Case Digest: Technol Eight v.

NLRC & Amular

G.R. No. 187605 : April 13, 2010

TECHNOL EIGHT PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION AND DENNIS AMULAR, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner Technol Eight Philippines Corporation (Technol), located at 127 East Main
Avenue, Laguna Technopark, Bin, Laguna, manufactures metal parts and motor vehicle
components. It hired the respondent Dennis Amular in March 1998 and assigned him to
Technols Shearing Line, together with Clarence P. Ducay. Rafael Mendoza was the lines team
leader.

On April 16, 2002 at about 5:30 p.m., Mendoza went to the Surf City Internet Cafin Balibago,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. As Mendoza was leaving the establishment, he was confronted by Amular
and Ducay who engaged him in a heated argument regarding their work in the shearing line,
particularly Mendozas report to Avelino S. De Leon, Jr., Technols Production Control and
Delivery (PCD) assistant supervisor, about Amulars and Ducays questionable behavior at work.
The heated argument resulted in a fistfight that required the intervention of the barangay
tanods in the area.

Upon learning of the incident, Technols management sent to Amular and Ducay a notice of
preventive suspension/notice of discharge advising them that their fistfight with Mendoza
violated Section 1-k of Technols Human Resource Department (HRD) Manual. The two were
given forty-eight (48) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them
for the incident. They were placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days, thereafter,
Amular received a notice informing him that Technol management will conduct an
administrative hearing. He was also given two (2) days to respond in writing to the statements
attached to and supporting the notice. A day before the hearing, Amular filed a complaint for
illegal suspension/constructive dismissal with a prayer for separation pay, backwages and
several money claims, against Technol. Amular failed to attend the administrative hearing.
Technol sent him a notice of dismissal.

The Executive Labor Arbiter found Amulars preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal
were illegal. With respect to Amulars dismissal, the Arbiter held that Technol failed to afford
him procedural due process since he was not able to present his side because he had filed a
case before the NLRC at the time he was called to a hearing; Technol also failed to substantiate
its allegations against Amular; the fistfight occurred around 200 to 300 meters away from the
work area and it happened after office hours. Arbiter Reyes awarded Amular separation pay
(since he did not want to be reinstated), backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay and attorneys fees in the total amount of P158,987.70.

Technol appealed to the NLRC. It NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters ruling. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the latters decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is overruled.

LABOR LAW

Technol insists that it had to order Amulars dismissal in order to uphold the integrity of the
company rules and to avoid the erosion of discipline among its employees. Also, it disputes the
CAs conclusion that the fact that Amulars liability should be mitigated because the fight "was
nipped in the bud." It submits that Mendoza had already sustained grave injuries when the
mauling was stopped.

Amular undoubtedly committed a misconduct or exhibited improper behavior that constituted

a valid cause for his dismissal under the law and jurisprudential standards. The circumstances of
his misdeed, to our mind, rendered him unfit to continue working for Technol; guilt is not
diminished by his claim that Technols management called the three of them to a meeting, and
asked them to explain their sides and settle their differences, which they did. Mendoza
significantly denied the alleged settlement, maintaining that while they were summoned by De
Leon after the incident, he could not shake hands and settle with Amular and Ducay since they
did not even apologize or ask forgiveness for what they did. We do not find Mendozas denial of
Amulars claim unusual as Mendoza would not have stood his ground in this case if a settlement
had previously been reached. That a meeting had taken place does not appear disputed, but a
settlement cannot be inferred simply because a meeting took place.

Neither do we believe that Amular was discriminated against because he was not the only one
preventively suspended. These notices informed them that they were being preventively
suspended for 30 days from May 19, 2002 to June 17, 2002 for Ducay, and May 21, 2002 for
Amular.

Thus, Amular was not illegally dismissed; he was dismissed for cause.

LABOR LAW
What we see in the records belie Amulars claim of denial of procedural due process. He chose
not to present his side at the administrative hearing. In fact, he avoided the investigation into
the charges against him by filing his illegal dismissal complaint ahead of the scheduled
investigation. Under these facts, he was given the opportunity to be heard and he cannot now
come to us protesting that he was denied this opportunity. To belabor a point the Court has
repeatedly made in employee dismissal cases, the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law. Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 165995, August 14, 2007.

GRANTED
ROQUERO vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. Case Digest
[G.R. No. 152329. April 22, 2003] 

ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent. 

FACTS 

Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent PAL. From
the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed
possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL
security officers and NARCOM personnel. Roquero and Pabayo received a “notice of
administrative charge” for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to answer
the charges and were placed under preventive suspension. Roquero and company alleged that
they were set up by PAL to take the drugs through a certain trainee. In a Memorandum dated
July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal
dismissal. 

The Labor Arbiter ruled against Roquero and upheld the validity of their dismissal, but awarded
separation pay. 

While the case was on appeal with the NLRC, the complainants were acquitted by the RTC, in
the criminal case which charged them with “conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated
drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425,” on the ground of instigation. 

The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered
reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages. Complainants did not appeal
from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The
Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that
they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court. In accordance with the case of St. Martin
Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos, PAL’s petition was referred to the Court of
Appeals. 
The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and held that petitioner’s dismissal was valid, but it
denied the award of separation pay. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review under Rule
45. 

ISSUE 

Whether or not PAL can validly refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that
the case is still on appeal. 

HELD 

The SC held that PAL cannot refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that
the case is still on appeal. 

