SEPOCT – Deleuze K

1NC:
1NC – Link:
 Link – Rights:
rights say nothing about
When if you’ve read enough of their work one should ironize; in other words their saying the opposite of what they mean: human

the people because of the fact that these rights cover over those external others of the political that

“provided” those rights in the first place. Which means what they provide masks the power behind such
rights, rights that are a mere formality and mask of power as such: rights that provide nothing
to the people as immanent modes of existence, but rather as codes of a cultural hierarchy that
has nothing at all to do with the “human” or “rights”. This is the irony of “human rights” that it exposes power in the very empty
place where the human should have been, therefore uncovering as you said a layer of protections that are always external to the

subjectivation process rather than immanent to it as its mode of existence. The point being
human rights are a farce, not an answer to the dilemmas of the political truth of
subjectivation. Therefore covering over the very shame culture that hides itself in the shadows of such masking’s… Human Rights provide neither protection
nor escape, but rather provide the powers that be the legalisms to protect themselves from any stain of

shame for having not acted on the part of those very victims. (Such as the Genocide happening in the Middle-East under
ISIS… remember the reluctance of John Kerry and the Obama Administration to admit genocide, and only under a restricted purview which entails no action on American’s part,

it is to protect the powers from acting on

but rather just one more legalism to protect it from having to act. This is the truth of Human Rights:

behalf of victims, rather than a protection of the victims from power. ). Deleuze’s criticisms have to do with a quite
specific historical phenomenon, namely the manner in which human rights are represented as ‘eternal values’, ‘new forms

of transcendence, new universals’ and so on. Nothing in what he says implies rejection of human rights, the rule of law or democratic
government as such. The argument attributed to Deleuze in fact confuses the representation of human rights with human rights themselves and supposes that, just because he

Deleuze is opposed to rights in any form. It is true that existing

refuses the representation of human rights in these terms,

forms of constitutional state and incipient forms of constitutional world order increasingly rely
upon the concept of human rights as the basis for legal rights. Deleuze is critical of the uses made of rights talk in the
contemporary world: ‘Human rights will not make us bless capitalism’ (107).1 However, this does not make him an opponent of rights or even of the idea that some rights
should be universal. He is wary of attempts to ground human rights in features of human nature such as human freedom, rationality or the capacity to communicate.

human rights presuppose a universal and abstract subject of rights, irreducible

Understood in these terms,

to any singular, existent figures. They are eternal, abstract and transcendent rights belonging
to everyone and no one in particular. Human rights understood in this manner ‘say nothing
about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights ’ (107). Deleuze elaborates on the
emptiness of human rights in the abstract in his Abécédaire interviews with Claire Parnet, with reference to the situation of an Armenian population subjected to a massacre by

He objects, firstly, that when people make declarations about human

Turks and then to a subsequent earthquake.

rights in such situations, ‘these declarations are never made as a function of the people who are directly
concerned’. In this case, he suggests, the Armenian people concerned have specific needs in the context of
a specific and local situation: ‘their problem is not “the rights of man” ‘. Secondly, he argues that all such
situations must be considered as cases to be decided rather than simply subsumed under existing laws. He
further develops this idea of a jurisprudence proceeding case by case with reference to French legal decisions relating to the banning of smoking in taxis. A first decision refused
to allow such a ban on the grounds that the occupant was considered to be in the position of a tenant renting an apartment. A subsequent decision upheld the ban on the
grounds that a taxi was considered to be a public service and the occupant in a public rather than a private space. In other words, the judicial response to such cases is properly
creative and not simply the rote application of existing categories.2
 Link – Recognition:
The aff’s politics of inclusion is a mode of homogenization and a product of the
facial machine.
Saldanha 07: [“Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” Arun Saldanha,
2007] AA
My disagreement is not with Fanon’s and Martín Alcoff’s insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of
recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treats white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost
naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention is paid to the complicated processes
whereby some racial formations become dominant, that is, how racial formations emerge from
material conditions  and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari strongly distance themselves

from phenomenology and psychoanalysis. First of all, for them, it isn’t consciousness but an abstract
machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality and
constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries
such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect). That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. ¶ Deleuze and Guattari believe
faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different pheno- types, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality ¶ originated in

If the face is in
Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism: ¶

fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinaryWhite Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man,
black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the white wall of
signification, distributed by the black hole of subjectivity. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim
has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the
stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of
deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrates nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes
tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s ¶ a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro,

it’s a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside.

There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be .5 ¶ For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there
were “no people on the out- side.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of
Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in
relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual
attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeon- holed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable

to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows

—more or less. It would seem to me that

for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television
and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester
Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our
“post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihila- tion of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorial- izations. The
virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation
into the universal.
 Link – Universal Subject:
Their attempt to ascribe a unified essence to the subject – that individuals are
classified as complete and homogenous – fails to acknowledge the different
creative contexts that truly merit our philosophic inquiries. The particular can
never follow from the universal as it is built upon the exclusion of difference –
only a focus on the complex process of subject production can we open up new
possibilities.
Arnott: [Stephen J. Arnott, Canberra, ACT, Australia. “Liminal Subjectivity and the Ethico-
Aesthetic Paradigm of Félix Guattari” pol subjectivity assumes rational subject and separation]
AA

The emphasis
Before we begin this task in earnest, it will be necessary to say something about the concept of subjectivity as it is developed throughout Chaosmosis.

is always on the production of subjectivity, a thesis which opposes itself to any theory or philosophical
inquiry which conceives subjectivity as given, either wholly or partially, which, in other words, insists on its a priori or transcendental

status. This at once distances Guattari's approach from that of Turner, who while conceding that social and political structures are
produced for the most part due to organizational requirements, presupposes a unity of the individual which to some extent remains immune to the effects of structure and
stratification. Turner's individualism, however, is in no way a necessary requirement of his thesis, and in fact often seems to be at odds with it. For the moment we must

Guattari admits no such essential unity, for one because we have no grounds, empirical or otherwise,
emphasize that

for maintaining this presupposition, and for another because treating subjectivity in the light of the
complex processes of production by means of which it is constituted in all its heterogeneity or
diversity opens up ever new possibilities for its future production and also permits an
optimism which might be denied to proponents of essential qualities of human individuation.
The term 'production' gives rise to images of production-lines, of highly mechanized techniques for producing objects according to preconceived design specifications and

economic viability. The processes of production constitutive of subjectivity take on an altogether

different character but will include mechanized production in their midst. Guattari opposes
mechanism to 'machinism', and employs the latter to characterize production as it relates to
subjectivity. Machinic production is invoked to access the extreme complexity of contributing factors and the
enormous variety and variability of connectivity . Factors contributing to the production of subjectivity will not be limited to

biological arrangements, familial circumstances and social milieu, although all these will be included. Technology, media, art,
institutions, machinic encounters of all kinds must be seen to have an active role in the production
of subjectivity. Machines of extreme diversity, not simply scientific or technological machines,
but desiring-machines, aesthetic or literary machines, organic and inorganic, corporeal and
incorporeal, all contributing, all making their effects felt in varying degrees of intensity - on
the basis of this machinic background subjectivities are produced. By means of this machinic ontology, this machination
of ontological textures, we are able "to decentre the question of the subject onto the question of

subjectivity" (C p. 22). We no longer need recourse to a universal or transcendent subject, but instead
diagnose processes of subjectivation operating on biological, psychic, resource etc. materials in diverse and ever-changing ways. In
seeking to identify and understand the effects of factors implicated in the production of
subjectivity within both historical and present cultural and social contexts, we can hope to highlight those factors whose
contribution appears to be detrimental , which in other words steer both individual and collective subjectivity down paths of
self-destruction and at the same time pinpoint potentially creative or positive factors which have been blocked in
one way or another and thus been unable to be realized in any effective capacity. This is not to say that we can foresee in
advance what effects certain kinds of tendency or paradigm are going to have, although we can hazard an educated guess, though not without risks. This conveys something of
the force of Guattari's call for the reappropriation of the production of subjectivity: initially to try to be aware of or at least have a story about factors and processes which play
an active part in the production of subjectivity, and then to be ready to experiment with new factors, as they present themselves or are created, without, however, having any
clear ideas about the results of such experiments. For example, within an ethical perspective, we might identify the prevalence of transcendent principles licensed by religion or
other kinds of moral dogma in the production of subjectivity in certain social contexts or historical periods. While we can recognize manifest positive effects of such moralities
such as the institution of fairly stable communities of like-minded subjects, we can also see all-too-plainly the insularity and prejudices of such subjects and communities.
Perhaps we can find a way to preserve or enhance the positive effects by other means while at the same time lessening the negative ones. Guattari suggests that this might be
achieved by the introduction of a certain 'narrative element' of tolerance based on a conception of 'constellations of Universes of value' which would facilitate a respect amongst
 Such considerations might seem distant from the
proponents of belief systems of different or even opposing types.

multicultural societies which many of us now occupy, in which the recognition of the diversity
of value and systems of belief is supposedly acknowledged. It is still the case, however, that
political decisions are often made on the presupposition of shared community values which in
actuality amount to little more than the propagation of values that are dominant rather than
shared.
 Link – Fem:
Their affirmation of the patriarchy as a oppositional force to femininity ignores
the various intersections between the sexes which results in molar lines of
segmentation that obstruct lines of flight and deviance.
Grosz 93: [Grosz, Elizabeth. A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics. 1993,
link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00821854.pdf.]
As Deleuze and Guattari distinguish the BwO from the body's organisation as a singular, unified, organic and psychical totality, so too they distinguish between molar and

Becomings are always molecular, traversing and

molecular forms of subjectivity, minoritarian and majoritarian collective groupings.

realigning molar 'unities': If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that~
they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double

reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular
combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man , but the relation of
each to the animal, the plant etc.: a thousand tiny sexes. (1987, p. 213) If molar unities, like the divisions of classes, races and

sexes, attempt to form and stabilize an identity, a fixity, a system that functions homeostatically, sealing in its energies and intensities,
molecular becomings traverse, create a path, destabilize, enable energy seepage within and through these molar unities. In his paper 'Politics' (On the Line, 1983), Deleuze

the rigidly
makes a distinction between three types of 'line' relevant to understanding the nexus between the individual and the social: first, there is

segmented line, the line that divides, orders, hierarchizes and regulates social relations through binary
codes, creating the oppositions between sexes, classes and races, and dividing the real into subject and objects. This is a stratifying or
molar line. Second, there is a more fluid, molecular line, which forms connections and relations beyond

the rigidity of the molar line. It is composed of fluid lines which map processes of becoming, change, movement, reorganization. While it is not in itself
'revolutionary' (if it is still meaningful today to say this), it accounts for both socio-political and micro-becomings, demassifying molar segmentations, creating overcoded
territories, passages, or cracks between segments so that they may drift and yet something pass between them. And third, there is a more nomadic line, not always clearly
distinguishable from the molecular line, which moves beyond given segments in destinations unknown in advance, lines of flight, mutations, even quanta leaps. Thus if the

division,the binary opposition, between the sexes - or, for that matter, the global system of patriarchy - can be considered
molar lines of segmentation, then the process of becoming woman - for both men and women
- consists in the releasing of minoritarian fragments or particles of 'sexuality' (sexuality no longer functions on
the level of the unified, genitalized organization of the sexed body), lines of flight which break down and seep into binary aggregations . But this process of

the multiplication of sexualities is only a step in the creation of a nomadic line, a line of
becoming imperceptible which disaggregates the molar structures.
1NC – Impact:
 Evans:
They recreate the oppression they seek to resolve. Their endeavor to politically
eliminate difference results in a constant war where the unconditional value of
life is sacrificed in order to crack down on those they deem deviant from the
ideal.
Evans 10 Brad Evans, 2010 “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no.
4, August 2010, pg. 422-424.

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism
associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has
been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat
distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None
have been more ambitious in map- ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into
the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist

beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the
pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral

and political objectives , the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve

it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to
the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired ’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 2).
Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a
scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own

global project of emancipation , the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war . However much
it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon and
Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto- theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now
been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-
tures’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts

these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of

of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on),

scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining
enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘ any such war to

end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous
and unending process’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity
are inextricably bound to the global life-chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . .
marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability
to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in
these terms inevitably marks an important depar- ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is,
who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a
globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War,
if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in
contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies
have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics
deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life.
Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this
point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and
establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium
revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes
over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation
of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are
writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo- sophical implications, appears to
subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our
thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century
counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other
means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary
scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier,
war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there- fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies
can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of
humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and
Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the
advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter- insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security
governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it
insists upon a joined-up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel- opmental forms of progress (Bell and Evans, forthcoming).
Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance.
While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way
been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively
takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a
well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power
increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of
this his- tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political
terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches
some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct
privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war
paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply
because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal
imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical
category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing

putting the universal against the particular,

what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that,

willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself
is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the
principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political
dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded,
backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze and
Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily
concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life

a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that
necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘

holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to

the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems
occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the
constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the

since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always
subject,

has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended;
they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have
become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the
strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do
not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply,
political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial
(dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault,
2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place
in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of
society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our

names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening : When a diagram of power abandons the model of
sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-power’ or ‘bio-politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as
the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more
hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population
that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’.
Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species

to constantly ‘redefine
necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is

the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites
that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal

form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other
than pure biological life without any media- tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-inspired approach to violence – that
is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide- spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for
instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the
tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only
rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is
unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a

necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal

categorical failure to address how

encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites
the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.
 1NC – Alt:
The alt is to embrace actuality ecology where we subvert recognition under
majoritarian models in favor of existing in pack assemblages where we embrace
our own deviance.
MacCormack 09: [MacCormack, Patricia. Vitalistic Feminethics: Materiality, Mediation and
the End of Necrophilosophy. Deleuze and Law Forensic Futures. Edited by. Rosi Braidotti -
Utrecht University, The Netherlands,  Claire Colebrook -  Pennsylvania State University, USA,
Patrick Hanafin - Birkbeck College, School of Law, University of London, UK. 2009]

Benhabib’s formulation of a context-specific ethics – interactive not legislative (Benhabib, 1992, p. 6) – encourages an
application of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming and its focus on specificity, inten- sity and
unique intersections, within an ethical and ‘real-life’, social context or ecology. Mediation is a constant consideration of
concrete specificities as they intersect, not economically but in terms of quality and movement. Deleuze recognises meditative ecology : ‘Not

becom- ing unearthly. But becoming all the more earthly by inventing laws of liquids and gases on which

the earth depends.’3 Deleuze points to the application of theories of becoming is and mediation as directly affective of real bodies and real situations in
movement – finite existential territories and machinic phyla – not philosophical or reflective concep- tual versions of becoming. This actuality ecology

encompasses what Braidotti emphasises: ‘Here the focus is more on the experience and the potential becoming
of real women in all of their diverse ways of understanding and inhabiting the position
“woman”’ (Braidotti, 1994, p. 115).¶ Actuality ecology involves the slowing of time, of tactics which are modest and thus possible
to concretise, and of the mobilisation of pack assemblages , devolved animal-humans, rather than

the ‘so individual it is no longer completely there as human’ post-human . Feminism, queer, animal rights and
other mobilisations of reified maps are pack deterritorialisations of existential territories – inextricably actual and theoretical, politically, aesthetically, activist, creatively (and
actually risky for being so). While one may argue that the philosopher activates change because thought is material and thinking is inextrica- ble from action, the body able to be
hurt, deprived or die is the point at which the real of hermeneutic subjectivity both haunts and is irrefu- tably maintained in all philosophies.¶ To activate material vitalistic
philosophy the vitalism of the assem- blage must colonise that irresistible point of self-maintenance located primarily in the flesh – all we are and all we need to live.

Corporeal philosophy introduces the hitherto ignored, repressed and overcome. Autonomy
defined through legally owning our own bodies is precisely what we must refuse in order to
negotiate ethically being a self as not others. We must become molecular and one molecule in
a political assemblage, a molecule in a pack such as the pack of feminism, or of anti-racism, of
animal rights, of queer-rights. Real flesh has been the site of prejudice, isomorphic annexation
and suffering. It is purely because of the flesh – its use and its minoritarian status visually and
conceptually – that suffering and death has been experienced. The animal slaughtered or
experimented on, the woman impregnated, raped or beaten, the racial other starved or murdered, the queer denied human rights have all been

made to suffer corporeally and cease to exist through the maintenance of majoritarian
ideology. This ideology is a material philosophy. We should not focus on the victim, becomings
are not victimhoods but tactical entry points (although the prevention of the making dead of the victims is nonetheless an inherent quality
of becomings). Majoritarian systems need to be the focus of change, not just the immediate rights for

preserving potential victims within those systems. We must take care not to martyr ourselves.
Claiming we shall sacrifice our ‘oneness’ simply makes the value of that oneness consist- ent.
If it is not sustained it cannot be part of the assemblage and while not wanting to overvalue
the one that is us, we should not underesti- mate the more-than-one-less-than-one, which is
our ability to act as part of assemblages. We are sustained in our becomings not in our beings.
Activism changes paradigms but also attempts to preserve the life of other individuals at local and micro levels. Ethics demands that we seek to

decentre molar systems of majoritarianism which oppress ‘women’, ‘animals’ and so forth as groups but also
actively affect single instances of suffering and life. The sustaining self encourages these new
assemblages which in turn sustain themselves and that with which they subsequently make
connections. Sustainability forms both local and overarching assemblages. Sustainability raises ‘the challenge here of how to think in terms of processes, not of
entities or single substances, at both the social and symbolic levels’ (Braidotti, 2006, p. 206, cites Becker and Jahn).

-alternative understanding of identity

-instead of categorized identity ie. subject = blank or black = blank

-we instead amalgamate the diverse experiences within it. Ie. there are tons of ways to
be black and subject, by doing so, we recognize the other affective forces defining us

-looks like overlapping venndiagrams

-CX: Im Asian and am thus withing the Asian group. But instead of that group defining me, I
recognize the differences within me as well as the different types of catagories I fit in.

-thus no in and out group, cuz we are all interrelated and everyone within a group is
unique in their own way it’s the difference between comparison and relationality, ie. u can
analyse relations between people throughout history, but we get rid of the formal metrics (ie.
instead of giving measurement of opp, this event makes u this much closer to in group. We
instead recognize that while there may be a trend, the effect of events on memebers of an
assemblage are infinitly diverse.

**blurs distinction between groups in general

-we can analyse how oppression has effected certain people without creating a
 1NC – ROTB:
The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best challenges the politics
of recognition. Education grounded in majoritarian thought leads to a skewed
conception of the world.
Carlin and Wallin 14: [Carlin, Matthew. Wallin. Jason. “Deleuze and Guattari. Politics and
Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121]

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a

orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather,

certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does

a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank,
achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power

the subject
first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘

is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it , such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where
education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary
molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their
representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract

standardization of
essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the

education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the
stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an
abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per
se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for
unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii).
1NC – Case:
Framework:
Kant:
Policy-making:
 Overview:
Group all of their policy and materialism good arguments. They are all
predicated on the notion that LD has value to real world policy making and
decision making. However, by using fiat as their method to confront
oppression, they ignore the actions necessary to influence the passage and
implementation of the law. This turns case- they assume their skills are
portable, but they actually distort our view of politics thus making real world
change impossible.
Traber 1 Traber, Becca. “Fiat and Radical Politics by Becca Traber.” NSD Update, 17 Jan. 2018, nsdupdate.com/2018/fiat-and-
radical-politics-by-becca-traber/.

Fiat is structured such that the negative debater is unable to question the likelihood of
something happening as long as the aff debater defends the normal means of that
thing happening. This is a way of thinking that only makes sense if the only thing we are able to fiat is state legislative action. For all other forms of political action, there is no

we imagine congress
real way to separate normal means, passage of the “policy,” and effects of the “policy.” The ideal of state politics is such that

passes a bill and does so in a way that the content of the bill is separable from
the wheeling and dealing that allowed for it to be created . This is problematic as an assumption on its face—
implementation through the rest of the government is undeniably affected by the way the bill was argued and, indeed, the judicial branch often considers congressional intent
when evaluating a bill. Additionally, bills passed through congress typically are too vague to actually implement on their own and need a significant amount of bureaucratic
interpretation and adjustment through the executive branch in order to be implemented. But all that aside, there is at least a sensical way of separating the literal bill from the

If you are not advocating for the state, the separation between a
vote that got it passed.

policy and the means by which it is passed necessitated by fiat is impossible . What
policy was passed by the feminist movement? The movement was the advocacy and the actions taken by the feminist movement was the advocacy . The

“solvency” of collective action cannot be separated from the things that are
done in the collective action. This is true for all non-state actors who don’t have a formal parliamentary procedure. A community creating
institutions for itself typically doesn’t have strict bylaws which outline what normal means for change would be. This puts the kritikal debater in an impossible dilemma when
they are asked to fiat or implement some sort of policy. People who run these types of implementation arguments should stop pretending that the kritik they are arguing against
would be possible at all, in any meaningful way, if it were to fiat. There is no fair version of the kritik that is at all meaningfully similar to the kritik and there is no topical version

fiat in all cases functionally means that

of critical affs. The way we construct implementation and fiat in debate can only be thought as a state action. Insisting on

we cannot run arguments about politics outside the state without radically distorting the
nature of that politics. Many debaters assume that the only “practical” or “pragmatic” politics occur through the state. However, this is not the case.
Things like the feminist movements intervention on norms of sexual harassment are examples of politics outside the state. Collapsing the recent backlash to sexual harrasment
precipitated by Harvey Weinstein and others to possible state action ignores that the state could not possibly intervene in an adequate way to change those norms.

She continues:
The reality is that while radical and leftist politics occasional results in policy action , conceiving of it in terms of

policy action distorts the nature of that politics. If one were to set about with the goal of combating anti-blackness, as history has demonstrated, the first step

cannot be to try to be a policy maker. A politician with a radical advocacy cannot get
elected until that advocacy has enough support that people will vote for her. For instance, a politician who ran on
dismantling the United States or erasing all distinctions between animals and people to solve anthro would not have a constituency without a substantial social movement to
develop that constituency. This problem is inherent to any advocacy which significantly challenges status quo ideals. Things in the status quo are in the status quo because a lot
of people and powerful people agree with them. Before that can change more than incrementally, a lot of people have to change their mind. If you were to seriously consider
how to implement a strategy of radical politics, it would make no sense to have the first step be electoral. None of the major social movements were driven by
policy action— policies are driven by social movements . Fiating radical politics hides the radical politics entirely. Focusing on
policy actions, in this context, actively distorts how we should consider radical politics. Even if it were the case that we would eventually need policy actions to finally solve issues

Fiat erases the work necessary to allow for policy changes. It does not
of marginalization, that does not mean that we should start off with a question of fiat.

help us think about the movements we will have to create and the ways we will have to persuade. This
means that claims about the necessity of state action are besides the point– state action is only caused by a lot of non-state action that we have to think about first and that fiat
erases. The conceptual work that debaters often want to exclude by insisting of fiating policy is exactly the type of thing that radical politics does. Radical politics needs to
persuade and imagine new possibilities, first and foremost. Fiating away the process of change by which radical politics would be implemented makes irrational critical parts of
radical politics in the real world. A good example is the alternate social institutions implemented by Black nationalist organizations like the Black Panther Party. If we don’t have

In a world of
to consider the process of change, the benefit of having alternate institutions becomes significantly less. The types of benefit are different, as well .

fiat, the only benefit of creating an institution outside of the state would be
incidental to the immediate effects of the institution . Why develop free breakfast outside the school system
when we could just fiat free breakfast inside of it? The fact that it would not be possible in the immediate future to implement the breakfast in the school system or the state
and people need breakfast (or other help) right now should be relevant to the consideration of what political strategy to use. Fiat is a crutch that prevents us from seeing ways
we can intervene in our communities to create good things, right now, without relying on the vast institution of the state.
 AT Barma
1] No reason why policy is key to scenario analysis. Just says we have to analyse
the consequences of certain actions and ideas. Means the k is a form of
scenario analysis in so far as we analyse what the world of the alt and the aff
look like.
2] Traber turns your internal link. Even if we get some for of scenario analysis,
its always in context of a fantasy world and can never be applied to real world
politics.
 AT Zanotti
1] You miss tag it. It only claims that we should analyse specifc instances of
state oppression and domination but not that we should literally pretend ot be
the state and accept its flaws.
2] We solve. We anchor the state as the focal point of our critical analysis and
look at specific ways in which it has expanded its structures of domination (eg.
This aff)
3] Even if its inevitable, that doesn’t mean we have to engage with it
nevertheless endorse it. Empirically proven by out of state movements such as
the black panthers.
 AT Giroux
1] Never justifies statism. It just says we have to engage with dominant
institutions which our alt does.
2] TURN. It says that radical politics is key to combating right wing narratives
which is exactly what our K does. Absent that you get people like Ted Cruz who
pursue dangerous political agendas.
 AT Bryant
1] Just says critique without solution is bad. We have an alt that solves our links
so the DA doesn’t link.
2] Our alt is not abstract. We just call for a paradigm of engaging in the
multiplicity in the world. Real examples include black panthers who rejected
homogenizing naratives and embraced their own deviancy.
3] We don’t abstract. In so far as all relations are contextualized as affect, our K
just describes the world meaning its material. Also affect theory specifically
deals with the physical relations in the world that are experienced meaning we
don’t abstract.
 AT Coverstone
1] Empirically denied. While some form of power is inevitable, our current
political language is not. For example China changed its political language 3
times within one century.
2] Assumes debate applies to real world policy (cross apply Traber)
3] Our alt is a form of engagement with politics. Champion ideas is the first step
towards pragmatic change. Ie. the Civil Rights Movement required challenging
racism before it could even get support for policies. Outweighs because it’s a
pre-req to real policies.
2NR – XT:
Extensions [Oppression]:
 Thesis:
Here’s the thesis of the kritik—
 Link:
Saldanha 7—Oppression and formation of hierchies is fundamentally
multifaceted and arise from a variety of factors. Thus the aff’s starting point of
reducing all oppression to a question of inclusion and exclusion the attempts to
erase the inherent diversity in the oppressed experience and pin their identity
in relation to their ideal in group. However, their politics of inclusion has
historically been used to justify forms of oppression.
Implication:
A] Their aff has no solvency. In so far as they have conceded that oppression is
multifaceted and arises from a variety of factors, their attempt to categorize
the oppressed identity ultimate fails as it is impossible to reduce all oppression
to one factor.
Also means they don’t solve by claiming to include everyone since inclusion of
everyone is inherently impossible due to our radical differences.
B] Is terminal defense on the aff’s method. Oppressive hierarchies operate
through the paradigm of inclusion since by creating a universal ideal, they can
thus oppress people who they believe do not fit that ideal. Implication is that
you default to our method regardless of whatever disads they win since its
functionally try or die.
 Impact:
Extend Evans 10. Since their goal is complete inclusion and peace, their method
thus justifies violence and destruction in order to achieve it since their goal is so
universally beneficial. However they can never achieve their goal of full
inclusion so their method instead just devolves to endless violence against
those they deem deviant.
Additionally, their method of inclusion justifies creating a threshold for what
counts as valuable life since their method only deems people valuable if they
are able to be included. This justifies the complete dehumanization of the out
group and thus the annihilation of it.
Outweighs Case.
A] Cyclical harms. Their method justifies infinite war and oppression to achieve
their goal. Outweighs on longevity because even if their aff is good in this case,
their method justifies further violence in the future.
B] Epistemic indict. In so far as they dehumanize those who are deemed
deviant, they can never achieve their goal of full inclusion since those deviant
bodies wont even be considered in their decision making calculus.
 Alt:
Extend McCormick 09. We advocate for actuality ecology where we decenter
ourselves from forms of thought like the politics of inclusion by embracing our
inherent deviance and dissolving the notion of a unified identity. Ie. instead of
saying [X] factor is what makes a person human or [X] group we instead
embrace the inherent diversity within those groups or assemblages and
recognize that while there may be trends withing these groups, every member
of said group is infinitly diverse in their own sense and overlap infinitely with
other relationships with the world. Solves majoritarian modes of thinking since
we dismantle the notion that our value can be pinned in relation to a certain
characteristic or event by recognizing that our identity is constituted by all of
our unique relationships and interactions.
 ROB:
Extend Carlin and Wallin 14. Current forms of pedagogy are geared towards
creating seperate social categories among us. This is because current systems of
education stem from institutions premised off order and thus those systems
will always use education as a tool to promote the static categories that affirm
the system in the first place. A good example of this is public education where
the state teaches us that we are primarily citizens and that our other
relationships come secondary which in turn makes sure that the state’s notion
of the ideal citizen and grouping people in relation to it is sustained.
Implication is that if I win a single link into the affirmative you automatically
