Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs.

Ermita, 488 SCRA

226, G.R. No. 169838, G.R. No. 169848, G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

AZCUNA, J.:

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del
Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848,2 who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained
when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R.
No. 169881,3 allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
"Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them  in toto  and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a

violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. 5

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion,"
"protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it
is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows
their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and
imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void
for being vague and for lack of publication.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the

right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this
right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the
permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long
as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes
action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance
or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on
the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

The principal issues, as follows:

1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a)

and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5
and 6, 2005?

RULING: The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a
right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute
the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.

It must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this
Court said: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled
principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and
other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such
as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal
and city councils enact ordinances for purpose.

B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v.
Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 (1998), where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral”
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and
impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are
the words “opinion,” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the
government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
“Public” does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster’s
Dictionary defines it, thus: public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group
of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x. Not every expression
of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to “rally, demonstration, march, parade,
procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.” So it does
not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive
evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standard—the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
“imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c) substantially
means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent
Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary
to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu
City has declared a freedom park—Fuente Osmeña. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has
since been converted into a golf course, he added. If this is so, the degree of observance of
B.P. No. 880’s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six
months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The
matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from
the peaceful revolution of 1986. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an
essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s exercise of their right to
peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such
right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall
have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the
permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to
the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.

The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR
serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated
by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.

There is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act
on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an
application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance
with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then
presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has
been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed
following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our
people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold
the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that “in cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the
government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights
come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and
actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.” For this reason, the so-called
calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid
because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in
accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall
be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the
police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. Bayan,
Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226,
G.R. No. 169838, G.R. No. 169848, G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006
 G.R. No. 175241               February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office
of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application 4 for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit5 dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given
date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari which assailed the appellate court’s
inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public
Assembly Act of 1985.7

The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with
P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants
voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.

The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, 8 docketed as I.S. No. 06I-
12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.

Issue: The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of
the venue in IBP’s rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the
venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant
may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent failed to
indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a
clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to
such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as
the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It
smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the
appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific
statutory provision, not to have modified the permit “in terms satisfactory to the applicant.”
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 175241 February 24,
2010

Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost) GR. No. 223395, 4 December

2018

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:

On May 10, 2014, respondent Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) issued a stamp
commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial Celebration. The design of the stamp
showed a photo of INC founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the designation on the
left side containing the words "Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia
ni Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group at the background. At the right side
of Manalo's photo is the INC's centennial logo which contained a torch enclosed by a two
concentric circles containing the words "IGLESIA Nl CRISTO CENTENNIAL 1914-2014".[4]

On June 16, 2014, petitioner Renato V. Peralta (petitioner) filed a complaint [5] for injunction
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 33 of Manila, assailing the constitutionality of the
printing, issuance and distribution of the INC commemorative centennial stamps, allegedly
paid for by respondent PhilPost using public funds.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that the printing and issuance of the INC
commemorative stamp involved disbursement of public funds, and violated.
Section 29(2) of Article VI [6] of the 1987 Constitution. He argued that respondents' act
of releasing the said stamps was unconstitutional because it was tantamount to sponsorship
of a religious activity; it violated the separation of the Church and the State; and the non-
establishment of religion clause. Thus, petitioner prayed that respondents be restrained
from issuing and distributing the INC commemorative stamps. [7]

After service of summons to respondents PhilPost and its Board of Directors, and a hearing
on the petitioner's application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the RTC denied the
same in its Order[8] dated June 23, 2014.

Respondents filed their Answer,[9] maintaining that no public funds were disbursed in the
printing of the INC commemorative stamps. They alleged that there was a Memorandum of
Agreement[10] (MOA) dated May 7, 2014 executed between PhilPost and INC, where it was
provided that the costs of printing will be borne by INC. They claimed that the proceeds of
the sale of the stamps will not redound to the sole benefit of INC. [11] The printing,
according to them, is part of PhilPost's philatelic products, which will promote
tourism in the country because it will attract people from all over the world.
[12]
 They maintained that any sectarian benefit to the INC is merely incidental. As to
petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief, respondents contended that petitioner failed to
demonstrate irreparable injury, and that he cannot seek to restrain the printing and
distribution of the stamps as these were already printed prior to the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: the issue of this case centers on the constitutionality of the respondents'
act in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorating the INC's centennial
celebration.