Article 223(3) of the Labor Code (as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and
Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code)
provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even
pending appeal. 

In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor
Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the working man. These duties and responsibilities of the State are
imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution
also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation’s
progress and stability. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself
has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. 

Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an
immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may
be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the
life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family. 

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to
reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time
the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is
a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. 

Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll.
Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was
reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this
Court. 

We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court
are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code
and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the
other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse
whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services
during the period. 

Dismissal of Petitioner is affirmed, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which
Roquero is entitled from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this
decision.
Landmark Case: CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990 (Case Digest)
A truly remarkable case wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of “love”. The setting of the
case was in  when marriage between minors was still legal, way before the Family Code. In this
case, a 30 year old teacher had married her student which prompted the school to terminate
her. And against odds the Supreme Court Ruled in favor of here, hence, creating this Landmark
Case. “truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.”

CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
Digested Case

A Landmark Case

FACTS:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and
unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her
student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as
sufficient basis for terminating her services.

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High
School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended
without pay and was terminated of his employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct
Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a
clearance for termination.

ISSUE:

Was her dismissal valid?

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or
grave misconduct?

RULING:
 
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady teacher]
took advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two eventually fell in
love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the
truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely,
yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her
student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern
cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
 IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs

RAMONCHITO T. ALCON and JOANN S. PAPA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 194884               October 22, 2014

PONENTE: Brion

TOPIC: Sexual intercourse in workplace during work hours as serious misconduct

FACTS:

                Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation

engaged in the manufacture of auto seat-recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents as
manual welders in 2001.

                On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift – from 8:00
pm to 5:00 am of the following day. At around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen’s security
guard on duty, went to patrol and inspect the production plant’s premises. When Altiche reached
Imasen’s Press Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan off,
he followed the sound that led him to the plant’s “Tool and Die” section.

                At the “Tool and Die” section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse
on the floor, using a piece of carton as mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard
house and relayed what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana, another security guard on duty.

                Respondent’s defense: they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the “Tool and
Die” section at the time of the incident. They also claimed that other employees were near the
area, making the commission of the act charged impossible.

                Both LA and NLRC held that the dismissal was valid. CA however nullified NLRC’s
decision and held that sexual intercourse inside company premises is not serious misconduct.

ISSUE:

                Whether the respondents’ infraction – engaging in sexual intercourse inside company

premises during work hours – amounts to serious misconduct justifying their dismissal.
 

HELD:

                YES. Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled

ideal, to the realm of purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere
affection, sexual acts should be carried out at such place, time and circumstance that, by the
generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend public decency nor disturb the generally
held or accepted social morals. Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting
adults do not have a place in the work environment.

                Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises
and during work hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct.
Added to these considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only
disregard company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on
the status of ethics and morality in the company.

                Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-
employees or other company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents
likewise committed their act at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact,
been at their respective posts, and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other
employees had in fact been, working.

                The Court also considered the respondents’ misconduct to be of grave

and aggravated character so that the company was justified in imposing the highest
penalty available ― dismissal.

                Their infraction transgressed the bounds of socially and morally accepted human

public behavior, and at the same time showed brazen disregard for the respect that their employer
expected of them as employees. By their misconduct, the respondents, in effect, issued an open
invitation for others to commit the same infraction, with like disregard for their employer’s rules,
for the respect owed to their employer, and for their co-employees’ sensitivities.
Leus vs. St. Scholastica College
Date: January 28, 2015 GR. NO. 197011 PETITIONER: Cheryll Santos Leus RESPONDENT: St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove
FACTS: SSCW(respondent) hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW‟s Director. Petitioner
and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioners
pregnancy, they advised her to file a resignation. The petitioner refused to resign her
employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Respondent
formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed. Later on,
being unsatisfied with petitioner’s explanation, her employment with SSCW was terminated on
the ground of serious misconduct. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondent
claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner and that it was a valid exercise of
management prerogative. They maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting
pregnant amounts to a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an
employee under the 1992 MRPS (Manual of Regulation for Private School) The CA and the labor
tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS which provides: Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just
causes enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty,
may be terminated for any of the following causes xxx e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct; xxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner‟s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
“disgraceful and immoral” considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational
institution.
ISSUE: a.) whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that it is the 1992 MRPS and not
the Labor Code that governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools b.) whether the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
valid ground to terminate her employment
HELD: First Issue: Applicability of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools(MRPS) THE MRPS
is applicable. MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued by
the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232 which empowers the Department of Education
to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and
regulation of the educational system. The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel
of private schools, as well as the causes for the termination of their employment, are an
integral aspect of the educational system of private schools. It is thus within the authority of
the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification. Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s Dismissal of whether pregnancy out of
wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of
her employment. No. The fact of the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is
not enough to characterize the petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be
substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy
out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral. The determination of whether a
conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally
considers moral and respectable. The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious. Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. For a particular conduct to constitute
“disgraceful and immoral” behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of
the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias,
specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on “cultural” values
not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed
in the Constitution and the laws. The petitioner’s dismissal is not a valid exercise of SSCW’s
management prerogative. SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its
employees and, if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, there is no
cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral.
Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy,
does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in
SSCW‟s policy and rules, SSCW‟s dismissal of the petitioner is not a valid exercise of
management prerogative. In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as
there was no just cause for the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to establish that the petitioners conduct in engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock as considered disgraceful or immoral.