Bradley Lynn Coleman

Colombia and the United States
NEW STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mary Ann Heiss, editor
The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture
Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965
amy l. s. staples
Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance,

1939–1960
bradley lynn coleman
The Making of an
Inter-American Alliance,
1939–1960
Bradley Lynn Coleman
The Kent State University Press

Kent, Ohio
© 2008 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242
all rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 2007044972
isbn 978-0-87338-926-6
Manufactured in the United States of America
library of congress cataloging-in-publication data

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, 1973–
Colombia and the United States : the making of an inter-American alliance, 1939–1960 /
Bradley Lynn Coleman.
p. cm. — (New studies in U.S. foreign relations)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-87338-926-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) ∞
1. United States—Foreign relations—Colombia. 2. Colombia—Foreign relations—United
States. 3. United States—Military relations—Colombia. 4. Colombia—Military rela-
tions—United States. I. Title.
e183.8.c7c65 2008
327.730861—dc22 2007044972
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.
12 11 10 09 08 5 4 3 2 1
a mi esposa
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction: A Global History xiii
Maps and Illustrations xix
1 Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945 1
2 Old Problems, New Possibilities, 1945–1950 43
3 The Korean War and the Americas, 1950–1951 71
4 The Fighting Alliance, 1951–1953 97
5 Continuity and Change, 1953–1957 138
6 The Partnership Transformed, 1958–1960 171
Epilogue 199
Essay on Archival Research 205
List of Abbreviations 211
Notes 213
Bibliography 272
Index 294
Preface
In 1997 I decided to write a book about the Korean War, a comparative history of
small-country United Nations (UN) military forces. At the University of Georgia,
I planned a series of seminar papers, each covering a different UN member state.
The sum of those essays, I thought, would form my doctoral dissertation, the first
draft of my intended book. After some preliminary research, I started with the
Colombian Army in Korea. I discovered, in the process, the fascinating and large-
ly untold story of Colombia, Colombian-American cooperation, and U.S.–Latin
American relations during the Korean War. Over the years that followed, my in-
ternational history of the UN army drifted away from its concentration on Korea.
A 2001 trip to Bogotá, in particular, altered the direction of the work. This book,
therefore, is the unintended product of an unexpected journey. Its publication stirs
contradictory feelings within me, the author: pride, humility, and gratitude. It is
the most comprehensive account of U.S.-Colombian security relations published
to date. It contains useful information and analyses. Still, my ability to reconstruct
that past is necessarily limited. I am responsible for any errors in fact, interpreta-
tion, or presentation. Yet above all, I know that the entire undertaking would have
been impossible without the assistance of many individuals and institutions.
Larry Bland, Thomas Davis, and D. Clayton James devoted special attention to
my historical education at the Virginia Military Institute. At Temple University,
Richard Immerman and Russell Weigley nurtured my interest in military and
diplomatic history. William Stueck supervised my doctoral studies at the Univer-
sity of Georgia. Among his many generous acts, Professor Stueck diverted money
from his personal research fund to support my work in Colombia. Lester Lang-
ley taught me about the inter-American neighborhood. William Leary, Reinaldo
Román, and Thomas Whigham also made lasting intellectual impressions. Julie
Dyles cheerfully attended to all my interlibrary loan requests. David Bushnell,
James Henderson, Stephen Randall, Russell Ramsey, Dennis Rempe, César Torres
Del Río, and Álvaro Valencia Tovar helped me learn more about Colombia, its
armed forces, and its relationship with the United States.
The staffs of the Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá), Archivo de la Presi-
dencia de la República (Bogotá), Biblioteca Nacional (Bogotá), U.S. National Ar-
chives (College Park, Maryland), Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.), George
ix
x preface
C. Marshall Research Library (Lexington, Virginia), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presi-

dential Library (Hyde Park, New York), Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
(Independence, Missouri), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Abilene,
Kansas), Mariners’ Museum and Library (Newport News, Virginia), Dag Ham-
marskjöld Library (New York), U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washing-
ton, D.C.), U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), and
U.S. Naval Historical Center (Washington, D.C.) offered indispensable assistance
while I worked with their collections. The University of Georgia, Franklin & Elea-
nor Roosevelt Institute, George Mason University, and Virginia Military Institute
Foundation provided financial assistance.
Between 2001 and 2003 I served as a U.S. Army Central Identification Labora-
tory postdoctoral fellow, investigating the history of graves registration and forensic
anthropology. As part of the arrangement, the military supported my ongoing study
of U.S.-Colombian relations. I wrote first drafts of the chapters covering Colom-
bian-American cooperation from 1953 to 1960 during the fellowship. Without the
Central Identification Laboratory, this project might not have evolved into a book.
Later, in 2003, I joined a group of talented scholars at the Office of the Historian,
U.S. Department of State. They shared with me their diverse interests and insights;
they provided unfailing support when I most needed encouragement. In particu-
lar, