Professional Documents
Culture Documents
weaver
The intersection of force and diplomacy is one of many important topics in the
fields of history and national security. Examining their conjunction brings aca-
demic specialties together and broadens one’s understanding of how political
1. Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of
Nuclear War (New York, 2008), xvi–xv. Thanks go to Richard Immerman, H. W. Brands, and the
anonymous readers at Diplomatic History for comments on earlier drafts of this article. The views
expressed in this article are my own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Air Force, Air
University, the Department of Defense, nor the U.S. government.
2. Dominic Tierney, “ ‘Pearl Harbor in Reverse:’ Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (2007): 49–51.
3. Kenneth Michael Absher, Mind-sets and Missiles: A First-Hand Account of the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Carlisle, PA, 2009), 85–87. Len Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War:
Lessons from History (London and New York, 2007), 141–62—a chapter that reviews the lessons of
the crisis.
Diplomatic History, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2014). ß The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University
Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. doi:10.1093/dh/dht070
Advance Access publication on April 29, 2013
137
138 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
readers, particularly those who will execute policy in the future, to understand the
ways in which force and diplomacy interact.
Historical experience has demonstrated that national security strategy is more
effectively served when military strategy and diplomacy are integrated.4 In prac-
tice, the role for the military during a crisis may range from active use, to an
instrument that makes a negotiated settlement attractive, or it may remain in the
background because its misuse could trigger an avoidable war. At the very least,
wielders of the diplomatic and military instruments of power need to take each
other into account, but a tendency of treating the two as profoundly different
remains. War, military actions short of war, and diplomacy mutually support
each other when thought of as instruments of power that inhabit the same
4. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our
Time, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford, 1995), 258–59.
5. Frederick W. Kagan, “Power and Persuasion,” The Wilson Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2005): 57.
6. See, for example, Kagan, “Power and Persuasion,” 57, Allan Ramsay, “British Diplomacy,”
Contemporary Review 292 (2010): 4. David Williard, “When Scholars Inform Public Policy,”
William & Mary News and Events, May 5, 2008, http://www.wm.edu/news/stories/archive/2008/
when-scholars-inform-public-policy.php (accessed April 15, 2013); Patton Oswalt, “Guns and
Yoga,” New York Times Magazine, March 25, 2007, 30. “Excerpts from an Interview with John
Kerry on Diplomacy and Defense,” New York Times, May 30, 2004, 12.
7. Paul Gordon Lauren, “Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in
History,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed., ed. Alexander L. George and William E.
Simons (Boulder, CO, 1994), 23–25.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 139
his country.”8 In his theory of coercion, Thomas Schelling observed that effective
diplomacy requires a reserve of military force that could be utilized to achieve one’s
goals.9 Regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, Alexander George has written that a
“purely diplomatic option” actually entailed risks of escalation into military
strikes.10
Neither is the use of diplomacy with military force an innovation new to
political leaders. The power and threat of the Royal Navy aided Great Britain
while it pursued favorable outcomes over conflicts with the United States such as
the boundary between Maine and British Canada, and the dispute over Oregon
during the 1840s.11 During the Mexican War, the Polk Administration blended
negotiations with military actions in order to achieve a lasting resolution.12
8. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed.
(New York, 1972), 519.
9. Thomas C. Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT and London, 1966), 172.
10. Alexander L. George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution through Coercive
Diplomacy,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 114.
11. Rebecca Berens Matzke, “Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American
Relations, 1838-1846,” War in History 8, no. 1 (2001): 30–35.
12. Dean B. Mahin, Olive Branch and Sword: The United States and Mexico, 1845-1848
(Jefferson, NC, 1997), 76, 82, 105, 109, 117, 161, 184.
13. William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
(Princeton, NJ and Oxford, 2002), 151. Stueck’s is not an argument that force and diplomacy
were the sole factors in this war. Ideological differences, distrust, disputes over the fate of prisoners
of war, and culture, for example, were all important issues.
14. Donald W. Boose, Jr., “The Korean War Truce Talks: A Study in Conflict Termination,”
Parameters 30, no. 1 (2000), 106, 111.
15. Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu
Crisis,” International Security 12, no. 4 (1988): 107–8, 118–19.
16. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations,
1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY and London, 1992), 239–40, 245–46, 248, 260. Leonard J. Gordon,
“United States Opposition to the Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962,” The Journal of
American History 72, no. 3 (1985): 644–52, 660. Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety,
Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE, 1999), 178–86. Eisenhower recog-
nized that force or force and diplomacy would not always serve his objectives. The limited ability
140 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
threat of military action “as a highly refined instrument of diplomacy,”17 but the
Cuban Missile Crisis was not Kennedy’s first use of a force and diplomacy strategy.
He utilized a deployment of conventional military forces to Europe, along with
additional instruments of power from across the NATO alliance, particularly
diplomacy, to help persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate an end to the Berlin
Crisis of 1961–1962.18 Despite the evidence of case studies such as these, the
mutually supporting relationship between diplomacy and military force is
common knowledge only among academic and professional specialists. Ideally,
my contribution will not only pass muster among Cuban Missile Crisis experts
but will also prove useful in educating individuals that force and diplomacy are best
examined in tandem.
to project power into Hungary, for example, and Eisenhower’s desire to avoid escalation into “all-
out war,” persuaded him to rely on information warfare and diplomacy during the Soviet invasion
of Hungary in 1956. James D. Marchio, “Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives:
U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising,”
The Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (2002): 791–92.
17. Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, 260.
18. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, May 5, 1961,
Charles S. Sampson, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIV: Berlin Crisis,
1961-1962 (Washington, DC, 1993), 62. Memorandum of Conversation, Ministerial
Consultations on Berlin, August 5, 1961, ibid., 283–87. National Security Action Memorandum
No. 92, September 8, 1961, ibid., 398–99. Memorandum of Conversation, September 15, 1961,
ibid., 413–14. Minutes of Meeting, October 19, 1961, ibid., 487–88. Lawrence Freedman,
Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York and Oxford, 2000), 67. Toshihiko
Aono, “‘It Is Not Easy for the United States to Carry the Whole Load:’ Anglo-American Relations
during the Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 326, 328, 338.
19. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an
American Adversary (New York and London, 2006), 431, 434–36. Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s
Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 (Washington, DC
and London, 2002), 82. Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban
Missile Crisis (Stanford, CA, 2005), 18–19. Medium-range “R-12” ballistic missiles (MRBMs) had a
1,292-mile range; intermediate-range “R-14” ballistic missiles (IRBMs) had a 2,796-mile range.
Both had the capacity to be armed with one hydrogen bomb per missile. Their inaccuracy pre-
cluded using a warhead with a smaller yield. Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
(Cambridge, MA and London, 2001), 185, 188.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 141
20. Dobbs, One Minute, 79. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 439. Norman
Polmar and John D. Gresham, Defcon-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, with a foreword by Tom Clancy (Hoboken, NJ, 2006), 62, 66.