default negative since if the aff is a form of majoritarian thinking, it is
epistemically suspect as current education deliberately promotes that idea and
actively cracks down on deviance from it meaning that A] their justifications for
it are products of institutional manipulation of our ideas so it should be
distrusted and B] its impossible to properly invest the validity of their claims in
a pedagogical setting since it is inherently geared towards making their claims
of identity seem right.
Extensions [vs FWK]
 Link:
Extend Arnott—subjects are unstable and multifaceted in their constitution
since moral decision-making is affected by various factors such as reason,
phenomenology, instincts etc. However, having a universal subject demands
some form of uniformity and continuity amongst our subject formation and
moral decision making since it demands that certain characteristics are inherent
and primary in our decision making.
Implication:
A] Reject their framework. In so far as it misconceives how moral decision and
the subject is made it is thus false since its based off of the false assumption
that there is such thing as an a priori subject with inherent characteristics.
B] Means they can’t use framework to turn the K. In so far as our method
necessitates a multifaceted and unstable subject, their ethical theory is thus
incoherent within our method and thus cannot be applied. Also takes out any
perms since our methods are fundamentally incompatible.
C] Means their framework is epistemically suspect since their starting point
shuts us off from theorizing about the various factors that effect subjectivity by
asserting that only one (ie. reason) is relevant. Thus, their aff is wrong on face
since they actively prevents us from evaluating what the subject even is.
 Impact:
Extend Evans 10. In so far as their moral theory is only relevant to the universal
ideal they’ve created, they justify violence and moral exclusion against those
who they deem as deviant from that norm. Don’t let them say that their
framework is uniquely inclusionary since by reducing the subject to a core
characteristic, they thus redefine the threshold of what counts as valuable and
Outweighs case on epistemology. They dehumanize people who are deviant
from their universal ideal, thus their theory is always geared towards affirming
itself as everyone who differs or challenges it is not even considered.
 Alt:
Extend McCormick 09. We advocate for actuality ecology where we decenter
ourselves from universal ideals and embrace the unstable and multifaceted
nature of our moral actions. We do this by recognizing that each individual
within a group or assemblage is radically diverse in the way they interact with
the world and is thus unique in their composition. This solves since we no
longer have a sense of a universal ideal since we recognize that our difference
makes a universal ideal impossible in the first place.
 2nr Explanation Overview
Inclusion
The aff is a form of majoritarian logic that pins the oppressed’s identity in
relation to their conception of (x group). This however ignores the intricate
ways oppression is made and its multifaceted impact on people. What this does
is that it recreates the oppression they seek to solve since they justify violence
against those they deem deviant from the ideal. This is inevitable
2n Overview
ROTB Epistemic Framing
Explain Methods K debate
-ie. sub offense don’t matter cuz its q about starting point not what the res does
and stuff
-even so if they concede impact explain how impact is terminal D to their aff
since their case doesn’t achieve their impact.
Old / WIP:
 Lin Saldanha:
The aff’s politics of inclusion is a mode of homogenization and a product of the
facial machine.
Saldanha 07: [“Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” Arun Saldanha,
2007]
My disagreement is not with Fanon’s and Martín Alcoff’s insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of
recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treats white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally
opposed entities. There is, then, little attention is paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant, that is, how racial
formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the
spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope.
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari strongly distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis. First of all, for them, it isn’t consciousness but an abstract

machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power . And second, faciality and constantly
invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though
binarization can be an important effect). That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. ¶ Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality’s
imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different pheno- types, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality ¶
originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of

contemporary racism: ¶ If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances , the first
divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the white wall of
signification, distributed by the black hole of subjectivity. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim
has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is
grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-

Man face, which endeavors to integrates nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes
tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s ¶ a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a

, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who
Negro, it’s a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism

should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.5 ¶ For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the out- side.” Locals,
domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it
will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would
place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical
monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeon- holed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to

the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—more or less. It would seem to me that to understand the
intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is
preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is
included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the
global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our
“post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihila- tion of the other, but on subtle machinic
differentiations and territorial- izations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies
interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.