their subsequent agitation propaganda. Gebru

had three probable assumptions: 1/ “as it is rumored the state could have him

assassinated”; 2/ “those who call themselves Eritrean Liberation Front could have

assassinated him to create conflict between the state and the people”; 3/ “persons who

seek to overtake state power could have assassinated him” in order to antagonize students

with the state. Walelign had two alternatives: 1/ as Tilahun is a popular and progressive

student “the state through its security could have assassinated him to terrorize others and

make him exemplary” but the ordinary manner of the killing leads one to the other

assumption; 2/ “a body which wants to benefit from a conflict between students and the

state might have killed Tilahun.” It rather seems, Walelign reasoned, that a force which

was convinced that students are not rising up for demonstration even if their magazine

Tagel had been banned and are peacefully continuing classes might have committed the

killing. Primary suspects could be powers who do not support student progressivism,

oppose the state’s policy and aspire to establish a separate state different from and
101
Reportedly, Tilahun was hit by three bullets fired by two unidentified persons, at a place called
Afencho Ber near the Erer Gota green grocer. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462. 07.
102
According to security reports, the ringleaders of the disturbance were Gebru Mersha, Walelign
Mekonen, Mehari Yohannes, Dawit Hiruy, Dariwos Modi, Hailesilassie Gebremikael, Tekalign
Woldemikael, and Yirga Tesema. A slogan attributed to Gebru Mersha. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462. 07.

188
between the two. In this line of suspicion should be the armed forces, educated civilians,

perhaps also the Eritrean liberation organization.103

Whatever the case may be, Tilahun’s death had a very serious impact on the general

student movement as well as in the subsequent preeminence of ethno-nationalism in the

country. When the student movement showed signs of recovery from that tragic incident

and the attendant upheaval a year later, it had become irreversibly disintegrated and

radicalized.104 The initiative and leadership of the home front had been taken over by

high school students and the movement had evolved into two major underground

factions, which later emerged as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and

the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM). It is not surprising that now the

nationalities issue emerged as the single most important question of the

revolution/movement.

The next issue of Struggle was brought out in May 1970 by a group which called itself

the Underground Revolutionary Press(URP), taking over the symbolism of a rifle

wielding arm on the title page along with the generation’s war song “ፋኖ ተሰማራ/2/፣ በዱር በገደሉ

ትግሉን ልትመራ!” Published only five months after Walelign’s essay, in the same Marxist

framework and upholding its fundamental arguments, this was, however, far superior in

103
This is a statement by the individuals given to the police immediately after the incident. While latter
evidence shades doubt on the truth of the matter, it nevertheless gives clue to the perception of existing
alignment of political forces by the leaders of the movement. Three AAU students, Abiyu Birile, Esubale
Tebeje, Admasu Techane, were allegedly caught red-handed while attempting to derail the Addis Ababa –
Djibouti train on 25 Tahsas 1962. MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07.
104
Abdul Mohamed in Bahru, Documenting ESM , p.77.

189
comprehension and presentation of the nationalities question that it could be considered

as the first coherent treatise ever to come out of the student body.105

The writers attempted to highlight historically and theoretically “the relationship between

feudalism, regionalism and national oppression” with rare modesty and balance. They

argued that what then existed in Ethiopia was a conjunction of class exploitation and

cultural domination resulting from the relationship between feudalism and regionalism.

There are no nations and nationalism in Ethiopia but regions and regionalism. Therefore,

the national question is relevant only from the perspective of cultural oppression; there is

a feudal class rule but Amhara cultural domination. Contrary to Walelign’s assertion, the

authors maintained that regionalism shows the economic drive of feudalism while

national subjugation is a means of facilitating economic exploitation and not an end by

itself.106

A similarly tempered view was advocated by ESUE, analyzing the tribe versus class

enigma and the ‘oppressor-oppressed’ nationalities distinction, with care and sensitivity

than the propagandist anti-Amhara rhetoric of the home front: “...though Amhara is ‘tarik

yeweledew bale tera’, the entire tribe is not responsible for this problem. Therefore, why

we stand in unison alongside the Ethiopian people is not to liberate the Tigre from the

Amhara, the Galla (sic) form the Tigre, or Islam from Christianity but by toppling down

and destroying the feudal system to establish in its place a system where the life of the

105
Kiflu, Ya’Tiwlid, p.83. Struggle, no number, published by URP, May 1970. In fact, this issue did not come
out of the leaders of the home front as Andreas Eshete and Hagos Gebreyesus were returnees from
ESANA.
106
Struggle, published by URP, May 1970. This treatise comes complete with the formality of relevant
quotations about Amhara domination from Richard Greenfield, Donald Levine, Christopher Clapham,
George Lipsky.

190
masses is improved, national and individual rights are respected, the suppressed culture

and language of each tribe flourishes in equality, and religion becomes an individual

choice and does not interfere in government activity.”107

The 10th ESUE Congress reaffirmed its stand on the Eritrean insurgency as one among

popular struggles for democracy in the country waged to overthrow economic, social,

cultural, linguistic and religious domination. However, it withheld support for the

leadership due to latter’s suspicious revolutionary credence.108 Again the 11th congress of

ESUE-WWUES, which took place at Berlin under the theme “Biherawi Guday

Be’Etyopia”(the National Issue in Ethiopia), in principle acknowledged the right of self-

determination of nationalities but subordinated it to class unity in struggle as well as in

progress based on equality. The duty of progressives is, accordingly, to fight to wipe out

the two extremes: “1/ the chauvinism among the working social classes of oppressor

nationalities; 2/ the narrow nationalist sentiment among the peoples of oppressed

nationalities.” 109 The resolutions regarding the armed struggle in Eritrea were so far

provisional, keeping a watchful eye on the movement and its leadership. Naturally, such

moderate position invited recriminations from two angles; the state charged it with evil

intent “to disintegrate the country”; ultraethno-nationalists condemned its call for unity as

an “Amhara chauvinist” hoodwink.110

107
Tiglachin, No. 3, Ginbot to Nehassie 1962 EC.
108 th
Tiglachin, 1, Tikemt 1963 E.C, proceeding from the 10 Congress. Yeraswork in Bahru, Documenting
ESM , pp. 58 & 59, believes that serious dissension in the student body emerged at the 1970 congress as a
forerunner of the genesis of underground splinter parties.
109
Tiglachin, 1, Meskerem 1964 E.C.
110
Tiglachin, 1, Meskerem 1964 E.C.

191
This was a period in which divergent trends were hardening and ethno-nationalist

elements had been striving to prey upon the movement. The first confrontation on the

national question occurred between the Addis-Algeria group and the ESUNA delegates at

the 10th ESUE congress in 1970. However, it was at the August 1971 ESUE congress,

also held in Berlin, that the former’s radical position was adopted as noted above. The so-

called Algerian group, an ultraradical sect constituted by student planejackers under the

shadow of the ELF, had been out on campaign to take over the overseas contingents.

Therefore, it made the acknowledgement of nations and nationalities in Ethiopia and their

unconditional right to self-determination imperative. 111 In fact, this group had been

instrumental in keeping the Eritrean issue at the heart of the ESM, and ultimately

derailing and splitting the movement on this bedrock. Of particular importance was the

circulation of a highly polemical expose’ by this group in October 1970, attacking the

ambivalence of student unions on Eritrea’s unconditional right to secession and their

characterization of the various insurgencies in the country as regionalist and

reactionary.112

The paper claimed to present “the most just, correct and democratic solutions” for the

national question, which the author/s asserted to have been incontrovertibly “defined and

111
Andargachew, Meison, pp. 64, 75, 81. Andreas in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.105. He believes that
the national question was only a pretext for rival takeover bids of the forces which later emerged as EPRP
and Meison. Kiflu Tadese, Ya’tiwlid, II, p.50, 52-53.
112
“The National Question(‘Regionalism’) In Ethiopia” under a pseudonym Tilahun Takele. Andargachew,
Meison, pp.64, 75, 78-80, 81, 89-90, alleges that Kiflu has admitted to him of being the author of this
document. Kiflu didn’t acknowledge it in his books. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the text hints that
the work was a joint effort; unmistakable traits of USUAA (Algerian contingent) are evident.
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution,p.137, on the other hand maintains that it was widely believed at
the time that the paper was the work of Berhane Mesqel Reda.

192
resolved in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice.” 113 Generally, the student body had

been captivated by the deceptive simplicity of Stalin’s definition of the nation. This work,

however, went beyond and regarded Leninism-Stalinism as a revealed truth. It argued

that “nations are generally evolved from tribes” at the epoch of rising capitalism and

disintegrating feudalism, and declared that there were some full-fledged nations or

nationalities fast transforming into nations in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, nations/nationalities

are not constituted in the act of definition and claim, beyond which the paper did not go.

How did that transformation occur and even vary within a single sociopolitical

framework? How would a feudal multinational state, even at that ‘Shoan feudalism’, be

possible? What is the logical relationship between cultural domination, which the paper

considered as the cardinal question, and political secession?

The paper denied that Eritrea is a nation, nonetheless upheld the right of self-

determination up to secession to “the peoples of Eritrea!” In contrast, it opportunistically

evaded questions of whether a multinational state is possible or advisable; and reserved

judgment on the Ogaden, Bale and Arusi movements’ right to join Somalia. What is

remarkable about this work was the disproportionate influence it exerted on the ESM.

According to some observers, Tilahun Takele’s work was able to have a special ring to

students who joined AAU after 1970 due to its explicit emphasis on ‘chauvinism’ and its

advocacy of the principle of national self-determination up to and including secession as

the raison d’être of the struggle.114 Starting from 1970, Eritrean students in both ESUE

and ESUNA abandoned these associations and formed a separate organization known as

113
The authors of the 17th ESANA congress are especially marked for mudslinging: ‘social chauvinists’,
‘racist bourgeois political scientists’, ‘cadets’, ‘Abyssinian diplomats,’ etc. Andargachew, The Ethiopian
Revolution, p.137.
114
Melaku in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.109. Andargachew, Meison, pp.78-80.

193
Eritreans for Liberation. Ethnic based study circles began to form among Ethiopian

students at home and abroad.115 In January 1971, the WWUES not only reaffirmed its

solidarity with the Eritrean people’s struggle for self-determination but also explicitly

endorsed the secessionist agenda.116

Still some elements were not satisfied with WWUES’ stand on Eritrea so that they

strongly criticized it as moderate and unscientific. They claimed that Eritrean struggle to

establish an independent state must be believed and supported not because of its

usefulness for the people of Ethiopia but only on its own merit...The people of Eritrea are

different from other Ethiopia not only in geography but also in history, religion, culture,

etc, thus the formation of separate Eritrean student unions was inevitable and correct.117

The tension came to a climax at the 19th ESUNA Congress in 1971 and split the

association into ‘the old ESUNA’ and ‘the new ESUNA’. Already a week before this, the

ESUE had adopted the position of the Algerian group at its 11th Congress held in Berlin

in August 1971. Finally, at Berlin in April 1973, the strife between rival trends in the

overseas unions resulted in the restructuring of WWUES into the World Wide Federation

of Ethiopian Students (WWFES) and the emergence of EPRP and MEISON.118

The social nationalism of the ESM was defeated because of its failure to innovatively

adapt Marxism-Leninism to Ethiopia’s concrete situation. The Algeria group in particular

considered “the question of nationalities to be of paramount importance and the rest to be

115
Andargachew, Meison, p.69. Abdul Mohamed in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.79. Kiflu, Ya’Tiwlid II,
p.152.
116
Tiglachin, 2, Tir 1963 E.C. “A Statement by the WWUES Regarding the Eritrean People’s Struggle” in
opposition to measure taken by the Ethiopian state.
117
Tiglachin, 3, Miazia 1963 E.C.
118
Andargachew, Meison, pp.76, 93, 94-96. Kiflu, Ya’Tiwlid II, p.139, on pre-1974 rift between EPRP and
MEISON. Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.132,137.

194
of little consequence.”119 The historic nation had never been exclusively identified with

the Amhara as argued in chapter one. However, the generation of Walelign distorted that

conception to target the Amhara and anyone who believed in the survival and unity of the

Ethiopian nation as ‘chauvinists’.120 It consigned the fate of an entire nation on a piece of

conjecture and the Leninist-Stalinist dogmatism it advocated ultimately reduced the

nationalities question to family tree politics. The primary difference between the EPRP

and MEISON factions was not ideological but their tactical stand on the resolution of the

nationalities question.121

When the next issue of Struggle (since 1969/70) appeared in September 1974, both the

political context and the relevant questions have changed inside Ethiopia. The revolution

has erupted and power was in the hands of a new military junta calling itself Derg, and

the opposition was now demanding the military to restore “Power to the Peoples!” The

civilian intelligentsia which took over the student movement was forced to reassess its

role. Struggle now appeared to speak on behalf of this realignment of forces rather than

on behalf of the studentship: “...The ESM is well aware that it can’t and will never ever

champion (play the vanguard role) the movement of the great masses and then carry the

revolution to the end because it is the masses alone who are the locomotives of any

revolutionary movement. In any anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle, the student

movement has a very limited role to play because, as is well known, such a struggle is

119
Abdul Mohamed in Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.78. Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.145.
120
Aregawi Berihe, “A Political Histroy”, on TPLF’s accusations over other pan-Ethiopian groups, pp.197-
198. See for similar views Merera Gudina, Ye’Etyopian Temariwoch Mskilkil Guzona Yehiwote
Tizitawoch(Addis Ababa:2005 EC), p.47.
121
Bahru, Documenting ESM, pp.16, 58-63, 68, 80-81. Andreas, p.105, and Melaku,p.110, also believe
that the national question was not even a fundamental question, it was little more than an instrument in
the struggle between organizations. See also Andargachew , The Ethiopian Revolution, pp.132, 134, 137.
Kiflu, Ya’tiwlid II, pp. 140-146, on post-1974 drift between EPRP and MEISON.

195
composed of the working class, the peasantry, the left wing of the national bourgeoisie,

the conscious sector of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the lower sections of the

military and finally the students.” The military ALONE also can’t and will never...thus

there must be a “UNITED FRONT”122

By the end of 1974, the “National Question” left the platform to other pressing questions:

Land to the tiller! Formation of political parties! Freedom of the press, assembly, speech

and demonstration! Socialism via New Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia! 123 The

immediate task at hand was the establishment of a PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNMENT and the sloganeering was epitomized by “Power to the People!” while

the battle cry for the other (military) camp was “Ethiopia Tikdem!” The tone of the

nationalities issue was much watered down: Equality of nationalities and all religions,

and the separation of religion from politics. “በብሄሮችና በጾታዎች መካከል ያለውን የበላይና የበታችነት

ማጥፋት፣… የብሄሮች እኩልነት ይመስረት፣ ወ.ዘ.ተ…” An article by Ayalew Yimam entitled: “ የኤርትራ ህዝብ ትግል ከየት

ወዴት?” also suggested preconditions for the peaceful resolution of the Eritrean question.124

For many students of Ethiopian history the major cause of ethno-nationalist grievances is

the expansion of the imperial state over ethno/regional territories. A Leninist application

of this view advanced by the ESM argued that the ‘south’ was born as a result of

conquest by the ‘north’, a phenomenon which created difference in class and culture

between the two entities and made the former a hot bed for ethno-nationalism.125 This

class – culture convergence thesis of the Ethiopian left is premised on taking the ‘north’

122
Struggle, VI, 1, September 1974. All emphases in the original.
123
Struggle, VI, 1, September 1974. Kiflu, Ya’Tiwlid, pp.128-131, 140-146.
124
Struggle, VI, 2. Bahru, Documenting ESM, p.76.
125
Markakis and Nega, Class and Revolution, pp.104-105. Andargachew , The Ethiopian Revolution,
pp.7,8.

196
and ‘south’ as autonomous and internally homogenous units which at the same time were

antithetical to each other. In addition to its reductionism, this view cannot explain the

apparent incongruity between the expansion of the Ethiopian state, which had been going

on for millennia, and the genesis of ethno-nationalism in the ‘south’, which is a recent

occurrence.

Contrary to the above, where class oppression was assumed to prevail, opposition did not

take class form and strong ethno-nationalist movements became evident within the very

core of historic Ethiopia. Another assumption which squarely contradicted the facts is

related to the emergence of ethno-nationalism among peasant classes in rural setting. The

original bearer of ethno-nationalism has been an urban based intelligentsia that

conscripted its allies in the struggle from various classes of ethnic members. Particularly

in the imperial period, nationalist sentiments were hatched in urban contexts, in

administrative centers from Woreda to Teklay Gizat, which were points of cultural

contact and also became potential hotbeds of ethnicity. In the more developed cities, such

as Addis Ababa, it was rather the competitive atmosphere created by the conglomeration

of sections of the various groups which bred ethnic rivalries and politics. This ‘new

ethnicity’ may be regarded as the consequence of the ‘expansion’ of the periphery to the

center. The emergent ideology was couched in terms of traditional issues such as

territory, history, culture and religion, but at its root were claims over modern resources

such as markets, political offices, posts in the civil service, in the military, representation

in educational institutions, etc.

197
In its early phase, urban ethnicity was expressed as ethnic solidarity in primary

organizations like equb, edir, senbete, and mahber. Ethnicity, however, is not merely an

internal consciousness of group identity but also externally defined in contrast to others

and expressed in various forms, from mild stereotyping of other groups to no holds

barred conflicts. The new ideology is so pervasive and overriding that it levels all intra-

ethnic differences and tends to interpret everything in terms of ethnicity. Hence group

identity, ideology, and organization mutually reinforce each other and prey on other

contexts to evolve into nationalist form. During the late 1960s, tensions between the

major ethnic groups Amhara, Oromo and Tigre were being spontaneously manifested in

cities. The annual brawls between the Oromo and Tigre groups at the feast of Timket in

Jan Meda and elsewhere in Addis Ababa is an indication of the simmering hostility

between the two groups. This was attributed to the ethnically and culturally

condescending attitude of the Tigre towards the Oromo, the former considering the latter

as ‘slaves’.126

Interestingly, while the imperial government was adamant in the suppression of ethnic

and religious particularisms, these annual brawls were attributed to secret maneuvers of

the Amhara. 127 An anonymous document(7 pages, type-written) of the late 1960s

elaborating prophesies about impending civil and religious wars in Ethiopia, mainly due

to the undeserved status of Sabeans (to mean Tigres of Eritrea) in the government and the

establishment of the Somali state, predicted that the Amhara people will be the main

126
President Girma Woldegiorgis, biography, a personal account of this attitude while he was working in
Eritrea in the 1950s.
127
Tilahun Takele, The National Question, p.30. Under a subtitle 'ethnicity' Msmaku relates a fascinating
and quite revealing personal incident which speaks volumes about the ethnic undercurrent in the late
1960s,pp.119-121. This is also a telling specimen of how Amhara intellectuals of then as now find such
ethnocentric episodes as utterly incomprehensible?

198
victims of this threat. This not only shows the understanding of the imminent sources of

challenges, that is Eritrea and Tigray as well as Somalia, but also demonstrates that there

had been a recognition of the surging anti-Amhara sentiment, at least among some

sections of the society.128

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the enthusiasm for change had gradually

percolated down the ladder to the masses. The peasant movements and the military coup

had inspired the student movement, while the oppositions within the working classes and

civil servants as well as the urban petty bourgeois had taken its cue from the students.

This general discontent permeated even the highest ranks of government both in the

military and the civil service. While this latter elite group was less organized and less

radical, it nevertheless was not exempt from ethnic politics.129 In the early 1970s, a group

formed by such high profile dissidents was concerned that if any military clique took

advantage of Ethiopia’s chaotic situation to wrest power, then the country would be

doomed to unending chaos by dictators. An anonymous friend of Dejazmach Zewde

Gebresialssie advised the latter to closely follow the developments and control the power

politics in the hands of civilian intellectuals like him. This individual had sent Zewde a

128
MoI Files: No. 07.17, Yiqirta Yemaygegnlet Sihtet. The general hatred for the Amhara, especially for
Shoan Amhara, is corroborated by the writer of the anonymous letter to Dejazmach Zewde, who relates
his distaste for the power elites and observes that “neftegna sitegib egzher yale aymeslewm.” MoI Files:
No.30.02.04. An anonymous letter to Dejazmach Zewde G/Silassie, written from Hamburg on 17/1/64 E.C,
in reply to the latter’s letter of 13/1/1964 E.C.
129
MoI Files: No.30.02.04. An anonymous letter to Dejazmach Zewde G/Silassie.

199
study about the situation in Ethiopia and its future prepared by a group concerned with

the country’s predicament.130

The process of urbanity also had with it an ideology of modernity, of being advanced and

more sophisticated than the rural areas. Addressing the specific issue of Ethiopian

modernity Donham writes that 'becoming modern’, 'of the times'(zemenawi),

'civilized'(silitane)(sic), 'educated'(yetemare), required one “to some considerable

degree(especially if not Protestant or Muslim), to adopt Orthodox Christian customs...

Since the meta narrative of modernity was channeled in Ethiopia through the political

center controlled by the Amhara, the notion of progress was mapped on ethnic

differences.” 131 The modern idea of civilization or ‘zemenawi silitane’ advocated by

Ethiopian kings and intellectuals of the 19th and 20th century was specifically aspiring for

Western science and technology. But in the context of the popular concept of ‘silitun’,

‘yetemare’ or ‘zemenawi’ , it referred to the ethos of a new class of the Western educated

elite or their lifestyle, which was considered generally appropriate to be imitated. Hence

there was no integral or logical relationship between being Amhara/Orthodox and being

‘zemenawi’, ‘yeseletene’ or ‘yetemare’. And conversely, being a Protestant or Muslim

and becoming ‘zemenawi’ or ‘siltun’ or ‘yetemare’ were not antithetical. Nevertheless,

the unexplained and undeclared norms of urban etiquette or socialite demanded, among

others, command of Amharic as they still do, while being ‘yetemare’ or even ‘siltun’ and

‘zemenawi’ were gauged more by the command of Western languages, French and

English.

130
MoI Files: No.25.02, Le’Etyopia Min’aynet Mengist Yasfeligatal? A 75 pages analysis of the existing
situation and proposal on the future of the Ethiopian state, written in a very good Amharic and an
excellent grasp of progressive political thoughts.
131
Donald Donham(1986),pp.128-29.

200
 CHAPTER FOUR

THE ERA OF SOCIALIST NATIONALISM

The mutiny of the 24th Unit of the Fourth Division in Negele and Dolo in January 1974

was a clarion call for an insurrection by the Ethiopian armed forces and the chain reaction

of events which developed to a revolutionary upsurge. The announcement of increase in

the price of petroleum on 13 February 1974 sparked widespread public unrest; and the

taxi drivers of Addis Ababa stopped work. On 18 February, Ethiopian teachers called out

a general strike in protest against the Sector Review educational reform. On 20 February,

students and workers in Addis jointly held a large demonstration escalating the situation.

These events culminated in the first round of military uprising that led to the resignation

of Aklilu's cabinet on 27 February and Endalkachew's appointment next day as Prime

Minister.

The reshuffle satisfied none of the revolting classes, the military, intelligentsia,

professionals, labour or even the disorganized aristocracy. The expression of public

discontent in Addis Ababa and Asmara spread to other regional cities within a short

period of time.1 Most importantly, the labour unions coordinated a general strike of the

working force effective between 7 and 11 March 1974. In some of the centers of

strongest popular uprisings between 29 March and 6 April, such as Jimma, Metu, Assela

and Arba-Minch towns, people flooded the streets demanding the dismissal of

incompetent and corrupt governors and other officials.2 So far the demonstrators made it

1
Addis Zemen(AZ), 12 Miazia 1966.
2
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, pp.46-47.

201
clear that the changes they were demanding should be peaceful but radical. 3 Another

feature of the uprisings between January and June 1974 was that they were limited to

urban areas. Nowhere in the country did the rural peasantry take active part in these early

insurrections.4 It was the urban corporate groups that paralyzed government by strikes,

boycotts and marches demanding the dismissal of their officials and the right to form

trade unions. A writer on Addis Zemen jokingly observed that since the movement started

two months ago, the only section of the society which did not take to the streets were

‘ ’(soothsayers and witch doctors).5

In spite of the clear ethno-nationalist tone of the student activism, the popular uprising of

the early revolutionary period was not dominated by ethnocentrism and sectarianism.

Whatever religious, regional and ethnic demands there were, they appeared on the

margins of the popular upsurge. In one instance, on 25 April 1974, about a hundred Afar

balabbats, elders and Afar students attending schools in Addis Ababa filed a complaint to

the Minister of Interior, Zewde Gebresilassie, detailing the injustices done by Awash

Valley Authority in depriving the Afar of their communal lands and trampling on their

nationality rights. A far stronger and more popular pressure than this, which was inspired

by the revolutionary activism of Addis Ababa, had started on 18 April when

representatives of the Muslim community submitted to the Prime Minister demands for

the freedom of belief and religion. The Minister’s promise for a speedy reply could not

avert a huge public outburst only a few days later.6

3
AZ, 27 Megabit 1966.
4
Andargachew, Ibid, pp.54, 55, 57-58, 59.
5
AZ, 11 Miazia 1966.
6
Ibid.

202
In what was the biggest demonstration of the period, held on 20 April 1974, thousands of

Muslims and their Christian supporters as well as students of the HSI University and the

various Addis Ababa high schools took part in the call for religious equality. Their key

motto was “ !”[a popular saying of Emperor Haile Selassie].

Other banners included ‘Religion Must be Separate from State Administration,’ ‘Ethiopia

Shall Not be Divided Along Ethnic and Religious Lines,’ ‘Ensure Religious Equality,’

‘Ethiopia is Ethiopians’ Island,’ ‘Unity is Achieved through Equality,’ ‘Equality for All

Ethiopian People,’ and ‘Muslim Holidays Shall be National Holidays.’7 Some of these

slogans will appear again and again in the political debates of the subsequent period.

As much as it was a show of solidarity, however, this event had split public opinion in

Addis Ababa. On the one hand, progressive elements stood by the demonstrators and

acknowledged their demands as long overdue rights. They also welcomed the spirit of

cooperation between Christians and Muslims as a sign of harmony and beneficial for the

unity of the nation.8 On the other hand, a conservative section of the society regarded

some of the above expressions as too radical and threatening. What the Addis Ababa

Orthodox clergy and a part of the laity found to be particularly inflammatory was the

alleged denial of Ethiopia’s conception as a Christian island: “ኢትዮጵያ የኢትዮጵያውያን ደሴት ናት!”

In both the applications of representatives of the religious community and that of the 42

Orthodox Churches in the city, submitted on 21 April to the Prime Minister and the

Patriarch respectively, it was emphasized that this disavowal would constitute a menace

to the longstanding unity and historical identity of the nation. This referred to the

persistence of the personality of the historic nation, Bihere Etyopia. The clergy

7
AZ, 13 Miazia 1966.
8
Ibid.

203
underlined that a threat to the Orthodox faith is a threat to the Ethiopian state, now as it

had always been through the ages. The Prime Minister was only too anxious to avert a

major sectarian confrontation and he was grateful when the Christian community

cancelled a planned counter-demonstration in compliance with his request.9

The revolution seems to have caught the civilian left by surprise, both organizationally as

well as ideologically wanting. After a decade of agitation and violence the student body

did manage to rock the imperial regime. But the movement itself had irreversibly

bifurcated into antagonistic groups, more clearly so outside the country. The only known

domestic underground organization called Abiyot was also weak and had minimal role in

the revolutionary upsurge. What seems undeniable is that student activists who had made

the nationalities question the most important platform of struggle since 1969 were not

vindicated by the dramatic events of early 1974. The popular revolts which ushered in the

actual revolution were not focused on ethnicity or national freedom or even national

oppression, but were primarily about the soaring price of consumer goods, declining

standard of living, and for democratic and administrative reforms. Hence the ESM and

the organizations which claimed to represent it were overtaken by the spontaneous

popular uprising of the period. As the only well-organized and disciplined group of the

society, the military and security forces had a more decisive role to play.10

The Derg was in fact a hastily constituted committee of low ranking officers from various

branches of the Armed Forces so that, in spite of later ethnic considerations by its

detractors, the only thing which united the group was desire for change. As men in

9
AZ, 15 Miazia 1966.
10
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.57.

204
uniforms the members’ strength lay in discipline and deference to authority, the very

qualities lacking in the organizations of the civilian groups. The Derg announced its

formation on 28 June 1974 and immediately began to make the revolution real by

dismantling the imperial regime. The detaining of former senior officials started on 29

June 1974. On 3 July 1974, the Derg demanded the Emperor to release political prisoners

(except those who had committed crimes against the unity and development of the

country), to pardon political exiles, and to speedily proclaim the newly-drafted

constitution. On the same day, Lt General Aman Andom was presented by the committee

and appointed by the Emperor as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Endalkachew government begged two things from the Ethiopian people: peace and

time! Very expensive commodities during a revolution indeed, and after six months of

sincere effort it was in turn replaced on 22 July 1974 by Ras Imru’s cabinet. The ultimate

political decision was taken by the Derg on 12 September 1974: Proclamation No.1

1974, article 2 demoted the Emperor effective from that day; made the Crown Prince

successor to the throne; limited the monarchy’s powers to that of head of state and

stripped it off all executive and other functions. Article 4 shut down the Imperial

Parliament, article 5 suspended the 1955 Constitution while article 6 gave the Committee

provisional powers.11 A few days later, Proclamation No.2 of 15 September bestowed all

powers on the Derg and its name was officially known as Provisional Military

Administrative Council (PMAC).12 A new era was in the making.

11
AZ, 3 Meskerem 1967.
12
AZ, 7 Meskerem 1967.

205
4.1 The Genesis of Socialist Ethiopianism

When the burgeoning crisis forced a change of government on 28 February 1974, the

incumbent cabinet of Endalkachew issued on 8 April 1974 a document outlining its

objectives, aims and beliefs. Accordingly, the consolidation of the unity of the country,

maintenance of its territorial integrity, the promotion and preservation of the culture of

coexistence among its peoples were on the top of the agenda.13 The constitution drafted

by this government also espoused moderate changes over the structure and shape of the

state. Its pronouncements on the identity, integrity and future of Ethiopia were, however,

little different from the previous constitutions of the imperial regime. In fact, as noted in

chapter two above, its conception had even reverted to the references of the historic

nation as Bihere Etyopia.

The Derg signaled from the very beginning that its nationalism would be of a different

order, more like a military intervention to oversee the revolutionary change towards

national renaissance. As its 4 July 1974 meglecha (statement) to reassure the public of the

Committee’s seriousness of purpose attempted to underscore, “in general, those who

started the current military movement are children of the Ethiopian people, burning with

Ethiopian sentiment, caring and worrying to the utmost about the safety of the Ethiopian

people and their Emperor, and everything they do is based on a true Ethiopian spirit...”14

‘Etyopia Tikdem’(Ethiopia First) was the first Derg policy statement, announced the

same day (4 July) and published in Addis Zemen on 10 July 1974.

13
AZ, 1 Miazia 1966.
14
AZ, 27 Sene 1966. AZ, 28 Sene 1966. AZ, 1 Hamle 1966.

206
What was the meaning of Etyopia Tikdem? The Addis Zemen editorial defined it in what

appears like a verbatim from Tarikna Misale: “Its meaning in short is to defer to the

interest of the country, to sacrifice oneself to the benefit of the country and the people –

to think about the well-being of the majority instead of the luxury of the few.”15 When

the Derg’s official explanation about Etyopia Tikdem was published on 27 July 1974, it

outlined the major ideological components: a national call to dedicate oneself to the

purity of history, to the development of the civilization and the common good of the

country and the people. It was also a plan to avoid conflict and discord, to bond with

unity and love, to cultivate national feeling among the people; to avoid discrimination

based on birth, religion, race, wealth, power, etc, and to establish trust, equality, unity and

harmony of the highest order among Ethiopians.16

Originally, Etyopia Tikdem was little more than a convenient slogan to give a sense of

direction to the ad hoc committee. 17 The Derg assumed political power with modest

objectives and never contemplated of radical measures, let alone radical socialism, for

Ethiopia. Initially, the Derg defended its home-spun nationalist position by deeming

Marxist-Leninist solutions as alien and inappropriate to Ethiopia's problems. The

committee, however, eventually fell under immense pressure from various quarters so

that it began to abandon its reformist positions. Even though the Derg had practically

discredited the crown by stripping the reigning monarch off his powers and prerogatives,

the debates within the committee between 6 and 10 September 1974 were centered on the

identification of appropriate government for future Ethiopia. A constitutional monarchy

15
AZ, 9 Hamle 1966.
16
AZ, 20 Hamle 1966.
17
Mengistu, Tiglachin, p.157.

207
remained on the table until the ultimate deposition and arrest of Emperor Haile Selassie

and the suspension of the 1955 Constitution on 12 September 1974. The Derg wanted to

immortalize this event by making September 12 a Revolution Day.

The Derg published its second official explanation about Etyopia Tikdem on 31 October

1974. The core principle was now framed as follows: “When we say Ethiopia First, we

mean let’s say ‘We’ instead of ‘I’.” This was a more refined and coherent presentation

which could be considered as a comprehensive political program or policy outline of the

regime. It touched major socioeconomic issues such as education, health, social security,

infrastructure and public amenities, balance between cities and rural areas, land

ownership, legal justice, culture and history.18 Of the thirteen points of the outline, about

half were concerned with the cultivation Ethiopian nationalism, eradication of traditions

and customs inimical to the progress and unity of the country, abolition of ethnic,

religious and other discriminations, and the faith to achieve these national goals resting

on the uniqueness of Ethiopia’s history and culture. “The call for Ethiopia Tikdem was in

part an attempt to inculcate a sense of a national and common Ethiopian identity beyond

that of particular regions or nationalities.”19 Arguably, that single statement had served to

rally representatives of the armed forces and influence the course of Ethiopian history for

better or worse.

The key terms representing the personality of the military regime, i.e, its name Derg

(committee) and its ‘philosophy’ Etyopia Tikdem, seem to have made it at once enigmatic

and popular, at least in the initial period and among the common people. Many people

18
AZ, 21 Tikemt 1967.
19
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.66.

208
still believe that these terms were introduced by the NCOs who took power in 1974.

Colonel Mengistu himself has mentioned in his recent book that the original 108 member

committee was christened as Derg by one of the officers with a cleric background. He

also claimed to have originated Etyopia Tikdem as a rallying slogan in the very first

gathering of the committee. 20 In fact, Mengistu had attempted to capitalize on this

‘resourcefulness’ and publicity after he scored a temporary victory over his rivals in the

Derg in early December 1974.21 However, in the simple sense they had been originally

used by the Derg, both terms were not uncommon in the literature. For instance, ‘Etyopia

Tikdem’ appeared in Addis Zemen at least in three different occasions and topics between

late 1973 and early 1974, whereas ‘Derg’ was a more frequently used term during the

same period.22

Etyopia Tikdem, however, soon proved to be the regime’s Achilles heel. Especially, the

civilian left leveled strong criticism at the lack of ideological sophistication of the

military and the nebulousness of its nationalist precept. Within six months, therefore, the

Derg was forced to toe the Socialist line partly to stymie this pressure. On 20 December

1974, it issued to this effect a hybrid political and economic program called

Hibretesebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism), purported to be an elaboration of Etyopia

Tikdem; a philosophy springing from Ethiopian soil, her history, culture and religions.

According to this document, the political philosophy which emanated from our great

religions and their teachings on the equality of man, from our tradition of living and

20
Mengistu, Tiglachin, p.151.
21
AZ, 10 Hidar 1967.
22
Zerihun Legese, a poem entitled ‘Etyopia Tikdem’ criticising the superfluous preoccupation of some
fans with national soccer matches, AZ, 22 Meskerem 1966. AZ, 27 Meskerem 1966. AZ, 1 Miazia 1966. AZ,
4 Miazia 1966. AZ, 9 Miazia 1966.

209
sharing together, as well as from our History so replete with national sacrifice, was

Hibretesebawinet. In what amounted to a restatement of Etyopia Tikdem, the detailed

policy could be subsumed under five basic principles: national sovereignty, the

absoluteness of Ethiopia's unity, national self-reliance, the dignity of labour, and

precedence of the public good.23 Now another slogan was appended to ‘

[ !]’ – that is , ‘ !"#$%& ' !’(Let Socialism Flourish!).

Throughout its tenure the military regime used this motto to build up Socialist

Ethiopianism.

The shallowness of the historical analysis underpinning Hibretesebawinet was evident,

especially in how it traced the origin of exploitation in Ethiopia to the previous forty

years! Though it was designed to allay the radical left, both Ye’sefiw Hizb Dimts (Voice

of the Masses) and Democracia compared Ethiopian Socialism to, among others, Hitler's

National Socialism. The latter particularly rebuffed the program's historical premise

stating “... that blaming Haile Selassie for everything was to deny the existence of class

contradictions and its preponderance over the centuries." It also condemned as Fascistic

the regime’s emphasis on the “absoluteness of Ethiopia's unity” for giving precedence to

the unity of the country over and above the freedoms, rights and benefits of the broad

masses.24 Democracia moreover labeled the Derg as ‘ ( )* +, ’ (elite officers’

gang, actually a cumbersome Amharic phrase for ‘junta’), implying that soldiers were

incapable of handling such subtle ideology as Marxism-Leninism.

23
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, pp.86-87. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, pp.128-131.
24
This was a familiar argument of the student movement both in and abroad as noted in the previous
chapter, and among its inheritors now as it was then.

210
The initial questions of the various splinters of the civilian left, most of which surfaced

after the revolution, were focused on guaranteeing democratic rights and the handover of

power to a provisional peoples’ government. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party

(EPRP) came into the open in Addis Ababa on August 31, 1975. Though it claimed to

have been founded in April 1972, its members inside the country launched the weekly

paper Democracia only in July 1974. In August 1974, another group which would

emerge later as the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement, commonly known as MEISON,

too started its own weekly called Ye’Sefiw Hizb Dimts. Leaders of this underground

organization also began returning to Ethiopia a few months later in January 1975. In

February 1975, EPRP and MEISON failed to reach agreement on tactical positions; and

the latter officially pledged to give critical support to the Derg in March 1975. The

historic proclamation of 4 March 1975 for the nationalization of rural land had impacted

MEISON’s decision to review its characterization of the military regime.

The next ideological leap of the Derg was the proclamation of the National Democratic

Revolution Program of Ethiopia (NDRPE) on 20 April 1976. This was considered by

Marxist-Leninists as a transitional package which would prepare pre-capitalist societies

for full-fledged Socialism or Scientific Socialism. In this program, the Derg pronounced

its basic difference from other civilian groups on the issue of nationalities. NDRPE

affirmed the Marxist precept that national, religious and gender contradictions are

secondary to class contradictions. This was also the official line held by the civilian left

though in practice the national question had come to dominate all others as noted in the

previous chapter. The real difference, however, consisted in the vexed principle of the

211
right of nationalities to self-determination, especially on the recognition of the right as

including political separation.

Paragraph five of the new program acknowledged the right of self-determination for any

nationality in Ethiopia in terms of regional autonomy, limited only to local self-

government and cultural rights. It provided that the history, identity, culture, tradition,

language and religion of every nationality will enjoy equal respect and recognition. The

ultimate rationale for unity between Ethiopian nationalities emanated from the necessity

of a common struggle against their class enemies now as well as on building up a future

life based on mutual trust, cooperation, love and equality. “- #.%/ 012

!3"$4 1 - 56 7 892 : ' !3"$4 - ;%< = >= ' ?#@ (AB

CD :) E= )! F" ( -)06G H !3"$! - ;%< ?( I@ J

')) K ' ?#@ -L'M;N -O* :N - - & 6P Q ') R - ?(

25
?#@ S Q )ATJ ?#@@ATJ ') "( )! "U VV” “Cognizant of Ethiopia’s

concrete situation that existing nationalities’ contradictions could be resolved by ensuring

their rights for regional autonomy, every nationality shall enjoy the right to handle its

internal affairs and govern itself, to use its own language in its political, economic and

social life and to elect its own leaders and administrators.” But the NDRPE had one

serious handicap, namely that it was “hurled at the people from above.”26

It is relatively easy to discern the ideological pedigree of the NDRPE from its moderate

regionalist prescription to the national question. By this time even the Derg seems to

have been obliged to echo the ‘Menelik villain’ rhetoric of the ESM, apparently due to

25
NDRP, part II, no.5.
26
AZ, 14 Ginbot 1968.

212
the influence of MEISON and other civilian allies, as Mengistu’s TV and radio address (

20 April 1976) on the occasion of the declaration of NDRPE indicates.27 In fact, the

nationalism of each regime has been defined instrumentally so that the Derg justified its

dedication to equality in unity by denouncing the imperial regime for dividing up the

Ethiopian people in order to perpetuate its rule. The so-called policy of ‘' # Q ’

was among the accusations leveled at the executed officials of the imperial government.28

Mengistu also gave a twist to the term biherawi/ ‘national’ in NDRPE: the program was

called biherawi “because it liberated the people from neo-colonialism and imperialism. It

was also called 'democratic' because it abolished feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism,

made the masses owners of the means of production, gave them democratic rights, and

resolved the national and workers' questions democratically."29

The proclamation for the establishment of a Peoples’ Organizational Affairs Provisional

Office (POAPO) was also issued on the same date (20 April). This body, which became

mainly staffed by members of the MEISON, was given mandate to prepare and

disseminate articles and directives on the philosophy of socialism in the languages of

various nationalities. Already in December 1975, the Derg had established a MEISON-

dominated committee in charge of politicizing and organizing the masses under a slogan

“Sefiw Hizb Yinqa, Yideraj, Yitateq!” This event sparked off in the government-

controlled as well as respective papers a series of public debates between the EPRP and

MEISON. In April 1976, MEISON also formally announced its program but stopped

short of calling itself a party. At the same time the Derg invited all progressive forces to

27
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.159.
28
AZ, Hidar 17 1967.
29
AZ, 13 Miazia 1968. AZ, 16 Miazia 1968.

213
form a joint front against reactionaries and other enemies of the national revolution. In

May 1976, EPRP rejected this invitation by putting forth several preconditions, the most

important of which was the regime’s stand on the nationalities question. With the

assistance of MEISON and other allied organizations the Derg proceeded to establish the

Yekatit-1966 Political School in May 1976.

Why did the adoption of Marxism-Leninism by the Derg fail to bring about greater

harmony and cooperation among the various forces in the country? This, among others,

was because ultra-leftist groups were generally skeptical of the regime’s capability as

well as its motives regarding the nationalities question and particularly the principle of

national self-determination.30 As will be noted below, the two major groups - EPRP and

MEISON - made this the ultimate reason for breaking up with the Derg. At the outset of

the revolution, most contending civilian parties and organizations were pan-Ethiopianist,

if not always multiethnic in their composition as well as unionist in their prescription.

This means they accepted the national integrity of Ethiopia as a matter of principle and

aimed to overtake and radically transform the state rather than dismantle it.

The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) was the only organization, besides the Derg,

which did not originate in the ESM. Being founded by prominent members of the

imperial regime, it was perhaps the most conservative of the political organizations of the

period in its approach to the national question. In contrast to mainstream political

organizations, EDU upheld liberal democratic ethos, moderate reformist rather than

radical prescriptions to the nationalities issue. It aspired to abolish the monarchy and

30
See Andreas Eshete in Bahru, Documenting ESM, pp. 106; Abdul Mohamed, p.78; Melaku Tegegn,
p.110. Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.145

214
restructure the state in some kind of administrative federalism. It also advocated that

existing national and class problems in Ethiopia could be resolved if viewed as questions

of democracy, by guaranteeing equality in unity for all constituent elements of the nation.

"EDU claimed that its membership consisted of all Ethiopians, whatever their class,

nationality or ideology, so long as they were opposed to the Derg."31 Its highest authority,

the Supreme Council, had seventeen members representing the different parts of

Ethiopia. The three pillars of EDU’s political program were democracy, federation and

land reform.

All other groups were formed as splinters of the ESM, espoused leftist ideologies and

carried over the movement’s divergent lines on the resolution of the nationalities

question. 32 “ME’ISON, ECHA’AT, MALERED supported in principle the right of

nationalities up to and including secession, although they did not accept the legitimacy of

secession in the conditions prevailing in Ethiopia and subscribed to the NDRP which

denied such right, even in principle.”33 The Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples’ Revolutionary

Struggle, commonly known as ECHA’AT, was a predominantly Oromo organization

which put special emphasis on the ‘oppressed nations and nationalities’ issue. In fact,

there were some rumors about the link between ECHA’AT and Oromo-based secessionist

movements. There was also a gradual identification of MEISON with the South, not as

exclusively Oromo-affiliated group but as an advocate of the regime’s land reform

31
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.125.
32
Andargachew, Meison, on Meison’s stand on the national question, pp. 76, 94-96, 203-204, 206, 232,
290, 313-315, 319, 355, 406-407, 419; on EPRP’s stand on the national question, pp.98-99; on Derg’s
stand on the national question, pp.183, 186, 190-191, 201-203. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, on EPRP’s stand on the
national question, p.83. Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, EPRP on the national question, pp. 176,
178; Derg on the national question, pp.266, 318-319
33
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.235.

215
program in the region. When the battle of words intensified, MEISON was slandered by

EPRP as a party of ‘Fidists’, ‘narrow nationalists’ and the Oromo intelligentsia.

Due its dominance in the POAPO, MEISON was able to use effectively its access to

government-controlled media to disseminate its views. In the national daily Addis Zemen,

a column entitled ‘!3 & ?W ’ (national sentiment) was started in 1975 and another

known as ‘ ! 2& ),"X’ (revolutionary forum) in 1976. Particularly the latter was

considered to be an exclusive forum for “ $Y Z! , [ +, L'M;

YT ”(supporters of the Voice of the Masses group) which allegedly abused their

privilege to discredit the rival ‘Democracia’ group and promote their sectarian agendas.34

This was the period of escalated political tension between EPRP on the one side and

Derg and the rest on the other.35

After celebrating the second anniversary of the revolution, the military regime once again

extended invitation to all Ethiopian progressive forces to come under a Marxist-Leninist

umbrella in early September 1976. 36 Again the nationalities question emerged as a

stumbling block to political understanding between the various civilian organizations and

the Derg. EPRP responded by another set of preconditions which demanded that “the

right of national self-determination up to and including secession was to be recognized,

especially for Eritrea, and the organization leading the secessionist struggle in Eritrea was

34
AZ, 6 Miazia 1968. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, p.152, on ethnic based underground organizations by EPRP.
Andargachew, Meison, p.69, on ethnic based study circles among students.
35
AZ, 4 Puagmen 1968.
36
AZ, 13 Meskerem 1969.

216
to be recognized as a legal representative of the people." 37 This radical reaction

constituted the final rupture between the two organizations and set the stage for a regime

of terror.

In September 1976, the EPRP ‘kill squads’ made an alleged attempt on Mengistu’s life

(23 September) and followed it by many high profile assassinations, notably those of

Fikre Merid (1 October) and G/egziabher Hagos(12 October). On 25 October 1976, the

Yekatit-66 Political School was burnt down again allegedly due to a bomb detonated by

EPRP. On 31 October 1976, therefore, the Derg issued an ultimatum stating that it would

no more tolerate such terrorist actions.38 This act signaled the reign of ‘ ! 2& \ ]’

(revolutionary measure). A state of emergency was declared on 9 November 1976 to be

immediately effective in Addis Ababa and its environs. The law gave security forces

discretionary power to take summary measures! The crackdown on EPRP then

commenced from early November 1976.39

The Joint Front of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organizations, or commonly EMALEDIH,

was established in March 1977(consisting of five organizations MEISON, ECHAAT,

SEDED, MALERID, WEZLIG) and its paper Voice of Unity was launched in September

1977.40 EMALEDIH had as one of its subcommittees the nationalities committee whose

functions included coordinating nationality movements and working for the recognition

of the culture of various ethnic groups in the country. The marriage of convenience

37
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.176. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, pp.202-204, 209, 250. Andargachew,
Meison, pp.98-99.
38
AZ, 16 Meskrem 1969. AZ, 24 Tikemt 1969.
39
AZ, 24 Tikemt 1969.
40
Hibret Dimts, No.1, 30 Nehassie 1969.

217
between the Derg and MEISON, however, did not last much longer. The latter announced

its decision to go underground ( ? ' () on 20 August 1977 citing among its

reasons for doing so: “Marxist—Leninist organizations must implement the right of self-

determination of nationalities immediately, and not recognize it only in principle, as the

Joint Front had done…" 41 This volte face seems a spin-off from the underhand

maneuvers for political supremacy between SEDED and MEISON. In January 1978, the

Derg charged ECHAAT of conniving with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and

suspended it from the Joint Front. On 20 July 1978, MEISON was also officially expelled

from EMALEDH membership.42

Cultivating and Disseminating Socialist Ethiopianism

The 1963 was an eventful year which saw the bold poem of Ibssa Gutama entitled

‘Man’new Etyopiawi” (Who is an Ethiopian?), the establishment of the Mecha-Tulama

self-help association and the subsequent politicization of ethnicity and language in

Ethiopia. It was no mere coincidence that one former member of parliament recalled how

he and his compatriots had been pushing an agenda for launching a radio program in

‘Galligna’ (sic) since 1963. Their demand was, however, swiftly hashed up and even did

not get a chance to be floored for deliberation in the lower house. In 1972, the Ministry of

Education and Fine Arts had announced a plan to launch radio programs, with technical

and financial support from the British government, in order to assist Ethiopia’s

41
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, pp.23-236. Andargachew, Meison, pp.94-96, 203-204, 206,
232, 390, 313-315, 319, 355, 406-407, 419.
42
AZ, 13 Hamle 1970.

218
educational and economic endeavor.43 This had revived interest among the intelligentsia

and politicians of the various groups to benefit from the plan. Again this did not

materialize until the revolution.

The National Amharic Language Academy (NALA) had been established on the eve of

the revolution according to the provision of Order No. 79/1964(EC). In fact, as the

Emperor acknowledged in his parliament inauguration speech, the nomination of

members for the Academy was made on the occasion of the 43rd Crown Anniversary (2

November 1973). Following this, NALA office announced the appointees in the fields of

language and literature, culture, science, modern and ancient/traditional education, fine

arts, history and law. The 23 member NALA Council then held its first convocation on

28 December 1973.44 Its cardinal objectives could be summed up into two: building up

Amharic’s capacity as a language of instruction and science at higher levels, and

enhancing its efficiency as a national language. As the Minister of Education noted, “a

special common national language is necessary for countries at similar social and

economic level of development to ours.”45

The NALA temporarily revived the pre-1941 debate about reducing some ‘dysfunctional’

characters in the Amharic alphabet by soliciting public opinion on the matter on 9 August

1973. The issue had never been about science or knowledge but about history and

heritage, as the lively public debates on the eve of the revolution testify.46 However, this

institution was the first victim of the revolutionary uprising; for it was closed due to

43
AZ, 20 Megabit 1964.
44
AZ, 17 Hidar 1966. AZ, 18 Hidar 1966. AZ, 20 Tahsas 1966.
45
AZ, 20 Tahsas 1966.
46
AZ, 3 Nehassie 1965. AZ, 1 Tikemt 1966. AZ, 3 Tikemt 1966.

219
university students’ demand. Once the revolutionary fervor was over, the issue of

nationalities, especially with respect to the status of languages, emerged as the most

sensitive concern among the educated elite. The debates about national and local

languages escalated following the promises of Etyopia Tikdem and even more after the

announcement of the Development through Cooperation Campaign in 1974. The debates

were centered on education at literacy and primary levels. The argument was that, though

Amharic was the official national language, it would be appropriate to reach the speakers

of one of the largest languages (namely Oromigna) in Ethiopia through the radio until the

time the people learn to read and write Amharic. Writers argued that given the cardinal

objective of the upcoming campaign was to equip the peasantry with practical and

problem solving skills, it would also be advisable to use other indigenous languages

besides Amharic.47

During the short period of freedom of opinion from early 1974 to mid-1976 the pressure

to test the military regime’s commitment to the promises of ‘Etyopia Tikdem’ and

‘Hibretesebawinet’ intensified. In its Ethiopian Socialism program the Derg had stated
48
that “- ?( _ H !3 % 2EE T \ ` ,I " _VV” This

provision, if put into practice, would be the second most important instrument, next to the

realized religious equality, to cement unity, cooperation and love among Ethiopian

people. The gist of the discussion was that equality precedes unity, not the other way

round. According to the principles of socialism, to promote the language of one

nationality and let the others wither is unacceptable, writers argued.

47
AZ, 25 Hidar 1967.
48
AZ, 11 Tahsas 1967.

220
On 20 June 1975, the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts announced that it was

finalizing the preparation of a new national curriculum in line with the principles and

objectives of Ethiopian Socialism.49 In the numerous articles published as a response to

this call, many argued that besides its unquestionable educational merit, the language

issue was an important precondition for the resolution of the nationalities question. Some

even challenged Amharic’s status as the official language of the nation. They argued that

the question of deciding the national language of a country must be settled only after the

other major languages are given right, support and a long period of gestation. How to

communicate in the meantime? There was what looked like an audacious proposal: let’s

use a foreign language such as English for national/official purposes, but keep local

languages for day to day communication. Another interesting proposition was regarding

language of instruction. There was a suggestion that every Ethiopian child should learn

two languages besides the mother tongue, with the teaching materials being prepared in

mother tongues. Amharic should be given as one subject for all and those whose mother

tongue is Amharic should also learn two other languages.50

In order to promote the development of major languages, they must be used in the mass

media such as radio and newspapers. A start was made in this direction when the PMAC

launched a one hour radio program in Oromigna on 24 December 1974. However, this

was not deemed enough as the language must be used for official and instructional

purposes in its locality [particularly at the primary level]. In addition, the development of

the target language could be facilitated when it is extensively used in the theatres, music,

49
AZ, 7 Ginbot 1967. AZ, 9 Ginbot 1967.
50
AZ, 20 Hamle 1967.

221
literature, etc. 51 Only this would solve, according to proponents, the unfair advantage

Amharic speakers had over speakers of other languages in Ethiopia. Even the Addis

Zemen editorial repeatedly emphasized that rectification of the hegemony of one

language and culture over the others would be the fundamental prerequisite to national

unity.52

The battle was pitched at the primary level education where strong cases have been made

on the merits of enabling the child grow firmly centered on the day to day life, culture,

language and history of its locality. Only a child confident and proud of its ethnic identity

would grow up a good Ethiopian!53 While this claim was itself debatable, a related issue

regarded the choice of a script for a particular language. Now the universal applicability

of the Geez-Amharic script was being challenged openly. There appears a general

compromise on the values of promoting equality and development of the vernaculars

while disputing the educational and economical justification of imposing English or other

foreign languages under this pretext, even as a temporary measure, except being a zero-

sum expression of hatred for Amharic. Therefore, the best solution would be not to ban

Amharic altogether but to teach local languages in ‘Sabean’ (to mean Ethiopic)

alphabet. 54 This, proponents reasoned, is substantiated by the history of linguistic

evolution. All great languages have borrowed their script from others; Ethiopic itself was

borrowed and thus not an exclusive property of any group in Ethiopia. It could be

appropriately called Ethiopian.

51
AZ, 11 Megabit 1967. Identical argument under the title ‘unity through equality’ in the issue of 8 Ginbot
1967. AZ, 27 Miazia 1968, demand for the Wollayita a radio program in the local language.
52
AZ, 14 Ginbot 1967. AZ, 7 Ginbot 1967.
53
AZ, 19 Nehassie 1967.
54
AZ, 22 Ginbot 1967.

222
It is evident that these public exchanges were surface expressions of the political

undercurrents regarding the nationalities question. The military regime might have

encouraged such a compromise solution to the issue as its subsequent measures indicated.

The Derg did not get a breathing space between 1974 and 1978 due to internal and

external problems. In 1979, however, it launched a massive public education program by

establishing the National Literacy Campaign Coordinating Committee (NLCCC) under

the Ministry of Education. In fact, it was during the literacy campaign that the fifteen

most widely spoken languages of the country began to be used for educational purposes.

However, this official list did not automatically disqualify other minority languages

which already had some experiment in transcription. A January 1978 report by Getachew

Mekuria, entitled ‘Report on the Pre-Implementation Survey Mission to Gambella’,

notes what was observed from the meetings with the various peasant associations in the

awraja: “The Anuak and Nuer languages were both written: Anuak in Ethiopian

characters and Nuer in the Latin script. According to the new democracy the use of local

languages should be encouraged for educational purposes but a thorough study was

required to be able to do this and this was still lacking at the present time. They [the

peasant associations] recommended that the Nuer language should also be written in the

Ethiopian script.”55

In 1979, the military regime established in place of the NALA a new Ethiopian

Languages Academy, though for a long time this body did not do significant work on

other Ethiopian languages except Amharic and Geez. 56 For much of the Derg period,

55
GPNRS Files: Education Bureau, a report written in English, January 1978.
56
Mekuria Bulach, “The Language Policies of Ethiopian Regimes and the History of Written Afaan
Oromoo: 1844-1994,” JOS, I,2(1994), p.108.

223
Amharic remained the medium of instruction at elementary (1-6) level and it was given

as a subject at higher levels with emphasis on the grammatical aspects. Amharic literature

was not taught both at elementary and secondary levels and the few books which had

been deposited in school libraries were intended to assist Amharic learning, rather than

for their literary qualities. However, towards the end of its rule, the Derg had briefly

launched a trial use of Amharic as a medium of instruction in selected secondary schools.

The Department of Ethiopian Languages and Literature at AAU was the only place where

some attempts were made to teach Amharic literature. Even then the courses offered were

predominated by Amharic with respect to linguistics and by Geez with respect to

literature. This was due to the nature and history of the two languages. Geez has a well-

developed literary tradition and heritage though it is obsolete for practical communication

purposes. In contrast, Amharic has a national communicative significance but a brief

literary life and a wealth of literature far less than Geez.57

The second most important concern in the educational reforms of the period was the

content of the national curriculum. Unlike the imperial regime, both formal and informal

systems of public education were highly centralized and closely monitored. School

curricula of the Derg era were also heavily permeated by state ideology. From the outset,

some subjects such as geography and history, religious or ethical education, were singled

out for being outdated and in need of revision. The first two were debunked for they were

regarded as instruments of national oppression by perpetuating the ideology, history and

culture of a ‘certain’ ethnic group. The others were similarly deemed one-sided and even

more irrelevant in the new context of socialism. The national education policy was

57
AZ, 3 Tikemt 1966, interview with professors of the department Hailu Fulass, Abrham Demoz,and
Amsalu Aklilu.

224
single-mindedly devoted towards cultivating “the new Socialist citizen” and the direction

and content of syllabi reflected this goal. The Yekatit-66 Political School, which was

initially established for training cadres, also produced teachers who could handle a

subject called ‘political education’ at the secondary and tertiary levels.

The escalation in the intensity of student politics had its repercussions on the

determination of the worth and status of academic history. During the period of political

uncertainty between 1974 and 1979 university students, especially ethno-nationalists,

opposed the teaching of history altogether for it was perceived to be unrepresentative of

the various Ethiopian peoples. There was of course an ideological bent for this opposition

and “...members of academic staff in the History Department were being accused of

being anti-Marxist, because of not teaching the history of the masses as this related to the

Ethiopian people. There was a period, in 1977-78, of considerable underground ethnic

secessionist activism from which the University and in particular the History Department,

did not escape. Students interfered, created chaos and ‘dictated’ to a number of

teachers...It became very difficult to teach history without this being used or perceived as

a contribution to the political debate.”58

The military regime, however, did not cancel history from the curriculum of higher

education though it wanted it to be in line with socialist ideology. The initial

masterpieces of modern Ethiopian historians dealt with historical and institutional

continuity (Tadesse), ethnic interactions and reorganization (Merid), and national

58
Randi Ronning Balsvik, The Quest for Expression: State and the University in Ethiopia Under Three
Regimes, 1952-2005(AAU Press: 2007), pp.91-92.

225
survival (Rubenson).59 The AAU Department of History launched its annual seminars in

1983 and up to the fourth seminar, which took place in 1987, a total of 41 articles on

various aspects of Ethiopian history were published. This period assured the department’s

role as the institutional home of Ethiopian historiography, spanning diverse research

issues employing the concepts of class and ethnicity, touching on economic, social and

institutional issues. In the early 1980s, there was a renewed interest drawing expatriate

historians and anthropologists to the study of peripheral Ethiopia. Of particular

significance was the conference organized by Wendy James, Peter Garreston and Donald

Donham, who were themselves attracted to Ethiopia through the study of the Sudan.

Between 1979 and 1981, they organized two workshops specifically aiming to see the

people in southern Ethiopia and its borderlands not in their generality but individuality,

“...in terms of the links imposed by the conquest.”60

Truilzi dubbed the renewed attention of foreign anthropologists and historians on

southern Ethiopia, including his own concern on Wollega history, as the ‘peripheral

school’ and elaborated its rationale and purpose. In his view, Ethiopia did not so much

attract anthropologists and their advent could be regarded as salutary because they

represented the ‘periphery’ in contrast to the ‘center’-oriented perspective of historians.

He also noted that this modest effort was intended “...to put together a body of local

sources for each southwestern region which will enable us to redress the imbalance in a

historiography which is still heavily dependent on external sources and official center-

59
Donald Crummey, “Society, State and Nationality in the Recent Historiography of Ethiopia,” Journal of
African History, 31(1), (1990), p.104.
60
Richard Caulk, “Work being done outside of Ethiopia on Ethiopian history and related topics: a survey,”
First Annual Seminar of the Department of History (1983), pp. 324, 325.

226
oriented chronicles.”61 Nevertheless, pursuing a separate ‘peripheral’ school in contrast to

the ‘central’ one was not necessary because: “...the final aim of these regional and local

studies should not be, in my view, the writing of some sort of counter-history for the

‘periphery’, but an attempt at writing a comprehensive history of the Ethiopian people – a

history which, so far, we have failed to produce.”62

The increasing relevance of ethnicity unleashed by the revolution was reflected in the

sphere of academic history as well."Undergraduates at Addis Ababa University

anticipated the importance of this issue in a number of theses dedicated to non-Semitic

speaking peoples in the years before the Revolution. Of the 103 theses accepted then in

the History Department, 76 dealt with Ethiopian topics, and, of the 76, 13 or 17-I per cent

dealt with peoples other than the Amhara or Tegray." 63 Interestingly, it was the late

Professor Tadesse Tamrat who explicitly noted the dire need for interdisciplinary studies

on the history and culture of Ethiopian nationalities. After outlining research priorities,

which he suggested could be undertaken as regional studies based on geographical units

such as the Awash basin, Gibe-Omo, etc, he concluded: “With the development of our

research capacity here at A.A.U. and in other future centers of higher education in

Ethiopia, parallel studies of these areas could be made so that within the following ten

years we will have been able to build up quite a vast material on the rich cultural heritage

of the peoples of Ethiopia.”64 But this was not an easy task in practice since, for example,

from about 177 best B.A. theses produced in the Department of History between 1972

61
Alessandro Truilzi, “Center – Periphery Relations in Ethiopian Studies, Reflections on Ten Years of
Research on Wollega History,” 7th ICES (1982), p.359.
62
Ibid. p.362.
63
Crummey, “Society, State,” p.113.
64 nd
Tadesse Tamrat, “Research Priorities,” 2 Annual Seminar of the Department of History, II (1984), p.68.

227
and 1998, only one had direct relevance to the history of the Nilotic peoples of the

borderlands.65

The adoption of socialist ideology also demanded a reinterpretation of national history

and recreation of collective memory and culture. In 1975, the Derg changed the date for

the celebration of Victory Day from 27 Miazia (5 May) to 28 Megabit (6 April), claiming

that Ethiopian patriots had victoriously hoisted the national flag on the latter date. This

momentous event was considered as the victory of the Ethiopian broad masses rather than

its rulers; and even the venue of celebration was temporarily shifted to Menelik II Square.

To consolidate its measure, the regime hailed two historic flags which had served as

symbols of unity and inspiration during the five years of patriotic resistance. One of

these, used as banner for Shoan patriots, was entrusted as a national heritage to the

keeping of the Ancient Ethiopian Patriots’ Association. The other was the flag Ethiopian

patriots had hoisted on the afternoon of 6 April 1941 when they victoriously entered

Addis Ababa alongside the British allies.66 This measure was considered an instance of

“returning history to its owner.”67 Therefore, the Socialist regime envisioned a complete

revision/rectification of the writing and teaching of history itself; the national discourse

from the history of kings, aristocrats and personalities to that of the common people, the

real motors of history.68

The Derg wanted to refashion the national emblem, !3 & , as a symbolic

expression of its departure from the previous regime. On 17 February 1975, decision was

65
This was Atieb Ahmed Dafalla, “Sheik Khojale Al-Hassen and Benishangul: 1825-1938,” (B.A. Thesis,
AAU: Department of History, 1973).
66
AZ, 6 Miazia 1967.
67
AZ, 24 Megabit 1967.
68
AZ, 25 Megabit 1967.

228
passed to prepare an artistic representation of the nation based on the philosophy of

socialism. Accordingly, the Ministry of Culture announced a public contest on 18

February 1975 inviting Ethiopian artists to take part. The singular criterion for the

intended emblem was that “it should be based on the fundamentals of Ethiopia First

thinking and the political philosophy of socialism, while not entirely divorced from

Ethiopianness both in history and sentiment.” “- )$"2& ?#>$! E

#)"*a 0 N - !"#$%& L'M; b ?b )$" N -2AX 0 -?W bc

69
& 'RR )0 -2 VV” Already the Derg had changed the Jubilee

Palace’s name to National Palace on 25 August 1974 and the Haile Silassie I Theatre to

National Theatre. Starting from 10 September 1974 the names of some hospitals, squares

and roads were also changed thus setting a pattern for the regime’s own symbols and

traditions.

Nevertheless, the official representations were again based on the symbolisms and

markers of the historic nation though given a new socialist interpretation and emphasis.

The tricolor flag and the lion were the two main national symbols retrieved from the

historic nation. The Derg removed all other symbols from the Moa Anbessa flag and

maintained the plain green-yellow-blue without changing its shape and size. This

remained the ultimate national emblem while its interpretation emphasized only the

history, culture, patriotism and development of the Ethiopian state and people.

Simultaneously, however, the regime adopted another flag, ‘the red banner’, to stand for

its ideology and internationalism.

69
AZ, 11 Yekatit 1967.

229
Though removed it from the flag, the Derg did not entirely reject the national lion (of

Judah). It initially wanted it to be Ethiopian, a plain figure now symbolizing the

patriotism and independence of the Ethiopian nation. The regime gave the lion symbol a

historical turn by resurrecting the 'Black Lion' as a symbol of Ethiopian resistance. The

major government institutions including the army, the air force, the navy and service

giving organizations such Anbessa Buses and Ethiopian Ari Lines utilized these

paramount national symbols, flag and lion. The new national currency prepared by the

Derg in 1976 would not have been called truly national if the lion hadn’t been embedded

in it. The military regime capped its creation of national symbolism by erecting in

September 1984 Tiglachin, a monument of the Unknown Soldier, to celebrate the

revolutionary struggle of the Ethiopian people.70

The period between the defeat of the Somali invasion in late 1977 and the onset of the

most severe famine in recent history in 1984 marked the zenith of the military regime.

During this brief period the Derg launched several projects bringing about profound

social and economic changes designed to forge Socialist Ethiopia. In fact, the major

mobilization decisions of the regime in the entire period had an element of promoting

unity and integrity at core. The first among these was the Development through

Cooperation Campaign (Idget Behibret) which, besides other explicit objectives, was

intended to consolidate Ethiopian unity.71 This controversial plan was set in motion on 18

October 1974, when the Directorate for Development through Cooperation, Knowledge

and Work Campaign was formed. The inauguration of Idget Behibret was celebrated

70
AZ, 2 Meskerem 1977. Mengistu, Tiglachin, p.5.
71
MoI Files: No.714/7, 1, Ye’Edget Behibret Zemecha. AZ, 2 Yekatit 1967.

