Defence Diplomacy

This book analyzes examples of strategic engagement in order to identify

the factors which contribute to the
success or failure of defence diplomacy
in preventing interstate conflict.
For more than a century, nations have engaged in defence diplomacy to
cultivate mutual understanding and mitigate
conflict. A subset of defence
diplomacy is strategic engagement, defined as peacetime defence
diplomacy between
nations that are actual or potential adversaries. This
book analyzes three cases of strategic engagement in order
to elucidate the
factors which contribute to the success or failure of this diplomacy in
preventing conflict. It
uses an inductive framework to compare strategic
engagement in the following cases: Anglo–German defence
diplomacy
prior to World War I; U.S.–Soviet defence diplomacy during the Cold War;
and post-Cold War U.S.–China
defence diplomacy. Based upon archival,
literature, and personal interview research, the book argues that defence
diplomacy can mitigate the risk of interstate conflict between potential
adversaries. The lessons learned from
this book can be employed to discern
the significant elements conducive to achieving a successful outcome of
strategic engagement and averting conflict or even war.
This book will be of much interest to students of defence studies,
diplomacy studies, foreign policy and
international relations.

Daniel H. Katz is a non-resident scholar for the China Studies Program at

the James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston,
Texas, U.S.A.
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Defence Diplomacy
Strategic Engagement and Interstate Conflict

Daniel H. Katz
First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 Daniel H. Katz

The right of Daniel H. Katz to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Katz, Daniel H., 1986- author.
Title: Defence diplomacy : strategic engagement and interstate conflict / Daniel H. Katz.
Other titles: Strategic engagement and interstate conflict
Description: London, UK ; New York : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2020. |
Series: Cass military studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019051364 (print) | LCCN 2019051365 (ebook) |ISBN 9780367135966
(hardback) | ISBN
9780429027406 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Diplomacy--Case studies. | International relations--Case studies. | Great Britain--
Military
relations--Germany--Case studies. | Germany--Military relations--Great Britain--Case
studies. |Russia--Military
relations--United States--Case studies. |United States--Military relations--
Russia--Case studies. |United
States--Military relations--China--Case studies. |China--Military
relations--United States--Case studies.
Classification: LCC JZ1305 .K377 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1305 (ebook) | DDC 355/.031--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019051364
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019051365

ISBN: 978-0-367-13596-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-02740-6 (ebk)
Contents

Acknowledgements

1    Introduction
2    Defence diplomacy: a conceptual overview
3    Anglo–German pre-World War I strategic engagement
4    U.S.–Soviet Cold War strategic engagement
5    U.S.–China post-Cold War strategic engagement
6    Compare and contrast
7    Conclusion

Appendix 1: Framework
Appendix 2: Defence diplomacy activities
Appendix 3: Typology of strategic engagement
outcomes
Appendix 4: Treaty text – INCSEA
Appendix 5: Standing Consultative Commission
regulations
Appendix 6: Interactions between the U.S. National
Defense University
and the Chinese National Defense University, 1986–2012
Appendix 7: Excerpt from Section 1201 of the
National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2000 provision relating to U.S. military
contacts with the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
References
Index
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank the professors, staff, and fellow
students of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies for their kind
and helpful support throughout my Ph.D. journey. I would particularly like
to thank Dr. Ralf Emmers for his generous guidance and support throughout
the course of my doctoral studies.
Finally, I would like to express my
gratitude to my wonderful family, without whom none of this would have
been
possible.
1    Introduction

Historically, diplomatic and military affairs have often been interrelated.

Conceptions of the military evoke
notions about soldiers, sailors, and
airmen employing decisive force and representing the hard power of a
nation-state. Diplomacy conjures up images of suit-clad civilians
composing long cables home in exotic capitals
and mingling at embassy
functions. A primary reason for the perceived distinction between
diplomacy and the
military is bureaucratic, whereby diplomatic affairs are
the domain of ministries of foreign affairs and defence
matters fall under
ministries of defence. Nonetheless, leading strategist Carl von Clausewitz
affirmed the
proposition that politics and war were inextricably linked.
The convergence of diplomatic and military affairs dating back millennia
can be seen in the concept of “naval
diplomacy.”1 Leading maritime
historian Geoffrey Till has outlined
the peacetime functions of navies and
naval diplomacy, a key component of which is naval presence.2 According
to Till, “naval diplomacy is a spectrum, a continuum, in
which the
boundaries between the functions are inherently fuzzy. The activities they
lead to may differ not in
type, but merely in degree.”3 Navies possess a
unique quality that
other elements of a country’s military power do not,
namely “the more benign, coalition-building aspects of naval
diplomacy.”4
Naval diplomacy is particularly relevant because it is
a key component of
strategic engagement, the main focus of this book.
In the seventeenth century, “many aristocratic envoys held military posts
in wartime, and peacetime diplomacy was
therefore an aspect of fairly
continual service to their monarchs, as well as providing a role for these
men.”5 In the eighteenth century, “the appeal of diplomats with a
military
background remained strong, and notably at certain courts, especially
Berlin.”6 This was primarily due to the fact that “war, its presence, changes
and
consequences, set the pace for the diplomacy of all states.”7 In
the early
twentieth century, the alliance blocs that maintained peace in Europe
collapsed and ultimately led to
the outbreak of World War I. There were
diplomatic attempts to curb the naval competition between Britain and
Germany, including the clandestine Haldane Mission of February 1912 to
Berlin. British Secretary of State for War
Lord Richard Haldane failed to
convince Kaiser Wilhelm II to curb the German naval buildup.8 Though the
outbreak of World War I was due to a
multitude of factors, the intense
Anglo–German naval competition and the linked German desire for a
British
guarantee of neutrality were notable elements of the buildup to
general war. It is worth considering whether a
successful Haldane Mission
would have changed the course of later events. The Anglo-German naval
competition was
an important, but not determinative factor, in the ultimate
outbreak of World War I.
Many countries have maintained for over a century a system of military
attachés.9 A defence attaché was “from the beginning … something of a
hybrid in the world of
international relations. He was part diplomat, part
scout, and perhaps, as Lord George Curzon suggested, not
entirely
welcome.”10 In addition to their role as
soldier-diplomats, “military attachés
were the Nation’s eyes and ears abroad in the days before satellite
photography and sophisticated electronic collection techniques.”11
Despite
major technological advances in intelligence collection, human intelligence
in the form of attachés
remains one of the best sources for information
gathering. The responsibilities of defence attachés differ
depending on the
nature of the bilateral relationship between their home country and their
host country. If the
host country is a military ally or partner, their duties
could involve foreign military sales, capacity-building
or promoting
interoperability. Should the host country be a potential adversary of the
attaché’s home country,
their role focuses more on military intelligence.
However, defence attachés also serve as working-level contacts
between
military establishments.
From the end of World War II until 1989, the predominant global security
challenge was the Cold War superpower
competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The bipolar order that emerged divided the
world into
competing blocs for American and Soviet influence. The level of
strategic risk was so high at times that there
was a real prospect of war that
could lead to a nuclear exchange. However, despite the exceedingly high
tension
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the civilian and military
leaders of both countries’ national security
establishments arrived at a
number of important agreements, most notably the 1972 U.S./USSR
Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas
(INCSEA) as well as the U.S.–Soviet Standing Consultative
Commission
(SCC) established in December 1972. The agreements and the associated
military-to-military
consultations brokered during the détente era of the
1970s held despite a renewal of competition between the U.S.
and the
Soviet Union during the 1980s under U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
INCSEA, the SCC, and other confidence
and security building measures
(CSBMs) served as useful risk mitigation mechanisms throughout the Cold
War. The
Soviet Union began to crumble in 1989 and formally dissolved by
1991.
In the post-Cold War period, similar forms of diplomatic interaction
between the defence officials and
practitioners of potential or actual
adversaries have occurred to mixed effect. Examination of these efforts,
which will be referred to as “strategic engagement,” is the core subject of
this book.12 Despite the anticipated peace dividend of the post-Cold War
period and
hopes for the emergence of a new world order characterized by
peace and stability, security tensions between China and its regional
neighbors as well as the U.S. have steadily grown in the last two
decades
and have become particularly acute since 2010. Nonetheless, personnel of
the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) have met and participated in
exchange activities with their counterparts from countries including the
United States, Japan, and Australia.
China has arguably emerged as the closest approximation to a peer
competitor to U.S. global economic and military
primacy. China surpassed
Japan to become the world’s second largest economy and its military
capabilities,
particularly in the naval domain, have increased substantially
alongside its growing economic prowess. The PLA is
the world’s largest
military in terms of number of fielded forces. Its budget has increased by
double digits
between 2001 and 2011, albeit from a relatively modest
base.13 Its
annual military budget is now second only to the U.S. Major
concerns within Asia regarding Chinese military
modernization have
grown. Some countries who have had historical or territorial disputes with
China responded to
this challenge by participating in various forms of
engagement with the PLA. The defence establishments of the
U.S. and
China have been interacting regularly since the early 1990s, though such
engagement has been subject to
periodic suspensions. Though there have
been no recent major combat operations in the Asia-Pacific theater, the
risks
of inadvertent conflict or escalation from a minor incident remain high and
merit preventive measures.
The peacetime work of militaries receives far less attention than their
activities in wartime. Military personnel
and defence ministries spend more
time planning for possible contingencies and maintaining preparedness than
actually deploying in combat operations. Therefore, the nature of peacetime
engagement between potentially
adversarial defence establishments is
worthy of examination and is the subject of this book.

The goal of exploring strategic engagement

National security establishments of most states in the world survey their
strategic environment and assess the
allies (de facto and de jure) and
adversaries (actual and potential) that may pose a
challenge to their national
security. Frequent interaction between allies is sensible and contributes to
the
state’s own security.
However, engagement between adversaries is an important component of
international relations. Throughout the
twentieth century and continuing
into the twenty-first century, strategic engagement has selectively occurred,
though it is unclear what drives these encounters. The motives and
objectives of strategic engagement differ
depending on the particular
bilateral context. The quality or success of strategic engagement between
adversaries has varied greatly over the past century, and explaining such
variation is the central objective of
this book.
The book seeks to illuminate the following issues:

The reasons why potential adversaries pursued strategic engagement

with each
other
The factors which contribute to the success or failure of strategic
engagement between potential
adversaries
 The lessons which can be gleaned from success or failure in each of
the historical case studies that can be
applied to contemporary strategic
engagement between the U.S. and China, and whether these are
applicable to
strategic engagement between other potentially
adversarial countries

Definition of key terms

Strategic engagement is meant to encompass a subclass of what is more
commonly referred to as defence
diplomacy, specifically between actors
who are potential adversaries. Strategic engagement is defence diplomacy
which leads to the establishment of instruments that allow otherwise
adversarial states to manage their
relationships with the ultimate goal of
diminishing the risk of interstate conflict. The preferred use of
strategic
engagement in referring to defence diplomacy in the Anglo–German, U.S.–
Soviet, and U.S.–China
contexts is due in part to the extensive international
relations literature on engagement, but also to the use
of the term
engagement by countries such as the U.S. and China, particularly in the
post-Cold War period, to
refer to their mutual interactions. Although not a
diplomatic term of art, engagement refers to “a willingness
to talk directly
with those with whom it may not be possible, or even desirable to agree.”14
Mel Gurtov asserts that “engagement is a long-term strategy that may
involve negotiations but embraces a good deal more, including unilateral
steps, multilateral formats, and
exchanges below the official level.”15 Evan
Resnick has
distinguished the term engagement from the alternative
approaches of appeasement, containment, and
isolation.16 Resnick defines
engagement as “the attempt to
influence the political behavior of a target
state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of
contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military,
economic,
cultural).”17
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster defined defence diplomacy as “the
peacetime cooperative use of armed forces
and related infrastructure
(primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy.”18
Two countries that are “former or potential enemies” are involved in
strategic engagement when they participate in these efforts.19 Of
the 10
defence diplomacy activities enumerated by Cottey and Forster, the U.K.
and Germany, the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., and the U.S. and China have
performed at least several of these activities with each other:
“bilateral and
multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian officials,”
“appointment of defence
attachés to foreign countries,” “contacts and
exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits,”
and
“bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes.”20 (See
Appendix 2 for the range of possible defence diplomacy activities and those
which
constitute strategic engagement.)
Strategic engagement is defence diplomacy between actors that will not
participate in
all defence diplomacy activities due to their mutually
competitive posture. Therefore, strategic engagement is
a subset of the
generalized phenomenon of defence diplomacy, in which a wide range of
activities transpire.
More traditional defence diplomacy is often conducted
between allies in order to build capacity or
interoperability. The goals of
defence diplomacy and strategic engagement are not identical due to the
divergent nature of the relationship between the actors. Strategic
engagement is also broader than strategic
dialogue since it sometimes goes
beyond discourse to working-level contacts between defence attachés,
educational visits, ship visits, and other activities. While strategic dialogue
can occur between allies and
potential adversaries, strategic engagement is
often reserved for countries whose relationships may be poor and
in need of
improvement. The goals of strategic engagement vary depending upon the
countries involved and the
prevailing circumstances.21 Regardless of the
disparate
objectives pursued by the respective parties, the means employed
range from episodic interactions to
institutionalized diplomatic and
military-to-military mechanisms. In most circumstances, strategic
engagement
aims to reduce the prospect of conflict between potential
adversaries.
The conception of strategy employed aligns with that of Colin Gray, who
posits that “strategy is the bridge
between military power and political
purpose.”22 Strategic
engagement encompasses a range of activities whose
ostensible goal is to foster improved military-to-military
relations, all the
while acknowledging that the military is not an independent actor detached
from political
endeavours. Policy remains paramount and the agenda of
strategic engagement remains circumscribed by political
guidance.
Nonetheless, the relationships forged via strategic engagement mechanisms
have the potential to shape
policy. Strategic engagement can, though need
not, encompass what has been termed operational arms
control.23
Diplomatic mechanisms which do not have a specific
arms control agenda
also fall under the remit of strategic engagement. Contrary to the
pessimistic assertion of
Colin Gray that “arms control must fail …,”24 even
he concedes
that selected measures (such as the 1972 U.S.–Soviet Incidents
at Sea Agreement) may “minimize the possibility
of potentially dangerous
military acts …”25 Strategic engagement
does not presume that the
diplomatic instrument is an inherent good; however, it is capable of shaping
security
relationships for the better given the proper policy parameters. The
primary goal of strategic engagement is to
improve interstate relations.
Within that construct, competitive states employ aspects of confidence-
building
measures (CBMs), crisis management, and intelligence. The
relationship of each of these components to strategic
engagement will be
explicated in Chapter 2.
The use of the strategic level (as opposed to operational or tactical, which
Tan See Seng and Bhubindar Singh
use to distinguish between different
defence diplomacy modalities) seems most appropriate. This is due to
strategic engagement’s contribution to the shaping of strategic outlooks and
discussions regarding the
maritime, nuclear, and to a lesser extent ground
components of military force, which
are all capable of engaging in a
“strategic mission.”26 Strategic
engagement is strategic because it
contributes to understandings of the connection between means and ends as
applied to the counterpart state.
Strategic engagement encompasses interactions between national security
establishments and is not limited to
military bureaucracies, although
defence ministries feature prominently as an institutional actor. While the
study and use of strategy historically belonged almost exclusively to the
uniformed military, its practitioners
broadened to include civilians,
particularly since the onset of the Cold War. Strategists can work in defence
ministries, foreign ministries, or the executive branch of government. In the
U.S. government system,
non-military personnel involved in strategic
engagement include the Secretary of State (or other
representatives of the
Department of State), the National Security Advisor, intelligence
community personnel,
scholars, or technical experts serving in a Track
1.5/Track II capacity on behalf of the government.27
The notion of strategic engagement, as a subset of defence diplomacy, is
distinct from military diplomacy.
Although the concepts of military and
defence diplomacy are “often used interchangeably in the academic
literature,” they “are not quite the same even though they clearly
overlap.”28 Military diplomacy would more accurately be defined as “the
deliberate application by a
nation of its military assets and resources, in
nonviolent ways and in bilateral or multilateral settings, to
attain positive
outcomes for its security.”29 As noted above,
strategic engagement is more
inclusive as regards utilization of civilian personnel.
Finally, strategic engagement is not analogous to public diplomacy,
which has been described by former U.S.
Ambassador Edward Djerejian as
“‘… the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and
influencing people around the world …’”30 While strategic
engagement
practitioners are representatives of a nation-state, their purpose is not
promotion of their
national interest to foreign publics. Public diplomacy
itself is a contested term lacking a consensus
definition, and is instead “a
blanket term signifying the necessity of influential international
communication
– from interpersonal to mass media – but without a
consistent strategic reason or justification.”31 In fact, strategic engagement
is frequently conducted discreetly outside
of the public eye.

Overview of the book

The aim of the book is to conduct a systematic, in-depth investigation of
strategic engagement. Bilateral
peacetime interactions between great-power
competitor national security establishments have occurred throughout
the
twentieth century and in recent years to mixed effect. The analysis of three
cases from the twentieth
century to the present will provide a broader range
of empirical qualitative data and allow a more
comprehensive treatment of
the phenomenon. The comparative nature of the case studies will enable
deeper
understanding of the practice of strategic engagement. By
elucidating the factors which facilitate successful
strategic engagement, the
book aims to provide policy recommendations for future
strategic
engagement efforts with the goal of diminishing the risk of interstate
conflict.
The main arguments of the book are threefold. First, strategic
engagement has been pursued as a tool for states
to communicate their own
motives to a potential adversary as well as to better understand the motives
of their
counterpart. Strategic engagement in particular bears on
informational assessments of a potential adversary,
but the content of
discussions and/or the demonstration of military capabilities relates to
material
considerations. Though countries that are in security competition
with one another have sometimes gone to war
in spite of strategic
engagement that has attempted to avert conflict, in other cases the risk of
inadvertent
conflict or miscalculation has been reduced. States pursue
strategic engagement since it is low-cost and
preferable to the alternatives,
which are little to no communication, misunderstanding of motives, and
greater
potential for conflict. Although some states may engage in
deception or act in bad faith during strategic
engagement, others see it as an
opportunity to diminish suspicions, bridge differences, and build trust.
Second, strategic engagement that has well-defined objectives, is
conducted on a sustained rather than ad
hoc basis, and has the active
support of political leadership should be more likely to succeed. Despite
the
necessity of top-level political support, excessive political interference is
detrimental to the overall
success of strategic engagement efforts.
Additionally, confidentiality of proceedings and removal from the
public
eye to the maximal degree possible facilitates successful strategic
engagement. Since adversarial states
innately harbor deep suspicions
toward one another, privacy is conducive to effective discussions of
sensitive
issues of national security. Although it may be tempting for
nations to solicit populist, nationalistic support
vis-à-vis their competitors,
successful strategic requirement requires discretion to avoid the detrimental
effects of propaganda.
Third, the history of strategic engagement offers useful lessons from
which contemporary policymakers can
approach global policy challenges.
Although the specific actors and circumstances may change, recurrent
themes
emerge. Policymakers contemplating strategic engagement would
do well to consider characteristics of past
successful strategic engagement
efforts. While civilians nominally wield ultimate control in Iran, North
Korea,
Russia, Pakistan, and China, the military holds considerable sway in
these countries. The U.S. and Europe will
need to consider the security
challenges posed by competitor nations and engage them appropriately.

Rationale for case studies

Case selection is not arbitrary. Instead, there are only limited examples of
twentieth-century strategic
engagement between countries with major
military capabilities. Conflict between the U.K. and Germany prior to
World War I, the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and China
and the U.S. in the post-Cold War
period had the potential for global
geopolitical consequences. This is a principal
criterion for case selection.
All three cases represent strategic engagement between great powers from
the
twentieth-century to the present. The bilateral focus is meant to isolate
factors involved in strategic
engagement processes. The exclusion of
multilateral and international strategic engagement per se is
not because
these interactions are insignificant. Rather, bilateral strategic engagement in
the context of
multilateral strategic engagement (for instance, a U.S.–China
sideline meeting at a regional forum) falls
within the scope of the book.
Additionally, the three cases represent variation along the nuclear
dimension.
The World War I case transpired in the pre-nuclear era with a
resultant war, while the Cold War U.S.–Soviet
case occurred in the nuclear
era without an attendant war. The final case study, the U.S.–China case,
represents a contemporary instance in the nuclear era with an uncertain
outcome. In accordance with the premise
that nuclear weapons
fundamentally change the nature of conflict and warfare, analyzing case
studies in light
of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons is essential.
Second, strategic engagement took place between all of the states under
examination with varying results. In
the World War I case, strategic
engagement failed to achieve its objectives and war broke out after the U.K.
and Germany were unable to forge a neutrality accord. Although other
important factors led to the ultimate
outbreak of World War I, the inability
of the U.K. and Germany to stem their naval competition is commonly
cited
as a contributing factor to the conflict. In the U.S.–Soviet case, strategic
engagement occurred with
particular intensity during and after the détente
era with attendant moderate success. The results of this
engagement
included a number of agreements, notably the 1972 INCSEA accord and the
U.S.–Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission. As a prime example of
strategic engagement, INCSEA contributed to increased safety at
sea and
confidence-building despite a renewal of bilateral political tensions in the
1980s. According to some
participants, the Standing Consultative
Commission was significant in upholding the integrity of the
Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty over the course of its history. The metric of success
for INCSEA was a
reduction in dangerous incidents at sea, while the SCC
had a mixed record of success in ABM treaty compliance.
In the U.S.–
China case, strategic engagement has occurred since the early 1990s. Due to
its incipient and
sometimes episodic nature, U.S.–China strategic
engagement represents a more contemporary test case where
potential
benefits or drawbacks of these efforts could materialize. The three cases
constitute a spectrum of
outcomes across the range of conflict. In the World
War I case, war resulted despite strategic engagement aimed
to prevent
hostilities. During the INCSEA process, the record of strategic engagement
aligns more with the
objectives sought and dangerous incidents at sea were
markedly diminished. The SCC led to more mixed results,
with allegations
of cheating and failure to resolve major ABM compliance issues. In the
post-Cold War period,
the U.S. and China have thus far avoided significant
interstate conflict. Whether and to what extent strategic
engagement
contributed to diminishing the likelihood of conflict is a goal of this book.
Third, all cases possess an element of naval competition that is a
prominent focus of
strategic engagement. World War I strategic engagement
between the U.K. and Germany focused on an emerging
naval arms race.
Cold War-era strategic engagement and the potential for naval accidents
resulted in the
negotiation of an INCSEA by the American and Soviet
navies with subsequent annual meetings. U.S.–China
strategic engagement
has incorporated a U.S.–PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(MMCA) since 1998
that has facilitated the mutual exchange of views on
maritime issues. China’s current naval buildup and
activities in the East and
South China Seas are a prime concern for the security as well as freedom of
navigation of the U.S. and other regional actors. In all three cases, there was
competition between an
established naval power (the Royal Navy in
Chapter 3 and the U.S.
in Chapters 4 and 5)
and a rising, near-peer
competitor (the German High Seas Fleet in Chapter 3, the Soviet Navy in
Chapter 4, and the PLA
Navy in Chapter 5). The dynamics in these case
studies can be seen
as a maritime security dilemma, which “are more
difficult to define, but can in some ways be easier to solve,
primarily
because seas provide a certain distance and can have a moderating, or
insulating effect …”32 In the contemporary era, defence diplomacy related
to disputes over
sovereignty and militarization of the South China Sea has
the potential to mitigate maritime security dilemma
dynamics. Additionally,
defence diplomacy can be viewed as a specific form of cooperative security
whereby
parties seek to solve common challenges, although some
participating countries may be focused more upon gaining
advantage.
Finally, the absence of World War II-era strategic engagement in the
book can be explained. Investigation of
the diplomacy of this period did not
yield evidence that strategic engagement occurred between the Allied and
Axis powers. The Axis powers were intent upon war and strategic
engagement was not of interest to Germany or
Japan. This book is intended
to be sufficiently broad to be generalizable but suitably focused for
feasibility.
Three cases that explore major conflicts of the twentieth century
should serve this function. Although the
three cases selected may initially
appear to be widely disparate both temporally and geopolitically, they all
possess common features of strategic engagement. Just as Alexander
George examined seven cases of coercive
diplomacy as an alternative
strategy to “appeasement, deterrence, or war,”33 so this book explores the
importance of strategic engagement as an alternative to armed
conflict.

Methodology
This book, which is largely qualitative in nature, consists of “structured,
focused comparison” of three
cases.34 This methodological approach was
initially advanced by
Alexander George in the 1970s as follows:
The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the
research objective
and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and
standardize data collection, thereby
making systematic comparison and cumulation of the
findings of the cases possible.
The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain
aspects of the historical cases examined.35
The book will elucidate in a “structured” fashion the motivation for
adversaries to pursue strategic
engagement; inductively discern the factors
which contribute to the success or failure of strategic engagement;
and offer
policy recommendations that can be useful for confronting contemporary
global challenges. Policy
practitioners can draw from the lessons learned
from past historical episodes to guide future strategy. While
the interactions
between the countries analysed encompass a vast array of components, this
book is “focused”
specifically on contacts which fall within the realm of
strategic engagement.
Although quantitative data is employed, assessment of the success or
failure of strategic engagement does not
flow from a primarily quantitative
analysis. While qualitative research flows from “an inductive logic,
whereby
empirical observations are used to generate theoretical
propositions, quantitative research is argued to be
deductive, as theoretical
propositions are tested against empirical data.”36 The premise of this book
relies on the belief shared by Alexander George and Andrew
Bennett that
inductive “qualitative methods are not quantitative methods writ small”
since “qualitative
research methods are not susceptible to the same potential
weaknesses as quantitative approaches …”37 Quantitative methods are
valuable only insofar as they are useful to
illuminate qualitative analyses.
The data collection method employed is triangulation. This technique
utilizes numerous data sources in order to
“capture a more complete,
holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study.”38 Empirical
data concerning the activities of strategic engagement was
collected for
each case. The nature of the information differs for the three cases due to
technological
progress and the broad time span covered by the book, which
ranges from World War I to the present.
Triangulation is essential in order
to avoid the logical fallacy of appealing to the authority of interview
subjects. However, the impressions of direct participants in strategic
engagement processes are a crucial
source of qualitative data.
First, official archival or documentary evidence serves as a valuable data
source. This consists of
declassified archival documents. For the World War
I case, relevant archives are those which contain
contemporary internal
government memoranda and correspondence between officials who
participated in strategic
engagement. Cold War-era U.S.–Soviet strategic
engagement records relative to the U.S.–USSR Incidents at Sea
Agreement
(INCSEA) are located at the Naval Historical and Heritage Command in
Washington, D.C. Documents
relevant to the U.S.–Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) can be found in the collections of U.S.
presidential libraries. For post-Cold War U.S.–China strategic engagement,
government documents are located at
the National Security Archive at
George Washington University.39
For authoritative Chinese materials,
sources on China’s military diplomacy range from
white papers to official
news agency reporting. In addition, officials’ public statements on strategic
engagement are available for the U.S. and China in the post-Cold War
period.
Second, for the Cold War and post-Cold War cases, interviews with
civilian and military officials who directly
participated in or planned
strategic engagement provide a useful source of insight. In the U.S.,
interview
subjects include officials who served in the Department of
Defense (including defence attachés), Department of
State, the National
Security Council, and United States Pacific Command. American officials
who worked on
strategic engagement with the Soviet Union are less widely
available due to the passage of time, though some
interview subjects are
still alive. In China, relevant actors are active or retired military officials,
many of
whom are based in major Chinese think tanks and universities.
Candid conversations with current and former
defence ministry
representatives reveal more than official documents due to the risk aversion
sometimes
displayed by government personnel speaking publicly regarding
sensitive issues. Since it is impossible to
interview World War I-era
subjects, the second leg of triangulation for this case consists of memoirs
and
biographies of strategic engagement practitioners.
Third, for the Cold War and post-Cold War cases, documentary records
of track 1.5/Track II strategic engagement
from the research institutes that
coordinated these activities were utilized. These are supplemented by
interviews with the personnel involved in organizing and executing
dialogues. Discussions held with the
authorization or awareness of
governments have been helpful since the Cold War as testing grounds for
issues
too sensitive to broach at the official level, particularly in functional
areas where cooperation or
understanding is absent. Should governments
prove receptive to recommendations broached below the official
level, the
proposals may then reach the official agenda.
Post-Cold War U.S.–China strategic engagement includes a multitude of
initiatives conducted over the course of
the last two decades. In China and
in the U.S., interviews with those involved in Track 1.5/Track II exchanges
illuminate issues that may not appear in the documentary record of strategic
engagement. The value of personal
interviews is that subjects are often
more candid in a private setting than in a public venue. Think tanks and
research institutes have often played a key role in facilitating sensitive inter-
governmental discussions that
cannot be held in a Track I setting.40 For
instance, events such
as the annual Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), a Track
I/1.5 discussion due to the presence of military personnel in their official
capacity, has
allowed for private bilateral meetings on the sidelines
between, for example, the U.S. and Chinese
militaries.41 According to Li
Bin of the Carnegie Endowment,
“since the late 1980s, the United States
and China have pursued strategic nuclear dialogues at various levels,
ranging from track I government-to-government negotiations to track II
exchanges among non-governmental
security experts.”42 The inauguration
of new Track 1.5 nuclear dialogues in the late 1990s enabled the inclusion
of PLA Second
Artillery officers as observers.43 The Second Artillery
operates
China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile force.44 In
China, military and civilian researchers and scholars who advise the
government on relations with the U.S. are
worthwhile interview subjects.
University and think tank-based experts play an important, though often
under-appreciated, role in foreign
policy formulation and often appear at
Track 1.5/Track II fora on behalf of their respective governments.
Complementary Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues on Sino–U.S. strategic
issues have occurred since
2004.45 An official April 2008 U.S.–China
Nuclear Dialogue took
place, but details on the proceedings are scarce. A
semi-official Sino–U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue organized by
the U.S. think
tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Chinese
think tank China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
which formally met six times from 2009 through 2012,
has included “a
broad range of U.S. and Chinese officials and scholars responsible for
cybersecurity
issues.”46 The third leg of triangulation for the World War I
case relies upon examination of secondary histories and discussions with
scholars of the period.
Triangulation is essential for corroborating and verifying the accuracy of
data. Official documents as well as
statements, interviews, unofficial
discussions, and secondary histories should all point to the same trends in
a
given case of strategic engagement. However, discrepancies can be
adjudicated among the different sources of
data. If all three align, there can
be increased confidence in assessments of strategic engagement. Historical
cases by necessity rely more on archival and documentary evidence.
Book structure
The book is structured as follows. It is comprised of a total of seven
chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter which outlines the goal of
exploring strategic
engagement, defines key terms, provides an overview of
the book, and lays out the rationale for the case
studies as well as the
methodology.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on the topic as
well as
related issues, identifies the gaps in the literature, outlines the claims of the
main international
relations paradigms about strategic engagement, and
introduces the basis for the inductively generated
framework. Chapters 3
through 5 proceed in a chronological examination of the three main case
studies. Chapter 3 focuses on Anglo–German strategic engagement prior to
World War I. Chapter 4 examines U.S.–Soviet strategic engagement during
the Cold War
with emphasis upon the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement
(INCSEA) and the U.S.–Soviet Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC)
established in December 1972. Chapter 5 discusses
Sino–U.S. strategic
engagement in the post-Cold War period. Chapter
6 compares and contrasts
the three case studies to (a) inductively derive a framework composed of
the
factors which contribute to the success or failure of strategic
engagement, and (b)
assess the outcomes, namely the relative success or
failure of strategic engagement in each case study.
Chapter 7 concludes with
lessons learned and policy prescriptions
for ongoing and future strategic
engagement efforts.

Notes
1        See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Twenty-First Century (2nd ed.) (London:
Routledge, 2009).
2        Ibid., pp. 258–264. Till points out that “the pioneer was
the US Navy’s Admiral Stansfield
Turner who encouraged thought about what he called the ‘Naval Presence mission
… the use of
naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives’. Turner discussed ‘preventive
deployments’ (where the appearance of naval forces prevents a problem from becoming a crisis)
and ‘reactive
deployments’ (where naval forces respond to a crisis),” pp. 253–254.
3    Ibid., p. 257.
4        Ibid., p. 256. Till indicates that Soviet Admiral Gorshkov
was an advocate of this line of
thinking. “It is not simply that sailors are a nicer set of people; the other
services find it difficult
 to replicate parts of the spectrum of possibilities offered by warships, in which
something that is
potentially quite menacing can easily be made to seem warm and cuddly while alongside in a
foreign harbour. It is certainly quite hard to conceive of an equivalent courtesy visit by a
division of main
battle tanks.”
5    Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy (London:
Reaktion Books, 2010), p. 72.
6    Ibid., p. 102.
7    Ibid., p. 143.
8    See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery (Amherst, NY: Humanity
Books, 1976).
9        See Colonel Timothy C. Shea, “Transforming Military
Diplomacy,” Joint Force Quarterly
(Issue 38, 3rd Quarter 2005): 49–52. According to Shea, the U.S.
military “services sought
congressional approval in September 1888 to establish a number of Army and Naval
attaché
positions in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Vienna” (p. 50).
10    Shea, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” p. 50.
11    Ibid.
12    The use of the term “strategic engagement” aligns with
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster,
Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and
Assistance, Adelphi
Paper 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 7. For a full explication of
this key term,
please see I.III, “Definition of Key Terms.” Also see Appendix 2, “Defence Diplomacy
Activities”
as well as II.II.II, “Confidence Building Measures” for a justification of strategic
engagement activities.
13        For current annual military budgets, see Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute
Military Expenditure Database, www.sipri.org/databases/milex. In 2018 current U.S. dollar
terms, U.S. military spending in 2018
was $648.8 billion and Chinese spending was $249.99
billion. Estimates of total Chinese military expenditures
vary, sometimes substantially. The U.S.
Department of Defense approximates 2018 Chinese spending at greater
than $200 billion. See
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2019,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POW
ER_REPORT.pdf, p.
95. For PLA budget trends over the decade from 2009 to 2018, see p. 94 of
the 2019 report.
14    Alan K. Henrikson, “United States Contemporary Diplomacy:
Implementing a Foreign Policy of
‘Engagement,’” in Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds.), Diplomacy in a Globalizing
World: Theories and Practices (New York/Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), p. 279.
15        Mel Gurtov, Engaging Adversaries: Peacemaking and
Diplomacy in the Human Interest
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p. 11.
16        Evan N. Resnick, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of
International Affairs 54, no. 2 (2001):
551–566, p. 566.
17    Ibid., p. 559.
18    Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy,
p. 6. According to Lieutenant Commander
Leonardo Giovannelli, Military Diplomacy: A Need for Doctrine
(Newport, RI: Naval War
College, 2012), military diplomacy “could be defined as the use of military forces, in
any size,
as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy goals via peaceful and diplomatic interaction,” p. 2. In
See
Seng Tan and Bhubhindar Singh, “Introduction,” Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 221–231,
“defense
diplomacy refers to the collective application of pacific and/or cooperative initiatives
by national defense
establishments and military practitioners for confidence building, trust
creation, conflict prevention, and/or
conflict resolution” (p. 221).
19        Ibid., p. 7. Alternative definitions of defence diplomacy
offered by the British Ministry of
Defence (MOD) in a 2000 paper and a former Singaporean air force chief do
not capture Sino–
U.S. military dynamics.
20    Ibid.
21    For hypotheses and main arguments on the goals of
strategic engagement, see section I.V.
22        Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory
and Practice (London: Routledge,
2006), p. 1.
23        For a definition of operational arms control, see Colin
S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms
Control Must Fail (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p.
x.
24    Ibid., p. ix.
25    Ibid., p. 41.
26    A strategic mission defined by the U.S. Department of
Defense as a mission “with the purpose
of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking
capacity and will to
make war.” See Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint
Publication 1–02, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 August 2012), p. 295.
27        For a description of diplomatic tracks, see “Tracks of
diplomacy,” United States Institute of
Peace Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and
Peacebuilding, available at
http://glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy
28    See Seng Tan, “Military Diplomacy,” in Costas M.
Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp
(eds.), The Sage Handbook on Diplomacy (Los Angeles, CA:
Sage, 2016), p. 592.
29    Ibid.
30    James Thomas Snyder, The United States and the
Challenge of Public Diplomacy (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 28.
31    Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public
Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Plymouth,
UK: Lexington Books, 2012), p. 287.
32    Geoffrey Wiseman, Concepts of Non-Provocative
Defence: Ideas and Practices in International
Security (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 191.
33       Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds.), The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (2nd
ed.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Pres, 1994), p. 268.
34    Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), p. 67.
35    Ibid.
36    Christopher Lamont, Research Methods in International
Relations (London: Sage, 2015), p. 98.
37    Colin Elman, “Symposium on
Qualitative Research Methods in Political Science,” The Journal
of Politics 70, no. 1, (January 2008):
p. 272.
38        Todd D. Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative
Methods: Triangulation in Action,”
Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979): 602–611, p.
603.
39    See National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/index.html
40    Besides the initiatives listed in the body of the text,
there are numerous other Track 1.5/Track II
dialogues organized by think tanks in order to increase strategic
understanding. In the Sino–U.S.
case, this includes the efforts of the New York-based National Committee on
United States–
China Relations. For details, see https://www.ncuscr.org/program/us-china-track-ii-strategic-
security-dialogue. Professor Susan
Shirk, a former Clinton administration official, has organized
the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue between
the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and the two
Koreas since 1993 through the University of California Institute on
Global Conflict and
Cooperation (IGCC). Each country’s representation includes “one foreign ministry official,
one
defense ministry official, one military officer, and two academics from each country,” Susan L.
Shirk, “The
Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue: An Experiment in Track II Multilateral
 Diplomacy,” in T.J. Pempel and
Chung-Min Lee (eds.), Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia:
Architecture and beyond (New
York/London: Routledge, 2012), p. 199. Finally, the Preventive
Defense Project (PDP), a joint collaboration
between Stanford University and the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University, has coordinated
U.S.–China strategic engagement
as part of its work. See https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/preventive-defense-project
41    The Shangri-La Dialogue has been held since 2002 in
Singapore. Representation often occurs at
the ministerial or chief-of-defense level. The U.S. Secretary of
Defense has been represented
every year since 2003. The PLA sent higher-level representation beginning in 2007,
when its
delegation was led by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 2011, Chinese Defense Minister
Liang
Guanglie led the Chinese delegation, one of only two years of Chinese representation at
the ministerial level
since the Dialogue’s inception (the other being 2019).
42        Li Bin, “Promoting Effective China–U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Dialogue,” October 18, 2011,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/18/promoting-effective-china-u.s.-strategic-nuclear-
dialogue/8kzx
43    Ibid.
44    Ibid.
45    US–China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VI: An NPS and
Pacific Forum Conference, June 2011,
PASCC Report 2012 001, p. 4, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=709606
46        “Bilateral Discussions on Cooperation in Cybersecurity
China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) – Center for Strategic and International
Studies,” June 2012,
http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/120615_JointStatement_CICIR.pdf
2    Defence diplomacy
A conceptual overview

Introduction
There is little written on the subject of strategic engagement whereby the
concept is defined as defence
diplomatic interaction between potential
adversaries. Therefore, this book represents a unique in-depth
examination
of the phenomenon. Available literature includes work on defence
diplomacy, confidence building
measures, crisis management, and
intelligence. The contribution of this book to the field of strategic studies
is
made clearer by understanding its relationship to what has already been
written.

Defence diplomacy and strategic engagement

Available work on defence diplomacy can be divided into several broad
types. There are books on diplomacy that
discuss in a limited manner the
historical and contemporary interactions between military establishments as
part of a centuries-long diplomatic tradition between sovereign states.1
Additionally, there are numerous think tank reports and book chapters that
discuss an
individual bilateral military relationship such as U.S. military
diplomacy with the Soviet Union or the
American military’s engagement
with the PLA.2 There are several
significant studies on Sino–U.S. strategic
engagement authored by acknowledged China experts.3 Peer-reviewed
journal articles have discussed the broad contours of
defence diplomacy.4
Multiple U.S. military officers have written
theses on the topic, whether
broadly in reference to the defence attaché system or to a specific bilateral
defence diplomatic relationship.5 Government documents and
statements
emanate from ministries of defence and other executive agencies, which
provide reports, testimony,
and white papers.6 Finally, pieces in military
periodicals
discuss the role of military diplomacy and strategic
engagement.7
The major book-length study that treated in some depth the issue of
soldiers, diplomats, and their occasionally
overlapping functions is Alfred
Vagts’s 1956 work, Defense and Diplomacy. A military historian by
training, Vagts provides a sweeping survey of the evolution of diplomacy
and military diplomacy, particularly
in Europe. Though there is not a central
argument, Vagts provides valuable
perspective on the functions of military
diplomats as well as the occasional substantial influence that
military
officers wielded in policymaking. Despite bureaucratic rivalries within and
between foreign and
defence ministries, strategy is inherently about civil–
military relations. The empirical record shows that the
stereotypes of the
conciliatory diplomat and the bellicose soldier can be flawed. Military
officers or
policymakers with combat experience have counselled caution
when civilian decision-makers without experience of
war or military affairs
have urged escalation and resort to force. Military officers have served as
ambassadors
and chiefs of mission, blurring the traditional demarcation
between diplomat and soldier.8 The exposition of the military intelligence
function of diplomats and
service attachés is of particular value for this
analysis of strategic engagement due to its direct relevance
for interactions
between potential adversaries.9 Improved
information on motives is a
significant potential value of strategic engagement. Diplomacy and
intelligence
have a common objective, namely “seeking knowledge and
understanding of foreign countries.”10
In practice, interdepartmental frictions do emerge and strategies are not
always unified. The divergence
between defence and foreign ministries’
strategic outlooks in peacetime is more pronounced in liberal
democracies
such as the U.S. or U.K. than in more highly centralized government
systems such as World War I-era
Germany, the Soviet Union, or China.
However, wartime may create a unity of effort in government that is
lacking
in peacetime. The degree of influence exercised by the foreign or defence
ministry on strategic
formulation varies according to the state context and
time period, though the onset of the Cold War led to a
degree of
convergence and equality in the U.S. bureaucracy.
The premise of this book relies on the synthesis of strategy and
diplomacy, since “both strategy and diplomacy
are embedded in policy and
politics, both in wartime and in peacetime.”11 Strategy formulation involves
multiple agencies of government beyond the defence ministry.
The focus on
peacetime strategic engagement is appropriate since “strategy is deeply
rooted in a country’s
peace-time conditions and influences.”12 This book
will note when
there are discernible clashes in strategic outlook within a
particular government and attempt to draw out the
resultant policy
implications. The case studies will outline the governmental structure for
the states under
examination as well as the relative influences on policy and
strategy of the main actors. Civil–military
balance is one of the factors to be
analysed within the framework of this book.
The other major work that addresses defence diplomacy is Cottey and
Forster’s 2004 Adelphi Paper, Reshaping
Defence Diplomacy. Their
monograph is an important contemporary study on defence diplomacy and
is a
valuable contribution to the literature. By comparison, this book
demonstrates that strategic engagement, or
defence diplomacy between
potentially adversarial states, occurred throughout the twentieth century and
to the
present day. Strategic engagement is not, as Cottey and Forster claim,
a creation of the post-Cold War period.
While some parties view “strategic
engagement as a means of reducing the likelihood of conflict between
former
or potential enemies,”13 others view it
as an opportunity to shape the
information environment or obtain advantage over a potential adversary
through
negotiation, the demonstration of resolve, and the acquisition of
intelligence. Cottey and Forster enumerate
six functions of strategic
engagement: “a primarily political role, acting as a symbol of willingness to
pursue
broader cooperation, mutual trust and commitment to work to
overcome or manage differences”; “a means of
introducing transparency
into defence relations, in particular with regard to states’ intentions and
capabilities”; “a means of building or reinforcing perceptions of common
interests”; “changing the mind-sets of
partner states’ militaries”; “to support
specific, concrete defence reforms in the partner state”; and “as an
incentive
to encourage partner states to cooperate in other areas.”14 Defence
diplomacy can serve as an important tool of conflict prevention and should
be
aggressively employed when possible. The challenges of strategic
engagement noted by Cottey and Forster include
the inability to deter the
ultimate outbreak of war, conditionality and reciprocity, and linkage with
broader
issues.15 A finer-grained analysis of scope conditions for
success or
failure of strategic engagement would increase confidence in these
assertions.
One scope condition for successful strategic engagement appears to be
persistence. Detractors assert that both
parties may not approach strategic
engagement with cooperation in mind. By this logic, strategic engagement
itself could actually impede cooperation, serving as a forum for signalling
malign motives and offensive
intentions, thereby increasing the likelihood
of conflict. Defence diplomatic mechanisms established in periods
of
rapprochement often continue despite a downturn in political relations.
Although ministerial meetings may be
delayed or cancelled, working-level
activities proceed. Another area of discussion of defence diplomacy
concerns the possible flaws in strategic engagement programme execution
due to conflicting reporting
requirements of defence attachés. Although
meetings between defence ministers and chiefs of defence receive
more
public attention, the daily work of strategic engagement often occurs via
defence attaché offices (DAOs)
in a country’s embassy. Defence attachés
(DATTs) facilitate strategic engagement with the defence ministry of
their
home country and oversee its implementation on the ground.
Defence attachés also have intelligence collection responsibilities in
addition to their ostensible diplomatic
functions. In the U.S. system, DAOs
“are hampered by complex command and control relationships and
competing
priorities.”16 The staffing of DAOs in U.S. diplomatic posts
reflects the geopolitical context of the Cold War period. In the U.S.
government, for example, “it is telling
that the largest attaché offices in the
current system, and the only two with general officers as DATTs, are in
Moscow and Beijing.”17 While intelligence collection is an
important
component of the duties of defence attachés, they are also responsible for
facilitating other
strategic engagement activities such as ship visits befitting
their diplomatic role. Other studies take the
structure of strategic
engagement as a given or attribute flaws in strategic engagement to the
counterpart
military’s intransigence or uncooperative attitudes. The lack of
coordinated doctrine
for strategic engagement activities is a final issue
raised. This book will advance scholarship by examining
the quality of
diplomatic and military-to-military interaction as a factor influencing the
outcome of strategic
engagement.

Confidence building measures

The origin of confidence building measures (CBMs) lies in the context of
the Cold War.18 CBMs “are said to be useful instruments for preventing
wars, bringing
about arms control and disarmament agreements and
facilitating conflict resolution. It is also suggested that
they are applicable
to all states, easily negotiable and bring only benefits.”19 This more
overarching characterization of CBMs emerged in the post-Cold War
period, when
enthusiasm for their use increased. However, during the Cold
War, CBMs had limited aims focused on “specific
military concerns” and
the negotiating parties did not claim that “they would improve trust between
adversaries.”20
CBM activities are comprised of four major categories: “exchanging
information and/or increasing communication
between the parties;
exchanging observers and/or conducting inspections; establishing ‘rules of
the road’ for
certain military operations; and applying restraints on the
operation and readiness of military
forces.”21 Although strategic
engagement can encompass some of
these activities, some conceptual
differentiation is necessary. CBMs are usually embedded in a process of
ongoing interactions, whereas strategic engagement can be either ongoing
or more limited in scope such as the
Haldane Mission preceding World War
I. Applying restraints to military forces is more applicable to the Cold
War
period due to the size and mutual alert levels of superpower nuclear
arsenals as well as the high risk of
military conflict in Europe. Although the
current Sino–U.S. relationship is tense, the alert levels of the two
nations’
militaries are minimal compared to those prevailing between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. during the Cold
War.
The judgment of CBM effectiveness varies greatly. The most expansive
view of CBM utility would claim their
ability to
 reduce the risk of miscalculation or communication failure escalating into war, and can inhibit
the use, or the
threat of use, of force for political coercion. They can increase predictability,
strengthen stability and
enhance security, as well as open “channels of communication”
between adversaries, break deadlocked security
relationships, improve political climates and
help establish working relationships. CBMs can also be the basis
for establishing cooperative
security regimes or collective security systems, for defining new models of
security
relationships, or for “reorganising” security.22

A middle-ground approach indicates that “some CBMs, such as ‘rules of

the road,’ may be useful tools for
managing the interactions of Soviet and
American forces during peacetime and crisis.”23 Detractors of CBM utility
indicate that “only a
handful of existing CBMs even begin to constrain the
behaviour of states and make a real contribution to
international security.
What is worse, the process of negotiating, and sometimes even executing,
these measures
can actually damage international security.”24 This negative
assessment emphasizes that specificity and verifiability are paramount for
CBMs to have any chance of
succeeding.25 This book does not prejudge the
utility of
strategic engagement, which encompasses some activities
typically referred to as CBMs. However, historical
evidence seems to
vindicate the middle-ground approach. The 1972 INCSEA agreement, for
example, has led to
measurable decreases in serious incidents at sea or in
the air, though detractors unfairly claim that
continuation of any incidents is
proof positive of CBM failure. The 1972 SCC was established under Article
XIII
of the ABM Treaty by the U.S. and the Soviet Union for compliance
and verification purposes. It was regarded as
“constructive and integral to
the process, not only as a forum of consultation on issues and questions, but
also as a domain of cooperation between rival nuclear powers over an
indefinite future period of technical and
political change and interaction.”26
Critics of CBMs raise several valid points. From a policy perspective, the
value of CBMs as compared with other
policy options should be
considered.27 Detractors’ belief in the
utility of arms control is
questionable, while the purported inability of CBMs to inform on motives is
not
empirically supported. There is nonetheless reason for states
implementing CBMs to be vigilant against
“selective compliance, bad faith
and deception.”28 Although
motives are certainly difficult to assess,
strategic engagement and elements of CBM processes could be a
valuable
avenue for discerning them. In the absence of a better alternative for
evaluating motives of a
potential adversary, CBMs should not be casually
dismissed. As Colin Gray asserts, arms control between
adversaries is
indeed difficult and also subject to the same pitfalls that critics ascribe to
CBMs.29

Crisis management
Although military crises have emerged throughout history, the necessity for
crisis management became
particularly acute with the dawn of the nuclear
age in the aftermath of World War II and the onset of the Cold
War. Crisis
control has been defined as “the ability of nations to halt crises before they
become wars, and,
better still, to prevent crises from erupting in the first
place.”30 Rational states and leaders do not seek nuclear war, but the risk
lies in “the path of
miscalculation in time of intense crisis, of
miscommunication, of human blunders and organizational
foul-ups.”31
Although nuclear arms control is certainly
important, the sheer quantity of
warheads possessed made anything but deep cuts less significant. After all,
“a
few hundred could destroy American society. It may only take a few
thousand to end human civilization. While
pursuing reductions, then, we
need to ensure that the weapons that exist are never used.”32 While crisis
management has been viewed as
distinct from CBMs, CBM discussions
sometimes address hotlines and crisis management tools.
The agenda of strategic engagement in the post-World War II period has
often included crisis management. As
“practical and politically feasible”
tools of risk reduction, crisis control can occur alongside arms control
discussions.33 The most widely recognized crisis management tool
is a
hotline. The lack of adequate crisis communications mechanisms between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led
to the 30 August 1963 establishment of the Moscow–Washington
hotline,
“a Teletype located in the Pentagon with an extension to the White
House.”34 The rationale of written as opposed to verbal communication lay
in the idea that “a
printed message allows more time to reflect and to
consult advisers before responding.”35 Technological improvements to the
hotline arrangement continued
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S.
and China inaugurated a presidential hotline in 1998 and an
inter-defence
department hotline in 2008 after several bilateral incidents with escalatory
potential occurred
in the 1990s and early 2000s. In September 2015, the
U.S. and China unveiled suggested improvements to the 2008
Defense
Telephone Link (DTL) through mutually agreed upon procedures.36
Another prominent crisis management tool is that of INCSEA. From the
late 1960s onward, U.S. and Soviet ships
increasingly “blocked,
shouldered, and played chicken with each other.”37 American and Soviet
naval officers successfully negotiated “an agreed-upon handbook of
‘rules
of the road’ and signals the two navies could use to communicate. Every
ship in both navies received a
copy.”38 Senior naval officers discussed
incidents annually and
retained the option to convene further meetings.39
The number of
serious incidents decreased after the agreement was signed
on 25 May 1972. Abiding by the agreement stemmed
less from altruism on
the part of the U.S. or the Soviet Union than from “a genuine common
interest in ensuring
that no hotheaded or careless action by two naval
officers in some far-off corner of the globe triggers a
dangerous crisis that
neither side wants.”40 The U.S.–Soviet
INCSEA “represented the first
important military agreement between the two superpowers since World
War
II.”41 The U.S.–China MMCA is less robust than the U.S.–Soviet
INCSEA. A U.S.–China INCSEA has met resistance from both sides for
different reasons, including Cold War
connotations and a U.S. insistence
that international rules of the road should suffice. Although U.S.–Soviet
navy-to-navy interactions took place under the auspices of INCSEA, the
defence ministers of the two countries
very rarely met. As of the mid-
1980s, apart from interactions at the June 1979 SALT II Treaty signing, “the
highest military leaders in each nation, responsible for controlling immense
military machines in constant
daily contact, have not met since World War
II.”42 American and
Chinese military leaders, by contrast, have met
numerous times in the last two decades.
The challenges to and limits of crisis management emerge in works on
the subject. During the Cold War, “the
Soviets have expressed suspicion
about American motives in advancing crisis control
as a subject for
negotiations.”43 Two potential adversaries with
mutual mistrust
understandably may have reservations about the motives of their
counterpart. In this fashion,
the normative underpinnings of crisis
management are in synchrony with those of CBMs. Both the CBM and the
crisis control agenda gained greater momentum in U.S.–Soviet security
relations with the declining results of
arms control processes. In contrast to
the claims of CBM detractors, INCSEA proponents assert that despite the
absence of “provisions for formal enforcement … mutual interests and
continuing U.S.–Soviet naval encounters
create the basis for a system of
self-enforcement through reciprocity.”44 Therefore, enforcement
mechanisms are not always a necessary condition for bilateral
crisis
mitigation, as demonstrated by the success of the U.S.–Soviet INCSEA. In
reference to the U.S.–Soviet
Cold War rivalry, Alexander George asserts the
stabilizing potential of diplomacy in moderating great power
competition
where formal agreements reach an impasse. Since military competition
between great powers often
involves economic and security interests
beyond their immediate borders, “the two superpowers should seek to
develop – through timely, intensive discussions – a series of individual
understandings as to how to limit
competition and involvement in a
particular country or region.”45
In all three case studies, strategic
engagement involves diplomatic efforts to diminish or stabilize
competitive
security dynamics.

Intelligence
In international relations and strategic studies, “intelligence is defined as the
collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information for competitive
decision making.”46
States actively seek intelligence on other states and the
international environment, but dedicate particular
attention to actual or
potential adversaries. Good intelligence is valued because it can lead to
better-informed policymaking; “intelligence thus affects the distribution of
power in the international
system…” and can help countries to achieve “a
thorough understanding of the target state’s reactions,
vulnerabilities, and
intentions.”47 Although the role of
intelligence in foreign and security
policy is paramount, “with a few exceptions, scholarship seems to skirt a
great, dark void: the relationship of intelligence to politics and
diplomacy.”48
 For many participating states, strategic engagement is an intelligence-
heavy enterprise. State dyads involved
in strategic engagement seek
intelligence on one another in order to gain advantage for any potential
future
military contingency. At the working level, military attachés are
tasked with intelligence collection
responsibilities. Their reports are often
transmitted to the respective state’s military intelligence branch
and read by
military and civilian leaders and strategists. At the ministerial or sub-
ministerial level,
strategic engagement affords an opportunity to engage
directly with a counterpart official, which may lead to a
greater
understanding of motives. Material capabilities of a potential adversary are
on display during visits
to ships as well as military facilities, and form an
additional component of
intelligence assessments. Adversaries tend to be
the highest-priority targets for intelligence collection, both
overt and covert.
An incipient line of scholarship focuses on the differential assessment of
an adversary’s intentions by
political decision-makers and intelligence
organizations.49
Civilians and intelligence officials diverge in that
“intelligence organizations predictably rely on different
indicators than
civilian decision makers do to determine an adversary’s intentions.”50 An
interesting finding from this research pertinent to strategic
engagement
indicates that “personal diplomatic communication may leave strong
emotional impressions (positive
or negative) on leaders, who then use these
impressions as evidence of intentions.”51 Civilian leaders and national
security officials are the primary focus of this analysis.
The impact of
interactions between military officials on assessments of an adversary’s
intentions is missing.

Claims of main IR paradigms regarding strategic engagement

Each major school of international relations theory makes explicit or
implicit claims regarding engagement and
its role in security competition
between sovereign states. The discussion below will define and lay out in
turn
the defensive realist, neoliberal institutionalist, and constructivist
schools’ views on strategic engagement,
in particular the strengths and
shortcomings of each paradigm in relation to the topic. Although this book
aims
to derive its inductive framework via empirical investigation of three
case studies rather than through a
deductive, theory-driven approach,
explicating the theoretical underpinnings of strategic engagement is useful
nonetheless.
Since realism and liberalism each encompass several theories, which may
make disparate predictions as to the
projected outcomes of strategic
engagement, this study focuses on sub-strands of realism and liberalism,
namely
defensive realism and neoliberal institutionalism, respectively. As
constructivism is less well-developed than
the other paradigms due to its
comparatively more recent exposition in the literature, it is sufficient to
outline mainstream constructivist claims on strategic engagement. On the
basis of the paradigms examined, a
typology outlining strategic engagement
outcomes ranging from weak to strong will result (see Appendix 3).

Defensive realism
According to defensive realist theory, strategic engagement is challenging
because states are inherently
secretive over national security issues.
Defensive realists have defined their philosophy as one in which
“states
merely sought to survive and great powers could guarantee their security by
forming balancing alliances
and choosing defensive military postures (such
as retaliatory nuclear forces).”52 Strategic engagement would only serve
purposes of signaling, updating, or bargaining.
Although the security
preferences of both actors would remain the same, the
strategies pursued to
achieve those preferences may change due to strategic engagement. In other
words,
strategic engagement could serve as a tool for more clearly and
credibly signaling motives to rival states,
thereby ameliorating, if not
eliminating, the security dilemma between them. Other realist thinkers such
as
John Mearsheimer (an offensive realist) and Aaron Friedberg (more
accurately characterized as a neoclassical
realist) are very clear in their
positions that the pursuit of engagement by the U.S. vis-à-vis China in the
post-Cold War period has failed and should be abandoned.53 The
military
intelligence collection aspect of strategic engagement can be seen as
gathering information on a
potential adversary that could be useful in
conflict. The display of powerful weapons capabilities or
operational
prowess via ship visits or joint exercises, respectively, has deterrent value
insofar as the
counterpart military views these as a threat to their security
interests. The possibility of deception in
discussions between countries
involved in strategic engagement accords with realist notions of zero-sum,
security-maximizing behaviour by nation-states.
The defensive realist view of strategic engagement accords with a weak
strategic engagement outcome. Strategic
engagement may or may not serve
as a contributing factor with regards to conflict, but side deals could result
on issues that reduce the prospects of war between two potential
adversaries. The author agrees with the
defensive realists that countries
often view strategic engagement largely through a realist lens as a means to
gain advantage over the other party. However, the offensive realist
conclusion that conflict between countries
is inevitable is overly pessimistic
about prospects for cooperative behaviour. By definition, offensive
realists
“argue that anarchy encourages all states to try to maximize their relative
strength simply because no
state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist
power might emerge.”54 Next, military intelligence can serve a dual
function. In addition to sizing up a
potential adversary or assisting in the
modernization of military capabilities, it can also serve as a
reassuring
factor to one or both sides if certain weaknesses are exposed. False
assumptions about the
capabilities of a potential adversary that are
incorporated into operational planning can have dire
consequences if
conflict erupts. The exposure of weaknesses may aid in more accurate
planning and diminish the
possibility for unnecessary escalation. Finally,
deception in discussions between potential adversaries is
always possible,
particularly if a country’s military strategic culture sees this as useful for
furthering its
national interests. Nonetheless, military intelligence and better
open-source information on countries’
military assets places limits on the
extent to which deception would be effective.

Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalists view strategic engagement as a “regime”
whereby rivals can promote mutual
cooperation within a prisoner’s
dilemma setting. Neoliberal institutionalists maintain that “institutions …
facilitate cooperation when it is in each state’s interest to do so, but it is
widely
agreed that they cannot force states to behave in ways that are
contrary to the states’ own selfish
interests.”55 State preferences would
remain fixed. However,
strategic engagement can promote cooperation
between rivals via issue-linkage, decreased transaction costs,
lengthening
the shadow of the future, and leading to the articulation of clear rules of the
game that
constitute defection. Strategic engagement would serve to
minimize conflict in an anarchic world and ought to
lead to prisoner’s
dilemma behaviour by states. Neoliberal thinkers such as Joseph Nye, Jr.
and Richard Haass
believe that it is possible for learning to take place inside
institutions.56 Early neoliberal work by Nye and Robert Keohane focused
on complex interdependence arising
from the many interactions between
states in an increasingly complex, interconnected world. International
institutions in particular were important venues for transmission of certain
codes of conduct and rules of the
road to state actors. However, other forces
had an influence as well, ranging from business interactions to
other
channels that went beyond the confines of the traditional international state
system. Military force was
not the primary means of exerting state
influence. Nye’s later work focused on soft power and the attraction of
certain cultural and ideational forces, which he saw as another source of
American influence in the world. Nye
and Keohane are optimistic about the
ability of complex interdependence to diminish the risks of military
conflict.
While soft power is a useful notion in international relations discourse, it
is distinct from strategic
engagement and defence diplomacy. Soft power is
traditionally defined as “the ability to ‘affect others to
obtain the outcomes
you want without coercion or economic inducement …’” via “co-optation –
where objectives
are achieved by getting others to ‘want what you want.’”57
By
contrast, defence diplomacy, and strategic engagement in particular, is
more focused upon achieving common
ground as well as deploying military
and diplomatic assets in the pursuit of conflict prevention. In addition,
soft
power is devoid of a strategic focus.58
The neoliberal institutionalist view of strategic engagement aligns with
the medium level of strategic
engagement outcomes, whereby diplomatic
interactions consistently improve vexing security challenges. However,
this
view of strategic engagement is problematic for several reasons. First, the
level of analysis is not
appropriate. Most neoliberal institutionalist
scholarship tends to focus on the power of international
institutions in
promoting cooperation. Bilateral interactions between nation-states are de-
emphasized. However,
smooth bilateral and regional interactions are crucial
for maintaining global peace and security, the stated
aim of international
institutions such as the United Nations.
Neoliberal institutionalists are correct in pointing out that economic
interests are important to nations.
However, they overstate its power to
subsume traditional security concerns. Substantial economic
interdependence between European states – such as the U.K. and Germany
– did not prevent the outbreak of World
War I. Although logic would dictate
that states should not imperil their economic well-being by instigating a
conflict, either deliberately or inadvertently, history has shown that
economics is
not always a sufficient deterrent to the use of force. States
often do behave to maximize their absolute rather
than their relative gains,
but this does not consistently apply in the realm of national defence. Zero-
sum
thinking too often figures into countries’ net assessments and
operational planning. Although military officers
paradoxically tend to be
less prone to advocate the use of force than their civilian counterparts,
military
planning favours decisive force that leads to victory over an enemy.

Constructivism
With regard to the ambitious nature of objectives, adherents of
constructivism occupy the highest rung among
the three levels of strategic
engagement outcomes, predicting strong and even transformative results.
Constructivists believe in “the capacity of discourse to shape how political
actors define themselves and their
interests, and thus modify their
behavior.”59 Constructivist
tenets would predict that nations can employ
strategic engagement to alter the very preferences of rival states
through the
transmission of norms, thereby fundamentally transforming the bilateral
relationship from one of
enmity to amity.
Constructivists believe that processes like strategic engagement can lead
to socialization or mutual learning.
One variant in accord with hegemonic
socialization theory would infer that the U.S. should be capable of
socializing countries into preferred norms and behaviours.60
Another would
involve an adversarial version of mutual or reciprocal socialization wherein
both states are
trying to socialize one another. Empirical evidence does not
bear out the socializing impact of strategic
engagement.61
The author would tend to agree with those who have argued against
constructivism as a school of thought
completely distinct from neoliberal
institutionalism.62 There is
much greater emphasis on learning, norms and
teaching in constructivism than in neoliberal institutionalism.
The level of
analysis is predominantly international in both schools. Some of the leading
proponents of
constructivist theory assert that “norms are shared beliefs
which may or may not manifest in behavior depending
on their strength, but
norms can only have effects if they are so manifested.”63
The output of constructivist literature in international relations has
increased considerably over the past
several decades. Its arguments are
novel in the sense that they advocate for perspectives otherwise
unaccounted
for by the other main schools of international relations theory.
However, constructivism does not serve as a
comprehensive explanatory
framework for strategic engagement for several reasons.
Constructivist claims that norm diffusion can occur in different settings
set very high expectations for
interactions in international institutions and
other similar bodies. It is possible that learning occurs inside
these
institutions and through regular interactions. However, constructivism goes
too far in its assertions of
transformative change. Constructivists do account
for degrees of norm internalization, but they still privilege
learning and
norm diffusion inside institutions over other processes at work on state
actors. In addition, there is a problem of measurement which constructivists
have still not come to terms with.
The only scholarly attempt to measure
military engagement using statistical methods did not specifically
address
cases worthy of strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific.64 A 2009 edited
volume attempted to grapple with problems of identity measurement, but is
not concrete about how to operationalize these methods.65 Since
changes in
norms that result in behavioural change could take decades to materialize, it
is difficult to assess
empirically whether and how these processes occurred.
Contribution of study
This book derives key insights from primary-source information or
interviews that incorporate the perspectives
of both militaries involved in
strategic engagement. Think tank and government products derive their data
from
diverse sources, but often do not feature in-depth views of a potential
adversary. The result is speculation on
intentions and motives of counterpart
militaries. However, military or military-affiliated organizations have
better
access to data that involves sometimes confidential or classified interactions
between military
establishments than academics or other civilians.
Since strategic engagement by its nature incorporates elements of
international relations theory and policy, it
does not neatly fit into
international relations or strategic studies. Instead, authors who have
attempted to
fuse the theoretical and policy domains are the best sources of
scholarly input on strategic engagement. The
sub-field of international
relations which most nearly attempts this is foreign policy analysis.
Scholars such
as Alexander George devoted their careers to developing
policy-relevant works of international
relations.66 Two notable American
academics who became
policymakers, Ashton Carter and William Perry,
were advocates and practitioners of strategic engagement between
the U.S.
and China in the post-Cold War period.67 Their works
serve as a valuable
foundation for ideas about statecraft and the importance of developing
military ties with
potential adversaries. However, George does not focus on
the peacetime activities of militaries. Carter and
Perry provide useful
insights from the perspective of policymakers, but do not set out to develop
a framework
of factors which contribute to success or failure of strategic
engagement vis-à-vis China or other countries.
There is much written about the concepts of coercive diplomacy and
arms control. However, the goal of strategic
engagement is sometimes the
pursuit of mutual advantage and cooperation, which is not covered by
coercive
diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is defined as
a defensive strategy … distinguished from other nonmilitary strategies for preventing
opponents from altering
status quo situations in their own favor … [it] is essentially a
diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the
threat of force rather than the use of force to achieve
the objective.68
Coercive diplomacy therefore requires that one party prevail over the other,
resulting in a zero-sum game. Unlike strategic engagement, which seeks a
win-win outcome beneficial for both
sides, coercive diplomacy has a victor
and a loser. Additionally, while failed strategic engagement does not
necessarily have an immediate negative consequence, coercive diplomacy is
an aggressive tool of statecraft,
whose failure can have significant
repercussions. Coercive diplomacy, in contrast to the negotiations which
transpire under strategic engagement, diverts focus from mutual interests
and emphasizes conflict. Although the
idea of transacting business through
discussions and sometimes cooperative endeavours with a potential
adversary is counter-intuitive, that is exactly what the countries included in
this study have done via
strategic engagement. Much more is written in the
strategic studies literature on the actual or potential
wartime uses of military
power than the peacetime activities of militaries.
This study aims to fill a gap in scholarship on strategic engagement as a
general phenomenon. Defence diplomacy
receives scant treatment and
strategic engagement even less. More than half a century has elapsed since
Vagts’s
book-length study attempted to explain the role of military officers
and defence ministries in the formulation
of policy and strategy. Cottey and
Forster’s monograph as well as several peer-reviewed journal articles on the
subject in the last decade have brought the topic back onto the research
agenda. The contribution of this book
lies in a detailed exposition of the
forces that have driven strategic engagement in the twentieth century and
beyond, in the hope that lessons can be drawn for its future application. In
an era of uncertain global defence
budgets, particularly in the U.S., a better
understanding of what may be a low-cost, beneficial tool of
statecraft is
necessary.

Framework
The framework (see Appendix 1) is inductively derived, drawing from
detailed analysis of three case studies of
strategic engagement over the past
century. These three case studies are the U.K. and Germany in the lead-up
to
World War I; the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as reflected by the Incidents at
Sea Agreement of 1972 as well as the
1972 Standing Consultative
Commission; and the U.S. and China from 1989 to the present. Each case
study follows
a uniform structure. The three issues outlined earlier are
evaluated in turn. The motivation for potential
adversaries to pursue
strategic engagement with one another initially provides contextual
background and
historiography on the prevailing dynamics between the two
nation-states prior to the initiation of strategic
engagement. In exploring this
issue, the case study explores the motivations underpinning strategic
engagement
efforts and provides the results of strategic engagement
processes.
The majority of each case study chapter is devoted to discerning the
factors leading to the success or failure
of strategic engagement. By
employing the technique referred to by George as “‘soaking and poking,’”69
diverse sources of triangulated empirical data
tease out the contributing
factors which lead to successful or failed strategic engagement. Although it
is
impossible to quantitatively weight the degree of importance of a specific
factor, the goal is to elucidate the
overall preponderance of evidence
pointing in a specific direction. The results of a compare-and-contrast
examination of the inductively derived contributing factors are the basis for
a discussion in Chapter 6 as well as a table of results presented in Appendix
1.70
The results generated through this exercise of answering the first two
issues and the accompanying analysis
constitute the theoretical framework
of the study presented in Chapter
6. The ultimate goal is to produce
“conditional generalizations that identify those factors and
variables noted
in our case studies that, if present, favor the success of the strategy. Such
generalizations
will also identify those factors that are likely to lead to its
failure.”71 Just as George sought to explore the conditions surrounding
coercive diplomacy as a
diplomatic technique, so this book strives to
analyse strategic engagement as an important tool of statecraft.
Each case study chapter will conclude with lessons learned. However, in-
depth examination of policy
prescriptions drawn from the three case study
analyses will be reserved for Chapter 7. There are a wide number of
contemporary global security challenges for which strategic
engagement
would be applicable. By recognizing that history can impart useful
knowledge to present
circumstances, future mistakes might be averted.
Notes
1    See Black, A History of Diplomacy, Alfred Vagts,
Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the
Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King’s Crown Press,
1956), and Cottey and Forster,
Reshaping Defence Diplomacy. For discussion of the sometimes divergent
outlooks of
diplomats and soldiers in a Cold War context, see Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and
Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). However, there are others as
well which
discuss specific kinds of military diplomacy, in particular naval diplomacy. Within
this type, there are also a
number of works that focus specifically on naval diplomacy. See
“Political Components of Maritime Power,” in
Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st
Century: Strategic Transactions China, India and Southeast
Asia (Singapore: ISEAS
Publishing, 2011) for discussion of Chinese naval diplomacy. For a more rigorous
historical and
theoretical approach to naval diplomacy, see “Naval diplomacy” in Till, Seapower (2nd
ed.),
(London: Routledge, 2009).
2    For an up-to-date discussion of Sino–U.S. military
relations, see Christopher P. Twomey, “The
Military–Security Relationship,” in David Shambaugh (ed.),
Tangled Titans: The United States
and China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013). For
discussion of U.S.–Soviet strategic
engagement, see Alexander L. George et al., U.S.-Soviet Security
Cooperation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988).
3        See Shirley A. Kan, U.S.–China Military Contacts:
Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 2012); David Finkelstein, The
Military Dimensions of U.S.-
China Security Cooperation: Retrospective and Future Prospects (Alexandria,
VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, 2010). This builds on an earlier report, David M. Finkelstein and John Unangst,
Engaging DOD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United
States, Report No.
CRM 99–0046.90 (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 1999); Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China
Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship (Arlington, VA: RAND
Corporation,
2004); Colonel Jer Donald Get, What’s With the Relationship Between America’s
Army and China’s PLA?: An
Examination of the Terms of the U.S. Army’s Strategic Peacetime
Engagement with the People’s Liberation Army of
the People’s Republic of China (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996); Charles W.
Hooper, Going Nowhere Slowly:
U.S.-China Military Relations 1994–2001 (Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead
Center for
International Affairs, 2006); William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, The Content of U.S.
Engagement with China (Stanford, CA and Cambridge, MA: The Stanford-Harvard Preventive
Defense Project,
1998); Kenneth Allen and Eric McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations
(Washington, D.C.: Henry
Stimson Center, 1999).
4    Tan and Singh (2012): “Introduction,” Asian
Security 8, no. 3: 221–231, and Anton du Plessis,
“Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions
with Specific Reference to South
Africa,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 30, no. 2.
5    For theses on defense attachés and military diplomacy, see
Major Paul Sigler, Defense Attachés
and Theater Security Cooperation: Bringing Military Diplomacy into the
21st Century
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007) and Giovannelli, Military Diplomacy: A Need for
Doctrine, respectively. For theses on Sino–U.S. strategic engagement, see Major Mark T.
Nakagawa,
United States Military-to-Military Contacts with the People’s Liberation Army: Can
It Further U.S. Policies
and Aims in the Asia-Pacific Region? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College,
2003), and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Kjorness,
U.S.-China Military Relations: Unstable but Not
Impossible (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 2011).
 6        For U.S. strategic engagement activities with China, see
the Pentagon’s Annual Report on
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China. For China’s
strategic engagement activities with the U.S. and other regional militaries, see
China’s National
Defense (which has been published since 1998).
7        See Shea, “Transforming Military Diplomacy,” Joint
Force Quarterly, no. 38 (3rd Quarter
2005): 49–52, and Donna Miles, “Military–Diplomatic Relationship as
Critical in Pacific as
Middle East,” American Forces Press Service, 26 September 2007.
8    Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, p. 51. Vagts
indicates that the practice of appointing military
officers to diplomatic posts was adopted by the U.S. around
World War II with mixed success.
The rationale for sending officers such as General Walter Bedell Smith to
Moscow was the
elevated importance of military affairs in foreign relations and the perceived preference of the
Soviets for someone from a military background over a civilian diplomat, p. 51 and p. 60.
9    For an explication of the relationship between
intelligence and strategic engagement, see section
on “Intelligence.”
10    Michael Herman, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, no. 2 (1998): 17.
11    Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, p. 453.
12    Ibid., p. 462.
13    Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy,
p. 13.
14    Ibid., pp. 16–17.
15    Ibid., pp. 18–19.
16    Sigler, Defense Attachés and Theater Security
Cooperation, p. 2.
17    Ibid., p. 9.
18    Marie-France Desjardins,
Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to Agreement
and the Risks of Overselling the
Process, Adelphi Paper 307 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 4.
19    Ibid.
20    Ibid.
21    Ibid., p. 5.
22    Ibid., p. 4.
23    Alan J. Vick, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation,
1988), p. 22.
24    Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building
Measures, p. 5.
25    Ibid.
26        Robert W. Buchheim and Philip J. Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet
Standing Consultative
Commission,” in Alexander L. George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security
Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 265.
27    Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building
Measures, p. 57.
28    Ibid., p. 51.
29    For critiques of arms control and CBMs, see Gray,
House of Cards, and Colin S. Gray, Weapons
Don’t Make Wars (Lawrence: Kansas University
Press, 1993).
30    William L. Ury, Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis
Control Can Prevent Nuclear War (New York:
Penguin Books, 1986), p. 4.
31    Ibid.
32    Ibid., p. 6.
33    Ibid., p. 10.
34    Ibid., p. 52.
35    Ibid.
36        For text of the agreement, see https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-
CHINA_CRISIS_COMMUNICATIONS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf
37    Ury, Beyond the Hotline, p. 77.
38    Ibid.
39    Ibid., p. 78.
40    Ibid.
41    Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in
Alexander L. George et al. (eds.),
U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 488.
42    Ury, Beyond the Hotline, p. 93.
43    Ibid., p. 135.
44        Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in George
et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security
Cooperation, p. 500.
45        Alexander L. George, “U.S.-Soviet Efforts to Cooperate in
Crisis Management and Crisis
Avoidance,” in George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, p.
594.
46    Jennifer E. Sims, “Diplomacy and Intelligence,” in
Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds.),
Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices
(New York/Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), p. 244.
47    Ibid.
48    Ibid., p. 245.
49    See Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How
Leaders and Intelligence Communities
Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” International Security 38,
no. 1 (Summer 2013): 7–51,
and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing Thy Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and
Assessments of
Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
50    Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder,” p. 9.
51    Ibid., p. 47.
52        Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World,
Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no.
110, Special Edition: “Frontiers of Knowledge” (Spring 1998): 31.
53    According to Mearsheimer in his
influential 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
“Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is
doomed to fail … In short, China and the United
States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows”
(p. 4). In the September/October
2012 issue of Foreign Affairs, Aaron Friedberg derides the
“diplomatic happy talk” inherent in
American policy toward China, which he characterizes as a “broadly
consistent two-pronged
strategy combining engagement and balancing.”
54    Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many
Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110, Special
Edition: “Frontiers of Knowledge” (Spring 1998): 37.
55    Ibid., pp. 39–40.
56        See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet
Security Regimes,” International
Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 371–402, and Richard Haass and
Megan O’Sullivan
(eds.), Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington,
D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000). The Haass and O’Sullivan volume is a useful primer on
engagement
strategies that selects cases of “‘rogues,’ adversaries, or other problem regimes,”
including China.
57    Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public
Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Plymouth,
UK: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 4–5.
58    Ibid., p. 5.
59    Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many
Theories,” p. 41.
60        See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan,
“Socialization and Hegemonic Power,”
International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283–315.
61        See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in
International Institutions, 1980–2000
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Amitav
Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?
 Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY /London: Cornell
University Press, 2009)
for discussions of constructivism in Asia.
62        Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds
of a Feather? Constructivism and
Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies
Quarterly 44, no. 1 (March 2000):
97–119.
63        Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 185.
64    Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material
Power: Military Engagement and the
Socialization of States, 1972–2000,” International Studies
Quarterly 50 (2006): 509–537.
Atkinson employs Cox Proportional Hazard models to a data set of more than
160 countries and
“finds U.S. military engagement activities to be positively and systematically associated
with
liberalizing trends, and provides evidence that these programs play an important role in U.S.
national
security.” Much of the analysis on authoritarian states focuses on Latin America, which
is an entirely
different context than counties in the Asia-Pacific region. However, her study is
valuable in the sense that it
lays out “how U.S. military engagement activities have been
designed to serve a normative persuasion function
that explicitly aims to alter the political
identity of the engaged states and thus serve as an excellent way
to measure a social
construction process” (p. 510).
65        Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston,
and Rose McDermott (eds),
Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University
Press, 2009).
66        See Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and
Practice in Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), and Paul Gordon
Lauren, Gordon A.
Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our
Time (5th
ed.) (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
67    See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive
Defense: A New Security Strategy for
America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), in
particular “Dealing with a
Rising China,” pp. 92–122.
68    Alexander L. George, “Coercive
Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in Alexander L.
George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits
of Coercive Diplomacy (2nd ed.) (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 2.
69    George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences, p. 90.
70        See George and Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy (2nd ed.), p. 288 for their
table of results.
71    Ibid., p. 268.
3    Anglo–German pre-World War I strategic
engagement

Introduction
This chapter examines Anglo–German strategic engagement prior to the
outbreak of World War I. If conflict
between the U.K. and Germany was not
inevitable, it is necessary to consider the role that strategic engagement
might have played in transforming the dynamics of the bilateral relationship
and diminishing the risk of war.
The core elements of strategic engagement
analysed in this chapter are the diplomatic missions to Germany of
British
Secretary of State for War, Lord Richard Burdon Haldane, other diplomatic
interchanges between the two
countries’ officials, as well as the work of
army and navy attachés of the respective countries. The former
focuses
upon the diplomatic activities of a principal British defence policymaker
with his German defence
counterparts. The latter represents the military-to-
military component of strategic engagement efforts.

Historiography of pre-World War I diplomacy

A century after the outbreak of World War I, historical debate about the
causes of the conflict continues
without a consensus view. While the
prospects for rapprochement between the U.K. and Germany in retrospect
were
unlikely, relations were even poorer between France and Germany,
given a long history of Franco–German
animosity and conflict which
stemmed from French defeat in the Franco–Prussian War of 1870. Domestic
and
international factors prevailing within and between the countries of the
Triple Entente – the U.K., France, and
Russia – and the Central Powers –
Austria-Hungary and Germany – interacted in complex ways after the
assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in late June 1914 in
Sarajevo to ignite a conflagration that
engulfed Europe for the next four
years.
One of the primary fault lines in scholarship on World War I is whether
conflict broke out by accident or by
design. Prominent advocates of the
accidental thesis are Luigi Albertini and A.J.P. Taylor, while Fritz
Fischer,
Marc Trachtenberg, and Jack S. Levy argue separately that deliberate
decision-making by Germany and
others accounts for the eruption of
hostilities.1 Taylor’s assertion of war by miscalculation was based on
inflexibility of railway mobilization
schedules for the movement of troops,
while Paul Kennedy believed that general staffs and political elites were
unwilling to compromise due to a desire for “absolute victory.”2
Historians
who authored works in the decades directly following the conflict “were
inevitably marked by their
nationality; they would immediately be treated
with suspicion if they were unfavourable to their own
countries.”3
Histories of pre-War diplomatic efforts to stem competitive dynamics in
Europe focus on the two multilateral
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and
1907. These gatherings represented “the most serious pre-war effort to
limit
armaments by negotiation.”4 The 1899 Conference “advocated
disarmament
as part of a complex of proposals … for settling disputes by arbitration.”5
The resolution that emerged from the Conference preserved the legality of
states’ employment of force and merely indicated the desirability of arms
limitation.6 Although the recently elected Liberal British Government
desired the
inclusion of arms limitation on the agenda of the 1907
Conference, opposition to a naval treaty by Austria and
Russia as well as
several admiralties (including the British Admiralty) ensured that “there
was no consensus in
favour of concerted limitation …”7 Despite efforts to
forge a
treaty focused on armies in 1899 and navies in 1907, the lack of
consensus among the major countries set the
stage for a European arms race
from 1907 to 1912.8
While effective diplomacy has the potential to avert conflict, some
scholars have claimed that diplomacy
between the U.K. and Germany prior
to World War I exacerbated rather than diminished tensions. Volker
Berghahn
asserts that German diplomacy was intimately linked with its
armaments policy and that their “diplomatic
‘peace’ offensive …” aimed
“to distract British public opinion from the Anglo–German arms race …”9
If Berghahn is correct, Germany’s calls for peace with the U.K. were
merely a stalling tactic. German Naval Minister Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
and German Chancellor Prince von
Bulow counseled the Kaiser in 1908 to
allow private diplomacy, but avoid official talks with the U.K. on naval
armaments reduction.10 Niall Ferguson lays blame for the lack of
an Anglo–
German political settlement on the British, whose “position …was the more
intransigent.”11 Ferguson asserts that the cause of conflict is often
misdiagnosed since
“on close inspection, neither colonial issues nor naval
issues were leading inevitably to an Anglo–German
showdown before
1914.”12 Sean Lynn-Jones went so far as to claim
that the improvement in
Anglo–German relations between 1911 and 1914 was responsible for the
outbreak of
war.13 According to Lynn-Jones, the détente that the U.K. and
Germany pursued led to misperceptions and mistaken policies since the two
sides did not directly confront
fundamental differences such as naval
armaments and conditions for British intervention on behalf of
France.14
The diplomatic agenda in 1912 and 1913 turned instead
to secondary issues
where the interests of the two countries were more likely to converge.
These issues
included crises in the Balkans, Portuguese colonial holdings in
Africa, and construction of the Baghdad
Railway.15
Historians have targeted British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey as
the reason for
mistaken German assumptions of British neutrality in July
1914, since “Grey did not give Germany unambiguous
warning that Britain
would side with France until very late in the crisis.”16 In fact, Grey
provided no firm assurances of support to France or Russia.17 On the basis
of Germany’s mistaken presumption of British neutrality in
exchange for a
German guarantee not to attack France, the Kaiser forbade the Schlieffen
Plan (which entailed an
assault on France via Belgium) from being
implemented in July 1914.18 An unequivocal British commitment to the
defence of France in the event of a German attack
could have changed the
course of history, for “it is highly likely that a clearer statement of Britain’s
intention to intervene on behalf of France would have deterred Germany,
thereby preventing or at least limiting
World War I.”19

Dynamics motivating strategic engagement efforts

In the decades that preceded the outbreak of the First World War in August
1914, the nations of Europe
navigated a fluid security environment through
a series of formal and informal alliances. The Concert of Europe
that
promoted relative peace in the first half of the nineteenth century gave way
to a new, less stable set of
major-power relationships. One of the principal
security rivalries in the early twentieth century was between
the U.K. and
Germany. The U.K., the preeminent European naval power by virtue of its
Royal Navy, felt
increasingly threatened by the expansion of the Imperial
German Navy to the point that “so far as contemporary
opinion was
concerned, it was the naval question above everything else which
exacerbated Anglo–German
relations.”20 A growing German naval
presence in the North Sea
greatly concerned the U.K., which depended
heavily on naval primacy for its economic and overall security.
Likewise,
the U.K. presented a potentially formidable challenge to expansionist
German aspirations in Europe
and worldwide.
There was a wide range of defence diplomatic activity between the U.K.
and Germany in the decade prior to World
War I. Bilateral and multilateral
contacts between senior military and civilian officials transpired with some
frequency from 1904 to 1914 between heads of state as well as between
defence ministers. Army and naval
attachés were posted to London and
Berlin and conducted affairs of state normally reserved for civilian
personnel. In addition, episodic contacts and exchanges between military
personnel and ship visits occurred,
particularly during Kiel Week in
Germany, a major annual sailing festival.
Strategic engagement between British and German military officers and
representatives became a useful tool for
conveying satisfaction or
displeasure with the overall trend of bilateral relations. Military diplomatic
channels therefore assumed an unusual role in interstate relations. While the
British and German Foreign
Offices continued their work unabated, they
were not always the primary diplomatic actors. Under these
circumstances,
the U.K. and Germany sought to better understand the other party, to
explore the possibility of reciprocal cooperation, and to arrive at a mutually
agreeable geostrategic position
in Europe. It was with these goals in mind
that the U.K. and Germany engaged with one another diplomatically.
Analysis of strategic engagement factors

Civil–military balance
Britain and Germany maintained considerable relations prior to World War
I. As monarchies with common
familial ties (King Edward VII of Britain
was the uncle of Kaiser Wilhlem II; King George V, Edward’s
successor
after his death in 1910, was Wilhelm’s cousin) and extensive economic
interchange, the two
countries on the surface had ample reason to
cooperate. Both Britain and Germany relied heavily on
international trade,
with merchandise exports as percentage of GDP measuring 17.5 percent for
the U.K. and
16.1 percent for Germany.21 Additionally, by 1914 the British
percentage of global industrial production had declined to 10 percent, with
that of Germany increasing to 15
percent.22 The period preceding 1914 has
been termed by
historians as the “‘first great globalization’ … with
unprecedented trade, investment, and capital flows
across European and
global borders.”23 Despite economic
interdependence through extensive
trade between the two countries, war still erupted, demonstrating that even
powerful economic factors and the resultant mutual benefit cannot in and of
themselves mitigate conflict.
Though such clashes inevitably severely
damage both countries economically, this common-sense approach does
not
prevent war.
The government systems in the U.K. and Germany in practice were quite
different, specifically as relates to
the civil–military balance. Though
Germany was governed by a monarchy like Britain, “the Wilhelmine state
was
engulfed in a ‘permanent crisis of state,’” with “competing power
centers … mostly dependent on the favor of
Kaiser Wilhelm II …”24
Neither Chancellor Prince Bernhard von
Bulow (1900–1909) nor his
successor, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909–1917),
provided proper
strategic counsel to the Kaiser.25 Civil–military relations in
Germany were imbalanced in that civilian decision-makers were sidelined
in favour of military officials. The
extent of military influence in German
policymaking was so pervasive “that some officials feared that Kaiser
Wilhelm intended to dispense entirely with his civilian advisors, replacing
them with those of his soldierly
companions whom he found most
congenial, namely his aides-de-camp.”26 The Kaiser generally heeded his
military’s counsel. The Kaiser’s military leanings also
extended to foreign
relations, as he “preferred the company of officers to civilian officials and
was
inclined, where possible, to conduct state business – including
diplomatic contacts – with the former rather
than the latter.”27 The Kaiser’s
personal style of rule
translated into much greater interference in policy
than his British counterpart. The German parliament, the
Reichstag, did not
control “the military, the bureaucracy, and the diplomatic
service …,” as the
Kaiser wielded power over all three.28 The
German Chancellor was
constitutionally beholden to the Kaiser, who appointed him.29
By contrast, civilian authority was far more dominant in Britain. The
opinions of civilian Cabinet ministers
figured more prominently in U.K.
decision-making than in Germany. Though not as dysfunctional as the
German
government at the time, the Liberal Party in Britain was
nonetheless consumed by a host of domestic
challenges. Problems included
unrest in Ireland and threats of strike by rail, mine, and transport
workers.30
These domestic stresses upon the government did not
bode well for Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey, contributing to an isolationist bent within the
British
government; “throughout the July crisis of 1914 … there was among
them the ‘very strong feeling that whatever
happens amongst the other
European powers England must keep herself out of the quarrel.’”31
In summary, the U.K. had a civilian-dominant structure; by contrast, the
military was dominant in Germany.
Therefore, the British and German
governmental systems were starkly different from one another. While the
British government was a constitutional monarchy whose civilian
parliament exercised significant control, the
German government’s
parliament exercised far less authority with a dominant monarch and
military at the helm.
The German government was dysfunctional in its lack
of a coherent message. Ultimately, the positive forces of
economic
interdependence between Britain and Germany were inadequate to counter
the many additional negative
factors at play, and the result was tragic for
both countries.
Civil–Military Balance value: Negative
Competitive naval buildup
The British perceived expansion of the German Navy as a threat to their
hegemony on the seas. The U.K. was
determined to maintain naval
supremacy – “not only was Britain’s status in the world dependent on its
naval
power, but its access to foodstuffs, commerce, and its colonies all
relied on unfettered sea
transit.”32 As stated by British Foreign Secretary Sir
Edward
Grey, “the Navy is our one and only means of defence and our life
depends on it and it alone.”33 While naval buildup for Germany represented
a growth in military
stature, the U.K. regarded German naval expansion as a
direct existential threat to its survival. The British
believed that a German
naval buildup was specifically designed to contest the naval power of the
U.K.
German plans for building a strong navy date back to the late nineteenth
century. In 1897, then-Secretary of
State for Foreign Relations Bernhard
von Bulow (subsequently German Chancellor) stated, “‘We don’t want to
put anyone in the shadow, but we too demand our place in the sun.’”34
Naval Minister Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s aspirations for a strong
German navy date
back to 1897, at which time he issued a memorandum to
the Kaiser cautioning, “‘For Germany, the most
dangerous naval enemy at
the present time is England.’”35 In 1898, the Reichstag passed its first Naval
Law, planning by 1904 to possess “nineteen
battleships, eight armoured
cruisers, and twelve large and thirty light cruisers …”36 A second naval law
was passed in 1900 with a target of “thirty-eight
battleships, twenty
armoured cruisers, and thirty-eight light cruisers.”37 The goal of Admiral
von Tirpitz was to intimidate the Royal Navy, believing that a
powerful
German fleet would compel Britain to acquiesce to German military actions
on the European continent.
Additionally, von Tirpitz was responsive to the
German arms manufacturer Krupp and the Navy League, both of
whom
desired large expenditures by the German government for shipbuilding.38
The Reichstag passed minor novelles, or supplementary naval laws, in 1906
and 1908, but
a major novelle proposing a massive German naval
expansion was planned for 1912. The result was a naval arms
race in which
Britain built 29 capital ships versus 17 German capital ships between 1906
and 1912.39 British unwillingness to offer unconditional neutrality in return
for a
modified German naval bill led to the bill’s introduction to the
Reichstag in April 1912 and its becoming law
in June 1912.40
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Britain was the recognized leading
power, with Germany the ascending
power challenging Britain’s dominance
in Europe both in the economic, industrial, and military realms, with
the
latter particularly evident in the sphere of naval competition. The term
“Thucydides trap” was coined by
Graham Allison of Harvard University,
alluding to the fifth-century BC conflict between Athens, the
established
hegemon, and a rising Sparta.41 The ensuing
thirty-year war destroyed both
states. As pointed out by Allison, “most of these dangerous challenges have
ended badly, often for both sides. In eleven of fifteen cases in the past five
hundred years, the result was
war.”42 Competition for naval supremacy
between Britain, the
established hegemon, and Germany, the rising power,
may indeed have been a contributory factor to their
ultimate conflict.
Motivations for German naval expansion encompassed desire for a strong
navy as a symbolic tool of national
pride as well as the resultant propaganda
value. For Kaiser Wilhelm, “the navy was one of only two
institutions
directly subject to his control, the other being the imperial postal service …
similar ambitions
of departmental empire building were also behind the
machinations of Admiral von Tirpitz, whose brainchild
was the German
High Seas Fleet.”43 Britain was convinced that
the purpose of Germany’s
fleet of Dreadnoughts was to challenge the British Royal Navy. The U.K.
regarded
Germany as their “naval nightmare,” with many in the British
government believing that their country was
“doomed to second-rate status
if Germany continued its naval expansion.”44 Tensions brought about by
these dangerous perceptions were only exacerbated by extreme
nationalism
within the two countries.
The U.K. distrusted German motives for a strong naval buildup, and
Germany failed to make its motives for its
planned naval expansion
transparent. Ironically, the Dreadnought battleships which were the subject
of the
controversy did not play a significant role in World War I, excepting
the Battle of Jutland in 1916. In fact,
at the time of the outbreak of war,
Britain prevailed over Germany in the naval
competition, possessing 20
Dreadnought battleships as compared to 13 for Germany.45 Rather, German
submarines were the only naval asset that Germany employed, and their
construction was not contested by Britain.
Although extensive resources were expended on naval expansion by the
U.K. and Germany in the decades
preceding World War I, Germany was
ultimately unable to keep pace with the well-established British naval
shipbuilding industry. The U.K. surpassed Germany in quantitative terms,
underscoring the futility of Admiral
von Tirpitz’s lofty aspirations. By
1912, the British had effectively won the naval arms competition. The
Germans turned their attention to investing in their army in preparation for
ground warfare. The naval
competition ultimately proved to be a very
expensive distraction. Instead of resorting to diplomatic avenues
to address
their grievances with one another, the British and Germans focused upon
accumulating naval
materiel to no avail.
Competitive Naval Buildup value: Negative

Quality of diplomatic interaction (Haldane Missions)

The most active official from the U.K. involved in strategic engagement
with Germany in the pre-War period
was Lord Richard Burdon Haldane, the
Secretary of State for War from late 1905 until 1912. A British national
fluent in German, Haldane was at one time a student in Germany and a
regular visitor. Just as in Germany,
there was administrative and inter-
service rivalry in the U.K. Haldane as Secretary of State for War
“technically had responsibility for the navy, but in practice he did not.”46
During his tenure as minister, Haldane undertook missions to Berlin in 1906
and 1912.
The purpose of the 1906 Haldane visit to Germany was for Haldane to
serve as the British emissary at a German
state event. Haldane’s attendance
at the invitation of Kaiser Wilhelm “on the occasion of the dedication of
colours on 30 August and the autumn parade of the Guards Corps on 1
September … did not produce any tangible
results …”47 However, Haldane
visited the German War Office to
examine its operations as well as to
improve relations between the U.K. and Germany.48 Haldane held
discussions with Kaiser Wilhelm, German Chancellor Prince
von Bulow,
and Foreign Minister Herr von Tchirsky. Junior German military officers
who met Lord Haldane in
1906 did not display proper etiquette towards
him, indicating disrespect of a high-level visitor.49 This episode was
reflective of anti-British sentiment in Germany. In
the course of discussions
with Chancellor von Bulow, Haldane understood that although a naval
rivalry might
exist between the U.K. and Germany, it would not occur “for
many years, and that our [German] policy for the
present was strongly for
Free Trade …”50 It would appear that
there was a deficiency in
understanding by Haldane as to the motivation for and magnitude of the
proposed
German naval buildup.
Relations between the U.K. and Germany deteriorated in 1911. In July
1911, the
British Royal Navy intervened in Agadir, Morocco in support of
France, which alienated Germany and made the
Germans appear weak
domestically and internationally.51 State
Secretary of the German Foreign
Office, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, was responsible for the decision to
send
the gunboat Panther to Agadir to encourage French acquiescence to
German colonial claims in the
Congo.52 Neither the German Navy Office
nor the Admiralty Staff
approved the move.53 The dispatch of the Panther,
“among the smallest warships in the German fleet,” as a “gesture was
dramatic, but its strategic significance
was negligible.”54 The tense
atmosphere in Anglo–German
bilateral relations and desire to build trust
prompted two private citizens, Sir Ernest Joseph Cassel of the
U.K. and
Albert Ballin of Germany, to propose a peace mission between their
countries’ senior officials.
Though Cassel was born in Germany, he became
a naturalized British citizen and “an intimate friend of the
King as well as
acting as the Monarch’s banker and political adviser.”55 Ballin was the
director of the Hamburg-America Line shipping company. Both
governments
denied initiating this peace mission (otherwise known as the
1912 Haldane Mission).56 The Kaiser “regarded Ballin as an adviser and
friend.”57 Though Ballin suggested that Cassel accompany First Lord of the
Admiralty Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey on
the mission to Germany, both turned down
the request.58 Haldane received
the assignment since sending
Churchill “would have advertized the precise
nature of the talks …” and Grey’s presence “in the event of
failure would be
regarded a prognosis of war.”59 The irony of
the situation was not lost on
Haldane, who “saw the humor of having ‘the War Minister … transformed
into the
Peace Minister.’”60 Grey and Haldane considered each other
friends, and Grey had delegated tasks under his purview to Haldane on
other occasions.61
The background to the 1912 Haldane Mission requires further
explanation, since preliminary negotiations
preceded Haldane’s visit to
Berlin. Churchill replied on 7 January 1912 to a letter written by Cassel
declining the request to visit Berlin, explaining the futility of talks “till
Germany dropped the naval
challenge … but that any slackening on her
part would produce an immediate détente, with much
goodwill from all
England. Failing that I see little in prospect but politeness and
preparation.”62 The Kaiser mistakenly believed that Churchill was vying
with other
Liberal Cabinet officials “over who should reap the glory in
going to Berlin …”63 The British Cabinet upon the return of the Prime
Minister dispatched Cassel to Berlin
with “a memorandum containing three
clauses.”64 The Kaiser
interpreted the clauses as “an offer of neutrality in
return for naval concessions.”65 Cassel returned to London from Berlin with
a German memorandum
suggesting that Grey come to Berlin instead and
indicating “that the 1912 programme – the new supplementary
law – must
be included in a calculation of German naval plans.”66 This German
supplementary law proposed a massive naval buildup by Germany. Cassel
sent a
telegraph to Berlin, indicating that the British government would
engage in negotiations if Germany was
willing to compromise on naval
expenditure.67
The primary individual responsible for preparing Haldane for the talks
was Sir
Arthur Nicolson, the British Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs from 1910 to 1916. It is
ironic that Nicolson, who should
have supported Haldane in an effort to forge peace, was opposed to granting
any accommodation to Germany for fear of alienating France and Russia.
Nicolson was overtly antagonistic
toward the Haldane Mission. In a
confidential communication to Francis Bertie, British ambassador to
France,
in February 1912, Nicolson inquired “why … abandon the excellent
position in which we have been placed, and
step down to be involved in
endeavours to entangle us in some so-called ‘understandings’ which would
undoubtedly … impair our relations with France and Russia.”68
It is
unfortunate that Nicolson attempted to poison the very mission that he was
responsible for supporting.
The Haldane Mission of 1912 was more consequential and potentially
transformative of Anglo–German relations
than the 1906 Mission. Haldane
engaged in a series of discussions in Berlin with German officials from 8 to
10 February 1912. Despite Haldane’s insistence that he “had come to
Berlin, not to make an actual agreement,
but only to explore the ground for
one with the Emperor and his ministers,”69 the German government “were
later to contend that Haldane had concluded binding
agreements with them
…”70 The scope of Haldane’s assignment
encompassed colonial, naval, and
political issues. German documents from 12 February 1912 demonstrate the
degree of misalignment in objectives and understanding in the negotiations
between Haldane and German
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. As stated by
the Chancellor:
Lord Haldane offered an Agreement of neutrality, alteration of the treaty about the Portuguese
colonies in
accordance with our wishes, cession of Zanzibar and Pemba and a share in the
railway construction on southern
Persia, and asked in return for accommodation in the
questions of the Naval Supplementary Bill and the Bagdad
Railway.”71

This statement is distinctly at odds with historical facts, as there is no

documented British acknowledgement
of an offer by the U.K. for British
neutrality in the event of a continental war. It is unlikely that
strategic
engagement between the U.K. and Germany prior to the Haldane Mission
would have prevented the
misunderstandings which occurred. The entente
between the U.K. and France dated back to January 1906
discussions
between the Chiefs of Staff of Britain and France.72 As stated by former
British Foreign Secretary David Owen, “by entering a one-sided
military
dialogue so early, Great Britain alerted Germany to the fact that it definitely
intended to support
France. This limited both Great Britain’s military and
diplomatic clout with Germany …”73 Therefore, there could be no
reasonable expectation by Germany that the
U.K. would offer a guarantee
of neutrality in the event of continental war.
Admiral von Tirpitz objected to the U.K.’s two-power standard of naval
strength, which in practice ceased to
govern British naval policy but in
principle was now directed at
Germany.74 After Haldane expressed
concerns about the
accelerated construction of German battleships, the
Kaiser provided “a confidential copy of the draft of the
proposed new Fleet
Law …” and suggested that Haldane discuss a formula for a political
agreement with
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg at a second meeting.75 The
Chancellor proposed an agreement of four articles, among which was a
neutrality clause which would hinder
British assistance to France in the
event of a German attack.76
Haldane declined to review the Fleet Law while
in Berlin since he wished to analyse it more
closely.77 The British
Admiralty was also better suited to
understand the technical implications of
the proposals. Haldane himself told Kaiser Wilhelm in a 9 February
1912
meeting that he “was not a technical expert in naval things and that of
course the navy was not my
department.”78 Haldane and Bethmann-
Hollweg revised the
original language of the German articles, but Haldane
reiterated to the Chancellor that he “was not there to
make a bargain …”79
Haldane’s comments denigrating his own
expertise and authority may well
have damaged efforts to secure an agreement with Germany. According to
his
memoirs, Haldane left the meetings with the impression that Bethmann-
Hollweg and the Kaiser were genuinely
attempting to advance Anglo–
German relations towards a peaceful settlement.80 However, Haldane
perceived a divergence of views among the German leadership since “in
his
eyes, the Kaiser and the Chancellor seemed to disagree in almost every
respect with regard to German
foreign and naval policy towards Great
Britain.”81 Despite the
Kaiser’s wide-ranging power, he clearly did not
exert strict control over the messaging of the Chancellor.
Therefore, the
German leadership did not communicate to the British in a unitary voice.
Some historians have suggested that the announcement of a Fleet Bill to
the Reichstag on 7 February 1912
meant that “the Haldane Mission had
failed practically before it had begun.”82 While this may be the case, at least
some individuals within the British and German
governments made earnest
efforts towards a diplomatic settlement. Political will was not sufficiently
strong
for either party, for “unless the Germans surrendered their desire –
and their inherent capacity – to alter
the existing order in Europe and
overseas; or unless the British were prepared voluntarily to accept a great
change in that order, then their vital interests remained diametrically
opposed.”83 Personal diplomacy, however impactful on British and German
decision-makers, could not
alter these fundamental incompatibilities.
 Construction of new large surface vessels was the primary focus of the
Haldane Mission. However, an agreement
on battleships would not have
excluded the addition of smaller, yet quite significant, naval vessels such as
destroyers and submarines.84 These non-battleship vessels,
particularly
submarines, proved to be the main actors in naval warfare, which neither
countries’ officers
anticipated.85 World War I was primarily a ground war
fought
between vast land armies in continental Europe. The heated
disagreements between the U.K. and Germany over
battleship counts
ultimately were a moot point in the overall conflict. Both countries
overestimated the role
of large battleships since “these vast naval squadrons
did not engage in a single
decisive encounter in the North Sea between
1914 and 1918.”86 A
counterfactual appraisal of the Haldane Mission found
that had an agreement been brokered between the U.K.
and Germany on
battleships, this would have led to increased German expenditures on
submarines.87 Additional German submarines could have bolstered attacks
on commercial
ships and British battleships.88
Haldane regarded his conversations with Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Naval
Minister Admiral von Tirpitz as
substantive.89 The style of
Haldane’s conversation with the Chancellor led
the former to remark that “my impression, and I still retain
it, was that
Bethmann-Hollweg was then as sincerely desirous of avoiding war as I was
myself” and “I left the
Chancellor with the sense that I had been talking
with an honest man struggling somewhat with
adversity.”90 On the basis of
face-to-face dialogue with one of
his German counterparts, Haldane
assessed the Chancellor’s character and intentions. Personal impressions
similarly feature in Haldane’s account of meetings with the Emperor and
Admiral von Tirpitz, whereby “my
reception by the Emperor was very
agreeable; that by von Tirpitz seemed to me a little strained.”91 Haldane’s
impressions are reinforced by additional views that
Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg was at odds with Admiral von Tirpitz, with the Chancellor
regarding the Admiral’s
aggressive naval expansion programme as an
obstacle to Germany arriving at an understanding with
Britain.92 Bethmann-
Hollweg attempted to resign, but Kaiser
Wilhelm refused to accept his
resignation. The Chancellor subsequently bemoaned his view that “he could
have
achieved a deal with Britain if only Wilhelm had not kept
interfering.”93 Internal dysfunction in German communication was
reinforced by a senior German
commander, who stated “‘Der Kaiser machte
eine, der Kanzler eine andere Politik, der Generalstab seine
Antworthen für
sich’” [translation: the Kaiser made one policy, the Chancellor another and
the General Staff
came up with its own answers].94 Gaining a better
understanding
of the intentions of counterparts is among the main
objectives of strategic engagement. Haldane achieved this
objective through
his interactions with the three principal German officials – Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg,
Admiral von Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm.
Shortly after Haldane’s arrival in Berlin, Winston Churchill, who became
First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911,
made a speech in Glasgow on 9
February 1912 describing the German High Sea Fleet as a “luxury.”95 The
German reaction, particularly by the Kaiser, was negative since
“the
German word Luxus has a pejorative air of sumptuousness about it …”96
Churchill’s remarks “caused much indignation in Germany.”97 At the very
least, the British must have appeared disingenuous. Churchill’s statements
were imprudent and poorly timed given Haldane’s efforts to understand
German conditions for a political
settlement. Churchill as a senior
Admiralty official made a tactical diplomatic misstep which undermined a
unitary voice from the British government.
Uncoordinated messaging of strategic engagement risks undermining
overall success. While Churchill may not
have deliberately intended to
antagonize Germany with his remarks at Glasgow while
Haldane was in
Berlin, Churchill’s speech certainly undermined Anglo–German goodwill
and trust. If the two
parties were genuine about seeking a settlement,
Churchill did not improve the prospects for its conclusion.
At the very least,
Churchill should have informed Haldane of his plans. Additionally,
Haldane’s impression of
contradictory views between the Kaiser and the
German Chancellor was not conducive to elucidating Germany’s
actual
intentions.
A further demonstration of lack of accord within the German government
and failure to communicate with a
consistent voice is reflected in a 17
March 1912 telegram from Count von Metternich, German Ambassador to
the
U.K., to the German Foreign Office, in which the author alleges that
Haldane was being disingenuous in his
dealings with Germany. Count von
Metternich stated that Haldane was seeking to have the naval
supplementary
bill cancelled without providing Germany its desired pledge
of neutrality, and offering to transfer control
of the Portuguese colonies of
Zanzibar and Pemba to Germany, an action not within Britain’s power to
pledge.
German disdain for Haldane’s mission was summed up in von
Metternich’s statement about Haldane, “I saw
through him and his honest
colleagues in time and thoroughly spoiled their little joke.”98
Just as Churchill’s comments in Glasgow complicated Haldane’s
diplomatic efforts in Berlin in February 1912,
so too did remarks Churchill
made in the House of Commons on 18 March 1912 challenge the
subsequent
negotiations in London. Churchill said that Germany was Great
Britain’s primary naval competitor and
suggested a “‘naval holiday,’”
which would place a one-year moratorium on British and German
construction of
new capital ships.99 The Kaiser and Admiral von Tirpitz did
not
respond positively to Churchill’s overture and subsequently recalled
Count von Metternich from
London.100
In summary, while the British were intent upon maintaining naval
preeminence and preventing German naval
expansion, Germany desired the
increased respect that a powerful navy would provide. While Germany was
singularly concerned with a British pledge of neutrality in the event of
continental war, the U.K. was
unwilling to provide such a guarantee.
Nonetheless, strategic engagement was not bound to fail. Haldane did
not
have the authority to conclude a firm agreement on behalf of the U.K.
Haldane was dispatched to Germany
merely to explore a bargain with the
Kaiser with the goal of limiting Germany’s naval expansion. The U.K.
adamantly desired to maintain world naval dominance against any potential
competitor. By contrast, Germany
was infused with a war-like mentality
and regarded conflict as inevitable. Intransigence by the British and
German
governments and an unwillingness to alter negotiating positions meant that
the Haldane Mission and
subsequent discussions in London between the
U.K. and Germany stagnated without a formal breakup.101 The Haldane
Mission laid bare the internal divisions within the
British and German
governments, leading to a situation in which the two sides talked past each
other and did
not address their respective core concerns.
Quality of Diplomatic Interaction (Haldane Missions) value: Negative
Quality of diplomatic interaction (attachés)
Military attachés assigned to Berlin assumed a significant political function
that was outside the bounds of
their traditional duties. The work of military
service attachés forms a key component and a more permanent
fixture of
strategic engagement. As such, attachés are an essential source of
information on military
developments and intentions of the host country.
The extent to which their activities and reports impact the
planning of the
military and political leadership of the country varies depending on the
value
decision-makers assign to military intelligence. Inter-service rivalry,
which has been a consistent theme
throughout the history of modern
militaries, extended to the reporting of service attachés as well. Military
(also referred to as army) attachés and naval attachés have different
outlooks conditioned by their training
and their tendency to identify most
closely with the interests of their service branch. The activities of
both
British and German attachés played a key role in informing and influencing
their respective governments,
and shaped attitudes at a crucial time prior to
the outbreak of hostilities.
The post-War destruction of records by the British War Office and
Admiralty related to the vast number of
documents produced and the
challenges of preservation have complicated scholarly assessment of the
work of
British service attachés, but French and German attaché records
have been largely preserved.102 Fortunately, indirect methods of historical
analysis such as memoirs
of attachés and duplicate copies of dispatches
found in the records of other British government departments
have enabled
examination of the work of British attachés.

British attachés
Beginning in 1860, the British General Staff “posted a military attaché to
Berlin to act as a professional
observer of the Reich’s military affairs.”103
The benefits of
British service attachés were at least threefold – they “could
observe developments in the German armed
forces over time …,”
“possessed the necessary expertise to make informed reports about
specialist or
technical matters …,” and “could compile reports that touched
on political matters.”104 These functions placed them at the nexus of
diplomacy, military
affairs, and intelligence. British service attachés tended
to possess considerable independent wealth due to
the low salary and high
costs associated with their job.105 The
first British naval attaché stationed in
Berlin, Commander Arthur Ewart, arrived in November 1900.106
The frequent opportunities which British attachés had to interact with the
Kaiser were valuable for
discerning his thought processes. Since British
Foreign Office civilian diplomats in Germany did not have
privileged
access to the Kaiser, the British had to rely upon their military attachés to
provide accounts of
encounters with the Kaiser.107 The British attachés
were thus
important sources of insight for the U.K. into German views. The
Kaiser was forthcoming and occasionally indiscreet in revealing his
opinions on British officials. For
example, in an exchange with British
naval attaché Captain Watson in May 1913, the Kaiser termed Lord
Haldane’s 1912 mission as a “‘fiasco’” and Winston Churchill “‘a man who
could not be trusted.’”108 Such inflammatory remarks conveyed a negative
impression to the U.K.
and disadvantaged attempts at successful strategic
engagement. The Kaiser often engaged British attachés to
discuss “Britain’s
position relative to the continental powers …,” “to head off policy
initiatives from Great
Britain,” to convey “his disapproval of the British
media,” and to “express his displeasure with the British
government,
particularly in relation to military and naval matters.”109 In addition to the
Kaiser, the British army attaché would regularly meet with the
German
Minister of War and personnel from the German Great General Staff, while
the British naval attaché
would often speak with Admiral von Tirpitz,
representatives of the German Admiralty Staff, and other German
officers.110
Alarmist assessments by British military attachés to Germany in the
immediate pre-War period stemmed from the
reporting of two particular
military attachés: Colonel Trench, who served from 1906 to 1910, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, whose tenure spanned from 1910 to 1914.
They shared the belief “that Germany was
a potential rival to Britain and a
real danger to the nation’s security.”111 Colonel Trench detected widespread
anti-British sentiment within Germany in
governmental, military, and
public circles.112 Although
Trench’s remit did not focus on naval affairs, he
noted that Germans both regarded the U.K. as a prime
obstacle to achieving
German international aspirations and strongly supported a growing German
navy.113 Despite his assertions of considerable evidence of
German
preparations for an attack on the U.K., Trench mistakenly projected that
Germany would wait until 1915
to follow through with its plans.114
Trench’s successor,
Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, inferred from the strength
of the German Army that Germany lacked the incentives
for war since the
country had no viable peer competitor.115
Russell was more moderate than
Trench in his interpretations of anti-British sentiment in Germany, often
downplaying these statements and focusing instead on “those articles and
conversations that indicated German
confidence about their military
situation and satisfaction with their geo-strategic position.”116 However,
Russell’s views of Germany changed after the failed German
naval
intervention in Agadir, Morocco in 1911. Russell believed that the German
public’s diminished
confidence in their national strength and the U.K.’s
assistance to France in Morocco coincided with antipathy
towards the U.K.
by the Kaiser and the German Army.117 The
establishment of the German
Army League advocacy organization in January 1912, possible “secret
German
military preparations” in February 1912, and a German Army Bill
introduced in March 1912 that provided for
two additional army corps
fuelled Russell’s concerns about Germany’s offensive military intentions,
particularly vis-à-vis France.118 These concerns were
reinforced by growth
of the German army following the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, with the
1913 Army Bill
increasing the number of troops by 136,000.119 Within the
German military, there was a large contingent of anti-British officers who
advocated for conflict with the U.K.120 All of these
indications
cumulatively led Russell to project that Germany might initiate hostilities in
the post-1913
period.121
While British military attachés in 1907 and 1908 stationed in continental
Europe warned of the strong
prospect of a German landing onto U.K.
territory, most British naval attachés were less concerned due to
their belief
that a strong British Navy could deter Germany.122
Nonetheless, British
naval attachés’ views in the pre-War era varied on the threat posed by the
German navy.
Commander Ewart, who served as British naval attaché to
Germany from 1900 to 1903, asserted that contrary to
the opinion of the
ambassador and a senior British Admiralty official, the U.K. was the object
of German
sea-power.123 Though documentary evidence is scarce, Captain
Reginald Allenby, the naval attaché to Germany from 1903 to 1906, “was
very far from being an advocate of a
German threat.”124 By contrast,
Captain Philip Dumas, who
served as British naval attaché to Germany
from 1906 to 1908, “in the long-term … regarded the Reich as a
profound
threat to British security.”125 While Dumas at the
beginning of his tenure
believed that genuine animosity towards the U.K. was confined to the
German populace,
by his second year he perceived a shared desire by the
German navy and public to displace the U.K. militarily
and politically.126
According to Dumas, the German Navy League,
which had 900,000
members, was a primary actor in stirring up anti-British sentiment in
Germany.127 In 1908, Dumas projected the outbreak of a possible Anglo–
German
conflict circa 1913.128 He projected that Germany would have
difficulty waging an effective naval campaign against the U.K. prior to this
date, but the conclusion of
several major projects near the North Sea would
remove this obstacle.129 Dumas, like his military attaché contemporary
Colonel Trench, found favour among
British Foreign Office officials who
shared similar beliefs about a hostile Germany.130
Captain Herbert Heath occupied the naval attaché role from 1908 to 1910
and “would emerge as a leading
advocate of a new German threat
perception theory …” whereby sufficient hidden German shipbuilding
would
enable Germany to achieve naval dominance.131 Heath
concentrated
his efforts on matching data of official versus actual construction details
regarding German
ships, a difficult task given that Germany curtailed his
access to shipbuilding facilities and senior naval
officials.132 Captain Hugh
Watson, as Heath’s successor and
British naval attaché from 1910 to 1913,
based his assessment of German naval intentions more on the
activities of
the people and interests responsible for an expansionist German naval
policy rather than on
materiel.133 Watson believed that Admiral von Tirpitz
would
engage in deception via “small but regular incremental increases
alongside reassuring and calming statements”
vis-à-vis the U.K. in order to
achieve his goals.134 Since von
Tirpitz and his allies would require the
support of the German public and government in order to fund their
programme, Watson speculated that the Navy League may have been
responsible for German intervention in
Agadir.135 The final pre-War British
naval attaché, Captain Wilfred Henderson, began his duties in mid-October
1913.136 The short duration of his tenure, health problems, and absence of
inspection visits of
German shipyards may account for his lack of comment
on the prospects for conflict with Germany.137
Monitoring German naval innovation, particularly on destroyers and
submarines, was a key component of the
British naval attaché’s duties.
Destroyers, also known as torpedo boats, were of interest for their technical
specifications, the quality of personnel, and their potential employment in
an Anglo–German naval
confrontation.138 Early British reporting on the
development of
German submarines, or U-boats, noted the initial scepticism
of Admiral von Tirpitz and the Kaiser as to their
utility.139 However, once
Germany decided to proceed and build
submarines, the British naval
attachés relayed to London the acceleration of U-boat construction after
1908.140 Captain Heath, the British naval attaché in 1908,
correctly inferred
offensive German intentions from the displacement of the submarines,
which was out of
proportion to the requirements of a defensive mission
protecting the coast.141 His successor, Captain Watson, derived the same
conclusion from German U-boat
simulations of attack on enemy ships
during naval exercises in October 1910.142 In accordance with Yarhi-Milo’s
organizational expertise hypothesis, intelligence
professionals (in this case,
attachés) tend to infer intentions from capabilities. Since the British Royal
Navy’s main concern was a possible German naval threat emanating from
the North Sea, German U-boat
construction which could be employed
against the U.K. would confirm suspicions of malign intent.
In the U.K., attaché reports were sent via the head of mission for review
by the Foreign Office, which
“regularly turned important documents,
including the dispatches of service attachés, into confidential prints
for
other embassies and even to the Cabinet.”143 The
distribution list could
reach the highest levels of the British government, including “Buckingham
Palace, 10
Downing Street, and select members of the Cabinet.”144 British
First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher, sent King Edward VII favourable
dispatches from the naval attaché in
Berlin in order to ward off criticism of
his reform plans and enlist a powerful ally.145 Attachés were therefore not
merely bureaucrats whose reports went
unnoticed by upper-level officials.
Evidence suggests that attaché reports played a role in at least two
British
governmental debates – airship policy between 1909 and 1913 as well as
naval policy between 1908 and
1909 in the midst of a perceived German
naval buildup.146
Although other factors contributed to governmental
decisions in both instances, the information supplied by
the attachés cannot
be discounted.147
The British attachés were therefore a critical channel for diplomatic
communication between the U.K. and
Germany before the outbreak of war
in 1914. As a key source of on-the-ground intelligence and a direct
conduit
between the highest levels of the two governments, these attachés were
essential for British
policymakers seeking to understand the intentions of an
erratic Kaiser Wilhelm and his militaristic coterie.
While some British
attachés were less concerned about the threat posed by Germany,
others
rightly perceived an offensive Germany preparing for war. A comparative
analysis of British and German
attachés’ contributions to Anglo–German
diplomatic efforts prior to World War I will follow at the conclusion
of this
section.

German attachés
Germany first stationed a naval attaché in London in 1886.148
The social
background of German naval attachés was a factor in their appointment in
that “of the ten naval
attachés serving in London between 1888 and 1914,
only three were noble, and they were of the lowest and
newest creation.”149
The Kaiser was personally involved in the
approval and recalling of new
foreign attachés assigned to Berlin.150 This unusual move is an indication
that the German monarch assigned great value to
attaché appointments. The
Kaiser expected foreign attachés to ride behind him at military events and
maneuvers and spoke with the naval attachés at Kiel Week.151
In May 1897, Captain von Luttwitz became Germany’s military attaché
assigned to London.152 Since von Luttwitz had worked in the British
division of the Great
General Staff and had composed articles critical of
England in a German military journal, British military
officials ominously
interpreted his appointment.153 The German
military attaché in London
assigned low probability to a conflict between the U.K. and Germany, but
the
German naval attachés “depicted it as imminent, in accordance with
Tirpitz’s determination to keep the naval
arms race hot.”154 This divergence
of assessments between
German service attachés regarding the likelihood of
war is striking.
German naval attachés in conjunction with Admiral von Tirpitz tried to
circumvent the civilian diplomats and
establish an independent channel of
communication with the Kaiser.155 The Kaiser himself was equally
disdainful of civilian diplomats. At the urging of
Admiral von Tirpitz and
the German naval attaché Captain Widenmann, the Kaiser recalled his
ambassador Count
von Metternich from London due to the latter’s
persistently voiced concern that a growing German navy would
ensure
British hostility.156 Metternich in fact had warned von
Tirpitz that
Germany’s naval expansion programme was alienating Britain.157 The
Kaiser was more inclined to heed the counsel of von Tirpitz and
Widenmann, and von
Metternich’s viewpoint therefore did not alter the
Kaiser’s mindset. Widenmann’s favor with the Kaiser and
Admiral von
Tirpitz meant that he was allowed to serve at the German Embassy in
London until September 1912
despite calls for his reassignment by Count
von Metternich and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.158 In a private
letter from Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Metternich
called for
Widenmann’s removal, referring to “the Naval Attaché’s work of agitation
…”159 Widenmann’s aggressiveness and negative intervention in diplomacy
surfaced at key moments in Anglo–German relations. In a 28 October 1911
letter from Widenmann to Admiral von
Tirpitz, Widenmann manifested his
anti-British sentiment in his statement that “there is an unscrupulous,
ambitious and unreliable demagogue like Winston Churchill at the head of
the
Admiralty.”160 Widenmann further asserted that the U.K.
regarded
Germany as “the adversary most to be feared.”161
Widenmann urged the
Kaiser to embark upon a naval expansion programme, as “‘only one thing
impresses in
England: a firm goal and the indomitable will to accomplish
it.’”162 The Kaiser was sufficiently influenced by Widenmann’s views that
he employed them as
the basis for seeking a naval expansion bill contrary to
the views of Bethmann-Hollweg and Metternich. In a
March 1912 interview
with the editor of the British newspaper the Globe, which had ties with the
British Conservative Party, Widenmann maintained that Lord Haldane had
approved the terms of the 1912 German
naval law.163 There is no evidence
to support Widenmann’s
claim, and his statement directly contradicts
Haldane’s assertions.
Captain von Muller succeeded Widenmann in London, but continued his
tradition of inflammatory reporting.
Admiral von Tirpitz advised von
Muller to mention to the Kaiser his discussion with Winston Churchill only
in
passing and to frame the holiday proposal as a tactic to thwart German
naval expansion.164 It is apparent that the German naval attachés were an
important source
of agitation for war and, unfortunately, had significant
influence over the Kaiser.

Comparison of British vs. German postures

The receptivity of British and German military service chiefs to the value of
diplomacy with counterparts
varied. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of Staff of
the German army, thought that diplomacy would be ineffective
in attaining
Germany’s goals in war.165 General von Schlieffen
stated that “‘attack is the
best defense … one cannot defeat the enemy without attacking.’”166 The
obsession with offensive as opposed to defensive advantage in
warfare has
been termed by Stephen Van Evera as the “cult of the offensive,” which
prevailed throughout
Europe at the time.167 The preoccupation with
offensive
military strategy was echoed, albeit to a far lesser degree, in the
U.K. by General W.G. Knox, who declared
that “‘The defensive is never an
acceptable role to the Briton, and he makes little or no study of
it.’”168
German naval attachés were expected to supply justifications for
increased budgetary allocations, which
involved reporting on other navies
such as the Royal Navy.169
Bias and politicization of German naval attachés
were much more likely in these circumstances. British naval
attaché
reporting could be distorted as well, such as in the case of Captain Watson,
who “consistently
inflated the tonnage of German submarines and
exaggerated the numbers of vessels being built …”170 However, Captain
Watson’s errors were made more by accident than by
design due to lack of
accurate information.
Attachés drew their information from a variety of sources. As a general
practice, British attachés did not
disclose their intelligence sources.171
British service
attachés dispatched to Berlin all had education or experience
in intelligence.172 However, they were not allowed to engage in espionage
out of concern that they would disgrace the British government.173 By
contrast, German attachés did engage in espionage. However, surveillance
of British
attachés by the Germans, as well as two attempted but failed sting
operations, proved the wisdom of British
restrictions on clandestine
activities.174 While British
military attachés attended army maneuvers
where they could observe the German army in action, British naval
attachés
did not witness German fleet exercises since they were not invited.175
Nonetheless, British and German attachés did at times cooperate and
exchange details on
developments in one another’s military. For example,
the British army relayed its Field Service Regulations
and Training Manuals
in 1907 to the German army attaché in London prior to publication on the
condition that
Germany would provide something else of interest to the
British military.176 In 1903, the German attaché in London recommended
that Count Gleichen, who served as
British military attaché to Berlin until
1906, request any sensitive information he sought from the German
General
Staff instead of resorting to espionage lest he severely limit his access to all
information.177 In practice, British attachés who openly asked
for certain
closely held information would demonstrate gaps in British understanding,
invite German attachés
to seek reciprocity, and prompt Germany to create
bureaucratic obstacles to process the request.178 Instead, British attachés
resorted to “human intelligence, visual
reconnaissance, and open source
intelligence, namely the careful scrutiny of German publications.”179 Even
in contemporary times, these methodologies of intelligence
gathering
constitute the majority of intelligence data. Germany imposed limits on
interactions between German
General Staff or naval officers and foreign
service attachés, only permitting high-level German officers
“presumably
… chosen for their discretion and lack of loquacity” to engage in
discussions with their
counterparts.180
Beginning in July 1910, the U.K. and Germany had discussed the
possibility of a naval information exchange
“whereby Britain and Germany
could each disclose to the other the details of their forthcoming naval
building
programme …”181 Captain Hugh Watson, who became the British
naval attaché to Berlin in August 1910, claimed that he was explicitly
tasked by the leaders of the Royal
Navy to lead cooperative Anglo–German
naval initiatives such as the information exchange and fleet
meetings.182
The British Admiralty proposed that both
governments allow “six-monthly
visits by the two naval attachés to inspect the vessels under construction,
and reciprocal communications about the types and numbers of ships to be
built each year, with dates of
laying down and delivery.”183 Such a scheme
would have been of
particular utility for the U.K. due to the scarcity of
openly available information on the German
Navy.184 Watson personally
believed that the best prospects for
an Anglo–German agreement lay in a
concerted British naval buildup that would underscore the futility of
German attempts to rival the U.K.185 The U.K. agreed to publish
its naval
estimates closer to the German publication date in response to Germany’s
objections, but did not
consent to binding itself to the estimates.186 An in-
principle
agreement by Germany in July 1911 stalled due to the German
dispatch of the
Panther to Agadir. The exchange was formally rejected by
Admiral von Tirpitz in January 1912 after
the British suggested that the
exchange include information about the arming and conversion of ships
other
than battleships.187 Admiral von Tirpitz and his allies
believed a naval
information exchange was “a species of disarmament, to be opposed in all
of its
manifestations.”188 A possible confidence building measure that
could
have increased transparency and diminished mistrust did not materialize.
An open exchange of
information on respective naval developments and
on-site inspections would have signalled mutual commitment
to
transparency as well as provided clues on regime intentions and type.
Strategic engagement between the U.K. and Germany alternately
conveyed reassuring or menacing intentions. The
latter component proved
at odds with the goal of strategic engagement, namely managing otherwise
adversarial
relations and mitigating the risks of armed conflict. Certain
activities intended by one side to reassure
could unintentionally have the
opposite effect. In 1904, Kaiser Wilhelm invited King Edward VII and
British
naval vessels to Kiel Week. Although Wilhelm presented most of
the German fleet to his guests anticipating
praise in return, the British
“regarded this display of naval strength as a threat that Britain had to
meet.”189 The sight of so many assembled ships before the
British
delegation may have left a vivid impression that abstract naval estimates
could not. Evidence does
not suggest that the Kaiser intended to display the
ships as a tool of deterrence in the form of German naval
prowess, although
the British seem to have interpreted it as such. Wilhelm’s decision to
showcase numerous
German warships was not in line with the advice of
Admiral von Tirpitz.190 During the 1904 Kiel Week proceedings, the Kaiser
became upset after King Edward VII
commented on a translation book, The
Military Interpreter, published by a German officer that
contained anti-
British statements.191 In response, Wilhelm
reassigned the author and
blamed Count Gleichen, the British attaché to Berlin, for forwarding the
publication as well as spoiling bilateral relations during an important royal
visit.192 Count Gleichen’s private views ran counter to widespread British
notions of the threat of a growing German fleet, believing instead “that
Germany aimed, through its fleet
programme, at equality with Britain as a
world power and not the destruction of British power.”193 A decade later on
the eve of war, a naval arms race and deteriorating
bilateral relations did not
prevent “the arrival of a magnificent squadron of British Dreadnoughts …
and
three ‘light’ cruisers” to Kiel Week in June 1914.194 British
attachés
assigned intelligence value to Kiel Week, as it afforded them “the chance to
wander around and
observe not only the navy’s hardware, but also the
methods and training of the crews.”195 On 27 June 1914, one day prior to
the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the prevailing
banquet toast with British and German naval officers in attendance was
ironically “‘friends now, friends forever.’”196 On the
following day, 28
June, sailors from Britain and Germany were together at Kiel when the
news broke of the
Archduke’s assassination.
British and German decision-makers relied on many sources of
information in the
consideration of policy options. Service attaché reports,
which were circulated not only among the military
bureaucracy but also
among civilian bureaucracies in the U.K., were the primary source of on-
the-ground
intelligence on military contingencies. The impact of conflicting
threat assessments from army and navy
attachés may have produced
confusion among British and German policymakers searching for accurate
data.
Attachés can serve as a valuable conduit of information for informed
decision-making, but disinformation can
also undermine government efforts
to make peace with a potential adversary. In the lead-up to World War I,
German naval attachés exemplified the notion that “service attachés are
more warlike or more skeptical as to
the preservation of peace – the two
need not logically coincide – than diplomats.”197 While attachés were
ostensibly apolitical, both British and German
attachés’ reports crossed into
political terrain. Their views were shared with the highest levels of their
respective governments. In Germany, the advocates for a peaceful
settlement with the U.K. were predominantly
civilians outside of the
military bureaucracy, but their voices were overshadowed by the military
and their
attachés who advocated for conflict. In the U.K., Lord Haldane, as
the Secretary of State for War, attempted
to find common ground for peace
with Germany but ultimately failed.
The military-to-military relationship, as manifested by naval and military
attachés, conveyed frequently
inaccurate and often hostile impressions of
each side’s capabilities and intentions. The attachés for both
the U.K. and
Germany were, in final analysis, a negative force in the effective conduct of
defence diplomacy.
While their activities cannot be construed as causing
war between the U.K. and Germany, they certainly
contributed to failed
strategic engagement.
Quality of Diplomatic Interaction (Attachés) value: Negative

Political impact upon strategic engagement efforts

The influence of politics upon strategic engagement efforts was
considerable in Anglo–German diplomacy prior
to World War I. Lack of
unity as well as uncoordinated messaging between military and civilian
government
officials on each side prevailed in Anglo–German strategic
engagement.
The Haldane Mission of 1912 highlights the importance of the choice of
effective emissaries for successful
strategic engagement. On the British
side, although Haldane spoke German and military issues were under his
purview, he was regarded by some in the U.K. as “conceited” and
“surprisingly inattentive to
detail.”198 Fault lay equally on the German side,
since
“neither Haldane nor German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was
familiar with the methods of diplomatic
negotiation. Both men were
sincerely, almost feverishly, anxious to reach an agreement.”199 Despite
Germany’s initial interest in Churchill visiting Berlin, his
selection could
have proven inflammatory given his undiplomatic remarks on Germany in
public and before
Parliament. Foreign Secretary Grey may have been better
qualified to negotiate with
Germany on political issues, but his ignorance of
technical military issues would have been a liability. The
agenda of the
Haldane Mission was overly wide-ranging and encompassed colonial,
political, and military
issues. As the Secretary of State for War, Haldane did
not possess the necessary expertise to confront all of
these matters. A more
circumscribed agenda could have addressed this shortcoming. Another
alternative would
have been a joint delegation with numerous British
government officials in attendance. British Admiralty
representation would
have been particularly useful in properly evaluating German naval
proposals. While Count
Metternich claimed that Ballin suggested that
Churchill, Grey, and Haldane visit Berlin, Grey related in
correspondence to
the U.K. Ambassador to Germany that multiple participants in unofficial
talks could lead to
confusion.200
A potential sequel to the Haldane Mission in spring 1914 involving
Churchill did not materialize due to
internal dissension within the British
government. Churchill wished to conduct a new round of bilateral arms
control talks “when it appeared that he would receive an invitation to visit
Germany …”201 However, Grey and his colleagues at the Foreign Office
struck down the
idea, citing German unwillingness to discuss arms control
in good faith after the Haldane Mission as well as
possible difficulties that
could arise in British relations with the French and Russians.202 Grey
advocated for a bottom-up approach employing naval attaché
communications, “and if these talks made progress, high-level negotiations
could then begin.”203 However, both methods would have been unlikely to
endure given efforts
by the U.K. and Germany to cultivate external naval
partnerships and a reticence by other countries to sign
on to the holiday
arrangement proposed by Churchill.204
Therefore, internal British
government dissension was more of an issue for the U.K. than divided
civil–military relations.
By contrast, German strategic engagement efforts were plagued by civil–
military discord. Despite attempts by
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to
restrain the bellicose voices within the German military, he was ultimately
unsuccessful. Officers within the German military were strong proponents
for war in the prelude to World War
I. As stated by historian Luigi
Albertini, Bethmann-Hollweg “‘was completely overwhelmed by the
military’” on
30 July 1914 when he consented to declare war.205 The Kaiser
had a pro-military bias since “insofar as he remained steady in support of
any policy, the Kaiser
consistently backed Tirpitz and his naval policy.”206
However,
there were contrarian civilian voices within the German
government who urged a less confrontational stance
vis-à-vis Great Britain.
Counsellor Richard von Kuhlmann, who was stationed at the German
Embassy in London,
recommended that Germany curtail its naval buildup,
restrain plans for continental expansion, and subordinate
itself to the British
as an ally.207 The British perceived that
German civilian politicians such as
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg led a pacifist wing of the government, while
military leaders such as Admiral von Tirpitz were leading an opposing wing
bent upon war.208
Further contributing to a negative political environment and hampering
strategic
engagement efforts, the Germans regarded the British as the
enemy, and were suspicious of British complicity
in a plot to surround
Germany. Though British paranoia vis-à-vis Germany also existed, it was
less potent.
Other specific activities increased distrust between the U.K. and
Germany. The large display of German naval
power before King Edward
VII at Kiel in June 1904 spurred “the first official war plans drawn up
against
Germany in the summer of 1904 under Admiral Prince Louis of
Battenberg.”209 While navies routinely plan for contingencies, the
proximity of the Kiel display of
German naval power to British war
planning was more than a mere coincidence. The Kaiser was unable to
foresee
the unintended consequences of his decision to display Germany’s
naval prowess, which alarmed the U.K. and
reaffirmed British concerns that
Germany indeed intended to challenge the Royal Navy. Security dilemma
dynamics came into play whereby German actions prompted a British
“dilemma of response.”210 Kiel Week is a manifestation of an ostensibly
conciliatory gesture by
Germany being interpreted by the British as a show
of force. Distrust was further exacerbated by Wilhelm’s
penchant for candid
discussions with attachés, as when the British naval attaché Captain Dumas
recalled the
Kaiser asking him in the summer of 1906 whether Admiral
Fisher was preparing to attack Germany.211 Although such indelicate
remarks were engendered by the Kaiser’s
desire for a clearer understanding
of British intentions, they likely created significant apprehension in the
U.K.
Strategic distrust was fuelled domestically in Germany by the military’s
portrayal as espoused by General von
Schlieffen that their country was
“surrounded by rapacious enemies who were only waiting for the right
moment
to pounce,” with England an “‘implacable enemy.’”212 These
hostile beliefs were echoed by Germany’s naval propaganda office, which
“warned that Germany was being
surrounded and strangled by an insatiable
and malevolent Britain.”213 Even schoolchildren in Germany were imbued
with anti-British propaganda, told that
“Britain had always tried to keep
Germany as weak, disrupted, and small as possible …”214 British naval
attaché Captain Dumas further reported German
schoolchildren in 1908
“who gravely asked why England wished to destroy Germany and told me
further that
their teacher had begged them always to remember that England
was their enemy.”215 The evidence indicates that animosity towards the
U.K. extended to all levels of German
society from the populace to the
highest levels of power. The disinformation campaign stirred anti-British
sentiment and thwarted popular German support for accommodation with
Britain.
Paranoia within Germany was echoed, though to a lesser degree, in the
U.K. In 1899, former British Prime
Minister Lord Roseberry stated that
Britain was a “‘little island …viewed with so much jealousy, and with
such
hostility, with such jarred ambitions by the great empires of the world, so
friendless among
nations.’”216 In 1907, head of the British Foreign Office
division for Germany and western Europe, Eyre Crowe, sent an important
memorandum to Sir Edward Grey, stating
that Germany represented an
opponent which was blackmailing and attempting to gain
advantage over
Britain; he predicted steadily worsening relations between the two
countries.217 Despite the superficial amity between Lord Haldane and his
German
counterparts, long-standing animosity between the two countries
contributed to ineffective peace efforts.
Political Impact Upon Strategic Engagement Efforts value: Negative
Role of secrecy in strategic engagement
The importance of secrecy in successful strategic engagement aimed at
conflict mitigation is controversial.
In a democratic system where
transparency is valued, diplomatic initiatives conducted in secret are viewed
with suspicion. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1918 would later include an
admonition against secret
diplomacy in the first of his Fourteen Points: “open covenants of peace,
openly
arrived at, after which there shall be no private international
understandings of any kind but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and
in the public view.”218
However, secrecy in sensitive negotiations can be
valuable in facilitating successful results. There was a
deficit of secrecy
during the Haldane Mission of 1912. The Mission was intended to be
carried out under a
veil of secrecy and was the prelude to continued
clandestine negotiations in London for several months.
Despite efforts to
keep the visit out of the public eye, newspapers in Britain and Germany
wrote articles
during Haldane’s time in Berlin. On 9 February 1912, the
British newspaper The Times “doubted the
expediency of his mission, and
feared that its effect would not be to relieve the strain” between Britain and
Germany.219 Secrecy can be effective for delicate
intergovernmental
negotiations only if both sides are able to ensure that confidentiality is
maintained. The
failed efforts to keep the Haldane Mission of 1912 covert
had negative repercussions. The leak of the visit
to the press while Haldane
was in Berlin meant that speculation abounded among the British and
German
publics.
The lack of confidentiality enabled the German government to distort the
true content of their discussions
with Haldane, both among the German and
British populace. The Germans presumed that Haldane “had greater
powers
than he did.”220 Since Haldane was dispatched by the
British Cabinet, it is
understandable how Haldane’s status could have been overestimated by
Germany. The
ambiguous origins of the Mission led to a situation where
“each side believed that the other had made the
initial contact, and each
later assumed that the other had broken off the talks.”221 Lack of clarity
with the process of negotiations confounded the substance. The
post-
Mission private negotiations in London in 1912 only exacerbated these
problems. It is uncertain whether
or not Foreign Secretary Grey and
Ambassador Metternich, as the lead negotiators in these follow-on
discussions, had the full authority and support of the British and German
governments, respectively. Secrecy
was also paramount in that the U.K.
was concerned about alienating the French and Russian governments, and
Germany may have feared that its Triple Alliance partners – Austria-
Hungary and Italy – would react
negatively to a potential agreement with
the U.K. Though the British did not have
formal military alliances with
either the French or Russians, they nevertheless discreetly consulted with
both governments about exploratory talks with Germany. Sir Edward Grey
briefed French diplomat Paul Cambon
“very confidentially” on the Haldane
Mission.222 Cambon
believed that a British agreement with Germany on
naval expenditures “would be a very good thing; but he
feared that it would
be very difficult.”223 Grey similarly
advised the British ambassador to
Russia to inform Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs “very
confidentially”
of the talks, which were designed to place Anglo–German relations “on a
less unfavourable
footing.”224
While it is doubtful that maintenance of secrecy surrounding the Haldane
Mission would have improved the
prospects for a successful Anglo–
German agreement, public awareness in London and Berlin of the ongoing
talks
undermined diplomatic efforts. The propaganda machine in both
countries was already quite active in stoking
animosity and the leaked
diplomatic mission only added fuel to the fire.
Role of Secrecy in Strategic Engagement value: Negative

Lessons garnered from Anglo–German strategic engagement

The outbreak of hostilities between the U.K. and Germany in 1914 is a case
study exemplifying failed strategic
engagement. Analysis of the various
components of Anglo–German strategic engagement in the decade
preceding
World War I yielded multiple inductively derived factors.
The British and German governments were both in principle
constitutional monarchies. In practice, however, the
German government
functioned far more as a military-dominant monarchy. While the role of the
German Reichstag
was diminished, the British Parliament at Westminster
exercised greater authority in overall decision-making.
In Germany, the
locus of authority on matters of war and peace resided with the Kaiser and
his military
advisors. In the U.K., there was a more balanced consultative
process between civilians and military
representatives. This de facto
misalignment of regime type between the British and German governments
was a
strong negative factor in strategic engagement.
The U.K. and Germany embarked upon a competitive naval buildup
preceding World War I. While the motivations for
the naval arms race were
different for each country, the net effect of this security dilemma dynamic
was
increased suspicion and animosity with no positive tangible benefit.
The British ultimately out-built the
Germans and by 1912 led in
construction of large-scale surface warships. The British perception of a
rising
German naval power threatening their hegemony on the seas
resembled the ancient “Thucydides trap” of Athens and
Sparta. The
excessive focus upon battleship counts in Anglo–German strategic
engagement distracted from the
central issues which divided the two sides,
namely the issue of British neutrality in the event of a
continental war. The
competitive naval buildup undermined successful strategic engagement
between the U.K. and
Germany.
The quality of diplomatic interaction proved to be a critical factor in
Anglo–German
strategic engagement. Choosing the proper emissary or
assembling a suitable cohort can be a key element in
productive
negotiations. In this case study, Lord Richard Haldane was a poor choice
since he possessed neither
the knowledge base nor the authority to negotiate
effectively with the German leadership on a panoply of
military and
political issues. In addition, both sides failed to articulate clearly their core
concerns.
Well-defined goals and adequate preparation are conducive to
successful strategic engagement. Clear messaging,
lack of ambiguity, and
coordinated communication by each side with a unitary voice were absent
in the
Anglo–German case. The 1912 Haldane Mission with its ad hoc
character and lack of planned follow-up
negotiations proved the importance
of sustained efforts at strategic engagement for a successful result.
British
and German attachés were an important source of diplomatic exchange and
information gathering. However,
their efforts were degraded by personal
bias, overt espionage, and exhortation by their superiors to distort
their
reporting. The poor quality of diplomatic interaction at all levels of Anglo–
German strategic engagement
contributed to failed strategic engagement.
Politics can serve either a stabilizing or destabilizing function in strategic
engagement efforts. In the
Anglo–German case, there was significant
infighting within the British and German governments. There was
considerable internal dissension in Germany amongst the primary actors,
notably Kaiser Wilhelm, Admiral von
Tirpitz, and Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg. Each had a separate agenda which impaired their ability to
communicate effectively with the U.K. On the British side, Winston
Churchill, Lord Haldane, and other members
of the government were not in
unison. Additionally, negative propaganda was destructive to effective
negotiations on both sides. The pressure applied to the German government
by domestic arms manufacturers as
well as the Navy League interfered with
government deliberations. The political impact upon strategic
engagement
efforts did not contribute to a successful Anglo–German result.
Historically, the value of secrecy in diplomatic negotiations has been
contested. While the populace desires
transparency, government officials
have often regarded quiet negotiations shielded from public view as useful.
The Haldane Mission was not kept secret as originally intended, which
contributed to the dissemination of
misinformation in the U.K. and
Germany. Preexisting ill will among the British and German politics was
exacerbated through the stoking of nationalism by propaganda outlets in
both countries. Additionally, while
clandestine diplomacy can promote
candour between parties, it can also sow distrust among allies who may be
significantly impacted by the outcome of such negotiations. In the Anglo–
German case study, absence of secrecy
proved to be detrimental to the
conduct of strategic engagement.
The causes of the outbreak of World War I are complex and remain
contested over a century later. The object of
the case study has not been to
adjudicate this issue. Rather, the focus is purely upon the strategic
engagement
efforts of the U.K. and Germany to avert war with one another.
Even if Germany had
attained its desired neutrality with the U.K., it may
nonetheless have decided to embark upon continental war.
Additionally, if
the U.K. had succeeded in convincing Germany to abandon its naval
buildup, it would likely
still have aligned with France and been drawn into
World War I. In this case, strategic engagement failed not
because the U.K.
and Germany sought conflict with one another, but instead due to many
other complicating
factors.

Notes
1        David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe
before 1914,” International
Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 126.
2    Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in
History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to
the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 43.
3    Ibid., p. 41.
4        David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming War: Europe,
1904–1914 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 105.
5    Ibid.
6    Ibid., p. 106.
7    Ibid., p. 111.
8    Ibid.
9    V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in
1914 (2nd ed.) (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1993), p. 78.
10    Ibid., pp. 80–81.
11    Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic
Books, 1998), p. 71.
12    Ibid., p. 68.
13        See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Détente and Deterrence:
Anglo–German Relations, 1911–1914,”
International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 121–150.
14    Ibid., pp. 147–148.
15    Ibid., p. 133.
16    Ibid., p. 138.
17    Ibid.
18    Holger Afflerbach, “Wilhelm II as Supreme Warlord in the
First World War,” in Mombauer
and Deist (eds.), The Kaiser, p. 200.
19    Lynn-Jones, “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo–German
Relations, 1911–1914,” p. 144.
20    Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo–German
Antagonism 1860–1914 (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 416.
21        Richard N. Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and War,” in
Richard N. Rosecrance and
Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the
Risk of U.S.-
China Conflict (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2015), p. 58.
22    Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Inevitability and War,” in
Rosecrance and Miller, The Next Great War, p.
182.
23    Kevin Rudd, “Lessons from Europe 1914 for Asia 2014:
Reflections on the Centenary of the
Outbreak of World War I,” in Rosecrance and Miller, The Next Great
War, p. 200.
24    T.G. Otte, “War, Revolution, and the Uncertain Primacy of
Domestic Politics,” in Rosecrance
and Miller, The Next Great War, p. 105.
25    Ibid.
26    Matthew S. Seligmann, “Military
Diplomacy in a Military Monarchy? Wilhelm II’s Relations
with the British Service Attaches in Berlin,
1903–1914,” in Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm
Deist (eds.), The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in
Imperial Germany (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 176.
27    Ibid., p. 178.
28    Michael Epkenhans, “Wilhelm II and ‘His’ Navy,
1888–1918,” in Mombauer and Deist (eds.),
The Kaiser, p. 23.
29    Ibid., p. 24.
30    Otte, “War, Revolution, and the Uncertain Primacy of
Domestic Politics,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 122.
31    Ibid., p. 123.
32    Ja Ian Chong and Todd H. Hall, “The Lessons of 1914 for
East Asia Today: Missing the Trees
for the Forest,” International Security 39, no. 1 (Summer 2014):
14.
33    G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British
Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 6:
Anglo–German Tension: Armaments and Negotiation,
1907–12 (London: HMSO, 1930), No.
361 as cited in Chong and Hall, p. 14.
34       Alan Alexandroff, “Before the War: Three Styles of
Diplomacy,” in Rosecrance and Miller
(eds.), The Next Great War?, p. 8.
35    Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went
to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane,
2012), p. 149.
36    Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First World
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
p. 16.
37    Ibid.
38    Otte, “War, Revolution, and the Uncertain Primacy of
Domestic Politics,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 107. See also Wiseman,
Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence,
p. 19.
39    John H. Maurer, “The Anglo–German Naval Rivalry and
Informal Arms Control, 1912–1914,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 284.
40    Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War in
Europe, p. 209.
41        Graham Allison, “Thucydides’s Trap Has Been Sprung in the
Pacific,” Financial Times, 21
August 2012.
42    Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 73.
43    Otte, “War, Revolution, and the Uncertain Primacy of
Domestic Politics,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 106.
44    Charles S. Maier, “Thucydides, Alliance Politics, and
Great Power Conflict,” in Rosecrance
and Miller, The Next Great War, p. 93.
45    MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, p. 129.
46    Frederick Vaughan, Viscount Haldane: “The Wicked
Step-father of the Canadian Constitution”
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p. 91.
47        Jean Graham Hall and Douglas F. Martin, Haldane:
Statesman, Lawyer, Philosopher
(Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1996), p. 192.
48    Stephen E. Koss, Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), p. 50.
49    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 166.
50    Haldane, Before the War, p. 21.
51       V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in
1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993), p. 108. This episode is also known as the Second Morocco Crisis
or the Agadir Crisis.
52    Holger H. Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German
Navy 1888–1918 (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 73.
53    Ibid.
54    Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before
1914,” p. 136.
55    Hall and Martin,
Haldane, p. 200.
56        Irving Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission: A Study in Mutual
Suspicion and
Misunderstanding,” Master’s thesis, Columbia University, 1968, p. 17.
57    Hall and Martin, Haldane, p. 200.
58    Koss, Lord Haldane, p. 79.
59    Ibid.
60    Ibid., p. 80.
61    Ibid., p. 69.
62        Mr. Winston Churchill to Sir Ernest Cassel, No. 492, 7
January 1912, in G.P. Gooch and
Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War
1898–1914, Vol. VI
(London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1930), p. 666.
63    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 20.
64    Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, p.
325. The language of the clauses, quoted
from the official German government document collection Die grosse
Politik der europaischen
Kabinette, 1871–1914 in Woodward, pp. 325–326, was as follows. The first clause,
considered
“fundamental,” stated that “Naval superiority recognized as essential to Great Britain. Present
German naval programme and expenditure not to be increased but if possible retarded and
reduced.” The second
clause said that “England sincerely desires not to interfere with German
Colonial expansion. To give effect to
this she is prepared to discuss forthwith whatever the
German aspirations in that direction may be. England
will be glad to know that there is a field
or special points where she can help Germany.” The third clause
indicated that “proposals for
reciprocal assurances debarring either Power from joining in aggressive designs
or
combinations directed against the other would be welcome.”
65    Ibid., p. 326.
66    Ibid.
67    Ibid., p. 327.
68    Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p. 320.
69    Haldane, Before the War, p. 28.
70    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 5.
71    The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg to Count von Metternich,
12 February 1912, XXXI.120 in
E.T.S. Dugdale (trans.), German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914 (London:
Methuen, 1931),
p. 75.
72    David Owen, The Hidden Perspective: The Military
Conversations 1906–1914 (London: Haus,
2014), p. 1.
73    Ibid., p. 28.
74    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 30. Also see Paul
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British
Naval Mastery (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1976), p. 229.
According to Kennedy, the
British Admiralty internally abandoned the two-power standard as early as 1909 due to
the
financial infeasibility of outbuilding the United States and Germany.
75    Haldane, Before the War, p. 27.
76    Ibid., pp. 29–30. The text of the German Chancellor’s
proposed agreement was: “1. The High
Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their desire for peace
and friendship. 2. They
will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in any combination, which is
directed
against the other. They expressly declare that they are not bound by any combination. 3. If
either of
the High Contracting Parties become entangled in a war with one or more other
powers, the other of the High
Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the power so
entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its
utmost endeavour for the localization of the
conflict. 4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the
preceding article has no application in
so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the
High Contracting
 Parties have already made. The making of new agreements which make
it impossible for either
of the Contracting Parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is
provided by
the preceding limitations is excluded in conformity with the provisions contained in Article 2.”
77    Ibid., p. 28.
78    Diary of Lord Haldane’s Visit to Berlin, No. 506, 9
February 1912, in G.P. Gooch and Harold
Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War
1898–1914, Vol. VI (London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1930), p. 680.
79    Haldane, Before the War, p. 30.
80    Ibid.
81    Michael Epkenhans, “Wilhelm II and ‘His’ Navy,
1888–1918,” in Mombauer and Deist (eds.),
The Kaiser, pp. 26–27.
82        Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in
1914, p. 134. Also see Hall and Martin,
Haldane, p. 203.
83    Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo–German Antagonism
1860–1914, p. 470.
84    Maurer, “The Anglo–German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms
Control, 1912–1914,” p. 298.
85    Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet, p. 4.
86    Ibid.
87        James Kraska, “Fear God and Dread Nought: Naval Arms
Control and Counterfactual
Diplomacy Before the Great War,” Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law 34,
no. 1 (2005): 83.
88    Ibid., p. 85.
89    Haldane, Before the War, p. 27.
90    Ibid.
91    Ibid.
92    Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p. 318.
93    MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, p. 509.
94    Cited in Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p. 222 and p.
605 n 144, Alfred von Waldersee to Jagow
(State Secretary for Foreign Affairs), 6 May 1919.
95    Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet, p. 77.
96    Ibid.
97    Count von Metternich, in London, to the German Foreign
Office, 5 February 1912, XXXI.107,
in E.T.S. Dugdale (trans.), German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914
(London: Methuen,
1931), p. 74.
98        Count von Metternich to the German Foreign Office, 17
March 1912, XXXI.190, in E.T.S.
Dugdale (trans.), German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914 (London:
Methuen, 1931), p. 88.
99    Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet, p. 80.
100    Ibid.
101    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 38.
102    Matthew S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform: British
Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of
the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
p. 20.
103    Ibid., p. 14.
104    Ibid., pp. 16–17.
105    Ibid., pp. 64–65.
106    Ibid., p. 16.
107    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 45.
108    Ibid., p. 46.
109    Ibid., pp. 48–50.
110    Ibid., p. 98.
111    Ibid., p. 165.
112    Ibid., pp. 165–166.
113    Ibid., p. 168.
114    Ibid., p. 173.
115    Seligmann, Spies in
Uniform, p. 174.
116    Ibid., p. 175.
117    Ibid., p. 177.
118    Ibid., p. 179.
119    Ibid., p. 181.
120    Ibid., pp. 181–182.
121    Ibid., p. 184.
122    Ibid., pp. xi–xii.
123    Ibid., p. 185.
124    Ibid., p. 186.
125    Ibid., p. 187.
126    Ibid., p. 189.
127    Ibid., pp. 189–190.
128    Ibid., p. 194.
129    Ibid.
130    Ibid., p. 243.
131    Ibid., p. 195.
132    Ibid., p. 201.
133        Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 204. Watson
referred to the diverse German interests
responsible for German naval policy as “‘the
Tirpitz-Krupp-Shipbuilding-Navy League
Group.’”
134    Ibid., p. 205.
135    Ibid., p. 206.
136    Ibid., p. 211.
137    Ibid., pp. 211–212.
138    Ibid., pp. 133–134.
139    Ibid., pp. 136–137.
140    Ibid., p. 138.
141    Ibid., p. 139.
142    Ibid., p. 141.
143    Ibid., p. 24.
144    Ibid., p. 216.
145    Ibid., p. 223.
146    Ibid., p. 253.
147    Ibid., p. 260.
148    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 196.
149    Ibid., p. 348. Vagts attributes the appointing of less
socially established officers as attaches to a
belief that such officers would be motivated to serve Germany
more effectively.
150    Ibid., p. 303.
151    Ibid., p. 305.
152    Ibid., p. 153.
153    Ibid.
154    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. xii.
155    Ibid., p. 343.
156    Vagts, The Military Attaché, pp. 344–345.
157    MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, p. 120.
158    Ibid., pp. 346–347. Count Metternich was recalled prior
to Captain Widenmann. Metternich
and Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg were also concerned that Widenmann’s
reporting
would undermine the Haldane Mission of February 1912 to Berlin since the 1912 naval bill
was a major
topic of discussion.
159        Count von Metternich, in London, to the Chancellor,
Bethmann Hollweg, XXXI.11, 10
December 1911, in E.T.S. Dugdale (trans.), German Diplomatic Documents
1871–1914
(London: Methuen, 1931), p. 54.
160    Captain Widenmann, German
Naval Attaché in London, to Admiral Von Tirpitz, XXXI.11, 28
October 1911, in E.T.S. Dugdale (trans.),
German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914 (London:
Methuen, 1931), p. 44.
161    Ibid., p. 43.
162    Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p. 221.
163    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 207.
164    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 348.
165    Ibid., p. 313.
166    Stephen Van Evera, “European Militaries and the Origins
of World War I,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 159.
167    Ibid., p. 158.
168    Ibid., p. 160.
169    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 343.
170    Ibid., p. 145.
171    Ibid., p. 75.
172    Ibid., pp. 69–71.
173    Ibid., pp. 76–77.
174    Ibid., pp. 77–78.
175    Ibid., pp. 105–106.
176    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 195.
177    Ibid., pp. 202–203.
178    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 79.
179    Ibid., p. 81.
180    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 203.
181    Matthew S. Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German
Threat 1901–1914 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 133.
182    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 33. The British
Foreign Office denied that it authorized this
outreach and the British Admiralty later did as well.
183    Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p.
174.
184    Ibid.
185    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, pp. 209–210.
186    Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p.
174.
187    Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat
1901–1914, p. 134.
188    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 13.
189    Epkenhans, “Wilhelm II and ‘His’ Navy, 1888–1918,” p.
30.
190    Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet, p. 51.
191    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 56.
192    Ibid., p. 55.
193    Ibid., pp. 161–162.
194        “Kiel Week,” Grey River Argus, 24 August 1914,
p. 8, http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-
bin/paperspast?a=d&d=GRA19140824.2.65
195    Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, p. 111.
196        George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal
England (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1935), p. 326.
197    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 350.
198    Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War in
Europe, p. 207.
199    Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, p.
336.
200        Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, No. 497, 7 February
1912, in G.P. Gooch and Harold
Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914,
Vol. VI (London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1930), p. 669.
201    John H. Maurer, “The Anglo–German Naval Rivalry and
Informal Arms Control, 1912–1914,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 302.
202    Ibid., p. 303.
203    Ibid.
204    Ibid., p. 305.
205    Stephen Van Evera, “European Militaries and the Origins
of World War I,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 156.
206        David Fromkin, Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the
Great War in 1914? (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 61.
207        Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies
from 1911 to 1914 (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1975), p. 123.
208    Ibid., p. 129.
209    Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet, p. 51.
210    Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security
Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in
World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 5.
211    Vagts, The Military Attaché, p. 314.
212    Stephen Van Evera, “European Militaries and the Origins
of World War I,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 164.
213    Ibid.
214    Ibid.
215        Matthew S. Seligmann (ed.), Naval Intelligence from
Germany: The Reports of the British
Naval Attachés in Berlin, 1906–1914 (Aldershot: Ashgate for the Navy
Records Society,
2007), p. 140.
216    Van Evera, “European Militaries and the Origins of World
War I,” in Rosecrance and Miller,
The Next Great War, p. 165.
217    Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: How
Europe Abandoned Peace for the First
World War (London: Profile Books, 2013), p. 116.
218        “President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” 8 January
1918, The Avalon Project, Yale
Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp
219    E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German
Navy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 361.
220    Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p.
207.
221    Rappaport, “The Haldane Mission,” p. 18.
222        Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, No. 498, 7 February
1912, in G.P. Gooch and Harold
Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914,
Vol. VI (London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1930), p. 669.
223    Ibid.
224    Ibid., p. 667.
4    U.S.–Soviet Cold War strategic engagement

Introduction
This chapter analyses U.S.–Soviet strategic engagement during the Cold
War through an intensive focus on a
particular instrument, the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA),1 that encompassed all three primary
strategic engagement activities – bilateral contacts
between senior military
and civilian officials; appointment of defence attachés; and contacts and
exchanges
between military personnel. In addition, a secondary instance of
U.S.–Soviet strategic engagement, the
U.S.–Soviet Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC), will be examined.2 Given the adversarial posture of
these two great powers during the Cold War, it is
important to study
instances of strategic engagement which may have lessened tensions and
helped to avert
conflict. INCSEA and the SCC represent the only major
institutionalized fora for continuous strategic
engagement during and
beyond the détente era. This explains the focus upon these two entities for
this case
study.

Motivations for strategic engagement (INCSEA)

The Cold War, a global contest between alliance blocs led by the U.S. and
the Soviet Union for spheres of
influence, emerged in the aftermath of the
defeat of the Axis powers in World War II. Apart from ideological
and
territorial dimensions, a significant aspect of Cold War competition was the
buildup of military arsenals.
However, “during the first decade after the end
of World War II, the U.S. Navy (USN) maintained maritime
supremacy,
steaming unchallenged over the high seas. American naval leaders hardly
viewed their Soviet
counterparts as a threat.”3 Just as Wilhelmine Germany
was
primarily a continental power until its naval buildup, so too was Soviet
Russia until its shipbuilding
initiatives of the early-to-mid 1960s. The
deployment of new classes of Soviet ships in larger numbers meant
that
“Admiral Gorshkov finally could begin to challenge Western supremacy of
the high seas.”4 More Soviet vessels plying the oceans placed the U.S. and
Soviet navies in
frequent contact and confrontation with one another.
Competitive naval dynamics which were absent in the early
post-Cold War
era began to emerge during this period.
The 1950s witnessed numerous incidents at sea, many involving loss of
life. The
majority of these incidents involved aircraft-to-aircraft
engagement, though some incidents reflected
ship-to-ship encounters. In
April 1950, an unarmed U.S. Navy Privateer plane en route from
Wiesbaden, Germany
to Copenhagen, Denmark was shot down by Soviet
aircraft over the Baltic Sea with loss of four U.S. Navy
officers and six
enlisted men.5 Though it was not known at the
time, the Privateer was
engaged in a top-secret electronic intelligence collection mission that was
part of a
joint U.S. Navy–Air Force collaboration.6 In November 1951,
during the Korean War, a U.S. Navy twin-engine P2V bomber flying under
United Nations command on a weather
reconnaissance mission was shot
down by two Soviet fighter planes over the Sea of Japan with loss of 10
lives.7 In July 1953, a U.S. B-50 bomber with 17 crew members
onboard
was shot down by Soviet fighters near Vladivostok. The U.S. and the
Soviets disputed the precise
location of the bomber as well as the definition
of acceptable widths of territorial waters.8 In September 1954, two Soviet
MIG fighters shot down a U.S. Navy P2V
patrol plane off the coast of
Siberia, resulting in the death of one crew member. The U.S. was so
incensed that
it brought the matter before the United Nations Security
Council for the first time.9 There were many additional minor incidents
which occurred in the 1950s.
Soviet surface ships and spy ships known as Auxiliary General
Intelligence (AGI) vessels were the primary
culprits in many of the
incidents involving U.S. ships. A 1972 study of incidents over the previous
six years
revealed 79 incidents, of which 32 involved AGIs.10 Prior to the
increase in confrontations between U.S. and Soviet surface ships, the U.S.
Navy and U.S. Air Force lost a
number of aircraft to Soviet fighter planes.
Between 1950 and 1965, out of 10 incidents involving 90
unaccounted U.S.
air personnel, six of the cases stemmed from Soviet aircraft fire.11
The 1960s witnessed a sharp rise in the number and variety of incidents.
The Soviets alleged that in the first
five months of 1960 alone the U.S.
buzzed Soviet merchant and fishing vessels 250 times in international
waters.12 The first serious incident was in July 1960, when a
U.S. RB-47
reconnaissance plane was shot down by the Soviets in the Arctic. The
incident resulted in the death
of four crew and the detention of the two
survivors, whom the Soviets threatened with prosecution.13 Far and away
the most significant naval confrontation between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
was the U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of
October 1962. On 27
October, the American destroyer USS Cony detected
the Soviet submarine B-59 and began
dropping sonar buoys as well as depth
charges in an effort to force the submarine to surface. Unbeknownst to
the
Americans for decades thereafter was the grim reality that the Soviet
submarine had nuclear torpedoes on
board with permission to fire
independent of authorization from Moscow. The B-59 had lost radio
contact
with the Soviet General Staff and did not know if war had already broken
out. According to a
contemporary interview with former Soviet junior
navigator Viktor Mikhailov who served aboard B-59,
the specific Soviet
signal for a submarine to surface was three grenade explosions in
the water.
However, the Americans dropped many depth charges, leading Mikhailov
to comment, “I don’t know what
the Americans were doing, but it wasn’t
three.”14 Faced with the
belief that they were under attack, Soviet Second
Captain Valentin Savitsky ordered the crew to assemble the
nuclear torpedo
for firing.15 Since any order to fire nuclear
torpedoes required the
agreement of three officers, the weapon was never fired due to the refusal of
Second
Captain Vasili Arkhipov to consent. The B-59 surfaced and returned
to the Soviet Union. A nuclear
exchange which would have led to general
and likely nuclear war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was narrowly
averted. This episode highlights the critical role of mutually understood
signals for ship-to-ship
communication, since the Soviet and American
navies employed different standards for signalling a submarine to
surface.
The impetus for U.S.–Soviet diplomacy on addressing incidents on and
over the high seas stems from a series of
increasingly hazardous episodes in
the 1960s. The incidents included dangerous maneuvers, close air
surveillance or “buzzing,” simulated attacks, accidental firing during
exercises, and other forms of harassment
such as illuminating the bridge of
another ship.16 Individual
incidents are too numerous to recount, but
specific examples of more egregious events will be detailed. In
January
1965, the Soviet vessel Kotelnikov harassed the USS Saratoga and the USS
Neosho in the western Mediterranean Sea while the American vessels were
being resupplied, nearly
colliding head-on with the Neosho.17 In March
1965, off
the coast of Rhode Island in Narragansett Bay, the Soviet trawler
Sverdlovsky intentionally harassed
ongoing naval exercises involving three
U.S. ships – the USS Courtney, the USS Hartley and
the USS Keywadin.
The Soviet vessel positioned itself in front of the American ships, forcing
the
latter to turn sharply to avert collision.18 In November 1965, in
an
incident dealing with conflicting interpretations of freedom of navigation, a
Soviet vessel circled the USS
Banner in Peter the Great Bay. The U.S.
rejected the Soviet claim that the Banner was
operating in Soviet territorial
waters.19 In June 1966, a
collision occurred between the Banner and the
Soviet AGI Anemometr in the Sea of Japan,
resulting in damage to the
Banner.20 In May 1967, two
destroyers, the USS Walker and the Soviet
Besslednyy, collided in the Sea of Japan while the
Walker was engaged in a
multi-vessel naval exercise, though neither vessel was seriously
damaged.21
Admiral Gorshkov said that the naval exercise was “a
deliberately
organized provocational military demonstration.”22
However, the
commanding officer of the Walker steadfastly maintained that the actions of
the
Besslednyy were premeditated due to visual evidence of preparation for
impact.23 After North Korea seized the American signals intelligence vessel
USS
Pueblo in the Sea of Japan in January 1968 in what the U.S. regarded
as international waters, the
Soviet vessel Gidrolog harassed the aircraft
carrier USS Enterprise on the high seas west of
Japan and interfered in its
response to the Pueblo.24 In
the period between January and February of
1968, the U.S. claimed 14 incidents of Soviet harassment of U.S.
vessels
near Japan with one collision occurring between the USS Rowen and
the
Soviet vessel Vislobokov.25 While numerous incidents
occurred from 1969
through 1972, there is no evidence of any involving ship collisions or loss
of life.
 The genesis of U.S.–Soviet negotiations over maritime and air incidents
was years in the making and the result
of American initiative. On 20 August
1966, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson wrote a
letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, expressing concern over
the increasing number of encounters
between American and Soviet
maritime forces and soliciting suggestions for a “broad approach” to
address these
issues.26 On 30 November 1966, Vance replied to Foy Kohler
(Johnson’s successor), suggesting that the U.S. try to broker an
understanding with the Soviet Union on surface
ship encounters.27 At that
time, Vance cautioned against
discussing aircraft-to-aircraft or aircraft-to-
ship contingencies.28 In February 1968, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Nitze suggested to Under Secretary of
State Nicholas Katzenbach that the
Department of State approach the issue of ship proximity with the
Soviets.29 The Soviets were not receptive despite two diplomatic
approaches in 1968 on potential discussions regarding incidents at sea.30
However, by 1969 perceived aggressive Soviet overflights of American
ships in the Sea of
Japan made clear the desirability of a bilateral air-to-ship
understanding in these waters.31 Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposal
came in November 1970 during a
meeting between Boris Klosson, Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and Georgy Korniyenko,
who directed the American desk at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Korniyenko told Klosson that
“‘competent organs’ of the U.S.S.R. were
prepared to accept our proposal to hold a bilateral meeting regarding
how to
avoid incidents at sea between the ships or involving the aircraft of our two
countries.”32 The Soviets envisioned that a naval officer would likely serve
as their
head of delegation, though civilians would also participate.33
Several days later, Korniyenko suggested a late March or early April 1971
meeting in Moscow.34
The U.S. Department of State was assigned to lead the inter-agency
working group for negotiation preparations,
but the Department of Defense
insisted that one of its representatives head the delegation since an admiral
was
leading the Soviet delegation.35 John W. Warner, then the Under
Secretary of the Navy (later Secretary of the Navy and a U.S. Senator), was
tapped as delegation leader, while
working group leader Herbert Okun of
the State Department became the deputy head of delegation.36 Frictions
between the Departments of Defense and State were avoided since
Okun
and Warner worked well together.37 Although working group
members
were encouraged by the Soviet willingness to talk and believed that the
Soviets were genuine in their
motivations to reduce operational risk, there
was some concern that the Soviets “might use the talks to expand
into
broader areas such as Law of the Sea.”38 Nonetheless, the
U.S. prepared
intensively for the upcoming talks.
The 10-member U.S. delegation team, primarily composed of naval
officers, arrived in Moscow in October 1971.
Apart from the prospect of
substantive dialogue, the visit was symbolic as “the highest-ranking U.S.
military
delegation to visit the Soviet Union since 1945.”39 The Soviet
delegation, led by Deputy Commander Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov,
“included the
second, third, fourth, and fifth highest-ranking officers of the
Soviet Navy.”40 Warner would agree to finalize the programme for the U.S.
delegation after his arrival and
allow the Soviets to cover the Americans’
expenses during their stay in Russia.41 Admiral Kasatonov in his opening
remarks “expressed hope the talks would reduce the chance
of armed
conflict at sea and serve as a step toward improving the overall relationship
between the two
countries.”42 From the outset, the Soviets saw the benefit
of
dialogue for conflict reduction and positive spillover effects for U.S.–
Soviet bilateral relations.
Motivations for Soviet acceptance of the talks became clearer when an
interpreter noted privately to an
American delegation member the
inexperience of the young Soviet officers commanding their incipient blue-
water
fleet.43 The potential for accidents was therefore greater. The
delegations split into surface and air working groups to discuss issues in
greater detail. During the talks on
12 October 1971, the forthcoming visit of
President Richard Nixon to Moscow was announced.44 This upcoming
presidential visit provided an added impetus to the
negotiations. Although
the Soviets strongly wished to introduce a fixed distance formula between
aircraft and
ships, the U.S. resisted largely due to the opposition of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.45 U.S. military leadership wished to preserve maximum
operational
flexibility. A final set of consultations between the U.S. and
Soviet delegations occurred in May 1972 in
Washington, D.C. prior to the
signing of the Incidents at Sea Agreement on 25 May 1972 at the Moscow
summit
meeting. Secretary of the Navy John Warner signed on behalf of the
U.S., while Admiral Gorshkov signed on
behalf of the Soviet Union. A
protocol to the INCSEA Agreement went into effect on 22 May 1973 which
“extends
some provisions of the 1972 agreement to nonmilitary ships.”46
The motivation for formulation of the INCSEA Agreement was
ultimately attributable to several factors.
Foremost, despite underlying
political motives, it was the mutual recognition by both the U.S. and the
Soviet
Union that large numbers of potentially dangerous air and maritime
incidents were unacceptable. Additionally,
both governments wished to
promote an atmosphere of cooperation during the Cold War as the political
situation
between the two countries began to improve with détente.
INCSEA represents what has been described by Alexander
George as an
issue of “peripheral security importance for which … the mutual
dependence of the superpowers is
tight.”47 As such, the core security of
each country was not
threatened, but a dangerous incident at sea could
nonetheless escalate into a more serious confrontation.

Motivations for strategic engagement (SCC)

A key component of the Cold War competition between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union was in the domain of nuclear
weapons. After the Soviet Union
conducted its first successful nuclear test in 1949, both countries engaged in
a nuclear arms race that continued unabated until the late 1960s and
beyond. In addition to expending extensive resources on building its nuclear
stockpiles, the U.S. was
mired in the conflict in Vietnam. By the late 1960s,
hundreds of thousands of American troops were fighting
Communist North
Vietnam, whose patrons included the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic of China. The Soviet
Union was simultaneously expanding its
nuclear arsenal and had reached near-parity in megatonnage with the U.S.
by the early 1970s.
In 1969, the U.S. and the Soviet Union embarked upon an attempt to ease
Cold War tensions, which became known
as détente. From 1969 to 1972,
the two superpowers engaged in diplomatic efforts to stem their nuclear
competition via quantitative and qualitative limits on deployment of
offensive as well as defensive systems.
These negotiations culminated in
the signing of multiple agreements at the May 1972 Moscow Summit
attended by
U.S. President Richard Nixon and Secretary-General of the
Soviet Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev. Foremost
among these
agreements were the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union Of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement
Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Certain Measures With
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, which collectively comprised SALT I. Although the
interim
offensive arms agreement had a five-year duration through 1977, the ABM
Treaty was of indefinite
duration.48
The motivation for the ABM Treaty, which pertained to defensive
weapons systems, was to diminish incentives for
deployment of additional
offensive nuclear weapons and by extension an arms race. Article XIII of
the ABM
Treaty created the Standing Consultative Commission.49 The
drafting process of Article XIII was not contentious since both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. acknowledged the
necessity for a mechanism such as the
SCC.50 The role of the SCC
was to discuss ongoing compliance and
verification issues, which are “central to treaty implementation and
viability.”51 The SCC was set up to meet primarily in Geneva at
least twice
per year, with each country represented “by a commissioner and a deputy
commissioner assisted by
such staff as is deemed necessary.”52 The U.S.
Commissioner, who
was accorded the rank of ambassador, was appointed
by a group consisting of the National Security Adviser, the
Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the C.I.A. Director, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.53
The U.S. Commissioner was typically a civilian,
although some were retired military officers. By contrast, the
two Soviet
SCC Commissioners through 1985 were active-duty military officers drawn
from the General Staff:
General-Major Viktor P. Starodubov and General-
Major G.I. Ustinov.54
Even though each session generally lasted several weeks at a time,
communication between commissioners was
ongoing in the period between
formal sessions. In addition to information exchange, the commissioners
were
permitted “to draw up procedures for dismantling or destroying
offensive and defensive weapons
systems.”55 For all intents and purposes,
therefore, the SCC
remained in session permanently.56 In effect, the SCC
constituted
“the most specific and continuing device for assessing and
reinforcing the viability
of strategic arms agreements …”57 It is important
to note that
SCC commissioners were not authorized to negotiate
independent of instructions from their respective
governments. The SCC
Commissioners were “on a tight rein from their capitals. Neither side is
empowered to
establish government policy or to go off and solve problems
on its own.”58 However, both countries regarded the SCC as a useful forum
for private conversations on
sensitive issues.59
The U.S. and the Soviets perceived SCC proceedings as mutually
beneficial, at least until 1980. From the
American perspective, the
administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy
Carter viewed the
SCC favourably and did not criticize its operations. U.S.
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (who was
concurrently serving
as Secretary of State) expressed his view that the purpose of the SCC
session was to
clarify “ambiguous” compliance issues in order to “bring
about corrective action.”60 American motivations for SCC participation
were succinctly captured in a declassified
internal memorandum from U.S.
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft:
In the US view, such an exchange of representatives would resolve both sides’ remaining
concern over these
launch facilities, contribute to confidence building between the sides, and
more importantly, strongly reaffirm
the mutual determination of the US and Soviet
governments to maintain the viability of the SALT
agreements.61

Despite the fact that the U.S. had a cooperative posture vis-à-vis the SCC,
the American goal of the
proceedings was to maintain parity with Soviet
nuclear forces “either in perception or reality” through
“adequately
verifiable” means.62 Although the U.S. expected that
the Soviet Union
might attempt to breach treaty terms, American officials believed that
“national security
would be weakened significantly more without a
treaty.”63 From
the Soviet perspective, the SCC constituted “an important
channel of government-to-government
communication.”64 The high
military rank of the Soviet
Commissioners was a manifestation of the
respect which the Soviets accorded to the forum.
 In summary, the primary motivation for establishing the SCC was to
foster the objectives of the ABM Treaty and
apply its terms.65 The SCC
was also charged with prolonging the
longevity of the ABM Treaty by
enabling it to propose future amendments, thereby maintaining relevance in
the
face of evolving technologic advancements. The SCC was thus a
significant tool of strategic engagement between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
during the Cold War and beyond.

Analysis of strategic engagement factors

Civil–military balance (INCSEA)

On the surface, the governmental structures of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could
not be more disparate. With the
U.S. as the acknowledged superpower
democracy versus the U.S.S.R. at the vanguard
of communism, the stage
was primed for conflict. The primary strategy of the Soviet Union during
the Cold War
was to expand its sphere of influence and project military
power throughout the world to the maximum extent
possible. The strategy
of the U.S. was to contain Soviet expansion and the spread of communism
and maintain
freedom of navigation on and over the high seas. Both
countries engaged in deliberate provocation during the
Cold War in order to
promote broader military and political objectives.
Despite the ideological differences between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, the fundamental civil–military
balance of the two superpowers was
quite analogous. In both systems, military officers were directly
subordinate
to the civilian leaderships which they served. Inherent in military actions of
both countries was
increasing harassment between their navies and air
forces which had the potential to escalate into a larger
military conflict
involving two nuclear superpowers. Controlling this conflict and reducing
incidents at sea
to a manageable level, however, was clearly in the best
interests of the security of both nations. The U.S.
in particular regarded
naval power as a primary tool for enforcing national policy. INCSEA did
not materially
alter American or Soviet national policy and strategy.
However, in the course of their naval expansions, both
countries desired to
minimize unnecessary conflict and expenditure of assets. In that sense,
INCSEA was quite
valuable, and served as an important tool in strategic
engagement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., two potent
adversaries during
the Cold War. American and Soviet naval officers who led their respective
INCSEA
delegations were circumscribed in their negotiating positions by
the guidance issued from their civilian
leadership.