21. Major Richard S. Heyser, Interview by Robert Kipp, November 27, 1962, K239.0512-749,
Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. James G.
Hershberg, “‘Before the Missiles of October:’ Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against
Cuba?” Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (1990): 171.
142 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
22. Hershberg, “ ‘Before the Missiles of October,’ ” 163–64, 171. Memorandum from the
Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy: Report of Conversation with Ambassador
Dobrynin on Saturday, October 13, Regarding Cuba and Other Subjects, Edward C. Keefer,
Charles S. Sampson, and Louis J. Smith, eds., David S. Patterson, general editor, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington,
DC, 1996), 28. Hereafter referred to as FRUS XI.
23. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics,
June 24, 1961, Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar, and W. Taylor Fain III, eds., Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-63, XII: American Republics (Washington, DC, 1996), 255–57.
Hereafter referred to as FRUS XII. Kennedy’s goal was American security, and when push came to
shove, he valued anticommunism over the expansion of liberalism and democracy. Stephen Rabe,
“Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in Kennedy’s Quest
for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York and Oxford,
1989), 115–16. James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (2004): 9.
24. Memorandum of Conversation, Conference between President Kennedy and Venezuelan
President Betancourt, December 16, 1961, FRUS XII, 273.
25. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to
Secretary of State Rusk, September 30, FRUS XII, 328–29.
26. A. Lincoln Gordon, Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State,
January 4, 1962, FRUS XII, 282.
27. Memorandum of Conversation, June 29, 1962, FRUS XII, 313.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 143
something was afoot in July upon digesting reports from Cuban refugees, reports
from inside Cuba, U-2 photographs, surface-to-air missile sites, and even “routine
shipping intelligence.” He saw that the Soviets were funneling conventional
weapons into Cuba and quickly warned the administration “that the Soviets
might be placing Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba.” As a con-
sequence, the defense community began thinking about options, dangers, and
complications that would be the results of such an action by the Soviets before
the crisis was upon them.36 In this way, intelligence gathering and analysis helped
to provide analytical tools and plans for the execution of mutually supporting force
and diplomacy. Even though Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-
62 concluded that the Soviets would find placing missiles in Cuba too risky,
36. James J. Wirtz, “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” in Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, ed. James G. Blight and David A. Welch
(London and Portland, OR, 1998), 134. Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who
Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (New York, 1992), 331.
Editorial Note, FRUS X, 923. Peter S. Usowski, “John McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A
Persistent Approach to the Intelligence-Policy Relationship,” International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 2, no. 4 (1988): 555.
37. Special National Intelligence Document 85-3-62, FRUS X, 1071. Usowski, “John
McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 558–59. Indeed, it is conceivable that the United States
would not have detected the missiles in time without McCone’s intuition and leadership.
38. Raymond L. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Intelligence and the
Cuban Missile Crisis, ed. James G. Blight and David A. Welch (London and Portland, OR, 1998),
23, 18.
39. Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962. Historical Study No. 90 Vol. 1,
K416.01-90 v. 1, p. 13. AFHRA. Excerpt declassified in accordance with EO12958.
40. Robert Weisbrot, Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American
Confidence (Chicago, 2001), 76–79. Memory and film portray the surprise of the Cuban Missile
Crisis as a completely unexpected bolt from the blue, but in fact the kinds of suspicions McCone
and McNamara held were shared among the media beginning in August. “Russian Ships Arrive,”
Time, August 31, 1962, 31. “Cuba: The Russian Presence,” Time, September 14, 1962, 42. It
should be noted that there were “hundreds” of reports that ballistic missiles were being placed in
Cuba—all of which were proven at the time to be false. Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence in the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” 22–23.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 145
island, but Kennedy had naval forces practicing for an invasion just in case, and Air
Force fighter-bombers trained for air strikes against Cuba.41 The administration
knew that there were large numbers of Soviet technicians and workers in Cuba two
months before the crisis.42 Kennedy himself was involved in the October 9 deci-
sion to send a U-2 to photograph suspected ballistic missile sites.43 Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy’s back channel to Khrushchev, Georgi Bolshakov,
had raised the president’s expectations with assurances that the USSR would
never place “surface-to-surface missiles” in Cuba, but U-2 overflights on
October 14 and 15 found signs of a medium-range missile site at Los Palacios,
Cuba, and IRBM sites at Guanajay, Cuba.44 Nevertheless, the realization of the
41. Sheldon M. Stern, Averting “The Final Failure:” John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile
Crisis Meetings (Stanford, CA, 2003), 26. Hershberg, “Before the Missiles of October,” 186–87.
“The Tactical Air Command and the Cuban Crisis,” 683. File K417.01 62/07/00 - 62/12/00, Vol.
2, pp. 677–82. AFHRA. Excerpt declassified in accordance with EO12958.
42. Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Acting
Secretary of State Ball. August 25, 1962. FRUS X, Document 390.
43. Editorial Note, FRUS XI, 28.
44. Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History (New York
and Oxford, 2007), 53. Dino A. Brugioni, and Robert F. McCort, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story
of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1991), 198–99. Strategic Air Command Operations, 11.
AFHRA.
146 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
45. Dobbs, One Minute, 4–6. Brugioni and McCort, Eyeball, 223–24.
46. John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to
Bush (New York, 1991), 106. The president utilized this subset of the NSC because that body
“made him uncomfortable. It was large, hard to manage, and leaky. But Excomm, especially with
Robert Kennedy hovering in the background, gave JFK just what he needed, a small cohesive, and
controllable group that represented political support for the action he needed.” Robert Smith
Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile
Crisis (New York, 1992), 186. Prados differs with Thompson, noting that seventy-one persons had
been “cleared to attend the Excom.” Prados, National Security Council, 110. President Kennedy
stocked Ex Comm with individuals sure to debate each other and even excused himself from some
of the meetings so as to encourage free discussion. Weisbrot, Maximum Danger, 93–94. The
following April the “NSC Standing Group” was established to concentrate on longer range
planning and monitor “on-going programs.” Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the
National Security Council during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Washington, DC,
1988), 52–54. Members of the Ex Comm included President John F. Kennedy, Vice President
Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone,
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Undersecretary
of State George Ball, Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, Special Counsel Theodore
Sorensen. John F. Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandum 196, October 22, 1962.
FRUS, XI, 157.
47. Discussion in Secretary Rusk’s Office, August 21, 1962. FRUS X. Document 382. John A.
McCone, Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy, August 23, 1962. Ibid., Document
385. Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy
Planning Council (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy), August 31, 1962. Ibid., Document 400. Memorandum from the President’s Special
Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President’s Military Aid
(Clifton), September 1, 1962. Ibid., Document 402.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 147
options complemented each other: “we’ll develop both tracks,” General Taylor
commented. Diplomatic efforts not only held the possibility of success in their own
right, they also paved the way for military action should that prove necessary by
justifying such actions to the world. At the same time, preparations for an invasion,
a blockade, and air strikes were more than prudent; they encouraged the Soviets to
choose to resolve the crisis via negotiations, since military action was a near-term
threat and not a future abstraction.