230
throughout the country on 21 December 1974 and the earliest campaigners mobilized

from Addis to southern Ethiopia on 10 January 1975.72

The high school and university students included in this campaign were divided over its

relevance and goals. A part of the student body was enthusiastic about the Idget Behibret

as it seemed to answer to the call so far as a slogan ‘fanno tesemara’ and others also

welcomed it as a means of mobilizing grassroots opposition to the military government.

Still a vociferous minority seriously opposed it as a strategy to remove student activists

from the political center and claimed “we are the leaders of the movement so we will not

go out of this city unless we have established a popular government.”73 In the early days

of exuberant optimism many believed and argued that Ethiopia had a philosophy suitable

for administration and leadership, that the national life was suitable for socialism, and

that its distinctiveness justified a unique homespun ideology and statesmanship for the

new Ethiopia.74 This nationwide application of the ideas of Ethiopia First set the trend for

Derg’s massive mobilization programs in the period.

The 4 March 1975 proclamation nationalizing rural land also provided immeasurable

boost to the Derg. What is more important, it established a legal framework for elaborate

structures to administer land and deal with legal issues at the local level. This in turn

enhanced the regime’s capacity to access, supervise and indoctrinate at the grassroots

level.75 The strength of the Derg or its superiority over other civilian rivals lay not only in

its monopoly of raw force or its control of the vast state apparatus and resources but also

72
AZ, 28 Nehassie 1966.
73
AZ, 16 Tikemt 1967.
74
AZ, 14 Meskerem 1967. AZ, 19 Meskerem 1967.
75
AZ, 25 Yekatit 1967.

231
in its ability to create effective propaganda machinery through mass communication,

mobilization and organization. That was the relative weakness of the imperial regime. For

this task the Derg started what was called ‘ye’wideta gideta’, a term apparently

contradictory but an effective means of suppressing dissenting voices. It organized and

regimented the society along various lines: urban dwellers’ associations, peasant

associations (its power bases), youth associations, women’s associations, teachers’

associations, workers’ associations, etc. It even attempted to control and mobilize

religious institutions and other traditional associations such as Idirs. The Derg

accompanied every measure in this respect with a floodgate of ‘meglecha’, ‘mabraria’,

‘awaj’, ‘mefokir’, and a background march music which still echoes in one’s mind.

Other means of dissemination and mobilization of the people effectively used by the

Derg included arts, music and sports. The regime did an impressive job in promoting

tradition, culture and music of the various nationalities in line with the governing socialist

ideology. In a meeting held on 2 April 1974 between the then Minister of Information,

Ahadu Sabore, and employees of the Haile Selassie I Theatre, the latter urged among

others that “this generation has a great concern for tradition, therefore, serious care is

needed when it comes to cultural music and tribal languages...As Ethiopia is home to so

many tribes with distinctive performances, the cultures of all groups should have been

collected and studied instead of making the dance of a few tribes represent the entire

traditional plays of the country. This is inappropriate and counterproductive.” 76 In a

similar evaluation of its achievement so far, the Hager Fiqir Theatre also raised the need

for further work on traditional/folk music of the various groups. As the administrator

76
AZ, 1 Miazia 1966.

232
noted, the effort to represent the various folk dances and songs as faithfully as possible

must continue. In addition, the efforts to make cultural songs and dances performed by

members of the respective groups themselves (which were often performed by non-native

artists) have to be supplemented by the translation of the songs into Amharic and their

presentation to the public.77

From the very outset music and the arts were intended to serve social purposes: “d

') e”. Some of the most famous theatres such as ‘ 5 -?,? 7 ’, ‘\ f' 6’,

‘%';% %'@%’, ‘g( - 9 h’, ‘ ' Ii’, ‘ ’, ‘#j,k’, ‘ +l@ R k’, etc appeared in

the early revolutionary period with explicit indoctrination purposes.78 For instance, in the

period between ‘ +l@ R k’(1974) to ‘ Q D X!!’(1983,the first non-political theme

since the revolution) all the twenty theatres and musical dramas hosted by the National

Theatre were politically themed. 79 The Derg also established a network of music and

theatre bands known as kinets from region down to kebele levels performing both modern

and hagereseb (folk) works.80 It was only later, especially after the Ethio-Somali war,

that the regime relaxed the ideological burden on music and theatre and even gave more

freedom for private bands to operate. 81 The overall ‘cultural’ achievement seems

unparalleled both in its outreach and dynamism. The local bands gradually evolved into

veritable seedbeds for famous artists and singers thus ushering in the early 1980s the

second revival of Ethiopian music.

77
AZ, 9 Sene 1966.
78
AZ, 27 Hidar 1972. AZ, 7 Meskerem 1973. AZ, 9 Meskerem 1973. AZ, 17 Tikemt 1976.
79
Fekadu Feye and Etenesh Kassa, Ye’Etyopia Biherawi Theatre Achir Tarik’na Yemisetachew
Agelglotoch(2000EC).
80
MoI Files. No number, Ye’Kiflehageroch Ye’bahilna Ye’kinet Achir Report (1967 EC). AZ, 6 Meskerem
1971. AZ, 11 Meskerem 1971. AZ, 10 Tikemt 1976. AZ, 14 Tikemt 1976.
81
AZ, 8 Hamle 1970.

233
On the eve of the revolution in 1973, the first domestic tourism program called ‘Etyopian

Eneweq’ (Let’s Know Ethiopia) was started jointly by the National Tour Operation and

Wollo Commerce, Industry and Transport Share Company. This program “was launched

with the intention that domestic tourism would be more beneficial to see and understand

Ethiopia’s natural resources, captivating topography, historical heritage and longstanding

history.”82 An Addis Zemen editorial further argued that knowing one’s country and her

historical treasures should be a civic obligation.83 The Derg promoted the Hagerhin Eweq

(Know Your Country) clubs in schools, the civil service apparatus and various popular

organizations. In 1978, the regime launched the First Annual Cultural Development

Campaign Plan with explicit objective to promote national culture. In its second annual

plan the study of the nationalities languages, particularly research on the internal

structure(morphology) of the various nationalities as well as the collection and

compilation of folklore, songs and poems were integrated. 84 The NDRPE had also

pledged to make a special concern for the peripheral and ‘forgotten’ peoples of Ethiopia.

Sports were among the channels of collective expression, which during the imperial

period were generally dominated by themes of Ethiopian patriotism and nationalism.

Club names included such as Tewodros, Andinet, etc and the various provincial teams of

Shoa, Eritrea, Tigre, Arusi, etc, which gave very lively entertainment to the general

public, were intended to strengthen regional against any ethnic loyalties and

identifications. The latter occasionally backfired due to the ethnic character of some of

the regions. A notable example could be the soccer tournament among the 14 regional

82
AZ, 13 Tikemt 1966.
83
AZ, 14 Tikemt 1966.
84
AZ, 27 Hidar 1972.

234
teams held on the occasion of the 1973 Crown Anniversary, in which the Tigre Football

Directory evoked a serious political wrangling by changing the regional name to ‘Tigray’

on the team’s placard.85

The Derg again encouraged the establishment of various sports teams upward from the

kebele level and spent considerable resources to engage the youth in healthy pursuits. The

intention was to make the kebele not only an institution of local administration and

control but also a place of provision, leisure and socialization. The regime also allowed

the reestablishment of military and police sports clubs to compete with civilian teams at

various levels in the national league. The Derg’s idea of promoting unity in diversity

gradually began to permeate and find expression in the spheres of the arts, music,

literature, etc. The famous artistic representation of Ethiopian diversity, displaying

different groups and nationalities within the Ethiopian map, was painted in 1975 as a

promotion to the Ethiopian Commercial Bank. Tellingly subtitled as “ 5_ &

!”(see appendix II), this kind of display set a pattern for the future.

The most outstanding example of the Derg’s commitment to national unity was its

massive mobilization and propaganda in defence of the Mother Land. The Somali

invasion and the war of 1977-78 specially became the fire test of the regime’s capacity to

handle a national crisis and the one which stamped its legitimacy. This was in fact a time

the military regime felt that it was literally encircled by ‘the enemies of the revolution’ -

‘ ,jA ’(anti-revolutionaries), ‘ d?D ’(anarchists), ‘# m ’(secessionists), ‘$ n

4 ’(infiltrators), ‘ ("o ’(mercenaries), etc. 86 Mengistu passionately appealed to the

85
AZ, 25 Hidar 1966.
86
AZ, 2 Meskerem 1971.

235
national patriotism of Ethiopians in the ‘Call of the Motherland’ speech he made on 12

April 1977. The drafting, training and equipping of hundreds of thousands of people’s

militia forces to supplement the Ethiopian regular army at such a short call, and the

mobilization of the entire country behind the fighting forces was a huge task.87

The military regime mobilized every organization for the war effort. The best example of

these had been the coordination of the urban Idirs. The imperial regime had also

attempted to mobilize the people for peace, development and unity through neighborhood

self-help associations such as Idirs. 88 These institutions which were established and

spread over a period of thirty years following the Italian period in the various Ethiopian

cities had performed important activities in consolidating the public sense of tolerance

and coexistence. Though originally established as socialization and self-help associations

based on ethnicity and workplace, they had gradually abandoned their professional,

ethnic and religious bases and become common associations based on neighborhood and

locality.

In this respect Idirs have surpassed other similar institutions such as Mahber, Senbete and

Iqub. On the eve of the revolution Idirs had begun to coordinate their members for

development activities, to play significant roles in improving the socio-economic life of

communities and in consolidating people’s sense of unity. The fact that Idirs equally

embrace both ordinary members and government officials made them an exemplary way

of life for urban communities throughout Ethiopia. The military regime used Idirs

effectively from the very moment of the announcement of the Call of the Motherland on
87
AZ, 18 Sene 1969, about 300,000 newly trained militia made a great parade at the ‘Revolution Square’
and same date Mengistu warned Somalia to stop any violation of Ethiopian territory.
88
AZ, 2 Tikemt 1966.

236
12 April 1977 to the conclusion of the war in December 1977. In addition to this, the

regime established elaborate urban residents’ associations in the 248 towns throughout

the country.89

It is in such critical moments of national survival that the Ethiopian state instinctively

called upon the ideology, culture and traditions of the historic nation. In this respect the

military regime used the vast networks of people’s associations to appeal to national

sentiment, to raise the people’s morale, to draft volunteers en masse, and to organize

support events for the army throughout the country. Its war propaganda was also

unrestrained in the denigration of the rival Somali nationalism, history and identity. The

Ethio-Somali war not only boosted the regime’s nationalist stand but also served it to

expose and destroy domestic civilian opponents, who fell in public disgrace by allegedly

“stabbing the army in the back.”90 There were strong rumors that while the Ethiopian

army was fighting a last ditch battle in places such as Quore, and Karamara, its

commanders and bravest fighters were often shot from behind. Many soldiers who took

part in the war claim that such insider killings were aimed at demoralizing the army.

While the truth of this allegation should be doubted, the very absurdity of invoking the

nationalities principle for an international invasion shows how far some among the

contending groups were prepared to go.

The Ethio-Somali war also had another enduring impact on the regime. Victory made the

Derg confident in its military might and complacent towards the peaceful resolution of

internal insurgencies and oppositions. It rather kept the country on a war footing. The
89
AZ, 9 Tahsas 1966. AZ, 2 Meskerem 1970. Mengistu, Tiglachin, pp.383-388.
90
This is an unfortunate allegation but one which my own father, who had taken part as a GI in the Ethio-
Somali war remembered in disgust.

237
militia was never demobilized but maintained as part of the gigantic army the Derg built

in the subsequent period. Particularly, the introduction of national military service

became the most unpopular project which led to the demise of the regime. National

military service, as Emperor Haile Selassie noted in his 43rd Crown Anniversary speech,

was intended to instill discipline and love of motherland in the youth of the country.

Though the idea had been raised back in 1955, the actual law for its implementation was

not promulgated until October 1973. 91 The Derg revived this plan by proclaiming a

compulsory national military service in 1983/84 (1976 EC) for all Ethiopian youth

between ages 18 and 30. The first draftees entered training camps in April 1984. The

motto was “' ! 2& 5_ a! p !” The Derg sacrificed the youth and

resource of the country and led to the last hour an embattled nation.

The Management of Ethnic and Nationalities Issues

The military regime employed two parallel and complementary policies to manage ethnic

and nationalities issues. These were based on the very different nature and expression of

ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. Ethnicity, more appropriately traditional ethnicity, is

localized and spontaneous in nature and ranges from simple stereotyping among different

groups to communal exclusions, taboos and dissensions. Ethnicity is a part of day to day

social life and the best thing that can be done is to manage its conflictual manifestations.

A purely cultural practice of body markings, like in the Tigreans, Wolayita, Nuer,etc,

may be used as powerful ethnic diacritical marks. Some of the group labelings, such as

bariya, buda, bale’ij, shanqilla, related to minority groups and had deeper historical

91
AZ, 25 Ginbot 1966.

238
roots. The deployment of these features in a wider ethnic ideology first begins in

localized settings at the points of cultural contact between different groups. The Derg was

genuinely devoted to eradicate all features of ethnocentrism and strictly censored public

expressions of stereotyping such as linguistic, religious, color, gender and occupational

ones. 92 At the local level the regime attempted to arbitrate traditional feuds between

various communities in the country: often through the traditional institutions but backed

by a strong government presence.93

The nationalities issue was more organized and politicized in nature. From the very

beginning the regime showed determination to consolidate Ethiopian unity by a ‘one

country one people’ slogan. The translation of its nationalist ideology both as Etyopia

Tikdem and Hibretesebawinet was closely allied to the nation-building effort. The regime

justified the policy by historical as well as pragmatic arguments, “ -a) ?(

, , Z! q 0 ' ’’; it saw ethnic-based organizations suspiciously and

made ethnocentric agitations strictly punishable. The Derg was reasonably sincere in its

effort to redress the historical injustices suffered by oppressed faiths, classes and

nationalities. A ground breaking measure in this regard was the announcement on 23

December 1974 about the legal equality of Ethiopian national holidays. For the first time

in the country’s history, the Derg officially sanctioned major Muslim religious festivities

to be national holidays in par with Christian holidays. As noted in chapter two, the

imperial regime had in practice accorded them national status without acknowledging it

in public law. The Derg made many significant concessions to accommodate the diverse

92
AZ, 27 Miazia 1968.
93
AZ, 23 Yekatit 1967.

239
linguistic, religious and cultural diversity of Ethiopia. On 24 December 1974, it launched

a one-hour radio program in the Oromo language transmitted from the Addis Ababa radio

station. Books were published in Afaan Oromo and a weekly paper named Barissa was

also launched. The requirement of a pass in Amharic to join higher institutions, as well as

the freshman courses Amharic 101 and 102 were rescinded, and even the Amharic

Department itself was temporarily closed during the heyday of the revolution.94

Simultaneously, the Derg also harshly punished what it considered to be violent

organized expressions of ethnicity. One important case in point is the fate of Brigadier

General Tadesse Biru, the founder of Mecha-na-Tualama self-help association. Though

Tadesse had been sentenced to death for inciting communal dissension and violence in

1963, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by Emperor Haile Selassie. He

was then released and his pension reinstated when the Derg gave amnesty to all political

prisoners in early 1974. However, within a year, Tadesse was again accused of actively

engaging in ethnic agitation and armed insurrection against the new regime. In March

1975, Tadesse and his compatriot Lieutenant Colonel Hailu Regasa were apprehended at

Meta Robi in a locality called Guro Mako. The Supreme Military Court sentenced the

former to life imprisonment and the latter to death. This decision was, however,

overturned by the then Chairman of the Derg, General Teferi Benti, and Tadesse and

Hailu were executed along with other revolutionaries such as Meles Tekle, Rezene

Kidane and Alula Bekele.95

94
Tilahun Gamta, “The Politicization of My Oromo-English Dictionary: the Writer’s Reflections,” JOS, VII, 1
&2(2000), p.3.
95
AZ, 10 Megabit 1967.

240
From a pragmatic point of view, this action seems to have been intended to preempt rival

civilian organizations (including EPRP and MEISON) whose political agenda regarding

the nationalities issue has become a public secret. The regime argued that “Qr

!3 & s , j , : 0t VV” (Today Ethiopia’s national

tune has become unity is strength and strength is unity). 96 By mid-1976, the ethnic

undercurrents simmering in the various popular, civil and professional associations began

to erupt even on the pages of Addis Zemen. The main fault line was drawn between

opposite views labeled as ‘narrow nationalism’ and ‘chauvinism’. For instance, the

incriminating exchanges between the Wollega and Gondar branches of the Ethiopian

Teachers’ Association had been centered on whether or not there existed what were

called ‘ %! !3"#u ’ (‘narrow nationalism’) and ‘oppressor nationality’.97

Another important point of dialogue was regarding the use of ‘biher’ instead of ‘gosa’ for

each ethnic group, as the latter implied exclusiveness and backwardness. The Derg

consistently employed ‘gosa’(clan/tribe) for ethnic specific issues while it restricted

‘biher’ to the Ethiopian nation in general until 1976. It was after 1976 that another term

‘bihereseb’ was introduced to highlight the distinction between nation and nationality.

Though biher and bihereseb eventually came to be used interchangeably, in the

subsequent period bihereseb completely replaced gosa or neged to refer to ethnic groups.

Hereafter, the term ‘gosa’ (or ‘gosegna’/ ‘gosegnet) was occasionally used as a pejorative

reference to ultra-ethnonationalists or the so-called ‘narrow nationalists’.

96
AZ, 28 Hidar 1967.
97
AZ, 18 Nehassie 1968; 25 Nehassie 1968.

241
One means of combating ethnocentrism contemplated from the early days of the

revolution was redrawing the provincial structure inherited from the Imperial regime.

This was because the awraja – teqlaygizat system, though it was designed to solidify

regional against ethnic loyalty and identification, had left some historical entities such as

Tigray and Eritrea intact, thereby inadvertently solidifying ethno-regional sentiments.

Now one of the proposals to counter such pan-ethnic as well as ethno-regional

developments was the formation of wider administrative entities comprising of diverse

ethno-cultural units or “to group kiflehagers into central, northern, western and eastern

regions. For instance, to make Wollo, Begemedir, Tigre and Eritrea into the northern

Ethiopian region, etc.”98 However, this brought another conflict with the NDRPE which

explicitly endorsed regional autonomy for the ‘nationalities’. This means a genuine

implementation of the program would demand the regrouping of ethnic groups into

contiguous regions.

The task of dealing with the nationalities issue was initially entrusted to the Nationalities

Committee which was subsumed under the party structures of the Derg and its affiliates,

especially in the Joint Front. This body had become defunct after MEISON and

ECHAAT abandoned it in late 1977. The Institute of Nationalities Studies was later

established in 1983, headed by Yayehyirad Kitaw and including a number of staff

members from the AAU. 99 “Broadly speaking, the tasks of the institute consisted of

drafting the constitution of PDRE after having carried out the necessary research into the

national composition of the country, the administrative divisions of the regions and

98
AZ, 28 Hidar 1967.
99
MoI Files: No.129, 6.14, Ye’bihereseb Institute. No.50, Sile Bihereseboch Tinat.

242
comparative constitutional law of the socialist countries.”100 In the documents presented

for the Second Congress of the Commission for the Organization of the Workers’ Party

of Ethiopia (COWPE), 6-9 September 1984, which founded the Workers’ Party of

Ethiopia (WPE), it was clearly stated that the structure of the government will be unitary

and be based on the realities of the country's economy and shall take into account the

territorial configuration of the nationalities.101

Moreover, cadres argued that the right of nationalities has always been the concern of the

revolutionary government but this right would be implemented according to the

provisions of the NDRPE, which is regional autonomy. The regime denounced any

variation to the unitary structure of the state. "The desire to secede from socialist Ethiopia

is a desire to join imperialism and the reactionary camp; there is no third alternative to

it."102 The Department of Nationalities was also announced on the Second Congress and

was filled by cadres and party functionaries headed by Shoandagn Belete. Generally,

until towards the end of the period the Derg maintained the basic pattern of the imperial

regime’s teklay gizat system by renaming it kifle hager. But the very elaborate parastatal

structure down to local administration enabled it to make central control easier through

party officials. In sum, though the issue of Ras’beras Yewist Astedader(internal self-

administration) had featured in the political discourse of the Derg from the early period

of the revolution, its adoption as Ras-Gez Astedader in 1987 was forced by the realities of

the nationalities war. The only autonomous region, according to the 1987 Peoples

100
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, pp.266-7.
101
MoI Files: no number, Sile Ras’beras Yewist Astedader Yetederege Tinat (1969 EC). No number,
Ye’biher Bihereseboch Meteyeqna Tinat(1971 EC). AZ, 1 Meskerem 1977.
102
Andargachew, Ibid, p.266. MoI Files: no number, Ras’n Beras Astedader Be’meshegageria Gizena
Be’hibretesebawinet Amerar (1969EC).

243
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) constitution, where the administrative unit was

coextensive with the national composition was Ye’Asseb Ras-Gez Akababi (Afar).103

4.2 The Nationalities versus the State

As noted in the previous chapters, the early 1960s marked the apogee of the imperial state

and its version of Ethiopianism. This period also witnessed the origin of its ethnic and

regional antagonists. Somali, Oromo, Eritrean, and Tigrean ethno-nationalists emerged to

demand the dismantling of the Ethiopian state. While the early ethno-regional

insurgencies were all inspired and driven by external forces, the ethno-nationalist

movements which began in the 1970s mainly among the Eritreans, Tigreans and Oromos,

however, had been part of the general prise d’conscince inspired by the ESM and the

political uncertainty it engendered in the imperial regime.

Until the onset of the revolution most of the domestic political movements and activities

of the period were conceived and executed in Addis Ababa. Ideologically, they were also

influenced by the ESM and its Marxist-Leninist tendencies, with all its implications to the

resolution of the nationalities question. The ethno-nationalist forces within or outside the

student movement were induced by the perception of economic, political and socio-

cultural disparity in the framework of a city interaction. Their understanding and

prescriptions also ranged in the political spectrum from equality in unity to outright

independence. Paradoxically, the 1974 revolution and the concomitant state

103
MoI Files: No.15836, Ye’Tigray, Ye’Asseb, Ye’Diredawana Ye’Ogaden Ras Gez Akababiwoch Siltanina
Tegbar Lemewesen Yeweta Awaj (1980EC).

244
transformation intensified demands for ‘decolonization’.104 As an exception to the Third

World, Ethiopia harbored “a nationalistic or anti-imperialist element in both causation

and ideology, but this was subordinate to that of internally generated contradictions.”105

The Eritrean problem was one of the most intractable political challenges the Derg

inherited on taking power. Arguably, few other factors, perhaps with the exception of the

student movement, have left their mark as deeply on the course of subsequent history of

Ethiopia.106 Many scholars dispute the existence of any “Eritrean consciousness” apart

from Italian-induced antagonism in the imperial period. They argue that “not even a

collective oppression under a colonial rule for over half a century had produced any

unifying nationalist tradition within Eritrea.”107 On the contrary, regional identification

seems the major common denominator in Eritrean nationalism and it had much longer

historical roots than the Italian period. This traditional regionalism was the bedrock of

modern Eritrean nationalism. In fact, in the post-Italian period Eritreans had embraced

some of Italian-induced identifying marks, such as a distinctive sense of urbanity and

‘civilizedness’ in contrast to the rest of Ethiopia including Tigray. As mission schooled

they had been favored for senior posts in the hierarchy of the Ethiopian state apparatus

including the army; as inheritors of Italian skills, garages, vehicles, hotels, pastries and

various institutions, they were highly represented in the service giving sector in the rest

of Ethiopia.

104
Sally Healy, “The Changing Idioms of Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa,” in I.M.Lewis(ed),
Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa(London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p.102.
105
Fred Halliday and Maxine Mollineux, The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1981), p.14.
106
Henze, “Rebels and Separatists”, p.41.
107
Melakou Tegegn, “Eritrea: Evolution Towards Independence and Beyond,” in Abebe Zegeye and
Siegfried Pausewang(eds), Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy(London: British
Academic Press, 1994), p.79.

245
The perception of incongruity between an exalted social and economic position and the

relative lack of political power vis a vis the Amhara was at the core of burgeoning

Eritrean consciousness during the imperial period. The Eritrean movements, therefore,

later developed their ideology as the ‘negation’ of Amhara-Ethiopia. They conflated

Ethiopia and Amhara and limited Ethiopia to two or three Amhara provinces. Ideologues

of the Eritrean cause against Ethiopia, such as Bereket Habte Selassie, even fabricated a

separate history for the two entities based on a dichotomy of ‘Axumite’ versus

‘Abyssinian’.108 Nevertheless, it was the collective suffering in the protracted war against

the Derg and the war effort that finally brought various Eritrean groups together for a

common national aspiration.

The two main rival Eritrean insurgencies - Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean

People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)- were established in 1961 and 1973 respectively. ELF

was a Muslim-dominated organization that started armed rebellion by targeting the life

and property of Eritreans who struggled for unity with Ethiopia. Founded by Saed Awate,

its ideology emphasized the Muslim-Arab nature of Eritrea partly for tactical reasons.

The second organization was an offshoot of the ESM and played decisive role in the

Eritrean liberation struggle. Following the Ethiopian revolution, EPLF grew in number

and strength as new recruits, mainly Christian Tigreans, swelled its ranks. This condition

brought after 1975 an ideological shift towards the left and at the expense of Arabism. It

also showed that the Eritrean issue was tied more to events and developments inside

Ethiopia rather than to the Arab world.109 Besides having the staunchest advocates of

108
Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, pp.48-49. Melakou, “Eritrea,” pp.79-80.
109
MoI Files: No.1.2.47.05, Eritrea. Bereket, Ibid, p.64.

246
Eritrea’s right to secession in mainstream Ethiopian left, EPLF had also capitalized on

well-placed Eritreans within the Ethiopian government to sabotage and weaken the Derg.

What the Endalkachew government did regarding the intensification of insurgency in

Eritrea during the transition was to impose a temporary martial law and continue to seek

peaceful resolution.110 The Derg first signaled its desire for a negotiated settlement of the

Eritrean problem when it issued Etyopia Tikdem in early July 1974. As a gesture of

rapprochement it also sent then Chairman Aman Andom to canvass public opinion and if

possible establish a window for future dialogue with the insurgents. Paradoxically,

however, Aman was accused of conniving with the rebels on his fallout with the military

regime in November 1974. The Derg went as far as nominating an Eritrean administrator

for the region, sent high level delegates to hold public deliberations as well as initiate

talks with the rebels through the intermediary of Eritrean notables and elders. This group

also went on a diplomatic mission to Arab countries, principally the Sudan and Syria,

which were supporting the insurgents.

The Derg reiterated its willingness for a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem

immediately after proclaiming Ethiopian Socialism in late December 1974.111 By then a

mediation committee from central Ethiopia led by Abuna Filipos had been trying for

about four months to avert bloodshed between brothers. Nevertheless, developments at

the center begun to cast their shadow on the peace option when in the course of this effort

Eritrean representatives boycotted the parliament and returned to the region. Many

Eritreans in higher government and civil service posts were allegedly found complicit
110
AZ, 11 Sene 1966. AZ, 13 Sene 1966.
111
The famous journalist and author, the late Mamo Wudneh, was a tireless advocate of the peaceful
solution agenda. AZ, 1 Tir 1967.

247
with the insurgents, and many more went to join the rebels. Even the delegates trusted

with mediation were accused of secretly making peace between the two rival

organizations, ELF and EPLF, in Eritrea. The escalation was capped by the insurgents’

fierce armed attack on Asmara in early January 1975.112

This was the first flareout since the revolution which forced the PMAC to override the

partial proclamation of 1970/71(1963 EC) and declare full martial law on Eritrea

effective from 16 January 1975.113 In a 27 January 1975 statement the PMAC denounced

Syria and the Baath Party for interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs by supporting

Eritrean insurgents. The Eritrean problem had reached serious proportions so that the

regime formed on 30 August 1975 a high ministerial committee to seek lasting solutions.

This was accompanied by an ultimatum to all Eritreans throughout the country to stay

away from any ‘reactionary’ activities. 114 The overall plan, however, seems to have

lacked sincerity since Derg’s official line remained “O v( '7( !”; and that

the problem was caused by a few wonbedewoch (outlaws)and lackeys of our historical

enemies the Arabs, that most Eritreans were dedicated to Ethiopian unity.115

The NDRPE was the military regime’s first serious attempt to address the nationalities

issue, evidently featuring Eritrea as a top priority. Again on 16 May 1976, the PMAC

disclosed a nine-point policy to resolve the Eritrean problem peacefully. It also called for

cooperation and clarified its intention to start dialogue with progressive forces in Eritrea

on the implementation of the self-determination provision outlined in the NDRPE. The

112
Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, pp.30, 67. AZ, 1 Tir 1967. AZ, 27 Nehassie 1967.
113
AZ, 9 Yekatit 1967.
114
AZ, 29 Nehassie 1967.
115
AZ, 8 Yekatit 1967. AZ, 18 Yekatit 1967. Also 19 Yekatit 1967.

248
Derg particularly affirmed its commitment to the realization of regional autonomy, which

was elaborated in paragraph 2 of this program as follows: ይህንንም በተግባር ለመተርጎም በኢትዮጵያ

የሚገኘውን የያንዳንዱን አካባቢና በውስጡ ያሉትን ብሄረሰቦች ታሪክ፣ የርስ በርስ ግንኙነት፣ ጆግራፊያዊ አቀማመጥ፣ ኤኮኖሚያዊ

ይዞታ፣ ለልማትና ለአስተዳደር አመቺነት በማመዛዘን፣ ወደፊት ሊኖሩ የሚችሉትን ክፍሎች መንግሥት አጥንቶ በተገቢው ጊዜ ለህዝብ

ያቀርባል፡፡ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብም በየደረጃው ዲሞክራሲያዊ በሆነ መንገድ ተወያይቶባቸው ራሱ እንዲወስን ይደረጋል፡፡ “To put this

in practice, taking into account the history, interaction, geographical settlement,

economic condition, and suitability for development and administration of every region

in Ethiopia and its component nationalities; the government will study and propose the

future structure to the public at the appropriate time. The Ethiopian people will then

democratically deliberate on the issues and decide for themselves.”116

The problem for the Derg had been that Eritrea was not a nationality seeking regional

autonomy but a multiethnic region (with nine ethnic groups) demanding full

independence. On 7 July 1976 the Derg proclaimed the establishment of the Special

Commission for Eritrea Region entrusted with the task of implementing the nine-point

policy, especially points 5, 6, and 7. A mission led by Captain Sisay Habte and

accompanied by Haile Fida was dispatched to Eritrea. This scheme was, however,

interpreted by the insurgents as a device to eliminate the Eritrean problem by eliminating

Eritrea itself. The Derg continuously issued calls to Eritrean progressives to take a

“revolutionary stand” on the issue.117 The EPLF responded by adopting its own "national

116
AZ, 10 Ginbot 1968.
117
MoI Files: No.1360, Ye’Eritrea Kifle Hager Guday. AZ, 13 Ginbot 1968. Bereket, Conflict and
Intervention, pp.36-37. Henze, “Rebels and Separatists”, p.48.

249
democratic program" at its first congress on 31 January 1977. This document explicitly

underlined "Ethiopian colonialism" to be the major enemy of the Eritrean revolution.118

Meanwhile, the year 1977 saw the Eritrean struggle firmly entrenched in the region. After

the Derg’s call in April 1976 to all Ethiopian revolutionary groups to establish a common

front, ELF and EPLF also agreed for partial cooperation and proceeded to establish a

joint front of their own in January 1977. Within a year, both organizations succeeded in

gaining control of Eritrean towns and this campaign demonstrated EPLF’s superior

efficiency and power. During this period, in June 1977, the ELF-Revolutionary Council

and EPLF established a coordinating body called the National Democratic Front (NDF)

to include non-Eritrean anti-Derg organizations. This was intended to offset the regime’s

success in bringing most of the Marxist-Leninist groups under EMALEDIH three months

earlier. What followed was a temporary disengagement as the Derg shifted its concern

towards the Somali threat.

The Tigrean insurgency was in part inspired by the Eritrean insurgency, just like the other

civilian groups which took to the bush in the period. At the core of its ideology was an

intense anti-Shoan sentiment nurtured by real or imagined grievances. The 1955

Constitution, articles 45 and 47, allowed Ethiopians to form any association unless it is

used to incite ethnic and religious dissension and is found harmful to public interest or

decency. In fact this provision did not preclude the formation of political parties. 119

Nevertheless, it was the ethnic organizations which took to the stage in the late 1960s in

118
MoI Files: no number, Eritrea Kifle Hager Tsetita Gudayna Hizbawi Ginbar Harnet Eritrea
Ye’mejemeriaw Gubae Sened(1970EC).
119
The 1955 Revised Constitution, articles 45 and 47.

250
the form of self-help associations. The initial expressions of ethnic dissent and

mobilization among Tigreans brought together a part of the educated elite and the

hereditary nobility, represented by Ras Seyoum Mengesha, in the foundation of a semi-

legal cultural association known as Bahil-Tigrai. This cover organization engaged

teachers and students of the ethnic group in promoting their culture, which was a

reaffirmation of Tigrean identity. It lasted for about a year only. “A weekly newspaper

called Semyenawi Kokeb (Northern Star) was also set up but that closed as well."120

Again the university and the ESM provided suitable forum for mobilizing students and

focusing their concern on the problems of their respective region. The Tigraian

University Students Association (TUSA) that was formed in the early 1970s served as a

contact and coordination center. It linked students with the wider ethnic kins, particularly

with people who could contribute economically and politically to alleviate the problem of

the region. This marked the maturity of Tigrean ethnicism from mere concern with

culture and identity towards some form of organized, but still clandestine, action. “To

broaden ethno-nationalist awareness and reflect on necessary measures, occasional

informative papers like Etek (Get Armed) and Dimtsi Bihere Tigrai (Voice of the Tigrai

Nation) were produced and distributed freely to the people.”121 These activities attracted

many influential members of the ethnic group from various walks of life.

The next step in the evolution of Tigrean ethno-nationalism was the establishment of a

quasi-political organization known as Mahber Gesgesti Bihere Tigrai (MAGEBT) or

Tigraian National Organization (TNO) at the beginning of 1974. This body within a year

120
Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.58.
121
Aregawi, “A Political History,” p.61.

251
transformed itself to Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and started armed

struggle on 18 February 1975 at a place called Dedebit. 122 Originally, TPLF held a

moderate stand on the national question, especially regarding Tigray. It maintained that

its goal was the establishment of a united and democratic Ethiopia where Tigray’s right to

self-determination is respected. This original program was temporarily replaced in 1976

by the so-called Manifesto-68, a hardliner document which advocated the secession of

Tigrai: “የትግራይ ህዝብ ብሄራዊ ትግል ጸረ-አማራ ብሄራዊ ጭቆና፣ ጸረ-ኢምፔሪያሊዝም እንዲሁም ጸረ-ንዑስ ከበርቴያዊ ጠጋኝ

ለውጥ ነው፡፡ ስለዚህ የአብዮታዊው ትግል ዓላማ ከባላባታዊው ሥርዓትና ከኢምፔሪያሊዝም ነጻ የሆነ የትግራይ ዲሞክራሲያዊ

ሪፑብሊክ ማቋቋም ይሆናል፡፡” “That the Tigray people’s national struggle is anti-Amhara national

oppression, anti-imperialist, and anti-petty bourgeois reformism. Thus, the objective of

the revolutionary struggle will be to found a Tigray Democratic Republic free from

feudalism and imperialism.”123 This manifesto is interesting because it outlined the basic

ideology of Tigrian nationalism which still permeates a part of the TPLF thinking.

Particularly for the TPLF, this radical ethnicism had posed challenges on the tactical,

strategic as well as historical and sentimental levels. The advancement of the colonial

thesis for Tigray and the demand for independence from Ethiopia had threatened the

organization’s integrity as a majority of its members found it to be a bogus claim, neither

justified by history nor theory. Perhaps a more pragmatic consideration for its

abandonment was, however, the opposition of EPLF to the matter and the danger of

losing strategic alliance in the insurgency against the Derg. EPLF’s policy of shoving the

colonial thesis down the throats of the Ethiopian opposition first borne fruit with TPLF’s

122
TPLF 1968 Manifesto, p.iv. Aregawi, Ibid, p.46. There was also a short-lived rival organization known as
Tigrai Liberation Front which demanded outright independence from Ethiopia.
123
TPLF 1968 Manifesto, p.18.

252
ready concession in late 1970s.124 TPLF had accepted EPLF’s push for acknowledgement

of Eritrea’s ‘colonial question’ to curry the latter’s favor vis a vis EPRP and other rival

organizations operating in the region. At this time, EPLF opposed rival secessionist

movements for self-serving purposes: not to provide the Derg political ammunition and

the fear that they would blur Eritrea’s distinctive character.125 In sum, Manifesto-68 was

quietly dropped when it faced strong internal skepticism compounded by “EPLF’s

pressure and EPRP’s repeated accusation in the form of a campaign against the TPLF’s

separatist project.”126

A turning point in the TPLF insurgency came when the Derg shifted its concern from the

north to the southeast during the 1977 Somalian invasion. The shift was forced by a

strategic choice to avoid war on two fronts as well as the preferability of conventional to

guerrilla warfare. However, the fact that the Derg had also considered the northern

insurgency as a less threatening internal strife and its difficulty to justify and mobilize

Ethiopians against Eritrea and Tigray seem to have considerable impact on the

decision.127 During this respite the TPLF was able to defeat militarily a rival Tigrean

organization in the region called Tigray Liberation Front(TLF). It also defeated the EDU

and Ternafit (an irregular organization formed by peasant outlaws) and finally chased

EPRP out of Tigray in April 1979. Thus taking control of rural Tigray, TPLF continued

to employ every political and ideological weapon to isolate and antagonize the people

from the rest of Ethiopia. Perhaps the greatest tactical achievement of the TPLF was its

124
John Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and
Pragmatism,” JMAS, 34(1), (1996), p.106.
125
Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, pp.76, 93.
126
Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.198. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, pp. 146, 166-167.
127
MoI Files: No.123.48, Beyaqtachaw Silekebebun Tornetoch Tinat(1970EC).

253
ability to elude the Derg to the last minute and avoid a large scale sacrifice in Tigray,

which would have a negative impact on the struggle.

In general, all ethnic organizations made it a point to attack state nationalism in whatever

forms while they failed to deal with and propose a different view of Ethiopianism. When

the armed struggle against the Derg intensified, ethno-nationalists even condemned

political groups which advocated an inclusive social nationalism as mortal enemies. In

fact, by posing an ethnocentric ideology and propaganda they deemed Ethiopian

nationalism an exclusive ideology of the Amhara. TPLF, like EPLF, OLF and other

ethno-nationalist organizations of the period, subtly encouraged anti-Amhara propaganda.

"Cultural events, theatrical performances as well as jokes and derogatory remarks were

used to disseminate this poisonous attitude."128 It also made the acceptance of what it

called “the realities and implications of Amhara domination” as a criterion for

cooperation. Accordingly, the EPRP and other pan-Ethiopian organizations were

derogatorily known as “Abay Etyopia”(chauvinists who want to establish Greater

Ethiopia) and Tigreans who joined EPRA, the fighting wing of EPRP, were ridiculed as

“Habuy Kurkur”(Big Amhara Dogs). 129 In addition to evoking historical and ethnic

grievances, TPLF exploited the religious grievance of the Muslim community in the

region.

By the time the Marxist Leninist League Tigray (MLLT) was established in July 1985,

the ethno-nationalist position of the TPLF leadership has incurred it a heavy cost. Now,

128
Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.201. Kiflu, Ya’twlid II, pp.138-139, on opposition to EPRP in Wollega.
Merera, Ye’Etyopia Poletika, p.47.
129
Kahssay Abrha Bisrat, Ye’Asimba Fiqir, (Addis Ababa:Far East Trdg, 2005EC), pp. 35, 36,46, 186. Young,
“The Tigray and Eritrean,” pp.113, 119.

254
the reality of separating Tigray while the Derg was at large in the vast territory of

Ethiopia had become very controversial. 130 Hence the secessionist agenda had to be

subordinated to the ‘conquest’ and capture of the Ethiopian state. This led to the

formation of EPRDF in 1990 under the auspices of TPLF, a pragmatic move for

mobilizing other ethno-regional groups against the state. It is undeniable that, besides its

pragmatism, the TPLF decision was according to accepted historical patterns. And from a

nationalist perspective it answered to the deep-lying Ethiopianism of a significant portion

of its members. Whatever the case may be, the fight for the takeover of the Ethiopian

state necessitated a cover ideology. This is where history comes handy in the

advancement of a new, albeit Tigrean, view of Ethiopia and its national survival to

counter the Shoa-Amhara view of history. That will be for the next chapter.

While the Eritrean and Tigrean ethno-national demands have been temporarily resolved,

that of the Somalis and the Oromos still remain at large. The Somali question has

probably been quite different from other nationality issues inside Ethiopia. As noted in

the previous chapter, the problem was part of a wider pan-Somali irredentism and had a

state sponsor. The Somalis consider Ahmed Gran as the predecessor of modern Somali

nationalism as far as erecting for him a statue in the capital Mogadishu. This selective

deployment of the past was an antithesis to Ethiopian national history and ideology.

Hence the threat Somalia posed by claiming a third of Ethiopia’s territory always elicited

strong reaction and sentiment from the Ethiopian state and people.

130
Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean,” p.109.

255
In the first military confrontation between the two rival nationalisms in 1963, Somalia

had been beaten and for a time it had cooled down its aggressive activities. Nevertheless,

to abate the diplomatic hostility between the two nations, the 1973 OAU Heads of States

meeting held in Addis Ababa had formed a special committee composed of eight heads of

states and led by President Yakubu Gawan of Nigeria. 131 The next brazen and

unprecedented propaganda move by Somalia happened in the 23rd OAU Ministers’

Council, which was held in Mogadishu in early June 1974. In the course of this meeting,

Somalia distributed to the participants documents targeting Ethiopia and Kenya.132 Along

with several writings accusing Ethiopia of occupying Somalian territory, there was a

book by the Italian writer Luigi Pesta Loza entitled Somalian Revolution. This book

dismissed as groundless Ethiopia’s accusation about Somalia’s provocative actions in

1973 and rather claimed that Ethiopia was preparing for an imperialist invasion to reverse

the Somalian revolution. Ethiopian delegates to the meeting strongly countered that

Somalia’s action was hostile and contrary to the spirit of the OAU.133

Again in his speech for the 11th Summit of African Heads of States, President Siad Barre

(1969-1991) attempted to present the Ethio-Somalian issue as a territorial dispute

inherited from colonialism. Haile Selassie replied on 12 June 1974 that there was no

territorial dispute between the two countries except issues of some border demarcation.

This diplomatic wrangling continued throughout the 1970s. Until 1977, Somalia did all it

could to create instability in Ethiopia rather than engage in frontal attack. Radical Oromo

ethno-nationalist groups first emerged in alliance or under the tutelage of Somali

131
AZ, 7 Sene 1966.
132
AZ, 4 Sene 1966.
133
Ibid.

256
irredentism. One such organization was the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF),

which was established immediately after the independence of the Republic of Somalia in

1960. After a brief limbo due to Somali state’s withdrawal of support in the late 1960s,

WSLF was reactivated in the early 1970s. In 1973, a splinter group of the Bale rebellion

known as the Ethiopian National Liberation Front(ENLF) emerged claiming to have its

focus on “the liberation of the Oppressed' peoples of Ethiopia, especially the Oromo."134

In 1976, the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) was established to mobilize the Somali

and Oromo of Arsi, Bale and Sidamo and liberate the region to create Greater Somalia.

In addition to providing all-round support to the Eritrean and Tigrean rebel movements in

the 1970s, "the Somali regime also supplied small arms to the urban networks of the

Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and greatly contributed to the urban

terror of the 1970s."135 In early October 1976, Siad Barre publicly accused the Ethiopian

government for cold-shouldering Somalia’s proposal for uniting the two countries under

confederation and expressed his readiness to sign agreement to resolve the territorial

issue between the two nations.136 The Derg, like Haile Selassie, denied the existence of

any territorial question between the two countries and pointed out that it would be

unnecessary to labor to resolve a non-existent problem. The tension between the two

countries escalated when Somalia detained for eight months an Ethiopian Air Lines plane

and its crew on charges of espionage. The Derg appealed to the international community

and denounced Somalia’s role in inciting internal conflicts by arming anti-Ethiopian

134
Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, p.24.
135
Ibid., p.254.
136
AZ, 5 Tikemt 1969.

257
forces. In June 1977, the two countries were embroiled in a seven-months long frontal

war: “Everything to the War Front!”137

The affinity between Oromo liberation fronts and Somalia masked a more serious conflict

of interest between the two. Oromo ideologues repeatedly hint at unity of experiences,

outlooks and objectives with what they generally called ‘the south’, though they were

openly at loggerheads with Somali irredentism. In ethnic terms, the Somalis were known

to be more arrogant and paternalistic towards the Oromos and even had an explicit

ambition over a large part of Oromo inhabited areas in Ethiopia. The Somalis scarcely

hid their intention to occupy and assimilate inhabitants of these territories. “The

realization of that dream would have been a great tragedy for the Oromos...”138 This,

according to Oromo historians, is for two main reasons: that Siad Barre’s regime is no

better than Derg; that Greater Somalia would have turned millions of Oromos and their

territories Somali.139 Since the first insurgency in the 1960s, therefore, there had been

disagreements on what the relationship between the Somali state and each of the Oromo

affiliated organizations would be. There were also internal contradictions between the

Somali and Oromo groups within Somali-Abbo which suggests that, as in the 1960s, the

organizations failed to create a supra-ethnic ideology to effectively mobilize together the

Somali and the Oromo.140

137
AZ, 19 Hamle 1969.
138
Mohammed Hassen, “A Short History of Oromo Colonial Experience, Part Two: Colonial Consolidation
and Resistance 1935-2000,” JOS, VII, 1&2(2000), p.155.
139
Ibid,pp.155-56.
140
Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, p.396.

258
Oromo nationalists considered the suppression of the Mecha-na-Tulama and arrest of its

charismatic leader General Tadesse Biru in 1967 enough reason to intensify the Oromo

cause. Though the organization was formed as self-help and was legally open to all

Ethiopians, it nevertheless exclusively advanced Oromo interests. Its very name was

designed to emphasize Oromo unity and the official Oromo symbol (later adopted by

both the OLF and OPDO) the Odda or sycamore tree was chosen by this association.141

Similar to other ethno-nationalist movements of the period, the initial concern of Oromo

nationalists was the history, language and culture of the ethnic group. After 1963, Oromo

students at AAU had began to form clandestine association and in 1969 a paper named

Kana Beekta (Do You Know?) briefly circulated among the members. 142 This paper,

which had a life of only about a year and half, had the support of prominent Oromos such

as the Reverend Gudina Tumsa, secretary-general of the Evangelical Church of

Mekaneyesus. Then there were attempts to form links between educated and influential

Oromos abroad and inside Ethiopia. The lasting Oromo nationalist group which explicitly

emerged in 1976 as an insurgency against the Ethiopian state was the Oromo Liberation

Front (OLF).143

Oromo nationalists recognized that the most important, perhaps the only, binding element

among Oromo people was their language. Therefore, the movement had been very

conscious of language issues from its inception. Of particular concern in this respect was

141
Olana Zoga, Gizitina Gizot(Addis Ababa:1993), p.19.
142
Mekuria Bulcha, “The language Policies of Ethiopian Regimes and the History of Written Afaan
Oromo:1844-1994,” JOS, I,2(1994), p.106.
143
Mohammed, “A Short History: II,” pp.124,125, 126. By accident or design, the writing of Hirmata
Dubbi follows the Latinization of Somali script by Siad Barre in 1972. Gudina Tumsa was allegedly killed by
the Derg near the university compound in 1979.

259
the adaptation of the Latin alphabet to the Oromo language, later known as Qube. In

1973, the first Oromo grammar written in Latin characters, titled Hirmata Dubbi Afaan

Oromoo, was produced in Europe allegedly by Haile Fida and Mitiku Terfasa.144 During

the period of alliance between the Derg and MEISON the status of Oromo language and

the appropriate characters for it were hotly debated issues. Even in the doom and gloom

of Alem Beqagn, a row had been raised between the Oromo group and the Eritrean group

over the self-teaching of Afaan Oromo using the Qube rather than the Ge'ez script.145 As

co-authors of Derg’s NDRPE and its various policies until the rift in July 1978, members

of MEISON and their followers were disappointed by the regime’s reluctance to

implement a radical language policy.146 This, as discussed above, was one of the reasons

the party withdrew from the Joint Front and went underground while some of its

members who survived Derg’s hunt down, such as Ibssa Gutama, joined the OLF.

Some non-Oromo members of MEISON, notably of Sidama origin, also fled the country

and established separate Sidama Liberation Front (SLF), which was closely allied with

the OLF. "The primary role in organizing the Sidama against the Derg was carried out by

Wolde-Amanuel Dubale, the son of a former Sidama balabbat."147 Even though SLF

never had much material presence on the ground during the entire period, it had been

advancing the ‘Habesha colonialism’ thesis and struggling to the liberation of the Sidama

144
Kiflu, Ya’twlid, p.104, regarding Haile Fida’s Oromo script in Latin. Mekuria, “The Language Policies,”
p.106. Feyissa Demmie, “Historical Challenges in the Development of Oromo Language and Some Agenda
for Future Research,” JOS, III,(1996) 1&2, pp.19, 23.
145
Msmaku, “Modernization and Change”, pp.214-215.
146
AZ, 13 Hamle 1970.
147
Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, p.383.

260
people.148 Other liberation fronts such as the Gambella People’s Liberation Movement

(GPLM), which was established in 1984, had more specific grievances against the Derg.

As the founder of the movement and first president of the region put it: “Rulers of the

Imperial regime had put Gambella under Illubabor Province for their own convenience.

When Derg came, it sold out Gambella for Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement in order

to compensate for the insurrections in Eritrea and Tigray. For this very reason the peoples

of Gambella had lived as second-class citizens in their own land. The SPLM had

committed bloody massacres than the Derg, but the military regime closed its eyes to

such outrages on its own people...The SPLM is the cardinal reason for the problem of

peace in the region.”149

In spite of the fluctuating relationships and often antithetical aspirations between them,

the Sidama, Somali and Oromo ethno-nationalists have attempted to maintain an

ideological unity against the Ethiopian state. Their ideologues advanced the ‘Habesha

colonialism’ thesis and waged vitriolic propaganda against Ethiopian nationalism.

Radical ethno-nationalists do not stop at demonizing an ethnic enemy within the state but

campaign to taint the very name, history, traditions, symbols and values of the nation.

Their favorite terms ‘Abyssinia’ [the country or the state] or ‘Habesha’[the people],

specially to those who like the Oromos, Somalis, and Sidamas consider themselves as

Cushitic, refer to so-called Semitic-speaking conquerors.150 Ethiopia is thus dismissed as

“an artificial unit...” and its sovereign independence is discounted as the “mythology of

148
Seyoum Hameso, “The Coalition of Colonized Nations: the Sidama Perspective,” JOS, V, 1&2(1998),
pp.105-132.
149
Okello Oman, first president of GPNRS, AZ, 1 Meskerem 1985. OI. Okello Gnygelo, second president of
the GPNRS.
150
Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, p.383.

261
Greater Ethiopia.” Ethiopia is not only a local colonizer but also itself a victim of

colonialism. Its state formation is externally induced and it was no exception to the rest of

colonized Africa.151

The actual nationalist politics has always been much more complex than the ideologues

of respective sides would offer. The best illustration for this could be the concept of

Abyssinia for Eritrean, Somalian, Tigrean, and Ormo nationalists. As noted above,

Tigrean and Eritrean nationalists had dilemmas over the historical relevance of this term,

and the often interchangeable term Ethiopia, for their respective groups. Due to their later

reliance on the Eritrean fronts, the term ‘Abyssinia’ also posed a dilemma for Oromo

nationalists, since it supposedly included Tigray and Eritrea too.152 Abyssinian/Ethiopian

colonialism is called ‘settler colonialism’ centered on the neftegna – gabbar relationship.

Sisay had three categories based on the colonial relations in Ethiopia: i. conquered

nations (militarily), the Oromo; ii. annexed nations(politically), Eritreans and Ogaden

Somali; iii. subdued nations, Tigray, identified with oppressor culturally and

institutionally.153

Ethno-nationalists maintained that Ethiopia is a continuing ‘empire’ in spite of the

revolutionary transformations which established a socialist republic during the period of

the Derg.154 Throughout the period, the national question was articulated by all ethno-

nationalists in terms of the old theories of Leninism – Stalinism. For instance, writing in

the hopeful days (1990) and drawing on Eritrean ideologues such as Bereket Habte

151
Sisay, The Invention, pp.93-94. The author draws his major argument from Bereket Habte Selassie,
Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1980).
152
Ibid, p.94.
153
Sisay, Ibid, p.405.
154
Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, p.166. Sisay, Ibid., pp.388, 389.

262
Selassie, Sisay defined the national question as follows: “It is a matter raised by a people

who act together as a unit, usually a people who share a common language, territory,

economic life, and psychological make-up expressed through a common culture.”155 This

Stalinist premise has led to the emphatic assertion of Oromo homogeneity as well as

distinctiveness: “Oromos have always been historically, culturally, and linguistically

different from the Ethiopians”156

While most Oromo nationalists accepted the ‘colonial’ thesis, their solutions to the

nationalities issue were not uniform. There were several sticky points of history and

theory among the various groups and individuals. For moderate ethno-nationalists, such

as Mohammed Hassen, the Oromo are “one of the indigenous peoples of Ethiopia.”157

This school admits the variable historical relations of the Oromos with the Ethiopian state

and even stresses “the importance of and the need for building bridges of understanding

and tolerance between the various peoples of Ethiopia.”158 Mohammed discredited the

mechanical theory of “a ‘pure’ Oromo tribe derived from a single founding father...” and

advanced a dynamic conception of the Oromo peoples in their interaction among

themselves and their neighbors as well as the Ethiopian region.159 Another point which

does not sit well with the colonial thesis is the role of the Oromo in the conquest of the

south. While many denied or played it down as the evil work of a single selfish

155
Sisay, The Invention, p.404. A replica of this quotation in Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, pp. 74-75.
156
Merara Gudina, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-
2000(Netherlands: 2003).
157
Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860 (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1994),
p.95.
158
Ibid., p.96.
159
Ibid, p.98.

263
individual, Ras Gobena, others admitted that the Oromo have a “dual history” of being

both conquerors and conquered.160

Without doubt until the fall of the Derg, Oromia as a territorial entity had no meaning

inside Ethiopia. It was an exile construct. Nevertheless, Oromo nationalists have labored

to forge a name, territory, history, culture and elaborate ideology to that construct. The

first one was the establishment of the collective name Oromo to the target group, a

process which began in early 1970s and was popularized during the Derg period. It is to

be noted that even some prominent Oromo such as Haile Fida used the term ‘Galla’(sic)

in reference to the group, at least in their public statements, and this reference regularly

appeared in the newspapers and other publications in Ethiopia well until 1976.161 The

second claim about the territorial limits of Oromia had remained nebulous throughout the

Derg period though it was defined as a territory in which the Oromos live, often

expressed in the wider sense as the ‘south’ and sometimes including territories inside

Kenya.

The third component was the writing of the history of the Oromos, often as a counter-

discourse to Ethiopian history. In this continuous experiment Oromo nationalists always

noted that their objective was to redress the sinister and systematic plot by the “Amhara
162
ruling class” to destroy Oromo national identity. This endeavor made ethnic

160
For the first view see Tesema, “The Political Economy”, pp. 160, 161; and Mohammed, The Oromo,
p.99. The second view is represented by Merara, Competing Ethnic, (2003).
161
According to Tesema Ta’a, “The Political Economy,” p.8, the term ‘Galla’ was used for the first time in
European sources on Fra Mauro’s 1460 map. Many Oromo nationalists believe that this was a derogatory
reference invented by the Amhara, whereas the variation of the term is used by as different peoples as
the Anywaa (‘Galaa’) and Afar (‘Gali’ or ‘Galaitu’) as a reference to outsiders.
162
Mohammed, “A Short History II”, pp.109-198. Feyissa, “Historical Challenges”, p.18. Mohammed, The
Oromo, p.95. Tesema, “The Political Economy”, pp. 11-28.

264
nationalists adopt a regressive view of Ethiopian politics and history. The most elusive

part was perhaps the elaboration of common culture and national personality called

Oromuma or Oromoness, which is centered on the Gadda system. The OLF had been

most active in the invention of traditions, history and culture to forge Oromuma. It had

sponsored the writing of Oromo history and made learning the Qube a requirement for

fighters.

During the 1980s, the OLF was able to publish literacy and primary textbooks to be used

for its members and refugee children in the Sudan. In the late 1980s, it also launched with

the assistance of the Sudan government a daily radio broadcast called Sagalee Adda
163
Bilisummaa Oromoo (Voice of the Oromo Liberation Front). Its unwavering

dedication to the Oromo cause had made the OLF immensely popular among the

Oromos, even among those who do not subscribe to its secessionist agenda. The year

1984 marked the emergence of Oromo studies as a recognized scholarly pursuit centered

on the identity and nationalism of the Oromo.164 The first comprehensive Oromo-English

dictionary by an Oromo author was also published by IES in 1989. The author frankly,

perhaps with a dose of exaggeration, admits that the writing of the dictionary was a

political act more than a need to address a knowledge gap.165 As we shall see in the next

chapter, the material and ideological preparation of ethno-nationalist forces would bear

practical fruits after the demise of the Derg in 1991.

163
Mekuria, “The Language Policies”, p.110.
164
PTW Baxter, “Changes and Continuities in Oromo Studies,” JOS, V, 1&2(1998), pp. 36, 44.
165
Tilahun Gamta, “The Politicization of My Oromo-English Dictionary: the Writer’s Reflection,” JOS, VII,
1&2(2000), pp.1-18.

265
 CHAPTER FIVE

THE ERA OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

The military regime was discredited internationally and defeated on the battlefield by

ethno-nationalist forces, mainly the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and

Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF); and secondarily the Oromo Liberation Front

(OLF) and other ethno-regional combatants. The three fronts fought to dismantle or, at

best, reconfigure the Ethiopian state and articulated their ideologies instrumentally, in

terms of real or perceived injustices suffered by ethnic groups and the relative historical

and cultural ties to the state. All identified the Ethiopian state with the Amhara ethnic

group and the Shoan aristocracy and leveled their propaganda contextually blending

subtle national-regional-ethnic distinctions. The intelligentsia regarded the struggle on

behalf of respective ethnies as a historical and moral imperative. Economic, political,

cultural and historical grievances were framed in a Marxist-Leninist discourse to

transform ethno-regionalisms into combative ethno-nationalisms.

For TPLF, the ethnic struggle was necessary to redress the manifold injustices suffered

by Tigray due to the historical shift of power and influence to the Amhara elite.

Tigrayans had been economically disadvantaged by keeping the region underdeveloped,

culturally dominated by banning their language, and politically subordinated to Shoans.

By articulating these grievances in terms of historical symbolisms and memories, the

modern intelligentsia ironically championed the struggle of the feudal aristocratic classes.

TPLF claimed that Tigray is the birthplace of the Ethiopian state and its civilization, its

Aksumite origin. Nevertheless, the region’s historical centrality and leading role in the

survival and continuity of the nation has been undermined by Amhara-Shoan rulers in

266
modern Ethiopia. 1 "The neglect of Tigrai in the 1900s until the 1974 revolution was

perceived by many Tigraians as a deliberate and systematic policy of the Showa-Amhara

ruling class to weaken and demoralize them. This view was a reflection of the historical

rivalry between the two ruling houses and the Tigraian and Amhara aristocratic classes.”2

The Eritrean and Oromo ethno-nationalists went beyond the national to the colonial

question, partly to tap the global anti-colonial movement and ideology. They claimed that

Eritrea and Oromia had remained politically and culturally independent nations until their

conquest by Ethiopia/Abyssinia/Habasha. Both blamed Emperor Menelik and the Shoans

as the original source of their predicament. Eritrean nationalists first accused Menelik for

selling them off to Italian colonialism in order to divide and weaken the Tigre-speaking

group. Later again they blamed Emperor Haile Selassie and the Shoans for re-colonizing

an Eritrea decolonized from Italian rule.3 Oromo nationalists similarly argued that the

conquest of Oromia by Menelik was part of the Scramble for Africa and they have been

since under Habesha colonialism. Habesha-Amhara rulers or neftegnya (literally

riflemen) had exploited the Oromo economically, dehumanized them socially, suppressed

and denigrated them culturally and linguistically. Therefore, both the EPLF and OLF

considered Ethiopia as colonizer and fought for the decolonization of their respective

nations.

Who were the Shoans? A number of scholars have attempted to answer this question in

terms of region, religion, ethnicity and class. The straightforward definition is that

Shoans “were none other than Menelik's courtiers, his warrior lords of the south (the apex

1
Aregawi, “A Political History,” pp.45, 50, 51, 56,71.
2
Ibid., p.71.
3
Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, pp. 52, 90.

267
of the neftegna) and their descendants.”4 In contrast to this political-class understanding,

the Shoans are also viewed ethnically as a hodgepodge of various groups who were not

accepted by the Amharas of the north as ‘pure’ Amhara. In fact, contends this view, the

northern Amharas and Tigrayans believed that the Shoans had usurped their legitimate

throne.5 Similarly among Oromo nationalists, walmaka (impure) is the pejorative term for

Shoan Oromos who were considered as thoroughly ‘Amharized’ and complicit in the

empire-making project. As Merara argued, “Orthodox Shoan Amhara elite” is the

embodiment of the trinities of empire creation – religious, regional and ethnic factors.6

The above was the dominant Italian school which depicted Shoan identity in

contradistinction to other Ethiopians. Andargachew, for instance, seems to push the ‘Shoa

versus the rest’ view too far when he suggested that in the early days of the 1974

revolution the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) rejected the question of reinstating the

monarchy because it was supported only by its Shoan members which were in the

minority.7 This is dubitable since the organization was then led by a prominent member

of the Tigrean royalty, Ras Mengesha Seyoum, who, above all others, had a vested

interest in the preservation of the monarchy. What is more, there is little in the EDU

program and action to substantiate the above allegation and, as we shall see later, this

multiethnic organization has throughout maintained a sober view of the nationalities

question.

4
Andargchew, The Ethiopian, p.16.
5
Ibid. Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.71. G. Salole,”Who Are the Shoans?” Horn of Africa, II, 3(1979),
p.27.
6
Merara, Competing Ethnic,p.2.
7
Andargachew, Ibid, p.127.

268
Modern Ethiopian ethno-nationalist discourse converged on Shoa and held the post-

Italian process of ‘Shoanization’ responsible for subordinating both the north and the

south economically, politically and culturally. According to this view, the total overtake

of the state by the Shoan aristocracy weakened not only the traditional nobility of the

north but also severed the bond of loyalty between the government and the people.8 “The

crisis of Ethiopian statehood under Haile-Silassie cannot really be reduced to the north

versus south, nor to the Amhara ruling class (let alone Amhara) versus the rest, but stems

largely from the nature of the Shawan aristocracy itself.”9 Did the identification of the

state with Shoans stop after the demise of the last ‘Shoan’ monarch? No it didn’t! In fact,

anti-Shoanism continued and was even intensified by the various ethno-nationalist

insurgencies which maintained that “[t]he politics of the Darg was a continuation of the

politics of the Shawan aristocracy.”10

The post-Derg period, therefore, witnessed how the above major political currents were

played out conditioned by internal and external contexts. The almost overnight

disintegration of the military regime and the apathy of international mediators to work

beyond the fait accompli were significant preambles to the period. The London peace

negotiation of May 1991 was little more than a winner-take-all affair which negatively

impacted the future of the country. The ethnic insurgencies EPLF, TPLF (now EPRDF)

and OLF dominated both this event and the subsequent Addis Ababa Peace and

Democracy Conference of 1-5 July 1991. After securing the state, ethno-nationalists

8
Andargachew, The Ethiopian, p.16.
9
Adhana Haile, “Mutation of Statehood and Contemporary Politics,” in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried
Pausewang(eds), Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy(London: British Academic
Press, 1994), p.27.
10
Adhana, “Mutation of”, p.28. Bereket, Conflict and Intervention, for similar views.

269
translated their military victory into ideological, legal and institutional hegemony. The

new regime enshrined ethnicity as the governing principle of national life, redefined and

restructured the territory, memory and ideology of the Ethiopian nation. This radical

approach to the national question, its intolerance to moderate views and underestimation

of residual social nationalism characterized the post-1991 period.

5.1 Ethnic Empowerment and Redefinition of the Ethiopian Nation

The Transitional Charter, which not only served as the law of the land between 22 July

1991 and 21 August 1995 but also became a blueprint for the entire EPRDF regime, was

drafted by ethno-nationalists and reflected their radical attitudes towards the fate of the

Ethiopian state and people.11 The preamble to the Charter stated that the military regime

was a continuation of the past while its demise provided an opportunity to refashion the

state anew. The enshrinement of ethnicity as the major principle of political association

became a typical expression of disengagement from the past. As noted in the previous

chapters, both the imperial and the military regimes had seen political ethnicity as a

danger for national harmony. On the contrary, the new regime regarded the

acknowledgement and institutionalization of ethnicity as the ultimate guarantee for

national unity.

The Charter made nations, nationalities and peoples the foundation of the Ethiopian state

and provided for their political and cultural autonomy (Article 2 a & b). This was again in

11
Andargachew, The Ethiopian, pp.328, 335. Hagos Gebreyesus (1995), p.97. Leenco Lata (1998), p.56.

270
stark contrast to Derg’s regional autonomy which bestowed the right on administrative

entities rather than social groups.12 The EPRDF-led regime immediately proceeded to

dismantle the old apparatus and replace it with new institutions. The Boundary

Commission that was set up in August 1991 to determine the structure and composition

of national and sub-national units for the transition period faced many legal and practical

challenges. Though Article 13 of the Charter provided for the establishment of regional

and local administration on the basis of nationality, it did not define what nations,

nationalities and peoples were and how, if and when they desire, they would exercise the

right of independence (enumerated under Article 2c).

This problem was addressed by another bill to establish national regional administration

approved by the Council of Representatives on 14 November 1991. Issued on 12

December 1991 as the National Regional Self-Government Proclamation No.7/1991, this

law rendered nations or nationalities as: “ብሄር ወይም ብሄረሰብ ማለት በአንድ ኩታ ገጠም መልክዐ ምድር

የሚኖር፣ አንድ የሚያግባባ ቋንቋና የአንድነት ሥነ ልቡና ያለው ህዝብ ነው፡፡” This was a far cry from the Stalinist

dogma of the pre-1991 ethno-nationalisms. Based on the definition, Article 3 of the

proclamation identified 63 nations, nationalities and peoples and established them into 14

Kilils (literally closer in meaning to ‘Reserves’). Nevertheless, language became the

ultimate criterion the 10-member Boundary Commission used to carve administrative

regions. This is inevitable as nothing was done to assess popular will and expressions of

common psychological make-up among communities.

Actually, the resolution of the nationalities question in terms of language proved

intractable since very few areas in Ethiopia were linguistically homogenous. The ultimate

12
Transitional Government of Ethiopia Charter, Negarit Gazetta, 15 Hamle 1983.

271
result was composite regions, except Afar and Somali (Kilil 2 & 5 respectively),

containing more than one ethno-linguistic group. Some 48 of the 63 nations, nationalities

and peoples were established as self-governing units at woreda and above levels. The

remaining 17, which were found to have less population than the minimum set for

woreda administration, were represented in their constituencies as ‘minority

nationalities’. Proclamation No.7/1991 further provided that any adjacent self-

government units within the 14 Kilils could voluntarily form larger regional units. This

was a significant improvement on the Charter forced by the limits of ethnicity as a

universal principle, as well as an anticipation of developments in the southern region.