Civil–military balance (SCC)

Due to the innately confrontational relationship between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, the
leadership of both countries had good
reason to be suspicious of the other’s motives, especially in the arena
of
strategic weapons systems. In addition, the U.S.S.R. and its Communist
system of government had an
inherent penchant for opacity. The ABM
Treaty and the resultant SCC represented a bold move by both countries
to
cooperate despite considerable differences and acrimony. The first stage of
the Cold War preceding 1969,
the date of the opening of U.S.–Soviet
strategic arms negotiations, was marked by a frenetic strategic arms
race to
build up ever-increasing numbers of warheads and delivery systems in an
effort to achieve supremacy
over the other side. However, two decades of
the American strategy of mutually assured destruction and the
Soviet
strategy of massive first launch “premised on intercontinental
preemption”66 led the U.S. and the Soviet Union to perceive the logic of
détente due to its potential
for mitigating endless economic expenditures
and the spectre of nuclear armageddon.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union had an inherent alignment in their civil–
military structures vis-à-vis
strategic engagement. Despite the inclusion of
political commissars in the Soviet
military system, U.S.–Soviet strategic
engagement featured military representatives with operational
experience,
all of whom answered to civilian leaders within a strict chain of command.
While major decisions
in the Soviet Union on foreign and defence policy
flowed largely from the Politburo of the Communist Party,
the American
system formulated policy based on a complex mosaic of competing
interests ranging from the
executive branch to Congress as well as the
media, the public, and military-industrial entities. Although
paranoia
regarding the Soviet Union was widespread in the U.S. at the height of the
Cold War, as evidenced by
McCarthyism, the Soviet Union possessed a
commensurate level of suspicion toward the U.S. As stated by Soviet
leader
Mikhail Gorbachev on 14 October 1986, “‘We also have quite an
experience dealing with the United
States. We know how changeable the
internal political weather is …’”67
Two governmental systems as disparate as the U.S. and the Soviet Union
were not natural cooperative partners.
Despite this, the superpowers
managed to broker the ABM Treaty. Without cooperative processes such as
the ABM
Treaty and the SCC, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would have
been more likely to fall prey to mirror imaging
and worst-case assumptions
about their counterpart. The extreme distrust between the U.S. and the
Soviet
Union increased the importance and value of face-to-face diplomacy
to clarify intentions and mitigate the
risk of nuclear conflict. Nonetheless,
the issues raised at SCC proceedings tended to be fairly “symmetrical”
due
to the contentious and sensitive topics addressed as well as mutual
suspicions.68 Despite the disparity in government systems between the U.S.
and the
Soviet Union, the two countries found regular discussions of arms
control compliance to be in their mutual
best interest.
Civil–Military Balance value: Positive

Quality of diplomatic interactions – INCSEA

An assessment of the quality of diplomatic interaction can be garnered
through an examination of available
INCSEA records. The 25 May 1972
signing of INCSEA was merely the beginning of a process of ongoing
diplomatic
engagement between the U.S. and Soviet navies. The INCSEA
Agreement provided for annual consultations (also
known as reviews)
under Article IX. These consultations, which continued to feature surface
ship and air
working groups, institutionalized the interactions between the
U.S. and Soviet navies. Although not formally
specified in the text of
Article IX, the annual reviews alternated between capitals, and
chairmanship of the
working groups rotated between the two delegations as
well.69
The American and Soviet heads of delegation did not directly
participate in working group sessions “in which
the detailed work of the
review is accomplished.”70 This
arrangement made clear the desirability of
appointing a surface ship commander to head the surface working
group
and a certified aviator to lead the air working group.71
Between
consultations, naval attachés exchanged incident information, as provided
under Article VII, a feature which allowed for a thorough investigation of
the circumstances surrounding a
given incident prior to discussion. A
detailed examination of internal U.S. government documents in the
lead-up
to and aftermath of annual review sessions provides critical insight into the
mutual impact of
private diplomatic interactions between the two countries.
The quality of the INCSEA process can be judged by the efficacy of
reduction in dangerous incidents at sea
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Detailed analysis of archival documents from annual INCSEA review
sessions
from 1973 through 1992 provides insight into specifics which
contributed to INCSEA’s longevity.
Working group meetings took place from 13 to 18 November 1972 in
Moscow, followed by the first annual review
in May 1973 in Washington,
D.C. The November 1972 committee of Soviet and American military
officers convened
in accordance with Article X of INCSEA, which required
a meeting within six months after the Agreement’s
signing primarily to
discuss the fixed distances issue. Preliminary discussion among the
committee members
regarding new signals and provisions for non-military
ships featured prominently at the 1973 annual review. A
limited agenda was
employed, which the U.S. judged to be a factor contributing to productive,
candid
discussion. Despite the fact that the original INCSEA Agreement
excluded discussion of limiting fixed
distances between ships, the Soviets
introduced this notion repeatedly from 1973 onward. This disagreement on
objective did not impair the functioning of this or any subsequent annual
review. Soviet attempts to elicit
agreement from the U.S. on fixed distances
did not succeed due to American concerns about freedom of the
seas, but
the U.S. did agree to study a Soviet proposal that would provide for fixed
distances “‘as a
rule.’”72 A positive outcome in 1973 was the decision to
introduce new communications signals beginning 1 August 1973. In
addition, the two delegations signed a
protocol on 22 May 1973 applicable
to non-military ships.73 By
signing the protocol, “the two nations basically
agreed not to make simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile
launchers,
torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships” and “not to launch
nor drop any objects
near non-military ships in a manner that would create a
hazard to ships or to navigation.”74 No further amendments or protocols
emerged in the following decades.
This stability in the terms governing
INCSEA attests to the durability of the INCSEA process.
A useful structural concept in the organization of the INCSEA reviews
was the establishment of separate
surface and air working groups. In line
with providing the expertise to lead these distinct working groups,
U.S.
Vice Admiral George Talley suggested to the Chief of Naval Operations
that Rear Admiral Linder chair the
air group, a role which he held at the
prior review session, and Captain Rawlins lead the surface group as he
had
for the previous three meetings.75 This provided stability,
an important
feature of the INCSEA review process. Vice Admiral Weinel, head of the
U.S. delegation, believed
that continuity in U.S. representation would both
increase American bargaining
power and assuage Soviet concerns about
frequent turnover of U.S. delegation members.76 A draft U.S. Memorandum
to the President in preparation for the talks
succinctly stated the primary
American goal for the 1974 review session, namely “to convince the
Soviets that
to date implementation has posed no significant difficulties and
has helped reduce provocative incidents.
Therefore, changes are neither
desirable nor necessary.”77 The
structural aspects of stability and continuity
proved to be critical for INCSEA’s continued operation.
A shared objective in the INCSEA Agreement related to interaction
between ships and aircraft. INCSEA did not
explicitly prohibit the behavior
of ships toward aircraft since this category of incidents was not
significant
enough in 1971 to warrant its own provisions.78 The
Soviets continued to
advocate for fixed distances between aircraft and ships, a position that
remained
anathema to the U.S.79 An important mutual objective of
INCSEA
was to codify the use of jointly agreed upon signals for ship-to-
ship communications. At the review session,
the U.S. and the Soviet Union
decided to implement Article VI of INCSEA more fully by recommitting
their
commanding officers to employ signals from the International Code of
Signals (ICS) as well as special
bilateral signals not covered by the ICS. In
an instruction issued to U.S. ship commanders, U.S. Chief of
Naval
Operations Admiral J.L. Holloway, III circulated the table of signals, which
had been in trial use
since August 1972, and directed that “commanding
officers will utilize the signals … to the maximum degree
possible to
indicate maneuvering intentions to Soviet commanding officers.”80
A shortcoming in the core objective of INCSEA to eliminate incidents at
sea relates to the failure to
establish guidelines applicable to submerged
submarines. This deficiency manifested itself in an incident
involving the
collision of the U.S. frigate USS Voge and a submerged Soviet Echo II class
submarine
on 28 August 1976, several months after the 1976 review
session. It exposed the limits of INCSEA by design in
addressing certain
naval contingencies and not others. The U.S. opted to contest the incident,
in which the
Soviet submarine was deemed to be at fault, outside the
INCSEA context, since utilizing INCSEA “could well
establish a precedent
for discussing submarine operations which we have successfully avoided
over the past
few years.”81 INCSEA deliberately confined its scope to
encounters between ships operating at the surface.82
Application of
INCSEA provisions to submerged submarines was raised again in 1981 by
the Soviets, which the
U.S. insisted was outside the remit of the Agreement
as well as the agenda.83 This subject was again brought to the table by
Soviet Admiral Navoytsev in
1982.84 Walters indicated that he was unable
to engage on that
topic, but would convey Soviet interest to the U.S. Chief
of Naval Operations.85 In this manner, INCSEA had well-delineated,
focused objectives, which positively
impacted the quality of the
interactions.
In spite of the contribution by INCSEA towards avoidance of dangerous
incidents at sea, hazardous incidents
did not entirely cease. At the May
1977 review, issues were raised including blocking/shouldering maneuvers
designed to prevent surveillance, gun training incidents on U.S. ships, and
unsanctioned actions after the use of special signals.86
Additionally, the
U.S. reported as alleged violations Soviet training of guns and other
armaments at U.S.
aircraft.87 In a demonstration that INCSEA was not rigid
in its
structure but amenable to modification, the Soviet delegation, which
was persistent in its pursuit of fixed
distance provisions, unsuccessfully
proposed in 1977 experimental application of these principles and
unilateral
implementation.88 The Soviets tabled an alternative
“‘minimum
surveillance distance’” approach whereby a ship would withdraw after
initial identification of the
other side’s ship, but the U.S. perceived similar
problems to the other fixed distance proposals.89 Despite inability to agree
on this point that was important to the
Soviets, the INCSEA process
allowed for ongoing dialogue to attempt to align objectives between the two
sides.
An important area of contention and disagreement in objectives involved
the distinction between international
waters and territorial waters. The U.S.
has consistently, with regard to all countries, only acknowledged the
12
nautical mile boundary of territorial waters as sovereign territory of another
nation, with all waters
beyond this limit regarded as open international
waters. In open international waters, the U.S. has asserted
rights of innocent
passage for its vessels. In 1982, an incident regarding this issue was raised
that
elicited mutual protest, involving a helicopter operating from the U.S.
frigate USS Lockwood in
Peter the Great Bay, which the U.S. regarded as
international waters and the Soviet Union deemed territorial
waters. During
the demarche in Washington with Soviet naval attachés, Vice Admiral
Foley objected to
the “I will destroy you” message transmitted to the
helicopter as a violation of the spirit of the INCSEA
Agreement, stating that
U.S. ships would continue to operate in coastal waters despite Soviet
suggestions to
restrict patrols.90 Admiral Navoytsev, in reply to the remarks
of Vice Admiral Walters about the USS Lockwood at the opening plenary,
said the Soviet ship warned,
not threatened, the U.S. frigate on the right to
employ weapons in accordance with Soviet laws regarding
violation of
territorial waters.91 However, Navoytsev requested
that the two delegations
discontinue discussions over territorial waters since Soviet Admiral
Gorshkov and
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Hayward, more senior
officers, had earlier settled the issue through a
prompt exchange of
information.92
In addition to the core mission of INCSEA to address dangerous
incidents at sea, an important, secondary
benefit was the channel it provided
for improving overall military-to-military relations. In a memorandum to
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for the
value of INCSEA as follows:
Since the INCSEA Agreement became effective, Soviet behavior at sea has changed for the
better. The number of
serious incidents between US and Soviet units has dropped
significantly, while other incidents have not
increased despite major increases in deployed
operations by both sides … The effectiveness of the Agreement
has resulted from a Navy-to-
 Navy relationship, unencumbered by publicity or
political processes, that survived events
such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shootdown of KAL
007.93

As previously mentioned, although the INCSEA process significantly

reduced serious incidents at sea, they
were by no means eliminated. At the
1985 review, Rear Admiral Kurth, as Chairman of the air working group
and
an officer associated with INCSEA since its foundation, chose to
highlight four incidents initiated by the
Soviets against the U.S. –
interference by Soviet aircraft with the flight pattern of an American carrier;
rocket fire from a Soviet aircraft near a U.S. naval vessel; firing of flares at
unarmed American
reconnaissance planes; and training of weapons at
unarmed helicopters.94 Soviet General Volkov, speaking on behalf of his
delegation, replied that the Soviet
Navy had taken corrective action for the
carrier incident.95
Additionally, measures would be taken to avert future
rocket fire incidents, though immediate notification
would prevent future
occurrences.96 While these incidents were
potentially serious, the Soviets
acknowledged responsibility and intended to take action to remedy the
situation. This is a manifestation of a positive outcome derived from
INCSEA. In fact, the two delegations
concurred that the period from 1983
to 1985 witnessed the greatest decline in incidents since the Agreement’s
inception.97 Admiral Navoytsev, in his closing remarks at the
1986 review,
emphasized the importance of continuity and careful implementation for the
success and future
viability of INCSEA, stating “we must make sure that
this work is conducted consistently and persistently
because life goes on,
commanders of aircraft, ships and formations change and the situation
becomes more
complex.”98
At the 1987 review, the U.S. articulated its opposition to the issues of
fixed distances between ships and
submerged submarines which were raised
consistently throughout the INCSEA reviews. The U.S. position paper in
preparation for this meeting articulated the rationale for consistent U.S.
opposition since 1972 to the
repeated Soviet insistence on fixed distance
provisions:
infringement on freedom of the high seas; inconsistent with the internationally recognized
Rules of the Road;
could be used by Soviets to more easily disrupt U.S. operations and
degrade our intelligence efforts; fixed
distance rules difficult to implement and unworkable
 when third country ships are also present; could lead to
undesirable acrimony over an
increased number of “incidents” with no attendant improvement in
safety.99

In addition to American opposition to fixed distance provisions, the U.S.

continued to oppose the Soviet
desire to include submerged submarines in
the Agreement. Such provisions would greatly disadvantage the U.S.,
whose submarines operated with greater stealth than their Soviet
counterparts.100 This demonstrates that despite cooperation between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the
Americans wished to maintain a tactical
advantage that their submarines offered.
The contested issue of right of passage in territorial waters recurred on 12
February 1988. The missile cruiser USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS
Caron knowingly
breached Soviet territorial waters as a demonstration of
their right of innocent passage.101 They were confronted by two Soviet
ships, the Bezzavetnyy and
the SKR-6, who radioed the American ships in
English to change course and depart Soviet territorial
waters. When the
American ships did not alter course, the Soviet ships collided with the
American
vessels.102 Though the damage to all four ships was minor, the
incident was nonetheless significant. While the U.S. knew that INCSEA
only applied to the high seas, the
Americans employed INCSEA channels
to protest the event since INCSEA was intended to avert naval
confrontations.103 It is important to note that the U.S.
vessels did not
accidentally stray into Soviet territorial waters but were ordered to do so as
a
demonstration of the U.S. freedom of navigation policy.
The subject of freedom of navigation in territorial waters was again
manifest in the Barents Sea on 11
February 1992, in an incident involving
the Russian Sierra class submarine B-276 Kostroma and the
U.S. submarine
Baton Rouge.104 A collision between the
two vessels was directly related to
different interpretations of the location of restricted waters. While the
U.S.
did not acknowledge Russian territorial claims beyond 12 nautical miles
from the coastline, the Russians
maintained that the U.S. submarine was
operating five miles within a line between Cape Tsyp-Navolak and
Kilgin
Island.105 This episode echoes multiple previous
incidents involving
conflicting interpretations of freedom of navigation. The issue of
permissible behaviour
within territorial waters remains unresolved and was
outside of the scope of INCSEA. This topic has
particularly important
repercussions for contemporary naval behaviour in other waters,
particularly as it
relates to China.
The naval encounters between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as
the annual INCSEA reviews informed on
perceived intentions of the
counterpart at a tactical level. While the use of signals by aircraft and
vessels
of both countries was not flawless, their correct employment
allowed naval operators to better understand the
purpose of actions on and
over the high seas. Failure to heed signals was an indication that harassment
or
hazardous maneuvers were deliberate rather than a result of
misunderstanding.
The comprehensive analysis of the annual INCSEA reviews proves that
the Agreement was effective in reducing
the number of serious incidents on
and over the high seas. This result was clearly in the best security
interests
of both countries. The incidents of the 1950s and 1960s at the height of the
Cold War, in which
loss of life occurred with unacceptable frequency, were
not replicated in the post-INCSEA period. Both
parties to the Agreement
adhered strictly to INCSEA throughout the 1970s. Alleged violations by the
U.S. and
the Soviet Union raised at the reviews remained quite low during
the first five years after INCSEA’s
implementation, a substantial reduction
vis-à-vis pre-INCSEA years. A spike in alleged Soviet violations from
1976
to 1977 and from 1977 to 1978 can be attributed to a U.S. decision to count
weapons and fire-control
radar directed at American ships as incidents.106
In the
aggregate, “the agreement has led to a dramatic decrease in the
number of
near-misses and collisions. Although occasional close encounters
still occur, both navies work to reduce
them.”107 It is important to note that
INCSEA presumes that
periodic incidents will transpire, but the accord
provides mechanisms for their adjudication and resolution.
A 1981 article
by Captain 1st Rank Valentin Serkov, a regular participant in the INCSEA
process, noted
positively the sharp reduction of serious incidents to the
point that “nowadays there are virtually no cases
which might lead to
dangerous consequences.”108 The 1973
protocol, which extended INCSEA
provisions to non-military ships, also served a security-enhancing function
since these vessels were less likely to be threatened by military assets of the
respective countries.
Increased adoption of the International Code of
Signals and special signals reduced the operational risk of
both navies.
 The stability and continuity provided by annual reviews which were
attended by high-level naval officers was
a critical structural element for the
long-term survival of INCSEA. Though improvement in overall
military-to-
military relations was not a core goal of INCSEA’s formation, it was
certainly an important and
valuable byproduct of the accord.
The enduring nature of INCSEA is a testament to the belief of the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. that the Agreement
promoted their mutual security
interests and served their respective objectives. Institutional inertia is not
sufficient to explain why the two countries continued to meet and exchange
information on incidents despite
the renewal of superpower tensions in the
1980s. The reviews served as a venue in which each country could
advocate
for their national objectives as practiced through naval power. The U.S.S.R.
was persistent at
various junctures in its desire to implement a fixed
distance regime, to extend INCSEA to non-military
aircraft, and to include
submerged submarines in the Agreement. While the U.S. was equally
insistent in its
resistance to all of these positions to preserve its naval
superiority and intelligence-gathering efforts,
both countries believed that
they could advance their respective security agendas. After the fall of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, INCSEA annual reviews
continued despite a markedly altered
geopolitical context. The considerable
reduction of incidents in the period following 1991 has transformed
INCSEA from a forum for dispute management and resolution to a platform
in which military-to-military
dialogue can be maintained.
A major factor contributing to the success of INCSEA was alignment of
objectives. The Agreement was mutually
beneficial to the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. According to Rear Admiral Hilton, who had served as head of the
U.S.
surface working group in four annual INCSEA reviews:
Neither country wants to have its valuable ships damaged by inadvertent or imprudent actions
of its naval
officers. Neither nation wants an incident at sea to escalate into a governmental
confrontation. It was this
mutuality of interest that led to the original negotiations and the
decision by both sides to sign such an
agreement. And it is this same mutuality of interest that
is the key factor in keeping the INCSEA Agreement
alive and well today.109

For several years in the 1960s, the U.S. envisioned the value of negotiating
INCSEA. The Soviets, by accepting the American proposal, acknowledged
the risk of an incident escalating into
a more widespread conflict. Lynn-
Jones has suggested that the risk that “a naval incident could provoke a
major conflict leading to a nuclear exchange between the United States and
the Soviet Union” was
“unlikely.”110 However, history has shown that this
risk was in
fact very real, as proven by the previously described revelation
of the B-59 Soviet submarine
episode during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It
was unknown whether aircraft or ships were carrying nuclear
weapons
throughout and beyond the Cold War.
It is notable that despite the alignment of core objectives, there were
several contentious issues which have
never been resolved. The Soviet
delegation consistently advocated for establishing a fixed distance formula
between ships, which the U.S. steadfastly rejected. The U.S.S.R.
additionally wanted submerged submarines
included in the Agreement. As
discussed, the U.S. rejected this as well, feeling that they had a tactical
advantage in terms of stealth of their submarines relative to those of the
Soviets. The third issue, which
will be discussed again in the U.S.–China
chapter, deals with freedom of navigation and the right of innocent
passage
within the 12 nautical mile territorial waters zone. Notwithstanding these
three disputed concerns,
the overall positive alignment between the
strategic goals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relative to INCSEA
was
predictive of a high degree of efficacy in strategic engagement.
INCSEA had a limited, well-defined purpose with achievable objectives.
Its primary goal was improved safety
of navigation. The Agreement did not
attempt to regulate the quantity or quality of naval forces. George
Fedoroff,
the sole long-term participant in the INCSEA Review process, noted in an
interview that the
Agreement “provided a mutually desired and acceptable
straightforward practical solution to definable
real-world operational issues.
It did not overreach its goals and was not ambiguous in its proposed
actions.
These qualities have allowed it to stand the test of time.”111

Quality of military-to-military interaction under INCSEA

Though INCSEA represented a breakthrough in U.S.–Soviet military
relations, the U.S. at the outset wished to
circumscribe the nature of
bilateral military interaction due to the high Cold War tensions prevailing
between the two sides. A proposed address in 1973 by Admiral Alekseyev,
leader of the Soviet delegation, to
the U.S. Naval War College was deemed
inadvisable by the Secretary of Defense since he felt that “for the
time
being, we should not escalate the level or quality of contacts between the
U.S. and Soviet
military.”112 The Soviet delegation was composed of six
military officers and one civilian adviser.113 The American
delegation, led
by Vice Admiral J.P. Weinel, had nine members, all but one of whom were
military
officers.114 Despite potential unease regarding predominantly
military-to-military interaction, the delegations remained dominated by
naval officers throughout the INCSEA
process. In response to an inquiry by
the U.S. defence attaché office in Moscow “as
to mood in which subject
talks were conducted and as to our impressions of the Soviet participants,” a
representative of the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations said the discussions
were “conducted in a spirit of
professionalism and good relations.”115
Admiral Alekseyev “was
cordial and forthcoming.”116 Since this cable was
circulated
solely within the U.S. military, it can be taken as a credible
indicator of private impressions.
A U.S. Department of State memorandum summarizing the results of the
1978 review emphasized the significance
and possible spillover effects of
ongoing INCSEA consultations. As “the only formal high level recurring
mechanism for US-Soviet military discussions … INCSEA discussions
serve as a useful and apolitical
professional forum for both sides and have
the potential of being an index of military-to-military
relationships.”117 The
INCSEA process was therefore a rare
opportunity for regular consultation
between the U.S. and Soviet militaries unavailable through other
channels.
At the 1979 meeting, the efficacy of military-to-military interaction was
manifest in discussions regarding
an incident involving the USS South
Carolina and Soviet vessels. The Soviets criticized dangerous
U.S.
maneuvers near its ships.118 While the U.S. delegation
conceded that the
USS South Carolina should not have remained in proximity to the Soviet
ship for
such an extended time, the U.S. did not believe that the South
Carolina behaved
hazardously.119 Although special signals continued to be
useful
in incident prevention, the U.S. and Soviet delegations reached
consensus that further measures to acquaint
officers with the signals and
encourage their frequent use would clarify intentions and allow both sides’
ships to operate with a reduced chance of an incident.120 Once
again, a
potentially inflammatory incident was dealt with quietly and professionally
between naval officers.
After the conclusion of the 1983 annual review, U.S. Vice Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Ronald J. Hays,
in a letter to Senator John Warner,
attributed the success of the INCSEA Agreement to its navy-to-navy
character from formulation to execution as well as “the common experience
of seagoing naval professionals
…”121 At the 1984 session, Admiral
Navoytsev conveyed to Lyons
how INCSEA leaders who were fleet officers
were best equipped to address incidents quickly and quietly. The
1984
annual review was tense due to the prior 1 September 1983 downing of
Korean Air Lines flight 007 by a
Soviet fighter jet. At this review, the
delegations reached greater consensus on outstanding challenges and
the
Soviets recognized that the KAL 007 search and salvage operations had
undermined the INCSEA
Agreement.122 Vice Admiral Lyons told Watkins
that the Soviets
wished to resume cooperation with the U.S. and that the
tone of the review reflected this spirit.123 Connections forged between the
heads of delegation were evident from
their correspondence. The ability of
INCSEA to calmly deal with a very volatile issue is a tribute to the
positive
value of direct military-to-military interaction as a crisis management tool.
INCSEA proved to be a most effective military-to-military channel for
resolution of
disputes. In September 1985, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral Lyons related to U.S.
Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Watkins the challenge posed by simulated attacks on the aircraft
carrier
USS America by Soviet jets armed with anti-ship missiles.124 While
a comparable episode occurred in 1984 with a simulated Soviet attack on
the USS
Kitty Hawk in which acquisition radar was not activated, it was
unclear whether radar was activated
in the USS America episode.125 Lyons
expressed concern
over the danger of simulated attacks and believed that
INCSEA channels were the most appropriate method for
protest.126
As an unexpected benefit, INCSEA improved the overall military-to-
military relationship between the two
countries’ navies. These sentiments
are echoed by George Fedoroff:
The purpose of INCSEA was to increase the safety of close interactions between the naval
ships and military
aircraft of the US and USSR/Russia. INCSEA institutionalized
 communications means that would directly convey
intentions at the tactical level and thereby
minimize ambiguity and misunderstanding of observed
maneuvers.127

Naval attachés acted as the channel for information exchange and discussed
the incidents in detail at the
annual review meetings. Reporting violations
through the naval attaché channel as provided by INCSEA rather
than
standard diplomatic channels with demarches was a more direct and
effective means of communication. This
modality provided greater
operational impact. Displeasure expressed between civilian diplomats
would not
necessarily ultimately translate into behavioural changes by
naval commanders and their personnel. Since the
naval attachés liaise with
technical experts at their headquarters, the likelihood of a positive outcome
is
enhanced. Even when other high-level communication channels might be
strained due to political tensions, the
naval attaché communications
established by INCSEA would remain intact. Since other military service
branches
did not possess analogous mechanisms for military-to-military
communications with their Soviet counterparts,
the navy-to-navy link under
INCSEA was unique. It additionally served the broader end of cultivating
improved
military-to-military relations.
The military-to-military character of INCSEA featured representation
from the highest levels of the
respective navies, both possessing robust
command structures. Warner noted that the strong chain of command
within
the Soviet military meant that “decisions went up and down … with utmost
care and
deliberation.”128 The U.S. could have confidence that
agreements
reached with their Soviet counterparts at annual reviews would be honoured
since senior officers
would direct their subordinates to comply.
Additionally, naval officers have a camaraderie borne of a global
seafaring
culture irrespective of language or nationality.
In summary, direct military-to-military interaction established between
the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. with INCSEA was essential to the effective conduct
of defence diplomacy. INCSEA was dominated by
naval officers from its
outset, and virtually all of the participants from its formation onward were
military
officers. At the time of its formation, INCSEA represented the sole
high-level venue for continuous
U.S.–Soviet military dialogue. Throughout
the years, naval attachés were employed rather than utilizing
standard
diplomatic channels. This avoided political interference with ongoing
dialogues. Understandings
reached at INCSEA meetings by high-level
naval officers were carried out promptly and effectively without
requiring
numerous intermediaries, which is typical of civilian diplomatic practice.
The net result for the
factor of military-to-military interaction was strongly
positive.
Quality of Diplomatic and Military-to-Military Interaction – INCSEA
value: Positive

Quality of diplomatic and military-to-military interactions – SCC

As in the INCSEA examination, an assessment of the quality of diplomatic
interaction can be similarly
established through an examination of available
SCC records. The document creating the SCC establishes the
core
framework of the Commission “while leaving considerable discretion to the
two delegations on how the SCC
shall actually operate.”129 This left both
delegations with
flexibility as to the conduct and content of the
proceedings. There was minimal turnover for both countries
at the
Commissioner level. As evidence of this, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
each only had three
Commissioners for the period from 1972–1986.130
Additionally,
the “U.S. component” and the “U.S.S.R. component” (as per
internal SCC nomenclature) consisted of civilian
and military personnel “all
with a high level of relevant experience, competence, and
professionalism.”131 The stability and composition of the
delegations
contributed to their effectiveness.
Public evaluations of the performance of the SCC were generally positive
under the presidential
administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and
Jimmy Carter, but abruptly changed in a negative direction
under President
Ronald Reagan, a staunch opponent of Communism and the Soviet Union.
Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, who served presidents Nixon and
Ford, stated in testimony to the Senate Arms Services
Committee in 1975,
“‘We believe that the Soviet Union has been, and today is, in compliance
with the terms of
the SALT agreements’” and viewed compliance issues as
“‘ambiguities’” rather than violations.132 The U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency’s (ACDA) representative
to the SCC in 1976, Dr.
Carnes Lord, related in a personal interview a positive evaluation of SCC
efficacy:
“I would say the SCC was reasonably effective. There was a
problem-solving attitude on both sides and a
minimum of game-playing by
the Soviets … this reflected the focus on issues that were largely technical
rather than political.”133 Dr. Lord also noted that the small
size of the U.S.
and Soviet delegations to the SCC reduced structural difficulties
that
otherwise might have arisen.134 On the U.S. side, the
delegation consisted
of single representatives from the ACDA, the Department of State, the
Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
and a chairman/commissioner from the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The Soviet chair was typically a two-star general. In addition, he recalled
that
“contact between the delegations occurred fairly frequently and
informally.”135 Limitations noted by Dr. Lord “usually related to
bureaucratic wrangling between parent
agencies. There is nothing to be
done to improve that.”136
Overall, these comments reflect positively upon
the performance of the SCC during the 1970s.
In spite of these relatively optimistic comments regarding the SCC in
open testimony, declassified internal
U.S. government documents from
1975 authored by Henry Kissinger (concurrently serving as National
Security
Advisor and Secretary of State) reflect a less sanguine assessment.
U.S. officials in 1975 had uncertainty
regarding the dismantlement of
Soviet ABM launchers as well as “concealment activities.”137 Specifically,
the U.S. National Security Council under the leadership
of Henry Kissinger
and Brent Scowcroft felt that “such activities undermine the viability of
existing arms
control agreements and could create a major impediment to
the verification of national technical means of
present and future arms
control agreements.”138 The U.S.
Department of State under President
Carter reaffirmed a positive assessment of the SCC in 1979, maintaining
that “‘in every case [of a questionable practice raised by the U.S. in the
SCC] the activity has ceased, or
subsequent information has clarified the
situation and allayed our concern.’”139 By contrast, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Perle, while serving President
Reagan in the 1980s,
characterized the SCC in an extremely negative light:
I have put emphasis on the failure of the SCC to resolve compliance concerns because
previous
Administrations, in efforts to sell unverifiable arms control agreements to Congress,
 have created a virtual
mythology about it. The fact of the matter is that serious compliance
problems have generally not been
resolved by the SCC or in any other manner.140

A comprehensive two-year review of U.S.–Soviet arms control progress

culminated in an April 1985 meeting at
the Carter Center in Atlanta,
Georgia which included discussions of the SCC. Panels at the programme
included
experts from multiple countries, including the Soviet Union.141
Appraisals of the SCC to that point were mixed. These included a negative
review by David Jones, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
indicated that “the Standing Consultative Commission is not
working very
well now …” partly owing to failure to ratify SALT II (although the U.S.
and Soviet Union agreed
to abide by the terms of SALT II).142 By contrast,
positive
assessments were provided by Ralph Earle II, former Director of
the ACDA and Chief U.S. Negotiator for SALT
II, and Dr. Kenneth
Adelman, Director of the ACDA under President Reagan. According to
Earle, compliance
issues “in general … have been dealt with satisfactorily
…” in the SCC.143 Adelman concurred regarding the utility of the SCC,
stating that “the
SCC has been a useful device to better understand the
positions of the United States and the Soviet
Union.”144 While no
participant in the conference regarded the
SCC as a panacea, there was
consensus that the SCC was a significant component of U.S.–Soviet
strategic
engagement.
The SCC had several distinguishing characteristics which lent themselves
to in-depth discussion of ABM Treaty
compliance. The long duration of
SCC sessions as compared to standard diplomatic meetings was notable.
For
instance, the September 1975 SCC session lasted for four weeks in
Geneva.145 Additionally, both parties felt comfortable addressing sensitive
and significant arms
control issues in the SCC. In a declassified top secret
memo from Henry Kissinger, the important issue of
Multiple Independently
Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) was addressed: “the conversion of
launchers which
contain MIRVed missiles to unMIRVed launchers should
be permitted only under procedures agreed in the
SCC.”146 The SCC forum
allowed for both parties to address
issues in a non-threatening setting with
the goal of pre-emptively defusing contentious issues.
The SCC had some notable achievements which made the forum more
than merely a talking shop. At a June 1974
SCC session, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union agreed upon protocols regarding Procedures Governing
Replacement,
Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification. These
protocols, which were signed by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on 3 July 1974, dealt with two
issue areas. The first
issue pertained to offensive systems, namely “the
replacement of certain older ICBM launchers and launchers
on older
submarines by ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines …”147 The
second issue involved establishing “procedures for the dismantling or
destruction
of weapons systems and components in excess of those
permitted by the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement.”148 Subsequently
in 1976, an additional protocol was
arrived at which “codified means for
facilitating and speeding the transmission of immediate notifications …”
pursuant to the 30 September 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the
Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War.149
Although the longevity of the SCC should not be seen as a virtue in and
of itself, the forum endured despite
downturns in overall U.S.–Soviet
political relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Five-year reviews of
the ABM Treaty were held within the context of the SCC meetings of 1977
and 1982. The 21 November 1977 Joint
Communique produced after the
first review acknowledged that “the treaty was operating effectively, that
the
SCC consultations during the five-year period had been productive and
useful in promoting understanding,
working out procedures, and resolving
issues …”150 While the
1982 review did not result in a communique, the
1982 Annual ACDA Report to Congress indicated that “‘each
party
reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty and to
the process of consultation
within the framework of the SCC.’”151 In
summary, “the legacy
for the SCC will be the duty of dealing with intricate,
changing, and often
contentious problems of treaty interpretation and
application.”152 Given the adversarial nature of U.S.–Soviet relations during
the Cold War, the SCC was
successful in helping to uphold the integrity of
the ABM Treaty.
Quality of Diplomatic and Military-to-Military Interactions – SCC value:
Indeterminate
Political impact upon strategic engagement efforts – INCSEA
Favourable political conditions both within the U.S. government as well as
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
were integral to the initial adoption of
INCSEA. In addition to détente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
President Richard Nixon was in office and the Secretary of Defense was
Melvin Laird. Nixon served in the U.S.
Navy during World War II and
Laird was a deck officer on a destroyer in the Pacific Ocean. According to
Warner, “they were men who understood ship life … they knew it was
compelling to get this done.”153 Nixon travelled to Moscow in May 1972
for a summit meeting with Soviet
Premier Alexei Kosygin and the timing
was opportune to sign INCSEA. In October 1971 in Moscow, at the
exploratory meetings to negotiate an INCSEA Agreement, U.S. head of
delegation John Warner regarded his
deputy Herbert Okun of the State
Department as “an absolute full partner. There was a total sharing of
information.”154 A smooth working relationship prevailed
between the two
during the negotiations. Warner was cognizant of the “built-in, combative
relationship
between the Department of Defense and the Department of
State” and felt that “interagency cooperation was
vital” for the success of
the negotiations.155
Reduction of dangerous incidents at sea was clearly to the mutual benefit
of the governments of the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., both in diminishing the
hazard of armed conflict which could potentially escalate, as well as
sparing
costly damage to military assets. Having limited, focused, and achievable
objectives is important in
effective strategic engagement. The fact that
political conditions and support of leaders were favourable to
the formation
of INCSEA was invaluable in its establishment.
Despite obvious difficulties, INCSEA largely insulated itself from
political considerations from the outset
through its implementation over the
subsequent four decades. The U.S. would use the 1974 review as an
opportunity to emphasize the navy-to-navy channel as a “quick and
effective means of exchanging information
…” that would “promote better
mutual understanding and rapport between both Parties.”156 The direct
military-to-military channel, separated from political
interference, proved to
be efficient. In the 1977 review, it was noted that a positive atmosphere
insulated
from the broader political relationship prevailed.157 Despite
the
poor state of U.S.–Soviet political relations at the time of the 1978 review,
air working group
proceedings maintained professionalism, were devoid of
political discussion, and were “almost
conciliatory.”158 Soviet cooperation
became evident when
air group head Major General Vichinsky retracted
portions of a Soviet position
paper before full U.S. consideration in
anticipation of American dissatisfaction with its
provisions.159
At the 1979 annual review, the Soviet delegation accepted responsibility
in the air working group for an
incident that occurred just days before on 15
May 1979 involving two Soviet IL-38 aircraft interfering with
the flight
operations of the carrier USS Midway.160
The U.S. delegation believed that
the incident was inadvertent and not politically motivated after the Soviet
delegation members expressed their intention to instruct Soviet airmen to
comply more strictly with the
provisions of the Agreement and avoid such
hazardous maneuvers in the future.161 This incident and the positive Soviet
response to it reflect acknowledgment of the
separation of military-to-
military interactions from political events.
The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan placed a severe
strain on U.S.–Soviet relations, which
prompted U.S. consideration of
delaying or cancelling the annual review meeting. However, the U.S.
Department
of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and
the National Security Council, decided that “the
INCSEA Agreement was
useful to us and worth preserving and that we should not give the Soviets
(who have
consistently sought to modify the Agreement) any basis for
renegotiation …”162 As in 1978, the U.S. declined the temptation to allow
politics to derail the INCSEA
Agreement and the review process. Despite
the decision to continue participation, the U.S. government
insisted that the
delegation “maintain a lower profile than past years …” by curtailing social
activities and
declining trips beyond Moscow.163 U.S. government legal
opinion
deemed Vice Admiral S.R. Foley’s recommendation that the U.S.
postpone the meeting for 90 days “ill-advised”
since the Soviets could
claim that the U.S. violated the Agreement by declining to attend the review
meeting.164 The Assistant Secretary of Defense told Foley that
delay could
imperil the Agreement, establish a negative precedent, and invite a Soviet
legal
challenge.165
 The inauguration of ardent anti-Communist President Ronald Reagan in
January 1981 and the collapse of détente
at the end of the presidency of
Jimmy Carter were the backdrop to the Ninth Annual Navy-to-Navy
Review Talks.
The U.S. Department of Defense nonetheless continued to
perceive the value in conducting the talks since they
provided the sole
forum to interact with the Soviet military. The U.S. Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy
made the case to the Secretary of Defense when he
stated that “with senior level naval delegations
representing both sides,
these meetings are unique as they are the only institutionalized link we have
with
counterparts in the Soviet military.”166 Further, the Agreement
had led
to a reduction in incidents and could serve as a worthwhile instrument in
future U.S.–Soviet
contingencies.167
The ongoing Soviet military action in Afghanistan as well as a perceived
unhelpful Soviet reaction to the
American hostage situation in Iran were the
immediate sources of U.S.–Soviet tensions at the 1981 review. In
a
departure from the apolitical nature of discussions at INCSEA review
proceedings, Soviet delegation members aired their downcast impressions
of U.S.–Soviet relations with
their U.S. Navy counterparts.168 The Soviets
believed that the
U.S. was responsible for decreasing the intensity of
bilateral interaction and wished to establish more
robust contacts as well as
improve the relationship.169 The
U.S. distancing itself from the Soviets was
a way to indicate displeasure over Afghanistan and impose a cost
on bad
behaviour.170
At the time of the May 1982 review, representing the tenth annual
meeting, bilateral political relations
continued to be strained by an ongoing
crisis in Poland where Soviet intervention was a possibility.
Nonetheless,
the U.S. Department of State recommended that the consultations proceed
with the limitations put
in place since the 1980 review, which included a
five-day programme (instead of ten), limited outside travel,
and minimal
social functions.171 In a letter to U.S. naval
attaché Captain Coulbourn, Vice
Admiral Foley, who had served as U.S. Chairman of the 1980 and 1981
reviews,
provided important insights on the INCSEA review process in
which he expressed concern about maintaining its
vitality in the midst of
travel restrictions. Foley suggested that an alternate venue such as Newport,
Rhode
Island could reinvigorate the reviews, which were at risk of
stagnation that would “adversely impact the
efficacy of the Agreement.”172
The downturn in U.S.–Soviet
political relations since 1979 meant that the
ongoing interaction between the U.S. and Soviet navies
constituted “one of
the few working contacts between the two countries.”173 While senior
Soviet delegates communicated their wish to reinstitute travel beyond
capitals during the INCSEA reviews, U.S. delegates suggested that
improved bilateral relations would enable
the resumption of trips.174
Fedoroff believed that the relaxed
setting afforded by travel outside the
context of the formal working group sessions in capitals facilitated
casual
conversations between delegation members.175 The two
American delegates
from the U.S. Department of State commented that the Soviets “seemed
unusually intent on
ensuring a positive atmosphere for the review talks
…”176 The
Soviet delegates presented their positions calmly and did not
excessively dwell on contentious
topics.177 There was no discussion of
arms control, political
issues, or the potential repercussions of conflict in
the Falkland Islands for the two navies.178
A memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at the
1984 review on political signals
emanating from INCSEA talks correctly
pointed out that “viewed historically, INCSEA has always been something
of a special case within the larger context of U.S.–Soviet relations.”179
Though nuclear weapons negotiations were stalled, the Soviet political
leadership was
willing to engage in “low-level, low visibility contact which
works to their perceived advantage …” such as
INCSEA.180 INCSEA
provided a venue for tackling less
controversial problems before dealing
with larger issues such as nuclear weapons.
The greatest test of efforts to insulate INCSEA reviews from overall
political relations came in 1985. To
date, no INCSEA review had been
cancelled or postponed. On 21 February 1985, the U.S. proposed to the
Soviets
a week-long review session and opened the possibility of an
excursion beyond Washington.181 The U.S. meant to signal a thaw
in the
earlier deterioration of relations with the Soviets arising from events in
Afghanistan. However, the
24 March 1985 shooting by Soviet soldiers of
U.S. Army Major Arthur B. Nicholson while he was serving on
observer
duty in East Germany prompted Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to
request reparations and an
elimination of social contacts.182 Weinberger was
intransigent
in his opposition to entertaining the Soviet delegation. While
denying that his position reflected
“‘punishment’” of the Soviets, he
maintained that festivities would be inappropriate in light of the Major
Nicholson affair.183 The Soviets declined the revised American
invitation
since the proposed schedule did not contain a social programme.184 Soviet
Minister-Counsellor Oleg Sokolov told Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mark
Palmer in Washington that the U.S. “gave far-fetched motives for
these changes which have nothing to do with
the objectives of the
consultations and are completely unacceptable.”185 The U.S. administration
recommended that the INCSEA review must not be cancelled, but
issuance
of a new invitation should await an appropriate interval of time to allow for
possible resolution of
the Nicholson incident.186 They believed that the U.S.
should
dissociate INCSEA from the Nicholson matter, as “INCSEA should
stand alone because it affects the safety of
our ships and forces at sea.”187
The risk of continued linkage
was the stalling of INCSEA talks, which
served a vital function.
As mentioned in an internal paper to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for the 1985 review, the
Soviets had employed INCSEA mechanisms
to raise non-INCSEA issues removed from political channels.188 For
example, although the Agreement only covered actions on the high
seas, the
Soviets raised violations of territorial sea limits via INCSEA.189 Fedoroff
stated, “INCSEA in no way addressed, or was intended to address, political
or
policy issues.”190
On the twentieth anniversary of the INCSEA Agreement in 1992, the
U.S. and Russian (now the Commonwealth of
Independent States, or CIS)
delegations met in Moscow. It is vital to recognize that INCSEA survived
the
transition from the U.S.S.R. to the CIS. The INCSEA process has
consistently strived to insulate itself from
ongoing political tumult. Of
significant interest is the fact that, according to Fedoroff, “the 2014 review
did not occur due to scheduling difficulties and delays obviously related to
the Ukraine crisis.”191 This is similar to the circumstances of 1985, in
which the death of
Major Nicholson prompted a delay of the review. It is
therefore apparent that, despite attempts to segregate
the military-to-
military dialogue of INCSEA from the political arena, this has not been
entirely successful.
 Exclusion of the U.S. Congress from the negotiating process was
instrumental in forging the Agreement. INCSEA
was not a treaty, and as
such, did not require U.S. Senate approval or have any ongoing legislative
oversight. Were the formulation of INCSEA approached as a treaty
negotiation, it might have been delayed or
never implemented.
The fact that INCSEA reviews were conducted entirely between career
naval officers allowed the process to
continue even when bilateral political
relations deteriorated. Neither delegation attempted to use INCSEA for
political gain. As previously noted, one of the few instances in the history
of
INCSEA when the annual review did not occur on schedule was in 1985,
when Secretary of Defense Weinberger
insisted that the U.S. withdraw the
social programme due to the Nicholson affair, a matter totally unrelated
to
INCSEA. That annual reviews proceeded in the midst of inauspicious
political relations indicates that
strategic engagement can achieve some
degree of independent momentum. Nonetheless, military and political
processes cannot be fully decoupled.
In summary, the metric of separation from politics proved to be a critical
component leading to the success
of INCSEA as a tool of defence
diplomacy. Since INCSEA was not formulated as a treaty, it did not require
public debate and congressional approval. Therefore, INCSEA was rarely
politicized and was intended to be an
operational construct with focused
goals. None of the individuals involved in formulating INCSEA sought any
notoriety or political gain from its success. Since naval officers are not
elected officials, they answer to
their governments and not to constituents or
special interest groups. The annual working groups themselves
were largely
devoid of political discussions despite periods when the U.S. and the Soviet
Union were in
significant conflict with each other. INCSEA notably
survived unscathed through the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the current tensions involving
Ukraine, the
durability of INCSEA was put to the test. As of recently, the
2014 annual review had been delayed; the status
of the 2015–2019 reviews
is unknown. The net result for the metric of separation from politics is
almost
completely positive.
Political Impact upon Strategic Engagement Efforts – INCSEA value:
Positive
Political impact upon strategic engagement efforts – SCC
The SCC was established as a diplomatic institution designed to ensure
compliance with the ABM Treaty. While
U.S.–Soviet political dynamics
continued unabated throughout the Cold War, policymakers hoped that the
SCC
could be insulated to some degree from the periodic conflict that
engulfed the two nations. Since the SCC
lacked powers of enforcement and
sanctions, the success of the body depended on mutual support from U.S.
and
Soviet leaders.192 The SCC was not empowered to operate or make
decisions independent of national governments. SCC commissioners could
collaborate well “given proper
instructions, high-level political support,
problem-solving tactics, and sound bilateral relations
…”193 Nonetheless,
the three Soviet and American commissioners
who served until 1985 were
“all non-political and with professional backgrounds and competence.”194
Each SCC delegation is a proxy for its political leadership, “acting
according to instructions and reporting fully their formal and informal
discussions.”195 Pursuant to this, the U.S. Commissioner must adhere to his
negotiating
instructions from Washington but maintains discretion in terms
of negotiating tactics to achieve the desired
goals.196 In a parallel fashion,
the Soviet Commissioner must
receive authorization from Moscow but
proved amenable to cooperate on compliance
issues after obtaining
appropriate permission.197
Assessments of the efficacy of the SCC in the U.S. varied depending on
the prevailing political leadership.
For instance, under presidents Ford and
Carter, tests of Soviet SA-5 radar installations were not regarded as
ABM
violations. President Carter, as a proponent of the SCC, stated that “the best
way to address an alleged
violation is not to go public with it, not to have a
political confrontation, which in effect, damages the
prospects for
cooperation and arms control, but to take it first to the Standing
Consultative
Commission.”198 Carter recognized the value of discreet
diplomatic channels to resolve issues rather than open, contentious political
disagreement. For the period
spanning 1972 to 1980, which corresponded to
the détente era, the administrations of presidents Nixon, Ford,
and Carter
approved of the SCC.199 A 1979 internal Carter
administration report on
compliance determined that the SCC succeeded in resolving the matters that
came
before it.200
By contrast, under President Reagan, the administration had a disdainful
view of the SCC from the outset.
Shortly after Reagan’s inauguration in
January 1981, the scheduled spring 1981 SCC session was postponed
until
later in the year. In the interim, officials “debated whether or not to use the
forum, and avoided
appointing a U.S. delegation.”201 In fact, from 1981 to
1985,
SCC sessions largely featured the recitation of opposing talking
points and did not lead to significant
progress on bilateral compliance
issues.202 Some Reagan
administration officials were deeply critical of
Soviet SA-5 radar tests, alleging that such tests were
blatant violations of
the ABM Treaty.203 Beginning in 1984,
Congressional reports on
compliance concluded that “the atmosphere in the SCC has been
confrontational, not
cooperative.”204 The Soviet Union was angered by the
public
nature of the accusations regarding SCC deliberations.205 The
most
damning public indictment of the SCC came in 1985 from Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Perle in a
memorandum which stated: “Far
from resolving disputes over compliance, the SCC has become a diplomatic
carpet
under which Soviet violations have been continuously swept, an
Orwellian memory-hole into which our concerns
have been dumped like
yesterday’s trash.”206 However, others
under Reagan perceived the utility of
SCC discussions in addressing allegations of Soviet noncompliance. The
former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr.
Kenneth Adelman, believed that compliance
concerns “should be handled
in the SCC or in the diplomatic channels.”207 Despite the overall negative
attitude of the Reagan administration toward the SCC,
there were notable
outliers who supported its activities.
Attempts to maintain SCC continuity and function in the face of political
turmoil were generally effective.
In 1983, SCC discussions continued
despite Soviet withdrawal from deliberations on strategic and
intermediate-
range nuclear forces.208 The SCC channel remained
operational even during
downturns in U.S.–Soviet political relations. Nonetheless, the robustness of
the
SCC tended to track closely the status of bilateral U.S.–Soviet ties. As
succinctly
stated by the first SCC Commissioner Sidney Graybeal:
 While the SCC is somewhat more insulated from the ups and downs of superpower relations,
it has not been
immune from them. But when political relations between negotiating partners
deteriorate to the point where
intentions toward existing treaty obligations are called into
question, the SCC cannot be an effective,
problem-solving forum. If and when bilateral
relations improve and both superpowers clearly signal their
desire to reaffirm existing SALT
commitments, the SCC can again resolve difficult compliance
problems.209

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dissolution
of the Soviet Union, the SCC and
similar arms control fora assumed a less
prominent role in international affairs. However, the SCC served a
stabilizing function during the tense Cold War era. The communications
mechanism that it provided on arms
control issues was a useful tool of
strategic engagement.
Political Impact upon Strategic Engagement Efforts – SCC value:
Indeterminate

Role of secrecy in strategic engagement – INCSEA

The candid discussions which occurred during the INCSEA reviews were
an important parameter for the overall
role of INCSEA in furthering
strategic engagement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.. Vice Admiral D.S.
Jones,
Chairman of the U.S. delegation, stated in his opening remarks at the
1985 review dinner that INCSEA “is an
example of a specific, well defined
agreement that can enhance the security of the parties and contribute to
a
more stable peace … INCSEA has become an important – albeit highly
specialized – forum for face-to-face
meetings at which frank talk can
occur.”210 At the 1986 annual
review, the two delegations discussed the
increased robustness of the navy-to-navy channel of communications
provided for in Article VII of the INCSEA Agreement. In addition to
serving as an efficient mode of
addressing incidents, the channel was being
employed for transmission of messages of goodwill. The U.S. also
viewed
INCSEA as a valuable conduit for conveying confidential messages to the
Soviet Ministry of
Defense.211 Prior to the adoption of INCSEA, there were
no open
and ongoing communication links between the U.S. and Soviet
militaries at the working level. As a result of
INCSEA, “regular,
professional contact has been established between representatives of the
two
navies”212 and “both delegations have noted the mutual effort
of the
two sides to implement the agreement.”213 The discretion
which INCSEA
afforded enabled the candid exchange of views between U.S. and Soviet
representatives.
The benefits accrued from communications at annual reviews were
enhanced by the relative veil of secrecy
surrounding the entire INCSEA
process. In an effort to keep the proceedings out of the public eye, the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs expressed
in a
memorandum to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense that “it
is hoped that the conference will be
given the least possible coverage by the
media.”214 In fact, as
a testimony to the low profile that INCSEA assumed
in the media, a June 1983 press conference marked the
first public
announcement since the 1972 signing regarding the INCSEA Agreement.
At this briefing, U.S.
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. lauded the
benefits of the Agreement in reducing the number of
serious incidents to
one or two annually, a marked decrease from the 1960s and early 1970s.215
Lehman attributed the positive trends and success flowing from the
Agreement to the practical consultations which resulted in mutual, safety-
enhancing changes in operating
behaviour when legitimate complaints
arose.216 In 1985, U.S.
Navy Commodore Robert Steele explained to Rear
Admiral Sakulkin, the Soviet naval attaché in Washington, that
American
media interest in the U.S.–Soviet discussions required a general response to
the press, but promised
that the U.S. would attempt to shield the discussions
from undue public scrutiny by withholding specific
details of the review.217
In addition to the importance of
communication between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., there was a continued belief in the desirability of keeping
U.S.
allies, particularly NATO member states such as France, informed of the
progress of INCSEA discussions.
In addition to dispelling notions of a
“‘superpower condominium,’” the U.S. could impart useful lessons to
France, given increased French deployments of aircraft carriers and other
vessels to the Mediterranean, which
would place them in more frequent
contact with Soviet ships.218
Maintaining a low profile during the INCSEA process contributed to
productive discussions. The negotiations
leading up to the signing of
INCSEA as well as the annual reviews thereafter were conducted in a
discreet
manner with a minimum of press coverage. According to John
Warner in a personal interview with the author,
“INCSEA will quietly do its
own thing despite tumult.”219 Since
media was strictly controlled in the
Soviet Union, it was much easier to regulate dissemination of
information
to the public. The U.S. side made a conscious effort to refrain from detailed
media briefings
about the INCSEA reviews.
Even in the midst of political upheaval, such as the Soviet military action
in Afghanistan throughout the
1980s, the Soviet Union seemingly desired
“to start to set our relationship back on the pre-Afghanistan
course …,” as
the INCSEA review session was one of the “few avenues open to them for
sending such a message
…”220 However, the U.S. would not be very
receptive to a rapid
warming of relations since recent Soviet actions had a
profound impact on American perceptions of the Soviet
Union.
In summary, establishing effective and reliable yet discreet
communication between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
by virtue of INCSEA
was a powerful tool in the effective conduct of strategic engagement. The
communication
links established by INCSEA represented the first of their
kind between the American and Soviet militaries at
the working level. They
were beneficial not only to addressing ongoing incidents at
sea, but also had
a secondary value of conveying messages of goodwill between the two
countries. This served
as an additional confidence-building measure. By
keeping the entire INCSEA process at a low profile with
minimal media
attention, public scrutiny was averted and governmental interference,
potentially for political
benefit, was avoided.
Role of Secrecy in Strategic Engagement – INCSEA value: Positive

Role of secrecy in strategic engagement – SCC

Cold War diplomacy was complicated by the inherent opacity and
secretiveness of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. The U.S.–Soviet
nuclear arms race and the global struggle for spheres of influence only
further
accentuated dynamics of mistrust. In this context, the SCC, which
was established to monitor compliance with
the ABM Treaty, had at its core
a requirement for secrecy due to the sensitivity of the topics discussed. As
pointed out by Commissioner Robert Buchheim, who served as SCC
Commissioner from 1976 to 1981, “on technical
weapons issues of
considerable security sensitivity to one or both sides, the privacy
requirement has on
occasion enabled a degree of plain talk that is difficult
for both the United States and the Soviet Union,
but particularly for the
latter.”221 Research on the SCC is
complicated by the fact that “the detailed
records of SCC sessions remain closed to all but those with the
proper
clearances and the ‘need to know.’”222 As a result of
the confidentiality
clause, “there is no published record or unclassified history of SCC
activities.”223 The sessions themselves as well as all
documents and
discussions emanating from SCC meetings were highly classified.224
While the SCC was a confidential forum, it was not entirely a black box
for outsiders. As stated in the
Standing Consultative Commission
Regulations, “the proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission
shall
be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may
not make its proceedings public except with
the express consent of both
Commissioners.”225 However, the
U.S. Commissioners often explained to
their Soviet counterparts that the American system of government
required
keeping the public and Congress apprised of SCC actions in a general
fashion, resulting in the
occasional release of “limited summaries.”226 An
internal
declassified U.S. government document by Henry Kissinger from
September 1974 emphasizes that “privacy of the
SCC negotiations and the
avoidance of leaks must be maintained.”227 A subsequent Kissinger
document authored prior to the 1975 SCC session instructs the
U.S.
Commissioner to place the blame for any leaked information on the press
rather than on American
officials.228 The evolution in U.S. internal
guidance to the
SCC Commissioner stems from repeated Soviet objections
to restricted public disclosure of SCC proceedings.
Secrecy was a common objective in the SCC despite the changes of
presidential administrations, though its
maintenance proved difficult at
times. Prior to the Reagan presidency, “even the common understandings
reached by the SCC in the early 1970s were not made public.”229
By
contrast, during the first term of the Reagan administration (1981–1985),
“compliance problems became so politicized that the entire debate was
taking place in the public arena,
outside the SCC.”230 Despite the
downward trajectory of
U.S.–Soviet relations in the 1980s during the
Reagan presidency, the overall confidentiality of SCC
proceedings
prevailed out of mutual respect for the terms of the agreement. The SCC
provided an arena for
free and open discussion to deliberate upon important
arms control issues largely outside of public scrutiny.
Role of Secrecy in Strategic Engagement – SCC value: Positive

Lessons garnered from U.S.–Soviet strategic engagement

The decades-long enmity which prevailed between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union in the Cold War era provides an
ideal backdrop for studying strategic
engagement efforts. Analysis of the various components of U.S.–Soviet
strategic engagement during this period yields multiple inductively derived
factors. The two case studies
selected for evaluation are INCSEA and the
SCC, both of which were formed during détente yet endured the
dissolution
of the Soviet Union and beyond.
Despite the gross misalignment in regime type between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, similarity of goals on
important issues proved sufficient to
motivate enduring strategic engagement efforts. In the case of INCSEA,
both countries were concerned about loss of life and military assets through
inadvertent maritime incidents.
With the ABM Treaty and the associated
formation of the SCC, both superpowers acknowledged the heightened risks
of nuclear proliferation and potential nuclear miscalculation. Mutual self-
interest was sufficiently powerful
to overcome differences between the
democratic and communist orientations of the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
respectively. In addition, the universal military culture which most INCSEA
and SCC representatives shared was
a powerful force toward overcoming
otherwise insurmountable obstacles to cooperation.
The quality of the diplomatic and military-to-military interactions
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in
the context of INCSEA and the
SCC was surprisingly favourable given the acrimonious nature of the Cold
War.
There are important lessons to be derived from each case study. In the
case of INCSEA, review sessions served
an adjudicatory function for
dispute resolution. By contrast, the SCC was not empowered to resolve any
issues
of arms control compliance, but instead provided a forum for airing
concerns. INCSEA’s success relative to the
indeterminate nature of the SCC
may be attributable in part to its conflict resolution function. In terms of
behavioural and operational consequences of INCSEA, participants
consistently claimed that the process led to a
decrease in the number of
serious incidents at sea. As far as the SCC is concerned, “on occasion,
discussion in
the SCC was followed by changes in the behaviour that had
provoked the complaint.”231 For INCSEA and the SCC, their efficacy is
ultimately dependent upon whether both parties
perceive the value of the
agreements. One of the most important positive aspects
which INCSEA and
the SCC shared was the nearly continuous nature of the dialogue between
the parties on issues
which fell under their remit. This was particularly
important during times of hostility when other channels of
communication
did not exist.
INCSEA and the SCC both revealed a powerful lesson on the importance
of diminishing the impact of politics upon
strategic engagement efforts. In
the case of INCSEA, it was not established as a treaty and therefore was not
subject to Congressional approval or oversight. Furthermore, most of the
INCSEA participants were career
military officers who sought no political
gain from their work. This provided a direct military-to-military
communications link largely insulated from outside political meddling.
Under the SCC, reports to Congress were
only issued in a curtailed
summary form with no details revealed. This also diminished the prospect
of
political meddling. Given the ups and downs of U.S.–Soviet relations
since 1972, it is highly doubtful that
either INCSEA or the SCC would have
survived had they not been insulated from politics.
Secrecy was a valuable and common thread throughout the history of
INCSEA and the SCC. In both cases,
proceedings were kept out of the
public eye and media coverage was at an absolute minimum. Minutes of
INCSEA
review sessions and SCC deliberations were never disseminated
and information about their activities was on a
need-to-know basis only.
This quality enabled members in both fora to feel comfortable speaking
freely. Absence
of media attention and governmental meddling removed
pressure from the participants, enabling them to
communicate with
complete candour.