Ex Comm also concluded that if they chose to destroy the missiles, it would be
necessary to strike before they became operational, so as a consequence the ad-
ministration had to resolve the crisis quickly.48 In this instance human intelligence,
specifically that of Oleg Penkovsky, helped the administration realize that it had
48. Transcript of a Meeting at the White House, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m., FRUS XI,
31–43, 45. Another transcript of this meeting asserts that Secretary Rusk stated, “we’ll develop
both tracks,” Earnest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House
during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA and London, 1997), 72.
49. Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who Saved the World, 334. L. V. Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy, and
the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military, and Intelligence Aspects (Houndmills, UK and New York,
1999), 127–29.
50. Scott, Macmillan, 128. Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who Saved the World, 335.
51. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba,
October 16, 1962. Central Intelligence Agency, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, with
an Introduction by Graham T. Allison, Jr. (Washington, DC, New York, and London, 1994), 143.
Meeting at the White House, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m., FRUS XI, 31–32. No author, “State
Department Internal Paper,” October 17, 1962, NSAD, 643.
148 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
they moved against Berlin.52 Others believed Khrushchev also wished to establish
leverage against U.S. missiles in Turkey in addition to bringing the Berlin issue to a
head—political objectives which made it likely that the Soviets would be amenable
a political solution.53 In an ideal world, Kennedy would have known why the
Soviets had sent missiles to Cuba, but intelligence briefs had not provided a
definitive explanation. That meant that the president could not apply force and
diplomacy against a firm target; he could use them only against what he believed
the Soviet motivation was.54
Ex Comm recognized several technical and diplomatic shortcomings of mili-
tary action by itself. For one, they did not know if they had found every site, and
certainty was out of reach because bad weather might prevent complete photo-
52. Meeting at the White House, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m., FRUS XI, 35–37. The
Americans later concluded that R-12 launchers were operational on October 15. John M.
McCone, Memorandum for Record, November 3, 1962. FRUS XI, 361. This source states that
twenty-four launchers were ready, but a Soviet source states that “up to eight missiles” could be
launched on October 20. Polmar, DEFCON-2, 179.
53. John A. McCone, Memorandum for Discussion October 17, 1962. FRUS XI, 103–4.
Memorandum of Meeting Attended in Secretary Ball’s Conference Room, October 17, 1962,
FRUS XI, 95. The United States had put 16 “Jupiter” MRBMs in Turkey as part of the nuclear
deterrent. Kennedy had wanted them returned to the United States “over a year ago” “because
they had become obsolete and of little military value.” Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of
the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” October 27, 1962, 10 a.m., FRUS XI,
255.
54. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 24–26, 34.
55. Robert McNamara, “Notes on October 21 Meeting with the President, 11:30 a.m.-12:30
p.m.,” NSAD 738. Off the Record Meeting, 6:30–7:55 p.m., October 16, FRUS XI, 80.
56. Air Strike Scenario, October 19, 1962, draft. CMC 02136, Document 54, NSA.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 149
carry out the air strikes, conceded that even under the best conditions he did not
believe his planes could destroy all of the missiles during the first wave of attacks,
which left open a launch window for the Soviets. General Maxwell Taylor, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, similarly made no promises of 100 percent
success when he informed the president that “The best we can offer you is to
destroy 90 percent of the known missiles.”57 Taylor thus testified that force had
limits, especially when a limited use of force really needed to achieve 100 percent
effectiveness.
The generals were not writing-in excuses just in case the strikes met with less
than complete success. Their weapons suffered significant shortcomings.
Responsibility for destroying the ballistic missiles, SAM sites, and Soviet and
Cuban tactical air power in Cuba fell primarily on pilots of F-100 and F-105
fighter-bombers (figure 3). Capable by the standards of their day, they nevertheless
57. Robert McNamara, “Notes on Meeting with President Kennedy,” October 21, 1962,
FRUS XI, 139. The search for missiles continued after October 15. For instance, the Air Force
believed its reconnaissance aircraft photographed IRBMs on October 16; they later found three
IRBM sites with four launch pads each on October 23. Photo reconnaissance had already revealed
MRBMs on the 15th. “Tactical Air Command,” 764. “Transcript of Meeting at White House,
11:50 a.m.” October 16, 1962, FRUS XI, 31fn. Off the Record Meeting on Cuba, 6:30–7: 55 p.m.,
FRUS XI, 56. Alexander Fursenko, “Night Session of the Presidium of the Central Committee,
22-23 October 1962,” trans. Yuri M. Zhukov, Naval War College Review 59, no. 3 (2006): 132. R-14
IRBM missiles never arrived in Cuba; they stopped short of the blockade and returned to the
USSR. Dobbs, One Minute, 89. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 468–69.
150 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
possessed weaknesses that made their chances of destroying every one of their
targets unlikely. Pilots aimed unguided bombs, rockets, napalm, and gunfire
through simple gunsights.58 Digitally computed aim points and laser-guided pre-
cision weapons were years in the future. The challenge they could not overcome
was finding each and every missile.59 Since the military could not destroy all of the
missiles with 100 percent certainty, a diplomatic solution had its merits.
Nevertheless, striking without warning remained attractive, for if the missiles
were the vanguard of a Soviet first strike, Kennedy would have regretted having
tried anything else but preventive action.
The JCS believed that the missiles ought to be attacked at once and as new ones
appeared, instead of waiting until U-2s had discovered all of them. To wait until
was “no such thing as a unilateral action by the United States,” advised Dean Rusk.
He reminded the Ex Comm that America had forty-two allies and that it faced flash
points around the world. Furthermore, allied countries, not the United States,
would probably bear the brunt of any retaliation if the USSR decided to respond
militarily to an American conventional air strike against Cuba.64 The United
States simply had to consult with its closest allies on any military actions it
might take. Merely informing them of U.S. decisions after the fact was inadequate.
The Soviets might retaliate against one or more of the NATO allies—for an action
that the United States had taken without their consultation, but which put them at
risk.65 Charles E. Bohlen, the ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957,
also warned against striking first without trying diplomacy. The allies would be
64. Transcript of a Meeting at the White House, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m., FRUS XI, 31.
65. Off the Record Meeting, October 16, 6:30 p.m. FRUS XI, 55.
66. Charles E. Bohlen, “Memo to Dean Rusk,” October 17, 1962, NSAD 645.
67. Memorandum of Meeting Attended in Secretary Ball’s Conference Room, October 17,
1962, FRUS XI, 94–95.
