ECOND DIVISION properties are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and return possession thereof to complainants.

Finally, this Commission resolves to order respondents to cease and desist from:
[G.R. NO. 157856 : September 27, 2007]
A. Deploying of armed security guards;
CONCEPCION C. ANILLO of Barangay San Nicolas (formerly Molino), Bacoor,
Cavite Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS represented by B. Constructing of fences and putting of signboards in the area; and
Commissioner ERNESTO A. CARDIÑO; OIC-Associate Commissioner NOEL GALAROSA,
DEMETRIO T. VILLANUEVA, JR., Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
C. Collecting fees from persons for "rights" to occupy said lots and selling lots to innocent purchasers.
Region, Bacoor, Cavite; Provincial Director, PNP, Province of Cavite; National Police Task
Force on Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates, Hon. Mayor JESSIE B.
Promulgated: CASTILLO of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite; Hon. Barangay Chairman SO ORDERED.6
GAUDENCIO PAREDES; GREENVALLEY HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION INC.; and SOUTHRICH
ACRES, INC. Respondents. COSLAP affirmed its jurisdiction over the land dispute on the ground that the dispute would fall under
the all-inclusive proviso of Paragraph 2, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561,7 which created the
DECISION commission.

TINGA, J.:
This is a special civil action under Rule 65 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order, praying for the nullification of the
Resolution1 dated 30 July 2001, including the writ of execution2 and demolition3 in connection
therewith, for having been issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The instant controversy stemmed from a letter4 dated 29 May 2001 of Jessie B. Castillo, Municipal
Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, to COSLAP Commissioner Ernesto A. Cardiño, seeking immediate
assistance in the settlement of a land dispute brewing in Green Valley Subdivision, San Nicolas,
Bacoor, Cavite. The letter averred that squatters, claiming to have bought portions of the subdivision
land from the estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, had invaded the subdivision and turned
vacant lots therein into a squatter colony. A certain Henry Rodriguez had been purportedly
representing the estate and claiming ownership over a big portion of the Municipality of Bacoor
including the subdivision land by virtue of a Spanish title, and selling small lots to clueless victims.
Armed security guards were allegedly preventing registered owners and legitimate residents of the
subdivision from entering their own property and exacting money from them in exchange for the
peaceful occupation thereof. The complaint was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.
Acting on the complaint, COSLAP directed the parties to participate in a series of mediation
conferences. On 29 June 2001, Atty. Larry Pernito appeared on behalf of the Estate of Rodriguez. He
questioned the jurisdiction of COSLAP and argued that the matter had already been settled in the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the Estate of Rodriguez. The representatives of Green
Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and Southrich Acres, Inc., registered owners of lots within the
subdivision, prayed that their Torrens titles be respected. At the next conference, only complainants
appeared. COSLAP directed the parties to submit position papers, but only complainants complied.
On 30 July 2001, COSLAP issued a Resolution5 in COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Upon motion, COSLAP issued a Writ of Execution8 on 23 October 2001, directing the Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, with the assistance of the Cavite Provincial Director of the
Philippine National Police, to implement its Resolution dated 30 July 2001. Edwin A. San Miguel,
Sheriff IV of the RTC-Bacoor, filed a Sheriff's Report stating that he served copies of the writ and a
ten-day notice to vacate9 to the squatters but the latter refused to leave and remove the structures.
On 21 January 2002, a Rule 47 petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68640, was filed with the Court
of Appeals by a certain Eduardo Cabesa Abear and 106 others included as petitioners. Named
respondents in said petition, which sought to nullify the COSLAP Resolution dated 30 July 2001, were
Green Valley Homeowners Association, Inc., South Rich Acres Inc. and COSLAP.
On 4 February 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution10 in the said case, denying the petition
on grounds of improper remedy and lack of jurisdiction.
Because the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied and in view of the finality of the Court of
Appeals' resolution, COSLAP issued a Writ of Demolition11 on 29 January 2003 directing Sheriff San
Miguel to remove the structures and improvements illegally constructed within Green Valley.
On 21 April 2003, through a caretaker, petitioner received the notice to vacate issued by Sheriff San
Miguel. Petitioner Concepcion C. Anillo, identifying herself as the owner of Lot No. 5825 of the Imus
Estate measuring approximately 553,853 square meters, immediately wrote COSLAP, requesting,
among others, for copy of the Resolution dated 30 July 2001, the writ of execution and the writ of
demolition.12
On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition13 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Named
respondents are the COSLAP, represented by Commissioners Ernesto A. Cardiño and Noel Galarosa,
the Sheriff of the RTC of Bacoor, the PNP Provincial Director of Cavite, the National Police Task Force
on Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates, Bacoor Mayor Jessie B. Castillo, Barangay
Chairman Gaudencio Paredes, Green Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and South Rich Acres Inc.

Accordingly, this Commission rules in favor of complainants and against respondents. This body The instant petition is anchored on the following arguments:
upholds the contention of complainants that any person desiring to contest their titles must do so in a
proper proceeding in accordance with law and not thru force, intimidation and acts of harassment.
This Commission further rules that respondents and all persons claiming rights over the subject
A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COSLAP, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER ERNESTO A. CARDIÑO AND The records belie petitioner's claim.
OIC-ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER NOEL A. GALAROSA, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER COSLAP CASE
NO. 2001-05-46 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED JULY 30, 2001 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
Even before COSLAP conducted the series of mediation conferences, it sent through registered mail
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN [sic] EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
notices to persons, including herein petitioner, claiming ownership rights derived from the Estate of
Rodriguez, directing them to appear at the mediation conference. At the first scheduled mediation
B. PETITIONER WERE [sic] DENIED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SHE WAS NEVER MADE PARTY TO conference, a certain Atty. Larry Pernito appeared on behalf of the Estate of Rodriguez, questioning
COSLAP CASE NO. 2001-05-46 AND WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD TO REFUTE the jurisdiction of COSLAP. He was the same counsel who represented the petitioners in CA-G.R. SP
AND CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS STIPULATED IN THE COMPLAINT. No. 68640 who eventually sought, albeit unsuccessfully, the nullification of the COSLAP resolution
being assailed in the instant petition. COSLAP likewise gave both parties the opportunity to present
their claims when it directed them to submit their respective position papers. Respondents therein
C. PETITIONER, HER TENANTS AND CARETAKERS ARE IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
and Atty. Pernito, however, failed to appear in subsequent proceedings or to submit any position
SUBJECT PROPERTIES UNDER A VALID CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND BY VIRTUE OF A DEED
paper.
OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE ESTATE OF HERMOGENES AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER DULY APPROVED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF PROBATE JURISDICTION.14
Petitioner cannot disavow and in fact does not even disown the authority of Atty. Pernito to represent
the Estate of Rodriguez or deny knowledge that said lawyer was representing the Estate of Rodriguez.
In a Resolution  dated 15 May 2003, the Court granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order
15
The records show that in the various notarized documents purportedly authorizing their holders to
conditioned upon the posting of a bond and enjoined COSLAP from enforcing the Resolution dated 30
occupy portions of the disputed property, petitioner was a signatory therein as one of the witnesses
July 2001, the writ of execution as well as the writ of demolition. The Court also directed respondents
whereas Atty. Pernito, described therein as "Chief Legal Counsel of the Rodriguez Estate," attested to
to file their comment or opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 29
the execution. These documents were executed between January and October 2001, or exactly during
September 2003.16 On even date, the temporary restraining order was issued.17
the pendency of the COSLAP proceedings. Petitioner's claim that she was totally uninformed about the
proceedings before the COSLAP is not worthy of belief. On the contrary, petitioner is deemed
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it constructively notified of the said proceedings.
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.18 While we have
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following:
concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
the venue of appeals and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal
petitions for the extraordinary writs.19 This Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.20 A
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
records or made known to the parties affected.25
the petition. Petitioner failed to show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.21