Notes
 1    The formal title is “Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Incidents on
and Over the High Seas.” The full text can be found at www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm or in
Appendix 4.
2    See https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm for text of ABM Treaty, specifically Article
XIII.
3    David F. Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea: The
History of the INCSEA Concept (Halifax,
NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2008),
p. 11.
4    Ibid., p. 63. Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov was the Admiral
of the Fleet of the Soviet Union.
5    “Soviet Fliers Fire on U.S. Airplane Over Baltic Area,”
New York Times, 12 April 1950, p. 1;
Box 2, Series I: Subject 1950–1988, Papers of David F. Winkler,
Operational Archives Branch,
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. [hereafter, Papers of DFW].
6    See “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
Special Electronic Airborne Search
Operations,” 5 May 1950, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 2, Series I: Subject
1950–1988,
Papers of DFW.
7    “Soviet Attack on U.N. Plane Reported by U.S.,”
Department of State Bulletin, 3 December
1951, p. 909, Box 3, Series II: Subject 1950–1988, Papers of
DFW.
8    “Text of Soviet Note of December 31, 1954 to the United
States,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, Box 1, Series I, Subject 1950–1988, B-50 folder, Papers of
DFW.
9    A.M. Rosenthal, “U.S. Seeks
Action by World Court on Downed Plane,” New York Times, 11
September 1954, p. 1; Box 3, Chronological,
1945–1992, Siberian coast incident 4 Sep 1954
folder, Papers of DFW.
10    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 37.
11    “Unresolved Soviet-Related Cold War Losses,” Box 1,
Series I: Subject 1950–1988, Papers of
DFW.
12        “Soviet Presses ‘Buzzing’ Charge,” New York
Times, 17 July 1960, p. 4, Box 2, Series I:
Subject 1950–1988, RB-47 folder, Papers of DFW.
13    Osgood Caruthers, “Soviet Downed U.S. Plane Lost on
Arctic Mission; 2 Survive, Face Spy
Trial,” New York Times, 12 July 1960, p. 1; Box 2, Series I,
Subject 1950–1988, RB-47 folder,
Papers of DFW.
14    The preceding information on the USS Cony and
Soviet submarine B-59 is drawn from a 2012
documentary entitled “The Man Who Saved the World.”
Available at
www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/the-man-who-saved-the-world-watch-the-full-episode/905/
15    “16. Recollections of Vadim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59),
‘We Will Sink Them All, But We
Will Not Disgrace our Navy,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
No. 75,
William Burr and Thomas Blanton (eds.), October 31, 2002.
16        Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in
Alexander L. George, Philip J.
Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation:
Achievements, Failures,
Lessons (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 482–483.
17        “Subject: United States Protest Note on Soviet Harassment
to United States Ships in
Mediterranean,” Department of State to American Embassy Moscow, 26 February 1965, Box
3, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1965 folder, Papers of DFW.
18    “Subject: U.S. Protest Note on Soviet Harassments to U.S.
Naval Ships,” Department of State
Airgram, 5 April 1965, Box 3, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1965
folder, Papers of
DFW.
19    “USS Banner Incident,” Outgoing Telegram, U.S.
Department of State, 18 November 1965,
Box 3, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1965 folder, Papers of DFW.
20        “Subject: Collision of Soviet Vessel with the USS
Banner,” U.S. Department of State
Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1966, Box 3, Series II,
Chronological, 1945–1992,
1966 folder, Papers of DFW.
21    John W. Finney, “A U.S. Destroyer in Far East Bumped by
Soviet Warship,” New York Times,
11 May 1967, p. 1, Box 3, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1966
folder, Papers of DFW.
22    The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XIX, no.
20: 18–19.
23    “Statement by CDR McClaran, CO Walker, During Collision
with DD022/DDGS 025,” Box 3,
Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, Winkler Folder 2 1967, Papers of DFW.
24    “Subject: Note to MFA Concerning Buzzing Protest and
Incidents at Sea,” Department of State
Airgram to AmEmbassy Moscow, 9 April 1968, Box 3, Series II,
Chronological, 1945–1992,
1968 folder, Papers of DFW.
25    “Subject: Encounters between US and Soviet Ships Near
Japan,” 12 March 1968, Box 3, Series
II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1968 folder, Papers of DFW.
26        Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis
Johnson to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Cyrus R. Vance, 20 August 1966, Box 3, Series II, Chronological,
1945–1992, 1966
folder, Papers of DFW.
27    Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to
Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy
Kohler, 30 November 1966, Box 3, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1966
folder, Papers
of DFW.
28    Ibid.
29    Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze to
Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, 1 February 1968, Box 3, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1968
folder, Papers of DFW.
30        Letter from Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Nitze, 16 August 1968, Box 3, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1968
folder, Papers of
DFW.
31    Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard to Secretary
of State William Rogers, 26 August
1969, Box 3, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1969 folder, Papers of DFW. A draft
paper from
Packard to Rogers about a possible U.S. agreement with the Soviets regarding air and naval
activities in the Sea of Japan contained three key points for discussion: “a. ships and aircraft of
one nation
will not operate in dangerous proximity to the ships or aircraft of the other nation in
such a manner as to
create an impression of hostile intent and thus a possible hazardous
situation. b. The right of ships and
aircraft to close for identification purposes is recognized;
however, the ship or aircraft initiating the
surveillance should maneuver in a manner that will
neither embarrass nor endanger the ship or aircraft being
identified … c. Once the
identification procedure is complete, the ship or aircraft initiating the procedure
should break
off. Prolonged close accompaniment on the high seas, in the absence of a clear reason therefor,
is
not justifiable.”
32        “Subject: Incidents at Sea Meeting,” U.S. Department of
State Telegram from American
Embassy, Moscow to Secretary of State, 10 November 1970, Box 4, Series II:
Chronological,
1945–1992, 1970 folder, Papers of DFW.
33    Ibid.
34    Ibid.
35    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 85.
36    Ibid., p. 88.
37    Author’s interview with John W. Warner, 14 March 2014,
Washington, D.C.
38    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 89.
39        Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 487.
40    Ibid.
41        “Incidents at Sea Talks: Administrative Arrangements,”
Department of Defense National
Military Command Center Message Center, 29 September 1971, Box 6, Series III,
Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1971, Papers of DFW. The U.S. side would cover the expenses
of the Soviet
delegation for follow-up discussions in Washington, D.C.
42    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 104.
43    Ibid., p. 109.
44        Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 487.
45    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 123.
46        Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 490.
47       Alexander L. George, “Incentives for U.S.-Soviet Security
Cooperation,” in George, Farley,
and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 646.
48    Philip J. Farley, “Strategic Arms Control, 1967–87,” in
George, Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 216.
49    The text of Article XIII is as follows (https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm#text):
“1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties shall establish
promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of
which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and
related
situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to
assure confidence in
compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of
verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the
provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or
their components in cases
provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this
Treaty; including
proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic
arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,
Regulations for the Standing
Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and
other relevant matters.” (See Appendix 5.)
50    Sidney N. Graybeal and Michael Krepon, “Making Better Use
of the Standing Consultative
Commission,” International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 184.
51        Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, p.
257.
52    Ibid., p. 255.
53        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 185.
54    Ibid., p. 186.
55    Ibid., p. 184.
56        Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, p.
255.
57    Ibid., p. 257.
58        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 185.
59       Antonia Handler Chayes and Peter Doty (eds.),
Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM
Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.:
Perhamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 51.
60        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC), for SCC Session on Compliance Issues,” National Security Decision
Memorandum
283, 25 January 1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision
Memoranda,
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
61        “Subject: Instructions for US Commissioner, Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC),
Geneva,” National Security Decision Memorandum 323, 31 March 1976, Box 1,
National
Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
62        “Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks Geneva,
September 18, 1974,” National Security
Decision Memorandum 271, 24 September 1974, Box 1, National Security
Advisor Study
Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
63        Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle
(eds.), Modelling and Analysis in
Arms Control (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1974), p. 379.
64        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 186.
65    Sidney N. Graybeal and
Patricia Bliss McFate, “Assessing Verification and Compliance,” in
Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty (eds.),
Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM
Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (New York:
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 193.
66        Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1987), p. 50.
67    Philip J. Farley, “Strategic Arms Control, 1967–87,” in
George, Farley, and Dallin, U.S.-Soviet
Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New
York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 246.
68    Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in Alexander L.
George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 260.
69        On rotating working group chairmanships, see “Air Working
Group Report,” 14 November
1985, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of
DFW.
70        “Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject:
Incidents at Sea Agreement
(INCSEA) Annual Review,” Vice Admiral George C. Talley, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Plans and Policy), 1 February 1974, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1974,
Papers of DFW.
71    Ibid.
72    “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,” 29 November
1972, p. 7, John P. Weinel, Jr., Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chairman, US
Delegation, Incidents
at Sea Meetings, Box 5, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, Nov-Dec 1972 folder, Papers
of
DFW.
73        “Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the
High Seas,” Box 5, Series II,
Chronological, 1945–1992, 1973 folder, Papers of DFW. The full text of the
Protocol can be
found at www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm or in
Appendix 4.
74    “U.S., USSR sign pact at Ft. McNair,” The Pentagram
News, 24 May 1973, p. 3. Box 5, Series
II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1973 folder, Papers of DFW.
75        “Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject:
Incidents at Sea Agreement
(INCSEA) Annual Review,” Vice Admiral George C. Talley, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Plans and Policy), 1 February 1974, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1974,
Papers of DFW.
76    Ibid.
77    “Subject: Second Annual Review of US-USSR Agreement on
Prevention of Incidents On and
Over the High Seas,” Department of State Staff Director Brandon Grove, Jr. to
NSC [National
Security Council] Under Secretaries Committee, 26 April 1974, p. 1, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1974, Papers of DFW.
78        “Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Talks,” CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] to USDAO [U.S.
Defense Attaché Office] Moscow, 24 May 1973, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA
Agreement 1973, Papers of DFW. While not technically violations, “such actions are
considered contrary
to the spirit and intent of the Agreement.”
79    Ibid.
80        “OpNav Instruction 23301, Subj: Special Signals for use
between United States and Soviet
Ships,” Chief of Naval Operations, 11 July 1974, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1974, Papers of DFW.
81        Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Eugene V.
McAuliffe to The Honorable George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State, 2 September 1976, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1976, Papers of DFW,
82    “Subject: Collision with
Soviet Submarine,” Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow,
11 September 1976, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1976, Papers of
DFW.
83    “Subject: U.S.-US-Soviet Incident at Sea Talks,”
Department of State Memorandum, 9 June
1981, Robert K. German to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Box 6, Series III,
Annual Review of
INCSEA Agreement 1981 folder, Papers of DFW.
84        “Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject:
Tenth Annual Review of
U.S./U.S.S.R. INCSEA Agreement,” 28 May 1982, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA
Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
85    Ibid.
86    “United States Government Memorandum. Subject: INCSEA
Agreement Review,” OP-616 to
AdHoc Study Group on INCSEA Agreement, 9 February 1977, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1977, Papers of DFW.
87    “United States Position Paper, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Annual
Review of the Agreement on Prevention
of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Moscow, May 1978,” p. 11, Box 6,
Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1978, Papers of DFW.
88    Ibid., p. 3.
89    Ibid., p. 4.
90    “Subject: Soviet Navy Response to Message Re: INCSEA
Agreement,” Naval Message, Navy
Department, CNO to USDAO Moscow, 8 May 1982, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review
of
INCSEA Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
91    “Memorandum for the Record, Subject: INCSEA Meeting 24–27
May 1982,” Department of
the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 3 June 1982, Box 6, Series III,
Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
92    Ibid.
93        “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
Reactivating the Incidents at Sea
(INCSEA) Agreement Annual Review,” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 7, Series
III, Annual
 Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
94        “Air Working Group Report,” 14 November 1985, Box 7,
Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
95    Ibid.
96    Ibid.
97    “Subject: U.S.-USSR Incidents at Sea Meeting,” Lou
Michael to Dr. Ikle and Mr. Perle, Box 7,
Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of
DFW.
98        “Second Plenary Session, 0930–1200, 11 June 1986,” Box 7,
Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA Agreement 1986 folder, Papers of DFW.
99        “United States Position Paper, U.S.-USSR Fifteenth Annual
Review of the Agreement on
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Washington, June 9, 1987,” Box 7,
Series
III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1987 folder, Papers of DFW.
100    Ibid.
101        Letter to The Honorable Phil Gramm from J. Edward Fox,
Assistant Secretary of State for
Legislative Affairs, 5 April 1988, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement
1987 folder, Papers of DFW.
102    “Text of Adm Makarov Izvestiya Interview,” 14 February
1988, CINCUSNAVEUR to SecDef,
JCS, and CNO, Box 1, Series I, Subject 1950–1988, Black Sea Incident 1988 folder,
Papers of
DFW.
103        “Subj: Soviet INCSEA Violations,” 12 February 1988, CNO
to USDAO Moscow, Box 1,
Series I, Subject 1950–1988, Black Sea Incident 1988 folder, Papers of DFW.
104    “Subj: U.S., Russian Naval
Experts Meet in Moscow, Moscow ITAR-TASS in English,” 21
May 1992, Box 6, Series II, Chronological 1945–1992,
1992 folder, Papers of DFW.
105        John H. Cushman, Jr., New York Times, 19
February 1992, A6, p. 19, Box 6, Series II,
Chronological 1945–1992, 1992 folder, Papers of DFW.
106    Winkler, Preventing Incidents at Sea, p. 150.
107        William L. Ury, Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis
Control Can Prevent Nuclear War (New
York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 78.
108    Captain 1st Rank V. Serkov, “Practice in Preventing
Incidents at Sea,” Selected translations
from Morskoy Sbornik, Soviet Naval Digest, Naval Intelligence
Support Center for Naval
Intelligence Command, Issue No. 5, 1981 (translated December 1981), p. 80.
109    Robert P. Hilton, “The U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea
Treaty,” Naval Forces 6, no. 1: 37.
110        Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents at Sea Agreement,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-
Soviet Security Cooperation, p. 492.
111    Author’s e-mail interview with George Fedoroff, 5
January 2015.
112    “Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Subject: Visit by
Chairman, Soviet Incidents at Sea
Delegation,” Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International
Security Affairs, Box 5, Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992, 1973 folder, Papers of DFW.
113    “Action Memorandum for Mr. Eagleburger, Subject:
Incidents at Sea Conference,” William J.
Schoning, Major General, USAF, Director, Policy, Plans and NSC
Affairs, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Box 5, Series II,
Chronological, 1945–1992, 1973 folder, Papers of DFW.
114    “Subject: Incidents at Sea Talks,” 9 May 1973, Box 5,
Series II, Chronological, 1945–1992,
1973 folder, Papers of DFW.
115        “Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Talks,” CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] to USDAO [U.S.
Defense Attaché Office] Moscow, 24 May 1973, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA
Agreement 1973, Papers of DFW.
116    Ibid.
117    “Memorandum. Subject: 1978 US-USSR Incidents at Sea
Review,” Captain J.E. Burgess, USN
to Mr. Gelb, June 14, 1978, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1978
folder, Papers of DFW.
118    “Memorandum for Vice Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN.
Subject: Surface Ship Working
Group Report on 1979 US-USSR Incidents at Sea Annual Review,” p. 2, Robert P.
Hilton, Rear
Admiral, U.S. Navy, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1979 folder,
Papers of
DFW.
119    Ibid.
120    Ibid., p. 3.
121    Ronald J. Hays, Admiral, U.S. Navy to The Honorable John
W. Warner, 25 May 1983, Box 7,
Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1983 folder, Papers of DFW.
122        “James D. Watkins, Admiral, U.S. Navy to Admiral Thomas
B. Hayward, USN (Ret.),” 20
July 1984, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1984 folder, Papers
of
DFW.
123    Ibid.
124        “Subj: INCSEA,” 22 September 1985, CINCPACFLT to CNO,
Box 7, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
125    Ibid.
126    Ibid.
127    Author’s e-mail interview with George Fedoroff, 5
January 2015.
128    Author’s interview with John W. Warner, 14 March 2014,
Washington, D.C.
129        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making
Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985):
184.
130    Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in Alexander L.
George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 256.
131    Ibid.
132        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): p. 187.
133    Personal e-mail interview with Dr. Carnes Lord,
Professor of Strategic Leadership and Director
of Naval War College Press, U.S. Naval War College, 27 February
2017. Note that efforts to
interview additional participants in the SCC were complicated by the fact that many
of its
leaders have either passed away (i.e. former Commissioners Sidney Graybeal, Robert
Buchheim, and Philip
Farley) or did not respond to interview requests (Manfred Elmer, Paula
DeSutter, Col (Ret.) Robert Bartos,
Stanley Riveles, Rose Gottemoeller, Ambassador Steven
Steiner, James Timbie, and Sven Kraemer).
134    Ibid.
135    Ibid.
136    Ibid.
137        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commissioner
(SCC), Geneva, March 24, 1975.” National Security Decision Memorandum 290,
26 March
1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald
R. Ford
Presidential Library.
138        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC), for SCC Session on Compliance Issues.” National Security Decision
Memorandum
283, 25 January 1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision
Memoranda,
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
139        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 187.
140    Ibid.
141        Ellen Propper Mickiewicz and Roman Kolkowicz (eds.),
International Security and Arms
Control (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. ix.
142    Ibid., p. 68.
143    Ibid., p. 81.
144    Ibid., p. 105.
145        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC),
Geneva, September 22, 1975.” National Security Decision Memorandum 307, 25
September
1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald
R. Ford
Presidential Library.
146        “Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva,
January 31, 1975.” National Security
Decision Memorandum 285, 6 February 1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor
Study
Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
147    Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in Alexander L.
George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 258.
148    Ibid.
149    Ibid.
150    Ibid., p. 259.
151    Ibid.
152    Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in Alexander L.
George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 263.
153    Author’s interview with John
W. Warner, 14 March 2014, Washington, D.C.
154    Ibid.
155    Ibid.
156    “United States Position Paper, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Annual
Review of the Agreement on Prevention
of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Moscow, May 1974,” p. 5, Box 6,
Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1974, Papers of DFW.
157    “Fifth Review of the US-USSR Agreement on Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High
Seas, Washington, D.C., May 1977,” p. 8, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of
INCSEA
Agreement 1977, Papers of DFW.
158    “Memorandum for Vice Admiral P.J. Hannifin, USN. Subj.:
1978 US-USSR Incidents at Sea
Review,” Rear Admiral D.G. McCormick, USN, Director, Aviation Programs Division,
Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1977 folder, Papers of DFW.
159    Ibid.
160        “Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Subject: U.S./USSR Incidents at Sea
Agreement,” R.L.J. Long, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations
(Acting), 4 June
1979, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1979 folder, Papers of DFW.
161    Ibid.
162        “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:
Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Annual
Review Talks,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, Box 6, Series
III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1980 folder, Papers of DFW.
163    Ibid.
164    “Memorandum for Captain E.J. Melanson, Subject: Navy
Proposal to Postpone the Conference
Scheduled in Accordance with the Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the
High Seas (INCSEA Agreement),” 30 April 1980, M.J. Cifrino, Office of the Associate
General
Counsel for Intelligence, International and Investigative Programs, Department of
Defense Office of General
Counsel, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement
1980 folder, Papers of DFW.
165        “Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Subject: Soviet Violations of the
INCSEA Agreement,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, Box 6,
Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1980 folder, Papers of DFW.
166        “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Subject: US-USSR
Agreement on Prevention of
Incidents at Sea-Decision Memorandum,” Franklin D. Kramer, Under Secretary of
Defense for
Policy (Acting), 4 March 1981, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1980
folder,
Papers of DFW.
167    Ibid.
168        “Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Subject: Dinner Conversation with
Soviets on Tuesday, 2 June 1981,” 2 June 1981, Box 6, Series III, Annual
Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1981 folder, Papers of DFW.
169    Ibid.
170    Ibid.
171        “Subject: Forthcoming Navy-to-Navy Incidents at Sea
Talks,” Department of State Action
Memorandum, 23 April 1982, Richard R. Burt and H. Allen Holmes to The
Secretary, Box 6,
Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
172    S.R. Foley, Jr., Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy to Captain
Samuel W. Coulbourn, USN, U.S. Defense
Attaché Office, American Embassy, 14 December 1981, Box 6, Series III,
Annual Review of
INCSEA Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
173    Ibid.
174    Ibid.
175    Ibid.
176    “Subject: U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Review,”
Department of State Information
Memorandum, 2 June 1982, Jonathan T. Howe and H. Allen Holmes to The Acting
Secretary,
Box 6, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1982 folder, Papers of DFW.
177    Ibid.
178    Ibid.
179    “Subj: Incidents at Sea Review in Moscow,” 26 July 1984,
OP-616 to OP-06, Box 7, Series III,
Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1984 folder, Papers of DFW.
180    Ibid.
181    “Subject: Incidents at Sea Agreement-Thirteenth Annual
Review,” U.S. Department of State
Telegram, 21 February 1985, Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow Box
7, Series
III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
182    “Memorandum for the Chairman, US Delegation to US-USSR
Review of The Incidents at Sea
Agreement, Subject: Instructions to the US Delegation,” Secretary of Defense
Caspar
Weinberger, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of
DFW.
183        David Wood, “Weinberger’s Hard-Line Halts Big Two
Meetings on Naval Crises,” Newark
Star-Ledger (18 July 1985), p. 19, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review
of INCSEA Agreement
1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
184        “Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subj:
Social Activity Associated with
Annual Review of U.S.-USSR Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) Agreement,” 8
 November 1985, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers
of DFW.
185    “Subject: Soviet Demarche on INCSEA,” Department of
Defense USS Message Center, 8 June
1985, Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow, Box 7, Series III,
Annual Review of
INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
186        “Benefits of INCSEA Agreement,” Memorandum to Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12
June 1985, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder,
Papers of
DFW.
187    Ibid.
188    Ibid.
189        “Subject: Issues Expected to be Raised by Soviets,” 31
October 1985, LCDR D.H. Potter,
USN, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers
of DFW.
190    Author’s e-mail interview with George Fedoroff, 5
January 2015.
191    Ibid.
192        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 183.
193    Ibid.
194    Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in Alexander L.
George et al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 257.
195    Ibid., p. 256.
196        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 185.
197    Ibid., p. 186.
198        Mickiewicz and Kolkowicz (eds.), International
Security and Arms Control (New York:
Praeger, 1986), p. 120.
199    Chayes and Doty (eds.),
Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the
21st Century (Washington, DC:
Perhamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 204.
200    Ibid.
201    Gloria Duffy, “Conditions that Affect Arms Control
Compliance,” in Alexander L. George et
al. (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988), p.
283.
202    Ibid., p. 284.
203        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 190.
204    Chayes and Doty (eds.), Defending Deterrence:
Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the
21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Perhamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 204.
205        Duffy, “Conditions that Affect Arms Control Compliance,”
in Alexander L. George et al.
(eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 284.
206    Chayes and Doty (eds.), Defending Deterrence:
Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the
21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Perhamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 205.
207        Mickiewicz and Kolkowicz (eds.), International
Security and Arms Control (New York:
Praeger, 1986), p. 121.
208        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 183.
209    Ibid., p. 199.
210        “Welcoming Remarks by Vice Admiral D.S. Jones, USN,
Chairman, U.S. Delegation,
Thirteenth Review Meeting, US/USSR Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over
the
 High Seas, Washington,” 11 November 1985, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA
Agreement 1985 folder,
Papers of DFW.
211        “Memorandum for the Chairman, U.S. Delegation to US-USSR
Review of Incidents at Sea
Agreement, Subject: Instructions for the US Delegation,” 29 April 1986, Box 7,
Series III,
Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1986 folder, Papers of DFW.
212    Captain 1st Rank V. Serkov, “Practice in Preventing
Incidents at Sea,” Selected Translations
from Morskoy Sbornik, Soviet Naval Digest, Naval Intelligence
Support Center for Naval
Intelligence Command, Issue No. 5, 1981 (translated December 1981), p. 81.
213    Ibid., p. 84.
214    “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary
of Defense. Subject: U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Incidents at Sea Conference – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM,” Box 6, Series III,
Annual
Review of INCSEA Agreement 1975, Papers of DFW.
215    “Incidents Reduced, Navy Secretary Says,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 June 1983, p. 4, Box 7,
Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1983
folder, Papers of DFW.
216    Ibid.
217    “Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Call on Commodore
Steele by Rear Admiral Sakulkin,
Soviet Naval Attache in Washington,” 7 November 1985, Robert J. Steele,
Commodore, U.S.
Navy, Box 7, Series III, Annual Review of INCSEA Agreement 1985 folder, Papers of DFW.
218    “Subject: US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Discussions,” U.S.
Department of State Telegram from
American Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, 13 May 1975, Box 6, Series III,
Annual Review
of INCSEA Agreement 1975, Papers of DFW.
219    Author’s interview with John W. Warner, 14 March 2014,
Washington, D.C.
220    “Subject: US-Soviet Incidents
at Sea Discussions,” U.S. Department of State Telegram from
American Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, 13
May 1975, Box 6, Series III, Annual Review
of INCSEA Agreement 1975, Papers of DFW.
221        Buchheim and Farley, “The U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission,” in George,
Farley, and Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, p.
257.
222        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 188.
223       Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Living Under a
Treaty Regime: Compliance,
Interpretation, and Adaptation,” in Chayes and Doty (eds.), Defending
Deterrence: Managing
the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p.
204.
224        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 188.
225        “Standing Consultative Commission Regulations,”
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm#text
226        Graybeal and Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing
Consultative Commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985): 197.
227        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission,
Geneva, September 24, 1974,” National Security Decision Memorandum 272, 27
September
1974, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald
R. Ford
Presidential Library.
228        “Subject: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commissioner
(SCC), Geneva, March 24, 1975,” National Security Decision Memorandum 290,
26 March
1975, Box 1, National Security Advisor Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Gerald
R. Ford
Presidential Library.
229        Duffy, “Conditions that Affect Arms Control Compliance,”
in Alexander L. George et al.
(eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 284.
230    Ibid.
231    Ibid., p. 283.
5    U.S.–China post-Cold War strategic
engagement

Introduction
This chapter analyses strategic engagement between the U.S. and China
after the June 1989 Tiananmen incident,
which occurred in the same
timeframe as the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is widely acknowledged
that the
U.S.–China relationship is the most consequential bilateral
relationship in contemporary international
relations. Although the
relationship between the U.S. and China has many dimensions, the security
component
looms large. The extensive modernization and increasingly
expansive outlook of the Chinese military coupled
with the preeminent
security position of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific has necessitated strategic
engagement to
mitigate the risk of conflict. To this end, it is important to
analyse critically the past as well as the
future trajectory of U.S.–China
strategic engagement efforts.

Motivations for strategic engagement from 1972 to 1989

From the time of President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 until
1989, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and
China engaged in a pattern of
triangular diplomacy commonly referred to as the Strategic Triangle. Each
state
occupied a unique position within the triangle and developed
distinctive policies. The ideologically and
militarily adversarial relationship
between China and the Soviet Union, as well as between the Soviet Union
and
the U.S., materially advanced China in its increasingly strong strategic
and economic cooperation with the U.S.
The Sino–U.S. relationship also
benefited the U.S. as a military counterweight to the Soviet Union.
 1989 was a pivotal year in U.S.–China relations. Rapprochement
between China and the Soviet Union in May 1989,
initiated by Gorbachev,
led to a diminished U.S. role for the Chinese as a balancing force against
the Soviets.
Under Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost,
relations warmed between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union, diminishing
America’s need for a Chinese counterweight to the Soviets.
Contemporaneously,
however, the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in
China led to a sudden and powerful deterioration in U.S.–China
relations,
whose effects are still felt to this day.1
The Tiananmen incident left a chill in U.S.–China relations, particularly
on the
military-security front. As U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry
articulated in an August 1994 internal
memorandum, “The Department of
Defense had a robust military relationship with the People’s Liberation
Army
(PLA) in the mid-80s. That relationship halted abruptly in June
1989.”2 What began with a visit by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to
Beijing in January 1980
expanded starting in 1984 to include sales of 24
Sikorsky Aircraft transport helicopters and five General
Electric gas turbine
engines for Chinese naval vessels.3
Additional programmes followed
between 1985 and 1987 with artillery ammunition modernization, F-8
fighter jet
avionics upgrades (the Peace Pearl programme), as well as sales
of Mark-46 anti-submarine torpedoes and
AN/TPQ-37 radar systems.4 The
U.S. suspended military sales to
China after Tiananmen. In halting this
important component of U.S.–China military cooperation, the U.S. was
acting under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 which
empowered the Secretary of State, acting with the
authorization of the
President, to decide “whether there will be delivery or other performance”
of sales of
U.S. munitions to foreign countries.5 The final legal opinion
issued on 4 June 1989 by the General Counsel for the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA), was that the
U.S. Government (USG) “may
cancel/revoke governmental sales to the PRC as well as private US exports
of
munitions and dual-use items.”6 The cessation of weapons sales
from the
U.S. to the PRC marked an enduring inflection point in the bilateral
relationship.
Motivations for strategic engagement from 1989 to the present

U.S. motivations to engage China

High-level U.S.–China military contacts after Tiananmen did not occur
until the 31 October–2 November 1993
visit to Beijing by Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Chas Freeman. The
stated key objective of the trip was to restore high-level U.S.–China
military contacts and dialogue “to help
reestablish the trust and mutual
understanding necessary for great powers to get along and to
cooperate.”7
Ambassador Freeman recalled that “in 1993, the
policy framework had
been broken,” and that there was a need to rebuild relations with China “as
peacefully
as possible.”8 William Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense until
February 1994, “realized that we couldn’t afford a relationship with China
where we didn’t talk to the
military,” particularly if the U.S. wished to make
progress in the area of human rights with
China.9 The mood surrounding
Freeman’s meetings with Chinese
Defense Minister General Chi Haotian
and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Liu Huaqing was
tense due to lingering suspicion over alleged foreign support for the
Tiananmen protests. The Chinese
interlocutors framed the impasse in U.S.–
China military relations as the fault of the U.S.; however, Freeman
maintained that the problem required mutual efforts to resolve.10 According
to Freeman, “if you don’t communicate, your ignorance of each other
grows. Suspicion grows apace. In time, suspicion becomes hostility.
If you
want other than hostility, then you have to engage, 介入 (jieru).”11 A
positive military relationship between the U.S. and China would facilitate
progress on
human rights, non-proliferation of missiles and weapons of
mass destruction, as well as trade
issues.12 Freeman described a shift from
the “‘three pillars’ …
high level dialogue, working level exchanges, and
military technology cooperation” that had previously
underpinned the
bilateral military relationship to a new paradigm which would not include
military technology
cooperation.13
Visits to China by former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner
and Admiral Chuck Larson, as well as
Deputy Chief of the PLA General
Staff Xu Huizi to the U.S., followed the efforts of Assistant Secretary
Freeman. The Freeman visit created momentum that demonstrated the
mutual desire by the U.S. and China to
restart strategic engagement. This
set the stage for a visit to China by Secretary of Defense William Perry
in
October 1994. The prior visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense to China was
Frank Carlucci in
1988.14 Perry clearly stated America’s motivation for
re-
establishing military relations with China:
The rationale is that China is fast becoming the world’s largest economic power, and that
combined with its
UN PermFive status, its political clout, its nuclear weapons and a
modernizing military, make China a player
with which the United States must work together.
Our security posture dramatically improves if China
cooperates with us. In order to gain that
cooperation, we must rebuild mutual trust and understanding with
the PLA, and this could
only happen through high-level dialogue and working level contacts.15

Perry acknowledged the growing economic, political and military

importance of China in the new international
order and the benefits that
would accrue to the U.S. by re-establishing links with the Chinese military.
In
addition, Perry believed that strategic engagement could contribute to
improved mutual understanding of
military strategy and planning.16 Perry
aimed to convince the
Chinese of the importance of transparency “to dispel
any misperceptions about your strategic
intentions.”17 As will be seen later,
Perry’s enthusiasm for
outreach to the PLA was not reciprocated.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
October 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security
Affairs Joseph Nye expounded on seven reasons for U.S. engagement with
the PLA:

Opportunity to influence China in the midst of global transition

Regional allies of the U.S. in Asia support American military
engagement with China
Transparency promotion and confidence-building
China’s role in critical international security issues, including arms
control and nonproliferation
Acknowledgement of the key role of the military in China’s political
system
Avoidance of accidents and misperceptions between the Chinese and
U.S. militaries
 Attempt to encourage Chinese participation in institutions favourable
to American national
security.18

Nye and the Clinton administration wished to seize the opportunity to

influence China’s domestic and foreign
policy evolution to become a
partner in the post-Cold War regional and international context. By contrast,
Dr. Andrew Scobell of the RAND Corporation said that strategic
engagement in the Clinton years amounted to
“engagement for
engagement’s sake.”19 According to Scobell,
Clinton administration
officials believed that more engagement was beneficial, but should have
been more
goal-oriented through a focus on signals, acquisition of
intelligence, and cultivation of
contacts.20
Numerous China experts hold divergent opinions as to the importance of
the various motivations behind U.S.
strategic engagement with China.
Professor David Shambaugh provided ten reasons for U.S. military
engagement
with China over the past two decades: to reduce
misperceptions; to serve as a signalling mechanism, which can
either clarify
or obfuscate; to build esprit de corps and develop a sense of those on the
other side; to
forge habits of cooperation; to function as mechanisms for
communication; to attempt to get into the
strategic mindset of a counterpart
and determine their logic train; to determine the degree of autonomy in
civil–military relations; to promote transparency; to manage strategic
competition; and to serve as a
deterrent mechanism.21 Professor Emeritus
Michael Yahuda
similarly regards deterrence as an important factor driving
U.S.–China military relations. The American
conception of deterrence,
derived from its experience with the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
relied upon
awareness of an adversary’s capabilities with a level of
certainty; by contrast, the Chinese conception
relies upon uncertainty and a
reticence to consent to detailed agreements.22
Two additional American China experts echo the importance of
deterrence as a key U.S. motivation for
strategic engagement with China.
Arguing for strategic engagement as deterrence, Dr. Douglas Paal, former
Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council under President
George H.W. Bush, stated “the more
we can expose potential adversaries to
the realities of the U.S., the less likely we will be in conflict with
them.”23
Displaying the military capabilities of the U.S. to a
potential adversary has
important deterrent value and can potentially reduce the likelihood of
conflict.
According to Professor Oriana Mastro, who participates in
strategic dialogues with the PLA, “we use
military-to-military dialogue to
reassure China that we won’t attack them for no reason. The Chinese
understand the deterrence message, but not the reassurance.”24
In this line
of thinking, strategic engagement can have unintended consequences of
amplifying China’s threat
perception vis-à-vis the U.S.
The net impression of American China experts is that strategic
engagement serves
the combined purpose of improving overall relations as
well as deterrence. Strategic engagement aims to
improve relations through
increased familiarity with the counterpart security establishment in an effort
to
reduce mistrust. Deterrence can be a byproduct of this process and is not
necessarily negative. Deterrence in
the U.S.–China context is particularly
relevant regarding Taiwan. The U.S. has maintained a policy of “dual
deterrence,” “deterring an unprovoked PRC attack on Taiwan and the
possibility of PRC military action in
response to a declaration of
independence by Taiwan.”25 This
has placed the U.S. in a difficult position.
Excessive military support for Taiwan might embolden it to
declare
independence, while reduction of military support might encourage Beijing
to be more aggressive
toward Taiwan. U.S. strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis
Taiwan remains a deeply contentious and problematic issue
in U.S.–China
relations. While the consensus of most China experts is not universally
positive regarding
strategic engagement, the majority agree that it is
beneficial.

China’s motivations to engage the U.S.

Chinese motivations for participating in strategic engagement differ from
those of the U.S. It is necessary
to acknowledge these differences in order
to avoid the phenomenon of mirror imaging as espoused by Robert
Jervis.
While discerning intentions and motivations of a potential adversary is
difficult, it is possible to
glean elements of Chinese motivations through
personal interviews and research from primary sources.
 A key study by David Finkelstein and John Unangst analysed the forces
driving military-to-military relations
with the U.S. from the Chinese
perspective. Finkelstein and Unangst identified three primary PLA
objectives.
The first objective, to “satisfy the political requirement to
engage the U.S.,” refers to the expectation by
Chinese political leaders that
the PLA has an obligation to pursue a military relationship with the
U.S.26
The PLA fulfilled this mandate by increasing the number
of high-level
military exchanges with the U.S., participating in new cooperative
frameworks, and promoting
maximum press coverage of U.S.–China
military activities.27 The
second objective is to “advance Beijing’s security
agenda with Washington.”28 For the PLA, every level of the military-to-
military relationship represents an
opportunity to promote the Chinese
political and security agenda. Specifically, the issue of Taiwan has
overshadowed all other elements of U.S.–China bilateral relations given the
Chinese assumption that the U.S.
will intervene in any armed conflict
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. The PLA
directs
its anger equally at American politicians and military personnel
regarding U.S. military support of
Taiwan.29 Further, the PLA utilizes
contacts with their
American military colleagues to counter the perception
that China represents a military threat to any other
nation, particularly to the
U.S.30 The PLA also advocates for
the U.S. to restrain Japanese military
expansion due to Chinese historical
sensitivity to the events of World War II
and fear of any renewed military threat from Japan.31 China views its
military interactions with the U.S. as a chance to
influence American
behaviour toward North Korea and reduce the probability of a U.S.
intervention against
North Korea.32 The third objective, to “support defense
modernization,” reflects China’s desire to modernize its military by
gleaning as much as possible from
exposure to U.S. practices and
technology.33 Dr. Denny Roy
takes a sceptical view of the Chinese attitude
toward strategic engagement: “The Chinese don’t see the
intrinsic value in
this … they perceive dialogues as a weapon to be used against the U.S.”34
Dr. Roy therefore discounts the confidence-building potential of
strategic
engagement since the Chinese regard interactions as an arena for
competitive advantage.
 The best barometer of Chinese attitudes towards strategic engagement
with the U.S. is direct interaction with
senior Chinese military officials.
PLA Major General Yao Yunzhu of the PLA Academy of Military Science
echoed
the third objective articulated by Finkelstein and Unangst, stating
(translated here from Mandarin Chinese):
“for a long time, the PLA thought
military-to-military relations did not help us improve our military
capabilities. Otherwise, it would just be part of improving the political
relationship. The military needs
military benefits, not just for the Foreign
Ministry.”35 Major
General Yao is thus indicating that strategic engagement
with the U.S. serves the Chinese purpose of
benefitting their military.
The Chinese infer that U.S. objectives in promoting military-to-military
relations are threefold –
deterrence, intelligence, and influence.36 These are
all
negative attributes, not framed in the context of improved relations. In
their view, the U.S. displays its
military prowess to PLA visitors as a form
of intimidation to deter China. U.S. advocacy for increased PLA
transparency is regarded by China as an effort to gather intelligence to
probe PLA military strengths and
weaknesses. Lastly, the Chinese believe
that the U.S. military attempts to exert influence on PLA
counterparts in
order to advance American security goals and to effect political change in
China.37 Given the extreme sensitivity of Beijing to any efforts to
undermine
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this is an
extremely important point to acknowledge.
Analysis of Chinese literature provides two interesting perceptions on the
meaning of military diplomacy
within the PRC. In 中国军事百科全书
China Military Encyclopedia (Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu),
Yang
Songhe stated that the goal of military diplomacy “is to maintain, realize
and expand the national
interest, and directly serves the national defense
construction and military strategy of a state … It is the
specific reflection of
the state diplomacy.”38 Chinese National
Defense University Professor and
PLA Senior Colonel Guo Xinning explained the purpose of military
diplomacy
as “‘improving and realizing national interests and national
security. It is an important aspect and
component of the foreign relations
and overall diplomacy of a state … it is also the reflection of a state’s
national defense policy in its foreign relations.’”39 Both of these definitions
of military diplomacy indicate that the Chinese goal of the
military
diplomacy component of strategic engagement is to serve the interests of
the state.

Common motivations for pursuing strategic engagement

The U.S. and China ostensibly pursue strategic engagement for its
confidence-building potential. In spite of
the varying motivations discussed
above in pursuit of their respective national interests, both the U.S. and
China earnestly seek a stable relationship. Accordingly, Shambaugh
suggested that openness can build
confidence.40 Although the U.S.–China
military relationship
reflects an uneasy union of cooperation and
competition – termed by Shambaugh as “coopetition” – strategic
engagement can still proceed effectively and need not be adversarial.41 Paul
Haenle, Director for China on the National Security Council under
presidents George
W. Bush and Barack Obama, concurs that “it is not
inevitable we will be in conflict with one another. We can
find a way to a
competitive and cooperative relationship.”42
However, differing opinions
on the value of strategic engagement for confidence-building exist.
Expressing a
downcast outlook, Dr. Michael Green, Senior Director for
Asia on the National Security Council under
President George W. Bush,
stated that “the U.S. tends to overestimate the confidence-building value of
mil-to-mil engagement or overestimate the risk.”43 Similarly,
Professor
Robert Ross is dismissive of the importance of confidence-building
measures (CBMs) and
military-to-military relations, believing them to be
“an effort in search of an imagined problem.”44 Ross believes that the U.S.
and China may not require strategic
engagement since behaviour can
improve via rules of engagement in the absence of formal agreements or
CBMs,
as evidenced by contemporary dynamics between China and Japan.
However, the latter overly pessimistic
analyses are not shared by most
American China experts or by the author.
Two decades of strategic engagement between the U.S. and Chinese
militaries have produced a significant
number of interactions between
military personnel of the two countries, numerous dialogues, and several
agreements of variable significance. On a positive note, despite contentious
issues, most notably the lack of
clarity in the ongoing controversy over
Taiwan, the U.S. and China have successfully avoided any direct
military
confrontation.
Central to any efforts at strategic engagement is establishing trust
between the U.S. and China. If the two
countries do not trust one another,
then accurate perception of intentions is difficult to achieve. A
recurrent
theme in U.S.–China relations is that a fundamental lack of trust
complicates effective bilateral
relations. Xi Jinping, then-Vice President of
China, in a 15 February 2012 speech in Washington, D.C.,
introduced the
notion of distrust between the U.S. and China as a key obstacle in the
overall relationship.
Peking University School of International Studies
Professor Wang Jisi and Brookings Institution scholar Dr.
Kenneth
Lieberthal, Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council
under
President Bill Clinton, defined the term “‘strategic distrust’” as “a
perception that the other side
will seek to achieve its key long term goals at
concerted cost to your own side’s core prospects and
interests.”45
Strategic distrust is particularly acute between the U.S. and China in the
security arena. The U.S. distrusts
the PLA due to perceived Chinese
prioritization of assets directed at the U.S. military as well as a lack of
transparency on its capabilities, doctrine, and military plans.46 PLA distrust
of the U.S. runs deep, stemming from continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,
U.S. reconnaissance near the Chinese coast, and cultivation of U.S. security
relationships with countries
near China.47 From the Chinese perspective,
“Taiwan has always
played a key role in Sino–American relations and the
management of the Taiwan issue, even if they cannot
resolve it, has been
the benchmark of the overall relationship between the two nations.”48 From
the U.S. perspective, however, it is vital to maintain an
independent Taiwan
to preserve open sea lines of communication in East Asia. Equally
important is the
powerful message that the U.S. conveys to its other allies in
the region, as the perception of abandoning
Taiwan would send a dangerous
signal that the U.S. cannot be counted upon to uphold its alliance
commitments
and enforce regional security. Such a move could easily
trigger a regional arms race.
The U.S. has pursued a policy of “strategic ambiguity” and “dual
deterrence” with Taiwan,49 which has not contributed to any long-term
solution of the conflict.
The difficulty with the policy of strategic ambiguity
is that it incentivizes China to continue pursuing an
offensive strategy since
the U.S. has not been clear as to its military commitment to Taiwan.
Therefore,
Beijing seeks to alter the status quo in its favour. Although the
PRC vocally aspires to ultimate unification
with Taiwan, at this time it will
likely not pursue military action to accomplish this goal and thereby risk
war with the U.S., assuming Taiwan does not force the issue by declaring
independence. The need to address
strategic distrust is essential since “an
accident could trigger a devastating political or military crisis
between
China and the United States.”50 Continued refusal to
seek a final, peaceful
resolution to the contentious issue of Taiwan raises the prospect that war
could erupt
in the future.
Discussions with Chinese and American experts illustrate concurrence on
the theme of lack of trust between
the two countries. Dr. Teng Jianqun of
the China Institute of International Studies said the U.S. and China
do not
entirely trust one another and should first find areas of common interest.51
PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu suggested that “it is impossible for the
U.S. to accept
China’s peaceful rise and it is difficult for China to trust the
U.S.”52 In spite of the challenges, the U.S. and China “have to build up
trust. Cooperation over
Somalia and multilateral cooperation in Africa is a
way to build up fundamental trust between the two
countries.”53 From the
American perspective, Professor Lora
Saalman suggested that “China and
the U.S. are bound for a certain level of distrust, but you can cooperate
without trusting the other party.”54 This latter point is
important to note. In
spite of the obstacles in establishing trust, progress can
nevertheless be
made in military-to-military relations given their overall importance.
The issue of distrust was exacerbated during the tenure of former
President Barack Obama in light of public
announcements by the U.S.
regarding changes in American strategy vis-à-vis Asia. The new paradigm
had three
iterations: “‘returning to Asia,’” followed by the “‘pivot,’” and
subsequently the
“‘rebalancing.’”55 According to former Assistant
Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, the
impetus for this strategy was “to address the
challenges and opportunities
brought by the rapid rise of China, reassure U.S. allies and partners
throughout
the region, and, above all, ‘sustain American leadership in
Asia.’”56 While the motivation for this announced change in policy may
have been to bolster
anxious nations in the region fearful of an increasingly
powerful and assertive China, the net effect was to
reaffirm Chinese beliefs
that the U.S. was trying to encircle and contain China. Critics of the “pivot”
include experts both in the U.S. and China. Professor Robert Ross argues
that this proclaimed strategy has
convinced China that “the United States
has abandoned strategic engagement, the cornerstone of U.S. policy
toward
China since the end of the Cold War … herein lies the great irony of the
pivot: a strategy that was
meant to check a rising China has sparked its
combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation.”57 The sentiment of
suspicion of U.S. motives was espoused by Chinese
commentator Dai
Qingcheng in the Global Times, warning of American desires for
“‘encirclement and
blockage’ (weidu) … to ‘consume’ (xiaohao) China’s
power …”58 The distrust arising from interpretation of U.S. motives was
only exacerbated by
multiple arms sales to Taiwan. Nonetheless, China has
continued to militarize features in the South China Sea
despite a pledge by
President Xi not to do so.59 Under the
administration of U.S. President
Donald Trump, there is a focus upon “risk reduction and conflict prevention
rather than cultivating mutual trust.”60 The shift in emphasis
from trust
cultivation to conflict prevention has occurred in the wake of U.S.
disenchantment with perceived
lack of PLA transparency as well as
Chinese militarization of the South China Sea.
Improving trust between the U.S. and China is central to formulation of a
sound military-to-military
relationship. There are acknowledged areas of
serious contention between the two countries, but, as stated by
Dr. James
Mulvenon, the U.S. and China must “try to identify areas in which strategic
trust can be
established, and then move on to sensitive areas.”61 Professor
Michael Yahuda noted that the U.S. and the Soviet Union never established
overall trust, but “both sides knew
each other’s capabilities. That may be
the reason why they were able to achieve mutually useful
agreements.”62
Yahuda suggests talking more openly about
strategic concerns as a
mechanism for increasing trust. As proven by the history of U.S.–Soviet
relations,
progress in Sino–U.S. military-to-military relations can be
achieved even in the face of strategic distrust.
Analysis of strategic engagement factors

Civil–military balance
The U.S. and China possess vastly different governmental systems. The
U.S. is a representative democracy with
three separate but equal branches of
government. The system was established by the country’s founders to
check
the excesses of any particular governmental branch. By contrast, the PRC
has operated since its
founding in 1949 as a one-party authoritarian state in
which the government and the PLA are de facto
subordinate to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). While the U.S. and China engage in robust
economic
interchange largely without incident, the relationship on the
politico-military front is far more strained.
Sino–U.S. strategic engagement involves the military branches of the
U.S. and Chinese civilian leadership.
The American military is fully
subordinate to the directives of the U.S. President, who serves as the
Commander in Chief of all armed forces. The PLA is similarly beholden to
the President, who simultaneously
holds the position of Chairman of the
Communist Party. While there is little uncertainty regarding the
allegiance
of the U.S. armed forces, there has been debate in China regarding the PLA
as a state versus a
party army. Under President Xi Jinping, the role of the
PLA as a party army has become far more solidified.
Historically, the PLA has had a close association with politics in the PRC
due to its role in the elevation
of the CCP to power in 1949.63 In the almost
three decades
since Tiananmen, however, military representation in high-
level political bodies has progressively
declined.64 The most telling
indicator of diminished PLA
influence at the highest levels of the Chinese
political system is the fact that no PLA representative has
served on the
Politburo Standing Committee since 1997.65
Additionally, the PLA has
limited involvement in the institutionalized succession of civilian
leadership. The
primary PLA role in recent years has been “formal approval
of decisions that have already been made
elsewhere.”66 While the PLA is
no longer a major factor in the
Chinese political decision-making apparatus,
its influence should by no means be discounted.
 China is cognizant of its position as the dominant rising power in Asia.
The core objectives of the
government are maintaining its sovereignty and
political system without any outside interference,
particularly from the
United States, which has been intensely critical of Beijing since Tiananmen.
The
impetus behind the growth of PLA strategic engagement in the 1990s
“was a dramatic shift in perceptions of
the international security
environment.”67 China regards the
U.S. as the hegemon unwilling to
surrender its regional power, and as the sole threat to its preeminent
position
in Asia. In particular, control over the South and East China Seas as well as
the goal of ultimate
reunification with Taiwan loom large in the Chinese
outlook. An authoritative expression of Chinese military
and security policy
appears in the form of officially issued defence white papers. In every
Chinese defence
white paper since the original document produced in 1998,
Taiwan has been
prominently discussed as a core interest. In 1998, the PRC
stated
Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory … the issue of Taiwan is entirely an internal
affair of
China … the Chinese government seeks to achieve the reunification of the country
by peaceful means, but will
not commit itself not to resort to force.68

Under former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s “24-Character Strategy,” the

prevailing mindset was “hide our
capacities and bide our time; be good at
maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”69 There is a
discernible clash in outlook between the civilian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) and the PLA regarding strategic engagement with the U.S. vis-à-vis
Taiwan. American
arms sales to Taiwan have often elicited a cutoff in
strategic engagement with the U.S. In these instances,
“the MFA has a
propensity to get the M2M relationship back on track as soon as possible to
avoid lasting
damage.”70 The PLA does not perceive the value in restoring
military-to-military contacts unless the U.S. reduces or ceases its arms sales
to Taiwan.71
The current civilian government in China with President Xi Jinping at the
helm has proposed establishing a
“‘new type of great power relationship’
(新型大国关系 – xinxing daguo guanxi) between China and the United
States as a way to break the ‘old pattern’ of great power conflict …”72 In a
2013 meeting with the Berggruen Institute’s 21st Century Council in
Beijing,
President Xi Jinping specifically addressed this notion and its
applicability to relations between China and
the rest of the world, stating
“We all to need to work together to avoid the so-called Thucydides trap –
destructive tensions between an emerging power and established powers, or
between established powers
themselves.”73 Xi expounded further on
conflict avoidance:
Our aim is to foster a new model of major country relations in three aspects. First is a no
confrontational
or zero-sum mentality. Second is mutual respect for other’s path of
development and cultural heritage. Third,
to seek common ground on issues of common
interests in pursuit of win-win progress. As long as the major
countries follow these
principles, no war will break out in the world.74

Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged the risk of the
U.S. and China going down this
dangerous Thucydidean path in a March
2012 speech, stating “‘We are now trying to find an answer, a new
answer
to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a
rising power meet. We need a
new answer.’”75 With progressive increases
in Chinese military
expenditure, notably in the area of naval vessels, stealth
aircraft, and missiles with potential anti-carrier
capability, “China intends to
challenge the United States as a Pacific power, and we are now seeing an
arms
race between the countries in that region.”76 There is a
heightened
awareness among the U.S. and China of the risks of great-power
conflict.
Nonetheless, China has not fought a war since 1979 and the operational
effectiveness of the PLA is
untested.
PRC sensitivity to the concept of hegemonism resonates throughout most
of the PLA defence white papers issued
biennially since 1998. The 1998
white paper states, “hegemonism and power politics remain the main source
of
threats to world peace and stability …”77 By contrast, the 2008
white
paper contains the statement, “China will never seek hegemony or engage
in military expansion now or in
the future, no matter how developed it
becomes.”78 In the 2012
white paper, the oblique reference to the U.S. is
that “some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific
military alliances,
expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the
situation there
tenser.”79 It is apparent that the Chinese continue to resent
the strong American military presence in the region despite all efforts at
confidence-building. The Chinese
at every important meeting reiterate their
stated three obstacles to an improved military-to-military
relationship with
the U.S.: U.S. support for Taiwan, American infringement upon their 200-
mile exclusive
economic zone, and suspicion of China as manifested by the
2000 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA).80 An important feature
of China’s strategic objectives
has been described as anti-access area-denial
(A2/AD), sometimes referred to by the Chinese term
shashoujian
(“assassin’s mace”).81
These methods might include attacks on logistics, transportation, and support forces; attacks
on sea, land,
and ports; and attacks on air bases. In addition, shashoujian forces can be
expected to engage in
attacks to disrupt and/or destroy US battle networks, to include
cyberattacks and the use of ASAT weapons.
They might also include coercive measures
designed to dissuade US allies from granting US forces operational
access to their bases.82

These Chinese objectives contrast with the position of the U.S., whose
declaratory policy is to maintain a
peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region.
While ostensibly not aiming to contain China, the U.S. is wary of
allowing
China to dominate the other countries in the region as well as to restrict
freedom of commerce,
freedom of navigation, or infringement on natural
resources. While the U.S. views improved
military-to-military relations as
an important venue for enhancing stability and minimizing conflict, the
U.S. has a difficult task in bringing the Chinese onboard. Under President
Xi Jinping, “the ultimate purpose
of China’s military expansion and
modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S.
Navy
from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient
doubt in the minds of American
strategists as to their ability to prevail.”83
The U.S. is
understandably wary of China’s military buildup for the purpose
of A2/AD in the East and South China Seas.
Chinese activities in these
waters provide the impetus for U.S. Navy freedom of navigation patrols,
which
elicit strong Chinese objections.
Alliances figure prominently in U.S.–China relations. In particular, firm
mutual
defence commitments between the U.S. and Japan are a source of
tension and serve as possible flashpoints in
the region. Significant U.S.
military commitments to Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,
Thailand
and the Philippines also feature prominently in American regional
alliances. Potential conflicts between
China and these countries, especially
given competing claims in the South and East China Seas, create a
dangerous situation. These alliances are particularly jeopardized by China’s
focus upon A2/AD strategies. The
U.S. is in a difficult position regarding
its military presence in the East and South China Seas. If the U.S.
exerts a
strong, aggressive posture in the area to counter China’s A2/AD, it risks
fuelling an arms race with
China. On the other hand, if the U.S. is perceived
as vacillating in its projection of strength, it risks
undermining the
confidence of its regional allies in U.S. support and precipitating an arms
race by these
countries to counter China. At this point, the U.S. is showing
no signs of relinquishing its predominant role
in the Western Pacific. The
U.S. and China continue to function with different governmental operating
systems
and frequently disparate regional goals.
Civil–Military Balance value: Negative

Quality of diplomatic interactions

An assessment of Sino–U.S. governmental and semi-official fora provides
insight into the quality of
diplomatic interaction between the two countries.
The U.S. and China have engaged in a multitude of Track 1,
Track 1.5, and
Track 2 dialogues. U.S.–China strategic engagement takes place at official
(Track 1),
semi-official (Track 1.5), and unofficial (Track 2) levels. Track 1
diplomacy participants are civilian and
military representatives in their
official capacity. Track 1.5 diplomacy involves a combination of official
(in
their personal capacity) and non-official representation. Track 2 diplomacy
refers to unofficial
dialogues that typically involve non-governmental
personnel.84
These will be analysed in turn to assess their efficacy and
contribution to overall strategic engagement
efforts.

Track 1: strategic and economic dialogue (S&ED)

The U.S.–China Senior Dialogue inaugurated in 2005 under President
George W. Bush and the U.S.–China
Strategic Dialogue begun in 2006
were merged in 2009 to form the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
(S&ED). The annual meeting alternates between Washington and Beijing.
By consolidating the previous
dialogues into the S&ED, the U.S. and China
transformed “what had once consisted of high-level and
singular
conversations about economic policy into a comprehensive set of meetings
of strategic concern
…”85 This forum has been described as the most
important
dialogue between the U.S. and China other than summit meetings
between the two respective presidents.
The American leader of the strategic
track is the Secretary of State, while the
Chinese leader is the State
Councilor. While the American representative for the strategic track
component
is a Cabinet official, the Chinese representative is not from the
Politburo Standing Committee.86 The significantly lower relative stature of
the Chinese envoy
severely constrains his authority to make strategic
resolutions. Additional representatives for the
strategic track of the S&ED
include the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs as well as their Chinese counterparts
from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.87 Over 150 representatives each from
the U.S. and
China, including multiple ministers, are present at the
meeting.88
The S&ED has been criticized by American analysts as being “too large
and unwieldy, too much a ‘check
the box’ exercise.”89 Shambaugh has
described this and
similar dialogues as “increasingly ephemeral and
episodic, while the deeper competitive forces threaten to
overwhelm the
efforts for cooperation.”90 At the 9–10 July
2014 meeting in Beijing,
multiple commitments for improvement in military relations were made,
though no
concrete progress was achieved. Critics of the S&ED feel that the
few deliverables achieved by the
process are not commensurate with the
expenditure of time and effort required to stage the
Dialogue.91
Some China experts in the U.S., however, are more positive as to the
benefits of the S&ED mechanism. As
stated by Bonnie Glaser:
The S&ED has undoubtedly strengthened the overall U.S.–China relationship. By bringing
together such
large delegations with many senior participants, both sides demonstrate to their
respective publics and to
other nations the importance of the bilateral relationship and that the
U.S. and China can work together in
support of shared goals. Over time, the potential exists
for habits of cooperation to be built,
misperceptions eliminated, and mutual understanding
enhanced.92

Further support for the S&ED comes from Professor Christopher Twomey,
who believes that the dialogue
provides “substantial opportunity for senior
leaders to engage on issues of broad threat perceptions,
statecraft, and geo-
political influence.”93 In addition to
substantive interactions beyond
standard government rhetoric on a range of issues including Taiwan, the
U.S. and China have made strides toward heightened transparency.94 The
S&ED is a unique opportunity for high-ranking officials from the U.S. and
China to cultivate rapport and establish effective lines of communication.
The S&ED facilitates
interactions between narrowly focused, highly
bureaucratic agencies of the American and Chinese
governments, which has
the potential to create unforeseen synergies. A secondary byproduct of the
S&ED
is the public relations component, signaling to the international
community as well as to the American and
Chinese publics the importance
of the bilateral relationship. Conversely, U.S. allies such as Japan and
India
warily perceive the intense efforts of American officials to cultivate
enhanced ties with China as a
possible “G-2.”95
The Chinese perspective of the value of the S&ED is mixed, as espoused
by a
leading Chinese academic who frequently participates in Track 1.5 and
Track 2 dialogues on U.S.–China
relations:
The Dialogue makes a positive contribution in several ways. 1) It satisfies the “do something”
demand – as
the overall relationship is often said to be poor and undesirable in both countries
– from the different
political spectrums, especially the media. 2) Within the bureaucracies, the
Dialogue does not produce much
in terms of major breakthroughs BUT it also helps to make
a case for “more effort.” 3) Outside the
bilateral context, it is useful and at certain junctures
even critical for Beijing and Washington to be
seen as willing (though not as capable) to
manage their differences. If the ultimate goal of the mil-to-mil
relations is to know your
adversary better to defeat it with less cost to yourself and a higher degree of
assurance of
winning, then the dialogue is going to be by nature more cosmetic than substantive. My own
assessment is that under no condition is the US side going to amend its alliance arrangements
in Asia –
that may be a goal for the Chinese side – as a result the military dialogue is going to
continue to be
perfunctory.96

While Chinese analysts acknowledge the limits of the S&ED in achieving

transformative outcomes, they
nonetheless agree that continued dialogue is
important for public perception and potential motivation for
future
improved relations.
The value of the S&ED in its current format came into dispute. As a
result, the S&ED has been
replaced by the United States–China
Comprehensive Dialogue in the wake of the April 2017 meeting between
U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The
Comprehensive Dialogue features four
pillars: the Diplomatic and Security
Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement
and
Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue.97
The first meetings of this forum were scheduled for summer 2017.98
Regardless of the new branding for this Track 1 dialogue mechanism,
the
criticism regarding the need for more frequent, sustained bilateral
discussions should be addressed
through inter-sessional activities or
working groups.

Track 1: strategic security dialogue (SSD)

An additional Track 1 component of U.S.–China diplomatic interaction
relevant to strategic engagement is
the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD).
Launched in May 2011 under the strategic track of the S&ED, the
goal of
the SSD is “to build more understanding on issues in the bilateral
relationship that have the
potential for miscalculation and accident.”99
Subjects
covered in the SSD of concern to the U.S. include the cyber, space
and nuclear domains. Chinese priorities
in the SSD are limiting American
maritime activity within its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) as well as
Taiwan arms sales.100 The creation of
the SSD by former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State James Steinberg was a response to the perceived need for
improved military-to-military interactions and civil–military
coordination.101 Representatives of the U.S. Department of State and
Department of Defense participate
opposite their Chinese counterparts. As
with other U.S.–China dialogues, the U.S. tends to dispatch
higher-level
representation than the Chinese. In the case of the SSD, the highest-ranked
U.S.
representative has been the four-star Commander of U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM), while the Chinese have
sent a one-star rear
admiral.102 The most recent iteration of
the SSD was held in Beijing in June
2016, during which the U.S. and China held “candid, constructive
discussions … on strategic security issues – including maritime issues and
the DPRK.”103 While the SSD initially convened annually, the forum
evolved to
include an inter-sessional meeting approximately six months
after the S&ED, the most recent of which
occurred at the end of 2016.

Track 1.5/Track 2 dialogues

The term “Track 2” originates from a 1981 article written by American
Foreign Service officer Joseph
Montville. He believed that a second track of
diplomacy was a vital supplement to official, Track 1
diplomacy (then
between the U.S. and Soviet Union) that became stilted due to political
posturing and the
need to preserve credibility among domestic audiences.104
Track 1.5 diplomacy is more formal than Track 2 dialogues due to the
former’s closer connection with
government elites and diminished
flexibility of participants.105 The official intergovernmental mechanisms of
Anglo–German and U.S.–Soviet diplomacy
such as the Haldane Mission
and INCSEA/SCC, respectively, were equivalent to Track 1, though they
were not
formally characterized as such at the time. The notion of
diplomatic “tracks” is a late twentieth-century
construct, although unofficial
or semi-official strategic engagement might have proven of some utility in
previous historical periods. The ability to speak freely outside of a Track 1
setting can be beneficial by
enabling participants to convey attitudes which
can then filter upward to the official intergovernmental
level.
Interviews with those involved with the Track 1.5 dialogues on strategic
nuclear issues, the Track 1.5
Sino–U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue organized
by the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)
and the Chinese think tank China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR),
the annual Track 1/Track 1.5 Shangri-La Dialogue
organized by the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies
(IISS), and Track 2 U.S.–China dialogues reveal mixed assessments of the
varied platforms
in exploring sensitive bilateral policy issues.
Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues have provided an opportunity to explore
issues in a candid manner. Former
PLA Navy officer Dr. Teng Jianqun
suggested that the value of Track 2 discussions as compared to Track 1 is
that “if the two countries have an official dialogue at a very high level, there
might be less possibility to have frank, straightforward discussion.”106 Just
as Joseph Montville described in 1981, governmental elites are constrained
in
their ability to speak freely on sensitive issues. Paul Haenle concurs,
believing that “Track 1.5/2 is
critical. At the official level, conversations are
difficult. The political environment can
shift.”107 Dr. Mulvenon similarly
indicated that Track 1.5
meetings are a “consequence-free environment” in
which government representatives can issue non-papers and
statements.108
The lower profile nature of Track 1.5/2
dialogues enhances their utility to
discuss contentious matters without fear of political repercussions.
From the American perspective, Track 1.5 and 2 Sino–U.S. dialogues on
nuclear issues are challenging,
though they have led to an increased
understanding of Chinese viewpoints. The U.S.–China Strategic Dialogue
began in 2005, co-organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific
Forum CSIS and periodically
co-sponsored by the China Arms Control and
Disarmament Association (CACDA); the CACDA has close association
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). According to Brad
Glosserman of Pacific Forum, which
organizes Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues between the U.S. and China,
these exchanges have been of dubious value to the U.S., though they have
allowed for the articulation of
the Chinese position on policy issues.109 In
Glosserman’s
view, China believes that the U.S. is attempting to undermine
its interests and does not trust the U.S.
Despite its frustration with lack of
progress, the U.S. has “no choice but to keep talking and maintain
channels
of communication for problems when they arise. At best, progress will be
made on the
margins.”110 By contrast, advocates of Sino–U.S. nuclear
dialogues are cautiously optimistic as to their beneficial impact. Dr. Lora
Saalman, who participates in
Pacific Forum Track 1.5 nuclear dialogues,
said “there is huge value in Track 1.5. You get more than
straight Track 1
and it is more diverse …” with representation from the Department of State,
the Department
of Defense, and academia.111 While U.S.–China nuclear
dialogues have improved greatly in recent years, particularly since 2007,
and have been useful in
clarifying terminology, Saalman admits that
dialogue can sometimes exacerbate distrust. Chinese desire to
“hammer
away” at the issue of ballistic missile defence with the U.S. seems
“pointless” from the American
viewpoint.112 The U.S. feels an obligation to
protect itself
as well as regional allies from the threat of a North Korean
missile attack, as evidenced by the deployment
of the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system in South Korea in
2017. While the
U.S. has assured China that THAAD poses no threat to
Chinese security interests, China does not accept this
explanation,
maintaining that THAAD imperils their second-strike capability.113
 The Track 1.5 nuclear dialogue has continued despite multiple
cancellations of military-to-military
contacts throughout its ten-year history,
with the June 2014 meeting taking place in Hawaii. At the 2014
meeting, it
is encouraging to note that the 13 Chinese participants, representing the
largest delegation to
date, included several active and retired senior PLA
officers.114 A specific goal was established of creating a pool of
repeat
participants to build camaraderie and trust. The nine confidence and
security building measures
(CSBMs) proposed at the 2014 meeting were:
(1) “Development of a ‘joint statement on strategic stability’”;
(2) “Bilateral
technical exchanges on verification technology and procedures”; (3) “Joint
studies on
capabilities and threat of DPRK ballistic missiles”; (4) “Joint
statement on escalation …”; (5) “Chinese
participation in mock inspections
under New START or other Arms Control Treaty Protocols”; (6)
“Reciprocal
Visits to BMD Sites”; (7) “Three Pledges of No First Attacks
in Nuclear, Space, and Cyber”; (8) “Reciprocal
Visits to Nuclear Test
Sites”; and (9) “Reciprocal Notifications of BMD and Conventional Prompt
Global
Strike (CPGS) Test Launches.”115 The 11th iteration of the
U.S.–
China Strategic Dialogue occurred in June 2019 in Hawaii.
The spectre of nuclear conflict between the U.S. and China is worrisome,
particularly as China engages in
nuclear weapons modernization. However,
the prospects of such confrontation in reality are quite slim,
according to
informed observers. In a closed-door March 2017 workshop on U.S.–China
strategic nuclear
relations attended by the author, a former senior advisor to
President Obama involved in leadership-level
meetings on China stated,
“Nuclear questions do not really come up in this relationship. [They] did
not
come up once in Obama-Xi meetings between 2009 and 2015. This is a
relationship wholly unlike that with the
Soviet Union.”116 The advisor
believed that the only
theoretical scenario under which nuclear weapons
would be employed would be over an armed confrontation
vis-à-vis Taiwan
due to its importance to China.
U.S.–China dialogues on cybersecurity achieved forward momentum for
a time, but have since regressed. The
U.S. views cybersecurity as a vital
priority area for strategic engagement. The Track 1.5 Sino–U.S.
Cybersecurity Dialogue, launched in December 2009, met six times by June
2012 with the goals of diminishing
misperceptions and clarifying each
country’s approach to cybersecurity as well as discovering pathways to
cooperation.117 At the outset, the two parties “found the
initial level of
misperception to be high” and dialogue was initiated “to reduce that by
frank discussion
of intentions and issues.”118 According to Dialogue
participant and cybersecurity expert Dr. James Mulvenon, despite the
establishment of a Cyber Arms Control
working group by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the U.S. government was
“disappointed with
PLA participation” in the Dialogue.119 The PLA is the
primary
cyber actor in China and the MOFA is “not read into PLA
collection programs,” which undermines increased
Chinese national
security coordination.120 Cyber dialogue
with the Chinese is difficult due to
differing interpretations of the meaning of cybersecurity; while “the
U.S.
wanted to talk about cyber security (defending networks), for the Chinese,
信息安全 (xinxi anquan) is
defending the network and policing content.”121
The Dialogue
evolved to become the July 2013 Joint U.S.–China Cyber
Working Group. After two meetings of the Cyber
Working Group, China
announced suspension of its participation in May 2014 in the wake of the
U.S.
indictment of five Chinese military officers for cyberattacks on U.S.
companies.122 Dr. Mulvenon expressed the most pessimistic
view of the
progress made to date in cyber dialogue, noting that “the dialogue has gone
into the ditch. The
only way out is to multilateralize the problem and
promote open-source information on Chinese
intrusions.”123 A read-out of
the January 2017 CSIS-CICIR
meeting in Beijing indicated that the
dialogue remains stalled with little progress in sight.124
The IISS Asia Security Summit, most commonly referred to the Shangri-
La Dialogue, was initiated in 2002.
The 2019 meeting, held from 31 May to
2 June, represents the eighteenth consecutive year that this Track
I/1.5
dialogue has occurred. Both the U.S. and China have participated in this
forum from its outset. The
U.S. has consistently sent the Secretary of
Defense since 2003 as the leader of its delegation. Dr. John
Chipman, Chief
Executive of IISS, sent a personal letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld,
inviting him to the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue, in which
he stated, “the Chinese have told us that they
intend to send their defence
minister.”125 However, General
Cao Gangchuan, the Chinese Minister of
National Defense, did not attend the 2003 meeting even though he
would
have had the opportunity “to schedule bilateral meetings on the sidelines of
the conference with many
Asian defence ministers, and also with defence
ministers from the US and the UK.”126 Despite annual personal invitations
from IISS, China only twice sent
its Minister of National Defense – General
Liang Guanglie in 2011 and General Wei Fenghe in 2019. In all
other years,
China sent lower-level officials. In 2014, Lieutenant General Wang
Guanzhong, who led the
Chinese delegation, stated in his speech that “we
need to strengthen coordination on the basis of mutual
respect, and oppose
the attempt by any country to dominate regional security affairs.”127 This
remark would appear to be directed at the U.S., implying that
the U.S. is
attempting to exert hegemonic control over the Asia-Pacific region. In
2016, Admiral Sun struck
a more belligerent tone regarding China’s
position in the South China Sea when he remarked, “We don’t cause
trouble, and we are not afraid of getting into trouble … China’s South
China Sea policy has not and cannot
change.”128 In 2019, General Wei
Fenghe stated “We hold
different views with the US side on several issues
regarding the wrong words and actions of the US on
Taiwan and the South
China Sea. We express our firm opposition.”129 While the SLD is intended
to foster cooperation among participating nations and
diminish regional
tensions, the U.S. and China have tended to assert the rectitude of their
respective
positions, which are often at odds. In a 2013 interview, Dr. Tim
Huxley, Executive Director of IISS-Asia,
explained the under-
representation by China at Shangri-La in this way: “the Chinese may still be
uncomfortable since they can’t control the structure. It has taken bravery on
their part to face
that.”130 Although the U.S. and China have often struck a
more confrontational tone at the plenary sessions, both countries annually
hold a private meeting on the
sidelines of the conference with U.S.
representation typically at the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
level.

Quality of military-to-military interactions

The quality of military-to-military interactions between the U.S. and China
can best be evaluated through a
systematic assessment of inter-military
dialogues as well as a wide range of contacts between the two
militaries.
These include an analysis of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(MMCA), the 2014
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the Defense
Consultative Talks (DCT), port ship visits, and direct
interaction between
the two navies.

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
INCSEA, as a tool of strategic engagement between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, was a robust tool of
military-to-military interaction between the U.S.
and Soviet navies. An analogous though less comprehensive
agreement, the
MMCA, was signed on 19 January 1998 by U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen and Chinese
Defense Minister General Chi Haotian in
Beijing. The MMCA was intended to foster trust and build
relationships
between the U.S. and Chinese militaries operating in proximity to one
another. This Agreement
provided for two- to three-day annual meetings led
by a high-level military officer from each side, working
groups, and special
meetings typically arranged through military attachés.131 Additionally,
Article IV provided for confidentiality of the meetings, though a
“mutually
agreed upon summary of the proceedings shall be available for release to
third
parties.”132 The MMCA was established as a vehicle for
dialogue with
no specific protocols for behaviour at sea or mechanisms to reduce
incidents. Dr. David
Winkler of the Naval Historical Foundation
appropriately termed the MMCA “INCSEA-lite.”133 The MMCA, though it
represents a confidence-building measure for
ongoing dialogue regarding
military encounters at sea, lacks a framework for risk reduction or real-time
communication.134 While INCSEA represented an Agreement
between two
countries with navies operating on the high seas, the U.S. does not wish to
confer equal status
on the PLA Navy.135 Despite this, there have been
multiple
encounters at sea between the U.S. Navy and the PLA. The
following encounters have been documented,
affirming the need for a more
comprehensive military-to-military agreement:136

October 1994: PLA Air Force fighters were dispatched to intercept the
USS Kitty Hawk’s S-3
Viking aircraft, which was tracking a PLA
nuclear attack submarine; no engagement occurred.
 March 2001: PLA frigate passed in close proximity to surveillance
vessel USNS Bowditch; no
collision occurred.
April 2001: PLA F-8 fighter jet collided with U.S. Navy EP-3; Chinese
pilot killed, EP-3 made an
emergency landing on Hainan Island and
U.S. crew detained.
September 2002: PLA aircraft and ships harassed the unarmed USNS
Bowditch in the Yellow Sea.
November 2007: USS Kitty Hawk sailed through the Taiwan Strait
after departing Hong Kong; the
PRC objected.
March 2009: Multiple PLA aircraft and ships harassed two U.S. Navy
ocean surveillance vessels,
including the USNS Impeccable, in the
Yellow Sea and the South China Sea; no collision
occurred.
June 2009: “Towed sonar array” of USS John S. McCain collided with
a PLA submarine near the
Philippines.
December 2013: PLA ship had a near-collision with USS Cowpens in
the South China Sea.

In nearly two decades, the EP-3 incident represents the only case in
which there was loss of life, and no
ship-to-ship collisions have occurred to
date. PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu maintained that the EP-3/F-8
collision might not have been avoidable, but that the PLA acted
professionally and no Chinese soldiers
approached the EP-3 upon landing
for an hour.137 Zhu stated,
“the Chinese do not create crises, only make
responses.”138
The EP-3 incident created a broader diplomatic crisis
between the U.S. and China beyond strictly military
implications. The delay
in resolution of the incident highlighted the weakness of the MMCA.
Personal interviews with Chinese and Western experts reveal ambivalent
views on the impact of the MMCA,
though there is a consensus regarding
the inability to establish a true INCSEA in the U.S.–China context.
Randall
Schriver, Senior Country Director for the PRC, Taiwan and Mongolia in the
Office of the Secretary
of Defense from 1997 to 1998, played a pivotal role
in the drafting and negotiation of the MMCA. Schriver
maintained that the
MMCA arose in response to the October 1994 Kitty Hawk incident. The
MMCA was
distinct from the INCSEA Agreement, as “we did not want the
appearance of a Cold War
relationship.”139 A more comprehensive
INCSEA-like agreement
between the U.S. and China would be, according
to Dr. Tom Bickford of the Center for Naval Analyses, “a
real non-starter
with the Chinese because it smacks of China as a declared enemy. We have
to frame the
dialogue in a different way. It might take a serious incident to
establish it.”140 Paul Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center concurred
with this view, stating “an
INCSEA-like arrangement won’t work here.”141
Dr. Matthieu
Duchatel, formerly of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), noted the value of a
bilateral Sino–U.S. naval
agreement since “the Chinese are taking the risk of incidents more
seriously.
Efforts stem from the Taiwan Strait Crisis. They did not see the
value in avoiding incidents before this.
We are trying to convince the
Chinese that avoiding incidents is in their interest.”142 From the Chinese
perspective, PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu believed
that a positive
feature of the MMCA was its narrow focus on specific issues as well as
recognition of a
need to increase communication between the two
militaries.143
Some U.S. experts have suggested that an INCSEA Agreement with
China would be
beneficial, though they acknowledge the limitations of any
U.S.–China naval accord. Regardless of whatever
incidents agreement
exists, Brad Glosserman has indicated that “accidents will still happen. The
degree to
which frameworks are in place prevents them from becoming
crises.”144 Professor David Shambaugh has pointed out that a U.S.–China
INCSEA will remain a
theoretical proposition only since “the Chinese
refuse an INCSEA.”145 Regardless of the likelihood of an INCSEA, Dr.
David Winkler suggests that “signing a
US–China INCSEA, upgrading the
current MMCA, or just maintaining the status quo does little to enhance
bilateral relations if there is non-compliance.”146 At this
time, views
regarding the value of establishing a true INCSEA agreement between the
U.S. and China are
largely moot, since no such framework seems likely in
the foreseeable future.
Limited data is available on results of MMCA plenary meetings due to
the confidential nature of the
discussions themselves. In the period from
1998 through 2013, these meetings occurred in July 1998, May
2000, April
2002, April 2003, July 2005, August 2006, February 2008, October 2010,
September 2012, and
August 2013.147 It is notable that only 10 plenary
meetings
took place within a span of 16 years. By contrast, annual INCSEA
reviews occurred continuously from its
inception through 2013. Two special
meetings of the MMCA occurred in September 2001 and August 2009. The
first of these was in response to the April 2001 EP-3 incident; the second
arose out of the March and June
2009 maritime incidents previously
described.148 Actual
results from MMCA meetings were nominal. Although
a May 1999 naval working group discussed maritime
communication
protocols, the topic was still under discussion at an MMCA plenary session
in August 2006
without implementation.149 The U.S. and China held “the
first
combined exercise under the MMCA, a search and rescue exercise
(SAREX) … after eight years of
talks.”150 When China suggested
amending the MMCA and sought
information on upcoming naval exercises
at the February 2008 plenary, the U.S. rejected discussion of
“policy and
planning” issues within the context of MMCA.151
Recent efforts to reinvigorate the MMCA took the form of a November
2014 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the U.S. and China
announced during President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing. While the text
of
the agreement refers to the MMCA, in fact the MOU is non-binding
under international law in accordance with
Section V and “is made without
prejudice to either Side’s policy perspective on military activities in the
Exclusive Economic Zone.”152 PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu
articulated the Chinese perspective regarding American military
reconnaissance activities within China’s
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
stating “China is OK with some reconnaissance flights, but the U.S. has
been
unwilling to decrease the pace and intensity of reconnaissance flights.
It makes China believe that the
U.S. is preparing for war against China.”153
China
consistently demonstrates extreme sensitivity to U.S. reconnaissance
near its shores, believing that such
activities violate its sovereignty.
The U.S. policy regarding freedom of operation on and over international
waters
was articulated by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan
Greenert in September 2014 at a meeting held
at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in Washington, D.C. When asked about diminishing
the
tempo of U.S. reconnaissance flights near China, Greenert responded
“There is no intention that I am aware
of to do that. We’re flying in
international airspace. China comes and steams in our Exclusive Economic
Zone. We don’t make a big deal out of it. The Russians have in the Cold
War flown in international
airspace, so this is not new.”154 Although the
MOU does not
resolve the issue of military operations within the EEZ,
Commander Leah Bray of the U.S. Navy opined that
the language in the
MOU “created the space necessary to achieve an outcome that maximizes
operational
safety.”155 A current U.S. Navy officer who has worked on
Asia
strategy at the Pentagon said, “these agreements do reduce operational risk
or provide a legal
framework to complain from. We are very particular
about whether we are within or outside territorial
waters.”156 The
distinction between territorial waters (12
nautical miles) and the EEZ (200
nautical miles) is crucial to this discussion.
The origin of increased U.S. surveillance off the Chinese coast dates back
to fall 2000 after a study
conducted on EP-3 deployment recommended
diminishing coverage of Russia and shifting of surveillance assets
to
China.157 There was a large increase in the frequency of
surveillance flights
of China at the end of the Clinton administration, leading to a Chinese
protest at
these activities at the May 2000 MMCA meeting in Hawaii.158
In
September 2015, the U.S. and China agreed to an annex to the 2014 MOU
entitled, “Rules of Behavior for
Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters.”159 The
agreement intends to
promote safe aviation practices between military
aircraft of the two countries. The MMCA is specifically
mentioned as a
possible channel of communication to discuss “improvement measures”
related to unsafe air
encounters.160 The issue of the sanctity of what China
regards as its domain remains an important point of contention. According
to Drew Thompson, who directed
China policy at the Pentagon from 2011
to 2018, the MMCA “does what it’s supposed to do. The Chinese invest
in
it as well and take it seriously. They hold those meetings promptly and
enthusiastically. At that level,
operational safety is a key mission priority.
They’ve also received a set of clear signals from their
leadership that the
Chinese side doesn’t want an unsafe incident to create a crisis.”161 Since the
inception of the 2014 MOU and the 2015 annex, the MMCA has
“been
improved qualitatively …”162
In conclusion, though the two countries have agreed upon the MMCA
and have recently established the MOU,
these do not represent INCSEA-
equivalent accords. Neither side wishes to establish a true INCSEA at this
time. The U.S. does not want to confer equality of status on the Chinese
Navy, and China regards INCSEA as
a Cold War-era agreement. Only 10 of
16 annual plenary meetings have occurred under the MMCA, representing
a
limited commitment to continuity. In the absence of a true INCSEA accord
in which the navies of the two
countries can interact separate from direct
political interference, the prospect of robust
military-to-military interaction
as achieved by INCSEA cannot be realized.

Defense Consultative Talks (DCT)

The Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) were launched in 1997 and
convened for the 15th time in October 2014
in Washington, D.C.163
However, the DCT has not convened
since 2014. The DCT is a formal high-
level dialogue between the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and
a Chinese Deputy Chief of General Staff. The purpose of the DCT has been
to provide the militaries of
the U.S. and China a forum to
discuss critical defense-related issues at a relatively high level. The talks are also intended to
set the
coming year’s agenda of bilateral defense exchanges and provide a forum for candid
dialogue that can reduce
misunderstanding and the possibility of miscalculation between the
two militaries.164

The DCT was suspended several times, all following major U.S.–China
events (1999 Belgrade incident, 2001
EP-3 incident, 2008 Taiwan arms
sales). Although to date no significant public agreements have resulted
from
the DCT process, it has been one component of high-level military-to-
military dialogue.
The U.S. and China expressed disparate views as to the inherent value of
the DCT. Former Under Secretary of
Defense Douglas Feith presided over
multiple DCT meetings on behalf of the U.S. during the presidency of
George W. Bush. Feith is sceptical of the notion that dialogues such as the
DCT are innately beneficial:
“I’m not sure that talk is inherently good.
Sometimes it is not good, sometimes it is harmful. If it winds
up being
misleading, it can be part of a deception.”165 Feith
perceives an important
aspect of military-to-military dialogue as disabusing China of incorrect
ideas they
might possess about U.S. thoughts, capabilities, and intentions.
He relates that Americans who read Chinese
military literature find that
Chinese military officers often write articles that inaccurately portray U.S.
intentions. Therefore, “it is generally in our interest for the Chinese to know
what our intentions are
rather than to indulge in erroneous views about
us.”166 The
DCT has served as a vehicle for the U.S. to convey reassuring
messages to China, although many in China
believe that the U.S. is
disingenuous.
American participants in the DCT convey the notion that the quality of
dialogue is equally important to the
quantity. Feith notes that U.S.–China
military-to-military dialogues are one-sided since Chinese
interlocutors are
reticent to share information: “they tend to be very disciplined and
bureaucratic …
they’re giving us talking points. They’re not actually
talking with us.”167 According to Feith, American participants at U.S.–
China dialogues do not gain
insights into the thought processes of their
Chinese counterparts: “they’re happy to learn what they can
learn. They’re
not looking to communicate very much.”168
Michael Schiffer, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia under President Obama who
participated in the DCT process, delivered a 2011 address on the
importance of the U.S.–China military-to-military relationship. He began
with his assertion that “the
military-to-military relationship is a critical
component of the broader U.S.–China
relationship.”169 Schiffer articulated
six guiding principles
for the military-to-military relationship presented by
the U.S. to the PLA at the 2011 DCT: “mutual
respect,” “mutual trust,”
“reciprocity,” “mutual interests,” “continuous dialogue,” and “mutual risk
reduction.”170 Along with this, the stated four U.S. goals
which he felt were
in the interest of both countries were: “clear and consistent lines of
communication,”
“increase the safety of both U.S. and Chinese military
personnel,” “greater insight into the military
capabilities, intentions and
doctrine of the other,” and “engage as a responsible power in the region
globally and locally.”171 Finally, Schiffer stated, “China
will need to buy
into the framework and the logic … for the military-military relationship for
its own
reasons and in pursuit of its own interests, not because we ask them
to.”172 U.S. officials continuously searched for commonality of purpose in
DCT discussions.
The DCT historically has played a role as the “highest
recurring policy dialogue with authoritative
positions presented by both
sides … designed to build mutual understanding of the other side, not a
workshop to try to solve problems.”173 The talks did not
occur in 2015 and
2016 since multiple iterations of the SSD transpired biannually, particularly
given
rising tensions in the South China Sea and a desire by the Obama
administration to convene talks to improve
relations.174 The DCT will not
convene in 2019 and no
decision regarding its status for 2020 has been
made at this time.175
By contrast to the American position, Chinese military officials regularly
articulate three obstacles to
improved U.S.–China military relations, namely
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, American reconnaissance ships and
aircraft
operating within China’s exclusive economic zone, and the NDAA of
2000.176 After the 10th round of the DCT in 2009, appraisal of progress by
Chinese experts was overall negative:
“The distrust between the militaries often results in political, economic or diplomatic pressure
for both
China and the US,’ said Tao Wenzhao, a senior expert on US studies at the Chinese
Academy of Social
Sciences. ‘But stern actions often lead to nothing. The two nations still
need an open, candid and frank
channel on the road to military mutual trust.”177

Until such time as American and Chinese goals for a successful military-to-
military relationship are
aligned, the outlook for a sustained engagement
between the two countries will be in doubt.

Port ship visits and other military-to-military interactions

Port ship visits are one important mechanism in building meaningful
interaction between the militaries of
the U.S. and China. Analysis of port
visits between the two countries from 1995 to 2014 indicates a total
of 21
ship visits, 15 of these being U.S. ships to Chinese ports and 6 being
Chinese ships to U.S. ports.178 From 1995 to 2005, one to
two ship visits
occurred per year with the exception of 1999, when no visits were recorded.
While three
visits occurred in 2006, there was an absence of visits in 2007–
2008 as well as from 2010 to
2012.179 Of note was a ship visit by U.S.
Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel in April 2014, when he toured the
Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, meeting
with senior PLA officials as well
as more junior crewmen.180
In a reciprocal activity in May 2014, PLA
General Fang Fenghui toured the aircraft carrier USS Ronald
Reagan and
met with Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command.181 In July 2014, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Chief of
Naval
Operations, met with Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander of the PLA
Navy. During this visit, Greenert met with
Liaoning crewmembers and
toured PLA ships.182 A
benefit of ship visits is the trust-building
mechanism afforded by interaction between naval personnel of
the two
countries. According to Randall Schriver, U.S. naval officers “have an
impact on younger PLA
officers. They make a strong impression.”183
Despite their
perceived value, ship visits have declined of late related to
tensions in the U.S.–China relationship and
anti-government protests in
Hong Kong. During the summer of 2019, China twice denied port calls to
U.S.
Navy ships in Hong Kong and refused permission for a U.S. Navy ship
to dock in Qingdao.184
In a demonstration of naval cooperation, China participated for the first
time in the summer 2014 Rim of
the Pacific (RIMPAC), a large multi-
national naval exercise off the coasts of Hawaii and southern
California.
The PLA Navy sent four ships as part of this exercise: “the destroyer
Haikou, the
frigate Yueyang, the supply ship Qiandaohu, and the hospital
ship Peace
Ark.”185 Immediately following RIMPAC 2014, all of these
vessels except for the Peace Ark engaged in a mock search and rescue drill.
China had declined to
formally observe RIMPAC in previous years. In a
curious move, the Chinese sent an uninvited AGI 853
Dongdiao spy ship to
collect signals intelligence in addition to the invited ships.186 Additionally,
China has declined to participate in Pacific Airlift
Rally and Pacific
Endeavor, both Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) exercises. In the
Pacific Reach
submarine exercise, China declined to participate but did
observe.187 In a sign of increased naval operational engagement, China
expanded its participation
in RIMPAC in 2016, sending five ships and
1,200 personnel.188
American experts generally view China’s participation
in multilateral naval exercises as a positive action
since “they place PRC
military forces in a setting where they are expected to work together with
the United
States and its friends and allies.”189 However, this
sentiment is
not universally shared. A notable long-time China expert for the U.S.
Congressional Research
Service, Shirley Kan, is sharply critical of Chinese
RIMPAC participation, believing that PLA participation
is inappropriate
given China’s expansionist moves in the South China Sea.190 The U.S.
disinvited China from participation in RIMPAC in 2018, citing objections
to
Chinese militarization of features in the South China Sea.191
Nonetheless, China deployed an AGI surveillance vessel to monitor the
exercises.192
In addition to ship visits, exchanges of military officers between the U.S.
and
China are a potentially valuable mechanism of enhancing the military-
to-military relationship. When
officers from the U.S. National Defense
University (NDU) travel to China, they can evaluate the PLA
firsthand (see
Appendix 5).193 The reverse also applies for
visits by PLA officers to the
U.S. Although there are agreements in place for exchanges between the
U.S.
Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and Naval
War College with China’s Academy of Military
Sciences and other military
institutions, these exchanges have been infrequent.194 In May 2018,
however, PLA general officers enrolled in the “Dragons” course at
China’s
NDU visited the U.S.195 Additional exchanges involve
the National
Defense Science and Technology University and the PLA’s Science and
Engineering University
with the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.196
A study on U.S.–China military engagement emphasized the
asymmetries involving military exchanges between
noncommissioned
officers:
U.S. observers point out that when PLA personnel study in the United States, they generally
take the same
courses as U.S. military personnel do and are housed in common facilities
where they can intermingle. By
contrast, in China, U.S. military personnel live in separate
barracks and study in courses designed to
separate them from contact with Chinese officers
and soldiers. Such a situation undermines the basic
reciprocity that undergirds and legitimizes
military exchanges.197

These discrepancies diminish the opportunity for development of

interpersonal relationships between
military officers of the two countries.
Additionally, interaction between U.S. and Chinese military
delegations is
very important for confidence-building. As pointed out in a monograph by
Allen and McVadon,
“the better the relationship and the more delegations
that visit China, the more opportunities there are
for US military attachés in
China to have contact with the PLA to discuss issues of interest. These
attachés provide the long-term, as well as day-to-day contact between the
two militaries.”198 Increased contact between officers of the two militaries
has the
potential to breed familiarity and diminish misperceptions of
counterparts.
In order to cultivate improved military-to-military ties, regional analysts
and leaders have suggested that
the U.S. and China cultivate non-traditional
security collaboration. Former American military officer Paul
Haenle
recommends “putting at center stage areas where we have common interests
and objectives.”199 Potential areas of cooperation include joint naval
exercises for
counter-piracy as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR).200 After the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,
China was disparaged for a weak
response. Critics included the late former
Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, who stated “the
Americans
brought the most and did the most. U.S. hard power magnified its soft
power … We can expect China
to develop its soft-power
competitiveness.”201 This event
may well have motivated China’s
commissioning of the medical ship Peace
Ark, which was launched in 2007
and conducted its first exercises at sea in March 2009.202
The U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy have both independently conducted
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden, with the shared mission of
maintaining safe and open sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Although
PLAN vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden are distinct from the
multinational Combined Task Force (CTF)
151 established in 2009, they
have occasionally intercepted vessels on behalf of CTF 151. However, joint
counter-piracy exercises between the two navies have yet to transpire.203
Since China’s economy is heavily dependent on petroleum imports and
exports by sea,
Beijing has a strong vested interest in maintaining safe,
secure and open SLOCs. This mutual concern for
the U.S. and China is a
valuable motivator for enhancing cooperative efforts between the two
navies.

Structural imbalances impacting quality of military-to-military

interactions
Structural imbalances have constrained U.S.–China military-to-military
relations. As stated by Ambassador
Chas Freeman, “we are still dealing
with China as if it were a purely regional power; we need to rethink
that.”204 These comments reflect Freeman’s assessment that
the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) (renamed
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
or USINDOPACOM in May 2018)
inappropriately have primary responsibility over the day-to-day functions of
U.S.–China military relations. PACOM is a regional combatant command
with a circumscribed portfolio and DIA
serves an intelligence function and
does not have a military international relations staff. Instead,
Freeman feels
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should take the lead in the diplomatic
and intelligence
functions of U.S.–China military relations, reflecting their
global nature.205
Structural imbalance is repeatedly brought up as an impediment to
improved U.S.–China military relations.
Dr. James Mulvenon pointed out
that the structural parity which prevailed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
that enabled arms control does not exist between the U.S. and China.206
Similarly, Dr. Douglas Paal perceives an “institutional mismatch” between
the U.S.
and Chinese systems which is a significant source of the structural
imbalance. Since the Chinese military
is organized differently than the U.S.
military, there is considerable difficulty in having “the right
dialogue among
the right people” in order to achieve a successful result.207 Randall
Schriver, who participated in drafting the MMCA, describes absence of
contact
with operational PLA personnel as a significant problem; “you can’t
get the right people to the
meetings.”208 American analysts often describe
the PLA
representatives at U.S.–China military dialogues as “barbarian
handlers” whose connection to frontline PLA
personnel is limited and
whose function is to gather intelligence and promote CCP political
objectives.
Structural imbalance as an impediment to effective U.S.–China military
dialogue
presents itself in the area of crisis communication as well. PLA
Major General Zhu Chenghu admitted to
structural difficulty in the Chinese
military regarding the issue of crisis management. He noted that “the
Chinese are short on crisis management experience, but are learning.”209
An illustration of failure in crisis management was the inability of the U.S.
to
establish telephone contact with the Chinese in the course of the EP-3
crisis. According to Dr. Michael
Green, “the EP-3 incident showed the
Pentagon’s misperception of relations with China
bureaucratically.”210
Crisis management is a vital goal of
strategic engagement. Confidence-
building and a mature military-to-military relationship are critical to
preventing a minor incident from escalating into a major military
confrontation.
From the Chinese perspective, an important issue impacting upon the
scope of U.S.–China
military-to-military interactions is the 2000 NDAA
adopted by the U.S. Congress. Section 1201 deals with
“Limitation on
Military-to-Military Exchanges and Contacts with Chinese People’s
Liberation Army” (see
Appendix 7).211 It enumerates 12 areas in which the
U.S.
military is prohibited from granting “inappropriate exposure” to the
PLA including joint military
exercises, arms sales or technology transfers,
and disclosure of classified data.212 According to Roy Kamphausen, a
former U.S. military attaché to
Beijing and a senior advisor at The National
Bureau of Asian Research, “the U.S. is constrained by law in
the types of
exchanges in which the Secretary of Defense can accept risk.”213
Additionally, Kamphausen states:
Both sides tend to think the other side learns more than one’s own side learns. This is curious,
and can be
a disincentive to deepened ties. I’ve had an acquaintance in the [PLA] General
Staff Department tell me
that top operational leaders in the PLA absolutely believe that U.S.
information-gathering during exchanges
is better than the PLA’s, and this dampens
enthusiasm for exchanges.214

The U.S. and China assign intelligence value to military contacts, but it is
clear that there is distrust
on both sides which significantly constrains
military-to-military relations.
Numerous experts from the U.S. and China have noted the divergence in
how the U.S. and China view
military-to-military issues. As stated by
Ambassador Chas Freeman, “the Chinese think differently than we
do.
They think inductively, we think deductively.”215
Professor Michael Yahuda
similarly points out that “the difference in perceptions and conceptions of
reasonable behaviour between the U.S. and China makes it more difficult to
reach
understandings.”216 Professor Oriana Mastro concurs,
emphasizing
that “the Chinese focus on regional security,
217
地区安全
(diqu anquan), while
the U.S. focuses on
regional safety.” While China is concerned about the
regional balance of power and substantial American military presence in
their near abroad, the U.S.
prioritizes the upholding of principles of
freedom of navigation as well as its
Asian alliances and partnerships. For a
successful military-to-military relationship, the U.S. and China
need a
common outlook. According to Paul Haenle, “the vision for the region
needs to be aligned between the
U.S. and China on the military/security
side.”218 While there
is wide agreement on the divergence of outlook
between the U.S. and China in the military sphere, there are
fewer
suggestions for how to bridge the divide.
Finkelstein has noted a fundamental difference in approach to military-
to-military engagement between the
U.S. and China. The Chinese paradigm
is “top down” beginning with “agreement on strategic issues,” which
leads
to “understanding and trust,” thereby allowing “specific initiatives.”219 The
U.S., by contrast, employs a “bottom up” paradigm, beginning with
proposal of
“specific initiatives,” which “builds understanding and trust,”
thereby helping to “resolve strategic
disagreement.”220 The Chinese
military thus views resolution
of contentious strategic issues as a
prerequisite for productive strategic engagement, while the U.S. views
resolution of these contentious issues as the ultimate byproduct of strategic
engagement.
Marked differences of opinion still exist regarding the importance of the
military-to-military
relationship, both among experts within China and the
U.S., as well as between the two governments. The
Chinese have employed
military-to-military relations as an avenue to “vent dissatisfaction with
overall US
policy … when a political decision to sell arms to Taiwan takes
place, mil-to-mil has suffered, while other
parts of the overall relationship
are relatively unaffected.”221 Dr. Tom Bickford notes that “China wants to
sacrifice mil-to-mil when they want to
protest Taiwan. However, they don’t
want to harm other aspects of the relationship.”222 From the Chinese
perspective, PLA Major General Yao Yunzhu maintains
that continuing the
military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and China is important,
stating “it
is no longer cost-free to break off mil-to-mil relations. Now, if we
don’t have improved military
relations, the two countries could develop a
crisis.”223 Dr.
Teng Jianqun indicated that the military-to-military
relationship is positive, though “there is still no
clear roadmap for us to
cooperate.”224 By contrast, Dr.
Douglas Paal is less positive about the
dividends accrued from U.S.–China military-to-military relations,
as “U.S.–
China strategic competition has not been converted into anything less
dangerous.”225 Though neither side wishes to discontinue dialogue, the
inertial
quality of U.S.–China military relations continues without realistic
proposals on how to break the logjam.
For successful strategic engagement, both militaries need to believe that a
strong military-to-military
relationship is in their mutual interests. For much
of the last two decades, military-to-military relations
between the U.S. and
China have been a “political football” which is sacrificed to express
displeasure.226 It is widely regarded that the U.S. has
valued the military-to-
military relationship far more than China. As previously stated, though
China had
suspended military contacts with the U.S. on multiple prior
occasions as a retaliatory measure, the U.S.
only initiated suspension once
after the 2001 EP-3 incident. PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu articulated
the
Chinese perspective succinctly when he said, “mil-to-mil should not be
sacrificed first if anything happens with U.S.–China relations.”227 PLA
Major General Yao Yunzhu concurs, stating (translated from Mandarin) that
the
U.S. and China “ought to put more effort to cooperate so good things
can happen, not just prevent negative
things from happening.”228 Despite
these positive statements
by PLA representatives, the Chinese practice of
repeated cancellations of mil-to-mil activities to express
displeasure belies
these sentiments.
Several American participants in strategic engagement with China noted
the importance of steady emphasis of
priority issues in achieving success.
For instance, cybersecurity expert Dr. James Lewis of CSIS suggested
that
“every high-level visitor has to raise cyber” in their discussions with
Chinese counterparts as a way
to convey its importance to the American
security agenda.229
Chad Sbragia of the China Strategic Focus Group at
U.S. Pacific Command cites “consistent and persistent
messaging,
coherence, and continuity of rationale” as well as avoidance of new talking
points as essential
elements in U.S.–China military-to-military relations.230
A
significant barrier is the frequent turnover in assignments for U.S.
military personnel as well as the
American election cycle, both of which
undermine continuous policy messaging and forging of personal
rapport
between high-level officers.
 An important concept is the relationship of military officers to
government officials in China. The PLA is
subordinate to the Chinese
Communist Party and their interests are largely aligned. Therefore, “there
are
no civil-military relations in China … only relations between the
military and nonmilitary elements of the
CCP.”231 The principal goal of the
PLA is to ensure the
continuity of the regime as well as to defend “national
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”232 By contrast, the U.S. military,
though clearly under the control of
the commander-in-chief, is a national
force and not an arm of a political party. It is important to
acknowledge the
military-to-military activities that China does not engage in. The PLA does
not establish
customary military alliances.
In summary, there is a gross misalignment of objectives and structural
balance between the U.S. and China
impairing the quality of the military-to-
military relationship. Objectives of strategic engagement are
disparate
between the two countries. The U.S. values the military-to-military
relationship as a means of
strategic engagement to improve relations
between the two countries and garner stability in the region. By
contrast,
China historically has not valued the military-to-military relationship,
perceiving its primary
value as gleaning information and venting
dissatisfaction with the U.S. Proof of the difference in
perceived value of
the military-to-military relationship is the fact that China has cancelled
military-to-military contacts on numerous occasions, while the U.S. has
only once cancelled such contacts.
Additionally, the markedly different
structure of the two countries’ militaries contributes to difficulties
in
establishing an effective military-to-military relationship. Though the
military-to-military interaction
between the U.S. and China has been poor, it
does show some signs of promise. There has been limited
exposure to naval
attachés on both sides. Certainly, ship-to-ship visits and exchange of naval
personnel have transpired periodically for many years. Recently, the
Chinese have
also participated to a limited degree in joint naval exercises.

Communication issues impacting upon quality of military-to-

military interactions
Failure of communication between the U.S. and Chinese militaries has been
a consistent theme which must be
addressed. This was most glaring during
the April 2001 EP-3 incident. In addition to the Chinese refusal to
pick up
the phone after the incident, the U.S. was initially unable to ascertain the
status of the crew.
During the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident, the U.S.
was only able to speak with Chinese
counterparts after a significant delay.
According to Dr. Andrew Scobell regarding the issue of
communication, “it
is hard to know if things are improving.”233 It is obvious that, in addition to
tools for communication, the cooperation and will
by both sides to
communicate freely needs to be established. China acknowledged the
importance of effective
military-to-military communication in the 2008
white paper, announcing “the two countries have formally
established a
telephone link between China’s Ministry of National Defense and the US
Department of Defense
…”234 Clear communication channels between the
U.S. and
Chinese militaries must be created in times of peace so that they
are readily available during times of
conflict.
Christopher Twomey puts forth an important hypothesis relating to
communication between two nations which
has specific relevance to the
U.S.–China case study. He posits a compelling theory which can lead to
bilateral communication failure. In his doctrinal-difference misperception
hypothesis, “when two nations
have different theories of victory, they will
be more likely to misperceive each other’s relative
capabilities, and these
misperceptions will raise the risk of underestimation of the adversary.”235
Twomey points out that, particularly in the context of the Taiwan
Strait, it is
crucial to evaluate the signals the U.S. sends to Beijing, and vice versa.
Communication
extends far beyond verbal means and also relates to
military actions. When the U.S. deployed aircraft
carriers near Taiwan in
1996, the U.S. may have perceived these actions as defensive in character;
China,
by contrast, perceives this as a naval offensive maneuver. Twomey
suggests that “rather than deploying a
carrier as a signal, the United States
might do better to deploy a half-dozen nuclear-attack submarines.
Rather
than surging bombers, an emphasis on tactical fighter aircraft is likely to be
more persuasive” with
China.236 If two countries view situations through
divergent
“military lenses,” there is increased potential for “misperception
and miscommunication in the conduct of
their diplomacy and statecraft
…”237 Despite Twomey’s
assertions, it is nearly impossible to determine
how China would respond to different military signals by
the U.S. in any
given context. However, Twomey highlights the dangers of mirror-imaging
in formulating
security policy. Strategic engagement can be a valuable
vehicle for better discerning the military lenses
and theories of victory of
one’s counterpart. The more the militaries interact with one another, the
greater the potential for mutual understanding.
Relative to Twomey’s doctrinal difference theory, signalling by the U.S.
military to China has not been effective and has increased mistrust. When
the U.S. conducts joint naval
exercises with allies in the Asia-Pacific, the
signal sent to China is threat and encirclement. A poll in
the Chinese
newspaper Global Times in 2010 revealed that “81.6 percent of the Chinese
public
believed that the United States either had the intention or both had
the intention and showed the behavior
of containment against China …”238
An indication of the
contentious nature of U.S.-coordinated naval exercises
is the corresponding response by China’s PLA,
holding
seven military exercises, including a live-fire exercise near the Yellow Sea by the artillery
troops of the
Nanjing Military Region, and a joint live-fire exercise by the destroyers from
China’s three major fleets,
the East China Sea Fleet, the North China Sea Fleet, and the South
China Sea Fleet.239

While both the U.S. and China contend that their military exercises are
peaceful and defensive in nature,
“the main problem with provocative
exercising is the fear it generates that a real attack might be launched
under
the guise of an exercise.”240 U.S. military exercises
in the region have often
been the prelude to retaliatory Chinese exercises in response, unfortunately
contributing to a zero-sum conception of security in the Asia-Pacific region.
In summary, there has been poor communication between the U.S. and
China. Verbal communication has failed
at times of dangerous incidents as
detailed above. Non-verbal communication has been equally poor, with
U.S. naval exercises regarded by China as threatening messaging. As
pointed out by Twomey, the U.S. and
China have different “military
lenses,” which largely has not been acknowledged by the U.S. and has led
to
poor signalling. At many of the high-level bilateral meetings, the U.S.
regards China as conveying standard
points of contention without an
effective dialogue resulting.
 The foregoing analysis of the diplomatic and military-to-military
instruments of U.S.–China strategic
engagement reveals a mixed picture.
While outward intentions are positive in many instances, concrete
results
have yet to be achieved in the most critical and sensitive areas of the
bilateral relationship.
However, in order for engagement to be successful, it
must be pursued with consistency, as “engagement is
much more than
talking or even formally negotiating. It is a lengthy, multilevel process
measured in years,
not months …”241 An overall assessment of U.S.–China
diplomatic and military-to-military interactions to date is negative.
Quality of U.S.–China Diplomatic and Military-to -Military Interaction
value: Negative

Political impact upon strategic engagement efforts

While military-to-military relations ideally should be insulated from the ebb
and flow of political events,
the U.S. and China have frequently found it
difficult to compartmentalize the
two.242 In the post-1989 period, there have
been numerous
delays or suspensions of U.S.–China military contacts in
response to political and military incidents. There
were several major
contentious events in 1995 and 1996 which disrupted the forward
momentum begun with the
Freeman and Perry visits of 1993 and 1994,
respectively. The first was the granting of a U.S. visa to
Taiwanese
President Lee Teng-hui to speak at Cornell University on 9 June 1995. The
announcement of the
decision to grant the visa in May caused the Chinese
to cut short a U.S. visit by PLA Air Force Commander
Lieutenant General
Yu Zhenwu.243 Shortly thereafter, from 21 to
28 July 1995, the PLA fired
M-9 ballistic missiles toward the East China Sea.244 There was no direct
U.S. military response to this action. However, the 8–15 March 1996
firing
of short-range ballistic missiles by the PLA into the Taiwan Strait led to the
U.S. deployment of two
aircraft carriers, the USS Nimitz and the USS
Independence, off the eastern coast of
Taiwan.245 The U.S. was acting
under Section 2 of the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act, whereby the U.S.
committed “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any
resort
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the
social or economic
system, of the people on Taiwan.”246 This series of
incidents
led Secretary of Defense Perry to curtail the number and level of
military-to-military exchanges, with the
only high-level American visit to
China by Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe occurring in June
1996.247 Though postponed, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian
visited
the U.S. in December 1996, meeting with President Clinton, receiving a
U.S. draft proposal for what
would become the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and agreeing to initiate the Defense
Consultative Talks.248
Two significant events subsequently transpired which derailed U.S.–
China military-to-military relations. The
first of these was the 7 May 1999
accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces
under
U.S. command, which resulted in Chinese suspension of military-to-
military contacts. High-level exchanges did
not resume again until the
January 2000 visit to the U.S. by PLA Lieutenant General Xiong
Guangkai.249 According to Paul Haenle, “military-to-military
relations
really suffered after Belgrade with suspicion and mistrust.”250 The Chinese
believed that the Belgrade attack was intentional, while the U.S.
steadfastly
maintained that it was a wartime accident. The second major incident
involved the 1 April 2001
collision of a Chinese F-8 fighter jet with a U.S.
EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea,
leading to the death
of the Chinese pilot, an emergency landing of the EP-3 on Hainan Island,
and the
detention of the American crewmen.251 As stated by Dr. Andrew
Scobell, U.S. Ambassador to China Admiral Prueher tried to reach someone
at the Ministry of National Defense,
but the Chinese did not pick up the
phone.252 Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the U.S. military
to suspend contacts with the Chinese military on 30 April
2001. Douglas
Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President George W.
Bush, said that
Secretary Rumsfeld felt that it was important to deliver a
strong message that the
U.S. would not allow itself to be intimidated by the
Chinese.253 The White House lifted the suspension shortly thereafter on 3
May 2001.254 Though China had suspended military contacts with the U.S.
on multiple
previous occasions as a retaliatory measure, this represented the
first time since 1993 that the U.S.
initiated the suspension.
In the last decade, suspensions of U.S.–China military-to-military ties by
China have followed announcements
of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. After
the September and November 2007 notifications to the U.S. Congress of
upcoming sales of missiles and P-3C patrol aircraft, China decided to
cancel an October 2007 MMCA
meeting.255 An October 2008 notification
of U.S. intention to
sell missiles, aircraft spare parts, and attack helicopters
to Taiwan prompted Chinese suspension of “some
military meetings and
port visits …”256 Though China rebuffed a
December 2008 attempt to
restore military ties, the military relationship resumed in February
2009.257
Although Taiwan previously assumed centre stage in Sino–U.S. military
relations, this issue has receded
somewhat from the foreground in recent
years. Professor Lora Saalman, formerly of the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, relayed that U.S.–China Track 1.5 nuclear dialogues
shifted from a singular focus in 2004
on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a
form of proliferation to little mention from 2008 onward.258 Saalman sees
this as evidence of maturation in the
military-to-military relationship, but
that improvement is also attributable to the Taiwan presidency of Ma
Ying-
jeou, whose tenure began in May 2008. A January 2010 notification of
intention by President Obama to
sell missiles, helicopters, and mine hunting
ships to Taiwan prompted a limited delay of military-to-military
ties by
China.259 The January 2011 visit by Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates to
Beijing was tantamount to full restoration of U.S.–China military relations.
The support of high-level civilian leadership is essential for robust
strategic engagement between the U.S.
and Chinese militaries that does not
fall victim to the vicissitudes of bilateral relations. Presidential
leadership in
the U.S. and China is required “to break inertia and push mil-to-mil forward
to get to other
areas of the bilateral relationship,” suggested Paul Haenle.260
Despite any assertions that military-to-military relations can be conducted
entirely apart from political
activities, this is not a realistic proposition. As
stated by Dr. Matthieu Duchatel, “only political will
matters. The overall
political relationship is most important.”261 Regional Track 1.5/2 convener
Brad Glosserman concurs, stating “the degree to which
Chinese leadership
and President Xi push the agenda, the military gets in line.”262 Former PLA
Navy officer and U.S. analyst Dr. Teng Jianqun is optimistic that “the new
leaders are more active in promoting mil-to-mil exchanges. This will give
military diplomacy much more energy
to go further.”263 Most assessments
of President Xi Jinping to
date have indicated that he wields greater control
over the PLA than his predecessors. Former President Obama
redoubled
American commitment to strengthening the military relationship with China
during his meetings with President Xi. President Xi has similarly committed
to
strengthening military relations with the U.S. during the Obama
administration.
The inability of the Chinese to separate the military-to-military
relationship from the political environment
is best summarized as follows:
“China’s approach to military diplomacy is largely tied into its political
agenda; therefore, when dealing with the PLA or when looking at China’s
military diplomacy activities as a
whole, one must also consider Beijing’s
larger political agenda.”264 From the Chinese perspective, as stated by PLA
Major General Zhu Chenghu, the U.S. is
responsible for all of the
downturns in U.S.–China military relations except for the Tiananmen
incident.265 The empirical record belies this hyperbolic and
nationalistic
assessment, as both countries bear responsibility for disruptions to U.S.–
China strategic
engagement. Former NSC China Director Paul Haenle
stated a familiar U.S. viewpoint that the “Chinese
leadership has used mil-
to-mil to buffer the fallout from certain instances between us; they have
allowed it
to bleed into political relations.”266 The record shows that
China
has been too willing to sacrifice the military-to-military relationship for
political purposes.
In summary, the issue of separation of defence diplomacy from politics
between the U.S. and China has been
poor. The numerous cancellations of
military-to-military relations, mostly initiated by Beijing, demonstrate
that
China places strategic engagement at a low priority level, sacrificed readily
for political
considerations.
Political Impact upon Strategic Engagement Efforts value: Negative

Role of secrecy in strategic engagement

From the earliest covert meeting between Henry Kissinger and Chinese
leaders in 1971 to the clandestine 1989
trip to Beijing by Brent Scowcroft
and Lawrence Eagleburger in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, secrecy
has been a recurring theme in U.S.–China relations. Strategic engagement
efforts have continued the pattern
of discretion in bilateral diplomatic and
military-to-military interactions.
A criticism commonly levelled against China by the U.S. in strategic
engagement is their lack of
transparency. Finkelstein has suggested that the
reticence of the PLA to share information more openly with
the U.S.
military may be attributable to fear of exposing what the Chinese perceive
as operational
limitations or deficiency in military capacity.267 Despite the
fact that the military-to-military relationship has been characterized to date
by Chinese opacity, Bickford
believes it is worth continuing since, although
“reciprocity and transparency are nowhere near where they
should be, they
are improving.”268 Former Under Secretary of
Defense Douglas Feith
stresses the importance of transparency, maintaining that it is essential to
establishing credibility of Chinese statements regarding their military
activities and intentions.269 However, China regards itself as militarily
inferior to the U.S. at this time, and views transparency as a luxury of the
more powerful state. The
optimistic remarks by Chinese defence officials
who were interviewed for this study regarding the
military-to-military
relationship are not in contradiction to the Chinese reluctance to be
transparent. China
is eager to acquire as much intelligence as possible about
the U.S. without disclosing its own military
capabilities.
An additional element of secrecy in U.S.–China strategic engagement is
the confidentiality of proceedings.
Although brief summaries of diplomatic
interchanges such as the S&ED and the DCT are released to the
public,
many aspects of the MMCA, SSD, and Track 1.5/2 discussions remain
private and confidential. While the
goal of secret proceedings may be the
promotion of candour to prevent potential backlash from domestic
audiences in the U.S. and China, there is no way to gauge the tenor of
exchanges at these meetings. Although
secrecy in sensitive negotiations
may have inherent value, absence of open records from dialogues impedes
the
ability of non-participants to assess the progress or lack thereof from
diplomatic interchanges. The only
conclusion that can be reached regarding
the value of secrecy in U.S.–China strategic engagement is that the
dialogues continue and the lines of communication between the two
militaries remain open, albeit with
questionable efficacy.
Role of Secrecy in Strategic Engagement value: Indeterminate
Lessons garnered from U.S.–China strategic engagement
The U.S. and China have been engaged diplomatically since 1972. The two
countries have developed enormous
economic ties which have rendered
them mutually interdependent. The military rise of China has accompanied
its
economic ascent, making China one of the most powerful militaries in
the Asia-Pacific region. The PLA has
evolved from almost a purely ground
force to a modern military with naval, air, nuclear, and cyber components.
China has grown increasingly assertive in its military behaviour, sparking
concern among neighbouring countries
and the U.S. Since circa 2010, this
issue has become particularly acute given provocative Chinese actions in
the South China Sea.
Many experts have emphasized a gross deficiency of trust as an
impediment to successful strategic engagement
between the U.S. and
China. This has been termed strategic distrust.270 The U.S. regards the PLA
as being secretive and nontransparent, directing its military
buildup at the
U.S. and its allies. Despite Chinese denials, the U.S. believes that China’s
goal is to become
the hegemon in Asia. China, by contrast, is deeply
suspicious of U.S. motives, feeling that the U.S. militarily
is the de facto
hegemon and will not relinquish its status to accommodate China’s rise.
However, sceptics
within the U.S. regard the most serious problem
separating the U.S. and China as sharply divergent core
interests in the
Asia-Pacific. The U.S. position is that it seeks a peaceful and stable Asia-
Pacific,
maintenance of freedom of navigation in the East and South China
Seas, and security for regional allies. The
Chinese position is that it seeks to
maintain the stability of the Chinese Communist Party, ultimate unification
with Taiwan, and maximal control over the East and South China
Seas. The
latter issue has become particularly contentious regarding the concept of
A2/AD, which the U.S.
regards as dangerous and a threat to the ability of
the U.S. Navy to navigate freely in these waters. John
Mearsheimer predicts
that an economically and militarily rising China will attempt to intimidate
the U.S. and
“try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region,
much as the United States pushed the European
great powers out of the
Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century … We should expect China
to devise its own
version of the Monroe Doctrine.”271 Recent events in the
South
China Sea with Chinese construction of an airfield in the Spratly
Islands and increasingly bold territorial
claims over South China Sea
features would appear to support Mearsheimer’s views.
The Chinese have been unable to purchase U.S. arms or sensitive
technology since 1989 by virtue of the
Tiananmen Square incident. By
contrast, the U.S. has maintained a policy of selling arms to Taiwan. While
the
U.S. has strong defensive alliances with regional countries, notably
Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines,
China has challenged these
countries based upon conflicting territorial claims. Friction has been
particularly
acute regarding Japan, which the U.S. strongly supports and
with which China has had a troubled history. While
the U.S. has been leery
of China’s rise, China is determined to reclaim its position as the dominant
power in
Asia. Mistrust has been aggravated by confusing messaging from
the U.S. under former President Obama of an
American “pivot” or
“rebalancing” to Asia. China views this as a strategy of encirclement and
containment.
Given the consequential nature of the U.S.–China bilateral relationship
and the disastrous implications of a
military confrontation between China
and the U.S. or one of its treaty allies, the necessity for strategic
engagement to mitigate risks is clear. By evaluating the numerous
diplomatic and military-to-military
interactions between the two countries
for over four decades, lessons can be gleaned from the inductively
derived
factors. The civil–military imbalance between the U.S. and China has
proven to be a negative factor in
achieving successful results. The PLA’s
raison d’etre is to maintain the single-party CCP in power, while the
U.S.
military serves the defence of the country and is not in service of a political
party. It is puzzling why
the U.S. and China seem to have such great
difficulty dealing with one another in the security sphere. The U.S.
and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War were ideological enemies and vastly
disparate political systems, yet
managed to transact nuclear arms
agreements and broader arms control accords.
There have been an extensive number of Track 1, 1.5, and 2 dialogues as
well as defence diplomatic activities
between the U.S. and China over the
years. Though numerous policy actors have divergent opinions as to the
value of these interactions, it is vital to maintain open lines of
communication and attempt to resolve
differences peacefully. Increased
contact between military officers of the two countries fosters greater
understanding and improved likelihood for resolution of differences. Given
the nationalistic impulses of both
countries and the desire of each
government to appease their respective populations,
there is inherent value
in keeping dialogues out of public scrutiny with a minimum of political
interference.
Both sides must redouble their resolve to bolster strategic
engagement efforts, particularly given the presence
of regional flashpoints
such as the South China Sea, a nuclear North Korea, and continuing
ambiguity regarding
the status of Taiwan.

Notes
1    Daniel Katz, “American Policy Thinking on the
Sino-U.S.-Soviet Relationship at the End of
the Cold War” (Master’s thesis, London School of Economics, 2011),
p. 2.
2        “Subject: U.S.-China Military Relationship,” Memorandum
for Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, August 1994, Document 01751,
National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
3    Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues
for Congress (Congressional Research
Service: Washington, D.C, 29 July 2014), p. 1.
4    Ibid.
5        Legal opinion from DSAA General Counsel Jerome Silber to
National Security Council,
China-US Military IGWG 1989, 4 June 1989, OA/ID CF00318, FOIA #
CF00318–016, George
H.W. Bush Presidential Library.
6    Ibid.
7        “Ambassador Freeman’s Main Talking Points,” October 1993,
Document 01623, National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
8    Author’s interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, Jr., 10
March 2014, Washington, D.C.
9    Ibid.
10    Ibid.
11    Ibid.
12    “Ambassador Freeman’s Main Talking Points,” October 1993,
Document 01623, The National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
13    Ibid.
14        “Secretary Perry’s Visit to China, 16–19 October 1994,
Events Book,” October 1994,
Document 01778, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
15        “Subject: U.S.-China Military Relationship,” Memorandum
for Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, August 1994, Document 01751,
National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
16        “Secretary Perry’s Visit to China, 16–19 October 1994,
Events Book,” October 1994,
Document 01778, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
17    Ibid.
18    See testimony of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 11 October 1995,
Congressional Record, Vol.
141, No. 157.
19        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Andrew Scobell,
Senior Political Scientist, RAND
Corporation, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2014.
20    Ibid.
21    Author’s personal interview with Professor David
Shambaugh, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
22        Author’s personal interview with Professor Emeritus
Michael Yahuda, London School of
Economics and Visiting Scholar, Elliott School for International Affairs,
George Washington
University, Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
23        Author’s personal interview
with Dr. Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
D.C., 11 March 2014.
24    Author’s personal interview with Assistant Professor
Oriana Mastro, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., 26 February 2014.
25        Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L.
George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time (New York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), p.
201.
26    David M. Finkelstein and John Unangst, Engaging DOD:
Chinese Perspectives on Military
Relations with the United States, Report No. CRM 99–0046.90 (Alexandria,
VA: CNA
Corporation, 1999), p. 23.
27    Ibid., pp. 23–25.
28    Ibid., p. 26.
29    Ibid., p. 28.
30    Ibid.
31    Ibid., p. 29.
32    Ibid.
33    Ibid., p. 30.
34    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Denny Roy, Senior
Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu,
30 April 2014.
35    Author’s interview with PLA Major General Yao Yunzhu,
Director Emeritus, Center on China–
America Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, 12 April
2014. Major
General Yao is a frequent PLA representative at international defence conferences such as the
Shangri-La Dialogue as well as U.S.–China nuclear dialogues.
36    Finkelstein and Unangst, Engaging DOD, p. 37.
37    Ibid.
38        Cited in Yu Tiejun, “China’s Military Diplomacy: Past,
Present, Future,” presented at the
Peking University–University of Chicago Summer Institute on IR Theory and
Method, 20
August 2014.
39    Ibid.
40    Author’s personal interview with Professor David
Shambaugh, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
41    Ibid.
42       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014. Mr. Haenle is a former China
Foreign Area Officer in
the U.S. Army posted twice to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, who also served as an
adviser on
China to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
43    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Michael Green,
Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan
Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Washington, D.C., 18 March
2014.
44    Author’s personal interview with Professor Robert Ross,
Boston College and Visiting Scholar,
Peking University School of International Studies, Beijing, 23 April 2014.
45        Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing
U.S.-China Strategic Distrust (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 5.
46    Ibid., p. 30.
47    Ibid., pp. 13–14.
48    Chu Shulong, “Bilateral Dialogue Mechanisms and
Sino-American Relations,” in Yufan Hao
(ed.), Sino-American Relations: Challenges Ahead (Farnham, UK:
Ashgate, 2010), p. 119.
49        Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L.
George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014), p.
203.
50    Lieberthal and Wang,
Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, p. 39.
51        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Teng Jianqun,
Director, Department for American
Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 6 December 2013, Beijing.
Dr. Teng served in
the PLA Navy from 1979 to 1992.
52        Author’s personal interview with Major General Zhu
Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense University, 3 December 2013, Beijing.
53    Ibid.
54    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Lora Saalman,
Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2 May 2014.
55       Wang Dong and Yin Chengzhi, “China’s assessments of U.S.
rebalancing/pivot to Asia,” in
Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi, China’s Power and Asian Security
(London/New York:
Routledge, 2015), p. 67.
56    Ibid.
57    Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign
Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2012.
58    Wang and Yin, “China’s Assessments of U.S.
Rebalancing/Pivot to Asia,” in Li and Kemburi,
China’s Power and Asian Security, p. 66.
59    Gurtov, Engaging Adversaries, p. 75.
60       Author’s telephone interview with Drew Thompson, Visiting
Senior Research Fellow, Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 28 July 2019.
Thompson
served as the Director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense, from 2011 to 2018.
61    Author’s interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a
non-governmental cybersecurity expert who
participated in the Sino–U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna,
Virginia, March 6, 2014.
62       Author’s interview with Professor Emeritus Michael
Yahuda, London School of Economics
and Visiting Scholar, Elliott School for International Affairs, George
Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
63    Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders,
“Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing
the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics,” INSS China Strategic
Perspectives 2 (Washington, DCL
National Defense University, August 2010), p. 3.
64    Ibid., p. 7. “the military held 23 percent of the seats
in the Central Committee elected during
the 14th Party Congress. By the 17th Party Congress (in 2007), the
percentage of military
representatives had fallen slightly to 20.5 percent present.”
65    Ibid.
66    Ibid., p. 8.
67    Eric Hagt, “The Rise of PLA Diplomacy,” in Phillip C.
Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.),
PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University
Press, 2015), p. 219.
68        China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information
Office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, July 1998).
69    “Deng Xiaoping’s ‘24-Character Strategy,’” www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-
character.htm
70    Eric Hagt, “The Rise of PLA Diplomacy,” in Phillip C.
Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds.),
PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University
Press, 2015), p. 235.
71    Ibid.
72    Wang Dong and Yin Chengzhi, “China’s Assessments of U.S.
Rebalancing/Pivot to Asia,” in
Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi, China’s Power and Asian Security
(London/New York:
Routledge, 2015), p. 78.
73        “A Conversation with President Xi at BIG’s ‘Understanding
China’ Conference,”
http://berggruen.org/topics/a-conversation-with-president-xi-at-big-s-understanding-china-
conference
74    Ibid.
75    Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the U.S.
Institute of Peace China Conference,
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 7 March 2012,
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/03/185402.htm
76        Margaret MacMillan, “The Great War’s Ominous Echoes,”
New York Times, 13 December
2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/opinion/macmillan-the-great-wars-ominous-echoes.html?
_r=0
77        China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information
Office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, July 1998).
78        China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing:
Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 20 January 2009).
79    The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed
Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 16 April
2013).
80        See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, available at
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/106-65.pdf
81        Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 14, http://csbaonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/2010.02.19-Why-AirSea-Battle.pdf
82    Ibid., p. 15.
83        Kevin Rudd, U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping
(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015), p.
20.
84        “Tracks of diplomacy,” United States Institute of Peace
Glossary of Terms for Conflict
Management and Peacebuilding, available at http://glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy
85    Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve,
2016), p. 24.
86    Rudd, U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping, p. 36.
87        Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance
and Process,” in David
Shambaugh (ed.), Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD:
Rowman &
Littlefield, 2013), p. 157.
88    Ibid., p. 158.
89    Robert A. Manning, “US and China Explore New
Relationship,” YaleGlobal Online, 11 June
2013, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-and-china-explore-new-relationship
90    David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial
Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), p. 74.
 91        Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a
Rising China in the Twenty-First
Century. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2011), p. 207.
92    Glaser, “The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and
Process,” in Shambaugh (ed.), Tangled
Titans, p. 159.
93        Christopher P. Twomey, “The Military-Security
Relationship,” in Shambaugh (ed.), Tangled
Titans, p. 251.
94    Ibid.
95    Dennis Wilder, “The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue: Continuity and Change in
Obama’s China Policy,” China Brief 9, no. 10, 15 May 2009,
https://jamestown.org/program/the-u-s-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-continuity-and-
change-in-obamas-china-policy/
96        Author’s interview with Professor Zha Daojiong, School of
International Studies, Peking
University, 15 October 2017.
97        “Statement from the Press Secretary on the United
States-China Visit,” 7 April 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/07/statement-press-secretary-united-
states-china-visit
98    Jesse Heatley, “What’s in the
US-China 100 Day Action Plan?” The Diplomat, 17 May 2017,
http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/whats-in-the-us-china-100-day-action-plan/
99    Glaser, “The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and
Process,” in Shambaugh (ed.), Tangled
Titans, p. 161.
100    Ibid.
101    Ibid.
102    Swaine, America’s Challenge, p. 133.
103        “6th U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue,”
https://www.imperialvalleynews.com/index.php/news/world-news/9552-6th-u-s-china-
strategic-security-dialogue.html
104        Sarah Elen Graham and John Robert Kelley, “U.S.
Engagement in East Asia: A Case for
‘Track Two’ Diplomacy,” Orbis 53, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 82.
105    Ibid., p. 86.
106        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Teng Jianqun,
Director, Department for American
Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 6 December 2013.
107       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
108        Author’s personal interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a
non-governmental cybersecurity
expert who participated in the Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna,
Virginia, 6 March
2014.
109       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Brad Glosserman,
Executive Director, Pacific Forum
CSIS, Honolulu, 1 May 2014.
110    Ibid.
111    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Lora Saalman,
Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2 May 2014.
112    Ibid.
113        See Ralph A. Cossa, An NCAFP U.S.-China Strategic
Dialogue Conference Report, April
2017, p. 8, https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NCAFP-2017-US-China-
conference-report.pdf
114        Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs,
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue:
Phase VIII Report, Report Number 2014–008, December 2014, p. 4,
 www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2015/2014 008 –
Public 2014
US-China Report_FINAL.pdf
115        Ibid., pp. 15–18. With reference to statement 4, the
joint declaration would oblige both
countries to: “a. Acknowledge that conventional attacks (to include space
and cyber) on
components of their nuclear systems could provide justification for nuclear retaliation, b.
Understand the escalation danger of conventional attacks on all components of the other’s
nuclear retaliatory
systems, and c. Thus intend to refrain from conducting such attacks, based
on their mutual understanding of the
potential consequences.”
116    “Emerging Challenges in the China-U.S. Strategic
Military Relationship,” workshop held at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 28 March 2017. Meeting was
held under Chatham
House rules, preventing disclosure of participants’ identities.
117        “Bilateral Discussions on Cooperation in Cybersecurity
China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) – Center for Strategic and International
Studies,” June 2012,
available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/120615_JointStatement_CICIR.pdf
118    Ibid.
119        Author’s personal interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a
non-governmental cybersecurity
expert who participated in the Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna,
Virginia, 6 March
2014.
120    Ibid.
121    Ibid.
122        Ting Shi and Michael Riley, “China Halts Cybersecurity
Cooperation After U.S. Spying
Charges,” Bloomberg, 20 May 2014.
123    Author’s interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a
non-governmental cybersecurity expert who
participated in the Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna,
Virginia, 6 March 2014.
124    See Adam Segal, “The Continued Importance of the
U.S.-China Cyber Dialogue,” 23 January
2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2017/01/23/the-continued-importance-of-the-u-s-china-cyber-
dialogue/. A
read-out of the November 2017 session can be found at
https://www.cfr.org/blog/update-us-china-cybersecurity-relations
125        Letter from Dr. John Chipman to The Honorable Donald
Rumsfeld, 18 November 2002,
internal IISS records.
126    Letter from Dr. John Chipman to General Cao Gangchuan, 1
April 2003, internal IISS records.
127        “Foster an Asian Security Concept and Jointly Work for a
Bright Future of Asia-Pacific,”
Speech by Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, 1 June 2014, IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
2014.
128        “The Challenges of Conflict Resolution: Admiral Sun
Jianguo – English,” 5 June 2016,
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2016-
4a4b/plenary4-6c15/jianguo-6391
129    “China and International Security Cooperation,” Speech
by General Wei Fenghe, 2 June 2019,
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019.
130    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Tim Huxley,
Executive Director, IISS-Asia, Singapore,
25 April 2013.
131    Text of “Agreement Between The Department of Defense of
the United States of America and
The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China on
Establishing a
Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety,” 19 January 1998. Available
at
www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-china98.htm
132    Ibid.
133    Author’s personal interview with Dr. David Winkler,
Naval Historical Foundation, Washington,
D.C., 28 February 2014.
134        David Griffiths, U.S.-China Maritime Confidence
Building: Paradigms, Precedents, and
Prospects (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), p. 22.
135    Pete Pedrozo, “The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea
Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster,” Journal of
National Security Law and Policy 6 (2012): 209.
136    The following incidents are drawn from the Appendix of
Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts.
137        Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense
University, Seminar at RSIS, Singapore, 25 September 2012.
138    Ibid.
139        Author’s personal interview with Mr. Randall Schriver,
Partner, Armitage International,
Arlington, Virginia, 10 March 2014.
140        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Tom Bickford,
Senior Research Scientist, China
Studies/China Security Affairs Team, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington,
Virginia, 12
March 2014.
141       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
142        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Matthieu Duchatel,
former Head, China and Global
Security Project, SIPRI, Beijing, 23 April 2014.
143        Author’s personal interview with Major General Zhu
Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense University, Beijing, 3 December 2013.
144        Author’s personal interview
with Mr. Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum
CSIS, Honolulu, 1 May 2014.
145    Author’s personal interview with Professor David
Shambaugh, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
146        David F. Winkler, “Breaking News: Incidents at Sea Did
Not End with the Cold War!”
Canadian Naval Review 9, no. 4 (2014): 21.
147        See Carlyle Thayer, “Enhancing Transparency? U.S.-China
Military Contacts and Strategic
Dialogues,” 6th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS), 18–19 June 2012.
148    Ibid., p. 9 and p. 22.
149    Ibid., pp. 9–10.
150    Ibid., p. 10.
151    Ibid.
152    “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China
Regarding
the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters,” available at
www.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf
153        Author’s personal interview with Major General Zhu
Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense University, Beijing, 3 December 2013.
154        “Admiral Greenert on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance,”
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 8 September 2014, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/08/admiral-
greenert-on-asia-pacific-rebalance/hm7e
155    Cmdr. Leah Bray, “It’s Time for Good Behavior,” The
Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2014.
156       Author’s telephone interview with anonymous (by request)
U.S. Navy officer, 9 December
2014.
157    Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Chas
Freeman, Jr., Washington, D.C., 10 March
2014.
158    Ibid.
159        For text of the agreement, see https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-
CHINA_AIR_ENCOUNTERS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf
160    Ibid.
161       Author’s telephone interview with Drew Thompson,
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 28
July 2019.
162    Ibid.
163    “15th China-US Defense Consultative Talks kick off in
Washington,” China Military Online,
19 October 2014.
164        Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “U.S.-China
Defense Consultative Talks on
December 7,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Critical
Questions, 2 December
2011.
165    Author’s telephone interview with Mr. Douglas Feith,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(2001–2005), 16 January 2015.
166    Ibid.
167    Ibid.
168    Ibid.
169    Michael Schiffer, “Building Cooperation in the
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship,”
International Institute for Strategic Studies – US, Washington,
D.C., 6 January 2011.
170    Ibid.
171    Ibid.
172    Ibid.
173        Author’s telephone interview
with Drew Thompson, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University
of Singapore, 28 July 2019.
174    Ibid.
175    Anonymous (by request) U.S. government official, 29
October 2019.
176        “China Eyes New-Type Military Relations with U.S.:
Defense Ministry,” Xinhua, 11 May
2011.
177        Cui Xiaohuo, “Trust Vital to U.S., China Military Ties,”
25 June, 2009,
http://english.sina.com/china/p/2009/0624/250876.html
178    Data is drawn from the Appendix of Kan, U.S.-China
Military Contacts.
179    Ibid.
180        “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2015,” U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary
of Defense,
www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf, p. 65.
181    Ibid., pp. 65–66.
182    Ibid., p. 66.
183        Author’s personal interview with Mr. Randall Schriver,
Partner, Armitage International,
Arlington, Virginia, 10 March 2014.
184    Minnie Chan and Sarah Zheng, “China Again Blocks US Navy
Port Visit as Qingdao Request
Is Denied,” South China Morning Post, 28 August 2019.
185        “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2015,” U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary
of Defense,
www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf, p. 68.
186    Michael Fabey, “Why Did China Participate in RIMPAC With
One Ship and Spy On It With
Another?” Aviation Week, 15 August 2014.
187        Christopher P. Twomey, “The Military-Security
Relationship,” in David Shambaugh (ed.),
Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p.
252.
188        Ankit Panda, “With 5 Ships and 1,200 Personnel, China
Expands RIMPAC 2016 Naval
Delegation,” The Diplomat, 18 June 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/with-5-ships-and-
 1200-personnel-china-expands-rimpac-2016-naval-delegation/
189    Scott W. Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance
Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-
China Military-to-Military Relations,” Asia Policy, no. 16
(July 2013): 119.
190        Shirley Kan, “This Is Why America Needs to Kick China
Out of RIMPAC,” The National
Interest, 19 April 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-america-needs-kick-
china-out-rimpac-15833
191       Ankit Panda, “Chinese Navy Surveillance Vessel Observes
RIMPAC 2018 Exercises,” The
Diplomat, 14 July 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/chinese-navy-surveillance-vessel-
observes-rimpac-2018-exercises/
192    Ibid.
193    Appendix 5 contains a listing of all interactions
between U.S. National Defense University and
Chinese National Defense University from 1986 to 2012.
194    Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability,” p.
122.
195        “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2019,” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POW
ER_REPORT.pdf, p.
111.
196    Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era
of Change,” a paper prepared for the
National Defense University symposium on China’s Global Activism:
Implications for U.S.
Security Interests, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006, p.
6.
197    Harold, “Expanding Contacts
to Enhance Durability,” p. 121.
198        Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s
Foreign Military Relations (Washington,
D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), Report #32, p.
74.
199       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
200    Ibid.
201        Lee Kuan Yew, “Competition in Compassion,”
Forbes, 18 April 2005,
www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0418/039.html
202    Peter W. MacKenzie, “Red Crosses, Blue Water: Hospital
Ships and China’s Expanding Naval
Presence” (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2011), pp. 12–14.
203        Christopher P. Twomey, “The Military-Security
Relationship,” in David Shambaugh (ed.),
Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p.
247.
204    Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Chas
Freeman, Jr., Washington, D.C., 10 March
2014.
205    Ibid.
206        Author’s personal interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a
non-governmental cybersecurity
expert who participated in the Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna,
Virginia, 6 March
2014.
207    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Denny Roy, Senior
Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu,
30 April 2014.
208        Author’s interview with Mr. Randall Schriver, Partner,
Armitage International, Arlington,
Virginia, 10 March 2014.
209    Author’s interview with Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean,
Defense Affairs Institute, PLA
National Defense University, Beijing, 3 December 2013.
210    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Michael Green,
Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan
Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Washington, D.C., 18 March
2014.
211        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
available at
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/106-65.pdf
212    Ibid.
213    Author’s interview with Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Senior
Advisor, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 10 January 2015. Mr. Kamphausen is a former China Foreign Area
Officer who
served as China policy director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and China strategist
for
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
214    Ibid.
215    Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Chas
Freeman, Jr., Washington, D.C., 10 March
2014.
216        Author’s personal interview with Professor Emeritus
Michael Yahuda, London School of
Economics and Visiting Scholar, Elliott School for International Affairs,
George Washington
University, Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
217    Author’s personal interview with Assistant Professor
Oriana Mastro, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., 26 February 2014.
218       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
219    Finkelstein, The Military Dimensions of U.S.-China
Security Cooperation, p. 25.
220    Ibid.
221    Author’s interview with Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Senior
Advisor, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 10 January 2015.
222        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Tom Bickford,
Senior Research Scientist, China
Studies/China Security Affairs Team, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington,
Virginia, 12
March 2014.
223        Author’s personal interview
with Major General Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center on China-
America Defense Relations, Academy of Military
Science, Beijing, 12 April 2014.
224        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Teng Jianqun,
Director, Department for American
Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 6 December 2013.
225        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Douglas Paal, Vice
President for Studies, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 11 March 2014.
226        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Andrew Scobell,
Senior Political Scientist, RAND
Corporation, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2014.
227        Author’s personal interview with Major General Zhu
Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense University, Beijing, 3 December 2013.
228        Author’s personal interview with Major General Yao
Yunzhu, Director, Center on China-
America Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, 12 April
2014.
229        Author’s personal interview with Dr. James Lewis,
Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic
Technologies Program, CSIS, Washington, D.C., 19 March 2014.
230        Author’s personal interview with Lt. Col. (Ret.) Chad
Sbragia, Deputy Director, Strategic
Focus Group, U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, 29 April 2014.
231    Stephen Van Evera, “European Militaries and the Origins
of World War I,” in Rosecrance and
Miller, The Next Great War, p. 173.
232    Michael D. Swaine et al., Conflict and Cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net
Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2015), p. 40.
233        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Andrew Scobell,
Senior Political Scientist, RAND
Corporation, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2014.
234        China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing:
Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 20 January 2009).
235        Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal
Difference and Deterrence Failure in
Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010),
p. 26.
236    Ibid., p. 252.
237    Ibid.
238    Wang Dong and Yin Chengzhi, “China’s Assessments of U.S.
Rebalancing/Pivot to Asia,” in
Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi, China’s Power and Asian Security
(London/New York:
Routledge, 2015), p. 70.
239    Ibid.
240    Wiseman, Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence,
p. 181.
241    Gurtov, Engaging Adversaries, p. 160.
242    While Clausewitz would contend that the political and
military realms are inextricably linked,
bureaucratic separation between political and military activities is
desirable for successful
strategic engagement.
243    Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts, p. 55.
244    Ibid., p. 56.
245    Ibid.
246    Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96–8 96th Congress, 1
January 1979.
247        David Shambaugh, Enhancing Sino-American Military
Relations (Washington, D.C.: Sigur
Center for Asian Studies, 1998), p. 3.
248    Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts, p. 57.
249    Ibid., p. 63.
250       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
251        “Subject: EP-3 Legal Issues,”
Donald Rumsfeld to Paul Wolfowitz, Steve Cambone, and
RADM Quigley, 10 April 2001, The Rumsfeld Papers.
252        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Andrew Scobell,
Senior Political Scientist, RAND
Corporation, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2014.
253    Author’s telephone interview with Mr. Douglas Feith,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(2001–2005), 16 January 2015.
254    Steven Lee Myers, “Rumsfeld’s Office Reverses China
Ban,” New York Times, 3 May 2001.
255    Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts, p. 39.
256        Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since
1990 (Washington, D.C.: The
Congressional Research Service, 29 August 2014), p. 44 and p. 59.
257    Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts, p. 74.
258    Author’s personal interview with Dr. Lora Saalman,
former Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2 May 2014.
259    Kan, Taiwan, p. 46 and p. 59.
260       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
261        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Matthieu Duchatel,
former Head, China and Global
Security Project, SIPRI, Beijing, 23 April 2014.
262       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Brad Glosserman,
Executive Director, Pacific Forum
CSIS, Honolulu, 1 May 2014.
263        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Teng Jianqun,
Director, Department for American
Studies, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 6 December 2013.
264    Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era
of Change,” paper prepared for the
National Defense University Symposium on China’s Global Activism:
Implications for U.S.
Security Interests, 20 June 2006.
265        Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs
Institute, PLA National Defense
University, Seminar at RSIS, Singapore, 25 September 2012.
266       Author’s personal interview with Mr. Paul Haenle,
Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, Beijing, 21 April 2014.
267        Dr. David Finkelstein, The Military Dimensions of
U.S.-China Security Cooperation:
Retrospective and Future Prospects (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 2010), p. 23.
268        Author’s personal interview with Dr. Tom Bickford,
Senior Research Scientist, China
Studies/China Security Affairs Team, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington,
Virginia, 12
March 2014.
269    Author’s telephone interview with Mr. Douglas Feith,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(2001–2005), 16 January 2015.
270        Please see “Common Motivations for Pursuing Strategic
Engagement,” in the fifth section
above, for greater elaboration. For these scholars, trust can be regarded an
independent variable
vis-à-vis strategic engagement.
271        John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”
The National Interest, 8 April 2014,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204
6    Compare and contrast

Introduction
Strategic engagement is defined in this book as a subset of defence
diplomacy, specifically between actors who
are potential adversaries. As set
out by Cottey and Forster, defence diplomacy is “the peacetime cooperative
use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries)
as a tool of foreign and security
policy.”1 Two countries that are “former or
potential enemies”
are involved in strategic engagement when they
participate in these efforts.2 This book examines the implementation of
strategic engagement amongst three case studies of
the twentieth- and
twenty-first-centuries. The subjects evaluated are: the U.K. and Germany
prior to World War
I; the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War with
emphasis upon the 1972 INCSEA accord and the SCC; and the
U.S. and
China from 1972 to the present. These case studies were selected since the
countries involved were
potential or ongoing adversaries with a high
prospect of conflict. The framework employed is inductive, whereby
specific contributing factors are derived from examination of the defence
diplomacy conducted between the
respective countries, and whose relative
values are conducive to a successful, failed, or indeterminate outcome
of
strategic engagement.3 The importance of strategic engagement
exists as
“an alternative to seemingly endless wars and intractable disputes; as a
strategy, it aims at
building trust and reducing tensions between adversaries,
with due regard – even empathy – for the other
party’s political,
socioeconomic, cultural, and historical circumstances.”4 The conclusions
reached by this book can then be employed to guide ongoing strategic
engagement between the U.S. and China, as well as to direct future cases of
strategic engagement between
potential adversaries with the ultimate goal
of mitigating conflict.
Civil–military balance
The initial contributing factor which emerged as a parameter for evaluating
success or failure in strategic
engagement is civil–military balance between
the two countries involved. In two of the three case studies,
there was
significant civil–military imbalance amongst the countries under
examination. A negative civil–military balance in the U.K.–Germany and
U.S.–China case studies was evident. Inductive
analysis has shown that it is
possible, as demonstrated principally by INCSEA and to a lesser extent by
the SCC
in the U.S.–U.S.S.R. context, for two regimes with a positive
civil–military balance to accomplish successful
strategic engagement. As
stated at the outset of the study, success of strategic engagement can be
measured by
the extent to which interstate relations have improved through
a reduction in the risk of conflict.
A comparative analysis of the three dyads in this study yields several
counterintuitive insights. The U.K. and
Germany, while both ostensibly
structurally similar as constitutional monarchies with absolute military
obedience to civilian authority, in fact operated in disparate fashion. The
monarchy in Germany assumed a far
greater role in operational governance
than in the U.K. The two countries approached negotiations at the
Haldane
Missions with completely divergent goals in mind. The British were
obsessed with preserving the peace
and restraining German naval
expansion, which they perceived as threatening their preeminent naval
hegemony. By
contrast, Germany’s government was divided between
civilian and military elements and was focused upon a
guarantee of
neutrality by Britain in a potential war on the European continent. Neither
side appeared to
recognize that large surface battleships, about which the
British were concerned, were not even relevant to the
menacing conflict
which ultimately consisted of a land war, with only submarines playing a
significant naval
role.
Avoidance of core issues was a common theme in the U.K.–Germany and
U.S.–China case studies, partly due to
pressures imposed by
parliamentary/congressional bodies. The U.K. was singularly desirous of
preventing
Germany’s naval expansion, but Germany was not seriously
intent upon relinquishing its naval position and
cancelling its novelle. The
U.K. and Germany had large public and military/industrial constituencies
whose interests depended upon armaments production. Correspondingly,
the U.S. has avoided dealing effectively
with the contentious issue of arms
sales to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act, the One China Policy, as well as
congressional actors intent upon promoting Taiwan arms exports,
complicate a decisive resolution to the Taiwan
issue. Chinese civilian and
military actors deeply resent U.S. efforts to support Taiwan, which they
regard as
intrusion into their internal affairs. China will not compromise
with the U.S. and assumes a position of
intransigence on Taiwan, which it
regards as a core, non-negotiable interest.
The democratic government of the U.S. and the communist regime in
China have approached strategic engagement
with divergent objectives. In
light of the meteoric rise of China on the world stage since the end of the
Cold
War, both economically and militarily, the U.S. has had to evaluate
and adjust to the increasing probability of
loss of its previously uncontested
position as the default hegemon in the Pacific. While the U.S. is loath to
relinquish its dominant military position in the region, President Xi Jinping
espouses an overarching strategy
of “a new type of great power
relationship” with the United States, rejecting what he regards as a
twentieth-century Cold War mindset. China is eager to reclaim what it
deems to be
its rightful, historically dominant position in the Asia Pacific
after what it perceives as a century of
humiliation at the hands of foreign
powers. Along these lines, the U.S. has actively sought to engage China
strategically since the thawing of relations post-Tiananmen, viewing
engagement with the PLA as a means of
guiding China along a peaceful
rise while mitigating conflict with the U.S. and its regional allies, and
maintaining unrestricted freedom of navigation in the East and South China
Seas. At the same time, the U.S. has
sought to walk the delicate if not
ambiguous path of supporting Taiwan militarily, while ostensibly agreeing
that there is only one China. All the while, the U.S. maintains an official
posture of non-interference in the
internal operations of the CCP, though
America is frequently critical of China’s human rights record. China is
focused upon maintaining its rapid economic growth, upon which the power
and legitimacy of the CCP is based. In
order to achieve continued
prosperity, China must minimize conflict which might interfere with its
economic
goals.
 Despite the vital importance of its economic relationship with the United
States, China will not compromise on
its core objectives. China resents any
efforts to interfere with its claims over the East and South China Seas.
Its
A2/AD strategies are intended to progressively impair the ability of the U.S.
Navy to operate freely in the
region. While the U.S. sees a need to pursue
strategic engagement with China to improve military-to-military
relations
and reduce the possibility of any future conflict escalating out of control,
the Chinese do not
concede the value of strategic engagement with the U.S.
in the realm of crisis management to the same degree.
The overall U.S.–
China relationship has never approached the level of animosity that
prevailed between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. In
addition, “the contemporary dense network of U.S.–China societal
exchanges is what distinguishes contemporary U.S.–China Great Power
relations from the U.S.–Soviet
relationship.”5 Nonetheless, Sino–U.S.
engagement has been poor,
in large measure due to a failure to establish a
common strategic objective. The vital significance of
acknowledgement of
mutual benefit from successful and sustained strategic engagement has to
date not been
achieved between the U.S. and China.
By contrast, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were ideological and military
enemies in the midst of the Cold War, at
risk of nuclear confrontation prior
to the beginning of détente in 1969. Nevertheless, despite their
significant
enmity and polar opposite governmental structures, the two countries were
able to come together in
a navy-to-navy format in 1972 to forge a mutually
beneficial act of strategic engagement in the form of the
INCSEA accord to
reduce dangerous incidents at sea. In addition, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
were able to
cooperate in the area of missile defence in the context of the
SCC. The militaries of both countries, albeit
with the blessings of the
adversarial governments they represented, perceived the risk of dangerous
confrontations escalating into more overt clashes which could potentially
result in war between these two
heavily armed nuclear superpowers. In
addition, improved cooperation between the
navies of the two countries was
economically beneficial, reducing damage to valuable military assets.
Cooperation arrived at via strategic engagement is also advantageous in
diminishing the prospects of an
expensive and dangerous naval arms race,
such as the world witnessed between the U.K. and Germany prior to
World
War I, and which we are currently experiencing in the Asia-Pacific. There is
an interesting parallel
between Germany’s naval expansion prior to World
War I threatening Britain’s dominance of the seas and China’s
ongoing
naval modernization challenging American naval supremacy in the Asia-
Pacific. Prior to World War I,
Germany aspired to build a blue-water navy
to safeguard international commercial interests and protect its
colonial
holdings. In a modern parallel, China has demonstrated its goal of acquiring
a blue-water navy to
venture forth into the Pacific. The significant
contemporary expansion of naval forces and weapons systems by
China
threatens to unleash a regional arms race with neighbouring countries.
The alignment of strategic engagement objectives which the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. astutely perceived in the
1970s and which led to the successful
establishment and subsequent perpetuation of INCSEA, does not seem
likely
to be replicated between the U.S. and China. Blame for the reticence
by the U.S. and China to proceed down the
path of establishment of a
formal INCSEA agreement can be attributed to both sides. The U.S., as
mentioned, is
reluctant to accord China the status of an equal in naval
power which it was comfortable doing with the Soviets
in 1972. China
regards INCSEA as a Cold War relic and rejects accords more forceful than
the current MMCA and
MOU agreements. Additionally, INCSEA applies to
surface vessels operating on the high seas, and potential naval
confrontations between the U.S. and China may involve submarines in the
East and South China Seas, which
currently represent highly contested
waters over which China asserts historic rights of control.6 Until such time
as China establishes a true blue-water navy, we are
unlikely to see a full-
fledged INCSEA agreement formed between the U.S. and China.
Though economic interdependence has often been cited as a powerful
force mitigating conflict between
adversaries with varying degrees of
regime type alignment, the cases studied demonstrate the fallacy of this
position. The U.K. and Germany were economically interdependent prior to
World War I, contributing to
prosperity for both nations, but this important
mutually beneficial factor was not powerful enough to promote
successful
strategic engagement between the two countries and avert war. Political
factors trumped economic
considerations with disastrous consequences.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War were not
economically
interdependent, yet naval considerations motivated them to engage in
successful strategic
engagement leading to INCSEA. The U.S. and China
are heavily interdependent economically, yet this has not
motivated them to
engage in productive strategic engagement to reduce the risk of conflict,
which would be
damaging and potentially disastrous for both countries. The
myth of the overriding importance of economic
factors in promoting
engagement for conflict prevention is therefore not affirmed by the three
analyses
provided.
A component which is difficult to manage and might be quite dangerous
is the issue
of military alliances. All world powers have alliances with other
nations which have the prospect of drawing
them into unanticipated and
potentially disastrous conflict. Such was the case in World War I, where
despite
efforts to establish an agreement between the U.K. and Germany,
both countries had complex alliances which
ultimately drew them into the
First World War. As discussed in the Anglo–German case study, the status
of
France in a possible conflict was a key point of contention between the
British and German governments prior to
1914. During the Cold War, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union entered into alliances globally which divided the
world into competing blocs. Some of the most perilous episodes involved
standoffs between superpower allies or
proxies which had the potential to
lead to nuclear war. Such risky alliances prevail today in the Asia-Pacific.
Even if the U.S. and China resolve their differences and come to terms on
such contentious issues as Taiwan and
sovereignty in the South China Sea,
there are dangerous tensions between China and Japan, and China and other
regional U.S. allies, as well as the hazards inherent in the Chinese alliance
with North Korea. Such entangling
alliances could well draw the U.S. into a
major regional conflict it might not have envisioned. Strategic
engagement
is therefore of value not only between the U.S. and China, but also between
all regional countries
which might be adversarial.

Quality of diplomatic/mil-mil interactions

A contributing factor which became manifest as a parameter for predicting
success or failure in strategic
engagement is the quality of diplomatic and
military-to-military interactions between potential adversaries.
This factor
was evaluated in multiple dimensions, which will be compared and
contrasted in the three case
studies.
The military-to-military interaction component of strategic engagement
has been shown to be quite significant
in the effective conduct of defence
diplomacy. In the U.K.–Germany case study, military attachés played a vital
role in collecting information, interacting with their counterparts, and
conveying impressions to their
respective governments. Particularly given
the lack of advanced technology in the early twentieth century,
human
intelligence played a very significant role. Unfortunately, the naval and
army attachés representing the
U.K. and Germany prior to World War I
conveyed inaccurate and inflammatory impressions to their governments. In
doing so, they impaired negotiations between the U.K. and Germany,
stoked mutual paranoia, and contributed to
the failure of any efforts toward
peace in the Haldane Mission. As such, they must be regarded as a negative
factor in the effective conduct of defence diplomacy between the U.K. and
Germany.
By contrast with the U.K.–Germany case study, a marked difference is
apparent in the military-to-military
interactions between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis the INCSEA accord. INCSEA was dominated by
experienced
career naval officers, both at its inception and throughout the
many years of annual
reviews. INCSEA was almost a pure military-to-
military process, with little civilian involvement. Naval
attachés were very
useful in conveying information and reporting incidents. The direct
military-to-military
format ensured that agreements reached at the annual
review meetings between senior naval officers could be
carried out quickly
and efficiently without intermediaries. All of these factors were vital in
ensuring a
successful outcome from the INCSEA process and leading to a
positive result in the effective conduct of defence
diplomacy.
Military-to-military interaction has met with very limited success in the
U.S.–China case study. As discussed,
the PLA is an arm of the Chinese
Communist Party, and does not have the capability of functioning freely.
There
is limited exposure by each side to naval attachés. In spite of these
limitations, however, ship visits have
occurred with some frequency,
serving as an important mechanism to improve understanding and hopefully
cultivate interpersonal interactions between naval personnel. Though only
of late, there has been limited
participation by China in joint multinational
naval exercises, and hopefully with time there will be increased
joint
HADR operations. If the two navies become more familiar with one
another, there should be less risk of
conflict at sea. Given tensions in the
East and South China Seas, this is particularly important, as an
incident
with loss of life could easily spiral out of control and lead to wider conflict.
Exchange programmes
involving military officers are also a promising
mechanism for enhancement of engagement between officers of
the two
countries. In sum, though military-to-military interaction has been of
limited success between the U.S.
and China to date, there is guarded hope
for improvement.
It is interesting to note that effective strategic engagement can result even
when there are unresolved issues
in contention. In the U.S.–U.S.S.R.
INCSEA analysis, the Soviets continued to press for a fixed distance
formula, and disputed the U.S. position regarding rights of free passage of
naval vessels in territorial
waters. Though never resolved, these issues
continued to be discussed at annual meetings and did not derail the
INCSEA process. In a similar vein, there were unresolved issues of
contention throughout the SCC process which
negotiators were able to
compartmentalize without inhibiting progress in other issue areas.
Conversely, the
Chinese have vociferously protested American displays of
what they regard as unacceptable incursions into their
territorial waters via
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), but which the U.S. regards as
its lawful
right of innocent passage. The dangers posed by an incident
resulting from such a dispute are precisely why a
commitment to ongoing
strategic engagement between the two militaries is vital and to the benefit
of both
countries. The purpose of strategic engagement is precisely to
reduce the threat of conflict between potential
adversaries, and more
effectively manage a crisis which might occur in the future before it
escalates. Until
the U.S. and China are able to arrive at a compromise
regarding FONOPS, the issue will continue to impair the
quality of bilateral
strategic engagement.
A significant component in assessment of the quality of strategic
engagement is
communication between the parties. Communication in the
Anglo–German case in the context of diplomatic and
military-to-military
interactions was markedly deficient and contributed to the failed Haldane
Missions. Within
the German government, the civilian and military officials
were at odds with one another, and lacked a
coherent, unitary message.
While the Kaiser and Chancellor seemed desirous of exploring peace with
Haldane,
Admiral von Tirpitz and other military officials were not
interested in peace and were preparing for war. The
overall German posture
was not respectful of the Haldane Mission and reflected failed
communication. Haldane
did not appear to acknowledge the poor
communication with his German counterparts in his memoirs. Churchill’s
comments in the U.K. were not supportive of the Haldane Mission and
contributed to ineffective messaging. These
deficiencies in communication
were an important factor leading to the failed conduct of defence
diplomacy.
Despite overall U.S.–Soviet Cold War acrimony, both INCSEA and the
SCC served as channels for interstate
communication. In the INCSEA
scenario, communication was always described as excellent between the
naval
officers. Dialogue involving reporting of incidents was professional
and productive. Additionally, given the
overall state of tensions between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the midst of the Cold War, INCSEA represented
the first open and ongoing communication link between the American and
Soviet militaries at a working level. As
regards the SCC, the Soviets and the
Americans (at least until the Reagan administration) regarded the dialogue
mechanism as a stabilizing component of the overall relationship. The SCC
in their view provided a significant
channel of government-to-government
communication. Effective communication is an important confidence
building
tool and represents a vital component of successful strategic
engagement, particularly in times of crisis, to
defuse tensions and prevent
escalation. High-quality communication can be regarded as fundamental to
the
successful conduct of defence diplomacy between these two countries.
By contrast, communication has been particularly poor between the U.S.
and China. When dangerous incidents have
occurred, the U.S. was unable
to reach Chinese officials by telephone. It was not till 2008 that it was
announced that a telephone link had finally been operationalized between
the defence establishments of the
respective countries. Despite the large
number of dialogues on multiple tracks between the U.S. and China, the
quality of dialogue has been described by most experts as deficient. The
U.S. maintains that the Chinese are
not listening and merely repeat standard
talking points detailing their grievances. In addition to deficiency
in the
quality of verbal communication, the non-verbal signals transmitted by joint
naval exercises on both
sides have been received as threatening. When
either the U.S. or China advances its military capabilities, the
country
engaged in this activity regards it as defensive, while the other nation
perceives it as offensive in
character. In particular, when China engages in
military buildup, this creates concern and fear not only in Washington, but
also among regional allies, notably Japan. This was analysed
in reference to
Twomey’s doctrinal-difference misperception hypothesis. Improvement in
communication will
require both countries to make politically difficult
commitments to address issues which neither side has
wished to confront.
Only in this manner can truly meaningful communication occur to conduct
defence diplomacy
effectively.

Political impact upon strategic engagement

Separation of military-to-military diplomacy from political interference has
been shown to contribute to a
positive result in defence diplomacy. In the
U.K.–Germany case study, the dysfunctional dynamics between the
civilian
and military arms of the German government severely impaired any
attempts to resolve differences with
the U.K. during negotiations.
Messaging was uncoordinated and goals were disparate, with the belligerent
and
offensively oriented German military focused upon war in Europe,
while the civilian arm of the government was
more restrained and
potentially desirous of a peaceful resolution. Haldane was also an
ineffective messenger,
and lacked proper support from Churchill at home.
The two countries were not appropriately positioned to
negotiate
effectively, dooming the 1912 Haldane Mission to failure.
Though the democratic U.S. and communist U.S.S.R. were certainly
incongruent and antagonistic regimes during
the Cold War, the INCSEA
accord was able to be effectively established and perpetuated specifically
because it
minimized governmental interference. INCSEA functioned on a
navy-to-navy basis between like-minded military
officers who shared a
common culture and mindset. Therein lay the conditions conducive to
successful and
effective strategic engagement between adversaries. While
political leaders of the two countries gave their
blessings to the accord, they
allowed the naval officers to negotiate the agreement and carry out the
annual
review meetings without governmental meddling. Had INCSEA
been attempted as a traditional treaty between the
two governments or
required continuous civilian oversight, it is unlikely it would have
succeeded. This is
testimony to the validity of military-to-military
interaction devoid of political interference as an effective
tool in defence
diplomacy. Although INCSEA was able to function independently of
political interference, this
was not entirely the case with the SCC. During
the administrations of presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, the
SCC was able
to function with a minimum of political interference. However, beginning
with the Reagan
administration there was political interference, given its
intense anti-Soviet posture. Fortunately, the SCC
endured despite the
intrusions of Washington.
The PLA, by contrast, as the military extension of the CCP, is unable to
function with any degree of autonomy
to conduct strategic engagement
effectively with the U.S. military. Conduct of military-to-military relations
by the PLA is regarded as an activity under the direct purview of the CCP.
PLA military diplomacy “is expected
to support the larger foreign,
diplomatic, political, economic and security agenda set forth by the
leadership
of the Party/State. In this regard, the ‘political’ and the ‘military’
are
inseparable.”7 There is inherent structural incongruity between
the two
militaries, and direct apolitical military-to-military engagement such as
occurred between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. under INCSEA is simply not
feasible with China at this time. Additionally, while the U.S. military is
fairly transparent about its objectives and forces, the PLA shuns
transparency. These factors have led to
devaluation by China of the
importance of military-to-military interaction, which has been unilaterally
suspended by China on numerous occasions to vent dissatisfaction with
American policies.
In the U.K.–Germany case study, there was effectively no separation
between the military and civilian elements
of the governments in conduct of
negotiations. This was further exacerbated by differences in outlooks and
perceptions between the civilian and military arms of government,
particularly in Germany. In his memoirs,
Haldane described positive
interactions with the Kaiser and the Chancellor, but negative contacts with
Admiral
von Tirpitz. However, given the intense warlike mentality of the
German military in the lead-up to World War I,
it is unlikely that any form
of negotiations, even purely military-to-military, would have succeeded in
averting war.
By contrast, separation from politics was critically important for the
success of the INCSEA process between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R., while the
lack thereof accounted for the mixed results of the SCC. Were INCSEA to
have
been approached in the form of a treaty, it would have risen to a very
public level of scrutiny by the
respective governments. Given the high level
of tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War,
such an
approach might have doomed the accord to failure, or certainly would have
markedly delayed its
adoption. From the outset, INCSEA represented an
apolitical forum to address a very specific problem, namely
dangerous
incidents at sea. Working groups at annual meetings were, as archival
records indicate, largely
devoid of political discussions. The testimony to
the validity of the importance of separation from politics is
the survival of
INCSEA despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Cold
War with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. No political gain was ever
sought from the annual reviews. They did not serve
any propaganda value,
being shielded as they were from the public eye. INCSEA serves as an
important lesson
that effective conduct of defence diplomacy can best be
accomplished when there is maximal insulation from
meddling by political
forces. Had the Reagan administration avoided meddling with and
politicizing the SCC, it
might have continued its functioning unabated on a
more positive footing.
In the U.S.–China case study, separation of military-to-military
diplomacy from politics is simply not feasible
at this time, given the close
relationship between the PLA and the CCP. The MMCA and DCT
processes represent
the highest level military-to-military engagements to
date. These have been of limited value, with numerous
planned meetings
cancelled as an expression of displeasure by China related to political
incidents, most
notably weapons sales to Taiwan. As discussed, a more
robust INCSEA-like accord is not in the offing at this time, as the U.S. is
unwilling to confer equality of naval stature to
China, and China rejects
what it regards as a Cold War type of agreement. Additionally, until the
hotly
contested issues of freedom of navigation in and reconnaissance
flights over regional waters are resolved,
establishment of a more robust
incidents at sea agreement is moot, as the waters in which conflict is likely
to
occur are not the high seas, but rather the East and South China Seas.
These elements have led to an overall
negative value for the separation
from politics factor in the conduct of strategic engagement between the U.S.
and China.

Role of secrecy in strategic engagement

Analysis of the three case studies reveals the compelling role of secrecy in
the conduct of strategic
engagement. In the U.K.–Germany case study, there
was an unsuccessful attempt to keep negotiations from public
view,
contributing to failed strategic engagement. In the U.S.–U.S.S.R. INCSEA
and SCC case studies, a
clandestine approach was quite successful. The
INCSEA accord and SCC proceedings were kept out of the public
eye,
press coverage was minimal, and minutes of activities were not made
public. These factors contributed to
the success of what were intended to be
working group relationships, not designed for political gain or
propaganda.
In the U.S.–China case study, there has been some effort to keep dialogues
from public scrutiny.
With MMCA meetings, minutes are not released
publicly, mimicking the practice of INCSEA reviews. However, given
the
advanced state of information dissemination in the current internet age,
maintaining the privacy of such
dialogues is quite challenging.
The issue of transparency in the conduct of strategic engagement merits
comparison. Mistrust between the U.K.
and Germany was exacerbated by
British beliefs that Germany was not being truthful about its naval
expansion
programme. Germany did not feel that Haldane was being
forthright in his motives or agenda in negotiation.
Mutual suspicions
contributed to failed Anglo–German strategic engagement. In the U.S.–
U.S.S.R. INCSEA
formation and subsequent meetings, transparency
between the parties was evident throughout the process, aided
by career
naval officers who respected one another. With the SCC, proceedings were
not allowed to be made
public except upon agreement of both nations’
commissioners. By contrast, transparency has been markedly
deficient in
engagement between the U.S. and China. The U.S. regards China as not
being sufficiently
transparent in its military modernization programme,
which China insists is purely for defensive purposes. An
instance of this is
China’s development of anti-ship ballistic missiles which the U.S. views as
directed
against American aircraft carriers to change the calculus of U.S.
naval power in the Asia-Pacific. As
previously discussed, the Chinese
regard periodic announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a
manifestation
of lack of transparency in America’s policy regarding
Taiwan’s future status. While secrecy has proven
beneficial at times in the
course of Sino–U.S. strategic engagement, the stalled
nature of progress to
date raises doubts regarding its efficacy.
The preceding comparative analysis illustrates the positive contribution
of secrecy to successful strategic
engagement between potential or existing
adversaries. Secrecy appears to be a necessary, though not sufficient,
factor
vis-à-vis strategic engagement efforts. There is value to discreet military-to-
military engagement
between adversaries, where more public civilian-led
efforts are more likely to fail. Maintenance of secrecy has
become
increasingly difficult in the modern era given the rapid diffusion of
information via the internet and
cyber intrusions. Nonetheless, maximum
efforts to ensure privacy of diplomatic engagements should be pursued.

Notes
1    Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy,
p. 6.
2    Ibid, p. 7.
3    For values of each contributing factor as well as overall
values of outcomes, see Appendix 1.
4    Gurtov, Engaging Adversaries, p. 2.
5        Robert S. Ross, “China: American Public and U.S.-China
Relations, 1949–2012,” in Geoffrey
Wiseman (ed.), Isolate or Engage: Adversarial States, U.S. Foreign
Policy, and Public
Diplomacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 81.
6    Discussion of submarine activities lies beyond the scope
of this study. The U.S. and Soviet Union
did not address submarines within INCSEA. Similarly, the U.S. and
China are unlikely to pursue
strategic engagement that encompasses submarines.
7    Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era of
Change,” a paper prepared for the
National Defense University symposium on China’s Global Activism:
Implications for U.S.
Security Interests. National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006.
7    Conclusion

The goal of strategic engagement is to reduce the prospect of conflict

between potential adversaries. Of the
three case studies selected in this
book, the outbreak of World War I is partially reflective of failed strategic
engagement between the U.K. and Germany; the U.S.–China case and the
SCC component of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. case had
ambiguous results; only the
INCSEA component of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. case yielded a successful result
insofar as
dangerous incidents at sea between the two navies decreased in
frequency. The lessons learned are important to
elucidate the significant
factors which must be focused upon to achieve a successful outcome and
avoid conflict
or even war. The U.S.–China case study represents an
ongoing process with profound consequences for the two
nations involved
as well as the international community. Since the interaction between the
U.S. and China has
been widely regarded as the most significant bilateral
relationship in the world, and as there are many
acknowledged areas of
contention between Washington and Beijing, it is vitally important that
successful
strategic engagement be accomplished. Additionally, given the
potential for conflict between China and regional
countries with whom the
U.S. has strong alliances, successful strategic engagement must also be
pursued on a
multilateral basis in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere (e.g.
Europe in the context of NATO) to avoid conflict which
could embroil the
U.S. due to alliance commitments.
Even though a century has elapsed since World War I, and despite the
vast differences in context between early
twentieth-century Europe and
early twenty-first century U.S.–China scenarios, there are compelling
parallels
which can be drawn. The issue of hegemony and conflict between
established and rising powers, the “Thucydides
trap,” is as relevant today as
it was over two millennia ago. A century ago, the U.K. feared its
preeminent naval
power being challenged by a rising Germany, just as the
U.S. today fears a rising Chinese military power
threatening its dominance
of the seas in the Asia-Pacific. A contemporary report by the Council on
Foreign
Relations (CFR) asserts that “since its founding, the United States
has consistently pursued a grand strategy
focused on acquiring and
maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North
American continent,
then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally.”1
China, by
contrast, rejects the notion of American hegemony, and seeks to
become the dominant
regional power in the Asia-Pacific, thus displacing
the United States from the role it has occupied since World
War II. China
under President Xi Jinping envisions a new grand strategy in which Asian
security is managed by
Asians, supplanting the U.S. as the leading military
presence in the region. The U.S. will not acquiesce to this
notion, thereby
setting the stage for twenty-first century conflict between the two countries.
The competition
for dominance in the region is complicated by strong
alliances between the U.S. and Japan, South Korea, as well
as the
Philippines, in addition to commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act. These American allies
are concerned about maintaining a
strong U.S. presence in the region as a counterbalance to ensure their
security
against an increasingly militarily and economically powerful
China. China’s support for North Korea, the only
nuclear power other than
China in the region, is also cause for significant concern by the U.S. and all
countries
in the Asia-Pacific.
If “China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s
power grows”2 as the Thucidydes Trap would predict, then it is all the more
imperative
that pathways be found for the two countries to engage
strategically to avert conflict. Lessons must therefore be
drawn from past
strategic engagement efforts, both successful and failed, to ensure that
Mearsheimer’s dire
predictions do not come to pass. Despite the pessimistic
projections by Graham Allison and Mearsheimer, the role
of nuclear
weapons must be taken into account. If the stability–instability paradox
holds between a dyad with
rational actors, strategic engagement between
nuclear powers will serve the function of mitigating the risk of
minor or
proxy conflicts since major nuclear war can effectively be ruled out. In the
nuclear era, the role of
the military is conflict avoidance rather than victory
in war. While the risk of nuclear war is very limited,
even the small chance
of the employment of nuclear weapons in conflict requires strategic
engagement focused upon
stable nuclear deterrence. Evidence of this can be
seen in the SCC and its role in ensuring compliance with the
ABM Treaty,
as well as U.S.–China discussions on the topic of strategic stability.
Certainly, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were overt enemies during the Cold
War, but the two countries found ways to
cooperate in successful strategic
engagement as demonstrated by the 1972 INCSEA accord and to a lesser
degree
with the SCC. Although the U.S. practiced a strategy of containment
during the Cold War towards the U.S.S.R., an
important military-to-military
agreement in the form of INCSEA was still achieved given its apolitical
stature
and focused, mutual benefit. In addition to the principal motivation
of INCSEA to resolve the issue of dangerous
encounters at sea, there was
the attendant but very important secondary benefit of improvement in the
overall
military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
in the midst of the Cold War. This unique
success of strategic engagement
in the face of otherwise overt hostility between two countries highlights the
potential for a positive outcome which might not otherwise be predicted.
The SCC focused upon arms control issues
with much higher stakes than
INCSEA, namely in the area of ballistic missile defence
systems. Even in
such a sensitive area, the U.S. and the Soviet Union managed to engage
over a long period of
time with some productive results. Had the U.K. and
Germany been able to communicate in an effective format
without political
interference, it is possible that an agreement might have been reached
regarding Germany’s
planned naval expansion. While it is doubtful that this
would have had any significant impact on the ultimate
outbreak of World
War I, an effective outcome of strategic engagement might have
ameliorated the arms race
between the U.K. and Germany, alleviated
tensions between the two governments, and led to overall upgrading of
relations between these two powerful potential adversaries. If the correct
parameters are present, successful
strategic engagement can be achieved.
As has been pointed out, the common refrain that strong economic
interdependence is a sufficiently powerful
deterrent to conflict is not a
foregone conclusion. Despite a robust economic relationship between the
U.K. and
Germany, strategic engagement failed and the two countries
became involved in open hostilities. Little economic
activity transpired
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, yet successful
strategic engagement
was accomplished, particularly with INCSEA. While
INCSEA decreased dangerous incidents at sea, it met its limited
objectives
and its goal was not to avert superpower war. The current economic and
trade interdependence between
the U.S. and China is of enormous
magnitude; failure of this bilateral relationship would be disastrous for both
countries. Despite this, the two nations are at odds with one another on
issues which might be of political,
ideological, and nationalistic
significance, but are far less important to the respective populations than
economic prosperity. One would logically anticipate that the overarching
importance of economic progress would
prevent worsening conflict, but
this is not necessarily the case. Continued strategic engagement, particularly
focused upon difficult issues, is therefore of paramount importance.
Establishing a shared narrative with common purpose is conducive to
productive strategic engagement. Despite the
decades of interaction
between the U.S. and China, a shared narrative is lacking, though the
contested issues are
publicly acknowledged on both sides. First and
foremost is the unresolved issue of the status of Taiwan. Due to
the highly
sensitive nature of any discussions regarding Taiwan in both the U.S. and
China, strategic engagement
on this issue would of necessity have to be
conducted in a discreet fashion outside of public scrutiny. The
potential
value of secrecy in delicate negotiations has been demonstrated by this
book. Ultimately, the U.S. must
acknowledge that there is an inherent
ambiguity in supporting Taiwan militarily while simultaneously
acknowledging that there is only one China. By the same token, China must
concede that aiming missiles at Taiwan
and periodic hostile rhetoric from
Beijing is threatening and will not lead to peace. The Chinese “top down”
approach with the U.S. vis-à-vis Taiwan might be more applicable,
beginning with acknowledgment of the importance
of the principle of a
peaceful resolution, building strategic trust on this matter, and ultimately
agreeing on
specific actions.
In the same vein, the crucial and contemporaneously significant topic of
sovereignty
in the East and South China Seas should be approached as well
in the form of discreet diplomacy. Because this
issue involves multiple
claimant states in pursuit of unrestricted freedom of navigation, all relevant
parties
need to be present at the table. Since this topic engenders strong
nationalistic sentiments between countries
which have been adversarial to
varying degrees, the importance of secrecy in the conduct of defence
diplomacy is
paramount. Propaganda, nationalistic sentiments, and
politicization of the issue of sovereignty over the
territorial waters will
poison any chance of successful resolution by strategic engagement. Of
equally great
importance is the potential for conflict between China and one
of the other claimant nations, which could embroil
the U.S. in direct
conflict with China due to military alliances or obligations. No issue should
be deemed too
difficult or contentious to approach in the format of strategic
engagement. No dispute should be deemed
unsolvable. Given the ongoing
belligerent activities in the South China Sea, notably China’s militarization
of
the Spratly and Paracel Islands, engagement cannot be delayed until an
appropriate level of strategic trust is
achieved between the U.S. and China.
The importance of mutual trust to successful strategic engagement must
be emphasized. The deficiency of trust
that exists between the U.S. and
China is manifest on both sides. The 2015 CFR report recommended
implementation
of trading agreements between the U.S. and allies that
deliberately exclude China, as well as emphasis upon the
U.S. and allies
denying China military equipment and dual-use technologies which it might
employ “to inflict
‘high-leverage strategic harm’ on the United States and
its partners …”3 Given the prominent stature of the CFR, such provocative
statements, though not reflecting
official U.S. government policy, are
nonetheless damaging to building trust. Incendiary statements by Chinese
officials and media are equally detrimental to formulation of trust between
the two countries. The inflammatory
rhetoric from both sides constituting
nationalistic propaganda only underscores the importance of low-profile
efforts to confront contentious issues.
Strategic engagement by definition occurs between potential or actual
adversaries who inherently do not trust one
another. However, distrust does
not necessarily translate to a failed outcome for strategic engagement. This
proposition was tested through analysis of the case studies under
examination.
In the U.K.–Germany case study, British mistrust over Germany’s naval
buildup motivated the Haldane Missions to
attempt to dissuade Germany
from proceeding with this effort. Germany, on the other hand, was
mistrustful of
Britain, viewing the U.K. as an enemy attempting to surround
and threaten Germany. Feelings of paranoia prevailed
on both sides, though
these were more intense in Germany. The marked deficit in trust doomed
the Haldane Missions
and contributed to the failure of strategic engagement
prior to World War I. Interestingly, the perception of
encirclement is
repeated in the U.S.–China scenario, with China regarding American naval
activities and
alliances, as well as its declared rebalancing strategy, as
attempts at containment.
In contrast to the initial U.K.–Germany case study, the U.S.–U.S.S.R.
interaction with
INCSEA reflected a sufficient level of trust for cooperation
between the senior naval officers involved in
adopting the accord and
participating in the annual review meetings. The recurring annual meetings
diminished
mistrust at a fundamental level. Additionally, the requirement
for triennial renewal provided for reaffirmation
of commitment. Despite the
overall mistrust which prevailed between the U.S. and Soviet governments
during the
Cold War, the personal and professional bonds between the naval
officers, many of whom were repeat attendees at
annual meetings and thus
developed a sound rapport, cultivated camaraderie between those involved.
Social
programmes associated with the annual meetings as well as ship
visits were valuable confidence building measures
which further enhanced
trust between the officers. Similarly, the SCC featured a roster of long-term
participants
who met over a prolonged length of time to adjudicate on
issues of concern. Of interest is the benefit of
developing a regular pool of
attendees at the Track 1.5 U.S.–China Strategic Dialogue as well as Track 1
platforms with the goal of building confidence and increasing trust. Though
career military officers typically
have long careers spanning multiple heads
of state, political appointees frequently remain engaged in the policy
arena
many years beyond their official tenure.
The strategic distrust which has been cited by experts in both the U.S.
and China has been widely regarded as an
important factor contributing to
poor strategic engagement between these two countries. The “Thucydides
Trap”
analogy has been applied to Britain’s fear of a rising Germany,
contributing to the ultimate outbreak of
conflict. This same analogy has
been specifically cited by both American and Chinese officials as relevant
to
current American apprehension regarding China’s rise, constituting a
potential threat to the safety and security
of the Asia-Pacific. This notion of
inevitable conflict has served to foment distrust between the U.S and China.
The U.S is leery of China’s motives as it builds a progressively more
powerful military, particularly in the form
of naval assets and missile
capabilities. China is deeply mistrustful of contemporary U.S. strategy,
convinced it
represents a thinly veiled attempt to contain and encircle
China, and keep it from rising. Certainly, the issue
of arms sales to Taiwan
fuels China’s mistrust of U.S. motives, supporting the island’s defence and
violating
what China regards as its sovereignty. America’s mutual defence
commitment with Japan, with whom China has had
tense relations, only
serves to exacerbate distrust between the U.S. and China. It is difficult to
anticipate
development of trust between the U.S. and China when U.S. law
specifically prohibits the sale of arms or the
transfer of sensitive technology
to China, all the while proceeding with such sales to Taiwan. This subject,
as
with the overall future of Taiwan, must be addressed head-on in a process
of discreet but serious dialogue to
come to a mutually acceptable resolution.
Such a dialogue would constitute an important form of strategic
engagement in and of itself, and would serve to diminish the distrust which
prevails between the U.S. and China.
A joint determination to develop a
comprehensive strategy, with the goal of averting
confrontation and
working towards resolving contentious issues such as Taiwan and the status
of the East and
South China Seas, would go far towards building trust
between the two nations.
Just as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were able to forge an important
agreement in the midst of serious acrimony
during the Cold War, so the
U.S. and China are capable of dealing with difficult issues in the face of
discordant
objectives, regime-type misalignment, and limited trust. While
important subjects of cybersecurity and prevention
of dangerous incidents
at sea can and should be tackled in strategic dialogue, the other more
contentious issues
discussed above cannot wait years or decades for a
resolution. The ongoing risks of inadvertent confrontation
with consequent
escalation are ever-present, and the stakes are simply too high for failure.
The author rejects
the prediction espoused in the CFR report that “there is
no real prospect of building fundamental trust,
‘peaceful coexistence,’
‘mutual understanding,’ a strategic partnership, or a ‘new type of major
country
relations’ between the United States and China,” as “intense U.S.–
China strategic competition becomes the new
normal …”4 A more
optimistic prediction for the future of the
U.S.–China relationship was
espoused by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who has coined
the phrase
“constructive realism – common purpose”:
“realist” about those areas of the relationship which are not possible to resolve within the
foreseeable future;
“constructive” about those areas that could be resolved with high-level
political effort at the bilateral,
regional and global levels; and guided by a “common purpose”
to build strategic trust, step by step, over time,
not based on declaratory statements, but
instead on common action in resolving common problems.5

The author’s views align with those of Rudd; the CFR predictions are
regarded as overly pessimistic and its
recommendations not conducive to
successful strategic engagement.
The stage is set for the inevitable competition for dominance in the Asia-
Pacific between the U.S. and China. Any
lessons that can be gleaned from
the past, whether that be failed engagement between the U.K. and Germany
prior
to World War I, or successful engagement between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. as regards INCSEA, must be analysed
for contributing factors
whose positive outcomes are conducive to successful strategic engagement.
The ultimate
goal is to avert future conflict which many tragically regard as
inevitable. The “cult of the offensive” which
prevailed in pre-World War I
Europe fuelled an arms race, undermined trust between nations, contributed
to
misalignment of objectives, and was associated with dysfunctional
communications between militaries and
governments. While such a mindset
is by no means clearly present between the U.S. and China to date, there are
very disturbing signs of similar offensive dynamics at play. Actors on both
sides predict inevitable conflict, an
arms race in progress in the land, sea,
cyberspace, and outer space domains, competition for alliances, stoking of
nationalistic sentiments, and efforts by China to diminish the U.S.
presence
in the Asia-Pacific. The hope for a successful outcome averting conflict can
only come from an
acknowledgment by both sides that they have too much
to lose if strategic engagement fails.
The goal of this book has been to gain wisdom for the future by looking
at past successes and failures. As George
Santayana said, “Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Particularly with
regards to
World War I, there are disturbing parallels which can lead to
similar tragic outcomes, catastrophic for both
sides, in the unfolding great
power rivalry between the U.S. and China. Despite the obvious logic that
conflict
and war are counterproductive to economic and overall progress,
nations sometimes act upon emotion as well as
nationalistic fervour and
become embroiled in entangling alliances, with events spinning out of
control. The
importance of good communication and confidence-building
measures to reinforce trust cannot be overemphasized, as
it is these factors
that apply the brakes when the locomotive of destructive forces appears to
be in motion.
The case studies examined in this book represent a detailed, small-N
analysis of strategic engagement as
experienced by significant dyads of
adversarial nations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, the
limitations of a small-N analysis present opportunities for future studies to
examine strategic engagement with a
larger number of case studies or
through a more quantitative, statistical lens. Additional case studies could
include strategic engagement between the U.S. and Iran; Israel and its
adversaries; India and Pakistan; as well
as Russia and Ukraine. Such studies
would further elucidate factors contributing to successful strategic
engagement and enrich understanding of the phenomenon.
Analysis of historical case studies highlights risks, but also shines light
upon opportunities for avoidance of
conflict and successful outcomes. Just
as hyper-nationalism and a militarily driven “cult of the offensive”
dominated the lead-up to World War I, there are forces both in the U.S. and
in China predicting inevitable
conflict, stressing the need for dominance,
and advocating for continually increased military budgets. Historians
have
noted that Europe appeared to be unusually calm in 1914 prior to the
outbreak of war, and that World War I
was in many ways unexpected.
Similarly, major conflict or war with China seems unimaginable at the
present time
given the critical economic and trade interdependence fuelling
growth in both countries. While bellicose rhetoric
erupts periodically on
both sides, numerous Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues continue, and
extensive academic
interchange of students contributes to greater
understanding. Nonetheless, it would be irresponsible to ignore
the perilous
dynamics that loom large: competition for hegemony, entangling alliances,
an ongoing arms race,
historical enmities, the issue of Taiwan, and
contestation over claims in the East and South China Seas.
 Rather than fuelling a competitive dynamic with China, the U.S. would
be well-advised to engage Beijing
strategically. China would be equally
well-advised to avoid a confrontational posture with the U.S., Taiwan,
Japan, and claimants to the South China Sea, and attempt to resolve its
differences
peacefully. Instead of casting blame for failures to address
contentious issues, it is essential for both the
U.S. and China to take
responsibility for acknowledging and attempting to solve problems by
means of strategic
engagement before they become crises. Bold, forward-
thinking strategic engagement can be viewed as nations’
proactive blueprint
for extinguishing small brushfires before they erupt into conflagrations.

Notes
1    Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising
U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, Council
Special Report No. 72 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
March 2015), p. 3.
2    John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 4.
3    Blackwill and Tellis, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China, p. 5.
4    Ibid., p. 38.
5    Rudd, U.S.–China 21: The Future of U.S.–China
Relations Under Xi Jinping, p. 25.
Appendix 1:
Framework

Table  A1a  Outcomes of strategic engagement

Successful Unsuccessful Ambiguous
U.K.–Germany X
U.S.–Soviet Union (INCSEA) X
U.S.–Soviet Union (SCC) X
U.S.–China X

Table  A1b  Contributing factors influencing strategic engagement

Factors U.K.–Germany U.S.–Soviet Union U.S.–China
Civil–military balance ˗ + ˗
Competitive naval buildup ˗ N/A N/A
INCSEA SCC
Quality of diplomatic/mil-mil interaction ˗ + ? ˗
Political impact upon S.E. ˗ + ? ˗
Role of secrecy in S.E. ˗ + + ?
Appendix 2:
Defence diplomacy activities

*1    Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian

defence officials
*2    Appointment of defence attaches to foreign countries
3    Bilateral defence cooperation agreements
4    Training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel
5    Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed
forces, defence management and
military technical areas
*6        Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and
ship visits
7        Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’
defence ministries or armed forces
8    Deployment of training teams
9    Provision of military equipment and other material aid
*10   Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes.
Source: Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy:
New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance (2004).

Note
1    The * indicates activities that would be practiced by parties involved in
strategic engagement.
Though these designations are not made in Cottey and Forster, they are based on the
author’s
understanding of strategic engagement.
Appendix 3:
Typology of strategic engagement
outcomes

Table  A.1
Strength of Relevant IR Details of prediction
S.E. paradigm
outcome
Weak Defensive S.E. may or may not be an independent variable. May result in side
realism deals on
issues that reduce the prospect of war and/or inform on
adversary’s motives.
Medium Neoliberal S.E. results in articulation of clear rules of the road and promotion of
institutionalism issue-linkage, thereby reducing the risk of conflict.
Strong Constructivism S.E. leads to unidirectional or reciprocal socialization. Previously
adversarial
states alter their interests and broker large compromises.
Source: Author.
Appendix 4:
Treaty text – INCSEA

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America

and the Government of The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas
Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972
The Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,
Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective
armed forces on the high seas and
flight of their military aircraft over the
high seas, and
Guided by the principles and rules of international law,
Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

Article I
For the purpose of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1    “Ship” means:

a        Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships

authorized to fly the naval auxiliary
flag where such a flag has been
established by either Party.
b       A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the
external marks distinguishing
warships of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and
whose
name appears in the Navy list, and manned by a crew who are
under regular naval discipline;

2    “Aircraft” means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-

air craft, excluding space craft.
3        “Formation” means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships
proceeding together and normally
maneuvered together.

Article II
The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their
respective ships to observe
strictly the letter and spirit of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter
referred to as the
Rules of the Road. The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct
operations on the
high seas is based on the principles established under
recognized international law and codified in the 1958
Geneva Convention
on the High Seas.

Article III
1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when
required to maintain course and speed
under the Rules of the Road,
shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.
2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other
Party shall, while conforming to the
Rules of the Road, avoid
maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the
formation.
3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic
where internationally recognized
traffic separation schemes are in
effect.
4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance
which avoids the risk of collision
and also shall avoid executing
maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance.
Except when
required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of
the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early
action so as, in the
exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under
surveillance.
5. When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such
signals (flag, sound, and light) as are
prescribed by the Rules of the
Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed
signals, shall
be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions.
 6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile
launchers, torpedo tubes, and other
weapons in the direction of a
passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction
of
passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other
powerful illumination devices to illuminate
the navigation bridges of
passing ships of the other Party.
7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising
ships shall show the appropriate signals
prescribed by the International
Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the
area.
8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party
conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4
(c) of the Rules of the
Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft
as well as ships
engaged in replenishment underway, shall take
appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and
shall
remain well clear.

Article IV
Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and
prudence in approaching aircraft and
ships of the other Party operating on
and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or
landing
aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated
attacks by the simulated use
of weapons against aircraft and ships, or
performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various
objects
near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a
hazard to navigation.

Article V
1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper
signals concerning their intent
to begin launching or landing aircraft.
2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under
instrument conditions shall,
whenever feasible, display navigation
lights.
Article VI
Both Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of

information and warning to mariners, not less
than 3 to 5 days in
advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which
represent a danger to
navigation or to aircraft in flight.
2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the
International Code of Signals to signify the
intentions of their
respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At
night, or in conditions
of reduced visibility, or under conditions of
lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct,
flashing
light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder
the movements of others or involve
a risk of collision.
3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International
Code of Signals, submitting such
signals to the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the
information of other States.

Article VII
The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of
collision, incidents which result in
damage, or other incidents at sea
between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall
provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington
and the Soviet Navy shall provide such
information through the United
States Naval Attache in Moscow.

Article VIII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall
remain in force for a period of
three years. It will thereafter be renewed
without further action by the Parties for successive periods of
three years
each.
 This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months
written notice to the other Party.

Article IX
The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this
Agreement to review the
implementation of its terms. Similar consultations
shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the
Parties may
decide.

Article X
The Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will
consider specific measures in conformity
with this Agreement. The
Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical
workability
of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters
between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The
Committee will meet
within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its
recommendations
for decision by the Parties during the consultations
prescribed in Article IX.
DONE in duplicate on the 25th day of May 1972 in Moscow in the
English and Russian languages each being equally
authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA:
John W. Warner
Secretary of the Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Sergei G. Gorshkov
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of The United

States of America and the Government of
The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas
Signed May 25,
1972
 Signed at Washington May 22, 1973
Entered into force May 22, 1973
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
herein referred to as the Parties,
Having agreed on measures directed to improve the safety of navigation
of the ships of their respective armed
forces on the high seas and flight of
their military aircraft over the high seas,
Recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by
additional
understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships
and military aircraft with respect to the
non-military ships of each Party,
Further agree as follows:

Article I
The Parties shall take measures to notify the non-military ships of each
Party on the provisions of the
Agreement directed at securing mutual safety.

Article II
Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming
guns, missile launchers, torpedo
tubes and other weapons at non-military
ships of the other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near
non-military
ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these ships
or to constitute a
hazard to Navigation.

Article III
This Protocol will enter into force on the day of its signing and will be
considered as an integral part of the
Argument between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High
Seas which was signed in Moscow on May
25, 1972.
DONE on the 22nd of May, 1973 in Washington, in two copies, each in
the English and the Russian language, both
texts having the same force.
 FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
J.P. Weinel
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Alekseyev, Admiral
Appendix 5:
Standing Consultative Commission
regulations

1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government
of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding the
Establishment of a Standing
Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a
U.S. component and
Soviet component, each of which shall be headed
by a Commissioner.
2. The Commissioners shall alternatively preside over the meetings.
3. The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance
of the matters to be submitted for
discussion, but may at a meeting
submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the
Commission.
4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each
Commissioner may transmit written or oral
communications to the
other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the
Commission.
5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and
experts as it deems necessary to participate in
a meeting.
6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and
prepare specific matters.
7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the
Commission may, if necessary, be entered
into records which shall be
in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both
texts being
equally authentic.
8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be
conducted in private. The Standing
Consultative Commission may not
make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both
Commissioners.
9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected
with its participation in the
Commission.
Appendix 6:
Interactions between the U.S.
National Defense University and the Chinese
National Defense University,
1986–2012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: U.S. NDU – PRC NDU, 1986–2012

1    Discussion.
This memorandum is prepared as a summary of the formal interactions
between the U.S. and Chinese National
Defense Universities (NDU).
2    Activities.
1986: visit to China by NDU President (NDU-P), Lt Gen Bradley
Hosmer, USAF
1992, April: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Dr.
P.H.B. Godwin
1993, April: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Dr.
P.H.B. Godwin
1994, January: visit to China by NDU-P, LTG Paul Cerjan, USA
1994, May: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Capt. B.D.
Cole, USN
1994, August: visit to NDU-P by PLA Vice Director of General Staff,
General XU Huizi, (NDU was not host of this
visit) and 1994,
September: visit to US by PRCNDU Dean, MG XU Fangting
1995, February-March: visit to US by PRCNDU President, General
ZHU Dun-fa
1995, March: speech at NDU by LTG XIONG Guangkai (NDU was not
host of this visit)
1995, May: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Mr. Philip
Lincoln
1996, May: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
1996, October: visit to US by PRCNDU President, General XING
Shizhong (MOA signed with NDU-P, Lt Gen Ervin
Rokke, USAF)
1997, May: visit to China by NDU student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
1997, October: visit to US by two PRCNDU librarians and two faculty
members (Sr Col ZHANG Yining, Col YU
Guohua)
1998, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
1998, May: visit to China by ICAF student delegations (2)
1998, June: Strategic Discussions between US NDU INSS and PRC
NDU ISS, in,
Washington
1998, September: visit to China by NDU-P, LTG Richard Chilcoat,
USA
1998, December: NWC faculty exchange visit to PRCNDU by Col John
McDonald, USA and Dr. Cynthia Watson
1998, December: PRCNDU faculty exchange visit to NDU by SrCapt
HUO Xiaoyong, SrCol KANG Jianwu, and LTC YANG
Jun
1999, March: visit to NDU by PRCNDU President, General XING
Shizhong
2000, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
2000, May: visit to China by ICAF student delegations (2)
2000, November: visit to NDU by PRC CAPSTONE delegation, led by
Lt Gen ZHAO Keming, Vice Political Commissar,
NDU
2000, December: ICAF faculty exchange visit to PRCNDU by Col.
Steven Randolph, USAF and Captain Jeanne Vargo,
USN
2001, March: PRCNDU faculty exchange visit to NDU by SrCol JIN
2002, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr.
Cynthia Watson
2002, May: visit to China by ICAF student delegations (2)
2002, October: visit to China by NDU-P, VADM Paul Gaffney, USN
2002, December: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE
2003, May: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE
2003, May: visit to NDU by PLA NDU-P, LTG Pei Huailiang
2003, December: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE
2004, May: visit to NDU by NWC student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
2004, November: visit to PLA NDU by INSS delegation
2004, December: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE
2005, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr.
Cynthia Watson
2005, May: visit to China by ICAF student delegations
2005, June: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE (Strategic Studies
course)
2005, November: visit to NDU by PLA Strategic Studies Institute
2006, April: visit to China by NDU-P, LtGen Michael M. Dunn, USAF
2006, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole
2006, May: visit to China by ICAF student delegations
2006, June: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE (Strategic Studies
course)
2006, July: visit to NDU and speech by PRC Vice-Chairman of Central
Military Commission Guo Boxiong
2006, October: visit to NDU by PLA Operational Commanders course
2006, December: visit to China by INSS delegation for dialogue
2007, April: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by MG
Marnie Peterson, USAF
2007, May: visit to China by ICAF Industry Studies student delegations
2007, May: visit to China by NDU CAPSTONE student delegation
2007, June: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE (Strategic Studies
course)
2007, December: visit to NDU by PLA Strategic Studies Institute for
dialogue
2008, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by MG
Robert Steel, USAF.
2008, May: visit to China by four ICAF Industry Studies student
delegations
2008, September: visit to NDU by PLA NDU-P LTG Wang Xibin
2009, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr.
Cynthia Watson
 2009, May: visit to China by four ICAF Industry Studies student
delegations
2009, September: visit to NDU by PLA NDU delegation for strategic
dialogue
2009, October: visit to China by CAPSTONE delegation
2010, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation, led by Dr. B.D.
Cole (did not meet with PLA or visit PLA
NDU)
2010, May: visit to China by CAPSTONE delegation (did not meet with
PLA)
2010, May: visit to China by four ICAF Industry Studies student
delegations
2010, October: visit to China by CAPSTONE delegation
2011, Mar: visit to China by INSS for strategic dialogue
2011, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation
2011, May: visit to China by four ICAF Industry Studies student
delegations
2011, May: speech at NDU by PLA Chief of General Staff GEN Chen
Bingde
2011, June: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE (Strategic Studies
course)
2011, Oct: visit to China by CAPSTONE delegation
2012, Mar: visit to NDU by PLA Strategic Studies Institute for dialogue
2012, May: visit to China by NWC student delegation
2012, May: visit to China by four ICAF Industry Studies student
delegations
2012, June: visit to NDU by PLA CAPSTONE (Strategic Studies
course)
2012, Aug: visit to NDU by DGCS LTG Cai Yingting

Source: Courtesy of Dr. Bernard (Bud) Cole, Professor, U.S. National War
College
Appendix 7:
Excerpt from Section 1201 of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of
2000 provision relating to U.S.
military contacts
with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

SEC. 1201. LIMITATION ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES

AND CONTACTS WITH CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY.

1. LIMITATION – The Secretary of Defense may not authorize any

military-to-military exchange or contact
described in subsection (b) to
be conducted by the armed forces with representatives of the People’s
Liberation
Army of the People’s Republic of China if that exchange or
contact would create a national security risk due to
an inappropriate
exposure specified in subsection (b).
2. COVERED EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS – Subsection (a)
applies to any military-to-military exchange or contact that
includes
inappropriate exposure to any of the following:
3. Force projection operations.
4. Nuclear operations.
5. Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations.
6. Advanced logistical operations.
7. Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to
weapons of mass destruction.
8. Surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
9. Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a
transformation in warfare.
10. Military space operations.
11. Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces.
12. Arms sales or military-related technology transfers.
13. Release of classified or restricted information.
14. Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.
15. EXCEPTIONS – Subsection (a) does not apply to any search-and-
rescue or humanitarian operation or
exercise.

Source: https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/106-65.pdf
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Author’s interviews
Author’s telephone interview with anonymous [by request] U.S. Navy officer, 9 December 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Tom Bickford, Senior Research Scientist, China Studies/China Security
Affairs Team, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, 12 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Matthieu Duchatel, former Head, China and Global Security Project,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Beijing, 23 April 2014.
Author’s interview with George Fedoroff, 5 January 2015.
Author’s telephone interview with Mr.Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2001–
2005), 16 January 2015.
Author’s interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, Jr., Washington, D.C., 10 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Mr.Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, 1
May 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr.Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., 18 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Mr. Paul Haenle, Director, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy,
Beijing, 21 April 2014.
Author’s personal interview with Dr. Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia, Singapore, 25 April
2013.
Author’s interview with Mr.Roy Kamphausen, Senior Advisor, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 10 January 2015.
Author’s interview with Mr. Michael Krepon, Co-founder, The Stimson Center, 20 February 2017.
Author’s interview with Dr. James Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 19 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Carnes Lord, U.S. Naval War College, 27 February 2017.
Author’s interview with Assistant Professor Oriana Mastro, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C., 26 February 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. James Mulvenon, a non-governmental cybersecurity expert who
participated in the Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue, Vienna, Virginia, 6 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C, 11 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Professor Robert Ross, Boston College and Visiting Scholar, Peking
University School of International Studies, Beijing, 23 April 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Denny Roy, Senior Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu, 30 April 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Lora Saalman, former Associate Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, Honolulu, 2 May 2014.
Author’s interview with Lt. Col. (Ret.) Chad Sbragia, Deputy Director, Strategic Focus Group, U.S.
Pacific Command, Honolulu, 29 April 2014.
Author’s interview with Mr. Randall Schriver, Partner, Armitage International, Arlington, Virginia,
10 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation,
Washington, D.C., 11 December 2014.
Author’s interview with Professor David Shambaugh, The George Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. Teng Jianqun, Director, Department for American Studies, China
Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 6 December 2013.
Author’s interview with Drew Thompson, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 28 July 2019.
Author’s interview with John W. Warner, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2014.
Author’s interview with Dr. David Winkler, Naval Historical Foundation, Washington, D.C., 28
February 2014.
Author’s interview with Professor Emeritus Michael Yahuda, London School of Economics and
Visiting Scholar, Elliott School for International Affairs, The George Washington University,
Washington, D.C., 5 March 2014.
Author’s interview with PLA Major General Yao Yunzhu, Director Emeritus, Center on China–
America Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, 12 April 2014.
Author’s interview with Professor Zha Daojiong, School of International Studies, Peking University,
15 October 2017.
Author’s interview with Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean, Defense Affairs Institute, PLA National
Defense University, Beijing, 3 December 2013.
Index

Note: page numbers containing n refer to chapter endnotes.

A2/AD (anti-access area-denial) strategy 121, 122, 147,
161
ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty (1972) 8, 20, 72,
74, 97;
Article XIII 72, 100–101N49;
compliance issues with 87; five-year reviews of (1977/1982) 87–88;
violations of 93, see also
SCC
ACDA (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 85,
86
Adelman, Kenneth 86, 93
Aden, Gulf of 137
AECA (Arms Export Control Act, U.S., 1976) 111
Afghanistan 79, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95
Africa 35, 41, 42, 117
Agadir (Morocco) 41, 47, 48, 53
AGI (Auxiliary General Intelligence) vessels 68, 69, 135
aircraft-to-aircraft engagement 68, 70
aircraft-to-ship incidents 68, 69, 70
Albertini, Luigi 34, 55
Alekseyev, Admiral 82, 83
Allen, Kenneth W. 136
Allenby, Captain Reginald (naval attaché) 48
Allison, Graham 39, 171
America, USS 84
Anemometr (Soviet AGI) 69
Anglo-German pre-World War I strategic engagement 1–2, 4, 7–8, 12, 28,
34–60,
159; and anti-
British sentiment 40, 47,
48, 50–51, 53, 56; and arms manufacturers 39, 59; and
arms race 9,
35; and assumptions of neutrality 36, 39, 41,
42, 43,
45, 58,
62–63n76, 160; and civil-military
balance 37–38, 160, 178; and colonies 35, 42,
45, 62n64; data sources for 10, 11, 12; and
diplomacy 34–36, 43, 46, 50, 51; dynamics motivating 36–37; and economic interdependence
25, 37, 38, 162, 172; failure of 1–2, 59–60, 170, 175, 178; and France/Russia 34, 35, 36, 41,
42, 47, 55, 57, 58, 163; and German naval expansion
38, 39–40, 41, 44, 45, 50, 51, 160, 162;
Hague Peace Conferences (1899/1907) 35; and Haldane Missions see Haldane
Missions;
historiography of 34–36; lessons learned from 58–60, 175, 176; and military attachés 34, 36,
46–54,
163; and naval competition see naval competition; naval information exchange in 52–
53; and negative effects of diplomacy
35; and politics 38, 43, 45, 54–57, 58, 59, 166, 172; and
propaganda 56, 58, 59; and secrecy 57–58, 59,
168; and threat perceptions 36, 38,
47, 48,
49,
50,
51, 53,
54, 56,
58; and Thucydides trap 39, 174; and trade 25, 37,
40; and trust/distrust 39,
41, 45, 47, 53, 56, 59, 173; and two-power standard 42–43, 72n74; and U.S.–China/U.S.
Soviet Union cases, compared 67, 125,
159–169, 170–171, 173–174, 178
anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) strategy 121, 122, 147,
161
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty see ABM
anti-piracy operations 136, 137
appeasement 4, 9
Arkhipov, Vasili 69
arms control 5, 19, 20, 35, 50, 53, 112, 171–172
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 85, 86
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, U.S. 1976) 111
arms race 9, 35, 53, 74, 96, 117, 120,
122, 162, 172, 175
arms sales 2, 111, see under Taiwan
Asia 118, 119, 146, 147
Asia-Pacific region 3, 27, 32n64, 110, 121,
128, 142, 146, 162, 163, 168, 170,
171, see also U.S.–
China
strategic engagement
Australia 3, 122
Austria-Hungary 34, 35, 57–58

B-59 (Soviet submarine) 68–69, 82,

99n9
B-276 Kostroma (Soviet submarine) 80
Baghdad Railway 35, 42
Balkan Wars (1912–1913) 47
Balkans 35
Ballin, Albert 41, 55
ballistic missile defence systems 126, 161, 172
Banner, USS 69
Baton Rouge (U.S. submarine) 80
Beijing (China) 111, 122, 123, 125, 128,
129, 131, 144, 145
Belgrade incident (1999) 133, 143
Bennett, Andrew 10
Berghahn, Volker 35
Berlin (Germany) 1, 13n9, 36, 40, 41,
42, 43,
44, 45,
46, 50,
55
Bertie, Francis 42
Besslednyy (Soviet destroyer) 69
Bethmann-Holweg, Theobald von 37, 42, 43,
44, 50,
51, 54,
55, 59,
64n158
Bezzavetnyy (Soviet ship) 80
Bickford, Tom 130, 139, 145
Bowditch, USNS 129, 130
Bray, Commander Leah 132
Brezhnev, Leonid 72
Britain (UK) 128; civil-military balance in 37, 38,
58, 160, see also Anglo-German pre-World War I
strategic engagement
British Admiralty 35, 41, 43, 46, 51, 52, 55, 62n74
British attachés 34, 36, 46–50, 51–52; and Kaiser 46–47; naval 46,
47, 48,
51, 55
British Foreign Office 36, 46, 48,
49, 55,
56–57,
65n182
British Navy see Royal Navy
Brown, Harold 111
Buchheim, Robert 96
Bush, George H.W. 113
Bush, George W. 116, 122, 133, 143–144
CACDA (China Arms Control and Disarmament Association) 126
Cambon, Paul 58
Campbell, Kurt 1128
Cao Gangchuan, General 128
capacity-building 2, 5
Carlucci, Frank 112
Caron, USS 80
Carter, Ashton 27
Carter, Jimmy 73, 85, 86, 89, 93, 166
Cassel, Ernest Joseph 41
CBMs (confidence-building measures) 5, 8, 16, 112, 116,
121, 127, 129, 174, 176; and crisis
management 21, 22,
138; effectiveness of 19–20; four categories of 19; information exchange
as 53; and policy 20, see also
CSBMs; rules of the road
CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 115, 137, 140,
146–147, 161
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 12,
125, 126, 128
CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) report (2015) 170,
173, 175
Chi Haotian, General 111, 129, 143
China 3, 4, 7, 17, 72; anti-access area-denial (A2/AD)
strategy 121, 122, 147, 161; data sources for
10–11; Defense Minister 15n41, 111, 129, 143; Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
of 121, 125,
131, 132, 134; government of 17, 119,
120, 140, 150n64, 160, 161,
164, 166–167; and Japan
114–115,
122, 123, 147, 163, 176; military budget of 13n13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) 120, 123,
126; Ministry of National Defense 128, 141,
143; modernization of
military 110, 111,
121, 146, 147, 162, 168; and One China policy 160, 161,
172; and Soviet
Union 110; and Soviet Union/U.S. (Strategic Triangle) 110; State Councilor 123; territorial
waters
of 80, 82, see also PLA; U.S.–China strategic engagement
China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) 126
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 115, 137, 140,
146–147, 161
Chinese National Defense University 115–116, 187–189
Chipman, John 128
Churchill, Winston 41, 44–45, 47, 51, 54, 55, 59, 165, 166
CICIR (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations) 12, 125, 128
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 91
civil-military balance 6, 37–38, 58, 73–75, 159–163, 178; in
Anglo-German strategic engagement
37–38, 160; cases
compared 1260; in Cold War 30n8, 73–75, 160; and U.S.–China strategic
engagement 119–122,
147, 160–161
civil-military relations 17, 37, 55,
113, 125, 140
Clausewitz, Carl von 1, 157n242
Clinton, Bill 113, 117, 143
Clinton, Hillary 120
coercive diplomacy 9, 27–28, 29
Cohen, William 129
Cold War 2, 6, 17; end of 2, 92, 94, 97, 167; see also U.S.-Soviet strategic
engagement
colonialism 35, 42, 45, 62n64
Combined Task Force (CTF) 137
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 91
communication 6, 94–96, 113, 123, 126, 141–142, 176; and attachés 49, 50, 52,
55, 84;
cases
compared 165–166; and CBM 19, 96; and crisis management 20, 21, 138; failures in 7, 20, 21,
44, 45,
59, 141, 142, 165; and hotlines 21; and INCSEA/SCC
72–73,
94, 98,
165; and
 military-to-military interactions 141–142,
146; and MMCA 129, 130, 131, 132; personal
diplomatic 23; sea lines of (SLOCs) 117, 137; ship-to-ship 69, 76,
77, 84
communism 74, 85, 97
Comprehensive Dialogue (U.S.–China) 124
Concert of Europe 36
confidence-building measures see CBMs
conflict prevention 14n18, 18, 19,
25, 118, 162
constructivism 23, 26–27, 180
containment 4, 142, 147, 171, 173
Cony, USS 68–69, 99n9
Cottey, Andrew 4, 13n12, 17–18, 28,
159, 179
Council on Foreign Relations see CFR report
Courtney, USS 69
crisis management 5, 16, 20–22, 138; and CBMs 21, 22;
challenges to/limits of 21–22; and hotlines
21; and nuclear threat 20–21
Crowe, Eyre 56–57
CSBMs (confidence and security building measures) 2,
127
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) 12,
125, 126, 128
CTF (Combined Task Force) 137
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 21, 68, 82
Curzon, Lord George 2
cybersecurity 12, 127–128, 140, 175

Dai Qingcheng 118

data collection 10, 27, 29; and destruction of records
46
DCT (U.S.–China Defense Consultative Talks) 129, 133–134,
143, 146
defence attachés see military attachés
defence diplomacy: defined 4, 14nn18,
19, 159; goals of 5; range of activities 4, 179;
scholarship gap
on 28; and strategic engagement 5–6, 16–19, 159
defence ministries 6, 17, 28
Defense Consultative Talks (U.S.–China) see DCT
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 137
defensive realism 23–24, 180
Deng Xiaoping 120
détente 2, 8, 71, 72, 74, 88, 161; Anglo-German 35, 41
deterrence 9, 53, 113, 114, 115
diplomacy 50; coercive 9, 27–28, 29; and defence, perceived
distinction between 1; military 6, 11,
16–17, 29n1; naval 1–2, 29n1; public 6
disarmament 19, 35
Djerejian, Edward 6
doctrinal-difference misperception hypothesis 141–142, 166
Dreadnought battleships 39–40, 53,
160
Duchatel, Matthieu 130, 144
Dumas, Captain Philip (naval attaché) 48, 56

Eagleburger, Lawrence 145

Earle, Ralph II 86–87
East China Sea 9, 119, 121, 122, 142, 143, 146,
147, 161, 162, 164, 168, 173, 175
East Germany 91
economic interdependence 25, 37, 38,
146, 162, 172, 176
Edward VII 37, 49, 53,
56
Enterprise, USS 69
EP-3 incident (2001) 129, 130, 131,
132, 138, 139, 143–144
espionage 51–52, 59
Europe 1, 7, 16, 19, 36, 170, 176; economic interdependence in
25, 37
Ewart, Commander Arthur (naval attaché) 46

F-8 fighter jets 111, 129, 130, 143

Fang Fenghui, General 135
Fedoroff, George 82, 84, 90, 91
Feith, Douglas 133, 143–144, 145
Ferdinand, Archduke Franz, assassination of 34, 53
Ferguson, Niall 35
Finkelstein, David 114, 115, 139, 145
Fischer, Fritz 34
Fisher, Admiral John 49, 56
fixed distances issue 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 164
Foley, Vice Admiral S.R. 78, 89, 90
FONOPS (freedom of navigation operations) 164
Ford, Gerald 73, 85, 93, 166
foreign ministries 17, 36
foreign policy analysis 27
Forster, Anthony 4, 13n12, 17–18, 28,
159, 179
France 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 47, 55, 57, 58, 163; and U.S.-Soviet strategic engagement 95
Franco-Prussian War (1870) 34
freedom of navigation 9, 69, 74, 80, 82, 121, 146,
161, 168, 173; operations (FONOPS) 164
Freeman, Chas 111–112, 137, 138, 143
Friedberg, Aaron 24, 32n53

Gates, Robert 144

George, Alexander 9–10, 22, 27, 28, 29, 71
George V 37
German Army 40, 47–48, 52
German attachés 34, 36, 50–51; naval 50, 51, 54,
55
German Foreign Office 36, 41, 45
German General Staff 44, 47, 50, 52
German Navy 9, 43–45, 47, 48, 67; expansion of 38, 39–40, 41, 44,
45, 50,
51, 160, 162, 172; and
Kiel Week 36, 50, 53,
56; submarines 40, 43, 44, 49, 51, 160
German Navy League 39, 48, 59
Germany 1–2, 17; Army Bill (1913) 47–48;
civil-military relations in 55, 160; Fleet Bill (1912) 43;
and France 34, 41, 47; naval
laws (1906/1908/1912) 39, 51, 64n158; political dissent in
59,
see also Anglo-German
pre-World War I strategic engagement
Gidrolog (Soviet vessel) 69
Glaser, Bonnie 123
glasnost 110
Gleichen, Count (British attaché) 53
Glosserman, Brad 126, 131
Gorbachev, Mikhail 75, 110
Gorshkov, Admiral 13n4, 67, 69, 71, 78
Gray, Colin 5, 20
Graybeal, Sidney 94
Green, Michael 116, 138
Greenert, Admiral Jonathan 132, 135
Grey, Edward 36, 38, 41, 55, 56–57, 58
Gromyko, Andrei 87
Guo Xinning, Senior Colonel 115–116
Gurtov, Mel 4

Haass, Richard 25
HADR (Humanitarian and Disaster Relief) 135, 136, 164
Haenle, Paul 116, 126, 130, 136, 139,
144, 145, 149n42
Hagel, Chuck 135
Hague Peace Conferences (1899/1907) 35
Haikou (PLA destroyer) 135
Hainan Island (China) 129, 143
Haldane Missions 1–2, 9, 34, 40–45, 125, 163; 1906 40; 1912 41–45, 54–55, 57, 59,
64n158, 166;
and assumptions of neutrality 41, 42, 43,
160; and Cassel 41; and Churchill 41, 44–45; failure
of 45, 59, 165, 166, 173; and France 41, 42; and
Kaiser 47, 167; lack of confidentiality in 57–
58, 59; and
naval competition 40, 41, 43–44; and Nicolson 42
Haldane, Richard Burdon 1, 34, 40, 41, 42, 51, 54, 57, 59, 168
Hartley, USS 69
Hawaii 126, 127, 132, 135
Hays, Admiral Ronald J. 83
Hayward, Admiral 78
Heath, Captain Herbert (naval attaché) 48, 49
hegemonic socialization theory 26
hegemony: in Anglo-German strategic engagement 38, 39, 58,
160, 170; in U.S.–China strategic
engagement 119, 121,
128, 146, 160, 170–171, 176
Henderson, Captain Wilfred (naval attaché) 49
Hilton, Rear Admiral 81
Hong Kong 130, 135
hotlines 21
Huaqing, Liu 111
human rights 111, 112
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) 135, 136, 164
Huxley, Tim 128

ICS (International Code of Signals) 77, 81, 182,

183
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 11,
125, 128
Impeccable, USS 130, 141
INCSEA (Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, 1972) 5, 8, 10, 12,
28, 97,
125, 159, 175; annual reviews 75, 76–78, 79,
80, 81,
82, 88–89, 90, 91–92; Article VII
76, 94, 183;
Article IX 75, 184; Article X 76, 184; background to 67–70; as CBM 20; and
China 130, 131, 132,
162; and civil-military balance 73–74, 160; and communication signals
76, 77, 80, 81, 83; continuity/stability in 76–77, 79,
81; as crisis management tool 21, 22;
effectiveness of 76, 78–79, 80–82, 97–98, 170, 171, 172, 174,
178; and fixed distances issue
76, 77,
78, 79,
81, 82,
164; and military attachés 75–76, 83, 84,
163–164; and military-to-
military relations 78–79, 81, 82–85, 88–89, 91, 129, 161, 178; motivations for 71; and mutual
interests 22, 71, 77,
81, 88;
and politics 88–92, 98, 166, 167, 178; post-Cold War 81, 91;
preliminary talks/signing 70–71; protocol
on non-military ships (1973) 76, 81; and quality of
diplomatic interactions 75–82; and
secrecy 94–96, 98, 168, 178; and submarines 77, 79,
80,
81,
82, 169n6; and territorial waters 78, 80, 82,
164; text of 181–185; unresolved issues in 82;
and U.S. Chief of Naval Operations 76, 77,
78, 83,
84, 90;
violations of 77–78, 79, 80, 83–84;
working groups 75–77
Independence, USS 143
India 123, 176
intelligence 16, 22–23, 115, 135, 146; and defensive realism 24; and military attachés 2, 17, 18,
22,
46,
49, 51–52, 53; and policymaking 22, 49, 54; and
strategic engagement 5, 7, 22, 23
inter-service rivalry 40, 46
interdepartmental relations 17, 70, 86
interdependence, economic 25, 37, 38,
146, 162, 172, 176
International Code of Signals (ICS) 77, 81, 182,
183
international relations 2, 3, 12, 22, 23–27; constructivist school 23, 26–27;
defensive realist school
23–24; foreign policy analysis 27; neoliberal institutionalist school 23, 24–26
international waters/airspace 68, 69, 78,
132
interoperability 2, 5
Iran 7, 89, 176
isolation 4
issue-linkage 25, 180

Japan 3, 15n40, 114–115, 122, 123, 147,

163, 166, 171, 176
Japan, Sea of 69–70, 100n31
Jervis, Robert 114
John S. McCain, USS 130
Johnson, U. Alexis 70
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCF) 71, 72, 78–79, 86,
91, 137
Joint U.S.–China Cyber Working Group 127–128
Jones, Admiral David S. 86, 94

Kamphausen, Roy 138

Kan, Shirley 135
Kasatonov, Admiral Vladimir 71
Kennedy, Paul 35, 62n74
Keohane, Robert 25
Keywadin, USS 69
Kiderlen-Wachter, Alfred von 41
Kiel Week 36, 50, 53, 56
Kissinger, Henry 73, 86, 87, 96, 145
Kitty Hawk, USS 129, 130
Klosson, Boris 70
Knox, General W.G. 51
Kohler, Foy 70
Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007
downing of (1983) 79, 83
Korean War 68
Korniyenko, Georgy 70
Kosygin, Alexei 88
Kotelnikov (Soviet vessel) 69
Kurth, Rear Admiral 79

Laird, Melvin 88
Larson, Admiral Chuck 112
Law of the Sea 70
Lee Teng-hui 143
Lee Kuan Yew 136
Lehman, John F. Jr. 95
Levy, Jack S. 34
Lewis, James 140
Li Bin 11
Liang Guanglie, General 15n41, 128
Liaoning (Chinese aircraft carrier) 135
Lieberthal, Kenneth 116–117
Linder, Rear Admiral 76
Locklear, Admiral Samuel 135
Lockwood, USS 78
Lord, Carnes 85, 86
Louis of Bettenberg, Admiral Prince 56
Luttwitz, Captain von (military attaché) 50
Lynn-Jones, Sean 35, 82
Lyons, Vice Admiral 83, 84

Ma Ying-jeou 144
McCarthyism 75
McVadon, Eric A. 136
Mastro, Oriana 113, 138
Mearsheimer, John 24, 32n53, 147, 171
media 47, 51, 57, 75, 95, 98
Metternich, Count von 50, 51, 55, 57, 64n158
Midway, USS 89
Mikhailov, Viktor 68–69
military attachés 2, 5, 16, 179, see also naval attachés
military attachés in Anglo-German case 2, 4, 13n9,
34, 36,
46–51,
46–54,
163; British see British
attachés; cooperation between 52, 55; German see German attachés; and
intelligence 17, 18,
 22, 49, 51–52, 53, 54, 59, 163; and inter-service rivalry 46; naval 13n9, 36, 46,
47, 48–49, 55;
as negative force 54, 59
military attachés in U.S.–China case 129, 136, 140
military attachés in U.S.-Soviet case 11, 16, 83,
136, 163–164; naval 75–76, 84, 90,
95
military budgets 3, 13n13, 28, 51
military diplomacy 6, 11, 16–17, 29n1
military exercises 4, 24, 138, 142, 179,
see also naval exercises
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA, U.S.–China) 9, 21, 129–131, 132, 137,
143,
144, 146, 162
military personnel exchanges 3, 4, 36, 67, 114,
136, 138, 140–141, 164
military planning 3, 24, 26, 39–40, 55, 56, 112, 117
military-to-military relations 5, 19, 34,
54, 163–166, 178, 179; and dispute resolution
84; U.S.–China
see U.S.–China
military-to-military relations; U.S.-Soviet see U.S.-Soviet military-to-military
relations, see also navy-to-navy relations
Montville, Joseph 125, 126
Morocco see Agadir
Moscow (Russia) 30n8, 70–71, 76, 88
Moscow Summit (1972) 71, 72
MOU (U.S.–China Memorandum of Understanding, 2014) 129,
131–132, 162
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) 87
Mulvenon, James 118, 126, 128, 137, 150n61

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, U.S. 2000) 121,

134, 138, 190
national security 3, 7, 23, 32n64, 73, 113, 115,
127
National Security Archive (George Washington University) 10
nationalism 7, 39, 59, 145, 147–148, 172,
173, 176
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 95, 143, 170
naval attachés 13n9, 36, 46, 47, 48–49, 84, 90, 95, 140, 163;
cooperation between 55, 75–76, 164
naval competition 8, 9, 36, 38–40, 41, 43, 43–44, 50, 62n64, 170, 178;
negative value of 40, 58; and
proposed shipbuilding moratorium 45, 55
naval diplomacy 1–2, 29n1
naval exercises 49, 69, 131, 137, 142;
joint 135, 136, 141, 142, 164, 165
Naval Historical and Heritage Command (Washington, D.C.) 10
Navoytsev, Admiral 77, 78, 79, 83
navy-to-navy relations 21, 78–79, 84, 88,
89, 94,
161, 162; and ship visits 4, 5, 18, 24, 36,
129, 134–
137, 174, 179
NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act, U.S., 2000) 121, 134,
138, 190
neoliberal institutionalism 23, 24–26, 180
Neosho, USS 69
New Zealand 122
Nicholson, Major Arthur B. 42, 91, 92
Nicolson, Arthur 42
Nimitz, USS 143
Nitze, Paul 70
Nixon, Richard 71, 72, 73, 85, 88, 110, 166
nonproliferation 112
norms/norm diffusion 26–27
North Korea (DPRK) 7, 12, 15n40, 69; and China 115, 126, 148, 163, 171
nuclear dialogues 11–12, 126–127; Cold War see SCC
nuclear weapons 2, 8, 19, 20, 68–69, 71–72, 74, 82, 96, 97, 171
Nye, Joseph Jr. 25, 112–113

Obama, Barack 118, 127, 131, 134, 144–145, 147

offensive realism 24
Okun, Herbert 70, 88
Owen, David 42

Paal, Douglas 113, 137, 139

Pacific Forum 126
Pacific Ocean 84, 88, 122, 160, see also Asia Pacific region
Pakistan 7, 176
Palmer, Mark 91
Paris Peace Conference (1918) 57
Peace Ark (PLA hospital ship) 135, 137
peace dividend 2
peacetime activities of militaries 3, 27, 28
perestroika 110
Perle, Richard 86, 93
Perry, William 27, 111, 112, 143
Philippines 122, 147, 171
PLA (People’s Liberation Army, China) 3, 111, 126,
146; and Chinese government 119, 120,
140,
150n64, 164, 166–167;
firing of missiles by 143; and hegemonism 121, 146; and
nuclear
dialogues 12; three objectives of 114–115; and
transparency/opacity 115, 117, 118,
145; and
trust/distrust 117
PLA Air Force 129, 130, 146
PLA General Staff 112, 133, 138
PLA Navy (PLAN) 9, 129, 130, 142, 146; and ship visits 134–137
policy/policymaking 5, 7, 10, 13, 17, 88–94, 119–120; and CBMs 20; and intelligence 22, 49, 54; and
international relations 27
Politburo 75
political leadership 7, 23, 43
politics: and Anglo-German case 38, 43, 45,
54–57,
58, 59,
166, 172; cases compared 166–168, 178;
and U.S.–China strategic engagement 118, 140, 142–145, 148, 167–168; and U.S.-Soviet
strategic engagement 88–94, 98, 166,
167
port ship visits see ship visits
post-Cold War period 2–3, 4, 18, see also U.S.–China strategic engagement
prisoner’s dilemma 24, 25
propaganda 6, 56, 58, 59, 173
Prueher, Admiral 143
public diplomacy 6
Pueblo, USS 69

Qiandaohu (PLA supply ship) 135

qualitative analysis 9–12; data collection method 10–12, 29;
document sources for 10–11, 46;
interviews 11, 12,
105n133

radar systems/installations 93, 111

RAND Corporation 113
Rawlins, Captain 76
Reagan, Ronald 2, 85, 86, 89, 93, 96–97, 166
reconnaissance missions 68, 79, 117,
131–132, 134, 143, 168
Reichstag 37–38, 39, 43, 58
research institutes 11
Resnick, Evan 4
RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises 135
Ronald Reagan, USS 135
Roseberry, Lord 56
Ross, Robert 116
Rowen, USS 70
Roy, Denny 115
Royal Navy 9, 36, 39–40, 41, 49, 51, 52, 56
Rudd, Kevin 175
rules of the road 19, 21, 25, 79, 180, 182
Rumsfeld, Donald 128, 143–144
Russell, Lieutenant-Colonel (military attaché) 47–48
Russia 7, 15n40, 34, 35, 36, 42, 55, 57, 58, 176; see also Soviet Union

S&ED (Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S.–China) 122–124,

125, 146
SA-5 radar installations 93
Saalman, Lora 117, 126, 144
Sakulkin, Rear Admiral 95
SALT agreements 73, 85, 94
SALT I (1972) 72
SALT II (1979) 21, 86
Santayana, George 176
Saratoga, USS 69
Savitsky, Valentin 69
Sbragia, Chad 140
SCC (U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission) 2,
8, 10,
12, 20,
28, 67,
71–73,
125, 159, 161,
164; and ACDA 85, 86; background to/creation of 71–73; and civil-military balance
74–75,
160; commissioners 72, 73, 85, 92, 92–93, 96; and compliance issue 86–87, 93,
97, 171;
composition of 72, 85–86;
effectiveness of 85–87, 93–94, 97–98, 165, 170, 171–172, 174,
178; longevity of 87–88; and
military-to-military relations 85–88; and politics 92–94, 97, 98,
166, 167; Regulations 96, 101n49,
186; and secrecy 96–97, 98, 168, 178; U.S./Soviet views of
73
Schiffer, Michael 133–134
Schleiffen Plan 36
Schlesinger, James 85
Schriver, Randall 130, 135, 137
Scobell, Andrew 113, 141, 143
Scowcroft, Brent 73, 86, 145
sea lines of communication (SLOC) 137
secrecy: and Anglo-German strategic engagement 57–58, 59,
168; cases compared 168–169, 178;
and U.S.–China strategic engagement 145–146,
148, 168–169, 172; and U.S.-Soviet strategic
engagement 94–97, 98, 168
Serkov, Captain Valentin 81
Shambaugh, David 113, 116, 123, 131
Shangri-La Dialogue 11, 15n41, 128
shashoujian strategy 121
ship visits 4, 5, 18, 24, 36, 129, 134–137, 140–141, 174, 179
sideline meetings 8, 11, 128
Sikorsky helicopters 111
Singh, Bhubindar 5, 14n18
Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue 127, 150n61, 152n108
Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity Dialogue (2009–2012) 12
SKR-6 (Soviet ship) 80
Slocombe, Walter 143
SLOCs (sea lines of communication ) 137
socialization 26, 180
soft power 25, 136
Sokolov, Oleg 91
Somalia 117
South Carolina, USS 83
South China Sea 9, 118, 119, 121, 128, 130, 134,
135, 146, 148, 161, 162, 163, 164,
168, 173, 175,
177; Spratly Islands 147, 173
South Korea 15n40, 122, 147, 171
Soviet Air Force 68
Soviet General Staff 68, 72
Soviet Navy 9, 67, 84; inexperience of officers in 71; submarines 68–69, 77, 80, 82, 99n9
Soviet Union 17; and Afghanistan 79, 89,
90, 91,
92, 95;
and China/U.S. (Strategic Triangle) 110;
Defense Ministry
94; dissolution of 2, 92, 94, 97, 167; and nuclear weapons 71–72;
policy/policymaking in 75; primary strategy of 74; territorial waters
of 78, 80, see also U.S.-
Soviet strategic engagement
Spratly Islands 147, 173
SSD (Strategic Security Dialogue, U.S.–China) 124–125, 134
Starodubov, General-Major Viktor P. 72
statecraft 27, 29, 123, 141; and coercive diplomacy 28
Steele, Commodore Robert 95
Steinberg, James 125
strategic ambiguity 117
strategic dialogue 5
strategic distrust 116–117, 146
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (U.S.–China) see S&ED
strategic engagement 2, 3–12, 13n12, 16–27; actors in 6; and defence diplomacy, compared 5–6, 16–
19, 159; framework 12, 28–29, 178; goals of 5, 159; and military diplomacy, compared
6;
outcomes, typology of 180; and policy see policy/policymaking; and political
leadership 7;
qualitative approach to see qualitative analysis; rationale for case studies 7–9, 159; scholarship
gap on 28; six functions of
18; and strategic level 5–6
Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD, U.S.–China) 124–125, 134
strategic studies 16, 22, 28
Strategic Triangle 110
strategy 5, 6, 10, 17
submarines 81, 82, 169n6; Chinese 129; German 40, 43, 44, 49, 51, 160; and INCSEA 77, 79,
80, 81,
82, 169n6; Soviet 68–69, 77,
80, 82,
99n9; U.S. 79, 80
Sun, Admiral 128
Sverdlovsky (Soviet trawler) 69

Taiwan 114, 116, 122, 123, 127, 128, 148,

161, 163, 172, 176; U.S. arms sales to 117, 118, 120,
125,
133, 134, 139, 143, 147, 167,
168, 174
Taiwan Relations Act (U.S. 1979) 143, 160, 171
Taiwan Strait 130, 141, 143
Talley, Vice Admiral George 76
Tan, See Seng 5, 14n18
Tao Wenzhao 134
Taylor, A.J.P. 34, 35
Teng Jianqun 117, 125–126, 139, 144
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 126
territorial waters 78, 80, 82, 132, 164
Thailand 122
think tanks 11, 12, 15n40, 16, 27, 125
Thompson, Drew 132, 150n60
Thucydides trap 39, 120–121, 170, 171,
174
Tiananmen incident (1989) 110–111, 119,
145, 161
Till, Geoffrey 1
Trachtenberg, Marc 34
Track 1/1.5/2 dialogues 6, 11–12, 15n40, 122, 144,
146, 147, 174, 176
trade 37, 40, 112, 172, 173; see also interdependence, economic
transparency 18, 39, 57, 59, 112, 113, 115,
117, 118, 123, 168, see also secrecy
Trench, Colonel (military attaché) 47, 48
Triple Entente 34
Trump, Donald 124
trust/distrust 7, 19, 172–175; in Anglo-German case 39, 41, 45,
47, 53,
56, 59,
173; in U.S.–China
case 116–118, 133, 134,
135, 138, 139, 146, 147, 172–173; in
U.S.-Soviet Union case 75, 118,
174
tsunami (2004) 136
Turner, Stansfield 13n2
Twomey, Christopher 123, 141–142,
166

Ukraine 91, 92, 176

Unangst, John 114, 115
United Nations 25, 68, 112
United States (U.S.) 7; Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 1976)
111; Asia strategy of 118, 132; and
China see
U.S.–China strategic engagement; and China/Soviet Union (Strategic Triangle) 110;
Cold War policymaking in 75; Cold War strategy of 74; defence
attachés in 18; Defense
Department 11, 70,
89, 111, 125, 126, 141; Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA) 111;
 election cycle in 140; interdepartmental relations in 17; military budget of 1313 28; National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 2000) 121, 134, 138, 190; National Security Council
11,
116, 117; and nuclear weapons 71–72; and One
China policy 160, 161, 172; pre-World War I
62n74; and soft power 25, 136; and Soviet Union see
U.S.-Soviet strategic engagement; State
Department 6, 11, 70, 83, 86, 90, 125, 126;
strategic engagement actors in 6; and Taiwan see
Taiwan; Taiwan Relations Act (1979) 143, 160, 171
U.S. Air Force 68
U.S. Congress: and China 135, 138, 144,
160; and Soviet Union 75, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98
U.S. National Defense University 136, 187–189
U.S. Navy 67, 68–69, 88, 121, 141, 147, 161; aircraft carriers 69, 84, 135, 141, 143, 168; and
ship
visits 134–137; submarines 79
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 11, 125, 135,
137, 140
U.S. Secretary of Defense: and China 15n41, 111, 112,
128, 129, 135, 143, 144, 145; and Soviet
Union 72, 78, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95
U.S. Secretary of the Navy 70, 71, 95,
184
U.S. Secretary of State: and China 111, 120, 123; and
Soviet Union 70, 72, 73, 86, 87, 91
Ustinov, General-Major G.I. 72
U.S.–China military-to-military relations 114, 115, 116, 118, 121, 129–142, 147, 162;
communication issues in
141–142, 146, 165–166; and DCT 129, 133–134, 143, 146; and
MMAC/MOU 129–132; and
North Korea 115, 126, 148, 163, 171; and political environment
144–145; and ship visits 129, 134–137,
140–141, 164; and South China Sea see
South China
Sea; structural imbalances in 137–141; suspensions of 139, 143,
144
U.S.–China Nuclear Dialogue (2008) 12
U.S.–China strategic engagement 4, 7–8, 12, 16,
28, 110–148, 170, 175–177; and alliances 121, 122,
139, 140, 147, 163,
170, 171, 173, 176; and Anglo-German/U.S.-Soviet cases, compared 110,
113, 118, 127, 129, 147,
159–169, 170–171, 172–173, 178;
and anti-piracy operations 136,
137; and arms sales 111; and Belgrade incident (1999) 133,
143; and CBMs 116, 127; and
civil-military balance 119–122,
147, 160–161, 178; and Comprehensive Dialogue 124; and
crisis management 21; and cybersecurity 124, 127–128, 140, 175; and defensive realism 24,
32n53;
and deterrence 113, 114; and doctrinal difference theory 141–142, 166; and East/South
China Seas see East China Sea; South China
Sea; and economic interdependence 146, 162,
172; and
EP-3 incident (2001) 129, 130, 131,
132, 138, 139, 143, 143–144; and HADR 135,
136; and hegemony 119, 121,
128, 146, 160, 170–171, 176; and incidents at sea 129–130; and
military attachés 129, 136,
140; and military personnel exchanges 3, 114,
136, 138, 140–141;
and military-to-military relations see U.S.–China
military-to-military relations; and
MMCA/MOU 9, 21, 129–132, 137, 143, 144, 146,
162; motivations for 111–118; and naval
exercises 131, 135,
136, 141, 142, 164, 165; and nuclear dialogues 11–12, 124, 125,
126–127,
144, 152n115, 171; and nuclear issues
126–127; and policymakers 27, 135, 138,
144, 160; and
politics 118, 140, 142–145, 148, 167–168, 178;
qualitative analysis method for 10–11; quality
of diplomatic interaction in 122–128; and
secrecy 145–146, 148, 168–169, 172, 178;
and
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 122–124, 125, 146; and Strategic Security
Dialogue (SSD) 124–125, 134; and suspension of contact
3, 127–128, 139, 143, 144; and
Taiwan see Taiwan; and
threat perception 113; and Thucydides trap 120–121,
170, 171, 174;
and Tiananmen incident (1989)
110–111, 119, 145, 161; and Track 1dialogue 122–125, 174;
and Track 15/Track2 dialogues 15n40, 125–128, 146, 147, 174,
176; and transparency 112,
113, 115, 117,
118, 123; and trust/distrust 116–118, 126,
133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 146, 147,
172–173, 174–175; and U.S. Asia strategy 118; U.S.
National Defense University-Chinese
National Defense University interactions 187–189
U.S.-Soviet military-to-military relations 82–89, 97,
98, 137; and INCSEA 78–79, 81,
82–85,
88–89,
91, 129; and SCC 85–88
U.S.-Soviet strategic engagement 2, 4, 7–8, 12, 16, 19,
28, 67–98, 171–172; and Anglo-
German/U.S.–China
cases, compared 67, 110, 113, 118, 125,
127, 129, 147, 159–169, 173–
174,
178; and CBMs 19; civil-military balance in 30n8, 73–75, 160, 161–162, 178;
communication in 72–73, 94–96, 98,
165; and crisis management 21–22; and
détente 2, 8, 67,
71, 72, 74, 88; and human rights 111, 112; and
incidents at sea 8, 68–70, 71, 83, 89; and Joint
Chiefs of Staff 71,
72, 78–79, 86, 91; lessons learned from 97–98, 175; and military attachés
see military
attachés in U.S.-Soviet case; and military-to-military relations see U.S.-Soviet
military-to-military relations; and National Security Council 11, 86, 89; and nuclear threat 68–
69, 71–72, 74,
82, 90;
and politics 88–92, 98, 166, 167; qualitative analysis method
for 10, 11;
quality of diplomatic interactions in 75–82; and secrecy 94–97, 98, 168; and
State Department
11, 70, 83, 86; Track 1, 125; and trust/distrust 75, 118, 174, see also INCSEA; SCC

Vagts, Alfred 16–17, 28, 30n8

Van Evera, Stephen 51
Vance, Cyrus 70
Vichinsky, Major General 89
Vietnam War 72
Vislobokov (Soviet vessel) 70
Voge, USS 77
Volkov, General 79
von Bulow, Prince Bernhard 35, 38, 40
von Kuhlmann, Richard 55
von Metternich, Count 45
von Muller, Captain (naval attaché) 51
von Schleiffen, General 51, 56
von Tirpitz, Admiral Alfred 35, 38–39, 40, 42,
44, 45,
53, 55,
59, 167; and attachés 47, 48, 49,
50

Walker, USS 69
Walters, Vice Admiral 77, 78
Wang Guanzhong, Lieutenant General 128
Wang Jisi 116–117
war: by miscalculation 34–35, 68–69; and CBM 19; and conflict avoidance
7, 8,
9, 18,
34, 120, 162,
170, 171, 176; and defensive realism 24; and military planning 3, 24, 26,
39–40,
55, 56;
and
naval competition 2, 39; and negative effects of diplomacy 35,
54; and neutrality 36, 39, 41,
42, 43, 45, 58, 60, 62–63n76, 160; and nuclear threat 2, 8, 20, 68–69, 82,
161, 163, 171; and
political systems 58, 160; and
politics 1, 13n2; proponents for 55, 165, 166; and
strategic
ambiguity 117; and trade 37, 40
Warner, John W. 70, 71, 83, 84, 88, 95
Washington, D.C. (U.S.) 71, 76, 78,
122, 133
Watkins, Admiral James D. 83, 84
Watson, Captain Hugh (naval attaché) 48, 49, 51,
52
Watson, Captain (naval attaché) 47
Wei Fenghe, General 128
Weinberger, Caspar 91, 92
Weinel, Vice Admiral J.P. 76–77, 82
Widenmann, Captain (naval attaché) 50–51, 64n158
Wildon, Woodrow 57
Wilhelm II, Kaiser 1, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 55, 59, 167; and attachés 46–47, 49, 50, 51;
political power of 37–38, 58
Winkler, David 129, 131
Wisner, Frank 112
World War I, outbreak of 1–2, 25, 59–60, 170, 176, see also Anglo-German pre-World War I
strategic engagement
World War II 9, 30n8
Wu Shengli, Admiral 135

Xi Jinping 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 127,

144–145, 160–161, 171
Xiong Guangkai 143
Xu Huizi, General 112

Yahuda, Michael 113, 118, 138

Yao Yunzhu, General 115, 139, 140,
149n35
Yarhi-Milo, Keren 49
Yellow Sea 130, 142
Yorktown, USS 80
Yu Zhenwu, Lieutenant General 143
Yueyang (PLA frigate) 135

zero-sum thinking 24, 26, 28, 120, 142

Zhu Chenghu, Major General 117, 130, 131,
138, 139–140, 145