68. Position of George W. Ball (no date given), CMC 8701667, Document 36,
National Security Archive. Ball made this point at the 11 a.m. meeting on October 18. Stern,
Averting, 104.
69. October 18 Meeting, Stern, Averting, 100.
70. John A. McCone, Memorandum for the File, October 17, 1962, FRUS XI, 96.
71. Stern, Averting, 104. Memorandum of Meeting Attended in Secretary Ball’s Conference
Room, October 17, 1962, FRUS XI, 94–95.
152 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
Kennedy’s ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, likewise feared the reper-
cussions of preemptive military action without even trying diplomacy. How would
the Latin American countries respond to the U.S. lack of consultation with
them? They, too, had vital interests at stake. If America was justified in attacking
missiles in Cuba, was not the Soviet Union justified in attacking U.S. IRBMs in
Turkey? Stevenson urged Kennedy to make it clear to the Soviets in no uncertain
terms that if they did not remove the missiles, the United States would.72 Alexis
Johnson warned that enacting a blockade without coordinating with the OAS
would be the “worst” use of force—precisely because the effort to justify the
action and gain support through diplomacy would have been missing.73 George
Ball perceived disturbing parallels between an air strike and the Pearl Harbor
72. Adlai Stevenson, “Memo to Self for Conference,” October 17, 1962, NSAD 650. Adlai
Stevenson, “Memo to the President,” October 17, 1962, NSAD 652.
73. Meeting, 11 a.m., October 18, Stern, Averting, 115.
74. Off the Record Meeting, October 16, 6:30 p.m. FRUS XI, 90. Timothy Naftali and Philip
Zelikow, eds., The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volume Two,
September-October 21, 1962 (New York and London, 2001), 539.
75. (no author), “Air Strike Scenario,” October 20, 1962, NSAD 706.
76. Audio Tape Transcript of an “Off the Record Meeting on Cuba,” October 16, 1962,
6:30–7:55 p.m. NSAD 623, 5–6, 10. Naftali and Zelikow, Recordings, 436–38, 444, 448, 465,
513–15.
77. 505th Meeting, 127–33.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 153
78. Adlai Stevenson, “Memo to President,” October 17, 1962, NSAD 652.
79. Meeting in the Cabinet Room, October 22, 1962, 3 p.m. Stern, Averting, 152.
80. Dillon, “Memo to President.” Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents,
and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ, 1993), 69. Stevenson, “Memo,” October 17. Naftali and
Zelikow, Recordings, 583–84. Usowski, “John McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 566.
81. C. Douglas Dillon, “Scenario for Airstrike against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in
Cuba,” October 25, 1962. NSAD 1334. C. Douglas Dillion, “Memo to President,” October 17,
1962, NSAD 647. Although he was secretary of the treasury, Dillon had gained considerable
experience with nuclear diplomacy as ambassador to France and as undersecretary of state
during the Eisenhower administration. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink:
Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, with a foreword by McGeorge Bundy
(New York, 1989), 10.
82. “Tactical Air Command,” 683. Air Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis, Air Defense
Command Historical Study 15, 21. NSAD 2654.
154 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
sought the destruction of threatening weapons, and for the most part considered
political concerns to be of secondary importance.83
Kennedy decided that he could best achieve his goals through a naval blockade
in combination with diplomacy and a threatening military mobilization. The Joint
Staff had presented a blockade as a possible contingency even before the crisis
broke, and Ex Comm discussed the possibility of a naval blockade from the first
day.84 He favored a coercive strategy that applied diplomatic pressure and gave
negotiation a chance to succeed, and utilizing a naval blockade as the keystone of
his strategy allowed Kennedy to be assertive and diplomatic at the same time. His
decision assumed that successful measures that did not resort to open conflict were
better than air strikes that had not been preceded by a diplomatic offensive. If the
83. 9:45 a.m. Meeting, October 19, Stern, Averting, 125–26. The Strategic Air Command
history, for example, restricts itself to a tactical-level narrative. It only mentions the strategic effects
of military operations within one paragraph: “Thus, the lifting of the quarantine meant that the
immediate threat to hemispheric peace had been solved to the President’s satisfaction, but routine
surveillance would continue indefinitely to ensure they were not clandestinely returned.” Strategic
Air Command Operations, 20.
84. Memorandum from the Director for Operations of the Joint Staff (Unger). FRUS XI, 21.
Meeting at the White House, October 16, 11:50 a.m., FRUS XI. 33, 35. 505th Meeting, 128–33.
85. John A. McCone, Memorandum for the File, October 19, 1962. FRUS XI, 108–9. Minutes
of the 505th Meeting, FRUS XI, 130. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in
the UK, October 22, 1962. FRUS, XI, 150–51. Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National
Security Council, October 22, 1962. Ibid., 152.
86. 505th Meeting, 135. “Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security Council,”
October 21, 1962, ibid., 143.
87. Leonard C. Meeker, “Defensive Quarantine and the Law,” American Journal of
International Law 57 (1963): 515. Larman C. Wilson, “International Law and the United States
Cuban Quarantine of 1962,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 7, no. 4 (1965): 486.
88. Leonard C. Meeker, “Memo to the Secretary of State,” (no date). NSAD 668. Record of
Meeting, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m. FRUS XI, 117.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 155
the missiles were ready for launch might provoke their use, which the United
States wished to prevent.97 In General Taylor’s opinion, the best scenario for
destroying the missiles was an attack without warning, for diplomacy might
encourage the Soviets to camouflage the missiles, greatly reducing the chances
of an effective attack.98 Similarly, a blockade warned the Soviets that further mili-
tary action could follow, and cost the Air Force the chance to hit the missiles with
complete surprise before they were all operational. Taylor believed that risks sky-
rocketed once the missiles became operational, because the launch crews might fire
their ballistic missiles if American aircraft were launched against them.99
Substituting a blockade for an air strike strategy could still subject European
allies to Soviet pressure. Soviet troops might blockade Berlin in retaliation, or
97. Record of Meeting, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m. FRUS XI, 118.
98. Meeting at the White House, October 16, 1962, FRUS XI, 35. McCone, Memorandum
for the File, October 17, 1962, 97. 505th Meeting, 129.
99. Department of State, Internal Paper, “Combined Scenario,” October 19, 1962, NSAD
689. Stern, Averting, 82–83.
100. G/PM Jeffrey C. Kitchen, “Memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, The Memorandum on
Negotiation,” October 26, 1962, CMC 8701667, Document 309, NSA. Dean Rusk and the presi-
dent had already discussed the matter, and decided to not press the Turks to dismantle them until a
suitable replacement—a Polaris submarine—was on station. An early decommissioning of the
missiles would have “embarrassed” the Turkish executive. It would force him to ask Parliament
to return them to the Americans just after allocating funds for their deployment. Rusk, As I Saw It,
239.
101. Chronology of JCS Decisions, 10.
102. Dillon, “Memo to President.”
103. Record of Meeting, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m. FRUS XI, 121.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 157
tions.”104 The Americans were unaware of this at the time, but the Soviets expected
such a strategy, so they were less likely to react impulsively against it.105
The data points in front of Kennedy suggested that force short of violence
would work. His State Department advisors believed that the Soviets wanted to
avoid a direct confrontation with the administration over Cuba. State Department
analyst Roger Hilsman deduced that Soviet leaders believed the United States
actually knew of the ballistic missiles (but was not letting on that it knew), and
coyly wished to remain noncommittal to any particular action.106 Therefore, the
administration could expect the less aggressive blockade to have a real chance of
influencing Soviet behavior.107 Regarding the interests of allies, a naval blockade
was more likely to gain OAS endorsement than a preemptive air strike. A blockade
104. Meeting in the Oval Office, October 24, 1962. Stern, Averting, 230.
105. Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, November
4, 1962, Cold War International History Project Bulletin no. 5 (1995): 97. Mikoyan was the first deputy
prime minister of the Soviet Union, 96.
106. Roger Hilsman, Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, “Memo for
the Secretary: Soviets Skirt Issue of Cuban Missile Buildup,” October 21, 1962, CMC 8702115,
NSA.
107. Theodore Sorensen, Executive Office of the President, Special Counsel to the President,
“Internal Paper,” October 20, 1962, NSAD 722.
108. Department of State Internal Paper, “U.N. Aspects of Cuban Situation,” October 19,
1962. NSAD 691. See also George Ball’s opinion in May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 143.
109. “Record of Telephone Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Macmillan, October 25, 1962. FRUS XI, 211. Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State
to the Mission to the United Nations, October 25, 1962. FRUS XI, 199. Paper Prepared by the
Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” FRUS XI,
217.
110. Naftali and Zelikov, Recordings, 605. 505th Meeting, 129.
111. Dean Rusk, Record of Meeting, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m. FRUS XI, 119, 121.
158 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
had better be prepared to remove its missiles from Turkey and Italy in exchange.
McNamara believed that a blockade would not be overly provocative, because the
CIA had concluded that the Soviets would not attempt to break through it.
Furthermore, the secretary agreed that a surprise air strike was “contrary to our
tradition,” and that a blockade lessened the chances of escalation with the Soviets
and a rift with U.S. allies.112 The next day, the president conferred with British
ambassador David Ormby-Gore, put forth the two options of an airstrike followed
by a blockade, or a blockade alone, and asked him which he preferred. The am-
bassador replied that he thought a blockade was the better of the two.113
In order for a blockade to work, the United States had to make it clear that if the
Soviets failed to remove the missiles, American armed forces would destroy the
119. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, Headquarters USAF, “The Air Force
Response to the Cuban Crisis,” 6. NSAD 2811. Strategic Air Command Operations, 38.
120. Polmar and Gresham. Defcon-2, 137–38.
121. Polmar and Gresham, Defcon-2, 182–83. Zaloga, Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, 87.
122. Willard S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy: Volume VIII, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC, 2011), 177.
123. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 176. Robert M. Beer, “The U.S. Navy and the
Cuban Missile Crisis” (Annapolis: Trident Scholar Project Report, 1990), 143–43. Air Force
RB-47 and RB-50 aircraft joined naval patrol aircraft in searching 4.5 million square miles of
the Atlantic Ocean. CINCLANT Historical Account, 104.
160 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
124. Scott, Macmillan, 97. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev:
1960-1963 (New York, 1991), 496.
125. Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York, 1991), 121. Soviet
submariners were familiar with the acoustics of American practice depth charges. They were
unresponsive to these efforts and did not surface until they needed to recharge their batteries.
Ibid., 123. Dobbs, Minute, 300.
126. Curtis A. Utz, Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Honolulu, 2005), 31.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 161
would use the “‘minimum amount of force necessary’ to permit a search of the
vessel.”127
Antisubmarine operations were supposed to buttress the political signaling
already being put forth by the quarantine, not function as discreet elements for
themselves, but they had the possibility of undercutting the spirit of Kennedy’s
strategy. Destroyers followed and even harassed five Soviet submarines. On
October 27, for instance, the USS Beale (seen in figure 4) dropped grenades and
pinged a submarine with sonar signals but got “no response.” Just before nine at
night, the sub surfaced. The Beale followed it for a few minutes and even flooded it
with a searchlight beam.128 One captain asked permission to drop a depth charge;
he “was denied.”129 Because each of these submarines carried a torpedo with a
127. Beer, “The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 133.
128. Ibid., 149. Utz, Cordon of Steel, 38–40. Deck Log, USS Beale, October 27, 1962. http://
www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/asw-II-13.pdf (accessed April 15, 2013).
129. Beer, “The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 150.
130. William Burr and Thomas S. Blanton, eds., “‘The Submarines of October’ U.S. and
Soviet Naval Encounters during the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 2002. Savitsky’s contemporaries ques-
tion the veracity of this account and doubt that he really threatened to arm the nuclear torpedo.
http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/index2.htm (accessed April 15, 2013).
Dobbs, One Minute, 303.
131. Bouchard, Command in Crisis, 105.
132. Utz, Cordon of Steel, 37.
133. Ibid., 32.
134. CINCLANT Historical Account, 104, 125.
135. Utz, Cordon of Steel, 32.
162 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
141. Ernest May, “Strategic Intelligence and U.S. Security: The Contributions of
CORONA,” in Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, ed. Dwayne A. Day, John
M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (Washington, DC, and London, 1998), 26. Record of Action of the
Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 25, 1962.
FRUS XI, 202.
142. “Tactical Air Command,” pp. 750–54.
143. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 25,
1962. FRUS 1961-1963 XI, 198.
144. “ Tactical Air Command,” 776. John A. McCone, Memorandum for File, October 24,
1962, FRUS XI, 159–60.
145. U.S. Marine Corps Emergency Action Center, 7 a.m., October 23, to 7:01 a.m., October
24, 1962. NSAD 1170.
146. CINCLANT Historical Account, 159.
164 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
147. Department of State Internal Paper, “U.N. Aspects of Cuban Situation,” October 19,
1962. NSAD 691.
148. October 18 Meeting, 11 a.m. Cabinet Room; Stern, Averting, 97–98. This was not a
unique insight. Lord Alexander Douglas-Home of the British Foreign Office made a similar
recommendation—that negotiations must be attempted prior to and to justify military ac-
tion—during the Berlin Crisis in 1961. Toshihiko, “It Is Not Easy,” 331.
149. See for example, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President
Kennedy and the Undersecretary of State (Ball),” October 24, 1962. FRUS, XI, 190.
150. Stevenson, “Memo to Self,” October 17, 1962.
151. Department of State Internal Paper, “U.N. Aspects of Cuban Situation, Specific
Contingencies: U.S. Action Sequence,” October 19, 1962. NSAD 692.
