1

Interp – the aff must inform the neg of all changes to the affirmative standard
or plan text.
Violation—screenshot in the doc – the plan text was military aid – clear in cx
that they made a typo

1. Justifies changing whole aff and saying it’s the same – decks neg prep –
couldn’t answer the aff
2. Wrecks ed – have to do entirely new prep during 1nc like I did – prepped for
military aid

Fairness ow

a. testing

b. new strat = wasn’t planning to answer the spikes bc I had a mil aid spec strat that made irrev

c. deter – future rounds

d. norming – still affect future rds

e. just hack against you

 2
Interpretation – debaters must disclose pre-emptive arguments that have been
read in their 1AC in previous rounds on the NDCA LD 2019-20 wiki at least 30
minutes before the round.
Violation –
1. I asked him and he refused – lying is a voting issue because we can’t trust anything you said
anymore. He told me

2. I inserted a screenshot – if you can’t see it ask me after the debate. There is ZERO way this aff
was just this – it is way too short to be a full 1AC. Spirit over text – its key to check actual abuse
rather than debating silly I meets and you should use your discretion as an educator to check
abusive practices.

Standards –
1] Accessibility – spikes are exclusionary to kids with learning disabilities.
Thompson 15 (Marshall, former circuit debater and current judge.), “Musings on Debate.” NSD, PDT, VBI., April 21, 2015
evaluating who is the better debater via who dropped spikes excludes lots of specific
First, I think that

individuals, especially those with learning disabilities. I have both moderate dyslexia and
extreme dysgraphia.  Despite debating for four years with a lot of success I was never able to
deal with spikes. I could not ‘mind-sweep’ because my flow was not clear enough to find the
arguments I needed, and I was simply too slow a reader to be able to reread through the
relevant parts of a case during prep-time. I was very lucky, my junior year (which was the first year I really competed on the national circuit) spikes were remarkably uncommon. Looking back it

I am confident in saying that if spikes

was in many ways the low-point for spike. They started to be used some my senior year but not anything like the extent they are used today. entirely , however,
had had anywhere near the same prevalence when I started doing ‘circuit’ debate as they do
now, I—with the specific ways that dyslexia/dysgraphia has affected me —would never have
bothered to try to debate national circuit LD (I don’t intend to imply this is the same for anyone who has dyslexia or dysgraphia, the particular ways that learning disabilities manifest is
often difficult to track).

They should have time to write out answers to your spikes.

You cannot vote aff if their practices were exclusionary – your primary role as
an educator is to keep debate safe for all students.
Strake Jesuit All Star Online Invitational
(https://www.tabroom.com/index/tourn/index.mhtml?tourn_id=15972)

Adults: The purpose of your competing is for fun and for the education of students. Your first priority should be
making sure that the rounds are safe and educational for the students you debate (and the students who
are judging you). Any behavior that intimidates or harasses a student (or in any other way makes them uncomfortable), including but
not limited to sexual harassment or other such comments, is absolutely unacceptable. This also extends to in round behavior - any
cross x or speech practices that would upset the student or make the round uneducational will not be permitted. As an adult in the
community, your primary responsibility is the wellbeing of the students.

2] Reciprocity – the pre-emptive arguments I read are on my wiki.

3] Depth – incentivizes putting in blips at top speed to assure we waste all of
our prep and can’t talk about the topic or moral phil – ow because you wont
use evaluate the debate after the 1AR in the real world.

Crossapply the voter from the last shell

 3
Non-contradiction collapses to universizability since if reasons can’t be
contradictory they must be universal. They haven’t justified theoretical reasons
– practical reasons outweighs:
1. The resolution is an ought statement about what action we ought take –
practical reasons concern acts for ends, and are thus the locus of moral
reasoning/action.
2. Action theory – only practical reason explains it.
Stephen Engstrom 08 – professor of phil at university of Pittsburgh; before coming to the University of Pittsburgh
in 1990, he taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard, and since joining the Department he has held visiting
positions at UCLA, the University of Leipzig, and the University of Chicago; “Universal Legislation As the Form of
Practical Knowledge”. Academia.edu, 2008)