Another formidable stumbling block to a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of COSLAP is
In Sy v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems22 and subsequently in Republic of the
the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing
Philippines v. Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc.,23 the Court expressly ruled that orders, decisions or
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res
resolutions of COSLAP cannot be brought directly to this Court, whether on appeal or on certiorari .
judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
The Court stated, thus:
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.26  ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before us in view of
Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise, if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the
The Court of Appeals' resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68640 amounts to res judicata in this case. The
Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68640 also sought the annulment of COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the
connection, it cannot be doubted that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial agencies exercising
same proceedings being assailed in this petition by parties claiming ownership rights derived from the
quasi-judicial functions. No convincing reason exists why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated
Estate of Rodriguez. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the dismissal of said petition effectively
differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are directly
foreclosed the right of petitioner or any person claiming ownership rights under the Estate of
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the
Rodriguez to institute a subsequent action to nullify the proceedings in COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.
enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. In that sense, Section 3(2) of E.O.
No. 561 declaring that the COSLAP's orders, resolutions or decision are appealable exclusively to this
Court is erroneous in the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil All told, the procedural lapses of the instant petition cannot be ignored. The doctrines of judicial
Procedure, x x x x24 hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
Petitioner insists that COSLAP did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was not made
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
party to the case before the said commission.
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.27 Procedural law has its
own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.28
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy
of last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary
action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.29
It is no longer necessary to resolve the question of jurisdiction of COSLAP.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated 29 September
2003 issued by the Court is LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
60. G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente,
con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la
sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba
a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in
the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S.
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary
inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court
Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville
for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2,
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p.
by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in
131.)"
the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227
U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose,
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not
No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
even in proceedings of this character: decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with
the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National 3. She concealed her failure to transmit the checks to respondent s correspondent bank abroad.
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
The Director's order was modified by Minister Ople in his order of March 10, 1981 by setting aside the award of back-
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
wage ruling that although petitioner violated certain rules of the bank, the degree of her offense does not warrant her
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
outright dismissal from the service, and that it is more attuned to the compassionate approach of administering labor
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
disputes to have her reinstated as a second opportunity to make good in her job. Further, the Minister pointed out
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
that petitioner admitted having committed the said infractions when she was first investigated by the bank authorities,
to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and she reiterated such admission in her complaint and opposition; but this time she claimed to have acted upon
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
orders of her superior officer, although she did not elaborate how she was led to commit the infraction; and that the
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
denial of backwages will serve as a penalty for her infractions and is intended to as a fitting lesson and reminder for
the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
her future conduct in office.
and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Petitioner now assails the order of the Minister of labor and claims that respondent bank utterly failed to adduce any
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely evidence to support its accusation except the unsubstantial findings of a committee which investigated the matter
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the without giving her an opportunity to be heard. She likewise asserts that the bank filed an appeal without furnishing
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, her with a copy of such appeal thus deprived her of the chance to refute the allegations therein; and that contrary to
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in the statement of the Minister of Labor in his questioned order, she never made any admission of the negligence
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered. imputed to her, for she was not even summoned during the investigation.

61. G.R. No. L-56591 January 17, 1983 Her assertion that she was not given the chance to be heard is belied by the records of the case. The minutes   of the
investigation showed that the gross negligence imputed to her as remittance clerk was substantiated. Thus —
1

MA. LOURDES T. CRUZ and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

Q. How long does it take you to prepare a transmittal?
ASSOCIATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING A. First, the checks have to be microfilmed, then stamped before the
CORPORATION, respondents. transmittal form is prepared.

Lamberto C. Nanquil for petitioners. Q. On the average?

Siguion, Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent. A. Depending on the volume of checks, thirty minutes.

Q. If you could have been working 30 minutes a day, you should have
updated your work?
DE CASTRO, J.:
A. Yes.
On November 21, 1979, respondent bank Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed an application for
clearance to terminate the services of its remittance clerk, Ma. Lourdes Cruz, for gross negligence which was Q. Since February, did you tell any officer of the branch about these
opposed by the latter by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. On February 11, 1980, the Regional Director resolved pending items?
the case by lifting petitioners preventive suspension and directing the bank to reinstate her with full back-wages. In
support of his order, the Director held that the record is bereft of any substantial proof tending to show that Lourdes
Cruz has committed act of gross negligence as imputed to her. A. No.

From the aforementioned order, RCBC appeal on the ground of abuse discretion on the part of the Director who Q. Did you not think that these officers could have helped you about your
issued the same. Specifically, the bank terminated the services of petitioner Cruz for the following reasons: problem?

1. Some l98 foreign checks received by the bank for the period from February to July 1979 were found missing and A. No.
verified to have been brought by petitioner to her house:
Q. Did you recognize the importance of sending out these checks?
2. On September 2, 1979, sixteen additional checks received by the bank in August, 1979 were found inside
petitioner's drawer; and
 A. I was trying to mail them actually. Only, the transmittals are not signed
yet. I was afraid to tell the officer that there are many checks accumulated in
me — kept pending. ...
Q. Before you acquired the microfilming machine in the branch, these
checks are sent to H.O. for microfilming?
A. I sent them to H.O. through out Settling Clerk. I receive them the
following day at 9:00 a.m.
Q. Why did you not have these subject checks microfilmed?
A. These checks are not, yet stamped. Once they are microfilmed, they will
be mailed.
Q. Do you prepare the transmittal before microfilming?
A. Yes
Q. Why did you not do it?
A. (No answer)
Q. Did you realize the necessity of stamping the checks?
A. So that these checks cannot be negotiated further.
Q. A check not stamped once lost, can be a direct loss to the Bank, So, why
did you not rubber stamp the check?
A. (No answer)
Q. Once you receive the check for deposit or encashment, they should be
rubber stamped.
A. Once I receive checks. I bring them immediately to Mr. Evangelista or
Rolly Santiago prior to stamping.
Q. Once it is approved?
A. I post them to the ledger.
xxx xxx xxx
Q The rubbert stamping is very simple and the microfilming was not done by
you and the checks come back to you the following day. These procedures
are very simple and we don't see any point why you failed to do this simple
step of rubber stamping, Can you give us any explanation on this?
A (No answer)
Q Based on these procedures during your period, could your officers have
known what was going on even without your specifically telling them so?
A Actually in my job, I don't think they will know there are pending checks in
me unless there will be an audit.
Petitioner's claim that she was denied due process is likewise without basis. She was given the chance to explain
and exonerate herself of the charges during the investigation. It was incumbent upon her to prove her innocence but
she failed to do so. Her allegation in her complaint that she acted only in obedience to her superior's order is an
obvious after thought which should not be given credence. She failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support her
allegation.
The Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, We agree with respondent
Minister's order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of
backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank officials acted in good faith. They should be
exempt from the burden of paying backwages. The good faith of the employer, when clear under the circumstances,
may preclude or diminish recovery of backwages.   Only employees discriminatorily dismissed are entitled to
2
backpay.   Petitioner's act is, unquestionably inimical to the interest of the bank. No one can begrudge the bank for
3
reacting thereto the way it did to protect its holdings. It had only to be tempered as the Minister of Labor judiciously
did,
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Escolin, J, I reserve my vote.
62. G.R. No. 81805 May 31, 1988
VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and COMNINOS BROS., petitioners,
vs.
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), EDGAR T. BUNYOG, VEDASTO NAVARRO, EUGENIO CAPALAD, RAUL T IS, ANTONIO TANIOAN,
CELESTINO CASON, DANILO MANELA & ROBERTO GENESIS, respondents.
Viray, Aseron & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Imputing grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent, the petitioners ask that the public respondent's decision dated
September 9,1987 in POEA CASE No. (M) 86-11-1080 entitled "VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and COMNINOS
BROS. vs. EDUARDO H. ARSOLON, ET AL.," be annulled for having been rendered without due process of law, and that
the writ of execution issued by the POEA Administrator be set aside for being premature because the decision is not yet final
and executory as no copy of it had been received by petitioner's counsel. A temporary restraining order was issued by this
Court to enjoin the execution of the decision complained of pending the determination of the merits of the petition.
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio
Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of
the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which
supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers'
Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective
position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a
position paper.
On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda (Annexes A, B, Code. D, E & F) the public respondent rendered a
decision on September 9,1987 (Annex G), the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering as follows:
1. Dismiss of the instant case with a reprimand and warning respondents
Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan,
Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, against the
commission of the same or similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with
more severe penalty;
2. Exclusion of Ricardo Llanes from this case;
3. Reprimanding complainant Var-Orient Shipping Co. for failure to comply
with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and regulations and warning
against committing the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt
with more severely;
4. That the case insofar as respondents Eduardo H. ArsoIon, Apolinario
dela Cruz, Levy Montero and Danilo N. de la Cruz are concerned, be
archived, while their names shall be included in the POEA watchlist until
they shall have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this
office;
5. Payment by the complainants jointly and severally, unto Vedasto
Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino
Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis the amount of Pl,550.59 each,
representing deductions from allotments, plus Pl,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and
6. Payment by the complainants jointly and severally unto respondent Edgar
T. Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment representing his salaries for the unserved portion of his
employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
to be tendered thru this Office, ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners' counsel, then
Attorney Francisco B. Figura, at his address on the 4th Floor, TRC Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila, through the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino, on the groundfloor of said building on September 21, 1987.
According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the decision (p. 66, Rollo). <äre||anº•1àw>
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on them on November
20,1987 by NLRC Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. On November 23,1987, petitioners,
through new counsel, Atty. Quentin Aseron, Jr., filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that
the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.
On January 19, 1988, the public respondent denied the motion. In due time, this petition was filed wherein the
petitioners allege that:
(1) they were denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator resolved the case without any formal
hearing;
(2) the respondent Administrator gravely abused his discretion in denying petition petitioners' right to appeal, and
(3) in awarding to the private respondent's damages which are not only excessive building unfounded.
The petition is not meritorious.
The petitioners' allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature because the decision had not
been received by their counsel is unconvincing, Atty. Figura's affidavit on the matter is self-serving. Petitioners failed
to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which she received
for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly
served on petitioners' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained.
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was
rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs.
Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera
vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of
Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they would file their
respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision (Annex 7 of Bunyog's Comment).
This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private
respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to
resolve (Annex 7, Bunyog's Comment). The petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the
respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987 (Annex 10), both of which were furnished
them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a
formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.
Furthermore, the petition for review does not allege that the petitioners are in possession of evidence, other than
those which they had attached to their pleadings, which if produced would have altered the outcome of the case. "Evidence for the petitioner tends to show that petitioner SEBASTIAN GARCIA, 61, married, employee
at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City and resident of Lucao, Dagupan City, has been employee
The Administrator did not abuse his discretion in ordering the petitioners to pay respondent Edgar Bunyog's salaries thereat since June 15, 1974 as Revenue Collector appointed to that position by then City Mayor
for the unserved portion of his contract plus attorney's fees, in view of the Administrator's finding that Bunyog did not Cipriano Manaois. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to
sign the letter of the other defendants to ITF, hence, 'he is deemed not to have committed any offense or act to March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against
warrant his dismissal." him. He resumed work on March 16, 1992 as Local Treasury Officer III. When he was suspended, his
position was Local Treasury Officer and Revenue Officer with a salary of P6,800.00 a month. When he
resumed work, his salary was already P7,615.00 monthly. From June 1, 1990 up to March 15, 1992,
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order which We issued
he had been reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer
is hereby set aside.
acted as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the
Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he did not submit himself for investigation.
SO ORDERED. He was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which caused his sleepless nights, his two
(2) children stopped schooling, he has to beg from his relatives. He has a wife with four (4) children
in college, one in Commerce, another taking up Dentistry. During the 1990 earthquake, there was
63. [G.R. No. 141149. July 5, 2002.] calamity loan granted to employees but he could not avail of it because the City Treasurer would not
approve the loan. He is asking P1,000,000.00 for his mental anguish and sufferings. From July to
SEBASTIAN GARCIA, Petitioner, v. JUANITO A. PAJARO and THE CITY OF October, 1987 the City Treasurer refused to give him his COLA, differential, cash gift, salary and mid-
DAGUPAN, Respondents. year bonus amounting to P6,800.00 up to the present. His salary now is P13,715.00 as Treasury
Officer III. Contrary to the charges of the City Treasurer, he has been doing his duties and
DECISION obligations; that for the acts of charging him in the Department of Finance and for charging him for
neglect of duties, he felt deeply hurt and is asking P250,000.00 for that; his agreement with his
counsel is P25% of what will be awarded to him. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Petitioner’s documentary evidence consists of the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Exhibit ‘A’, Order of Preventive Suspension dated June 1, 1990;

The city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate Exhibit ‘B’, Memorandum addressed to the disbursing Officer dated June 1, 1990;
officers or employees. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity
to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a Exhibit ‘C’, Formal Charge;
petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration.
Exhibit ‘D’, Subpoena issued by respondent Pajaro;
Statement of the Case
Exhibit ‘E’, Communication dated June 1, 1990 to Regional Director, Bureau of Local Government,
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 17, 1999 Department of Finance by the City Treasurer;
Decision 1 and the December 14, 1999 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
48285. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Exhibit ‘F’, Answer by Respondent.

"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, [this Court hereby affirms it] in "Evidence for Respondent PAJARO tends to show that
toto. No costs." 4
"JUANITO PAJARO, 65, married, City Treasurer of Dagupan City, first served in concurrent capacity
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. and OIC on December 4, 1981 and was regularly appointed as City Treasurer on January 2, 1986 up
to the present. Petitioner Sebastian Garcia is at present the Local Treasury Officer III but way back in
The affirmed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City (Branch 40), disposed as 1990 he was Senior Revenue Collector whose immediate superior was the late Mr. Viray, the Chief of
follows: the Local Taxes, then the Assistant City Treasurer, and the City Treasurer himself. Petitioner has been
rating Unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters which is the reason a [Formal] Charge
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED, without costs." 5 was filed against petitioner received by him on June 1, 1990, 10:00 a.m. and, as a matter of
procedure, if the charge is a major offense, by civil service laws, he was preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days, also duly received by Mr. Garcia on June 4, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. Then an investigation
The Facts
was scheduled and a subpoena was issued to Mr. Garcia to appear and testify on August 15, 1990
duly received by him on August 1, 1990, 8:55. Again Mr. Garcia did not Answer and refused to honor
the subpoena to submit himself for investigation. So he proceeded with ex-parte investigation and
The factual antecedents of the case, as summarized by the RTC and adopted by the CA, are
gathered and submitted testimonies to support the allegations in the Formal Charge then submitted
reproduced as follows:
the result of their findings to the Department of Finance for decision. A Decision was promulgated by
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the Department of Finance on August 1, 1991. The matter of preventive suspension of Mr. Garcia was
submitted to the Regional Director, Bureau of Local Government Finance which was ‘favorably
approved’ by the Regional Director. This case stemmed from the application of the petitioner for the
position of supervising revenue collector and he was duly appointed. The same appointment was
opposed by Mrs. Evangeline Estrada and by a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, the
appointment of Mrs. Evangeline Estrada was duly confirmed. Mrs. Estrada was recommended first and
she was issued an appointment by the City Mayor and was submitted to the CSC. It was contested by
Mr. Gracie. The first ruling of the CSC was adverse to Mrs. Estrada and she requested for
reconsideration. In the meantime, Mr. Garcia was able to get an appointment from the same City
Mayor but it was not approved. The CSC reconsidered the request of Mrs. Estrada favorably as shown
by Resolution 91-359 dated March 14, 1991. That position was affected by the reorganization and it
was changed to Local Treasury Operations Officer III now occupied by Mrs. Estrada. Despite the fact
that he was always u[p]held by the CSC and the Department of Finance, this case based on
unfounded allegations was filed against him, he is confirming his counterclaim against the petitioner
with 25% attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 per appearance. Petitioner’s charge that his benefits were
unduly withheld from him is not true because the law states when you are charged and preventively
suspended, the salary could not be collected. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was not acquitted;
there was additional penalty. He was penalized with a suspension of six (6) months without pay so he
could not by any means collect his salary. On the other hand, he was the one being harassed (sic) by
the petitioner; it has affected his performance and efficiency in the office, including sleepless nights.
In explaining the entries in the Performance [A]ppraisal Report, he said that the forms were given to
the personnel to rate themselves and then the final rating goes to the supervisor. The personnel gave
themselves excellent ratings but the basis of their record is the true assessment made by the
supervisor. In this case, the petitioner should have protested when he received his copy but he did
not. During the period of his preventive suspension, of course, the petitioner did not receive his
salary. He is not aware of the petitioner’s allegation that he reported for work during the period of his
preventive suspension, but that his co-employees testified that petitioner timed-in at 8:00 a.m. and
1:00 p.m. but did not make ‘time-outs’.
"The respondent City of Dagupan adopted the evidence of respondent Treasurer Pajaro.
"At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the litigation on the following issues:
1) whether or not petitioner is entitled to right of action against the respondents; and
2) who is entitled to damages." 6 (Citations omitted.)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private respondent was vested with legal power and
authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and employees. 7 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been fully
observed by Respondent Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the
charges against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner
chose not to answer those charges. 8
Hence, this Petition. 9
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First: Who has the power to remove, suspend or discipline the petitioner as a local employee,
appointed by the City Mayor, the latter o[r] the City Treasurer?
"Second: Is the filing of the formal charge by the [private respondent] with himself valid?
"Third: Is the suspension of the petitioner by virtue of the formal charge valid?
"Fourth: Who is liable for the unpaid salaries and benefits of the petitioner?
"Fifth: Is the respondent personally liable for the damages suffered by the petitioner?" 10
Simply stated, the issues boil down to two: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner
2. Whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Disciplinary Authority of the City Treasurer
Petitioner claims that the officer empowered to institute disciplinary proceedings against him is the
city mayor of Dagupan — not the city treasurer. He further asserts that under Section 78 of the Local
Government Code of 1983, 11 the city treasurer does not have the power to discipline him.
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We are not persuaded.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local Government Codes,
appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and
such rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, 12 unless otherwise
specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against
appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in
accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws. 13
The Administrative Code of 1987, 14 — specifically Book V on the civil service — is the primary law
governing appointive officials and employees in the government. 15 This Code enumerates the
grounds for disciplining them. 16 They may be removed or dismissed summarily" (1) [w]hen the
charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist . . .;
and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable." 17 Technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated
with that in the strict judicial sense. 18 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 19 to
heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. 20 On the other hand, the
power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted
by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code 21 to the
secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit,
the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu proprio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate
officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, 22 which was issued by the
Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the
regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative
disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. The pertinent portions of LAR 2-
85 are reproduced hereunder: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RULE I — INSTITUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
"Sec. 1. How commenced. — Administrative disciplinary action may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the Minister of Finance, Regional Directors or heads of the local
treasury or assessment offices at their own instance (motu proprio) or upon sworn written complaint
by any other person.
"In the case of a complaint filed by any other person, the complainant shall submit sworn statements
covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence.
x       x       x
"RULE IV — HEARING
"Sec. 1. Officer authorized to conduct hearings. — The investigation shall be conducted by the
Minister of Finance or the Director for Local Government Finance or his/her assistants or regional
director or head of office concerned or the duly designated representatives of said officials. The duly
designated representatives shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of
office, regional director or this Ministry, as the case may be. The investigation shall be held not earlier
than five (5) days not later than ten (10) days from date of receipt of respondent’s answer by the
disciplining authority and shall be finished within thirty (30) days from commencement of the hearing,
unless the period is extended or continuance allowed in meritorious cases." 23
In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of
the Administrative Code of 1987. 24 The term "agency" refers to any of the various units of the
government including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. 25 Respondent Pajaro, as the
city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue
collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who
could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against him. 26
Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him 27 is not persuasive.
Section 455 (b-1-x) 28 of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor "may cause to
be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city." This
rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the
heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees. 29 Likewise, the old Local Government Code
does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative
actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. 30 In fact, there is no provision
under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the Department of
Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. 31 By the same token, there is nothing
that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner. 32
As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. 33 In Hagad v.
Gozo-Dadole, 34 we explained the rationale for preventive suspension as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and
even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any
finding of guilt or innocence." 35 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
". . . Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation,
the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper
in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and
be given opportunity to prove his innocence." 36
In the present case, Respondent Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension
Order against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform
official duties and functions, and insubordination 37 — grounds that allowed the issuance of such
Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. 38 Clearly, the city treasurer acted
within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order. 39
Second Issue: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Due Process
Petitioner argues that his right to due process was violated, because he was not heard during the
administrative proceedings. 40 We are not convinced.
In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s
side. 41 Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. 42
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also — and perhaps
even many times more creditably and practicably — through pleadings. 43 So long as the parties are
given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with. 44 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. 45
In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure
46 set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a
copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge 47 against him. Second, Respondent Pajaro requested the
approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension 48 in his June 1, 1990 letter 49 addressed to the
Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director, who approved the Order in the First
Indorsement 50 dated June 4, 1990.
Third, a subpoena 51 dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an
investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly 52 refused to attend the investigation;
thus, it was conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s
findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision, 53 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, [petitioner] is hereby found guilty of Inefficiency in the Performance of
Official Duty and is hereby meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension from Office without pay to
take effect upon receipt of this Decision, pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989 of
the Civil Service Commission, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely." 54
We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to
answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process. 55 Petitioner’s refusal to
attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. 56 He therefore cannot
validly claim that his right to due process was violated. 57
As to petitioner’s claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way
of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. 58 There was no such showing in the present The BOI, through its Vice-Chairman and Managing Head, Edgardo L. Tordesillas, required Johnson to answer the
case. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
petition. Upon motion of Johnson, the BOI granted it an extension of time to file its answer. Thereafter, Adamson filed
an urgent motion reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a stop and desist order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. On May 8, 1980, Director Justiniano Y. Ascaño of the BOI's Project Administration and Legal Department, set the
petition for hearing in a letter which reads thus:
SO ORDERED.
Please be informed that the Petition filed by Adamson & Adamson, Inc. praying that the Board of
64. G.R. No. L-58292               July 23, 1987 Investments issue an immediate order to respondent Johnson & Johnson Philippines, Inc. to stop and
desist from manufacturing, distributing and selling disposable diapers, sanitary feminine tampons and
absorbent cotton has been set for hearing on May 14, 1980 at the PALD Conference Room at 2:30 P.M.  6

ADAMSON & ADAMSON, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, JOHNSON & JOHNSON [PHILIPPINES], INC. and the BOARD OF On May 9, 1980, Johnson filed its answer to the petition alleging that it did not have to secure from the BOI a
INVESTMENTS, respondents. certificate of authority for the manufacture, distribution and sale of disposable diapers, sanitary tampons and
absorbent cotton because said business activities were but a continuation of its principal business activity; that
assuming that it had expanded or developed its principal business activity, such expansion or development was in
FERNAN, J.: the same line of business that it was actually and lawfully engaged in prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 5455;
that the products complained of were within the category of the products the manufacture, importation or sale of
which it had disclosed to the BOI prior to the effectivity of the aforesaid law; and that assuming that there were
In this petition for certiorari, one of two competing manufacturers of hygienic and other related products claims that it
modifications in the form and quality of said products, such were mere improvements and/or development of the
was denied its right to procedural due process by the Board of Investments.
same line of products which needed no prior authorization from the BOI. 7

Since its organization on April 5, 1954, Adamson & Adamson, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as Adamson] has been
The May 14, 1980 hearing was held as scheduled and per its minutes the following transpired therein:
actually engaged in the "manufacture, sale and exportation of absorbent cotton wool products, surgical dressings,
bandages, medicinal, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, chemical products, sanitary towels and other articles and
commodities. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson [Philippines], Inc. [Johnson for short] was organized on February 17,
1 
NOTES ON THE HEARING ON THE PETITION OF ADAMSON & ADAMSON AGAINST JOHNSON &
1956 "to manufacture, import, export, buy, sell or otherwise acquire and deal in and with, either at wholesale or retail, JOHNSON CONDUCTED ON 14 MA Y 1980 A T THE BOI BOARD ROOM
pharmaceutical drugs, toiletry, hygiene products and related products of every kind, and chemical compositions of all
kinds and uses." 2

Present:

As it was not yet a Philippine national as defined by the Investment Incentives Act [Republic Act No. 5186], Adamson
applied for certificates of authority from the Board of Investments [BOI] in compliance with Section 4 of the Foreign Director J. Y. Ascaño - Legal Department
Investment Act [Republic Act No. 5455]. According to Adamson, said certificates were necessary to enable it "to Div. Chief, E.O. Arrobio - Foreign Business
expand its business activities to areas which while within its aforealleged primary purpose, Adamson was neither
actually manufacturing nor marketing as at the effectivity of the aforesaid two laws." ... After the publications and
3 
Div. Arturo C. del Rosario -do-
postings of notices regarding said applications, Johnson registered its opposition thereto. On May 28, 1973 and on
Oscar C. Pacquing -do-
November 7, 1974, the BOI granted Adamson said certificates of authority which it held on to until it became a
Philippine national on January 6, 1979. 4
Jaime Torres - Chemical Industries Dept.
Matilde Domingo -do-
On the other hand, Johnson has remained a foreign corporation. Sometime in 1979, after it had acquired new
machineries, Johnson commenced the manufacture and marketing of disposable diapers. During the first quarter of Atty. J. R. Blanco - Counsel, Adamson & Adamson
1980, it manufactured sanitary feminine tampons and absorbent cotton. Mr. Lucas Adamson - Pres., Adamson & Adamson
Atty. Esguerra - Blanco Law Office
Alleging that Johnson should not be allowed to expand its business activities "to areas in which it was not licensed
and in which it was not actually engaged as at the effectivity of Rep. Act Nos. 5186 and 5455 without first obtaining Atty. E. de los Angeles - Counsel, Johnson & Johnson
from the Board of Investments the corresponding certificates of authority after prior publication and posting of Mr. de Leon - Johnson's Representative
notices;" that Johnson's expanded field of business and economic activities was then being adequately exploited by
Philippine nationals and therefore, such expansion would not contribute to a "sound and balanced development of Mr. Robles -do-
the national economy on a self-sustaining basis;" and that Johnson's expanded activities would cause Adamson not Mr Natividad -do-
only irreparable injury but also injustice, on March 17, 1980, Adamson filed in the BOI a petition praying that therein
respondent Johnson be "ordered not only to forthwith stop and desist in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of its
aforealleged expanded product lines but also to recall from the market all said products being distributed for sale and The Chairman made the opening statement that the proceedings was for the purpose of hearing the Petition filed by
that after proper investigation and hearing to make the same permanent." 5
Adamson against Johnson and to hear arguments and receive evidences from the parties in order to resolve the
case expeditiously.
The Chairman re-stated the main issue raised on the petition, that Johnson & Johnson allegedly expanded into
another line of business without securing prior authority from the Board of Investments as provided under the law
and the rules because Respondent is not actually and lawfully engaged in the manufacture of the products
[disposable diapers, sanitary feminine tampons and absorbent cotton] and that a stop and desist order be issued by
the Board against Respondent. The Chairman then requested both parties to give their views and evidences so that
on the basis of which, the Board can act immediately on the Petition.
the manufacture and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs, hygienic products, toiletries and which activities they were
engaged in as to date. He further explained that if Johnson see [sic] that the markets are good, there is no reason for
Johnson to make an expansion but only to improve its products for the benefit of the consumers.
Mr. Robles further stated that under the law, they have the right to engage in business as long as they do not violate
any provision of law.

Counsel for the Petitioner, Atty. Blanco expounded on his views on the merits of the Petition and upon summing up
The Chairman, then emphasized to the parties that the issues have been cleared and the facts gathered from the
the justifications for the prayer in the Petition, cited the letter of Minister Ongpin as Head of the Iron and Steel
hearing shall be useful and that there being no other matters to be discussed, he asked the parties to submit their
Authority to Goodyear Steel Pipe Corporation, directing it to cease operations on its activities which were not
respective memorandum within fifteen [15] days from the date of the hearing.
authorized by the ISA, that BOI a government instrumentality has the power and authority to issue a stop and desist
order.
On this point, Atty. Blanco informed the Chairman that he cannot produce his memo within said period but he will
submit it later, which the Chairman granted
Thereafter, the Chairman asked counsel for the Respondent, Atty. de los Angeles, if Respondent added equipment
in the manufacture of diapers in 1979; if these were imported and the value thereof, to which Counsel answered that
there were new equipment introduced and imported valued at US$4 Million and that the required authority from the The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 p.m.
Central Bank was secured. Counsel also stated that there was an investment made in the amount of US$l Million
generated by borrowings.
Certified correct:

Counsel for Respondent also stated that the composition of diaper is similar to that of the sanitary napkins which
[Sgd.]
Respondent has been producing since 1971 which is made of rayon and cotton, that the product is an improvement
MARILOU P. OCAMPO
of the product to meet the policy of the Board.

NOTED:
Mr. Natividad, one of the representatives of Johnson & Johnson likewise stated that Respondent has installed
equipment to produce sanitary tampons way back in 1968 but were actually completed in 1972. However, marketing
thereof was not pursued for strictly business marketing reasons. Production of Johnson's cottonette [soft puff], on the [Sgd.]
other hand, was discontinued after 2 years from 1967 but Johnson's buds have been introduced since 1968. In the LETICIA VIÑA-IBAY
production of diapers, Mr. Natividad informed the Committee that surplus profits of the corporation was put in and Acting Division Head. 
8

therefore not considered as fresh capital.

The parties thereafter expounded on their arguments in said hearing thru the following pleadings: Johnson's
At this juncture, Mr. Adamson discussed three types of tampons and inquired how Johnson & Johnson can install memorandum, Adamson's reply memorandum, the former's rejoinder memorandum, and the latter's surrejoinder. 9

machines to produce tampons [OB] type in 1968 when the product was introduced by Karl Heinz only in 1973.
In this connection, Mr. Natividad stated that their mother company has been producing tampons but it was not the
OB type but of another type, however, construction is the same, as can be supported by documents.
On the Chairman's acknowledgment, Counsel for Petitioner, Atty. Blanco presented three issues to the Committee.
Impatient over what it considered a delay in the resolution of its prayer for a preliminary stop and desist order,
Adamson filed a motion dated August 19, 1980 praying that "hearings be forthwith scheduled for the reception of
evidence on the merits of petitioner's petition's prayer for a permanent stop and desist order, as well as the parties
notified thereof and furnished with a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes and/or excerpts of the preliminary
hearing on 14th May 1980 and the rules of this Honorable Commission's procedures for hearings on the
merits." Johnson opposed the motion and Adamson filed a rejoinder thereto.
10 

1] Johnson & Johnson allegedly manufactured, distributed and marketed disposable cotton diapers in 1979
which it is not actually and lawfully engaged in as of the effectivity of R.A. 5455;
2] Johnson & Johnson manufactured, distributed and marketed likewise tampons and absorbent cotton in
the early 1980 without prior authority from the Board; and
Director Ascaño denied said motion for lack of merit in his order of October 16, 1980. The order noted that during the
May 14, 1980 hearing, both parties were afforded every opportunity to fully discuss the facts and the issues involved
and that after Adamson had filed its motion of August 19, 1980, another hearing was conducted on September 5,
1980. It stated that there was no compelling reason to hold another hearing considering that the parties had
discussed extensively the facts and expounded in a scholarly manner the legal provisions involved in their respective
memoranda, and that another hearing would be inconsistent with Adamson's plea for an early disposition of the
petition and the BOI's objectives and policies on the matter.11

3] Can Johnson & Johnson resurrect the production of products which it has abandoned in 1974? That in
its report it failed to consider the phrase 'in which they were actually and lawfully engaged in provided in
the law. On October 21, 1980, the BOI sent Adamson the following letter:

Mr. Robles, representative of Respondent Johnson & Johnson, in answer to the above manifestations of Atty. Gentlemen:
Blanco, stated that they did not omit consideration of Sec. 3, Rule IV of the Rules of R.A. 5455 and that the activities
contained in their Form 7 is a matter of generalization. Mr. Robles explained that Johnson & Johnson's expansion is
Please be informed of the Board decision dismissing the Petition filed by Adamson & Adamson, Inc. against Johnson
in the same line of business for which no authority is required from the Board as it has been engaged prior to 1968 in
& Johnson [Phils.], Inc. praying that the Board of Investments issue a stop and desist order against the latter from
continuing in the manufacture and marketing of disposable diapers, sanitary feminine tampons and absorbent cotton. Adamson then filed a request for subpoena. The pertinent portions of said request state:
The Board finds that the said activities constitute expansion in the same line of business in which Johnson &
Johnson [Phils.], Inc. was actually and lawfully engaged in as of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 5455 and the
Please forthwith issue subpoena duces tecum to the following persons commanding them to appear before
same were financed by internally generated funds, hence do not need prior BOI approval.
this Honorable Court at the hearing on Thursday 4th June 1981 at 1:30 p.m. with the following documents
and to there and then give testimony in connection thereto:
Please be guided accordingly.
Names:
Very truly yours,
1. Atty. Lilia R. Bautista, herself Governor
[Sgd.]
LILIA R. BAUTISTA
2. Atty. Justiniano Y. Ascaño himself Director, Project Adm. & Legal Dept.
Governor.  12

Common Address:
Dismayed by the turn of events against it, on November 20, 1980 Adamson filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition seeking judicial relief from the BOI decision pursuant to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 5455 [Civil
Case No. 136282]. Contending that the BOI's letter-decision dismissing its petition was based merely on the oral BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
arguments of the parties at the May 14, 1980 hearing, Adamson averred that its right to be heard and to present
evidence on the merits of its prayer for a permanent stop and desist order was violated. It argued that as Johnson
Industry & Investments Bldg.
continued to engage in its expanded business activities in violation of Republic Act No. 5455 to the detriment of
385 Buendia Avenue Extension
Philippine nationals who were adequately exploiting Johnson's expanded business activities, it was entitled to
Makati, Metro Manila
exemplary and moral damages. It prayed that the BOI's letter decision be set aside and that a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order be issued enjoining Johnson from engaging in its expanded business activities. 13

Common Documents:
The lower court gave due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on the prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. 1. BOI's entire file on the 1980 case of Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Johnson & Johnson
[Phils.], Inc.
On December 19, 1980, after the said hearing was conducted, the lower court issued an order denying Adamson's
prayer for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order it had issued. The lower court saw
14 
2. BOI's entire file on Adamson & Adamson, Inc.
no extreme urgency for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and held that to grant said writ would prejudge the
case in favor of Adamson considering that the status quo or the last actual peaceable uncontested status prior to the
filing of the petition in the BOI was that Johnson was manufacturing and/or marketing absorbent cotton, sanitary 3. BOI's entire file on Johnson & Johnson [Phils.], Inc.
tampons and disposable diapers.
4. BOI's written rules of procedure in litigious proceedings before BOI. 
15