The petition lacks merit.

The non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to indifference to
religion

In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension

between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or
the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted,
total separation of the two is not possible.

The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses as erecting a "wall" between
church and state, see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 330 U.S. 18 (1947).
The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from
views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it But the metaphor itself is
not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state.

No significant segment of our society, and no institution within it can exist in a

vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from
government. "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of
total separation. . . ." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 413 U.S. 760 (1973). Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,
and forbids hostility toward any. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 343 U.S. 314,
343 U.S. 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 333 U.S.,
211 (1948). Anything less would require the "callous indifference" we have said was never
intended by the Establishment Clause." xxx (Emphasis Ours)
The U. S. Supreme Court then went on to state how its history and tradition has allowed a
healthy interaction between the State and religion, so long as the State does not commit
acts that are solely motivated by religious considerations.

Another important lesson in Lynch was the Court's consideration of the context within which
the government has issued a legislation or pursued an act. In that case, the Court found that
the inclusion of the creche in the annual Christmas display was merely a recognition of the
historical origins of the Christmas holiday.

Having in mind the above-stated rulings pertinent to the principle of non-establishment of

religion clause, We proceed to scrutinize the INC commemorative stamp.

Based on the foregoing, this Court is not convinced that PhilPost has actually
used its resources to endorse, nor encourage Filipinos to join INC or observe the
latter's doctrines. On the contrary, this Court agrees with respondents that the
printing of the INC commemorative stamp was endeavored merely as part of
PhilPost's ordinary business.

In the same vein, We do not find that there was illegal disbursement of funds under
Section 29(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. The application of this prohibition
towards government acts was already clarified by the Court in Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding Of Religious Rituals At The Hall Of Justice Building In Quezon
City:[66]

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or
property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
 to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose." "Appropriate" means
"to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or
property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found with or with
which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or
restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is
the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any
church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily
intended for the furtherance of a particular church.

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the
use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such
use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to
the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even
as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a
religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of
public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere
incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
placed it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the
same provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein
public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary
because they rendered service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and the
latter may have benefited from the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of
the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and
for which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be compensated in the
same manner.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. As such, the

foregoing interpretation finds support in the Establishment Clause, which is as clear as
daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish
a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof. [67]

Indeed, what is prohibited is the State using its resources to solely benefit one
religion. As stated above, the records do not show that the State has been using the
resources and manpower of PhilPost for INC's sole advantage. On the contrary, the stamps
printed and issued by PhilPost, as seen through its website, feature various entities and
organizations, other than religious sects.
The design of the INC commemorative stamp is merely an acknowledgment of the historical
and cultural contribution of INC to the Philippine society

Adopting the stance of benevolent neutrality, this Court deems the design of the INC
commemorative stamp constitutionally permissible. As correctly held by the CA, there is an
intrinsic historical value in the fact that Felix Y Manalo is a Filipino and that the INC is a
Filipino institution. It explained, thus:

xxx Both matters, "culture" and "national development," are secular in character. Further, it
cannot be denied that the part of the late Felix Y. Manalo's cultural and historical
contribution is his founding of the INC. This circumstance, however, does not immediately
put it in a religious light if it is only the historical fact of establishment which is being
mentioned, i.e., adding nothing more and without regard to its doctrine and teachings.

After arguing that the INC does not contribute to national development because it does not
pay taxes, (petitioner) Peralta now wants this Court to enumerate INC's contributions to
national development. This matter has already been determined by the President of the
Philippines, Congress, and the National Historical Commission. It is not for this Court to
question the wisdom of these executive and legislative issuances nor supplant the same.
The task of this Court is to resolve whether the printing of the stamps is constitutional in
light of these executive and legislative determinations.