Though neither the Charter nor the proclamation did explicitly determine the structure of

the state as unitary, federal or confederal, what emerged in practice was an ethnic federal

structure.13

As noted above, the Transitional Charter and the subsidiary laws for its implementation

were results of a back door deal orchestrated by TPLF and OLF. The Boundary

Commission was constituted by handpicked individuals representing the interests of a

few ethno-nationalist organizations. Therefore, the outcome of this caucus was bound to

be very much like a postwar settlement. There was little public deliberation on the matter

in spite of the invariable assurance by proponents about the new system’s reflectiveness

of majority interest and its merits in creating ‘strong popular unity’. The principle of

ethnic self-determination upheld by the law was considered as the ultimate resolution of

two antithetical views on Ethiopian unity, i.e, ‘territorial unity’ of the chauvinists versus

13
Fasil Nahom, Constitution for a Nation of Nations (The Red Sea Press: 1997), pp.44-45.

272
‘popular unity’ of the democrats.14 The state propaganda campaign attending the entire

process of transition rather labeled any kind of skepticism regarding the law and its

import as ‘chauvinism’.15 In its initial couple of years, the Derg had been preoccupied

with explaining the merits of Etyopia Tikdem and Hibretesebawinet; now EPRDF was

likewise busy selling the idea of National Regional Self-Government throughout 1991

and 1992.

One immediate consequence of the new paradigm shift was the proliferation of

organizations vying to represent ethno-linguistic groups. A plethora of fronts, movements

and parties formed and reformed often reflecting little more than the political whims of

individual actors. A total of 24 ethnic organizations had taken part in the July

Conference, whereas only 6 pan-Ethiopian and 2 professional associations were

represented. This was determined by the new regime’s discriminatory measures as well

as its capacity to seek out and coordinate pliable ethnic allies in the hubbub of the run

about to the Conference. Within a few months, however, at least two organizations

emerged for every ethnie and began to vie for recognition and power in the idioms of

identity, legitimacy and history. The very ones to be targeted were the original ethnic

organizations which had acquired seats in the Council of Representatives.

For example, in early 1992, a newly-formed Wolayta People’s Democratic Organization

(WPDO) mobilized residents of Areka town and the surrounding peasantry to denounce

the Wolayta People’s Democratic Front (WPDF) as an agent of the past regimes. 16

14
AZ, 3 Tir 1984.
15
AZ, 1 Tir 1984.
16
AZ, 23 Tir 1984.

273
Similarly, the Sidama Liberation Democratic Organization (SLDO) leveled

incriminations at existing political organizations on behalf of the group including the

Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM).17 The Somali and Oromo regions were the most

contested, where multiple contenders came out to haggle for political space. In extreme

cases, no less than nine political groupings were established in the name of various

Somali clans. Those vying to represent the Oromo were equally fragmented on the bases

of region, religion as well as ideology. The Oromo Unity Liberation Front (OULF), under

the erstwhile leader of the Bale rebellion Waqo Gutu, claimed that it was the oldest

organization fighting for Oromo freedom. Now in the intra-ethnic race to win the hearts

and minds of the Oromo people, the record of the former Western Somalia Liberation

Front (WSLF) and whose interest it had been advancing was being questioned. The

OULF argued in self-defense that despite the malicious rumors it had always been an

autonomous Oromo organization and nobody’s agent.18

Characteristically, the nationalities issue was not limited to a political controversy over

the spoils of government but even led to inter- and intra-ethnic debates over territory,

history, identity and legitimacy across the north-south divide. Some of these were low-

toned dialogues such as the overlapping identity of Irob – Saho. On the one hand, there

was the view of those who considered Irob as the group’s name and reserved Saho for a

language family spoken by the Irob and other neighboring groups. Others contended that

17
AZ, 27 Tir 1984.
18
AZ, 1 Ginbot 1984.

274
the name of the ethnic group was Saho while Irob referred to the land in which the Saho

lived.19

There were also more radical claims to recreate separate identities from an overarching

one. The Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF), for instance, was accused of

merging two peoples (Somali and Oromo) with distinct settlement patterns, cultures and

life-styles. According to the splinter Gurgura Liberation Front (GLF), the decision to

detach Gurgura from the common front with Issa was passed in a December 1991

meeting held at Dire Dawa town by members of the group and their traditional leader. A

forerunner of Silti ethnicism also began to mobilize pressure in 1992 against the Gurage

People’s Democratic Front (GPDF) and other organizations formed in the name of the

Gurage. As we shall see below in more detail, this was originally a political bid claimed

on the basis of separate linguistic-cultural identity for a people called the Gogot.

A slightly different case from the above, but still based on ethnic and historical claims,

was that of the three woredas of Wolqayt, Tsegede and Humera. These had been historic

parts of north and northwestern Gonder, now merged with Region One (Tigray) on

linguistic grounds. Public representatives of the three areas opposed the demarcation as

inconsiderate to the culture, sentiment, economic and social ties of the people. Their

appeals to regional and federal authorities, including the Council of Representatives, the

President’s and PM’s offices, were rejected for allegedly being inspired by EDU

propaganda. Similarly, the merging of Metema, another historical part of Gonder, to

19
AZ, 20 Miazia 1986. AZ, 4 Ginbot 1986.

275
Region Six (Benishangul-Gumuz) was contested by residents. In both cases, TPLF’s

decisions were influenced by concerts of strategic, economic and historic calculations.20

The 1994/95 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was

an elaborate affirmation of the basic ideas of the Transitional Charter. Federalism based

on ethno-linguistic units became a permanent contrast of EPRDF to those of previous

Ethiopian regimes. The Constitution accorded ultimate political sovereignty to the

nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. This was not a united popular sovereignty

but a composite sovereignty of the national groups. Ethiopia became a ‘nation of nations’

and was structured accordingly: “States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement

patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned.”21 The outcome of this

provision was in the main a solidification of the transitional structure by transforming

numbered Kilils to explicitly titular ethnic Kilil Mengistat (Regional States) named after

their dominant groups. These entities were then recognized as mini-states with elaborate

trappings of government, including separate constitutions, working languages and flags.

“Members of the Federation may by law determine their respective working

languages.”22

The right to secession (Article 39.1) was the most radical outcome of ethno-politics and

the one which made nationality rights a highly controversial part of EPRDF measures.

The regime defended this anachronistically Leninist position as the only way to establish

trust among the peoples of Ethiopia. However, in spite of its ideological justifications,

there was no way the regime could have excluded this right after endorsing the
20
Tobia, 21 Sene 1986.
21
The FDRE Constitution, Chapter IV, Article 41, No.2.
22
Ibid., Chapter I, Article 5, No.3.

276
independence of Eritrea (23-25 April 1993 referendum). What the FDRE Constitution did

to offset the disintegrative potential of the secession clause was build into the system as

much procedural encumbrances as possible. As the linchpin of EPRDF’s ideology of

governance and legitimacy, however, the right to self-determination constituted

interrelated aspects of territory, history, culture, language and government. In other

words, it was about a broad spectrum of cultural and political empowerment.

One of the very first decisions of the Transitional Government regarding nationalities

rights was on the use of their language for educational instruction. The Council of

Representatives decided on how to provide primary education in the mother tongue on 10

October 1991. A body called the Coordinating Committee to Oversee Translation, Study

and Evaluation Project, “የትርጉም ዝግጅት ጥናትና ግምገማ ፕሮጄክት የበላይ አስተባባሪ” was established to

facilitate the implementation. In its meeting held on 26 January 1992, the Committee set

a guideline that “regarding social studies, the curriculum must be consistent with the

spirit of the charter denouncing the previous system, while consolidating the equality and

spirit of coexistence of peoples, nations and nationalities.”23

The Coordinating Committee selected five nationalities’ languages to commence primary

education in the mother tongue for the 1992/93 academic year. The government did not

trust the job of preparation of educational materials for political parties but invited

professionals throughout the country. However, this matter sparked controversy even

before the preparation was off the ground. Especially in the south, the nomination of

Walaytigna elicited stiff reaction. Politicians of other ethnic groups such as the Gamo

23
AZ, 17 Tir 1984.

277
complained that the peoples of the region had not been consulted about the conduct of the

process and the fact that imposing Walaytigna on others would be endorsing Walayta’s

oppression on them, allegedly like in the Derg period.24

Now this was not merely about linguistic issues, as groups under the Omotic family were

mutually intelligible and considered as dialects. Neither was it about workability, since

Walaytigna had precedent as a language of literacy during the Derg period. This was

rather about ethnic boundary and prestige, a symbolic expression of defiance aggravated

by the existing political atmosphere. Some among the opposition conceded that the

project could work, but if so the name of the common language should be changed to

Gamugofigna or Omigna.25 This original conception would lead later to a grand attempt

at creating a unified language called the ‘Wogagoda’ from an acronym for Wolayta,

Gamo, Gofa and Dawro(the major ethnic groups in the region). In 2000, the fiasco from

this experiment led to a serious ethnic conflict which resulted in the creation of three

separate zones in the region – Wolayta Zone, Dawro Zone and Gamo-Gofa Zone. The

new education policy approved by the Council of Representatives in 1994 limited mother

tongue education to primary level mainly due to the high resources and preparation it

demanded.26

Another important aspect of the language policy was the determination of script for the

various groups, which beyond intrinsic pedagogical and linguistic merits evoked

widespread political and symbolic elements. The OLF was the first to implement such

24
AZ, 10 Sene 1984.
25
Ibid.
26
AZ, 9 Miazia 1986.

278
right by convening a public meeting on 3 November 1991 at the Parliament Building in

Addis Ababa. In addition to previous experience during the insurgency, the front had

already introduced literacy in afaan Oromo by using Latin script in the areas it controlled

following the demise of the military regime. Therefore, the meeting was only to

emphasize the historic significance of the issue. Following this formal endorsement,

Qubbe became the alphabet of work and education throughout Oromia. During Ibssa

Gutama’s tenure as Minister of Education (September 1991 to June 1992) textbooks were

prepared and teachers crash-trained in Qubbe phonetics. Mother tongue instruction at the

primary level fully commenced from the new academic year in September 1993.

Interestingly, the issue of adopting a script was not a simple ethnocentric choice but took

roughly the Semitic-Cushitic divide. In a public discussion regarding the preparation of

script for the Hadiya language, held at Menelik II School in January 1992, the advocate

of Qubbe, Dr Tilahun Gamta from the Ethiopian Languages Studies, was guest speaker

on the merits of Latin in contrast to the Sabean (Geez) alphabet. The participants of this

meeting recommended for further studies to be conducted on the suitability of Latin for

Hadiya language.27 Nevertheless, many languages of the Cushitic family, such as Hadiya,

Kambatta, Sidama, Gedeo, Afar, Nuer, Somali and others, adopted the Latin alphabet

with little popular consultation or consent. This issue proved to be persistent. In May

2003, the Benishangul Gumuz regional bureau announced its decision to use Latin for

writing the Berta language. Even as late as 2011, Tigray region itself faced mounting

Kunama pressure to adopt the Latin script.

27
AZ, 16 Tir 1984.

279
Whatever differences there were on the pedagogical and philological aspects, ethnic

entrepreneurs were unanimous on the political merits of linguistic autonomy. “The

struggle the Oromo have made for self-determination has started to payoff. They have

adapted the Latin alphabet to their language without fear of incrimination.”28 This was a

laudatory measure not only for its intrinsic value but also: “The development of the

Oromo language would, in the 1990s, mark the beginning of the end of Amharic

expansion at least in Oromia.”29 As Seyoum Hameso argued in a wider context, besides

being united by the quest for freedom, justice and democracy the “...Cushitic nations are

bound by ethnicity and cultural affinity. There is no readily available reason why all the

Cushitic-speaking nations should remain subservient to alien rule.” 30 The process of

Latinizing is perhaps the single most important testimony to the role of a numerically

small intelligentsia in shaping the identity and destiny of the ethnic group.

A direct outcome of the ethnic arrangement was an obdurate choice between assimilation

and eviction for non-indigenous groups which were included or found in other regions or

zones. Their ethnic rights were circumscribed by retroactively depriving them of the right

to work, be judged and learn in their own mother tongue. They became an ‘internal

diaspora' who suddenly found themselves excluded from the politics of their areas. Even

in regions which have made Amharic working language, such as Southern Nations

Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS), Gambella Peoples’ National

Regional State (GPNRS), or even Waag-Himra Special Zone, the move was considered

28
Tilahun Gamta, “Qubbe Afaan Oromo: Reasons for Choosing the Latin Script for Developing an Oromo
Alphabet,” JOS, I, 1(1993), pp.36, 38.
29
Mekuria, “The Language Policies,” p.111.
30
Seyoum, “The Coalition of”, p.125.

280
as a temporary strategy pending the development of local capabilities. This was

witnessed in the abortive Wogagoda experiment in the southern region in 2000

mentioned above. In the Amhara Regional State, the Waag administration had adopted

Amharic as a 'temporary strategy' in line with the policy objective of government. "By

1999 educational materials in Himtanga had been developed for school grades 1 to 4, and

the following year it was introduced in grade 5."31 Meanwhile, zonal authorities made the

teaching of Himtanga for government workers and other residents compulsory.

Language was only one aspect of the symbolic assertiveness, or even sometimes an

expression of symbolic revenge, against a real or perceived oppressor. The wider

reclamation of ethnic history and culture led to a return to the values and ways of the

ancient pristine community in every aspect of life. The initial period witnessed en masse

name change of ethnic politicians, to some extent the common people, from Amharic or

Amharic-sounding to local languages. The Oromos were quick to search for authentic

ethnic names while the Tigreans and Eritreans initially retouched some names such as

‘Sisay’ to ‘Shishay’, ‘Kassaye’ to ‘Kahssay’, etc. This was also considered as a symbolic

freedom from the lifelong weight of Amhara names. Place names as well were rectified

and reclaimed, for instance Alemaya to Haro’maya, Nazareth to Adama, Debre-Zeit to

Bishoftu, Illubabor to Illu abba’bora, Awash to Hawas and Awassa to Hawassa, even

Addis Ababa to Finifine, etc.

In some cases, attempts to estrange ethnic groups from Ethiopia were multifaceted, for

instance like adopting the Gregorian calendar and referring the Ethiopian one as ALH or

31
Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power”, p.244.

281
Akka Lekofss Habasha (according to the Habasha Calendar). It was during this period

that public celebrations of Gadda ceremony as well as the annual Laga Horra or Irrecha

feast at Bishoftu were reinitiated as moments of ethnic communion. “The resumption of

the celebration of the Gadaa tradition fosters public appreciation for Oromo cultural,

political, and social heritage.”32 Another case in point was the Sidama, who revitalized a

native ideology based on Sidama sky god; Sidama truth or Halale; and age-old national

sentiment or Aydu Ayana. The major Sidama holiday and its New Year festivities or

Fiche Chambalala was considered as a day of no work in the zone, even though there has

been no claim to make it a national holiday.33

The Management of Ethnic and National Demands

The cardinal justification for the right of nations to self-determination was the belief that

it would bring sustainable popular unity based on equality and trust. The regime defended

its record by pointing out that there has never been a single demand for secession so far.

Many argued, however, that ethnic federalism and ethnic politics has proliferated

communal dissension and violence at lower rungs of the state structure to an

unprecedented level. Hence, rather than consolidating national unity it has been further

weakening social and historical bonds at the grassroots. If there was a superficial show of

unity, it had been forced by strict political, structural, and fiscal control by the federal

government. It is important to see some instances highlighting the management of ethnic

and national issues at various levels: ethnic or local, regional and national.
32
Admassu Shunkuri, “The Influence of Abyssinian (Ethiopian) Political Culture on Oromo Nationalism and
Rebellion,” JOS, II, 1&2(1995), p.66.
33
AZ, 1 Megabit 1986.

282
Generally, political mobilization in terms of ethnicity and the added promise of the

Charter as well as the Constitution to “redress regional prejudices” were recipes for

communal conflict. “Appeals to ethnic sentiment in political elections based on ethno-

regional constituencies were a facile avenue to state power. Under these conditions the

growth of ethnicity was assured.”34 The ruling coalition, EPRDF, also had its share in

escalating the strife by creating the so-called PDO’s (People’s Democratic Organization,

the common name for its satellite organizations) to undermine independent ethnic parties.

This was a calculated risk designed to maintain the regime in power, though EPRDF had

little safeguards against the wastefulness of political fragmentation and duplication or for

controlling primordial dissensions going astray.

An unprecedented policy of beating up ethnic tension from above and simultaneous rising

expectation from below characterized the incumbent regime. In his speech on the

occasion of Eritrean independence celebrations in 1993, then President Meles said in

Tigrigna “Do not scratch your wounds, we will not scratch ours!”35 He did reverse this

reminder in Ethiopia. In his televised meeting with Somali elders, clan representatives

and members at Harar in February 1994, Meles assured the audience that the Somali had

been forced to become Ethiopians a century ago and now there is no way that should be

repeated. There were also high profile agitations and inflammatory speeches by state

officials, such as Tamrat Layne in the Somali region, Tefera Walwa and Addisu Legesse

in the Southern region, publicly giving state endorsement to ethnocentrism and anti-

34
Okudiba Nnoli, Understanding Ethnic Conflicts in Africa (1998), p.21.
35
Ruth Iyob, “The Ethiopian – Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991-
2000,” JMAS(2000), p.679, quoting Hadas Eritrea(1993).

283
Ethiopianism throughout the transition period. EPRDF’s favorite metaphor to Ethiopian

unity was a “marriage contract” to be dissolved anytime by any of the signatories.

The early period was particularly propitious for the expression of spontaneous and

organized ethnocentrism. Various ethnic organizations attempted to exploit the

transitional instability to incite respective groups by reopening historical wounds. In

Gambella, the entire Nuer ethnic group fled to the Sudan during the power vacuum in

1991-1992. The Gambella People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM) initiated a terror

campaign by killing, looting and intimidating Nuer communities to flee across the

border. 36 The longtime resident Gurage people in Dilla town were attacked and their

properties looted during this chaotic period. The Gedeo People’s Revolutionary

Democratic Movement (GPRDM) was later founded in a conference held at Dilla town

(3-5 January 1992) promising peace and security for other ethnic groups living in the

area. In 1994 again the ‘ ’ mobile drama team was mobbed at Dilla town by

Gedeo youth who were allegedly infuriated by the theatre’s ‘chauvinist’ message.

The most flagrant and systematic dissension campaign was carried out by ultra-ethnic

Oromo activists, at the forefront of which were the OLF. In January 1992, the OLF

organized a commemorative ceremony for the ‘martyrs of Anole’, the ‘massacre’

committed by Emperor Menelik 106 years ago.37 OLF ethnic propaganda was so much

engrossed in giving precedence to ‘blood’, even to language, as the quintessential

criterion of Oromoness so that it sometimes tended to have a racist tone. It went as far as

36
Tewodros Hailemariam, “Gambella: a History of Integration of the Periphery,”(AAU: M.A. thesis in
History, 1997). Dereje Feyissa, “The Experience of the Gambella Regional State”, (Osaka University: no
date), pp.10-11.
37
AZ, 1 Tir 1984.

284
making distinction between full-blooded and half-blooded Oromos. This ideology of

blood was sometimes employed in intra-Oromo infighting, for instance, labeling OPDO

as Oromo-speaking naftegna, or Shoan Oromos as ‘walmaka’, etc. 38 The primordial

politics of the day also had far more dangerous implications for all Amharas and other

northern groups resident in Oromia, who were now labeled as descendants of the original

naftegna conquerors and hence accountable for their fathers’ sins.

For instance, an Oromiffa weekly named ‘Mede Welabu’ aired such extremist ideas as

opposing the assignment of Amhara and other non-Oromos in the regional civil service.

The Orthodox Church and its followers were not spared from the identity politics of the

period, especially so in the southern regions. Organizations such as the OLF explicitly

denounced Orthodox religion as only appropriate for the neftegna.39 Even an intra-Oromo

conflict between Protestant and Orthodox followers was considered as a neftegna plot to

set brothers against each other.40 In many places in the southern and peripheral regions

‘ke’kililachin yiwtulin’ (out from our region) became a convenient slogan. In fact, this

extremism seemed to threaten the very fabric of society and the viability of the system if

pushed too far. The Oromia regional authorities countered that eviction and

discrimination were a violation of constitutional right and they would continue to appoint

all Ethiopian citizens except in the judiciary. Some even argued that ultra-exclusiveness

was an individual agenda which conflicted with the traditional hospitality of Oromo

people.41

38
AZ, 28 Ginbot 1984. Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power,” p.221.
39
OI: Shiferaw Muleta, personal communication.
40
AZ, 8 Miazia 1986.
41
AZ, 15 Miazia 1986.

285
The transition period was a time of soul-searching for the Amharic-speaking people

which, above the frameworks of the local and regional identification (as Ye’wenze lij) and

below an overarching Ethiopian sentiment, seemed to lack experience in a middle level

pan-ethnic identification. One of the most publicized dialogues of the early EPRDF

period was “on the existence of the Amhara nation!” In a 1992 televised debate between

then president Meles Zenawi and Professors Mesfin Woldemariam and Andreas Eshete,

Mesfin brought up an argument that there is no single homogenous nation called

Amhara.42 This was in a sense a continuation of Mengistu’s historical analysis in the last

hours of the Derg, stating his finding about the meaning of Amhara as “a people living in

mountainous region.” The standing argument against the coalescence of the Amhara

under an ethnic party was that “Amhara is an all-Ethiopian nation. It is a nation which

should not be dispossessed of its Ethiopian sentiment. To do this will only pave the way

for the disintegration of the country. Therefore, the Amhara should not be restricted to a

primordial party and separated from other nations and nationalities.”43

Nevertheless, the theoretical subtleties regarding the identity of the Amhara could not

stem the external ascription and violence engendered by ethno-nationalism in the period.

Now all native Amharic speaking people could not escape their Amharaness, and, if they

attempted to resist by asserting Ethiopian identity, they were subjected to harassment.

Again this took spontaneous as well as institutionalized forms. While all other ethno-

nationalist forces within EPRDF gave lip service to Marxist class solidarity and worked

to consolidate vertical ethnic bonds, the regime systematically divided up the Amhara

42
In fact, Mesfin seems to retract his original argument in his 1994 book Etyopia Keyet Wedet.
43
AZ, 10 Tir 1984. Getachew Haile, Ye’Amaraw Hizb Tarik(Amara Man’new?), Washington DC, 30 May
1993.

286
into ‘chauvinist’ and ‘oppressed’, and a new addition was ‘hodam’, classes to weaken the
44
group’s solidarity. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (EPDM), or

sometimes criticized as the Amharic department of TPLF, was the institutional face of

this policy.

The sidelining and exclusion of the Amhara was a major hiatus in the transition process,

though EPRDF argued that the allotment of 10 seats in the Council of Representatives for

EPDM (in par with TPLF and OPDO) was to safeguard Amhara interest. Neither its

name nor its deed confirmed that claim until EPDM began to champion the ‘oppressed

Amhara’ cause in late 1991. “ኢህዲን… የአማራው ህዝብ እንደ ብሄር በአማራነቱ፣ እንደ ህዝብ ደግሞ በጭቁንነቱ መለያ

መደራጀት አለበት ይላል፡፡ ለዚህ ሲባልም ጭቁኑን አማራ ከጨቋኙ አማራ የሚለይ ብሄራዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ድርጅት ያስፈልገዋል

ይላል፡፡“ “EPDM maintains that the Amhara people should be organized as a nation on the

basis of being Amhara and as a people on the basis of being oppressed. For this reason, it

deserves a national democratic organization which distinguishes the oppressed Amhara

from the oppressor Amhara.”45 Accordingly, EPDM introduced its agenda by hosting in

December 1991 what it called ‘Oppressed Amhara Nation’s Peace Conference’ in Bahir

Dar city. This body later changed its name to the Amhara National Democratic

Movement (ANDM), though it was from the very outset considered as a stooge of TPLF,

just like the other ethnic PDOs.46

The irresponsible and vindictive politics of the transition period, not an anomaly but a

continuation of insurgency propaganda, led to the death and destabilization of many

44
AZ, 18 Sene 1984. AZ, 18 Miazia 1986.
45
AZ, 1 Tir 1984.
46
AZ, 27 Sene 1984.

287
hundreds of Amhara in Asebe Teferi, Bedeno, Weter and many other places in the

country. The most glaring was the Araba Gugu massacre orchestrated by top government

officials, Hassen Ali (then Oromia chief), Hussien Adem, Dima Gurmessa(whose real

name is Captain Welde Senbet Gurmessa) and Kuma Demeksa. 47 Such tragedies

precipitated the establishment of the All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) on 23

January 1992. According to its president, the late Professor Asrat Woldeyes, the overt

and covert attacks which then gained a TPLF blessing had their origins during the Italian

invasion in 1935-1941. 48 AAPO has remained an object of EPRDF subterfuge and

harassment throughout the period.

Oromo nationalism has been another major contentious issue throughout the EPRDF

regime. Although a number of organizations had claimed to represent the interest of the

Oromo people, OLF was generally believed to be the only one enjoying wider popular

support in the region. It had decades’ long history of struggle and a better military and

organizational capability than its rivals. The disagreement between TPLF and OLF

started on the eve of the demise of the Derg when the former created in 1990 a rival

Oromo organization in OPDO. The OLF believed that this action would undermine the

Oromo question and opposed it seriously. In addition, due to the inferiority of its military

might in contrast to EPLF and TPLF, the OLF was not seen as an equal player in the

transitional power arrangement.49 Ironically, the political tension between the two fronts

47
Msmaku, “Modernization and Change”, pp.269-270. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Etyopia Kyet Wedet?(Addis
Ababa: Gurmayle Publishers, 1986 EC), p.25.
48
AZ, 10 Tir 1984.
49
Assafa Jalata, “The Oromo: Change and Continuity in Ethiopian Colonial Politics,” JOS, I, 1(1993), pp. 17,
18, 19. Mohammed, “A Short History II,” pp.153-54.

288
further escalated by the so-called colonial thesis to which Oromo nationalists adamantly

stuck even after victory over the Derg.

In an agreement signed between the two organizations on 26 September 1990, both OLF

and TPLF had identified their priorities. The OLF decided to agitate for national identity

and independence of the Oromo while letting the issue of unity with other peoples

emerge from future cooperation and trust building. The TPLF countered that in the event

the oppressive state is dismantled and peoples’ interests were safeguarded, it would be

mutually beneficial for all sides to work for democratic unity. On the issue of the right of

self-determination, both agreed that “. . . the exercise of the right shall be through a

democratically held referendum and the choice of the concerned people either to form

their own state or join with others in a union shall be respected."50 One of the cardinal

concerns of the July 1991 Conference was outlining the principles for resolving issues of

right of self-determination to dependent peoples.

Thus, the real test of EPRDF’s commitment to national self-determination emerged in the

very first year of transition. Though OLF considered the Charter a partial victory, it was

not at all satisfied with its secondary position in the government as well as the increasing

erosion of its regional power through OPDO. The June 1992 elections were the climax of

the rupture between EPRDF and OLF. In his public radio and TV address on 19 June

1992, then president Meles accused OLF of disrespecting the agreement to keep its

army in barracks by deploying them in fighting positions. In response, OLF boycotted the

emergency meeting of the Council of Representatives held on 20 June 1992. What is

50
Abiyu Geleta, “OLF and TPLF: Major Issues and Outcomes of a Decade of Negotiations since 1991,” JOS,
X, 1&2(2003), p.69.

289
more, members of the front who held ministerial posts in the Transitional Government

submitted letters of resignation to the Prime Minister on 22 June 1992. On the next day,

OLF wrote a formal letter to the Council of Representatives announcing its withdrawal

from the Council and the Government. It claimed that the withdrawal will disqualify the

integrity of the Transitional Government; hence OLF will no more consider itself bound

by decisions emanating from this body.51

After the withdrawal of OLF from the Transitional Government, talks were held in

Asmara in September 1992 at which “TPLF made OLF’s commitment to unity a priority

agenda. Third party mediators also pressed OLF to accept unity of the Ethiopian

peoples.” 52 All attempts in the period between 1993 and 1998 failed to bring peace

because of the uncompromising stand of the two parties. However, in 1998 some OLF

members showed tendency to accept the above preconditions in order to break the

deadlock. Towards the end of the 1990s, a new leadership of the OLF moderated its

demand for political separation and advocated a compromise regional autonomy solution.

This meant EPRDF was to admit that Oromia had been colonized whereas OLF was to

abandon its unconditional independence agenda. Mohammed Hassen’s statement is

representative of this view: “I believe, what is needed is the decolonization of Oromia

through the devolution of real power to the Oromo.”53

In fact, government repression in the Oromia region had been severer than other regions,

as also testified by Human Rights Watch and other international and local organizations.

51
AZ, 19 Sene 1984.
52
Abiyu, “OLF and TPLF”, p.81.
53
Mohammed, “A Short History II”, p.180.

290
However scanty the military presence and capability of OLF were, as it had been unable

to recuperate since the 1992 debacle, it seems to enjoy some sentimental hold among the

youth and educated section of the ethnic group. The EPRDF had been bent on uprooting

OLF from the region so that it incriminated the organization for sabotages and explosions

on public utilities. It also waged intensive propaganda campaign against the front as a

terrorist organization. In the late 1990s, the regime cracked down on members of the

reestablished Metcha’na Tulama Association and the Oromo Human Rights League.54

Both organizations were closed in 2003. In spite of occasional rapprochement between

OLF and EPRDF-TPLF, therefore, the prospect of unity in equality seems still bleak.

While the Amhara and Oromo issues concerned the two major ethnic groups and their

places in the overall national apparatus, most others were of localized and regional in

character. One episode of ethnic struggle which demonstrates the protean nature of

ethnicity and nationalism was the protracted Gurage-Silti question. The Gurage region is

roughly categorized into three main language zones - namely northeast, middle and

southwest. If these three zones were to be strictly viewed by linguistic criteria, they

would be further divided into 17 parts. The Gurage People’s Democratic Front (GPDF)

was formed in 1991 to represent a united Gurage and claimed to struggle any divisive

54 th
Statement submitted by The Advocates for Human Rights(AHR), to the 48 session of the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 30 April – 18 May 2012, pp.2,7 notes: “The
Government of Ethiopia actively impedes the rights of disadvantaged ethnic groups to self-
determination(Article 1). For example, individual Oromos and Oromo non-governmental organizations are
often assumed to support the Oromo Liberation Front – an organization the Government characterizes as
a terrorist group – unless they actively express support for the ruling party. These alleged OLF ties are
used to justify arrest, firing, expulsion from school, and confiscation of property.” Birhanu Nega,
Ye’Netsanet Goh Siqed (Kampala: M.M. Publishers, 1998 EC), p.22, eyewitness account about the majority
of the inmates of Qaliti State Penitentiary being Oromos suspected of affiliation with OLF. Mohammed,
“A Short History II,” p.165. Berhanu Gutema Balcha, “Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in
Ethiopia,” (PhD Dissertation in DIR: Alborg University, 2006), pp.227-229.

291
tendencies and forces.55 The Silte, originally Gogot, question was born in the attempt to

form a pan-Gurage organization but started to occupy public attention in 1994.

Coordinated by a diverse group which named itself the Silti, Azernet Berberi, Alicho

Werero, Mesqan, Melga and Welene Gedebano Democratic Organization (SAMWGDO),

it demanded that the chair held by GPDF in the Council of Representatives in the name of

the Gogot should be returned to the Gogot nation! The Silti politicians took issue with

GPDF’s conception of identity hierarchies, that Silti=‘gosa’, Gurage=‘biher’, then

Etyopiawinet.” They argued: “Menelik called us ‘Kembatta’, Haile Selassie ‘Gurage’, the

Derg continued same, the Hadiya ‘Gende’, whereas the Gurage ‘Adiya’. However, our

people called themselves as ‘Islam’ or ‘Silti’.” They claimed that the two peoples are

different in history, language and culture as the Silti traced their origin from the eastern

part of the country, specifically the Harari, while the Gurage are of northern origin. They

also labeled GPDF’s attempt to maintain Gurage unity as ‘zemenawi timkhitegnet’.56

The issue which originated as a demand for zonal representation escalated into public

pan-ethnic conflict in 1994. The political organizations in the name of the Silti people

had their first chance of testing public support in the elections for House of Peoples’

Representatives and regional councils held on 7 May 1995. Six years later, in a

referendum held in April 2001, the Silti were able to achieve a separate zonal

administration from the Gurage and a direct access to the national resources. This was

perhaps a classic example about the active creation of ethnic groups and ethno-

55
Tobia, 10 Yekatit 1986.
56
AZ, 21 Megabit 1986. AZ., 25 Megabit 1986. AZ, 5 Miazia 1986. AZ, 25 Ginbot 1986. AZ, 13 Miazia 1987.
AZ, 20 Miazia 1987. AZ, 4 Ginbot 1987.

292
nationalism by a determined elite acting primarily in self-interest. 57 The selective

appropriation of history; drawing support from linguistic and other anthropological

studies eclectically; the emphasis on cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries; the self-

perception of a separate identity and self-name; the articulation of real or perceived

political oppression and economic injustice either by the Gurage or the central

government or in concert; and capitalizing on current political atmosphere – all these

were involved in the Silti question.

The Gambella Peoples’ National Regional State (GPNRS) was another example which

shows how regional, national and even international issues impact the evolution of

ethnicity and nationalism. In general, Gambella regional politics evolved through three

overlapping phases. The transitional phase, 1991 – 1995, in which Gambella People’s

Liberation Movement (GPLM) single-handedly ran the region, was marked by poor

governance, misappropriation of public resources and escalation of ethnic conflicts

especially between the two dominant groups, Anywaa and Nuer. GPLM was established

by Anywaa dissidents back in 1983 to fight against the Derg.58 On the fall of the military

regime in 1991, the movement assumed uncontested control of Gambella and radically

transformed the political balance between the various groups.

Like any other neighboring people with different socio-cultural practices and lifestyles,

Anywaa and Nuer communities had a long history of ethnic integration, cooperation and

conflict. Together constituting about 80 percent of the total indigenous population in the

region, the relationship between the Anywaa and Nuer has always been vital to regional

57
Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power”, p.265.
58
Okello Oman, AZ, 1 Meskerem 1985.

293
peace and stability. During the second-half of the 20th century, the traditional systems of

maintaining ethnic balance were challenged by events such as natural disasters, regime

changes, the Sudanese civil wars and the unprecedented refugee influx into the region.

The Anywaa harbored increasing resentment against the Nuer who enjoyed a favored

position as woreda and awraja administrators during the Derg period. In addition to this,

the Anywaa had serious grievances against the depredations of Sudan Peoples’ Liberation

Army (SPLA) which had many Nuer members in its ranks. Therefore, at the fall of the

Derg entire Nuer communities in Gambella were forced to flee to the Sudan in fear of

reprisal by the Anywaa.59

When the Nuer began to repatriate seeing a modicum of peace and stability in the region,

they found themselves totally excluded from the political apparatus. Therefore, they

formed in 1992 the Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Union Party (GPDUP) to regain

political space in the region. Now the traditional rivalry between the two groups assumed

modern institutional forms sanctioned by the new regime. On 18 March 1994, the GPLM

was transformed into Gambella Peoples’ Liberation Party (GPLP) partly pressurized by

the federal government to accommodate regional demands. The party also elected 23

permanent and 4 alternate members to its central committee, the latter to represent the

minority communities(Opuo and Komo) in the region. The conflict between the Anywaa

and Nuer, further escalated in the 1995 regional elections. Though the two parties had

agreed to work jointly through the regional council, the ruling GPLP created obstacles to

59
Oral Informant: Samson John, former speaker of the GPNRS Council.

294
GPDUP while the latter retaliated by preventing GPLP members from running in Jikawo

and Akobo woredas.60

Mark Chuol Jewik, a Gambella Nuer, reminisced that he was elected as Deputy to the

Ethiopian Parliament four times up to 1969 by both the Nuer and Anywaa peoples.

During the Derg period he had served in various posts, as woreda and vice awraja

administrator, as advisor for Gambella affairs in Illubabor region and also as advisor in

Illubabor affairs in the Ministry of Interior. In the heat of the Anywaa – Nuer ethnic

rivalry in 1994/95, he was accused of and convicted for conspiring to detach Gambella

and join it with the Sudan. He observed that what currently emerged in Gambella was an

ethnic-based tussle between GPLP and GPDUP, which will eventually go down to the

people unless solutions were sought immediately.61 The Anywaa were afraid that Nuer

bid will erode their hegemony. They even sacked their leader Okello Oman in 1995 for

being submissive to external pressure and for accommodating other groups’ interests.

However, Okello was reelected president for second term due to the support from

highlanders and the Nuer.

The EPRDF intervened to bring about some accord between the five ethnic groups in the

region: the Anywaa, Nuer, Majangir, Opuo and Komo. In its first convention on 10 July

1995, the Gambella Regional Council decided on the region’s flag, language, and

capital.62 It also allotted one seat for each of the minority Opuo and Komo groups and

agreed to give them direct representation in the council’s executive committee as they

would not be able to win elections due to the size of their populations. The conference

60
Tobia, 24 Ginbot 1987. AZ, 12 Tir 1986. AZ, 7 & 10 Megabit 1986.
61
Tobia, 24 Ginbot 1987. AZ, 2 & 9 Sene 1987.
62
The legal basis for this was the 1995 Constitution, Chapter I, Article 3, No.3 and Article 5, No.3.

295
also approved a power-sharing formula for top executives by electing an Anywaa

president, a Nuer vice-president and a Majangir chief secretary/ later speaker/.63 In 1996,

the Gambella regional state acquired its own constitution, similar to other regions issued

from the center, which provided a legal basis for the establishment of self-government

and proportional representation for indigenous groups in the regional and federal

structure (Chapter II, Article 30, No.3). It also stipulated that regional political

arrangement should take into consideration the democratic relationship between the

nations, nationalities, peoples and political forces in the region (Chapter V, Article 51).64

The second phase in the dynamics of Gambella ethno-politics commenced with the

FDRE election in 1996 and continued until the TPLF infighting in 2002. This was a

period of unprecedented escalation of controversies over the manner of Nuer

participation, mapping ethnic zones and power sharing. The Nuer intensified their

demand for a fair political, social and economic representation in the region. Highlanders

in the region, though hardly represented in the political structures, initially had direct

influence through their votes and indirect pressures. This period witnessed a growing

disaffection between the regional and federal government, mainly due to the latter’s

unconstitutional highhandedness on the pretext of streamlining regional parties along

EPRDF lines. Okello Oman once again found himself in the political crossfire; thus in

1997 he landed in prison on charges of corruption.

The rivalry between the Anywaa and the Nuer, however, continued through the regional

political apparatus as well as the civil service. This was a too common problem the

63
AZ, 5, 11 & 15 Hamle 1987.
64
The 1996 GPNRS Constitution. Regional constitutions were adopted in June 1995 and revised in 2001.

296
EPRDF regime faced among what it called allied organizations. In August 1997,

therefore, the federal government conducted a series of conferences in Benishangul,

Somali, Dire Dawa, Afar and Gambella regions aimed at evaluating performance and

resolving outstanding issues of corruption, inefficiency and proliferation of ethnic

conflict. In the same month regional representatives were invited to attend the occasion of

unity between four political organizations in Benishangul Gumuz. Similar efforts in

Gambella had been going on for a year to create a united front between the GPLP and

GPDUP.65 In particular, the Gambella Peace, Development and Democracy Conference,

held between 10 and 22 August 1997, criticized the two parties for distancing themselves

from the people and negatively contributing to ethnic conflicts of the region. At the end

of the Conference, a united organization named Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Front was

established.66

This period also witnessed the transformation of elite politics into grassroots ethnic

violence. The federal government attempted to stem this tide by bringing the contending

parties under GPDF. The Federal Affairs Minister also appointed its own ‘advisors’ to the

region who became de facto bosses until the split within TPLF. The period saw

unprecedented escalation of ethnic conflicts as the Nuer vied for a dominant position in

the regional leadership arguing that they had larger population than the Anywaa. They

also demanded for a fair resource allocation to Nuer woredas as well as the reconstitution

of the administrative structure which allotted more kebeles to Anywaa woredas than Nuer

ones, even though the latter had larger population size. The emergence of other rival

ethnic parties in the fray, Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Congress(GPDC January 1999,

65
AZ, 4 Meskerem 1990. AZ, 16 Megabit 1990. AZ, 13, 29 & 30 Nehassie 1990.
66
Reporter, III, 34/139, 26 Miazia 1990. AZ, 17 Meskerem 1990.

297
Anywaa) and Gambella Peoples’ Democratic Union(2000, Nuer), further escalated inter-

ethnic tensions and became a hurdle for the creation of a common political space; the

division even started to go down to the common people.67

The third phase, from 2003 on, was a period of restructuring and overhaul of the parties

starting in November 2002. GPLP was reconstituted as Anywaa People’s Democratic

Organization (APDO) consisting of Anywaa and Komo. GPDUP was reformed as Nuer

People’s Democratic Organization (NPDO) consisting of Nuer and Opuo groups. The

Majangir People’s Democratic Organization (MPDO), a new party for the third largest

group, was established from Majangir who were formerly members in Anywaa and

Nuer parties. Then the three PDOs were joined in a common front named as Gambella

Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM). This was a very intricate process which has

done little to alleviate the inter-ethnic strife in Gambella regional state. After 2002, the

conflict between the two major rivals, Anywaa and Nuer, spread among the rural

communities. The traditional conflicts were localized and ignited by cattle raids and

trespassing of grazing areas. Now these transformed into pan-ethnic violence and came to

include urban areas. If a Nuer is a boss in a government post, the Anywaa did not take

orders and vice versa.68

As the above four cases illustrate, ethno-national demands for empowerment during the

EPRDF period took various forms. These represent three categories in scale and
67
AZ, 26 Tir 1991.
68
OI: Chan Gatluak, Nuer, vice-chairman of Jikawo woreda at the time of interview on 14 Miazia
1995(22/4/2003) at Jikawo. Group discussants: John Riek Nihal, Moses Gatkuoth, Watga Gatdeth,
interviewed at Teilut on 15 Miazia 1995(23/4/2003). For strikingly similar developments on the Borana of
the borderlands see Belete, “Agrarian Polity”, pp.384, 445, 450, 451. His conclusion also works too well
for Gambella region, p.449: “My major argument here is that rather than lead to political stability, ethnic
federalism as practiced in Borana had further increased political instability and economic uncertainty. The
policy had intensified local contest over land and political power.”

298
objective, national like that of Amhara and Oromo, local or regional like that the Silti and

Gurage or the Anywaa and Nuer respectively. The accommodation also varied according

to the magnitude of the problem and the threat it posed to the regime’s political integrity.

EPRDF might have taken genuine steps to the resolution of the national question.

However, its insecurity emanating from the narrowness of its TPLF base often overrode

the proper accommodation of ethno-national demands. What the regime granted

constitutionally, it took away by the imposition of rigid central control through elaborate

party and parastatal apparatus.

Perhaps an outstanding fact in the intricate political brinkmanship of EPRDF was the

representation of the nationalities rights to self-determination as antithetical to Ethiopian

unity and identity. Timkhit and tebabinet were now contextually defined, if and when

they did not specifically refer to the Amhara or Oromo, to mean feelings of superiority or

sectarianism respectively. For instance, the Harari considered the Oromo claim to ‘their’

region as timkhit whereas the intra-Harari division along clan lines is dubbed as

tebabinet. The Silti labeled pan-Gurage sentiments as zemenawi timkhit, whereas intra-

Silti localism was tebabinet. Similarly, the conflict between various ethnic groups in

Gambella or Benishangul and between different clans in Somali or Afar regions was

referred as tebabinet.

Like its predecessors, or perhaps in a more profound manner, EPRDF attempted to

control and define national political space and dialogue. It directly or indirectly

controlled the mass media, attempted to regiment the entire civil service and manipulated

educational curriculum in its own ideological image. Higher Education Proclamation

No.351/2003 provides a special protection to academic freedom. In practice, however,

299
"all levels of education are politically influenced. This practice violates the right of all

ethnic groups and people of all political views to receive education." 69 EPRDF has

launched vast indoctrination and conscription activities in colleges, universities and high

schools.

In the entire political drama federal government attempted to operate from backstage and

maintain a semblance of ethnic or national autonomy. If zemecha (campaign) had been

the key term expressing the Derg, an even more apt term for EPRDF would be

koreta(diversion). The period also saw the expression of rival conceptions of popular

history, as well as a reinterpretation of Ethiopian history along ethnic lines. Even among

professional historians, an ‘Oromo’ view or ‘Gojjame’ view was taken for granted. In the

heyday of nationalism, the battle between opposite ideological fronts was fought on the

fields of history.70 It was a classic example of the relationship between the power regime

and the knowledge regime.

History, Memory and Power

In war or peace nationalists fought for the hearts and minds of the people and in this

endeavour history became the handmaiden of embattled nationalism. During the

insurgency, TPLF and other ethno-nationalists embraced a compartmental view of history

69
The Advocated for Human Rights, “Ethiopia: Violations of the rights of the disadvantaged ethnic groups
protected by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” a statement submitted
th
to the 48 Session of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 30 April to
18 May 2012, p.24.
70
Tobia Magazine, Year I, No.1, 1984. See Mohamed Hassen, The Oromos of Ethiopia (1994), and Teshale
Tibebu, The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974(The Red Sea Press: 1995) for the respective Oromo
and Gojjame views of Ethiopian history. Adhana in “Mutation”, p.15, also snides Tadesse Tamrat’s
interpretation as ‘Shoan’: “...an eminent Ethiopian historian from Bulga(in northern Shawa)”.

300
based on radical ethnicism. Over and above the skepticism towards Ethiopian history in

general, this ideology conceded little beyond ethno-history. In 1992, then President and

Chairman of EPRDF and TPLF, Meles Zenawi, famously proclaimed that Aksum is

nothing for the Walayita and Lalibela is nothing for the Anuak (sic). This seemed a

logical assertion to ethno-nationalists given their fresh military victory over state

nationalism. Again it was a grave miscalculation regarding the depth and magnitude of

Ethiopianism which haunted the regime throughout the period.

The assumption of a role as defender of the sovereignty and integrity of Ethiopia

demanded an ideological framework accommodating the apparently incompatible roles.

The necessity of an Ethiopian face to the regime demanded a rival historical narrative,

one which cut to the ruling group a distinctive niche in the national past. After a brief

spell of ultra-ethnicism, therefore, the TPLF-led government started to search for an

appropriate historical legacy and legitimacy. It shifted from total rejection of the past to

selective use of the past. It attempted to span the ethnic as well as the national aspects of

history, still with an inherent proclivity to the former. The new official ideology called

‘revolutionary democracy’ attempted to marry residual Marxism with traditional

ethnicism.

Interestingly, TPLF’s alternative narrative and justification seemed to replicate the age-

old aristocratic rivalry of feudal Ethiopia. By reinvigorating an anti-Shoa/Amhara

propaganda, which incriminated the group as cause of the destruction of Ethiopia, TPLF

ideologues arrogated to themselves a new mission as saviors of the nation. The regime

hailed what it called the new politics of “to be” (revolutionary democracy) as an

301
antithesis to the former politics of “not to be”, i.e., to “chauvinistic nationalism and a

nationalism of withdrawal” plus everything in between. The latter “are the offshoots of

the politics of the Shawan aristocracy (old and new).” Both “share the same thought

patterns and frames of mind: hate and exclusiveness.” “...Both work to complete the task

the Shawan aristocracy left unfinished: the disintegration of Ethiopian statehood.”71

The EPRDF cast its roles and achievements in favorable light while it subtly

undercommunicated or debunked what it regarded as a history of Amhara regimes.

Aksum featured as an exclusive symbol of Tigray’s historical legacy and a goading star

for Ethiopia’s future. In a February 1992 interview to Addis Zemen, Fitawrari Amede

Lema, a veteran member of the imperial parliament who was at the head of a 1967

motion for the repatriation of Aksum obelisk, reminisced Haile Selassie’s tacit opposition

to the move. Amede noted that the Emperor overrode the decision by a joint committee of

both houses (Hig Memria and Hig Mewesegna) demanding him to suspend his visit to

Italy until the obelisk was returned. 72 When EPRDF later revived diplomacy for the

repatriation of this historical relic, the state media played down similar efforts during the

Imperial and Derg periods. The Derg attempted to restore history to the masses whereas

EPRDF wanted to give it to the ethnic groups.

The occasion of Adwa Centenary in 1996 provided another instance of seeking historical

legitimacy. Originally the regime’s tentative decision to host the national

commemoration in Adwa town was retracted due to strong public reaction. As a

compromise measure, therefore, twin celebrations were held in Addis Ababa and Adwa.

71
Adhana, “Mutation of”, p.28.
72
AZ, 29 Tir 1984.

302
The ethnicization of history and memory became more explicit with the retrenchment of

the regime after the 2004 elections. The ruling power portrayed itself as the ‘Renaissance

Generation’ and traced its roots to the ancient civilization of Aksum. Radio and TV

documentaries propagated that Aksumite equality and freedom in Ethiopia had been

interrupted by the intrusion of Amhara feudalism between the 13th and the 19th centuries.

In fact, the ruling style of Emperor Yohannes IV was uniquely regarded as federalism,

endorsing the Tigrean leadership’s legacy of democratic values. The repatriation and

erection of the Aksum obelisk in 2010 was also presented as the quintessence of revival

of Tigrayan power and glory.

Besides its eclecticism, EPRDF’s general lack of concern for the national past and the

worth of history as an academic discipline seem unprecedented. In the early period, all

expressions of national history and culture were unceremoniously dismissed from public

forums as well as school curriculums. The regime substituted Yekatit’66 Political School

by the Civil Service College in 1995 to produce a new breed of cadres and middle level

functionaries. It replaced Political Education by Civic and Ethical Education to infuse its

ideology through the national educational system. At the tertiary level, common courses

on Ethiopian history and geography were replaced by composite courses such as Civics

and Social Studies (containing history, geography and civics). Ethiopian history was

redesigned in line with the new emphasis on nations, nationalities and peoples.73 At all

educational levels, the very title of the subject/course was changed to a wider ‘Ethiopia

and the Horn’ and the specific reference ‘Ethiopia’ was substituted in textbooks by a

more general and vaguer ‘Ethiopian region’. Though the course title ‘Ethiopia and the

73
Mesfin, Ethiopia Ke’yet Wedet, p.14, recalls how two TPLF cadres came to the university at the outset
of the regime to instruct the staff with the new version of Ethiopian history.

303
Horn’ was originally introduced by the AAU Department of History, its adoption to

lower educational levels was in line with the governing ideology of the regime.

For much of the EPRDF period, regional education bureaus produced their own texts and

teaching materials often reflecting an ethnic version of history. Similarly, other relevant

bodies such as Culture and Tourism or Youth, Culture and Sports bureaus were

responsible for the promotion and preservation of regional culture, history and heritage.

This decentralization has undeniable merits in the opportunities it created for self-

government and empowerment, for drawing concern as well as material, financial and

human resources to sub-national and local values, institutions and traditions. Although

susceptible to propagandist and unscholarly abuses, one positive outcome of the post-

1991 period was the forum it opened for public and dialogue and research endeavors on

ethnicity, nationalism and their political and cultural implications. This was a period

when ethnic studies became a vibrant industry.

In tandem with global and national paradigm shifts, Ethiopianist scholarship entertained

vigorous calls by social scientists that preferred the ‘emic’ approach in ethno-history to

the ‘etic’ methods of historians. As argued by Ivo Strecker: “Ethiopia offers great

opportunities for ethno-historical studies today, or perhaps I should say it demands them,

for there are still many people who want to tell their history to the world and by doing so

assert their identity and their position within the wider Ethiopian orbit.” 74 The 13th

International Conference on Ethiopian Studies(ICES), held in Kyoto in December 1997,

was themed “Ethiopia In Broader Perspective” to reflect the shift from center to

periphery, from national to ethnic concerns. Generally, in the main professional Ethiopian

74
Ivo Strecker,”Ethno-History and Its Relevance for Ethiopian Studies,” JES, XXVIII, 2(1995), p.48.

304
outlets such as JES and ICES, there was similar gravitation towards ethnic and peripheral

issues. In some emerging universities, autonomous regionalist institutes were opened,

such as the Southern Studies Institute in Dilla University (2007), later renamed as the

Institute of Indigenous Studies, to rival the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES).

An outstanding testimony to flourishing ethnic scholarship was the emergence of Oromo

studies and the publication of its bi-annual journal, Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS),

since 1993. It is an index to the stage of Oromo nationalism that it has been engrossed

with the rediscovery, reconstruction and propagation of the history, culture and tradition

of the national community. At the forefront of this endeavor are historians, sociologists,

anthropologists, linguists/philologists, etc., though historians are highly represented.

According to a prominent Oromo historian, Oromo intelligentsia must play roles at all

phases of the collective attempt to carve a niche in the past, to justify the nationalist

struggle and give credibility to the ethnic view and ideology. “Educated Oromo have a

national duty to argue for the self-determination of Oromia. They have also the moral

responsibility to articulate the Oromo yearning to live in unity, harmony and peace with

the people of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.”75 An instance of such radical vein is the

attempt by scholars, notably Assafa, Sisay, Mohammed and Ezekiel, to historicize the

colonial thesis in their recent works.76

75
Mohammed Hassen, on a review of Assafa Jalata’s book, Oromia in Ethiopia, JOS, I, 2(1994), p.119.
76
Mohammed Hassen, “A Short History of Oromo Colonial Experience, 1870s-1990s: Part One: 1870s to
1935,” JOS, VI, 1&2(1999), pp.109-158. Also: “A Short History of Oromo Colonial Experience: Part Two,
Colonial Consolidation and Resistance:1935-2000,” JOS, VII, 1&2(2000), pp.109-198. Ezekiel Gebissa, “The
Lesser of Two Evils Paradigm of Colonial Rule: A Comparative Study of Colonialism in the Sudan and
Ethiopia,” JOS, VIII, 1&2(2001), pp.1-33.

305
The major problem in the above development has been the lack of a healthy balance

between ethnic and national perspectives. The political context tended to underscore

every gain for the former as a loss for the latter. However, ethnic closure and disregard to

commonalities and overarching bonds would be inimical to the national interest of the

Ethiopian peoples. Perhaps a widespread and damaging outcome of this particularistic

attitude has been the ongoing destruction of collective memory and heritage in the

country. In times of crisis and upheaval, the main targets of organized and mob

vandalism and larceny have been such institutional and material repositories as cultural

and historical artifacts, relics, buildings, works of art and archives. In the history of the

nation, this had happened countless times whenever certain groups, localities and

regions rose up against central or local administration. In the more recent periods, the

internecine war between insurgents and the state had destroyed official archives in

conflict zones.

Transitional lapses such as the 1974 revolutionary upheaval and the demise of the Derg

in 1991 were particularly notable for nation-wide vandalization of official documents. In

addition to spontaneous occurrences, the lack of proper legal and institutional care goes

very far to threaten the nation’s historical memories. As argued above, the process of

obliterating history seems to be ideologically justified in the current political system,

which has condemned everything that reminds of the past. Neither the federal

government nor the regions have provided clear policy and appropriate institutional

dispensary for official archives. This is notwithstanding to the fact that the regime had

promulgated Proclamation No.209/2000 on Research and Conservation of Cultural

306
Heritage in place of a similar provision of the Derg Proclamation No.36/1989 for the

Study and Protection of Cultural Heritage.

The EPRDF issued Proclamation No.209/2000 after a decade of foot-dragging partly in

response to civic and professional pressure. The law scarcely refers to archives as worthy

of conservation as its definition of heritage is inclined to cultural assets of the nations,

nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.77 The Authority for the Research and Conservation

of Cultural Heritage founded by this proclamation is based in Addis Ababa and has so far

been inactive in the various regions. Again the National Archives and Library Agency,

which has been reestablished in 1993 by Proclamation No. 179/1993, is totally

dysfunctional outside Addis Ababa. Ethno-politics and its institutional and legal

interpretation in federal structuring have particularized history. The Cultural Policy

adopted in 2004 seems to put the onus on ensuring the recognition, respect, preservation

and conservation of the languages, historical and cultural heritages, fine arts, oral

literatures and other features of nations, nationalities and peoples. There is no good

history to be cared for but localized ethno-histories which were counterpoised to national

meta-history. Even the Ethiopian National Museum has been relegated to an insignificant

department because, in the words of its former boss Ahmed Ugaz (Afar), there is nothing

so-called ‘biherawi’.78

In the reigning ideological, legal and institutional confusion, Ethiopia is losing its

historical witnesses which are the unique features of the country in the continent. The

77 th th
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 6 Year, No.39, 27 June 2000. Proclamation No.209/2000.
78
Oral Informant: an official in the Authority for the Research and Conservation of Cultural Heritage,
interviewed in Addis Ababa, September 2012.

307
impact of this state of affairs on the care and preservation of not only of archives of the

relative past but also current official documents can be observed throughout the

country.79 Cases in point can be the Gambella Regional State and the Amhara Regional

State. Though these widely divergent localities were selected from first-hand experience,

it is evident that the same goes for other regions and localities. The pre-1991 Gambella

archives, only a tiny portion of which were salvaged from destruction during the early

1990s, have been dumped to rot in a junk room in the Regional Council compounds.80

Likewise in the Amhara Regional State, the localities I endeavored to survey, such as

Dangella, Anjebara and Finoteselam, have virtually lost the entire pre-1991 documents.

Whatever extant archives there were had been carelessly abandoned in an underground

cellar of the old Tsehayu Enquselassie residence at Debre Marqos. More recently, there

has been a salutary effort on the part of Debre Marqos University to rescue these archives

by housing them in its compound.81

5.2 The Resurgence of Pan-Ethiopianism

The military victory of ethno-nationalism did not mean the resolution of the national

question or the ultimate defeat of Ethiopianism. Force has never been a good solvent to

deep-rooted historical and social problems. Unfortunately, what has been seen in the

post-1991 period was a reversal of roles between primordialist and unification

79
Oral Informant: Laekemariam Aemro, Debre Marqos, representative of Historical Affairs, Zonal Culture
and Tourism Bureau.
80
I have witnessed this on more than two occasions, while doing my M.A. research in 2004-6 and now
after four years in my Ph.D. project.
81
Oral Informant: Alemu Alene, history department, Debre Marqos University.

308
nationalisms, as EPRDF underestimated the depth of social nationalism (Ethiopianism) in

the same way the previous regimes failed to understand the persistence of ethnic

identities. Aregawi argued that since its inception in the ESM, the national question has

been distorted and used opportunistically. This had derailed the effort to find a genuine

solution to the question to date. Its analysis could then help to unravel the continuing

engagement between state, social and ethnic nationalisms and shed light on the behavior

of political actors “such as the MLLT/TPLF who seem to be bent on redefining popular

demand and exploiting grievances to promote a desire for power.”82

From the outset, the EPRDF demonstrated a willingness to employ ideology for self-

serving pragmatism. In 1991, it went to considerable lengths to resurrect and prop up

weakened ethnic insurgencies such as the WSLF and ONLF. It did not show similar zeal

towards peaceful pan-Ethiopian organizations such as the EPRP and MEISON. The effort

to create every possible obstacle against multiethnic groupings, while sponsoring the

formation of ethnic organizations, narrowed the political foundation of the new

government and led many to doubt its sincerity for meaningful political reform. A part of

the problem emanated from the nature of TPLF, the narrowness of its basis, its political

highhandedness and opportunism. "By taking over the ethnic agenda, the EPRDF has

been able to keep other key issues out of the political limelight."83 By presenting itself as

the champion of oppressed nations and nationalities, the EPRDF effectively sidelined

pan-Ethiopian social nationalists and denied rival ethno-nationalists, especially the

Oromo and Somali groups, an exclusive identification with the ‘south’.

82
Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.193.
83
Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: the Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000(Bergen:
Christian Michelsen Institute, 2002), p.47. Mesfin, Ethiopia Ke’yet Wedet, pp.11-24.

309
Hence, opposition to the regime came from both ethno-nationalist and multiethnic

quarters. Some emerged in an effort to counter the divisive and domineering pressure

from predator groups such as the EPRDF and its surrogate PDOs. Western Somalia

Liberation Front (WSLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) agreed to form

a united organization in 1992. Democratic Unity Party (DUP) was another Somali

organization which expressed its major aim as being “to create peace and unity among

Somali ethnic groups, to accept the equality and freedom and peaceful coexistence with

other neighboring peoples, and to stand with other democratic forces for the sovereignty

of the country.”84 The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Abo also agreed to

collaborate to stem the increasing pressure from EPRDF/ OPDO, before the ultimate

withdrawal of the former from the Transitional Government in July 1992. The two Afar

based organizations, Afar People’s Democratic Organization (APDO) and its

predecessor, the seat-holding Afar Liberation Front (ALF), also agreed in June 1992 to

work hand in hand for the peace and interest of their people within the Ethiopian

framework.

Other oppositions arose as a reaction to the regime’s policies and their impact on the

national interest, unity and destiny of the Ethiopian peoples. One factor should be noted

in order to fully understand the characteristics of the TPLF-led regime. That is, a

secessionist trait lingering from its past among the hardcore Marxist-Leninist League

Tigray (MLLT) members sitting at the helm of power. "In spite of TPLF claims to the

contrary, it is likely that the document [Manifesto 68] did represent the thinking of

important elements within the leadership at the time it was written, and that it continued

84
AZ, 11 Yekatit 1984.

310
to reflect significant political currents in the leadership." 85 Even among the ethno-

nationalist sympathizers, EPRDF’s readiness to sacrifice Ethiopian interest became clear

after the mishandling of the Eritrean issue and the collateral loss of an outlet to the sea.

The Derg’s accusation of TPLF as ‘asgentay’ appeared to hold true though the TPLF

couldn’t have stopped it even if it wanted to.

Still others gradually hardened after observing TPLF’s partiality to its regional and ethnic

base, the regime’s apparent lack of sincerity towards the resolution of the national

question as well as the flagrant abuse of state power by political actors. Even its former

allies deplored the use of the federal structure as a facile device for economic and

political control, and as a means to divide and dominate other ethnic groups, especially to

sow dissension between the Oromo and Amhara.86 Now it was TPLF’s turn to be accused

of ‘Tigreanization’ of the political and economic structure of the country.

The early 1990s were a period of intense hostility against pan-Ethiopian forces variously

labeled as ‘chauvinists’, ‘Dergists’, ‘monarchists’, etc. One observer explained the

atmosphere thus: “Today all history is considered as fabricated history. The unity stand is

considered as basically anti-democratic. To argue for unity is regarded as a design to

oppress the people and to obstruct the attempt of each community to know itself. When it

is said that one official language is necessary, it is denounced as a desire to destroy

others’ languages.”87 When on 18 July 1991 the then chairman of the Afar Liberation

Front (ALF), Hamfre Ali Mirah, declared that the Afar have come to the July Conference

85
John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991(Cambridge
University Press: 1997), p.99. Aregawi, “A Political History”, pp.186, 187, 199, 200(fn), 201.
86
Dima, “Contested Legitimacy,” pp.170, 196, 197. Aalen, Ethnic Federalism, p.93.
87
AZ, 25 Yekatit 1984.

311
because they believed in Ethiopian unity, it became stunning front page news. Few

thought that support for Ethiopian unity would come from the least expected quarters at

the most unlikely of times.

While the transitional period promoted the proliferation of ethnic and identity claims at

the local level, it also saw the development of new identification and loyalty at higher

level, particularly in the southern region. In a Peace and Development Conference held at

Awassa that brought together 45 ethnic groups and five regions from 7th to 11th May

1992, it was decided to merge the seven autonomous units into one united regional state

in accordance with Proclamation No.7/1991. This was a pragmatic decision not only for

administrative efficiency but also for the more urgent task of stopping the rampant ethnic

conflict and bloodshed orchestrated by the OLF, Oromo Islamic Liberation Front (OILF),

Sidama Liberation Front (SLF), and Gedeo People’s Democratic Organization (GPDO)

and others in the region.88

Tamrat Layne, then Prime Minister, turned around the implication of the decision as

proof that the self-determination up to secession logic is working, and that voluntary

unity is the model for future Ethiopia. Even though the amalgamation of the seven

regions into SPNNRS was an unexpected regional initiative, its relative success and the

smoothness in which ‘debubness’ entered into national identity discourse was

surprising. 89 The southern region immediately became a bulwark of Ethiopianism and

confirmed that it was and will remain an integral part of Ethiopia. In March 1993, the

Kembatta People’s Congress (KPC) issued a historical analysis entitled “Kembatta

88
AZ, 5 Ginbot 1984.
89
AZ, 13 Miazia 1986.

312
be’Giragina be’Oromo Inqsiqase Zemen” which argued that Kembatta and other southern

regions were part of medieval Christian Ethiopia.90

In the early 1990s, there were also widespread efforts to rally the forces of unity both

inside and outside the country. Following the unification of the southern region, the ten

political organizations with parliamentary seats formed a coalition named the Southern

Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Union (SEPDU). In Europe conferences to link the

domestic and diaspora opposition were held in Bonn in November 1992 and in London

on 10 March 1993. The Paris Peace Conference ‘On Ethiopian Peace’, held between 10

and 12 March 1993, notably passed a decision calling for the convocation of ‘a peace and

reconciliation conference’ to amend the wrongs being done by the Transitional

Government (TG). What made the Paris Conference different was the participation of

SEPDU thus sparking a public row between the regime and opposition groups in

parliament. The Council of Representatives demanded the ten coalition members of

SEPDU to explain their actions which allegedly contravened the charter they accepted.

The tension escalated when the Council attempted to divide the SEPDU by apparently

conflicting measures. On the one hand, it released a statement to the effect that half of the

coalition, namely Kembatta People’s Congress (KPC), Gurage People’s Democratic

Front (GPDF), Wolayita People’s Democratic Front (WPDF), Burji People’s Democratic

Organization (BPDO), and Kaffa Peoples’ Democratic Unity (KPDU), have escaped

punishment by conceding their mistakes and rejecting the decision of the Paris

Conference. On the other hand, it decided to oust the other half, the Sidama Liberation

90
AZ, 14 Megabit 1985.

313
Movement (SLM), Omotic People’s Democratic Front (OPDF), Hadiya National

Democratic Organization (HNDO), Yem People’s Democratic Movement (YPDM), and

Gedeo People’s Democratic Organization (GPDO), from parliament effective from 1

April 1993 allegedly for persisting to abide by the general decisions of the Paris

Conference. 91 However, nine of the above organizations jointly protested against the

Council’s deliberate misrepresentation of their stands, adding grievances such as the

Transitional Government’s lack of transparency in handling the upcoming Eritrean

referendum. The GPDF similarly objected the Council’s falsification of its views as if the

front had opposed the Paris decisions.92

In March 1993, the EDU also issued a statement urging a balanced view to the

establishment of sustainable peace in the country. “ኢትዮጵያውያን ተረግጠዋል፣ ተገዝተዋል፣ ተዋርደዋል፣

ተንኳሰዋል የሚለው አመለካከት በአንድ በተወሰነ ብሄረሰብ ወይም ኃይማኖት ላይ ብቻ የደረሰ በደል አለመሆኑን ለመቀበል መዘጋጀት

ዋና የሆነ የመተሳሰብና ተከባብሮ የመኖር መሰረትን ለማምጣት የሚያስችል ቀጥተኛ የሆነ መንገድ ነው፡፡” “That to be

prepared to accept the view about Ethiopians being suppressed, oppressed, denigrated

and dehumanized is not an injustice perpetrated on a single specific nationality or religion

is the direct road to bring tolerance and coexistence.”93 The EDU urged multinational

organizations to let all Ethiopians, regardless of language, race, religion, region and

culture, participate equally in the economic and social affairs of the country and live in

mutual agreement and love. Some of the multiethnic organizations, which were

signatories of the transitional charter, expressed similar hope that they would work within

91
AZ, 25 Megabit 1985.
92
AZ, 5 Miazia 1985.
93
AZ, 7 Megabit 1985.

314
the given parameters to disseminate their ideas and counter the threat posed on the unity

and integrity of the nation.

The Ethiopian Peace and Reconciliation Conference, held in Addis Ababa from 18 to 22

December 1993, was another major attempt to pressure EPRDF to be more inclusive in

the political process. About 70 organizations, including 6 which held seats in the

transitional Council, were represented in the conference. As the tenure of the TG was to

expire on 22 January 1994 , the conference concluded by establishing a Peace and

Democracy Alternative Forces Council(PDAFC), commonly known as Amarach

Hayloch, to pave the way for the establishment of an interim government in which all

political parties including EPRDF will be represented.

The alternative way was thought to be imperative due to EPRDF/TPLF’s record of

compromising the sovereignty of Ethiopia particularly in its unbalanced relations with

Eritrea, its factional and ethnic exclusiveness, its monopoly over the political and

economic spheres as well as total control of one ethnic group within the army, the police

and security apparatus. Moreover, EPRDF’s attempt to present one group (the Amhara)

as a historical enemy of the other nations and nationalities was considered as a recipe for

bloodshed. Its undue emphasis on group rights rather than individual rights was also

deemed undemocratic. 94 According to the conference’s spokesmen, the seven political

organizations which formed the Paris Peace Conference (March 1993) did not take part in

the deliberations, though they were in agreement with the move to bring back home the

Ethiopian political opposition initiative from the diaspora.

94
Tobia, 14 Tahsas 1986. Tobia, 12 Meskerem 1987.

315
The two platforms for political opposition during the constitution drafting process were

the inclusion of the secession clause and the so-called ‘joint ownership’ of land by the

state and the public which was regarded as a euphemism for state control.95 EPRDF was

so uncompromising on both points that in December 1993 the Ethiopian National

Revolutionary Party (ENRP) withdrew from the Constitution Drafting Commission

complaining that the political direction of the TG is contrary to the interest and view of

the Ethiopian people. Similarly, a member of the Council of Representatives and

chairman of the KPC, Tesfaye Habisso, opposed the inclusion of the rights of

nationalities up to secession in the constitution (on 19 March 1994) because its liability to

abuse by ethnic entrepreneurs.96

More importantly, on 2 April 1994, KPC and four other organizations with parliamentary

seats, the Ethiopian National Democratic Organization (ENDO), the Ethiopian

Democratic Coalition (EDC), GPDF and WPDF, established the Ethiopian National

Democratic Party (ENDP) with Dr Fekadu Gedamu as president. In its program, the party

opposed the constitutional endorsement of secession and noted that current concern

should be on promoting the common interest of the Ethiopian peoples. It also argued that

ethno-nationalism is a route to serious conflicts and civil war, which the regime should

do well to counterbalance by promoting cohesion and unity.97 ‘Etyopiawinet’ had been

perhaps the only organization of such a name expressly formed to counter the

disintegrative and ethnocentric politics unleashed by the transitional charter and the new

95
Paul H. Brietzke, “Ethiopia’s Leap in the Dark: Federalism and Self-Determination in the New
Constitution,” Journal of African Law, 39(1), (1995), p.25.
96
AZ, 14 Megabit 1986.
97
AZ, 27 Megabit 1986. AZ, 2 Miazia 1986. AZ, 19 Miazia 1986. AZ, 24 Ginbot 1986. Tobia, 28 Megabit
1987.

316
government. According to its leader Bitweded Zewdie Gebre-Silassie, the cardinal aim of

the civic organization was to make Ethiopians aware and be proud of their history of

freedom and unity and consolidate it in popular democracy.98

The EPRDF deployed its surrogate organizations to counter dissident voices in and

outside the parliament. This set off a string of demonstrations and oppositions, as

discussed above, orchestrated by the PDOs. For instance, KPC’s opponent the Kembatta

People’s Democratic Organization (KPDO) publicly expressed its support to the

secession clause.99 The regime also turned a deaf ear to all calls for political inclusiveness

and national reconciliation. The EPRDF line had been that there was a reign of peace and

democracy in Ethiopia and, therefore, “national reconciliation where there is no conflict”

is irrelevant. This was reminiscent of Derg’s stubborn idiom “politics is not a quarrel

between husband and wife.” Some radical ethno-nationalists, notably OLF, also

denounced the effort of pan-Ethiopian organizations as neftegna caucuses aimed at

removing the secession clause from the charter and possibly from the upcoming

constitution.100 Though the OLF itself had been ousted from the transitional government

exactly after a year, it considered the right to secession as its signature achievement.

The three major contenders of the period, EPRDF, OLF and AAPO, represented so

sharply contrasting views that they could not come together to the negotiating table

throughout the transition period. For instance, the Atlanta Conference held at the Carter

Center on 7 and 8 February 1994 was the last chance before the approval of the EPRDF

98
AZ, 16 Miazia 1986. Tobia, 25 Tir 1987.
99
AZ, 18 Megabit 1986.
100
Tobia, 10 Yekatit 1986.

317
constitution. The value of this meeting was, however, compromised due to the absence of

EPRDF, and the refusal of the OLF and AAPO to take part. When the OLF, AAPO,

SEPDU, CEDF, Common Political Forum (CPF), and EPRDF for the first time sat for

talks on 5 February 1995, mediated by the USA, the OLF, AAPO and CEDF withdrew

after the initial meeting.101 The regime promptly replied ‘mengedun cherq yarglachhu’,

meaning what is earned by war could be lost by war only.

The resurgent Ethiopianism, contrary to the ethno-nationalist rhetoric of EPRDF or OLF,

had not been limited by ethnic, regional, religious or other sectarian divides. TPLF made

little disguised effort to rally the Tigray people by portraying the overall struggle as a

question of survival to the region, as an Amhara-led conspiracy to restore oppression.

"One of the TPLF’s survival strategies has been to invoke the malleable material of

ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. It claims that if the opposition takes over or wins power,

the entire people of Tigrai will be doomed as a result of ethnic discrimination and

hegemonism, if not worse." 102 In spite of the subtle and overt maneuver to implicate

Tigray and isolate the region from the rest of the country, EPRDF’s policy did not go

unchallenged among the Tigrean intellectuals some of whom had been among the

harshest critics of the regime.

An organization calling itself Tigray-Tigrign Ethiopia Popular Movement was

established in early September 1994 to oppose the division of one people (the Tigre) into

two states as a result of tribal politics enforced by Sha’bia and Weyanne. The movement

rejected Eritrean statehood and vowed to struggle for the unity and Ethiopianity of

101
Tobia, 25 Tir, 2 Yekatit, 14 Megabit 1987.
102
Aregawi, “A Political History”, p.383.

318
Tigrayans. It also denounced the attempt of the so-called Ethiopian Patriotic Front (EPF)

to alienate the Tigrean people by implicating them in what was perpetrated by the TPLF-

EPRDF.103 Another such organization was the Tigraian Alliance for National Democracy

(TAND) or Demokrasiawi Mitihbibar Tigray which aimed to counter the attempt to

isolate the Tigrean people by rallying them alongside other Ethiopians in the struggle for

democracy. TAND was formed in a meeting held in Washington (11 to 13 February

1995) among the Ethiopian Multinational Congress Party (EMP), Tigrean People’s

Democratic Movement (TPDM), Ethiopian Democratic Coalition (EDC) and former

members of the TPLF.104

Ideally, the right to self-determination deemed political sovereignty and cultural

sovereignty intrinsic to each other. In practice, however, self-interest demanded striking a

modicum of balance between federal and regional, ethnic and national, historical and

ideological interests. Even with the apparent commitment of the EPRDF to full political,

linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic groups, the issue of an overarching means of

communication, symbol and identity could not be ignored. This pragmatic consideration

led to the adoption of Amharic as the working language of the federal government, while

at the state level it was left to the discretion of respective regions. In the words of one of

the architects of the Constitution: “The balance will have to be made between the need

for non-cumbersome mode of communication as is required for a modernizing state on

103
Tobia, 5 Meskerem 1987.
104
Tobia, 14 Megabit 1987.

319
the one hand, and on the other the need of the different ethnic groups to feel that their

identity is fully recognized and respected.”105

Another delicate balance between ethnic-regional and national-federal prerogatives was

regarding the symbols of the state, the national flag, national emblem and national

anthem, all of which indicated eclectic use of the past with an eye to special aspirations

of nations and nationalities. The FDRE Constitution had no radical departure from those

of previous regimes in terms of the form and meaning of the national flag and anthem.

The only novelty was a national emblem, a bright star at the middle of the flag, intended

to show the equality of the nations and religions of the country. The national anthem also

reflected the ideology of the regime couched in terms of history, patriotism and loyalty of

the Ethiopian people. Regional states were allowed to issue their own flags and emblems

though not their own anthems.106

Citizenship was the single most important overarching bond between all Ethiopian

peoples. As an individual legal status, this aspect often rivaled with the set of group rights

given precedence in the FDRE Constitution. The definition reaffirmed the jus sanguinis

principle by bestowing automatic citizenship on any one born of either or both of

Ethiopian parents. The constitution also specifically provided that Ethiopian nationality

rights including movement and residence cannot be deprived or abridged by the federal

nature of the state. The most important thing was, however, harmonization of these

unifying laws, symbols and ceremonies to group and nationality prerogatives and

practices, which the EPRDF regime had been explicitly lacking.

105
Fasil, Constitution, p.56.
106
FDRE Constitution, Chapter I, Article 3, No.3.

320
In general, during the first decade of subtle and overt campaign against Ethiopian

sentiment and unity, the national flag was almost non-existent or undermined in the

regions, it was commonly referred as ‘Ye’Federal Bandira’ instead of ‘Ye’Etyopia

Bandira’, daily flag ceremony in government offices and other institutions was neglected,

and even schools had abandoned the singing of the national anthem. In spite of the

nominal right of all Ethiopians to travel, work and live anywhere in the country, people

officially categorized as ‘non-indigenous’ faced institutional discrimination, were

constantly reminded of their ethnicity and told to go to their kilils.

Eritrea and EPRDF’s Refound Ethiopianism

The intransigence of the EPRDF was put to the test during the Ethio-Eritrean hostility

which began in the late 1990s. After the separation of Eritrea in a referendum held

between 23 and 25 April 1993, the major issue between the two governments had become

economic and social disengagement. This was not as simple as the political secession.

Because there was a millennia of traditional, cultural and religious bonds between the

peoples who were now almost suddenly made citizens of two nations. This huge and

complex task, which is beyond the capacity of TPLF and EPLF, was compounded by the

authoritarianism, haste and secrecy attending the entire process of Eritrean

independence.107 Lack of seriousness in self-determination is reflected in the boundary

negotiations between the two countries which neglected to involve the interests of

peoples like the Irob and Afar.

107
Kalewongel Minale Gedamu, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: the Quest for Peace and Normalizations,”
(University of Tromso: M.A. in Peace and Conflict Transformation, 2008), p.91.

321
Many Ethiopians thought that the relationship between the two countries was unbalanced

and detrimental to Ethiopia’s national interest. In the Agreement on Trade and Friendship

signed between the two nations in June 1993 and another on economic issues in

September 1993, the two countries were tied with a common currency in Birr. This was

not accompanied by an agreed monetary policy.108 Many Ethiopians felt that Eritrea was

taking unfair advantage of the agreement, especially when it was known that Ethiopian

coffee was bought cheap and re-exported in hard currency by the latter. It was inevitable

that popular anger should well up after the unprecedented enthusiasm Eritreans in

Ethiopia showed during the referendum, and the contrast between the post–referendum

dismal and abject situation of Ethiopians in Eritrea and the complete freedom, deferential

treatment and leniency Eritreans in Ethiopia enjoyed. Nevertheless, when in late August

1994 then Eritrean ambassador to Ethiopia, Haile Menqorios, issued a statement warning

Eritreans to consider themselves as ‘immigrants’ and not to expect equal treatment and

rights with Ethiopians, it came as something of a shock even to Ethiopians. The

ambassador’s statement anticipated the gist of what was to come a few years later: “It is

unthinkable to claim equal rights with other Ethiopians after voting for Eritrean

independence in the referendum.”109

What finally ended the four years of honeymoon between the two countries was Eritrea’s

introduction of its own currency, the Nakfa, in November 1997. The Ethiopian

government retaliated by changing the Birr in January 1998.110 On 14 May 1998, the

108
Kalewongel, p.39. Ruth, “Ethiopian-Eritrean,” p.670.
109
Tobia, 3 Puagmen 1986, quoting the statement on ‘Hadas Eritera’ newspaper, no. 104, by Haile
Menqorios then Eritrean ambassador to Ethiopia.
110
Kalewongel, “Ethiopia and Eritrea,” pp.31, 40, 48.

322
EPRDF government announced that Eritrea had violated Ethiopian border on 12 May

1998. In fact, the initial violation had occurred on 6 May 1998.111 Ethiopia demanded the

Eritrean government to withdraw its forces immediately without any precondition and

warned to take whatever measure necessary to maintain the sovereignty of the country.

On its statement issued on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of Ginbot 20 (28 May

1998), EPRDF tentatively adopted an Ethiopian patriotic voice, “...our past and recent

history testifies that we have both the might and heroism to defend any power which

attempts to wrest our territory by force.”112 It also called on all Ethiopians to mobilize

and involve in the defence of the motherland in absolute Ethiopian sentiment. The prime

minister followed this with orders on 5 June 1998 to the Ethiopian army to take any

measure to reverse the Eritrean invasion.

Now the issue of relations between the two peoples loomed large when the Eritrean

government began to persecute, dispossess and expel Ethiopians in Eritrea. The Ethiopian

government was quick to reassure that its brotherly attitude towards Eritreans in Ethiopia

or in Eritrea would not be altered. Simultaneously, however, it announced that it is taking

measures on Eritreans who were considered as risk to national security. It started to

deport some Eritreans and relieved those who held senior positions in government

apparatus.113 The measure raised uproar among the international community as a case of

ethnic cleansing, allegedly in some ways imitating the Kosovo incident.

111
AZ, 5 Sene 1990. Ruth, “The Ethiopian-Eritrean,” p.663.
112
AZ, 6, 8, 20, 28 Ginbot 1990.
113
AZ, 5 Sene 1990. AZ, 6 Sene 1990. Ruth, p.675.

323
For Ethiopia, in addition to human and nationality rights, this mass deportation had a

repercussion on the rights of citizenship as most of the victims held Ethiopian citizenship.

In other words, if, for example, Ethiopia went to war with Somalia, would Ethiopian

Somalis face similar expulsion?114 All peoples residing in Eritrea, except those who had

foreign citizenship, were made Ethiopian citizens by imperial order issued in 1960.

Article 33 sub-article 1 of the FDRE Constitution states that “no Ethiopian national shall

be deprived of his or her Ethiopian nationality against his or her will.” Sub-article 3 of

the same article also states that “any national has the right to change his Ethiopian

nationality.”

Now the argument from the Ethiopian side was that loss of Ethiopian nationality is

automatic on the adoption of another nationality, which in fact was not explicitly stated

anywhere in Ethiopian law. This was a retroactive argument based on the Ethiopian

Nationality Law of 1930. Eritrea’s first proclamation of nationality rights in 1992

accorded all Eritreans living in and abroad citizenship rights through jus sanguinus and

naturalization. It also demanded all claimants to fill out forms and obtain identity cards

called Meninet. This gave diasporic Eritreans including those in Ethiopia de facto

citizenship. 115 What is more, Eritreans in Ethiopia had voted in the referendum, as

admitted by the Eritrean ambassador above, and thereby attained Eritrean citizenship. As

the 1930 law does not allow double citizenship, then Eritreans will be disqualified from

Ethiopian nationality even though they had voted before the proclamation of the FDRE

114
AZ, 18 & 19 Ginbot 1991. Samuel Assefa’s paper for a panel organized by African Institute for
Democratic Deliberation and Action.
115
Ruth Ioyb, pp.663, 664.

324
Constitution.116 This was indeed an intricate legal debate which, nevertheless, shows the

tension created by the war.

Again the Ethiopian people have a surprise in store for EPRDF as they had for the

military regime. In spite of the government’s ethnocentric and divisive records in the past

seven years and the existence of widespread grievance among various groups in the

country, the popular response to the Eritrean invasion was almost spontaneous and

overwhelming. It was true that both the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea in different ways

had misjudged the residual strength of Ethiopian nationalism and patriotism. The EPLF

attempted to present the problem as an intra-Tigre affair, exactly what TPLF dreaded to

hear, but couldn’t isolate the regime as the popular reaction testified. The EPRDF, on the

other hand, was not militarily and psychologically prepared for the aggression, much less

to the support it would gain from nationalist forces. However, the EPRDF attempted to

justify this show of unity in line with its nationalities policy. It argued that in no way had

the unity and Ethiopian sentiment in our people had plummeted. In fact, it had been

consolidated thanks to the nationalities policy.117

The values and traditions of the Ethiopian state had become vital during the Ethio-

Eritrean war. Nothing demonstrated more vividly the value of building up a common

space than crisis and war. Marxism or any other ideology is threadbare when it comes to

appealing to the inner senses of national patriotism and sacrifice to the Motherland.

Ethiopian national culture and tradition is built through time via the medium of Amharic:

symbolisms, war cries and songs, poems and a rich legacy of nationalism were given free

116
AZ, 19 Sene 1991. Ruth, p.671.
117
AZ, 27 Sene 1990.

325
reigns in the mass media. The EPRDF did not hesitate to deploy even what the Derg, in

its passion for socialist Ethiopianism, had added to the wealth of the nationalist fund.

Interestingly, in the course of the first year of the war the EPRDF rhetoric completely

reverted to Ethiopian historic heroism and national sentiment: “ኢትዮጵያ በመልክዐ ምድር ባቀፈችው

የተፈጥሮ ሀብቷ፣ በህዝቦቿ ቋንቋና ባህል ብቻ ሳይሆን የምትታወቀው፣ ከምንም በላይ የአገር ፍቅርና የማይናወጥ ብሄራዊ ስሜት ባላቸው

ልጆቿ ደምና አጥንት ተጠብቃ የኖረች አገር በመሆኗ ጭምር ነው፡፡’’ “That Ethiopia is renowned not only for her

natural resources, the languages and cultures of her peoples, but also for being preserved

by the blood and bone of her children who have the utmost love and unwavering national

sentiment to their country.” 118 Statements issued by various regional states left behind, at

least temporarily, the obsessive association of concern for Ethiopian unity and national

integrity or sovereignty to chauvinism(Amhara) and reaffirmed a direct bloodline of

legacy between Ethiopian patriotism and the history of national sacrifice of “our fathers

and forefathers” to the current generation. The Oromia Regional State’s press release

reads: “እናት አገራችን በራሳቸው ብቻ በሚተማመኑ፣ ከውርደቷ በፊት ህይወታቸውን ሳይሰስቱ በሚሰጡና፣ በአካሏ ላይ ሊያርፍ

የተቃጣን የወረራ እድፍ በደማቸው እያጠቡ ሉዐላዊነቷን በሚያደምቁ፣ ዳር ድንበራቸውን በአጥንታቸው አጥረው በሚጠብቁ ዕልፍ

ዐዕላፍ ጀግኖች ልጆቿ መስዋዕትነት ተከብራ የኖረች የነጻነት ደሴት ናት፡፡” “That our Motherland had been an

island of freedom, preserved by the sacrifice of millions of patriotic children who are

self-confident, give their life unstintingly to shield her from the violation of her

sovereignty.” 119

The brief and bloody fraternal war was brought to a halt by the signing of Agreement on

Cessation of Hostilities on 18 June 2000. Its formal conclusion was the signing of the

118
AZ, editorial, 12 Sene 1991.
119
The Oromia Council Executive Committee Statement on the victory of the Ethiopian army, AZ, 19
Ginbot 1992.

326
Algiers Peace Accords on 12 December 2000. After the conclusion of the war with an

Ethiopian victory, the Meles government did not extract itself from Ethiopian nationalist

discourse. It rather wanted to tone down previous ethnic radicalism and allowed a margin

of popular and state expressions of Ethiopianism. During the Ethio-Eritrean war the idea

of erecting a statue for Emperor Tewodros II was conceived by an Ethiopian artist named

Bizuneh Tesfa with the overall sponsorship and coordination of the Mega Advertisement

and Arts Center and the approval of the Addis Ababa City Administration.120 Tewodros

Square had been dedicated in 1968 to signify the centenary of the death of the unifying

Emperor. Almost 35 years after this, the Addis Ababa City Administration’s Meqdela

Heritage Repatriation Committee erected in 2003 a replica of the Sebastopol Grand

Cannon to pay tribute to the emperor’s deed as the father of modern Ethiopia.121 The full

statue of Emperor Tewodros was erected in Gonder town only in January 2012.

In early 2000, EPRDF brought a new or renewed ideology of ‘revolutionary democracy’

as the only way to ensure the building up of a strong and united Ethiopia. “የብሄር ብሄረሰቦችን

መብት ለማስከበርና አንድነቷን የጠበቀች ጠንካራ ኢትዮጵያን ለመገንባት የአብዮታዊ ዲሞክራሲ መስመር አማራጭ የሌለው መፍትሄ
122
ነው፡፡” EPRDF claimed that revolutionary democracy had been officially adopted as the

party’s ideology since 1983, that is along with the establishment of Marxist Leninist

League Tigray. In fact, this was the line used to effectively purge opposition from the

very core of TPLF in 2001. Whatever the real reason behind the near fatal rift in the

TPLF, among which are the divergent lines the factions followed in the Ethio-Eritrean

war, the issue of rife corruption within the ruling elite, even personality clashes, the main

120
AZ, 7 Hidar 1992.
121
AZ, 1 Ginbot 1995. AZ, 10 Ginbot 1995.
122
AZ, 23 Ginbot 1993, etc. ‘Abyotawi Democracy’ special issue, Ginbot 1993.

327
agenda presented by the opposition was ‘tenberkakinet’ (submissiveness) while Meles’s

was ‘Bonapartism’(entrenchment) or ‘mussina’(corruption).123

In the confusion and uncertainty created after the factional battles in the TPLF, other

regional bodies had taken various positions. The so-called allied parties of the peripheral

regions also had a full month’s conference in May 2001 to clarify their stand and in this

EPRDF conceded that the paternalistic/custodian relationship between regions and the

federal government will henceforth be regulated according to the constitutional

provisions. For the past decade the regions had been subjected to full guidance and

control of the Regional Affairs Department under the PM’s office. This office had been

responsible for preparing the political and development plans annually.124 Another point

underlined by the ‘developing’ (formerly called underdeveloped) regions was the practice

of their exclusion by EPRDF from national affairs, in the national power sharing

including the army, police, security and the ministerial and diplomatic structure. As

Okello Gnygello, then president of GPNRS, said, the country is ours too, so we have to

participate at every step of the nation-building process.125

EPRDF’s Revolutionary Democracy is like Derg’s National Democratic Revolution, a

transition program towards capitalism in the case of the former. This is allegedly because

Ethiopia does not have the social and economic foundation to implement liberal

democracy. When it comes to rights and freedoms, revolutionary democracy considers,

for instance, the right to self-determination not only as simple question of democracy but

123 th
AZ, 20 Ginbot 1993, a statement by EPRDF on the occasion of the 10 victory anniversary. AZ, 22
Ginbot 1993, a statement by ANDM.
124
AZ, 3 Sene 1993. AZ, 7 Sene 1993.
125
AZ, 7 Sene 1993.

328
an intrinsic part of human rights. Revolutionary democracy subordinates individual rights

to group rights, meaning nations’, nationalities’ and peoples’ rights. Since the 2005

elections the regime had tightened its grip on every aspect of society by a proliferation of

sub-kebele structures. The amist-le'and (five-to-one) grouping is a phenomenal

adaptation of TPLF tirnefa strategy.126 EPRDF believed that this is especially important

to safeguard the unity and integrity of the country.

According to this line of argument, Ethiopia avoided the fate of Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra

Leone, or Liberia because of the peaceful accommodation of the nationalities questions

provided by this ideology. Particularly, the conflict in the ruling party had magnified the

danger posed by the secession right as many perceived. But EPRDF argued that

revolutionary democracy is intended to bring a fast economic and social development

which would undercut the bases of secessionist claims. If we build a just system that

ensures the social, economic and political development of our peoples, then we will

guarantee the unity and integrity of our country, so argued the cadres.127 Again after the

2005 election controversy the regime began to soften some of its attitude regarding the

symbolism and values of the nation. The national Flag Day was approved by the House

of Representatives in 2007 and started to be celebrated annually in 2008. This was an

explicit attempt to counter-balance to the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Day which

had been started as a national celebration in 2006.

126
Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, “The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in
Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy 36(120), (2009), p.198.
127
AZ, 28 & 29 Sene 1993, Seyoum Mesfin and Dawit Yohannes on the existing situation in the country.

329
Nevertheless, a glaring testimony to the regime’s insincerity is the controversial Article

39(1). This unconditional right to secession is curtailed in ambiguity in sub-article 4(b)

which does not specify who is entitled for referendum. This becomes clear when it is

compared to Chapter IV, Article 47(3) which specifies the procedure for a nation or

nationality to form its own state. Here sub-article 3(b) clearly states that the referendum

will be held in the particular nation, nationality or people that demanded the statehood. It

is true that the right to secession is a standing invitation to militant groups or, in

Horowitz’s words, "...effectively advantages militant members of ethnic groups at the

expense of conciliators."128 That the choice between secession and murderous conflict is

a false choice has been superbly illustrated by the case of Eritrea. Therefore, the emphasis

must be "on fostering interethnic accommodation within states."129 Inter-group relations,

exchanges and mutual influences are also part of the collective memories of the Ethiopian

peoples and these should get proper institutional and constitutional acknowledgment.

128
Donald Horowitz, “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede,” Journal of Democracy, XIV,
2(2003), p.11. Brietzke, “Ethiopia’s Leap,” p.35.
129
Horowitz, Ibid.,p.14. Jon Abbink, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia,” Journal
of African Law, 41(2), (1997), p.163.

330
 CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has set out to document the history of modern nationalism in Ethiopia

roughly beginning from 1941 to the present. Why since 1941 as Ethiopia arguably had

many hundreds of years of continuous nationhood? The introductory part has analyzed

the theoretical justifications for the demarcation of the study. It has been underlined that

the emergence of nationalism as an ideology and social movement is premised on the

modernization of society, particularly the functional expansion of the state, economic and

technological transformation and the concomitant emergence of new social classes and

forces. Modernization is a highly contextualized process which for Ethiopia took a stable

course after the Italian intervention (1935-1941). Hence I have used the epithet ‘modern’

for the history of nationalism in Ethiopia in the postwar period.

However, the pre-1941 history of Ethiopia cannot be dismissed as simply irrelevant. In

fact, the long period of Ethiopian statehood from the ancient to the recent and its rich

historical and cultural legacy has been vital for the evolution of modern Ethiopian

nationalism. This vast expanse of time is termed as the formative or proto-national phase

of Ethiopian history. Therefore, the first chapter has attempted to highlight the changes

and continuities in the basic components of the historic nation. This was also intended to

establish a baseline for identifying the persistence, reconfiguration and transformation of

these elements in the construction of the modern nation at various eras. It is the

contention of this study that symbols, ceremonies and memories were the most enduring

features of Ethiopian nationalism that have weathered cataclysms, revolutions and

ideological divides.

331
In chapter two, attempt has been made to trace the genesis and evolution of modern

Ethiopian nationalism. It has been shown that the imperial state had played central role in

forging a national community through vast projects of political socialization,

standardization of education, administrative structuring, etc in line with its modernization

objectives. Haile Selassie’s nation-building effort in the postwar period was part and

parcel of his modernization and Addisitu Etyopia was its quintessential expression. The

regime’s nationalism was natural, homegrown and firmly based on the values, traditions

and symbolisms of the historic nation. Its handling of the centrifugal forces and

tendencies within the state were more traditional and less experimental. Its administrative

structure and reforms did not significantly depart from the historical evolution of the

awraja unit (even though the Teklay Gizat was a new concept). Its guiding ideology, if it

could be said so, had been modernization with limits. The regime had to be mindful of

the increasing modernization call of two main voices of the nascent intelligentsia: the

Westernizers who took for granted European civilization and wanted Ethiopia to open her

doors widely, and the so-called ‘Japanizers’ who advocated a more moderate and

cautious approach to modernization.

It was during the imperial period that the enduring national symbols of modern Ethiopia

were established as expressions of the state’s modernity; a national flag, national emblem

and a national anthem all re-crafted from the values and traditions of the historic nation.

In this respect, the imperial regime was faithful to the secular-religious conception of

Bihere Etyopya and still symbolically exclusive of a large part of the Ethiopian people.

The monarchy identified itself with a national Orthodox Church and a single dynasty, but

it did not make a single faith or a single ethnicity a criterion for Ethiopian citizenship. It

332
conferred on all Ethiopians legal membership to the nation by the nationality/citizenship

law of 1930 as well as by the constitution of 1931. In fact, later in the 1950s the

monarchy as an institution symbolically separated itself from the state. This was part of

the attempt to create a modern Ethiopian nationalism more representative of the

constituents of the state.

Was there assimilation during the imperial period? May be, as a concept it might have

adherents among some nationally-minded individuals. However, this study contends that

assimilation did not exist as a state policy and in practice it was beyond the means of the

government. There was a drive for linguistic unification in the belief that it was the single

most important expression of national unification. This belief was not limited to the state

or to members of any single ethnic group but had currency among many of the prewar

and postwar intelligentsia. The results were quite extraordinary in the post-Italian period

in which a flood of Amharic literature by various authors across ethnic divides

established the foundation for modern Ethiopian literature. It is when a language passes

beyond the formal administrative and instructional roles to become the medium of artistic

expressions that it attains a smoothly and creatively integrative power. It was in these

spheres that Amharic had become a truly national language during the imperial period.

The third chapter has attempted to document the emergence of the second broad category

of nationalism, non-state nationalism, as a form of critique to the modernizing project of

the imperial state by the modern educated class. The production of a modern educated

intelligentsia was the core element, the most important social infrastructure, of the

imperial regime’s nation-building project. It is the major contention of this study that the

333
nationalism of the imperial regime began to founder when a new generation of student

activists turned against the entire social system.

This study has identified its two variants according to their political objectives and

chronological emergence in Ethiopian politics - social nationalism and ethnic

nationalism. The former had its roots in a generational quest for change among the

budding intelligentsia in the prewar period but continued in a reformist tone in the

postwar period. The ESM started as a more vigorous continuation of this kind of

nationalism until the mid-1960s. The late 1960s marked the time when Ethiopian students

in and abroad picked up a more radical ideology, namely Marxism-Leninism. This

changed the objective of the struggle from issue oriented demands for reform to a radical

revolution to demolish the ancie’n regime.

It was on the eve of the revolution that the student body metamorphosed from a nebulous

pressure group into rudimentary political parties. Nevertheless, by this time another

feature of the movement had taken root. Ethno-nationalists, who aimed to break away

from the state or gain autonomy within it on behalf of a specific ethno-regional group,

had begun to have a strong sway in the movement. For much of the imperial period,

political ethnicity was a non-issue though there were growing concerns for the language,

history and culture of the various groups among the respective intelligentsia. This was

particularly true for the Tigrean intelligentsia which produced quite a number of

publications in Tigrigna. Most of these works were published in Asmara, the rest in

Addis Ababa, in the 1960s and early 1970s.1 The self-consciousness of ethnic groups and

1
Preliminary data from the catalogue in the Legal Deposits section, the Ethiopian National Archives and
Library Agency.

334
their politicization into nationhood was a post-Italian phenomenon, though the Italians

had contributed to its emergence, which took three decades before a budding modern

intellectual of the various ethnies began political agitation under cover organizations. In

fact, the pioneers in the national movement were members of the so-called historic core

communities in Eritrea and Tigray, as there were also the Oromos and Somalis in the

south.

Already by 1970, a militant section of the student body had begun to give particular

emphasis to the national question. The Ethiopian student movement which started as a

generational quest for change began to derail the moment the national question emerged

to divide its ranks. The Leninist-Stalinist nationalities question was little more than an

ethnic question in content. It gave primacy not to peoples, not to workers even, but to

nations and nationalities which were marked off by primordial criterion, most importantly

common language and culture. This inevitably transformed the student movement from

inter-generational social nationalism to intra-generational ethnic nationalism. It is my

contention that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the ethnicization of politics in Ethiopia

led to the defeat of the civilian left by depriving it a nation-wide agenda and much needed

cooperation. It was EPLF and TPLF, not the Derg, which defeated the armed wings of

multinational insurgencies such as EDU and EPRP in the late 1970s.

The defeat of the multiethnic groups left the field to ethno-nationalist insurgencies to

influence the direction of the general struggle for democracy towards the nationalities

question. In this context nationalism became political in form but cultural and historical

in content. Meaning, ethno-nationalists aimed at dismantling the Ethiopian state, wresting

power from it or seeking empowerment on behalf of a specific group. To achieve their

335
goals they mobilized the target group by cultural and historical appeals. These appear

easier to personalize than more abstract universalist ideologies such as Marxism-

Leninism. This was why ethno-nationalisms in Ethiopia had been particularly successful

in mobilizing for a protracted war. In addition, ethno-nationalist insurgencies have been

‘pragmatic Marxists’, using the ideology only in the service of their ethnic agendas.

Chapter four is concerned with the period of the military regime or the Derg(1974-1991).

The Derg wrested political power with a single slogan, Etyopia Tikdem, and maintained

its power for seventeen years by trumping up the patriotism of indivisible Ethiopia. The

military regime employed socialism in the task of radical national integration. Its zest to

forge a unifying higher culture was based on the selective emphasis of national history

and memory. In what it termed as Ethiopian Socialism, the Derg completely secularized

the national ideology and symbolism. It divested the flag and anthem of all monarchical,

religious and mythological-symbolic elements so that all Ethiopians could identify with

it. The state identified itself with the common/ oppressed people. In word and deed the

regime was committed to ‘one country one people’ and its very ambitious projects such

as nation-wide literacy campaign, massive resettlement, national military service were

justified in the name of the Socialist Motherland.