Citing Section 4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 5455, the lower court ruled
that Johnson did not have to obtain BOI prior authorization to engage in the questioned business activities because
on September 30, 1968 [when the said law took effect], Johnson was actually engaged in the manufacture and/or
marketing of absorbent cotton, sanitary tampons and disposable diapers and therefore its alleged expanded
business activities were in the same line of business it was engaged in prior to the aforesaid date. The lower court
stressed that fact was best shown in Johnson's report to the BOI wherein it listed absorbent cotton, sanitary tampons
and disposable diapers under the respective product groups of cotton products, hygiene products and non-woven
fabrics.
Anent Adamson's claims that the May 14, 1980 hearing at the BOI was only on the issue of whether or not a
temporary desist order should be issued and that it was denied its right to present its evidence on the merits of the
petition, the lower court found that Adamson's right to due process was respected in the aforesaid hearing. It noted
that Johnson even presented witnesses who were cross-examined by Adamson's counsel. It added that the question
of whether or not Adamson was deprived of its day in court was immaterial to the issue of whether or not it was
entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction as Adamson had failed to establish its right to said writ and that said right
was violated.
Adamson's motion for reconsideration of the lower court's order was duly opposed by Johnson. When said motion
was heard, the issue of whether or not Adamson may introduce new evidence in support of its motion, arose. After
the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the lower court allowed the introduction of new evidence.
As said request was granted by the lower court, Johnson moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds, among
other things, that it was improper and oppressive to require Director Ascaño and Governor Bautista to testify and
explain their decision of October 21, 1980 and the proceedings relative thereto; that said officials were not the
custodians of BOI records; and that the documents sought to be produced had no relevance to the issues raised in
the motion for reconsideration.
The BOI joined Johnson in objecting to the request for subpoena and adopted as its own Johnson's motion to quash.
Adamson opposed said motion.
On August 18, 1981, the lower court issued the following order:
Considering the contentions and arguments respectively invoked by the parties through counsel, the Court
finds the Motion to Quash subpoena meritorious. In so far as the request for subpoena concerns Governor
Lilia R. Bautista and Atty. Justiniano Y. Ascaño the Court finds that the testimony of the two BOI officials
does not appear to be relevant and indispensable in the light of the allegations in the opposition of the
petitioner that these BOI officers would be asked merely on the procedure that was followed in the
questioned hearing of 14 May 1980 and since the proceedings that transpired would appear in the record
of the BOI case entitled Adamson & Adamson, Inc., petitioner, versus Johnson & Johnson [Philippines],
Inc., respondent.
 With respect to the BOI files of the petitioner and private respondent Johnson & Johnson, the petitioner
concedes that trade and industrial secrets will be excluded from examination. However, the petitioner did
not specify which files it sought to be brought before the Court. If the request of petitioner refers to the
record of said BOI case only, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the said record may be presented in
Court at the trial of the present case, provided, however, that the documents which the BOI considers
confidential for being trade and industrial secrets be excluded. But the request for the production of the
record of said BOI case could not be entertained for the present, because it was erroneously addressed to
Governor Bautista and Atty. Ascaño who are not the custodians of said records.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Request for subpoena filed by the petitioner is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.  16
Based on the foregoing, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process in the BOI. In
the first place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified that the hearing was on
the petition although it also stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer for a stop and desist order.
Necessarily, it is immaterial that said notice was sent before Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there was
yet no joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was before an administrative tribunal where technicalities
that should be observed in a regular court may be dispensed with.
Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, including its prayer for a stop
and desist order. As clearly enunciated in the minutes of the hearing which We have painstakingly studied and set
forth herein to determine if any irregularity attended the questioned BOI proceeding, it was conducted for the purpose
of hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the parties "to resolve the case expeditiously." Having been
given the opportunity to put forth its case, petitioner has only itself, or, better still, its counsel and officers who were

present therein, to blame for its failure to do so.

24

Thereafter, Adamson filed the instant petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Alleging that the May 14, 1980 hearing was held only for the purpose of determining whether an immediate stop and
desist order should be issued considering that no issues had as yet been joined as the notice for the hearing was
Petitioner's right to procedural due process was not violated when the hearing was conducted before a director of the
BOI and not before the members of the board themselves who decided the case. The requirements of a fair hearing
do not mandate that the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence be before the same officer who
will make the decision on the case. 25 
1avvphi1

sent to the parties a day before Johnson filed its answer, Adamson claims that in acting on the merits of the petition,
the BOI violated its right to procedural due process. Specifically, Adamson contends that its "cardinal primary rights"
Neither does the absence of stenographers during the hearing affect petitioner's right to due process. Section 16 of
were violated in the BOI proceedings because: [a] the May 14, 1980 hearing being merely on the issuance of an
Republic Act No. 5186, which provides for the powers and duties of the BOI, does not specify that said board is a
immediate stop and desist order and not on the merits of the petition, it was "not given an opportunity to fully present
board of record. The first paragraph of said section merely mentions minutes" in connection with proceedings of the
its case and to adduce evidence to establish its right to the issuance of a permanent stop and desist order against
board. Therefore, the absence of a transcript of stenographic notes taken during the BOI hearing cannot be claimed
Johnson"; [b] the decision of the BOI Board of Governors was not supported by substantial evidence as no
to have deprived petitioner of due process of law. 26

documentary and testimonial evidence were presented under oath; and [c] said decision was based on the views and
findings of Director Ascaño and not on the Board of Governors' independent consideration of the law and the facts of
the controversy because the members of said board were not present and no stenographic notes were taken during Petitioner's suspicion that something aberrant surrounded the drafting of the minutes of the May 14, 1980 hearing
the hearing.17
because it received a copy thereof five months later is unfounded as it is unsupported by evidence. The delayed
delivery of the minutes to the petitioner does not at all alter the fact that a hearing was conducted on the petition in
the BOI and petitioner was given the opportunity to present its side of the controversy.
According to Adamson, the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
relying on said void BOI decision and in issuing the order of August 18, 1981 which sustained the motion to quash
subpoena thereby preventing it from establishing the irregular BOI proceeding and exercising its right to examine the It should be noted that said hearing was not the only venue for the ventilation of petitioner's arguments. Aside from
entire BOI records of both companies. Adamson comes to this Court raising the following issues:
18 
the September 5, 1980 hearing, the parties also submitted their respective memoranda. They were, therefore,
afforded ample opportunity to assert their arguments in both the petition and the prayer for a stop and desist order.
a. Can a Court of First Instance for the purpose of denying a verified petition for preliminary injunction
adopt a decision of an administrative agency rendered in violation of a party's constitutional right to The BOI decision having been arrived at with due regard for the parties' right to procedural due process, petitioner's
procedural due process? contention that the lower court abused its discretion in relying on said BOI decision when it denied petitioner's prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and granted Johnson's motion to quash subpoena, does not merit further
consideration. Suffice it to state that whatever objections petitioner may have on the validity and correctness of the
b. Is a party entitled to establish by testimonial and documentary evidence the fact of such denial of due
BOI decision may be threshed out in the lower court.
process?  19

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the lower court is ordered to expedite the
Although the instant petition was filed before the lower court could resolve petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
disposition of Civil Case No. 136282 for judicial relief. Costs against petitioner.
the order denying its prayer for a preliminary injunction and, therefore, strictly speaking, it was prematurely filed, We
opt to rule on the issues raised herein to facilitate the final disposition of the case in the lower court [See Philippine
Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova, G.R. No. 52819, October 2, 1980, 100 SCRA 254,260]. SO ORDERED.

While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural 65. G.R. No. 114683           January 18, 2000
requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in
20 

administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. Hence, there is no
21 
JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner,
denial of due process where records show that hearings were held with prior notice to adverse parties. But even in
22 
vs.
the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of procedural due process as long as the parties are given the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMO ECLIPSE, respondents.
opportunity to be heard. 23

BUENA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolutions of the Ombudsman in OMB-Adm-0-92-0020 dated The respondent OMBUDSMAN denied the motion on February 28, 1994. 15

November 18, 1993 and February 28, 1994 which dismissed petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of benefits
1  2 

and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition basically reiterating his arguments in his motion for reconsideration.
corporation, and which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The facts are as follows:

While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation on May 24, 1997 stating that the criminal complaint for
16 

Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration.
estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative
case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the dismissal of the criminal case,
On March 21, 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) Mote a letter to petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed. 17

NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development. 3

Such manifestation is not well taken.

On November 17, 1988, petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT, sent a letter-proposal requested
by ABDN. Another letter was sent by petitioner on January 31, 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of ADBN confirming the
4 

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean
availability of NIACONSULT to conduct the training program and formally requesting advance payment of thirty
bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the
(30%) percent of the training fee in the amount of US $9,600.00 or P204,960.00.
5 

NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to March 7,
1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical
6 
Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments of
P61,488.00 and P143, 472.00. 7
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule
in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
18 

procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. 19

On April 1, 1991, NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding
the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received. Despite receipt of the letter,
8 

petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an Going now to the crux of the controversy, petitioner asserts that he was denied the opportunity to be heard.
administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. 9

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an order requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit
10 
within ten (10) days from receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but
also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 20

present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said order.
Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against
A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued another order giving petitioner another chance
11 
him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one
to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus, on April 14, 1993, private year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and
respondent was required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence to support its complaint. 12
the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set. The March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the
petitioner a last chance to present his defense, despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to
comply with the second order.
Thereafter, on November 18, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed Resolution, the decretal portion
1âwphi1.nêt

of which reads:
Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own remissness by
passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMAN has shown forbearance, petitioner
Withal, for such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and conduct prejudicial to the service as established by
has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was
overwhelming evidences, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be discharged
violated. We need only to reiterate that a party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges
from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the
cannot complain of a denial of due process. 21

government or any government-owned or controlled corporation; without prejudice to any civil action
NIACONSULT, Inc., may institute to recover the amount so retained by the respondent.
Petitioner's claim that he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his
counter-affidavit and of allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte is unmeritorious.
SO ORDERED. 13