152. Dillon, “Scenario for Air Strike.”
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 165
153. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the UK, October 22, 1962,
12:17 a.m. FRUS, XI, 150–51.
154. Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, October 22, 1962,
9 p.m. FRUS, XI, 167.
155. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, October 24, 1962,
11:24 a.m. FRUS, XI, 180–81.
156. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National
Security Archive Documents Reader (New York, 1992), 366–67.
157. Nineteen members approved the resolution; Uruguay abstained. American Foreign Policy,
Current Documents, 1962 (Washington, DC, 1966), 408. Brugioni, Eyeball, 378–79.
158. Meeker, “Defensive Quarantine,” 517. American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962
(Washington, DC, 1966), 410.
159. John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Files, October 23, 1962. FRUS XI, 173.
Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 481. Munton and Welch, Concise History, 70.
160. Dean Rusk, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil,” October
26, 1962. FRUS XI, 228–29. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil,” 5–7. “Minutes of the 506th
Meeting,” 148–49.
166 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
Stevenson pressured the Soviets through UN channels to not violate the quar-
antine with their ships.161 The most forceful use of the UN, of course, was
Stevenson’s public questioning of Ambassador Valerian Zorin on October 25.
When Zorin accused him of producing fake photographs, Stevenson called for
the Soviets and Cubans to permit UN inspectors to verify or refute American
accusations, at which the Soviets balked.162 This use of photo intelligence paid
positive dividends as well when the United States released photographs of the sites
to the European press.163
The United States obtained military support, however small and symbolic,
from several Latin American countries. Argentina sent search and rescue aircraft
and two destroyers. Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, and Guatemala offered
161. Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council, October 27, 1962. FRUS XI, 272.
162. Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson, 211–13.
163. Scott, Macmillan, 117–19.
164. “Tactical Air Command,” 705. Tad Szulc, “Six Latin Countries Offer Military Aid to
U.S. in Blockade,” New York Times, October 25, 1, 24.
165. Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations. V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign
Ministry, October 25, 1962, in “Russian Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 8, no. 9 (1996/1997): 285.
166. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 467–74.
167. Executive Committee Record of Action, October 24, 1962, 10 a.m., Meeting No. 3,
Chang and Kornbluh, Cuban Missile Crisis, 165. Dobbs, One Minute, 88–91, 375.
168. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the
Department of State, October 25, 1962. FRUS XI, 188. Harriman was in 1962 the Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 167
On the other hand, construction crews continued their work to ready the mis-
sile sites in Cuba.169 Then on October 24, Khrushchev sent a volcanic reply to
Kennedy’s imposition of the quarantine, an act which he considered “piratical.”
The premier rejected the legitimacy of the OAS, saying that it had no business
meddling in Soviet-Cuban affairs, that it had no authority, and that whatever
business the Soviet Union and Cuba conducted had no effect on anyone else.
Moreover, “the Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom
to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which
pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.” He also in-
formed the president that he would not stop his ships bound for Cuba, and warned
that the Soviet Union would take necessary measures to respond to any efforts by
State, October 25, 1962, ibid., 203. Summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council, October 26, 1962, ibid., 223.
178. Stern, Averting, 200.
179. Philip M. Kaiser, Journeying Far and Wide: A Political and Diplomatic Memoir (New York,
1993), 197–99.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 169
180. “Memorandum from the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy),” October 26, 1962. FRUS XI, 248.
181. Cleveland to Thompson, October 26, 1962. Cleveland was the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs; Thompson was Ambassador at Large, Department of
State.
182. “Memorandum Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council,” October 26, 1962. FRUS XI, 249.
183. Dean Rusk, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 12:12 a.m., October 28, 1962. FRUS XI, 276.
184. Meeting of Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, and John McCone. Oval Office, October 26,
1962, 12 noon. Stern, Averting, 284.
185. Naftali and Zelikow, Recordings, 532.
186. “Memorandum for the File,” October 19, 108. 505th Meeting, 136. “Summary Record
of NSC Excom Meeting 7,” October 27, 1962, 10 a.m. FRUS XI, 254–55.
187. Thomas K. Finletter, “Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of
State,” October 25, 1962. FRUS XI, 213. Finletter was the U.S. ambassador to NATO.
Histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis give the impression that no one but the Ex Comm and a
few diplomats were even thinking of such a trade. There was, however, open discussion of just such
a trade in the press—along with vehement denials by both governments—during the crisis.
“Turkey Denies Talk on Rocket Removal,” New York Times, October 26, 1962, 17. Sam Pope
170 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
Brewer, “Turkish Delegate Bars Bases Offer,” New York Times, October 28, 1962, 32. President
Kennedy also discussed the possibility with the prime minister of Great Britain. “Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan,” FRUS XI,
246. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. first publicized the trade fully in 1978. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert
Kennedy and His Times (New York, 1978), 519–23. Meanwhile, the Soviets directly threatened the
Turks, calling Turkey the Soviet Union’s Cuba. Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October:
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill, NC and London, 1997), 137.
188. Bromley Smith, Summary Record of the Eight Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council, 4 pm., October 27, 1962. FRUS XI, 265–68.
189. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, October 26,
1962. FRUS 1961-1963, XI, 239–40.
190. Telegram Trostnik (Reed—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to Pavlov
(Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), October 27, 1962, in
Svetlana Savaranskaya, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba: New Evidence,” CWIHPB 14, no. 15
(2003/ 2004): 388.
191. Meeting in Cabinet Room, October 27, 1962, 10 a.m. Stern, Averting, 290.
192. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 27.
193. Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 27, 1962. FRUS
1961-1963, XI, 257–60. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 488–89. Khrushchev made
the letter public that day. The Turkish government rejected the proposal outright. Nash, The
Other Missiles, 132, 140.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 171
American and Soviet anxiety because the shoot down increased the possibilities for
military escalation.194
In light of these events, diplomatic pressure seemed to be losing its power. The
president and his advisors again considered ordering an air strike to resolve the
immediate crisis of more and more missiles becoming ready for launch. An attack
now appeared more justified than before since a majority of the Security Council
and the entire OAS had condemned the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba. Besides, a
single series of strikes might be less escalatory over the long run than protracted
confrontations, if the assumption was correct that the Soviets would not go to war
in retaliation. Military action would also demonstrate that the president meant
what he said, that he was willing to fight for vital American interests. U.S. cred-
194. Meeting in Cabinet Room, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m. Stern, Averting, 344–64. Fursenko
and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 489–90. McNamara, Bundy, and Ball feared the likelihood of
extreme knee-jerk behavior. A U-2 had strayed over Siberia, and not a few Ex Comm members
feared that a mistake like this would trigger a nuclear war. Dobbs, One Minute, 269–71.
195. Dillon, “Scenario for Air Strike.” Jeffrey Kitchen, “Memorandum on Negotiation” to U.
Alexis Johnson, October 26, 1962. CMC 8701667 Document 309.
196. Savaranskaya, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 385. A list of weapons the State Department
wanted removed did not mention tactical nuclear weapons. The note did include a catch-all cover-
all-the-bases phrase “or any other type of nuclear weapon,” but did not mention the presence of
short-range nuclear missiles. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United
Nations, November 7, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, XI, 409–10. Strategic Air Command Operations, 11.
197. Lt Colonel Wallace A. Cameron, Joint Message Form DD173, October 30, 1962, in
“Tactical Air Command.” “Extract from Daily Intell Summ,” November 15, 62, ibid. Strategic Air
Command Operations. SNIE 11-19-62: Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,
October 20, 1962. “Current Weekly Intelligence Review, Soviet Forces in Cuba,” November 16,
1962, NASD 2359. John McCone showed a photograph to JFK on October 26 that
McCone said might have uncovered battlefield nuclear weapons. Stern, The Week, 143. Dobbs,
One Minute, 145.
172 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
moved into position.198 Especially puzzling is why the Soviets chose to not reveal
the presence of these additional weapons after October 22. Their deterrent effect
against an invasion would have been enormous.
While the discovery of the ballistic missiles was an intelligence success,199
missing these short-range nuclear weapons was just the opposite. The inability
to detect the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Cuba meant that threatening
an invasion was actually a much more dangerous proposition, not only because of
the obliteration of the American invasion force the FKRs and FROGs could have
inflicted, but even worse because their use would have been escalatory, and thus
counter to the coercive goals of the administration.
The Soviets considered giving the on-site commander, General Issa Pliyev,
198. USMC Emergency Action Center, “Summary of Items of Significant Interest, Period
300701-310700 October 1962,” NSAD 1777. FROG was the American name for the Soviet Luna
rocket. There were 80 FKRs and 12 Lunas on Cuba. Dobbs, One Minute, 179.
199. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 18.
200. USSR Minister of Defense R. Malinovsky, “To the Commander of the Group of Soviet
Forces in Cuba,” September 8, 1962. National Security Archive website, http://www.gwu.
edu/nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620908%20Memorandum%20from%20Malinovsky.pdf
(accessed April 15, 2013). Savaranskaya, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 385.
201. Copy of Outgoing Ciphered Telegram No. 20076, Director to Comrade Pavlov
[General Issa A. Pliyev], October 27, 1962. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation,
Special Declassification, April 2002. Fursenko, “Night Session,” 134, 139. http://www.gwu.
edu/nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20Ciphered%20Telegram%20No.%2020076.pdf
(accessed April 15, 2013)
202. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 473.
203. Savarankaya, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 386. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y.
Smith. Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago,
1994), 172.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 173
U.S. military forces had to make few additional preparations for the conven-
tional air strike, but officials still had to prepare the way diplomatically if Kennedy
chose that option. Secretary Dillon anticipated diplomatic challenges and postu-
lated responses, with his eye on utilizing diplomacy to justify an air strike. For
instance, the United States could attempt to cast itself in a conciliatory light by
proposing in a Security Council resolution that the Soviets remove the missiles,
and by presenting additional evidence of the Soviet buildup. If the White House
decided to attack, it could first issue repeated warnings that the Soviets needed to
dismantle the missiles. If Kennedy ordered the attack, he would notify the chair-
man of the OAS shortly beforehand, the Latin American heads of state, and the
NATO allies at its initiation. If the United States went forward with the attack, its
210. Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 83–84. Rusk, As I Saw It, 240–41. A. Walter Dorn and
Robert Pauk, “Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History 33,
no. 2 (2009): 284.
211. Cabinet Room Meeting, October 27, 1962, 9 p.m. Stern, Averting, 374–75.
212. Ibid., 378–79.
213. Ex Comm Meeting, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m., FRUS XI, 267. Zelikow and May, The
Presidential Recordings, 460–61. Garthoff, Reflections, 95.
214. “Off the Record Executive Committee Meeting on Cuba,” October 27, 1962, NSAD
1544. Ex Comm Meeting, October 27, 1962, 4 pm, FRUS XI, 265–66.
215. Cabinet Room Meeting, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m., Stern, Averting, 324, 328.
216. Cabinet Room Meeting, October 27, 1962, 9 p.m., Stern, Averting, 379.
217. 505th Meeting, 133.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 175
218. Dobbs, One Minute, 307. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 432–34.
219. Brewer, “Turkish Delegate Bars Bases Offer.” Columnist Walter Lippmann and the
editor of the New York Times Max Frankel also penned such a proposal. Weisbrot, Maximum
Danger, 169–70. Max Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York, 2004), 123, 128, 143.
220. Dobrynin Cable to the USSR Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962. CWIHPB 5 (1995),
79–80. Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the
American Jupiters in Turkey,” in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New
York, 1992), 95–96. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War
(Princeton, NJ, 1994), 122–30.
221. Stern, Averting, 219. Chang and Kornbluh, Cuban Missile Crisis, 370. May and Zelikov,
The Kennedy Tapes, 602. Nash, The Other Missiles, 139.
222. Dobbs, One Minute, 307.
223. “Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk,” October
30, 1962, FRUS XI, 270–71.
176 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
were obsolete and slated for dismantling made this deal more than palatable.224 If
this solution went forward, both sides would have to make concessions. The
Soviets had to remove their missiles from Cuba because of American threats,
and the Americans had to later remove ballistic missiles from Turkey, an action
that risked severe damage to the NATO alliance.
About six hours after Dobrynin met with Robert Kennedy (the morning of
October 28 in Moscow), Khrushchev received a cable of Dobrynin’s discussion
with the attorney general. It required little discussion for the Presidium to agree to
Kennedy’s terms. Khrushchev had already decided to remove the missiles from
Cuba prior to RFK’s discussion with Dobrynin; Kennedy’s offer to remove the
Jupiters from Turkey was icing on the cake.225 Later that day President Kennedy
224. Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General, October 30, 1962.
FRUS XI, 270–72. Dobrynin Cable to the USSR Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962. CWIHPB 5
(Spring 1995), 76–80. In his February 1963 testimony before Congress, McNamara swore that
“the President absolutely refused to discuss it [trading the Jupiters for the R-12s and R-14s] at the
time, and no discussion took place.” Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 (1985): 144. This account of Turkey’s
place in the Cuban Missile Crisis is admittedly U.S.-centric; an examination of a recent book on
Turkish foreign relations suggests that Turkish sources are still unavailable to scholars. William
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000 (London and Portland, OR, 2000), 134–36. In any event,
the missile trade did not lead to difficulties in US-Turkish relations. Ibid., 136.
225. Dobbs, One Minute, 322–23. Fursenko, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 486, 488, 490.
226. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 27,
1962. FRUS XI, 268–69. Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28,
1962, ibid., 279–83. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union,
ibid., 285–86.