To reiterate, in the same manner that public property is allowed to be used temporarily by
different religions like roads or parks, the philatelic services and products offered by
(respondent) PhilPost for valuable consideration, can be availed of not only by the INC but by
other people or organizations as well. For the above-stated reasons, this Court maintains its
finding that the printing and issuance of the INC Centennial stamps did not contravene
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Besides, (petitioner's) cause of action,
which is injunction, necessarily fails as there is nothing more to restrain or enjoin. [68]

Thus, this Court sees no religious overtones surrounding the commemorative stamps, as
insisted upon by the petitioner.

In the case of Aglipay,[69] the issuance and sale of postage stamps commemorating the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it violated
the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the
benefit of any church. In ruling that there was no such violation, the Court, through Justice
Jose P. Laurel, held that:

xxx It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious
in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken
by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts,
175 U.S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.).[Emphasis Supplied.]

Indeed, the design depicted in the INC commemorative stamp is merely a recognition of the
continuous existence of a group that is strictly Filipino. As compared to major religious
groups established in the country, Felix Y. Manalo, and the INC, are not plain religious
symbols, but also a representation of a group that is distinctly unique to the Philippines. To
the mind of this Court, the use of the facade of the Church and the image of Felix Y. Manalo
is nothing more than an acknowledgment of a historical milestone. It does not endorse,
establish or disparage other religious groups and even non-believers, especially considering
the fact that PhilPost also print stamps with symbols which can arguably be connected to
religion. In the case of Manosca vs. Court of Appeals,[70] this Court has already recognized
Manalo's contribution to the Filipino society:

Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation
of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo would benefit?

This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting
up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but
such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in
nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
(Emphasis ours)

To debunk petitioner's claim that Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution [71] was
violated, We agree with PhilPost's view that:

xxx the printing and issuance of the assailed commemorative stamps were
not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were neither for the
benefit of INC, nor money derived from their sale inured to its benefit. xxx the
stamps delivered to INC were not free of charge and whatever income derived
from the sale to INC and of the excess to the postal clients were not given to
INC, but went to the coffers of PhilPost. [72]

All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to grant the petition. In refusing
to declare unconstitutional the INC's commemorative stamp, this Court is merely applying
jurisprudentially sanctioned policy of benevolent neutrality. To end, it bears to
emphasize that the Constitution establishes separation of the Church and the State, and not
separation of religion and state.[73]

WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the July 24, 2015 Decision, as well as the
March 8, 2016 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 103151.

2. A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.

FACTS: A sworn letter complaint was made by Alejandro Estrada, requesting Judge Jose
Cosibes for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in said count,
for living with a man not her husband and having borne a child within the live-in
arrangement. Undoubtedly, Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the count condones her act.

Conversely, respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she
was already a widow her husband having died in 1998. Admittedly, she started living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., without the benefit of marriage more than 21 years ago when her
husband still alive but living with another woman. Lastly, as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehova’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has
the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991, a declaration of Pledging Faith fulness.

As a result, respondent was charged with committing disgraceful and immoral conduct
under Book V Tittle I Chapter VI, Sec 46 (b)(5) of RAC.

ISSUE: Does the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation
constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively
liable?

RULING:

By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their
adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an
approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and examines
the effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the
religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in
society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its
secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt laws or actions
of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent
neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of
separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion
clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where an exemption is
sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality,

benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a
free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with
hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will
strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it
does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause
because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the
protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of
legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out
an exception when the religion clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal
formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree
of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the
means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal
towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the
doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach
not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because
our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent
neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in
interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is
the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small-not only for a
majority, however large-but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society” and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable” by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and
thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.
Otherwise, if a law has an apparent secular purpose but upon closer examination shows a
discriminatory and prohibitory religious purpose, the law will be struck down for being
offensive of the religion clauses as in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. where the U.S.
Supreme

Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed—albeit not

exclusively—in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is
important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. More concretely, should the Court
declare respondent’s conduct as immoral and hold her administratively liable, the Court will
be holding that in the realm of public morality, her conduct is reprehensible or there are
state interests overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her conduct is being judged
within this realm, she will be accountable to the state. But in so ruling, the Court does not
and cannot say that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the realm of her church
where it is presently sanctioned and that she is answerable for her immorality to her
Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting her conduct are correct. On the other hand,
should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court will be holding that under her
unique circumstances, public morality is not offended or that upholding her religious
freedom is an interest higher than upholding public morality thus her conduct should not be
penalized. But the Court is not ruling that the tenets and practice of her religion are correct
nor that other churches which do not allow respondent’s conjugal arrangement should
likewise allow such conjugal arrangement or should not find anything immoral about it and
therefore members of these churches are not answerable for immorality to their Supreme
Being. The Court cannot speak more than what it has authority to say.
Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more
difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality fall
under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which a government employee may
be held administratively liable. The line is not easy to draw for it is like “a line that divides
land and sea, a coastline of irregularities and indentations.” But the case at bar does not
require us to comprehensively delineate between those immoral acts for which one may be
held administratively liable and those to which administrative liability does not attach. We
need not concern ourselves in this case therefore whether “laziness, gluttony, vanity,
selfishness, avarice and cowardice” are immoral acts which constitute grounds for
administrative liability. Nor need we expend too much energy grappling with the
propositions that not all immoral acts are illegal or not all illegal acts are immoral, or
different jurisdictions have different standards of morality as discussed by the dissents and
separate opinions, although these observations and propositions are true and correct. It is
certainly a fallacious argument that because there are exceptions to the general rule that
the “law is the witness and deposit of our moral life,” then the rule is not true; in fact, that
there are exceptions only affirms the truth of the rule. Likewise, the observation that
morality is relative in different jurisdictions only affirms the truth that there is morality in a
particular jurisdiction; without, however, discounting the truth that underneath the moral
relativism are certain moral absolutes such as respect for life and truth-telling, without
which no society will survive. Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the
conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to
another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. Lest the
Court inappropriately engage in the impossible task of prescribing comprehensively how one
ought to live, the Court must focus its attention upon the sole conduct in question before us.

The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent’s claim of
religious freedom to the “compelling state interest” test from a benevolent neutrality stance
—i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent’s claim to religious freedom would warrant
carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious
freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has
been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden
on her free exercise of religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that Sherbert’s religious
exercise was burdened as the denial of unemployment benefits “forces her to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”
The burden on respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price she has to pay for
her employment is not only her religious precept but also her family which, by the
Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands “honorable before God and men.”

The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent
appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not
secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict
and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against
her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together
with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her
congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing a
Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministers
testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit
conduct but to make the “union” of their members under respondent’s circumstances
“honorable before God and men.” It is also worthy of notice that the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA to the respondent
regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag ceremony after Circular No. 62-
2001 was issued requiring attendance in the flag ceremony. The OCA’s letters were not
submitted by respondent as evidence but annexed by the investigating judge in explaining
that he was caught in a dilemma whether to find respondent guilty of immorality because
the Court Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator had different positions regarding
respondent’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ contrary belief and practice. Respondent’s request for exemption from the flag
ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and not using
them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.

In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence on the sincerity of
her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using
the “compelling state interest” test. The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the
parties were not aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court’s use of
the “compelling state interest” test. We note that the OCA found respondent’s
defense of religious freedom unavailing in the face of the Court’s ruling in
Dicdican v. Fernan, et al., viz: It bears emphasis that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in
order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. It is apparent from
the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of
the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency. However, there is nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of
religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing
its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious exercise.

Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present

evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of
religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The
government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity
to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which
can override respondent’s religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of
first impression where we are applying the “compelling state interest” test in a case
involving purely religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as
how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who
stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.

G.R. No. 190582               April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination,
and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.

The COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector
is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Our Ruling: We grant the petition.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:26

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but
public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in
secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would
require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based
its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that
those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as

expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and
thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation.