Ong vs unto

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice
of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-
demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not
heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative
cases against the complainant. They, however, did not have any bearing or connection to the
cause of his client,

The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide
him any information against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions
against the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s acts constitute malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent
their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate, or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
2nd version

FACTS:

The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian claiming for the support of the alleged child of the complainant with the latter. A few days
thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the
complainant.  In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms.
Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the
complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son.  

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother and that the
complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening
to sue them.  The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s
Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for
alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and
Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the
Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the
Solicitor General. According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and
dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment.  The records show
that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. The
complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as “highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constituting…malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of lawyer.

HELD: YES.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.  Rule 19.01
further commands that “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”

We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did
not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian.   Clearly, the respondent
has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01.  His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is
unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law
and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.   Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months
and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants, 

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spouses sec
ured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortgage document that the a
mount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signing of the documents w
as just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3months b
ecause of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate mortgage document 
and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00. Again, on the assurance that it was 
only for formality, the spouses signed the new REM document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the 10k and 
went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave them a sheet of 
paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a 
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused. It was alleg
ed that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused without t
he consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00 as an advance 
payment  and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was confronted, he still did n
ot turn over the money.

Issue:

Ruling:

As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.
From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estat
e Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the succe
ssive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have 
at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, p
articularly the provision appointing him as the complainants’ attorney-in-fact in the event of default in p
ayments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers cannot 
“without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discharge of a clien
t’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the partial payment 
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practi
ce of law but a continuing requirement.

Atty. Decena was disbarred.

Samar Mining Company v. Arnado G.R.

No. L-22304 July 30, 1968.

FACTS
In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded
compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for Samar Mining.
The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a
regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Mining’s lawyer, Atty. Benedicto
Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or
jurisdiction over said case because he was a “mere labor lawyer” who had no authority to render the
award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.

Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-
15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional administrators of the labor
department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the appeal has merit.

RULING
No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the hope of
“draining the resources of the poorer party” “and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion.”
The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration
of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered

Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.
ACHACOSO v. CA G.R. No. L-35867 June 28, 1973
FACTS: Upon the filing of the petition at bar for review of the CA decision (which dismissed
petitioner's petition for mandamus), respondents filed on an extensive eighteen page comment.
Meanwhile, petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed a motion for leave to file reply within 15 days
from notice alleging that there was need for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court may be fully
and completely informed of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the instant petition.", to
which the CA granted. On the last day for filing of the reply, counsel asked for an additional 15 days
averring that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the
undersigned counsel during the original period granted, he has not had sufficient material time to
complete the preparation of petitioner's reply." The Court granted the requested extension.

On the last day of the extended period for filing of the reply, viz, March 29, 1973 counsel again asked for
still another 15-day extension stating that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily
trial engagements of the undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioners reply. The undersigned counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his crowded
schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this extension, but respectfully assures the Honorable
Court that this will be the last one requested.' The CA granted counsel's motion for such third and last
extension.

The period for the filing of petitioner's reply lapsed on April 13, 1973 without counsel having filed any
reply manifestation explaining his failure to do so.

Accordingly, the CA denied the petition for review for lack of merit, further required petitioner's
counsel to show cause why discipline action should not be taken against him for failure to file the reply
after having obtained such leave and three extensions time within which to do so. Counsel explained
that he was retained in the ease "on a piece-work basis on the verbal understanding that all expenses
for the preparation of pleadings and the cost of services of stenographer-typist shall be furnished in
advance by petition upon being notified thereof," that when he asked for a third extension, he so
informed petitioner and requested him to remit the expenses (P500.00) for the preparation of reply as
per agreement" and that he tried to contact petitioner before the expiration of the extended period
but failed to do as petitioner

"was then most of the time out of his office."

ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s counsel properly relied on the ground of non-payment of his fees as his basis
for not submitting his reply

HELD: No, if indeed he was not in a financial position to advance the necessary expenses for preparing
and submitting the reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was
foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt
disposition of the case after the filing by respondents of their comments on the petition showing its lack
of merit. Verily, the counsel's conduct as an officer of the Court that after assuring the Court that the
third extension requested by him "in view of his crowded schedule" and "of urgent professional work
and daily trial engagements" would be the last within which period he would at last file the awaited
reply within which he thereafter to let the period simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever does
not reflect any good on him.

PENALTY: Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since
his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient in this instance.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera, with the warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
resolution be filed in his personal record.

DOCTRINE: The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time to
file their pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or even
an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so. The Court herein reprimands petitioner's
counsel for such misconduct with the warning that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more
severely.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Facts: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following advertisements: 

Annex A 
SECRET MARRIAGE? 
P560.00 for a valid marriage. 
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. 
ANNULMENT. VISA. 
THE Please call:521-0767, 
LEGAL 5217232,5222041 
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm 
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. 

Annex B 
GUAM DIVORCE 
DON PARKINSON 
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours. 
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. 

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., 

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy 
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 
522-2041; 521-0767 

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court
on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice
of law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal
services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or
have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).
The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a
lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements
for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely
do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondent’s defense with the
case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state.”
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein.

IN RE: TAGORDA

53 PHHIL. 37 (1929)

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, with a note that he can execute any
kind of affidavit and offers free consultation.

He also wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio requesting to transmit this information
to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed
of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not tagorda is guilty of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain or
employment.

HELD

The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. al

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

Respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. In
view of all the circumstances of this case, respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1,
1929,

LEDESMA v. CLIMACO

G.R. No. No. L-23815, 28 June 1974

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
On 13 October 1964, Adelino Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental, thus discharged his duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused pending in the court, he filed a motion to withdraw, but was denied by the respondent Judge
Rafael Climaco. He was also appointed by the Judge as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. As a
result, he filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to render full time service. The volume of work will also
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. However, the Judge still denied the said motion, as
well as the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT Ledesma, a member of the bar, may withdraw as counsel de oficio, due to an
appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:

NO, Ledesma may not withdraw as counsel de oficio for the sole reason of his appointment as Election
Registrar.

The provision in the Constitution states that, “Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against them.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

This manifests the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an accused. What is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficiomust be fully fulfilled. The ends of justice would be served by
allowing and requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel the officio, since the prosecution has already
rested its case—the case being postponed at least eight (8) times. It was also noted that there was no
incompatibility between his duty to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as
Election Registrar.

Hence, because of these considerations, it is suffice for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio.

AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

A.C. No. 1261

December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the agreement lawyer
David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission
agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

However, mutual accusations of double-cross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil Relation and to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which
is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and discountenances his
conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should have known better.

Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but
it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not involve
separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also
published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued
that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service
and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in
a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which
are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
ROBERTO ANTONIO et al.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-77656 Aug 31, 1987

FACTS:
Roberto Antonio et al. are lessees of an apartment building foreclosed
by the GSIS after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.
After due notice to Robert Antonio et al. the property was sold to the
private respondent Alicia Bilan at a public bidding held on July 29,
1982. The bidding was not attended by the lessees believing as
tenants, they have priority in law to acquire the property and their
participation would be deemed a waiver of their right to question the
act of the GSIS in selling the property and would adversely affect
their offer to buy the same. The property was awarded to private
respondent by GSIS and certified as the owner of the property. The
GSIS advised the petitioners to pay their rent and arrearages to
Alicia Bilan. But despite repeated written demands Roberto Antonio and
others failed and refused to settle their accounts prompting Alicia
Bilan to file a complaint for ejectment case with Metropolitan Trial
Court. Said court rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the
petitioners to vacate the premises. Antonio and others appealed to RTC
which, on August 20, 1985, rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC. The petitioners’ counsel of record is the law
office Funelas, Perez and Associates represented by Atty. Funelas
filed a petition for review on certiorari with CA. On December 5,
1986, CA dismissed the petition and copy of same was received by said
law firm on January 6, 1987 thru its messenger. Atty. Funelas then
was abroad and petitioners were not informed of the decision which
became final and executory on January 22, 1987. On February 23, 1987
Roberto Antonio et al through their new counsel, filed an "Appearance
and Motion for leave to Admit Motion For Reconsideration, together
with the Motion For Reconsideration with Prayer For Issuance TRO,"
with the CA, obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing
the same. They alleged that their counsel of record abandoned them and
migrated to the United States without at least informing them that a
decision was rendered against them. On December 5, 1986, CA denied the
petition.

ISSUES: WON the client is bound by the negligence of counsel.

HELD:

Yes, client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. It

is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to
invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving
promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address
of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that
communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence,
may reach him promptly.

Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie, May 10, 1985

FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the
name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used
the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay
replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of
another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitledto practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated

with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firmname Baker & McKenzie. 