Kant holds that to set something as one’s end is to represent it in practical judgment as one’s effect,
or, in other words, to represent oneself as its cause: “an end”, he says, “is the object of a concept, so far as the latter is regarded as
the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility)” (KU 220; cf. MS 384). Thus the act of practical representation that constitutes

the setting of an object as an end essentially includes an understanding of itself as the cause whereby that

object is to be brought about. It’s therefore essential to an end that to will something as one’s end is to regard oneself, in one’s
representation of that end, as the cause that, through that same representation, is to realize it. Hence every representation of an

end—and so every maxim15—contains two components: (i) the representation of the object, and (ii) the
representation of the relation of causal dependency in which that object stands to the subject,
as the latter’s effect, or (what comes to the same thing) the representation of the subject’s causal sufficiency in respect of the object, that is, the

sufficiency of the subject’s action to produce it. And since what is represented in cognition must
correspond to the cognition of it, to these two components in the representation of an end there must correspond two components in
the end itself.

Action theory outweighs – absent being able to coherently explain an act, you
can never deem an act moral or immoral.
Contention –
Contention –
1. There’s nothing intrinsic to nukes that makes them coercive – only the results
of their use, which is not intrinsic to the structure of arsenals themselves –
means A. there’s no proactive obligation to eliminate them and B. prohibiting
them is an active instance of coercion because nukes aren’t intrinsically violent.
2. States have a de-facto to right to self defense by any means necessary –
prohibiting all of a particular nuke without regard to how it is used violates that
right.
Doyle 10 Thomas Doyle [Associate Professor in Department of Political Science at Texas States
University, Ph.D. from University of California, IrvineThomas Doyle’s research focus is in the field
of nuclear ethics. His recently published book is titled The Ethics of Nuclear Weapons
Dissemination: Moral Dilemmas of Aspiration, Avoidance, and Prevention (Routledge, 2015). He
has authored several articles which have appeared in journals such as Ethics and International
Affairs, Ethics and Global Politics, Journal of Military Ethics, International Theory, and Journal of
International Political Theory. Doyle has also contributed short opinion pieces on nuclear ethics
in the mainstream media. One is found on the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog and is
titled “The Iranian Nuclear Controversy is also about saving face.” Another is found on the
Brookings Institution Lawfare blog and is titled “The Foreign Policy Essay: Moral Values and the
Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons.” Doyle teaches courses on international security, international
organization, the politics of nuclear weapons, and introduction to international studies. He is a
member of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies
Association], 2010, "Kantian Nonideal Theory and Nuclear Proliferation," International Theory 2,
https://philarchive.org/rec/DOYKNT // ash

a state’s right to go to war entails the right to threaten to go to war. It follows

As I read Kant, that , first of all,

officials have the right to form the corresponding intentions necessary to wage or threaten war.
Second, they have the right to acquire the armaments needed for warfare or for making their
threats credible . But, living in the 18th century, Kant could not have conceived that states would become capable of creating, stockpiling, or using nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to the kind of aggression experienced in the 20th

if it can be shown that Kantian nonideal theory permits nuclear deterrence under
and 21st centuries. Yet,

certain conditions, the prima facie right to acquire nuclear weapons can also be shown. To make the
following discussion appropriately general and yet applicable to contemporary cases (e.g. Iran), I shall refer to two hypothetical states that coexist in the kind of anarchy that corresponds to today’s international system. Let us call them ‘Aspirant’ and ‘Rival’. Aspirant
is a nuclear threshold state in a ‘troubled’ or insecure region and Rival is their antagonist that also has nuclear weapons aspirations (e.g. Syria), actually has nuclear weapons (e.g. the United States), or is allied with an economically developed and nuclear-armed state
(e.g. Israel). For our purposes, Aspirant and Rival are signatories to the NPT. Admittedly, Aspirant’s pursuit of nuclear weapons by itself says nothing explicitly about their intentions. But this does not mean that Aspirant’s intentions are entirely opaque, especially if
their pursuits are accompanied by publicly advanced reasons or threats against Rival. A valid Kantian assessment of Aspirant’s nuclear pursuits therefore depends a great deal (but not exclusively) on the intentions that motivate their deterrence threats against Rival.
It is important at this point to distinguish two kinds of target for Aspirant’s deterrent threats: Rival’s military centers and government/ population centers. It is equally important to distinguish two kinds of corresponding intentions: an intention to carry out the threat
should deterrence fail and one to never carry out the threat. Table 1 depicts the conceptual territory of targets and intentions: Each number in Table 1 specifies a policy option for Aspirant that pairs a threat target with a threat intention. Option (1) pairs the reprisal
threat against military centers with the intention to carry it out if deterrence fails. Option (2) pairs the threat against military centers with the intention to never carry it out. Option (3) pairs the threat against population/ government centers with the intention never
to carry out the threat. And option (4) pairs the threat against population/government centers with the intention to carry it out. One should note that Table 1 does not relate a game theoretic matrix of choices with associated payoffs. Its purpose is to map the range
of policy options available to Aspirant. Specifically, Aspirant can undertake any of the four options individually or a limited set of combined options: (1) and (4), (2) and (3), or (2) and (4). Two combined options – (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) – are excluded inasmuch as
they are contradictory and could not be implemented at the same time. And, one combined option – (1) and (3) – is equivalent to (1) only. Now, an intention to carry out nuclear deterrent threats in the context of deterrence failure is an intention to engage in
nuclear war. Analysis of this category obviates the need to apply the Kantian view on lying in self defense, since Aspirant means to make good on retaliatory threats. Let us evaluate the only three options. The first is Aspirant’s policy to carry out deterrent threats on
military and population/government centers. This choice is tantamount to desiring Rival’s annihilation, which violates the doctrine of right (MM, 6: 235) as well as the nonideal proscriptions against enmity and vengeance in LE. On Kantian terms, the Formula of
Universal Law would not pass any maxim that corresponds to a policy of comprehensive nuclear reprisal. To see why, let us assess two varied formulations. One might be called a maxim of overkill: ‘In all instances of nuclear deterrence failure, the victim of
aggression must retaliate by means of nuclear strikes against the aggressor’s military, political, and population centers’. This maxim is easily rejected, for it is the clearest case of state annihilation, that Kant prohibits absolutely. However, it might be compared to a
maxim of strict nuclear reciprocity: ‘In all instances of nuclear first strikes, it is the duty of the victim to retaliate in kind’. One of the most challenging cases would be where Aspirant suffers a nuclear first strike on one military center and one industrial center. The
maxim dictates that the retaliatory nuclear strike must hit one of Rival’s military and industrial centers. In many cases, acting on this maxim falls significantly short of state annihilation, even though it probably involves high levels of civilian casualties. It might even
promote the re-establishment of deterrence in as much as it reinforces the expectation that nuclear escalation will be punished and de-escalation will be rewarded (Gauthier, 1984). However, a Kantian assessment of this maxim is largely independent of these
consequentialist concerns. Recall that the Formula of Universal Law draws an uncompromising bottom line where even Rival’s wrongdoing cannot justify Aspirant’s maxim of strict nuclear reciprocity. The indiscriminate destruction of human life, even when Aspirant
and Rival destroy only one military and industrial center apiece, cannot be willed as a universal law of nature. And if Aspirant really intended to allow strict nuclear reciprocity only for themselves and no one else, such partiality cannot be reconciled with the Formula

to carry
of Universal Law’s requirement to transform a maxim into a law that obligates all relevant actors. The same analysis applies to any policy of carrying out deterrent threats solely against population/government centers. However, for Aspirant

out deterrent threats solely against military centers seems prima facie consistent with Kant’s
view on the right of national defense Once , and it parallels some applications of just war theory on the problem of limited nuclear warfighting (Ramsey, 1962; Orend, 2000).

acquired, a lowyield nuclear device might annihilate one or more of Rival’s army divisions, naval
task forces, or air-force bases, its capacity to continue to aggress. More importantly, a
severely crippling

maxim that corresponds to this intention appears to pass the universality test. Aspirant could in
principle assent to a rule that permits all nuclear-armed states to threaten and carry out
exclusively counterforce nuclear reprisals, much in the same way that nationalist morality
permits all states to use conventional force in selfdefense .23 This isn’t to say that Rival can read off Aspirant’s intentions from its nuclear procurement behavior.

Aspirant’s maxim on this

And this is not to say that in the process of nuclear miniaturization required to produce these weapons that Aspirant might not retain its larger nuclear devices. It is to say, though, that

point can be imagined without formal contradiction . Moreover, were Aspirant to miniaturize its arsenal and then verifiably decommission or destroy its larger devices, Rival
might come to behave that Aspirant had abandoned any policy of mutually assured destruction in favor of a policy of severely limited counterforce warfare. There are, however, significant constraints on this nuclear defense right. Intending to carry out threats
against counterforce targets would be impermissible on Kantian nonideal principles if they led to countervalue strikes or a counterforce escalation that entailed massive collateral damage. In conventional warfighting, the just-war doctrine of double effect permits
unintended and limited killing of noncombatants on grounds of military necessity. However, at some point an escalation of counterforce strikes cannot avoid ruining the surrounding eco-systems and in turn injuring or destroying innocent human life. It would then be
false to claim that Aspirant only intended to do good by undertaking counterforce strikes of this kind. It would also be false to claim these counterforce strikes were necessary evils, and that the goodness of the outcome made the cost of the counterforce strikes

Kantian theory suggests that choice to carry out deterrent

worth it (Orend, 2000: 164). Barring these prohibiting conditions, though, my reading of nonideal Aspirant’s

threats strictly against military centers of Rival is permissible Given the special nature of the .

nuclear threat environment, Kantian nonideal theory permits Aspirant to do all that is
consistent with the reciprocity corollary to defend itself if Aspirant truly faces a nuclear . And

threat from Rival, their NPT commitments do not clearly over-ride their national defense
obligations. Indeed, the inclusion of Article X into the NPT is evidence that states parties are already committed to this position. What of the other policy options? The most salient options are that Aspirant might levy deterrent threats against
Rival’s military or/and their government and population centers but never intend to actually strike any target or never intend to strike any population or government centers. The important practical difference between this set of possibilities and those already
considered is that Aspirant expresses a threat against both military and government/population centers. The important moral difference is that this latter set of options embodies the intent to deceive. What moral assessments now follow on the basis of Kant’s views

on lying in self-defense and the Formula of Universal Law? First, we recall that the purpose of lying to criminal aggressors is to deflect or avoid
aggression and that lying to liars or assailants is not an injustice to them. If, for instance, North Korea’s nuclear threats are bluffs, they nevertheless are regarded by some to have helped dissuade America (i.e. the Bush Administration) from
launching anticipatory military strikes against Pyonyang (Smith, 2006: Ch. 4). This kind of deterrent threat by itself then appears at first glance to be permissible within the bounds of reciprocity. That said, the lie told to the criminal aggressor in Kant’s example does
not include a threat of harm. In contrast, the promise of harm that the threat conveys – which is an attitude Aspirant intends to cultivate even though he does not actually intend to carry out the threat – activates Rival’s hostility and the corresponding difficulty in
trust building. Such threats are inconsistent with Kant’s nonideal Sixth Preliminary Article that proscribes acts of hostility ‘as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peacey’ (PP, 8: 346). In plain terms, a persuasive nuclear deterrent threat that
Aspirant secretly intends to never carry out still inflicts a determinate harm that mere deflection or avoidance of aggression does not, namely the construction of an existential insecurity in the threatened state and, to the extent the threat is made public, the

given the kind of anarchy that is in today’s world, it would be a

creation of existential fear among people that are ‘ends in themselves’.24 Still,

mistake to think that Kant would absolutely forbid the practice of using deception in nuclear
deterrent threats. Assuming that Rival previously uttered a credible existential threat to
Aspirant, and assuming that Aspirant is not an ally of a country with a nuclear umbrella of its
own, a nuclear deterrent lie told to Rival is not unjust, even if it generally increases the tendency
to not believe statements of this kind. A credible deterrent lie prevents or deflects aggression
without causing further injury. In the same fashion, the reciprocity corollary advanced in fourth Section

establishes the possibility that, given a world of nuclear-armed states that have already
instituted nuclear deterrent regimes and have made hostile threats of their own, Aspirant might
reasonably conclude that advancing persuasive nuclear deterrent lies is necessary for national
defense. to establish the credibility of those threats, it would be morally permissible for
And

Aspirant to acquire nuclear weapons even though the NPT forbids it.