The Derg maintained the provincial administrative structure; but through elaborate

organization and mobilization of the masses it was able to propagate its ideology to an

unprecedented level. For the first time local communities became actively involved in the

management of their affairs and served the regime as grassroots agents of control and

repression. In its eagerness to bring together the disparate cultures, identities, sentiments

336
and ways of life into a new progressive socialist culture the regime overstepped the limits

of the possible. Its ill-planned campaigns did not resolve social and economic problems

and its supra-ethnic nationalism failed to provide credible alternatives to time-honored

bonds of community. Its heavy handed top down approach discouraged grassroots springs

of Ethiopianism, both traditional and modern civil societies. Most important of all, the

military regime destroyed the social infrastructure of nationalism by brutally crushing

and suppressing the development of an autonomous and self-confident class of

intelligentsia.

Though the regime had made sincere attempt to address the economic, social and political

inequalities among the various nationalities and ethnic groups, this failed to moderately

satisfy the demands of ethno-nationalist fronts. This study lends support to the conclusion

that as a result of its repressive and authoritarian nature the Derg failed to prevent the

growth of large-scale ethnic rebellions. Its cavalier treatment of ethnic demands alienated

various peoples and drove them to their primordial groups. Ethnic accusations were

leveled at the regime, as an Amhara junta in military uniform, by ethno-nationalists

which had to justify their struggle in terms of communal grievances. Nevertheless, the

demise of the military regime was intertwined with the fate of socialism globally.

The last chapter dealt with the period of the EPRDF regime (1991-2012) the heyday of

ethno-nationalism in Ethiopia. The fall of the Derg and the simultaneous march of the

TPLF-led coalition as EPRDF into Menelik’s Palace and EPLF into Asmara for a time

seemed to conclude Africa’s longest and most destructive war in the name of identity.

Assisted by global winds of change the rebel forces established a new status quo with an

apparently different discourse. EPRDF traced its ideological pedigree to the student

337
movement and made a radical commitment to the nationalities issue its raison d’être. It

consciously distanced itself from all brands of pan-Ethiopian nationalism (euphemism to

so-called Amhara chauvinism). It claimed to build a new Ethiopia based on complete and

untrammeled equality and autonomous will of its ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’. The

new government even wanted to prove the authenticity of its commitment by promptly

signing away Eritrea along with Ethiopia’s legitimate access to the sea.

One important distinction the EPRDF regime had from the previous ones was that it did

not define itself as a nation-state. To emphasize this, not only did it restructure the state in

the form of federal union but one that was formed from different ethno-linguistic nation-

states. In other words, it reversed the process of nationalization of the ethnic groups into

ethnicization of the nation. This reversal was conscious and deliberate and negated the

history, values, traditions and ethos of the Ethiopian nation. This must be so, because

TPLF and its allies had fought for decades in the name of particular ethnic groups.

Therefore, they couldn’t simply ignore that and adopt an apparently lost cause. The

EPRDF period also differs in that public political discourse was not issue oriented; it was

rather encouraged to be ethnic oriented. Political parties are mostly ethnic based and their

rhetoric is particularistic rather than nationalist.2

Generally, this study has highlighted that the Ethiopian state, during the imperial regime

and the Derg, had crucial role in the expansion of the historic nation and ‘creation’ of an

inclusive modern secular nation. It is the state which provided the framework as well as

the infrastructure for the socialization of the masses into national membership. The state

2
Abbink, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism,” p.160.

338
defined the masses not only as members of the nation but also as its defenders.3 The

state’s nationalism was defined instrumentally both to counter rival nationalisms and

external aggressors and to mobilize the people towards more positive tasks of national

development.

A related characteristic of state nationalism was its unifying tendency, which emanated

from the pragmatic need to maintain the integrity of the ruling elite and its power. The

capacity of the Ethiopian state to perform this multifaceted activity, to penetrate down to

the grassroots level and convince the people to identify with a larger national community,

had been enhanced or undermined by various contextual factors. Therefore, this study

draws the conclusion that any comparison between nationalisms of different eras must

take into consideration the general political, economic and social context of the time.

This will avert the danger of being anachronistic.

The politics of identity has both political or instrumentalist and ideological or

constructivist dimensions. In countries like Ethiopia where civic societies are very weak

and under government pressure, the state plays a decisive role in creating avenues for

building up a common space among the diverse units. The imperial regime somewhat

tentatively, the Derg vigorously had attempted to forge a national community with

common culture. In contrast, EPRDF’s nationalism lacks a civic content. There are no

clear policies designed to turn the political association between various ethno-regions

into national ones. In fact, the transitional period was completely devoid of national

content. In spite of the rhetoric about ‘popular unity’ (in contradistinction with ‘territorial

3
Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837(1996),p.78.

339
unity’) the current regime has been concerned with the political unity of the state. It has a

dismal record in creating the necessary infrastructure for popular integration and unity.

National symbols in the three regimes did not radically differ and were based on the

cultural values of the historic nation. All regimes had made attempts to fashion common

inclusive symbolisms based on their particular ideologies. The meaning given to the

tricolor remained similar only with a shade of difference. According to Proclamation

No.16 of 1996, Article 3(2), the three colors symbolize: green: work, verdure, and

progress; yellow: hope, justice, and equality; red: heroism and sacrifice. The Derg and

EPRDF did not show major difference in the emphases conveyed by the respective

national anthems; in fact these were musical representations of the meanings symbolized

by the national flag denoting national territory, history and patriotism.

Nationalism must also perform cognitive tasks, must provide meaning to the national

society. The basic function of national symbols is to emphasize an overarching national

unity of the Ethiopian people. Therefore, besides the three basic symbolic components

many other things are considered as symbolic markers: there are songs, maps, coins,

banknotes, national holidays, monuments, medals, even dress and other cultural practices

that could be powerful symbolic markers of identity.4 There have been little differences

between the three regimes regarding national identity markers. The EPRDF differs from

the other regimes in its lip service to the national symbols and ceremonies as well as in

allowing alternative identities to regional states by having their own flags and emblems.

4
Fasil, Constitution, p.205.

340
Language was perhaps the one element that is not emphasized but perceived as the most

significant symbol of national unity by both the imperial regime and the Derg. It is also

pragmatically acknowledged by the EPRDF. The establishment of Amharic as the

national lingua franca had to a considerable extent shaped the Ethiopian public sphere. A

common high culture built through the medium of Amharic is still the single most

important bond between the various ethno-linguistic groups in the country. In fact, the

EPRDF regime had made a great stride in allowing the nationalities to choose their

working languages. This was a long overdue right. Perhaps, in retrospect, what the

imperial regime and the Derg feared about languages other than Amharic seems

unreasonable. The chance of any other vernacular to compete with Amharic and emerge

as a national language is practically nil.

This had been demonstrated within five years of the EPRDF period. The proliferation of

publications in nationalities languages could not be sustained more than a few years

because of two main reasons: one, the invisible hand of the market; two, the general

clamp down of government on newspapers and magazines. 5 After an initial period of

unprecedented boom, literature produced by individuals in the vernaculars outside the

respective regions has dwindled. It is the regional governments which now publish such

literature. What individual authors do currently is either to write their works in Amharic

or write them in local languages and have them translated into Amharic. This, like in

other artistic fields such as theatre, music, cinema, etc, has kept the supra-ethnic

5
Shimelis Bonsa, “The State of the Private Press in Ethiopia,” in Bahru Zewde and Siegfried
Pausewang(eds), Ethiopia, the Challenge of Democracy from Below (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2002),
p.185.

341
dynamism of Amharic. Now, more than ever, artists of different ethnic and regional

backgrounds have kept Amhaic’s momentum as the language of the arts and literature.

The emergence of new or rival nationalisms is determined by the cumulative changes that

occur in the regional context, in the day to day life of the people- what they speak, what

they watch and listen, what they dress, etc. The battle over languages was a constant

feature of modern Ethiopian nationalism mainly due to its emotional and symbolic value.

What is at stake here is the comparative validity of different languages and by default the

prestige and power of the group. 6 However, the use of a particular language for

instructional, administrative and judicial purposes could pose a threat to national unity

only in circumstances where isolation is deliberately encouraged. It is when vernacular

languages are used for educational purposes beyond the primary level that they pose a

danger of creating a wall between the ethnic group and the larger national community.

In ethno-regional administrative systems, the geographical, linguistic and cultural

boundaries imposed by the states create barriers to communication. These overtime

accentuate the differences between constituent entities and push them towards seeking

freedom from the overarching political framework. To counterbalance these centrifugal

tendencies the federal government needs to widen the bases and platforms of interaction

horizontally between regions and vertically with the state. Now what exists seems to be

vertical integration through an elaborate and highly centralized party apparatus. This kind

of unity is superficial and lasts only as long as the political regime. Besides government

policy, there are also practices determined by the development of technology. Especially,

the improvement and availability of the electronic media - radio, TV, internet services

6
Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p.7.

342
and even mobile telephones - facilitate communication among groups. The recent

launching of regional TV and FM radio programs is partly determined by this advance.

How these changes affect the consolidation or decline of rival national identities in

Ethiopia is yet to be seen.

What is so far clear is that the growing ethnic consciousness is gradually permeating

every aspect of life. At least at one place in eastern Shoa in Oromia region(at Wayoo), the

corrugated roof of a small parish church had been painted in the tricolors of Oromia

rather than the traditional tricolors of the Orthodox Church. This was repainted after a

few months but it is evident that a symbolic redefinition is on the agenda. The

secularization of the state during the Derg and EPRDF regimes had deprived the

Orthodox Church its official role as a kind of civic society for the promotion and

propagation of the (Christian) national idea. In both periods, however, the Church has

remained the last stronghold of Ethiopian unity. During the Derg period people passively

expressed their resistance to Socialism by retreating to religion. During the EPRDF

period the Orthodox Church, as well as other denominations, was affected by ethnic

politics which threatened its very unity. Nevertheless, "[t]he period also witnessed the

resurgence of Orthodox religious observance as a manifestation of national unity among

Orthodox Christians in opposition to the government's policy of ethnicity."7

Ethnic nationalism has also been unsatisfactory in its outcomes because it had started

from a non-existent vertical solidarity within a specific region. At the level of ideology a

non-existent cultural similarity overrules social equality. This is why boundary conflicts

remained rife in the FDRE and even constituted standing threats to the stability of the

7
Wudu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church,” p.24.

343
regional states. In regions like Gambella, fiercely contested boundaries such as Itang

woreda have become unending battlefields in more recent years. In fact, the Ministry of

Federal Affairs admitted in February 2005 that the proliferation of ethnic conflict in the

peripheral regions was related to the slow pace of development and lack of good

administration in the region.8

This is partly true, but the main reason was the failure of ethnic federalism to defuse

ethnic conflicts, the very premise for its establishment. Cultural and ethnic differences do

not in themselves engender group conflict unless they are invoked strategically to

mobilize support.9 This study contends that the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in the

EPRDF period, even compared to the previous regimes, is because of the new contexts

and incentives for local rivalry provided by ethnic-federalism. It is a fight for jobs,

statuses, educational opportunities, political posts, etc all expressed in the idioms of

ethnicity. It is the ethnic entrepreneurs who invoke images of past suffering and injustices

and attempt to make these personal experience in an ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse.10 In fact,

the concern on the escalation of ethnic and communal conflicts had given the Ministry an

excuse to take over from the regional states their constitutional right to demand for

federal government intervention whenever they see it fit.11

Over and above the inherent problems of the ethnic federal system, EPRDF had also

attempted to set one group against another. The case in point was the regime’s

8
AZ, 22 Ginbot 1997.
9
Day and Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism, p.52.
10
Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since
1945,” International Political Science Review, XIV, 2(Sage Publications Ltd: 1993), p.166.
11
FDRE Constitution, Chapter V, Article 51(2): the Federal state “shall deploy, at the request of a State
administration, Federal defence forces to arrest a deteriorating security situation within the requesting
State when its authorities are unable to control it.”

344
encouragement of Oromia region to reclaim Addis Ababa during the 2005 election

controversy. The 1995/6 Oromia Constitution had made Adama the seat of the regional

state but it was only after nine years that transfer to Adama was effected in 2004!

However, after the defeat of EPRDF in Addis Ababa, the regime immediately restarted a

move to make Addis the capital of Oromia. 12 Then the most expensive of all dramas

started. This is also in contravention of article 49(1) which made Addis Ababa the capital

city of the Federal state. The Oromia authorities announced their intention to amend the

regional constitution based on the special rights provision in article 49(5) of the FDRE

Constitution. But the latter article does not give Oromia a takeover right. The OPDO

executive immediately declared on 16 June 2005 that it has decided to make Finfine

Oromia’s capital.

In this episode the regime had shown how far it could go to maintain itself in power. The

state propaganda apparatus which began to mobilize Oromo support from various regions

attempted to create tensions mainly between Amhara and Oromo groups over the claim

for Addis Ababa.13 In fact, the state media made frequent reference to the legitimate right

of Oromia to demand “if it has any other question!” Politics when tuned to ethnic

ideologies will become a no holds barred activity. The ethnic undercurrent had also

become evident when in the 2005 election Addisu Legese attempted to portray the

opposition as ‘Interahamwe’, a very extreme allegation highlighting the acrimonious

nature of the debates on the question of nationalities. “After this seemingly 'accidental'

utterance, Interahamwe language became a deliberate rhetoric used by the Prime Minister

and EPRDF leaders down to local level in the last weeks of the campaign. Ruling party

12
AZ, 5 Sene 1997.
13
AZ, 8 & 10 Sene 1997.

345
officials consistently claimed that opposition parties were sowing seeds of ethnic hatred

by questioning the rights of nationalities to self-determination."14

What could be deduced from the relative failure of the Derg’s policy of ‘homogenization’

and EPRDF’s policy of ‘segregation’ is that acculturation occurs more through economic

and social factors and pressure from mass culture rather than state coercion. In fact, what

is necessary would be voluntary integration which is a multi-directional process rather

than forced assimilation which is a uni-directional affair. Cultural integration or the

creation of a shared culture implies at least a common public culture. Similar precaution

should be placed on the clarity of the line between ‘segregation’ and ‘mulitculturalism’.

The post-Derg period had witnessed the predominance of ethnicism in every aspect of

social life. This has led to the undermining of cross-cutting ties and commonalities and

people of mixed ancestry are forced to choose rigidly bounded identities. It is still

possible to have ‘mixed origins’ but not socially ‘mixed identity’ in Ethiopia. By making

the inquiries ‘biher’, ‘bihereseb’, ‘af’mefcha quanqua’, ‘haymanot’ part of the vital

statistics ethno-linguistic identity has become inescapable.15

The past half-century has also witnessed variable role of history in the construction of

nations and nationalism. Again it has been attempted to show how scholars and

statesmen or nationalists differed not only on the importance of shared memories in

national ideologies but also in the standards they set for historical enquiry and truth

value. Academics believe that a factually supported objective history should be the

14
AZ, 21 Ginbt 1997. It was in one of those debates organized by the Inter Africa Group on ‘federalism,
good governance and group rights’ that Addisu Legese accused the opposition that they were attempting
to initiate a Rwanda like genocide and ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia. Aalen and Tronvoll, “The End of
Democracy?” , p.195.
15
Abbink, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism,” pp.171, 172.

346
foundation of historical education and discourse. This is true and must be upheld at least

as an ideal, but in modern Ethiopia it had become increasingly unreachable. One

impediment has been the heavy dose of dominant ideologies, whether socialism or ethno-

nationalism, infused in national curriculums. This had posed unavoidable criteria, an

externally imposed grid emphasizing some aspects of national history while undermining

others. It has been political power that determined which of the competing discourses of

national history were to be voiced.

This had gone to the extreme in the period of EPRDF in that student texts were written by

regional bureaus careful to contextualize it to particular needs and to avoid ‘unwanted’

topics. In addition, the writing of general regional histories has been undertaken by

regional states, which not only had predetermined political objectives but also tended to

particularize the past within current political boundaries and underplayed cross-cutting

features. Ethiopia in the school history texts is quite distinct from region to region and

from one ethnic group to another. History has become highly contested and

particularized. Every nation and nationality from the smallest communities such as

Zeyse in Gamo Gofa to the largest ones like Oromo and Amhara had their ethnic-

historians who recreated each group as a closed system.

The overall social, economic and political changes in Ethiopia in the past half-century

had been radical and profound. Especially, the period after the revolution had radically

transformed people’s ways of thinking and living. In spite of its central place in the

history of the period, linguistic evidence suggests that there seems to be a lack of

sufficient reflection on nationalism and ethnicism. This might be partly because of the

discouragement of ethnicism in the imperial and military regimes. There is no Amharic

347
equivalent to ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnicity’. When nationalist politics intensified after the

revolution, the key terms to express the phenomena were ‘gosegnet’, ‘gotegnet’,

‘mendertegnet’, ‘wenzawinet’, ‘awrajawinet’? None of these represented the concept of

ethnicity and ethnicism which is an aspect of a relationship. The more recent neology of

‘zewg’ and ‘zewgenet’16 is not yet established. But in popular usage ethnic relationships

have been represented by a nebulous term ‘biher-bihereseb’, as ‘gosa’ is still a taboo term

in public discourse.

This study has attempted to drive home that the theoretical explanations regarding the

origin of nationalist movements and consequently their resolution had been wanting. This

is not to deny the historical reality of oppression, class as well as cultural. What can be

surmised from the Ethiopian experience is that economic deprivation or cultural

oppression, either separately or together, were not sufficient explanations for the

emergence of nationalist movements. They were rather necessary factors which provided

material for an intelligentsia to articulate and mobilize support for its self-serving agenda.

This selfish interest may be economic, political, social, or psychological. This is why

ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia had its origins among the most privileged of the ethnic

groups and often led by members of the privileged classes.

‘National awakening’ is essentially a process of political mobilization which originates in

small elite groups and gradually embraces wider sections of the society. Studies on the

evolution of nationalism in Europe have identified three more or less distinctive stages:

the in-ward looking phase in which scholars become concerned with their people’s

16
Andargachew Tsige, Netsanetin Yemayawq ‘Netsa Awchi’ (Addis Ababa: 1997 EC).

348
language, culture and history; the fermentation phase during which a minority

intelligentsia begins to make political agitation on behalf of the group; and the

assertiveness phase during which the nation has ‘awoken’. 17 The Ethiopian case,

especially with respect to ethno-nationalism, does not follow this pattern. What has been

a fledgling interest in the language, history and culture of the various ethno-linguistic

groups was interrupted by violent insurgencies and the time and dedication that self-

recreation demanded was a luxury. That seems the reason why ethno-histories have

adopted a propagandist and counter-discourse tone.

Ethno-nationalists often consider the ideology of Ethiopianism as a Trojan horse

concealing Amhara interests. This study has attempted to show that Ethiopianism has not

been an exclusive ideology of a single ethnic group or a particular geographical region.

Instead, it has a wide social basis among the various groups in the country. Ethiopianism

is above all a belief in the national survival and integrity of Ethiopia. Its cornerstone has

been the acceptance of common history, memory, culture and destiny of the nation. This

does not mean confinement to identical details but to a general framework which

accommodates divergent even rival narratives. A national identity or a sentiment of

belonging to the Ethiopian nation has been conclusively demonstrated throughout the ups

and downs of the country’s history in the past half-century. When this supra-ethnic

ideology was put to the test time and time again, it had shown its residual strength across

the north-south divide.

17
Hroch, p.56.

349
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MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 019.01, YeEtyopiana Ye’Eritrea Andinet Mahber, Addis Ababa,
Nehassie 1/1937E.C.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 019.09, Be’Tigre’na Be’Raya Yalew Serawit Sew Hayl’na Titk,
Demisse to Fitawrari Birru W/Gebriel, Minister of War, no date. Emperor Hailesilassie’s
letter to ‘Wag Lords and People’, dated Meskerem 19/1937, signed by Tsehafe Tezaz
Wolde Giorgis.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 020.16, Sile Wello Awraja Ateqalay Report.
MoI Files: No: አ/ወ/ግ, 026.19, Ye’Etyopiana Eritrean Andinet Yemiqawemu Dirijitoch.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 026.26, Mahber Fiqri.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 027.51, Be’Rayana Qobo Awraja Yetekesetu Chigroch.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 029.15, Ye’Eritrea Wenbedewoch Be’Awsa.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 029.33, Asseb’n Ke’Wello Silemawahad.

MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 047.09, Keyekiflu Yetelaku Yemistir Debdabewoch, Zeleqe
Tachbele, Yeju Awraja Gizat Office, to the Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, Nehassie
15/1940.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 047.09, Keyekiflu Yetelaku Yemistir Debdabewoch, Ameneshewa
Tadele Worq to the Crown Prince, No.68, Megabit 18/41.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 049.06, Sile Wag Awraja Gizat Hunate Yetesafu Debdabewoch,
1942 E.C, no name, addressed to the Crown Prince, confidential, Yekatit 1/1942. In the
same file another confidential letter by Dejazmach Mengistu Gebresilassie, Wag Seqota,
to the Crown Prince, dated Tahsas 8/1942.
MoI Files: No., አ/ወ/ግ, 049.10 Muslimoch’na Hamasenoch.
MoI Files:No. አ/ወ/ግ, 049.11, Keyekiflu Yetelaku Andand Yemistir Mastaweshawoch. Cover
letter Captain Asefa Wolde Silassie, the Second Army Corps commanding officer, 3rd
Intelligence, to Crown Pince Merid Azmach Asfa wossen, Yekatit 20/1942, Dessie. The
Second Army Corps Headquarters, Dessie, intelligence report regarding the situation in
Asmara, to the Imperial Army Intelligence Officer, Addis Ababa, No. 2ኛ ክ/ጦ/
ዋ/መ/0037/790, Yekatit 20/1942.

MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 050.02, Ye’Dessie Ketema Islamoch Mamelkecha, 5 Miazia 1944.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 050.02, Be’Addis Abeba Yeminoru Ye’Wello Islamoch Mamelkecha,
15 Ginbot 1944.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 061.14, Fitawrari Minase Tedla to Crown Prince’s special office,
Addis Ababa, No.22404/5/400, Nehassie 25/1959.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 075.14, Ye’Dejach Ali Mirah Debdabewoch.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 076.31, Arafa’na Id Be’Dessie.

351
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 078.45, Mahber Fiqri.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 084.02, Woldia Ketema, No.1054/9, 26 Yekatit 1944 E.C.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 090.15, Ye’Qobona Wajirat Amets.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 090.18, Sile Abune Gebriel, the Wollo Province Inderassie to Crown
Prince Merid Azmach Asfa Wossen Office, special No.44/44, Megabit 29/1944 E.C.
MoI Files: No. አ/ወ/ግ, 092.01, Ye’Qekamawi Haile Selassie Metasebya, Addis Ababa
Muncipality to the Crown Prince Office, No. me/579/32, 10 Tikemt 1941.
MoI Files: No.1.2.4.15, The Emperor’s declaration to the people of Ethiopia, 12 Tir 1933.
MoI Files: No.1.2.8.15, Guksa File.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.15.02, Letter of the Imperial special etamajor, Birgadier General
Woldesilassie Bereka, to the various dignitary members of the Imperial War Council,
attaching minutes of the IWC deliberations, Ginbot 1953.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.15.07, Sile Ethiopiana Engliz, an anonymous confidential
memorandum, dated Miazia 8/1940.
MoI Files: No.1.2.44.12, Emperor’s Speech, University College, July 1960.
MoI Files: No.1.2.47.05, Eritrea, no date.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.47.08, University,Margaret Gillett, Registrar, HISU Office of the
Registrar, Prospectus 1963-1964, June 1963.
MoI Files: No.1.2.48.05, Donation of Genete Leul Palace to the University.
MoI Files: No.1.2.54.07, The National Amharic Language Academy, Mengistu Lemma
to H.E Tsehafetezaz Tefera-Worq Kidane-Wold, Nehassie 3/1964.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.67.06, The International Ethiopian Council for Study and Report.
Speaker’s Notes, nd.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.68.05, Yagezaz Denb, 1940 E.C.
MoI Files: No.1.2.70.17, Sile Sendeq Alama, no date.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.70.19, Governo Generale Dell’Africa Orientale Italians, 1939.
MoI Files: No.1.2.72.05, Ye’Remedan Tiri.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.76.20, A Manifesto Issued by the University College of Addis
Ababa,nd.
MoI Files: No.1.2.77.10, Ye’Arefa Bahil Akebaber.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.77.11, Ye’Remedan Bahil Akebaber.
MoI Files: No. 1.2.80.03, University College.
MoI Files: No. 8.09.20, Merid Wolde-Aregay to Dejazmach Zewde Gebresilassie,
December 22, 1968.
MoI Files: No. ከ.ተ, 12.06, Netsanet, A Review published by the Office of the
Representative of H.I.M in Eritrea, Press Department.
MoI Files: No.17.2.462.4, Ye’Etyopya Niguse Negest Mengist, Yager Gizat Minster,
Yetemariwoch Se’lf Tiyaqe, no date.
MoI Files: No. 17.2.462.07, Ye’Etyopya Niguse Negest Mengist Yepolis Serawit,
Yetemariwochin Hige Wet Adragot Lemaged Yeweta Memeria, 1962 E.C.
MoI Files: No.22.03.17, Abba Andrias Jaroussou’s Correspondence.
MoI Files: No.25.02, Le’Etyopia Min’aynet Mengist Yasfeligatal?, no date.

352
MoI Files: No.30.02.04, Wolde’ab and a Tigrean State, anonymous letter to Dejazmach
Zewde G/Silassie, 17/1/64 E.C.
MoI Files: No.50, Sile Bihereseboch Tinat, no date.
MoI Files: No.123. 48, Beyaqtachaw Silekebebun Tornetoch Tinat (1970EC).
MoI Files: No.129. 6.14, Ye’bihereseb Institute, no date.
MoI Files: No.714/7, 1, Ye’Edget Behibret Zemecha, no date.
MoI Files: No.1360, Ye’Eritrea Kifle Hager Guday, no date.
MoI Files: No.15836, Ye’Tigray, Ye’Asseb, Ye’Diredawana Ye’Ogaden Ras Gez
Akababiwoch Siltanina Tegbar Lemewesen Yeweta Awaj (1980EC).
MoI Files: No. 548, 171, Qelem Awraja.
MoI Files: No. 575/1, 173, Yirgalem Awraja.
MoI Files: No. 2212, 257, Yedangila Awraja Gizat.
MoI Files: no number, Ye’Kiflehageroch Ye’bahilna Ye’kinetibe Achir Report (1967 EC).
MoI Files: no number, Sile Ras’beras Yewist Astedader Yetederege Tinat (1969 EC).
MoI Files: no number, Ye’biher Bihereseboch Meteyeqna Tinat (1971 EC).
MoI Files: no number, Ras’n Beras Astedader Be’meshegageria Gizena
Be’hibretesebawinet Amerar (1969EC).
MoI Files: no number, Eritrea Kifle Hager Tsetita Gudayna Hizbawi Ginbar Harnet
Eritrea Ye’mejemeriaw Gubae Sened (1970EC).
MoI Files: no number, Colonel Kifle Ergetu, Director of Public Security, to Fitawrari
Kifle Dadi, Wollo GG Director, No.7/2729, Hidar 6/1941, Addis Ababa.
MoI Files: no number, President of YeEtyopiana YeHmassien Andinet Mahber
(Hamassien KeEtyopia) to the Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, No.293/29, Nehassie
10/1937, Addis Ababa.
MoI Files: no number, Abba Yohannes Gebre-Egziabher’s application to the Gibi
Minister, H.E. Tsehafetezaz Tefera Worq, Tahsas 19/1951.
IES Ms. No.2171. 'Ze'Metsehaf'.
IES Ms. No.75-15940. The Role of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Development. A
Consultation on January 5-6, 1971. Addis Ababa.

II. Newspapers and Other Publications

Addis Zemen: 20 Megabit 1964. 3 Nehassie 1965.

22,27 Meskerem 1966. 1,2, 3, 13,14 Tikemt 1966. 17,18, 25 Hidar 1966. 9, 20 Tahsas
1966. 27 Megabit 1966. 1 ,4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 Miazia 1966. 25 Ginbot 1966.4,7, 9, 11,
13, 27,28 Sene 1966. 1,9,20 Hamle 1966. 28 Nehassie 1966.

3, 7, 14,19 Meskerem 1967. 16, 21 Tikemt 1967. 10, 17, 25, 28 Hidar 1967. 11 Tahsas
1967. 1 Tir 1967. 2, 8, 9, 11, 17, 19, 23, 25 Yekatit 1967. 10, 11, 24, 25 Megabit 1967. 6
Miazia 1967. 7, 8, 9, 14, 22 Ginbot 1967. 20 Hamle 1967. 19,27,29 Nehassie 1967.

6, 11, 13, 16, 27 Miazia 1968. 10, 13, 14 Ginbot 1968. 18, 25 Nehassie 1968. 4 Puagmen
1968.
13, 16 Meskerem 1969. 5, 24 Tikemt 1969. 18 Sene 1969. 19 Hamle 1969.

353
2 Meskerem 1970. 8, 13 Hamle 1970. 2, 6,11 Meskerem 1971. 27 Hidar 1972. 7,9
Meskerem 1973. 10, 14, 17 Tikemt 1976. 1, 2 Meskerem 1977.

1, 3, 10, 16, 17, 23, 27, 29 Tir 1984. 25 Yekatit 1984. 1, 5, 28 Ginbot 1984. 18, 10, 19,
27 Sene 1984. 25 Hamle 1984.

1 Meskerem 1985. 27 Yekatit 1985. 7, 14, 25 Megabit 1985. 5 Miazia 1985.

12 Tir 1986. 1, 7, 8, 10, 14, 18, 21, 25, 27 Megabit 1986. 2, 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20
Miazia 1986. 4, 24, 25 Ginbot 1986. 1,5,28 Sene 1986.

10,13,19 Megabit 1987. 13, 20 Miazia 1987. 4, 24 Ginbot 1987. 2, 9 Sene 1987. 5, 11, 15
Hamle 1987.

8 Meskerem 1988. 6, 16 Tahsas 1988. 6,10,20 Nehassie 1989.

4, 17 Meskerem 1990. 16 Megabit 1990. 6, 8, 20, 28 Ginbot 1990. 5, 6, 27 Sene 1990. 13,
28, 29, 30 Nehassie 1990.

22 Meskerem 1991. 2, 26 Tir 1991. 18, 19 Ginbot 1991. 12, 19 Sene 1991. 7 Hidar 1992.
19 Ginbot 1992. 20, 22, 23 Ginbot 1993. 3, 7, 28, 29 Sene 1993. 1, 10 Ginbot 1995. 21,
22 Ginbot 1997. 5, 8, 10 Sene 1997.

Tobia(Newspaper), 21 Sene 1986; 14 Tahsas 1986; 10 Yekatit 1986; 3 Puagmen 1986;

5 Meskerem 1987; 12 Meskerem 1987; 25 Tir 1987; 2 Yekatit 1987; 14 Megabit 1987;
28 Megabit 1987; 24 Ginbot 1987.

Tobia Magazine, Year I, No.1, 1984.

Negarit Gazetta, 26th Year, No.6, 4 Yekatit 1959. Negarit Gazetta , 15 Hamle 1983.
Federal Negarit Gazetta, 6th Year, No.39, 27 June 2000.

Berhanena Selam : 10/3/27; 9/8/28; 27/5/26.

Hibret Dimts, No.1, 30 Nehassie 1969.

Reporter Magazine, III, 34/139, 26 Miazia 1990.

Challenge. The Journal of ESUNA. Vols. V( Nos.1,2); VI(nos.1,2),X(1, 2),XI(2) XII(1)XIII(1,2).

Journal of Oromo Studies (the). Volume I, Nos. 1(1993), 2(1994); volume II, Nos. 1&2 (1995);
volume III, Nos. 1&2(1996); volume IV, Nos. 1&2(1997); volume V, Nos. 1&2
(1998); volume VI, Nos. 1&2(1999); volume VII, Nos.1&2(2000); volume VIII,
Nos. 1&2(2001); volume IX, Nos. 1&2(2002); volume X, Nos.1&2(2003);
volume XI, Nos. 1&2(2004); volume XII, Nos.1&2(2005); volume XIII, Nos.

354
 1&2(2006); volume XIV, No.1(2007), No.2(2007).

Struggle. USUAA Paper. Vols.I(nos.1,2,3) II(nos.1,2,3,4,5)III(nos.1,)V(1,2); No Number(May

1970); VI(1).

Tiglachin. ESUE Paper. No.3(1962 EC); Special Issue(Meskerem 1963 EC); No.1(Tikemt 1963);
No.2(Tir 1963); No.3(Miazia 1963); No.1(Meskerem 1964).

Tewodros, Journal of the Ethiopian Students’ Association in the U.K. I, 1(1965).

The Third Five Year Plan: 1960-65 EC.

The 1931 Constitution.
The 1955 Revised Constitution.
The 1974 Draft Constitution.
The 1987 PDRE Constitution.
The 1991 TGE Charter.
The 1995 FDRE Constitution.
The 1996 GPNRS Constitution.
Ye’Tigray Hizb Netsa Awchi Dirijit Meglecha, Yekatit 1968 (Manifesto 1968).

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1981).

Bahru Zewde. "Relation Between Ethiopia and the Sudan on the Western Ethiopian Frontier
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Wudu Tafete. “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian State and the Alexandrian See:
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NAME OF THE DATE AND PLACE OF APPROXIMATE REMARKS

INFORMANT INTERVIEW AGE
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David Ott Korgang town 40
Desta Gebremariam Gambella town 75
Geleta Tasew Alem Ketema, Merhabete 68
George Nicolas Gambella town 70
Gore Jock Gambella town 35
John Jock Gambella town 65
John Riek Nihal Korgang town 48
Laekemariam Aemiro Debre Marqos 55
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Moses Gatkuoth Korgang town 51
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 APPENDIX

Appendix I: Symbols of the State.

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Appendix II: Ethiopia for All.

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