Ouano v aleanor
Facts
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. (Mercantile) and petitioner
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. (OASI) for replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which
were insured by Mercantile but were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegendy because of mishandling
by petitioner OASI.
Petitioner OASI’s answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (LSA) and
signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, Atty. Fidel Manalo,
a partner from the Makati office of LSA filed to postpone the hearing stating that the case had just
been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI.
After trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court rendered a decision holding
Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable for the cost of replacement of the
damaged equipment plust damages, totalling P435,000.00.
Only Mercantile appealed from the decision. When the IPI filed a motion for execution of the
decision against petitioner OASI which public respondent granted, the petitioner’s cousel, through
Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA, filed a notice of appeal claiming that the decision was
“mistakenly sent” by the trial court to the law firm’s Head Office in Makati.
Petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the writ
of execution alleging that the failure to file an appeal was due to excusable neglect and slight
“oversight” claiming that there was miscommunication between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as
to who would file the notice of appeal. The respondent judge denied OASI’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced.
On appeal, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that there had been a valid service of
the decision and that it was final and executor upon OASI.
Hence, petition for review to the Court.
Issue
Whether or not LSA having represented itself to the public as a single firm, be allowed to contend
that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and
distinct personalities and responsibilities.
Held
Petitioner’s counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any particular
member or associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a branch
office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and branch offices operate under one and the
same name, Saludo Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a
single firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and its branch
office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities.

A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975 CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO, complainant, vs. MUN. JUDGE
BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAY, respondent.

Facts: Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain

parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the
object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios
in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent
herein, as ex-officio notary public, on January 25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge that
the vendors owned only one-third undivided portion of the property and that she and other cousins of
hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the
property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their
behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent
the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of
P3,500.00. Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer.
Forthwith a complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the
pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw P3,500.00 she
had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no action was taken by respondent.

Issue: WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948

Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides in
part: All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of sessions applicable to
courts of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the latter may, after office hours and
with the permission of the district judge concerned, engage in teaching or other vocation not involving
the practice of law ... Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the
complainant, Mrs. Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case. Respondent's claim is
belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested as follows: (a)
He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with regards to
the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for
purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He
wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land
in question. (d) When his attempts at an out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4591 for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees. (e)
He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it
was Atty. Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of
respondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio
are notified of the date of the trial. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or
participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of
a litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. The rule disqualifying a
municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the power
and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel.
Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a
party litigant.

CRUZ vs SALVA
FACTS:A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found
Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio,Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder.
They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again
found guilty. Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine
Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons
other than those convicted. Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct
reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and
the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation made available
to counsel for appellants. Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva
copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee
for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affi davits and
confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee
and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation because the case
was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition. Salva said
he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow
him to a ppea r a t the inve s tiga tion. SC iss ue d writ of pre limina ry
injunc ti on s topping the pre lim investigation.

ISSUES Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?

RULING: No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and
annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed
what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail
to fi nd any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this
regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal
case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in
court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by
this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and
the Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
 MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:

Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th
Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.

On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of

the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper
stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received
such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on
November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the
military court denied the challenge.

Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received,
no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness
and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's
own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of
the members of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial?

HELD:

NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed
to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees.

If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of
the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect
the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to
remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial
publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners
was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those
imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due
process.

Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the

petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced
but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the
suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought
by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until
calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the
publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the
trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

Cordova v. Labayen

Facts:

A judgment was rendered against the complainants Cordova ordering their ejectment and
payment of rentals until they have vacated the subject lots. Pursuant to such judgment, a writ of
execution was issued by the court. However, Atty. Sabio with complainants Cordova, filed an
administrative complaint against respondents seeking their disbarment, dismissal and
disqualification from office, claiming that having filed a supersedeas bond, the writ of execution
should not have been issued.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative complaint filed by Atty. Sabio is violative of Canon 1,
Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Yes. The court is convinced that the issuance of the writ of execution was done in the
valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties of respondent judges. There is no
evidence to prove the charge filed by Atty. Sabio. Such filing of totatlly baseless and unfounded
charges against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of
their own negligence or in an effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court is reprehensible.

As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or
pervert, the administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on
the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in
flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an
administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually to
frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms
and course of justice.

Wherefore, Atty. Sabio is suspended from practice of law for six months.

PASCUAL V LIM gr 191837

FACTS:
-

a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Consolacion Rivera-Pascual – Lost)

- Filed a petition for the issuance of an order directing Respondents to accept the amount of P
10,000,000.00 in order to redeem the property owned by Respondents and cancelling TCT No.
V-73892
-Argued that that the CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds is
unwarranted. Petitioner invoked substantial justice against the CA’s strict application of the rule
requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the
rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping defective in
the absence of the details of any one of her current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there was merit in her petition and that she
complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel’s MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated
and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her
motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her
petition and decide the same on its merits. Petitioner alleged that procedural rules or
technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should
be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
-Appealed to SC the decision of CA

b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Spouses Lim and Registry of Deeds – Win)

- CA dismissed Petitioner’s petition for failure of her counsel to submit within five (5) days from
notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. 18
Apparently, Petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of
Petitioner’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Petitioner’s identity apart from her community tax certificate

ISSUE:
- Whether or not Petitioner’s petition should prosper despite failure of her counsel to submit his
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification
Against Non-Forum-Shopping

RULING:
Conclusion:
- Petitioner’s petition should not prosper. The appeal is dismissed
Rule:
- This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every
member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should
they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction
Application:
- In this case, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded
to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however,
after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable cause
proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling
reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be
an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the
relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
Conclusion:
- Thus, Petitioner’s petition should not prosper. The appeal is dismissed

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005)

FACTS:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK
had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his
family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented
as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as
then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that
the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction
of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and boundsof the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is
used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agencyprocedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the
court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding
the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a
public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the service.

DOROTEO IGOY vs. ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO

A.M. No. 2001-9-SC July 14, 2006

Facts:

Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in a civil case entitled “Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et
al. v. Mactan Shangrila Hotel”.

Complainant said that while the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of
Appeals, he tried to look for a person in the Supreme Court who may assist him in
obtaining justice. A friend introduced complainant to a certain “Justice” of the Supreme
Court, which was Atty. Soriano. He narrated to the said Justice the history of their case.
In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum of P20K. However,
the said Justice reminded complainant that he could offer no help while the case was
pending before the Court of Appeals.

They lost in the CA. So Soriano prepared the petition for review to be filed with the
Supreme Court. He asked for another P20K. As promised the money was delivered,
which was claimed by Soriano’s son.
Soriano denies the money given, saying that it was only a token.

Soon, Soriano resigned from his office.

Issue:

WON Soriano committed acts which will warrant his disbarment? YES

Held:

The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse
him from any liability. To tolerate such acts would open the floodgates to fraud or graft
and corruption to be committed by officials and employees of the Court.

It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should not be

used as an easy way to escape administrative liability by a court personnel facing
administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go scot-free and be simply
forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution he was bound by his oath and The
Canons of Legal Ethics to serve with utmost integrity.

Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished his record
irreparably and under the circumstances, this office believes that dismissal as a penalty
is warranted.

The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not
mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working
standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. Those
involved in the administration of justice must live up to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity in the public service.

What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a
senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his
record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has
prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole.

DECISION: DISBARRED with FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Reyes v. Gaa
A.M. No. 1048. July 14, 1995.

Per Curiam

FACTS:

Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been
the victim of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. The NBI agents then
apprehended respondent in an entrapment operation set up by them.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of lawyer’s
oath.

RULING:

Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes as a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-
67 [1983]).

Trieste vs Sandiganbayan

Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan with 12
counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law for having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took
part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the
purchases of construction materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision, convicting the petitioner in all the
twelve criminal cases.

After the petition for review was filed, petitioner filed an urgent petition to lift the order of the
Sandiganbayan. There having no objection coming from the Solicitor General, the petition was
granted, hence lifting the preventive suspension. A supplemental petition was also filed by petitioner.

The former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the original petition and to the
supplemental petition filed by the petitioner. He argued the dismissal of the petition (the urgent petition
to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan) on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are,
therefore, non-reviewable.

In the briefs, however, the new Solicitor General, filed a “Manifestation For Acquittal,” concluding that:
(1) petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen; (2) Sales of stocks need not be reported to Sec; (3)
Prosecution failed to prove charges; (4) No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment; (5)
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment; etc.

Issue: WON the Solicitor General made a conscientious study and thorough analysis in the case.
Held: Yes. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of the Court by the SolGen and in
view of the reassessment made by the Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the
Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully
sustained. The conscientious study and thorough ananlysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in
this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People’s Advocate in the administration of
justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the
guilty punished.

This court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and
resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the
herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

Collantes vs. Renomeron

A.C. No. 3056. August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON, Respondent.

FACTS:
Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), filed an administrative
case against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G
for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its
subdivision.
V&G complied with the desired requirements, however, Renomeron suspended the registration
of the documents pending the compliance of the former with their “special conditions”, which was that
V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as
pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G or
GSIS representatives.
Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the question
on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the
registrability of the documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the registration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his
previous denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the
Court for his malfeasance as a public official?
HELD:
The Court ruled that Renomeron may be disciplined by the Court as public official for his
misconduct constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source
of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action  (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). As the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office,
the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any
corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official
have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269).
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron was disbarred from the practice of law and his name was
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

FACTS:

Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Vincent Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to the application of
V&G for registration of 163 pro forma. Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which respondent committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.
PNB vs. Cedo

Facts:    PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not,
after leaving gov’t. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he
had intervened with in said service.  Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management
Group of PNB.

                                During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel
sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action
arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also,
when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firmCedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.

                                Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He also
claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty.
Ferrer.

Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.

Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.

                    In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client,
inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of  other matters
that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty.
utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that
their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.

                    It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the
parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 8243               July 24, 2009

FACTS:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez (respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel (later renamed as Precedent) and earned the ire of investors
after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being
appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at
Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of respondent but no Retainer Agreement was executed. Atty.
Lopez gave regular advice, helped prepare standard quitclaims, solicited money and properties
from complainant to pay the creditors and even discussed a collection case for the company.
Soon, complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with him.
Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the
money, documents and properties given to the latter but respondent failed to provide a clear
audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the complainant to the respondent.
Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

ISSUE: WON a lawyer-client relationship was created.

RULING: YES.

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent
and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The absence of a written contract
will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors
and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009

FACTS: Rebecca J. Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Felipe
Iledan, Jr. as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty.
Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach of the lawyer-client relationship occurred
during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting cannot
take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of
the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a
breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.

The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the
counsel of Soledad who was filed with an Estafa case by Comtech.

ISSUE: Whether or not (a) respondent violated the Confidentiality of Lawyer-

Client Relationship; and (b) respondent is guilty of representing an interest in
conflict with that of a former client

RULING: No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the
corporate by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be
considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of
new by-laws may be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a
majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding
capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation.” It
means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws.
Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies
of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of
incorporation and by-laws. The documents are public records and could not be
considered confidential.

It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed
with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential.
Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting
could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within
the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented

Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents
Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There
was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against
Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s
retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the
termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable
duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon
the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

The Court DISMISSED the complaint against Atty. Felipe Ileda, Jr. for
lack of merit.

Villanueva v Gonzales 544 scra 410

Facts:

Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
transferring the title over a piece of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as
mortgagee, wanted to transfer the title to her name because the mortgagor failed to
redeem the property within the redemption period and the sheriff had already issued a
sheriff's definite deed of sale in complainant's favor. Complainant gave
respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the property's TCT, and other pertinent
documents.1

After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid
complainant. Whenever complainant went to respondent's, respondent's secretary
would tell her that respondent could not be disturbed because he was either sleeping or
doing something important.

After some time and after complainant's daughter confronted him, respondent finally
returned the money. However, until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and
other documents.

Thus, complainant filed a complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit his
answer to the complaint. Respondent did not submit an answer. IBP Commissioner for
Bar Discipline Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint, and set the mandatory conference. Respondent did not submit an
answer or attend the mandatory conference. The Commission on Bar Discipline
considered the case submitted for resolution.

Issue: whether or not Gonzales is guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior

Ruling:

IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found
respondent guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he failed to perform any
legal service to his client, (2) he did not inform his client about the status of the case,
(3) he returned the P8,000 acceptance fee without any explanation, and (4) he was
indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent violated Canons 16 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year.

In a Resolution the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the
Report with modification. The IBP Board suspended respondent from the practice of law
for six months and ordered him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the
other documents.

The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification.
Respondent violated Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent Refused to Account for
and Return His Client's Money. Respondent Refuses to Return
His Client's TCT and Other Documents. Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence. Respondent Did Not Keep His Client
Informed
of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information. Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP

Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility because an attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in
nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons 16,
17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,

the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality
of this Decision, 

ORDERS him to RETURN the TCT and all other documents to complainant within 15

days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or
similar offense, including the failure to return the TCT and all other documents as
required herein, shall be dealt with more severely.

SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. FRIAL

Facts:

A writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favour of Lucy Lo, the client of Atty. Frial, over
two cars – a black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra. According to Atty. Salomon, the
attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them
over to Atty. Frial.

The Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals on several occasions. As
for the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately withheld information
as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the court was
not immediately put on notice of this development.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found in its Report that while there is perhaps no direct
evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact remains that it was
being used by other persons during the time he was supposed to have custody of it. As for the Volvo,
Atty. Frials could not explain the circumstances behind its destruction, but admitted not reporting the
burning to the court or sheriff. Thus, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial committed acts clearly
bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to observe the diligence required of him as
custodian of the cars. The Commission recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year.

Issue:

Is Atty. Frial guilty of grave misconduct in dealing with the 2 cars belonging to Luco Lo?

Ruling:

YES, Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics that states:

11. Dealing with trust property

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He
also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform
the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody
of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.

The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Thus, the Court found that a year’s suspension from the practice of his legal profession will provide him
with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, vs ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009

Facts:

Chua, friend of Dolores referred Atty. Macasa, for legal servicesin connection with the arrest of her son
for Violation of RA 9165. Atty. Macasa agreed to handle the case for P30,000.00. Dolores made 3 partial
payments on different occasions and P18,000 purpose of posting a bond to secure the liberty of his son,
however no receipt was issued by Atty. Macasa. Dolores found out that Atty. Macasa did not remit the
amount to the court supposed to be intended for the provisional liberty of her son. She demanded the
return of P18,000 several times but respondent ignored her. Moreover, Atty. Macasa failed to act on the
case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail the services of a PAO lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Macasa grossly neglected his duties for the cause of his client.

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. A lawyer who
accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and
effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly
striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and
ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally
applied.

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his
client with competence and diligence. [17] He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such
relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following
representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers
similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the
litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and
in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to
adequately safeguard his clients interest. [18]

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel
and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy
in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical. [19]

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal
assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on
account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the
Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right
to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the
provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.

Case Digest: Canoy VS. Atty. Ortiz [ A.C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005]
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Atty. Ortiz’s services were engaged by Canoy, who was illegally dismissed by his former employer. Canoy
filed the complaint against his former employer with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Regional Arbitration Board VI of Bacolod City.

The labor arbiter holding the said case ordered Canoy and the Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines to submit
their respective position papers. Canoy thereafter submitted pertinent documents to Atty.Ortiz for the
preparation of the said position paper. Canoy made several trips to respondent’s law office to follow-up
the status of the position paper required by the labor arbiter. After many visits Canoy failed to meet
Atty. Ortiz, so he decided to go to NLRC to follow-up the case himself. He found out that the complaint
was already dismissed couple of years ago because of failure to prosecute and that no position papers
were submitted.

Thereafter, Canoy filed a complaint with the Bar Confidant accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct and
malpractice.

In his defense, Atty. Ortiz said that he already prepared the position paper of Canoy but failed to submit
it until the labor arbiter issued an order to dismiss the case. Atty. Ortiz said that he was not able to
comply with the requirement of the labor arbiter because he was too busy being a newly elected
Councilor of Bacolod City while practicing law at the same time.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Atty. Ortiz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by abandoning the cause of
his client.

HELD:

The IBP, in their investigation, found out that Atty. Ortiz clearly showed that he failed to exercise that
degree of competence and diligence required of him.

He should have filed the position paper on time owing his duty as Canoy’s counsel. Or he should have
resorted to other means like asking for an extension to comply with the said requirement if his busy
schedule would not allow him to file the pertinent document on time. Lastly, he should have informed
his client that he would not be able to make a timely filing to give his client more time to look for
remedies.

**Atty. Ortiz was suspended for 1 month and is warned.

PLUS BUILDERS INC. VS. REVILLA, JR.

FACTS: This administrative case originated from a verified petition for disbarment filed by Plus
Builders Inc. and Edgardo Garcia before the IBP. Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with
committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes
to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law.

Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, the Provincial
Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus
Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. Tenants/farmers filed several verified pleadings as part of
the records of DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG
NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties, acknowledging the rights of the registered
owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant
Plus Builders, Inc.

On December 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty.

Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result,
PARAD did not give due course to the same. Another counsel for

TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing

TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the Kalayaan

Development Cooperative (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that
they received the Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and
jurisprudence. On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary
judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation granted to
Tenants/Farmers, filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption and Amendment of
Judgment'.

After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a
Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to
Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by
Respondent before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant
case was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Roxas). On the basis of the petition, a Temporary
Restraining Order was issued. The case was appealed to the CA and the assailed orders issued by DARAB
are declared null and void. It was further elevated to SC and dismissed the case with finality.

Enraged by his defeat, respondent filed a verified action to quiet title before the RTC praying for a TRO
to deliberately stop the enforcement of the decisions of the higher courts. He signed his pleading under
a signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as KDC LEGAL
SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included

KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact,
under the Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was
specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on record for the cooperative and
respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the
practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to become "counsel on record”.

Respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the action to quiet title, he had
merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients. According to him, they sincerely and
honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened into ownership.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of his clients
in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," in order to secure a temporary
restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the
provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999. Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined
that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law was neither
satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so led to the
presumption that the allegation was true. Thus, the investigating officer recommended a suspension
from the practice of law for 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Revilla, Jr. committed gross misconduct.

HELD: Yes. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They
act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are
expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or
from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession. Thus,
while lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to
the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected.

In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show,
however, that his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the
execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999. It must be noted that
when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a different
forum to pursue his clients' lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his
clients as tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the
action to quiet title, however, he conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging
that his clients were adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to
obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision.
Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of
ownership of the land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship
existing between his clients and complainants, as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.

Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of
respondent to challenge the allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of the accusation. His silence on this
accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it.

PENALTY IMPOSED: Guilty of Gross Misconduct. He is

suspended for 2 years from the practice of law effective
upon his receipt of the decision.

Ceniza v. Rubia

Facts: Ma. Earl Beverly Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
falsification of public documents. Ceniza sought the legal services of Rubia in regard to the share of her mother-in-
law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. Allegedly, Rubia filed her complaint in a court that has no jurisdiction
of the said properties to be recovered, forged the signature of Ceniza’s husband in a certain affidavit and
misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court when in fact, upon verification, it was not. But upon
the IBP investigation, the allegations filed by Ceniza have no factual basis. However, IBP found that Rubia committed
some acts for which she should be sanctioned, she leave Ceniza with no representation and failed to maintain open
communication regarding the status of the said complaint due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new
employer Nakayama Group of Companies. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal
of services.

Issue: Whether or not Rubia’s withdrawal of service is reasonable.

Held: Rubia’s withdrawal of service is unreasonable because when she accepted to handle the case of Ceniza she is
expected to do her duties with utmost attention, skill and competence, despite other workloads to do with other client.
This is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that states: A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate to the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who is task to assist in the administration
of justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to client. Thus, Rubia is
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Fidela Vda. De Enriquez v. Atty. Manuel San Jose

A.C. no. 3569, 516 SCRA 486, February 23, 2007

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda.

De Enriquez against respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.

Facts:

Complainant Vda. De Enriquez hired the services of respondent Atty. San

Jose for the purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against Rugerio
Alipante, complainant's lessee. According to her, she paid P 2,000.00 to the
respondent as attorney's fees but the latter failed to file the appropriate case.
As a result, she decided to withdraw the case from respondent and demanded
the return of pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent
refused and failed to return the documents. Furthermore, complainant alleged
that her daughter who worked for respondent did not received any salary
therefrom. Thus, complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent on
the ground of gross negligence.

On the other hand, respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he

received a letter from the complainant informing him that the lessee had
already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the filing of an unlawful
detainer case had become unnecessary.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross negligence and violates

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a

lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. A lawyer engaged to represent a
client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with
utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence
and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds
of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is
qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and
give the appropriate attention to his legal work. In the instant case, respondent
fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. It is
undisputed that respondent was hired by the complainant on August 28, 1989,
and that respondent sent the notice to vacate to the lessee before the
appropriate unlawful detainer case could be filed. However, after nine months,
respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case. Moreover,
the respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case after sending a demand
letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the
part of respondent.

Adjudication:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared

guilty of violation of Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution. He is ordered
to return to complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000
with 12% interest per annum from the date of the promulgation of this
Resolution until the full amount shall have been returned.

Uy v Tansinsin*

FACTS:
To defend her rights, complainant engaged the services of respondent who timely
filed an Answer to the complaint for ejectment. Required to file a Position Paper,
respondent, however, failed to file one for and on behalf of the complainant.
Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MeTC against the complainant.
Complainant, through respondent, elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) by filing a Notice of Appeal. In an Order dated May 25, 2004, the RTC
dismissed the appeal solely because of the failure of respondent to file a
memorandum on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for
having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:
Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel,
complainant initiated the disbarment case against respondent, before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD). Complainant
averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to respondent, but the latter
failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate.

RULING:
Respondent indeed violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.
Respondent ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more
severely.

PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA
(A.C. No. 5128) 31 March 2005

The Case: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer for disbarment

Facts: Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s relationship with
the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.

The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s counterclaim in a civil case
filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the
dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover
his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento was forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to
institute an action to recover the subject property.

In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental.  The Deed of
Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent.  Since there was another
person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent’s advice to build a
small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order
for complainant to establish his possession of the said property.  Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to
vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante,
Negros Occidental.  Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew
Held/Ruling:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.”
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to determine if there is a representation of
conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which
he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure
to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being
in that instance no conflict of interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the
lawyer’s new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client’s action, the
lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for the former client or
to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.

PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc v. NLRC (December 14, 2006)

Facts

In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines for and in behalf of
its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine. Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex for 12 months
with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate
of US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance
of US$175.00.

On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left foot. A request for medical
examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an
unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore.
He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996, a vessel's
agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the
Philippines. On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the
latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the complainant. NLRC
affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.
The respondent was not guilty of desertion to justify his dismissal. Petitioners admit that they did
not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and that they failed to
conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners
contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment. Thus the supreme court granted salary to
respondent and other allowances.

ISSUE (RELEVANT TO CANON 20): Whether or not the labor arbiter and NLRC erred in
awarding attorney’s fees.

Ruling(RELEVANT TO CANON 20):

[T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary
concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for recovery of
wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award
shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept
of attorney's fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party
may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages
recovered x x x

The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in
the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still
necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the employer
acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing
that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly, as in this case. In carrying out and interpreting
the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the employee's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration. In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC failed to state the reasons why attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that
private respondent was illegally terminated from his employment and that his wages and other
benefits were withheld from him without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he is
compelled to file an action for the recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and, in the
process, incurred expenses. On these bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.

Ma Luisa Hadjula vs Atty Madianda

AC 6711

( Canlas, P.A)

Facts

Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the BFP
(Bureau of Fire Protection). Complainant claimed that she approached respondent for some legal
advice and in the course of their conversation, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies
of marriage certificate, baptismal certificate etc. However, respondent refused to have her as client
and instead directed her to a lawyer friend.

Complainant filed criminal and disciplinary actions against respondent – in relation to the alleged
demand for a cellular phone by the respondent to grant complainant’s as the latter was part of BFP
promotion board

COUNTER COMPLAINT was filed by the respondent based on the information she received from
complainant when the latter tried to seek legal services from her. (Anti graft and corruption; Immoral
conduct )

Issue:

Whether the act of respondent in using the information she acquired from complainant when the
latter tried to seek legal advice from her was a violation of the rule on confidentiality.

Ruling:

Yes!

- The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon
the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the
burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to
keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The
fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement
follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was
executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship

- What at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing
charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data
were readily available.

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

FACTS:

1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition  to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
 1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

                                              i.     Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife
in front of media practitioners and other people. 

                                             ii.     Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife
causing the injuries to the latter.

2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the
Bar.

2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.

2. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as
“closed and terminated.” 

                                              i.     Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.

2. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.

3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

2. Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss
cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. 

3. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for
the Court to ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:

WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:

PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension
to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar).
 1. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”

1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters.                                           
i.     Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.

2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

1. Limited to citizens of  good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.

2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he
or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by
any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her.” 

1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

In re Edillon

(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,
there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY TAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. RENATO L.
GONZALES, respondent.

Facts:

Complainant purchased several parcels of land in Manila Southwoods Residential Estates owned FEGDI
and FEPI. Complainant was made to execute a Deed of Sale. Respondent Renato L. Gonzales, employed
as corporate counsel for FEPI and appointed/reappointed from 1996 to 2001 as notary public for
Quezon City, was the notarizing officer of Deed on which the name and signature of Bondoc appear as
the vendor's authorized representative. The office of FEPI is in Pasig.

complainant claims, Ms. Bondoc, signatory (for FEGDI as vendor) to Deed, that she had not personally
met nor transacted with her either with respect to the negotiations for the sale of the land nor during
the execution of Deed. Complainant would add, however, that Ms. Bondoc admitted that she and the
complainant did sign the said deed of sale, but at different times and in different places, and not in each
other's presence, like other "signed hundreds of deeds ( of sale) over other documents for our behalf of
the President [of Fil-Estate] with buyers

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Law

Held:

Yes. respondent breached the injunction against notarizing a document in a place outside one's
commission. As reported by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged that from
February 1, 1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period Deed 1108 was notarized, his notarial

commission then issued was for Quezon City. The Deed was, however, notarized in Pasig City. To
compound matters, he admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in Pasig City, where he used
to hold office, during the period that his notarial commission was only for and within Quezon City.

respondent's act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his
notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. For all legal intents and purposes,
respondent, by performing through the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized,
has indulged in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against

respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal
259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and
1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years
in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES:  Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of
law and for being a senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does
not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not
include payment of membershipor association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.