The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and which was admittedly
On February 16, 1994 petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was denied due
received by the latter explicitly contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was filed within the given period, a waiver
process in that the administrative case was resolved on the basis of the complainant's evidences, without affording
would be considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue according to the rules. Thus, respondent
him the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to present his evidence. Petitioner likewise contends that he was
OMBUDSMAN need not issue another order notifying petitioner that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit.
not given access to the records of the subject transaction vital to his defense and in the preparation of his counter-
affidavit despite his verbal requests to the graft investigator.
14
In the same way, petitioner need not be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of private respondent's
evidence. As such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.
With regard to the petitioner's claim that he made requests for the production of the documents alleged to be material
to his defense, the record is bereft of any proof of such requests. If it were true that the graft investigator did not act
on such requests, petitioner should have filed the proper motion before the respondent OMBUDSMAN for the
production of the documents or to compel the respondent complainant to produce whatever record necessary for his
defense. Petitioner did not. It was only after the respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed resolution of
November 18, 1993 that he bewailed the alleged failure of respondent's graft investigator to require the production of
the records of the subject transaction.
The record of this case indisputably shows that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
government when he failed to remit the payment of the training program conducted by NIACONSULT. The evidence
presented sufficiently established that petitioner received the payments of ADBN through its representative, GTZ,
Philippines the amount of US $9,600.00 and that he failed to account this and remit the same to the corporation. All
these acts constitute dishonesty and untrustworthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent
OMBUDSMAN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
66. G.R. No. 154243             December 22, 2007
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL,
P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on March 6, 2007. In said
Decision, the Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process during the
summary hearing.
Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following reasons:
1. The summary proceeding was null and void because no hearing was conducted; and
2. The evidence presented at the summary hearing does not prove that respondent is guilty of the charges
against him.
Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all but only relied on the
affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding further questions to complainant's witnesses, or
calling in other witnesses such as PO2 Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no
full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings. In Samalio v. Court of
Appeals,1 the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore, be struck down.
To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before
the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges
against him.
However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the Regional Trial Court is one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the administrative case against respondent was filed way back
in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of procedure.
The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does not toll the running of the period to appeal.4
However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of
procedure in order to promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other
instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of
pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief’s decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board
(NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against
respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section 41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought before the
People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to
immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals,7 promulgated in 2005 or after respondent had already filed the
petition for certiorari with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction over
cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief
and regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against members of the PNP
which may warrant dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said
authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully
ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB,
pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed
thus:
After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed
liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.10
Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher
interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated March
6, 2007 is MODIFIED such that respondent is hereby allowed to file his appeal with the National Appellate Board
within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
678. CARLOS R. SAUNAR, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA AND
CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN, CHAIRPERSON OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 20 October 2008 Decision1 and
the 17 February 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 which
affirmed the 19 January 2007 decision3 of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing petitioner Carlos
R. Saunar (Saunar) from government service.
THE FACTS
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined
as an agent in 1988. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of
the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official
investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then
Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former
Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue
became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for plunder.4
In Special Order No. 40035 dated 27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for
Western Mindanao based in Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad
testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President
Estrada. After securing approval from his immediate supervisor Filomeno Bautista (Bautista), Deputy
Director for Regional Operation Services (DDROS), Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on
several hearing dates, the last being on 27 October 2004.6
On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No.
0050337 informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional director for Western
Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions. Pursuant thereto, he
reported to Bautista on the first week of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an
investigation was being conducted over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should
just wait for the developments in the investigation. In the meantime, Bautista did not assign him any
duty and told him to be available at any time whenever he would be needed. He made himself
accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings
whenever required.8
On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October
2006. The charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August 2005, from Wycoco recommending an
immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March 2005,
without approved leave of absence for four (4) months.9
On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29
January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service.
The OP Decision
In its 19 January 2007 decision, the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that
Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained
that he did not report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility.
The OP highlighted that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It
added that it would have been more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was
specifically assigned to him, for the precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with
responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar from allegedly keeping government property
during the time he did not report for work, noting that he was able to account for all the items
attributed to him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by PAGC, Atty. Carlos R. Saunar, Regional
Director, NBI, for Gross Neglect of Duty under Section 22(b), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292 in relation to Section 4(A) of RA 6713 and for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019, is hereby DISMISSED from government service with cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the
government service.10
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007
resolution.11 Undeterred, he appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 20 October 2008 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The appellate court
ruled that Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against
him and was given the opportunity to defend himself. It expounded that the absence of formal
hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.
On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by
his being on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time. The appellate court
disregarded Saunar's explanation that he stayed in establishments nearby and that he had attended
court hearings from time to time. In addition, the CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 because public interest was prejudiced when he continued to receive his salary in spite of
his unjustified absences. Thus, it ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita dated January 19, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.12
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 17 February 2009
resolution.
Hence, this appeal raising the following:
ISSUES
I In Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court went on to highlight the importance of confronting the witnesses
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS
NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S
RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION; AND
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAELS GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENTS THAT PETITIONER
COMMITTED GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, HAD ABANDONED HIS POST AND WENT ON AWOL
FOR HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPORT FOR WORK FROM MARCH 24, 2005 TO MAY 2006. 13
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is meritorious.
Administrative due process
revisited
Saunar bewails that he was deprived of due process, pointing out that no real hearing was ever
conducted considering that the clarificatory conference conducted by the PAGC was a sham. In
addition, he asserts that he was not notified of the charges against him because he was only made
aware of the allegations after the PAGC had formally charged him. Further, Saunar highlights the
delay between the time PAGC received Wycoco's letter-complaint and when he received the formal
charge from the PAGC.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the
American Constitution in that it guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. While the words used in our Constitution slightly differ from the American
Constitution, the guarantee of due process is used in the same sense and has the same force and
effect.14 Thus, while decisions on due process of American courts are not controlling in our jurisdiction,
they may serve as guideposts in the analysis of due process as applied in our legal system.
In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.15 Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in that it
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.16
In Goldberg v. Kelly (Goldberg),17 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court ruled that due process
requires the opportunity for welfare recipients to confront the witnesses against them at a pre-
termination hearing before welfare benefits are terminated, to wit:
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to
be heard. It is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in
writing or second hand through his caseworker. x x x Moreover, written submissions do not afford the
flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues
the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at
issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are wholly
unsatisfactory basis for decision.
presented against the claimant, viz:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. x x x What we said in Greene v
McElroy, 360 US 474, 496-497, 3 Led 2d 1377, 1390, 1391, 79 S Ct 1400 (1959), is particularly
pertinent here:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that
where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action
depends on fact findings the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case
of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated
by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in
the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find
expression in the Sixth Amendment . . . This Court has be zealous to protect these rights from
erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where
administrative actions were under scrutiny.
Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses relied on by the department.18
In subsequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a lack of formal hearing in the
administrative level does not violate procedural due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy (Arnett),19 a case
involving the dismissal of a non-probationary federal employee, the US Supreme Court ruled that a
trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer was not necessary before the employee could be
removed from office because the hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the
actual dismissal is a sufficient requirement of the Due Process Clause.
In Mathews v. Eldridge (Mathews),20 the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination of disability benefits is not indispensable, to wit:
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a
temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the
very margin of subsistence:
The crucial factor in this context x x x is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. x x x (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief
Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and
xxxx
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."

All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the
"capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard to insure that they are given a meaningful
opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the
administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair
consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals. This is especially so where, as here, the
prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim
prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to
subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes final.21
It is true that in both Arnett and Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that due process. was not
violated due to the lack of a formal hearing before the employee was dismissed and welfare benefits
were cancelled in the respective cases. Nevertheless, in both cases it was recognized that the
aggrieved party had the opportunity for a hearing to settle factual or evidentiary disputes in
subsequent procedures. In our legal system, however, the opportunity for a hearing after the
administrative level may not arise as the reception of evidence or the conduct of hearings are
discretionary on the part of the appellate courts.
In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact
definition.22 It is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter
and the necessities of the situation.23
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,24 the Court eruditely
expounded on the concept of due process in administrative proceedings, to wit:
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.)
In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards
vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanate from the more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) ... The statute provides
that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.
860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct.
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S.
Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442,

50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a

basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.
S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial
fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said
Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case
there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.25 (emphases supplied)

From the pronouncements of the Court in Ang Tibay, the fluid concept of administrative due process continued to progress. In In Re: De Borja and Flores,26 the Court ruled that there was no denial of due process
when the Public Service Commission cancelled the certificate of Jose de Borja to operate an ice plant without prior notice or hearing because a hearing was conducted after the applicant filed a motion for
reconsideration. In Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union,27 the Court ruled that due process was observed even if the report of the investigating officer was not set for hearing before the Court of
Industrial Relations because during the investigation stage, the parties were given the opportunity to cross-examine and present their side to the case. It is noteworthy that in both cases due process was observed
because the parties were given the chance for a hearing where they could confront the witnesses against them.

In Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong,28 the Court explained that there is no denial of due process when a party is afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails to exercise the same, to
wit:

1. The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident
from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was announced by
Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this petition
must prosper. It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as
the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople, Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor
Relations Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta University
Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The opportunity to present its side of the case was given
both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity could then
be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter. 29 (emphasis supplied)

Again, there was no denial of due process in the above-mentioned case because the parties were ultimately given the chance to confront the witnesses against them. It just so happened that therein petitioner
failed to promptly avail of the same.

In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arboleda),30 the Court expounded that administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, to wit:

The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court.  Actual adversarial proceedings
become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it
is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon. 31 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the due process guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It
continued that it is a procedural right that may be invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases,32 the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in administrative proceedings because the
due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain their respective sides through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable
should not be hastily thrown around by administrative bodies.

A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a formal hearing but merely afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party fails to
invoke the right to hearing or is given the opportunity but opts not to avail of it. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free from a strict application of technical rules
of procedure and are given sufficient leeway. In the said case, however, nothing was said that the freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to allow matters which would ordinarily be incompetent
or inadmissible in the usual judicial proceedings.

In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court
reminded that administrative bodies have the active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it
would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule rather than the exception.
The observance of a formal hearing in administrative tribunal or bodies other than judicial is not novel. In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, 33 the Court opined that in illegal dismissal cases, a
formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when requested by the employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.

In Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres (Joson),34 the Court ruled that the respondent was denied due process after he was deprived of the right to a formal investigation with the opportunity to face the witnesses
against him, to wit:

The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:

xxxx

Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating
Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a
hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by
the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly
similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the
Local Government Code itself.35 (emphases and underlining supplied)

Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and claim that due process was observed by merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits. Besides, the Court
in Joson recognized the inherent limitations of relying on position papers alone as the veracity of its contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out the truth and in turn, render a more accurate decision.

In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to observe fairness in handling the case against him. Its unfairness and unreasonableness is readily apparent with its disregard of its
own rules of procedure.

The procedure to be observed in cases of clarificatory hearings is set forth under the PAGC rules of procedure. Rule III, Section 3 of its 2002 New Rules of Procedure states:

SECTION 3. Action After Respondent's Response.— If, upon evaluation of the documents submitted by both parties, it should appear either that the charge or charges have been satisfactorily traversed by the
respondent in his Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer, or that the Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer does not tender a genuine issue, the Commissioner assigned shall forthwith, or after a clarificatory hearing to
ascertain the authenticity and/or significance of the relevant documents, submit for adoption by the Commission the appropriate recommendation to the President.

The Commissioner assigned may, at his sole discretion, set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses if he or she believes that there are matters which need to be inquired into
personally by him or her. In said hearing, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If they so desire, they may submit
written questions to the Commissioner assigned who may propound such questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. Thereafter, the parties be required, to file with the Commission, within an
inextendible period of five (5) days and serve on the adverse party his verified Position Paper. (emphasis and underlining supplied)

On the other hand, the 2008 Rules of Procedure amended the said provision to read as follows:

SECTION 7. Clarificatory Hearings and Position Papers. - After the filing of the Answer, the Commission may, at its discretion, conduct Clarificatory Hearings, in which case, subpoenas may be issued for the
purpose. Should a Clarificatory Hearing be conducted, all parties relevant to the case shall be notified at least five (5) days before the date thereof. Failure of a party to appear at the hearing is not necessarily a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be allowed to present evidence, even in the absence of the adverse party who was duly notified of the hearing.

During a Clarificatory Hearing, the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall ask clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or information. The parties shall be afforded the opportunity to
be present and shall be allowed the assistance of counsel, but without the right to examine or cross-examine the party/witness being questioned. The parties may be allowed to raise
clarificatory questions and elicit answers from the opposing party/witness, which shall be coursed through the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, for determination of
whether or not the proposed questions are necessary and relevant. In such cases, the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall ask the question in such manner and phrasing as may be
deemed appropriate. (emphasis and underlining supplied)

xxxx

Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is discretionary. Nevertheless, in the event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules to be
followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to examine witnesses. They, however, may
ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the PAGC.

To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a
party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given
the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the
rules itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not
invoke the said right or waives the same.

The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC. He was deprived of the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the clarificatory hearing
attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus denied the chance to propound questions through the PAGC against the opposing parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself granted Saunar the right to be present
during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing party.

Even assuming that Saunar was not deprived of due process, we still find merit in reversing his dismissal from the government service.

Gross neglect of duty negated

by intent of the government
employee concerned

It is true that the dropping from the rolls as a result of AWOL is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of benefits or disqualification from re-employment in the government.36 Nevertheless,
being on AWOL may constitute other administrative offenses, which may result in the dismissal of the erring employees and a forfeiture of retirement benefits.37 In the case at bar, Saunar was charged with the
administrative offense of gross neglect of duty in view of his prolonged absence from work.

The OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because he was on AWOL from March 2005 to May 2006. He, however, bewails that from the time we was
directed to report to the DDROS, he was never assigned a particular duty or responsibility. As such, Saunar argues that he cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty because there was no "duty" to speak of. In
addition, he assails that he had made himself readily available because he stayed in establishments near the NBI.

Gross Neglect of Duty, as an administrative offense, has been jurisprudentially defined. It refers to negligence characterized by the glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected.38

When Saunar was relieved as regional director of Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS, he was obligated to report to the said office. He, however, was not assigned any specific task or duty
and was merely advised to make himself readily available. Saunar often stayed in establishments near the NBI because he was also not provided a specific station or office. The same, nonetheless, does not
establish that he willfully and intentionally neglected his duties especially since every time he was required to attend court hearings through special orders issued by the NBI, he would do so. Clearly, Saunar never
manifested any intention to neglect or abandon his duties as an NBI official as he remained compliant with the lawful orders given to him. In addition, when he received the order reassigning him as the regional
director for the NBI Bicol Office, he also obeyed the same. Saunar's continued compliance with the special orders given to him by his superiors to attend court hearings negate the charge of gross neglect of duty as
it evinces a desire to fulfil the duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, argues that Saunar's attendance at several court hearings pursuant to special orders does not exculpate him from the charge of gross neglect of duty. As
highlighted by the OSG, the certificate of appearances Saunar presented account only for fourteen (14) days.39

Notwithstanding, Saunar's conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order to be liable for violating the said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury
to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.40 As discussed above, Saunar's action was not tantamount to
inexcusable or gross negligence considering that there was no intention to abandon his duty as an NBI officer.
Illegally dismissed government
employees entitled to full back
wages and retirement benefits

On 11 August 2014, Saunar reached the compulsory age of retirement from government service.41 In view of Saunar's retirement, reinstatement to his previous position had become impossible. Thus, the only
recourse left is to grant monetary benefits to which illegally dismissed government employees are entitled.

In Campol v. Balao-as,42 the Court extensively expounded the rationale behind the grant of full back wages to illegally dismissed employees, to wit:

An employee of the civil service who is invalidly dismissed is entitled to the payment of backwages. While this right is not disputed, there have been variations in our jurisprudence as to the proper
fixing of the amount of backwages that should be awarded in these cases. We take this opportunity to clarify the doctrine on this matter.

Ginson and Regis also involved the question of the proper fixing of backwages. Both cases awarded backwages but limited it to a period of five years. Ginson does not provide for an exhaustive explanation for this
five-year cap. Regis, on the other hand, cites Cristobal v. Melchor, Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, 32 Laganapan v. Asedillo, Antiporda v. Ticao, and San Luis v. Court of Appeals, in support of its ruling. We
note that these cases also do not clearly explain why there must be a cap for the award of backwages, with the exception of Cristobal. In Cristobal, a 1977 case, we held that the award of backwages should be for
a fixed period of five years, applying by analogy the then prevailing doctrine in labor law involving employees who suffered unfair labor practice. We highlight that this rule has been rendered obsolete by virtue of
Republic Act No. 6175 which amended the Labor Code. Under the Labor Code, employees illegally dismissed are entitled to the payment of backwages from the time his or her compensation was withheld up to the
time of his or her actual reinstatement.

In 2005, our jurisprudence on backwages for illegally dismissed employees of the civil service veered away from the ruling in Cristobal.

Thus, in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, we categorically declared—

An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and
just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

We repeated this ruling in the 2005 case Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, in the 2007 case Romagos v. Metro Cebu Water District, and in the 2010 case Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr.

Thus, the Decision, in refusing to award backwages from Campol's dismissal until his actual reinstatement, must be reversed. There is no legal nor jurisprudential basis for this ruling. An employee of the civil
service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the
duties of his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never truly left the office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the
period of time until the employee found a new employment is not a full recompense for the damage done by the illegal dismissal of an employee. Worse, it effectively  punishes an employee for
being dismissed without his or her fault. In cases like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by the constitutional mandate to protect civil service employees' right to
security of tenure. Anything less than this falls short of the justice due to government employees unfairly removed from office. This is the prevailing doctrine and should be applied in Campol's case.

This entitlement to full backwages also means that there is no need to deduct Campol's earnings from his employment with PAO from the award. The right to receive full backwages means exactly this — that it
corresponds to Campol's salary at the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this amount. This is
consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who
illegally dismisses an employee has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had the illegal act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an
employee.

xxxx

We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same right. It is only by imposing this rule that we will be able to uphold the constitutional right to security of tenure with full force and
effect. Through this, those who possess the power to dismiss employees in the civil service will be reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority as a breach of an employee's
right to security of tenure will lead to the full application of law and jurisprudence to ensure that the employee is reinstated and paid complete backwages.  (emphasis supplied)
As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the time he was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement. In view of his retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such,
the back wages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his compulsory retirement.43 In addition, Saunar is entitled to receive the retirement benefits he should have received if he were not
illegally dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 October 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar is entitled to full back wages
from the time of his illegal dismissal until his retirement and to receive his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.