3. Freedoms are merely provisional in the state of nature, in which unilateral

coercion rules – only the establishment of an omnilateral will can distribute
rights claims.
Korsgaard 8 (Christine, “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to
Revolution,” in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology)
Kant also believes that there is a sense in which we have rights in the state of nature. We have a natural right to our freedom (MPJ 6:237), and, Kant
thinks, the Universal Principle of Justice allows us to claim rights in land and, more generally, in external objects, in property. Kant argues that it would
be inconsistent with freedom to deny the possibility of property rights, on the grounds that unless we can claim rights to objects, those objects cannot
be used (MPJ 6:246).7 This would be a restriction on freedom not based in freedom itself, which we should therefore reject, and this leads us to
postulate that objects may be owned. But unlike Locke, Kant argues that in the state of nature these rights are only
“provisional” (MPJ 6:256). In this, Kant is partly following Rousseau. In contrast to Locke, Rousseau argues that rights are created by the social
contract, and, in a sense, relative to it. My possessions become my property , so far as you and I are concerned,

when you and I have given each other certain reciprocal guarantees : I will keep my hands off your possessions if
you will keep your hands off mine.8 Rights are not acquired by the metaphysical act of mixing one's labor

with the land, but instead are constructed from the human relations among people who have
made such agreements.9 Kant adopts this idea, at least as far as the executive authority (p.239) associated with a property right is
concerned. I may indeed coercively enforce my rights. But if my doing so is to be consistent with the

Universal Principle of Justice, it cannot be an act of unilateral coercion . To claim a right to a piece of property is
to make a kind of law; for it is to lay it down that all others must refrain from using the object or land in question without my permission. But to

view my claim as a law I must view it as the object of a contract between us , a contract in which
we reciprocally commit ourselves to guaranteeing each other's rights. It is this fact that leads us
to enter—or, more precisely, to view ourselves as already having entered— political society. In
making this argument, Kant evokes Rousseau's concept of the general will. He argues that a general will to the coercive

enforcement of the rights of all concerned is implicitly involved in every property claim . Now, with
respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of
freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—
is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed
by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine [that is, can be property] only in a civil society. (MPJ 6:256) It is
because the idea of the general will to the reciprocal enforcement of rights is implicit in any claim of right that Kant argues that rights in the state of
nature are only provisional. They are provisional because this general will has not yet been instituted by setting up a common authority to enforce
everyone's rights. The act that institutes the general will is the social contract. Kant concludes from this argument that when
the time
comes to enforce your rights coercively, in the state of nature, the only legitimate way to do
that is by joining in political society with those with whom you are in dispute . In fact, you enforce your right
by first forcing them to join in political society with you so that the dispute can be settled by reciprocal rather than unilateral coercion: If it must be de
jure possible to have an external object as one's own, then the
subject must also be allowed to compel everyone else
with whom he comes into conflict over the question of whether such an object is [theirs] to
enter, together with [them], a society under a civil constitution. (MPJ 6:256) Suppose we are in the
state of nature and we get into a dispute about rights . My goat has kids, and I take them to be mine because I was caring
for the (p.240) mother goat when they were born. However, one of them escaped, and you found it wandering around apparently unowned in the state
of nature, took possession of it, fed it and cared for it for many years. Now we have discovered the matter, and each of us thinks she has a right to this
particular goat. Since I think I have a right, I also think I may prosecute my right by coercive action. And you think the same. So what can we do?
Perhaps I have a gun and you do not, so I can simply take the goat away from you . However, there are
two ways to understand my action. One is: I am using unilateral force to take the goat away from you. Such an action would be illegitimate, a use of
violence which interferes with your freedom. Icannot regard my action as an enforcement of my right without
acknowledging that you have rights too, which also must be enforced . So if I am to claim that what I am doing is
enforcing my right, I must understand my own action differently. The other way to understand the action is that I am forcing you to enter

into political society with me. That gets us to the first step; the act of enforcing my right involves the establishment of a juridical
condition (rechtlicher Zustand) between us and so establishes civil society. The second step, of course, is to settle the particular dispute in question in
some lawful way.

States have the sovereign right to make war by any means necessary.
Thomas Hobbes 2 [Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, was an English philosopher who is considered one of the
founders of modern political philosophy]; Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth
Ecclesiasticall and Civill. By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Printed for Andrew Ckooke , at the Green Dragon in St.
Pauls Church-Yard, 1651.

Ninthly, is
annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and
Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces
are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses
thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union
of their strength under one command; which command the sover- eign instituted, therefore hath, because the command of the
militia, with- out other institution, maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore, whosoever is made general of an
army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.
 Case
Paragraph theory = irrev

1. Cant change what it means

2. Can embed random blips

3. CA competing interps