227. Stern, Averting, 389.
228. Garthoff, “The Soviet Story,” 76.
229. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 483, 490.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 177
removing its missiles from Turkey because they had outlived their usefulness.230
Indeed, America gave up nothing. In January, it announced the replacement of the
Turkish and Italian Jupiters by Polaris SSBNs, weapons that, unlike the Jupiters,
were not vulnerable to a first strike. News reports denied that this action was part
of a trade.231 The Soviets made up for their losses in a matter of months, for by
1964 they had about two hundred ICBMs with many more under construction.232
Although tensions remained high for several more weeks, the crisis had entered
its waning phase. In order to not short-circuit follow-on diplomacy, “Quarantine
Operations were held in abeyance on 30 and 31 October” when U Thant went to
Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro.233 The last of the R-12 missiles left Cuba on
November 11, and U.S. forces maintained their high alerts until reconnaissance
230. I have not mentioned the exchanges between John Scali and Alexaner Feklisov because
the Kremlin never received Feklisov’s messages in a timely enough manner to make use of them in
the policy deliberations, and because the Kennedy administration did not make use of the
Scali-Feklisov channel to negotiate an end to the crisis. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy
Naftali, “Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
CWIHPB 5 (1995): 61–62. Furthermore, the Presidium had already decided on October 25 that
Khrushchev would offer to remove the missiles if Kennedy promised to not invade Cuba. Fursenko
and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 483–86. Finally, Feklisov’s deal making with Scali “was not
authorized by the Kremlin.” Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” 81. Michael Dobbs refers to the Scali-Feklisov “backchannel” as “largely fluff.” Dobbs,
One Minute, 290, 383.
231. Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1963, Charles S. Sampson and James E.
Miller, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIII, West Europe and Canada
(Washington, DC, 1994), 858–63. Garthoff, Reflections, 135. Hedrick Smith, “Turks Agreeable
to U.S. Removal of Some Missiles,” New York Times, January 21, 1963, 1. “Turks Give Up Missile
Bases, Long an Issue in the Cold War,” New York Times, January 24, 1963, 1. “Missiles in
Mediterranean,” New York Times, January 31, 1963, 5.
232. NIE 11-8-64, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack, 2. https://www.cia.gov/library/
center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cias-analysis-of-the-
soviet-union-1947-1991/nie_11_8_64.pdf (accessed April 15, 2013)
233. CINCLANT Historical Account, 106.
234. Chronology of JCS Decisions, 64. Six atomic bombs were in Cuba for use by the IL-28s.
Dobbs, One Minute, 247. Munton and Welch, Concise History, 84.
235. “Tactical Air Command,” 898. Telegram Trostnik (Reed—USSR Defense Minister
Rodion Malinovsky) to Pavlov (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa
Plieve), November 20, 1962, in Savaranskaya, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 398.
236. Garthoff, “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 34.
178 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
237. CINCLANT Historical Account, 13–14. Strategic Air Command Operations, 19. AFHRA.
Excerpt declassified in accordance with EO12958.
238. “Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of the Executive Committee of NSC,”
November 3, 1962, 4:30 pm, FRUS, XI, 361. “Summary Record of the 31st Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” November 29, 1962, 10 a.m. FRUS
XI, 541–42. Strategic Air Command Operations, 18–20. Arthur C. Warfel, History of the 4080th
Strategic Wing (SAC), Special Operations, November 1 to December 31, 1962, 2–6, 12.
K-WG-4080-HI, November 1 to December 31, 1962. AFHRA. Excerpt declassified in accord-
ance with EO12958.
239. Utz, Cordon of Steel, 42.
240. Roger Hilsman, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Western European Reactions to
the Soviet Decision to Dismantle the Missile Bases in Cuba,” Research Memo REU-74, To the
Secretary of State, October 31, 1962. CMC 8702115 Document 24, NSA.
241. Memorandum of Conversation, October 29, 1962. FRUS XI, 296–97.
242. The Air Force Response, 14. Strategic Air Command Operations, 49.
243. Memorandum of Conversation, October 28, 1962. FRUS XI, 289.
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force : 179
settlement. In Florida, an armada of 515 tactical fighters was ready for operations
against targets in Cuba by October 22. There were three wings of F-100D fighter-
bombers at Homestead Air Force Base south of Miami, another at McCoy AFB
(central Florida) along with an F-105 wing, two wings of F-84F fighter-bombers
and another F-100D wing at McDill Air Force Base (Tampa), a wing of F-104C
fighters and Marine Air Group 14 at Key West Naval Air Station.244 The com-
mander-in-chief of Atlantic Command commented that “nuclear weapons were not
needed” for these air strikes.245 In addition, there were 150,000 U.S. Army troops
standing by for an invasion, nearly 6,000 U.S. Marines at Guantanamo Bay, and
naval forces composed of three aircraft carriers and twenty-eight additional war-
ships. Planners, however, “had underestimated the number of vessels needed for an
over military operations.” The Air Force concluded that, “without this plan for an
air offensive, the Department of Defense would have been unable to provide the
Chief Executive with the military flexibility he needed to secure his political
objectives.”248 With an understanding of the variables involved, the Navy observed
that “operations were closely directed from Washington, presumably to insure
that the diplomatic and military endeavors complemented each other and would
not at any time be working at cross purposes.”249
The State Department considered a broader span of factors in the military and
political realms, and its diplomatic bent did not result in timidity. Its leaders
frequently expressed a noncompromising attitude, and diplomats deliberately
employed both force and diplomacy in pursuing national objectives. Diplomatic
agree to launch the missiles so as to bring ten more missiles on line, but which
lessened presidential control. The inability of Admiral George Anderson to under-
stand the need to modify the Navy’s doctrine for blockades to fit the sensitive
character of the standoff with the Soviet Union resulted in McNamara’s loss of
confidence in his judgment.254 The reactions of Admiral Anderson and General
LeMay to the resolution of the crisis confirmed Kennedy’s distrust. When the
president thanked them for their counsel, Admiral Anderson exclaimed, “we’ve
been had!” and LeMay “pounded the table: ‘It’s the greatest defeat in our history,
Mr. President . . . We should invade today.” “The military are mad,” Kennedy later
commented.255
The leadership of John McCone, in contrast, had modified the CIA into an
254. Dobbs, One Minute, 276–77, 72, 234, 309. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold
War Crises (Cambridge, MA, 1977; reprint, New York, 1991), 10.
255. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 544–45. Donald Alan Carter has argued that Kennedy never
trusted the service chiefs in the first place. Donald Alan Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,”
The Journal of Military History 71, no. 4 (2007): 1198–99.
256. James J. Wirtz, “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” in Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, ed. James G. Blight and David A. Welch
(London and Portland, OR, 1998), 80–83. Usowski, “John McCone and the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” 548, 551.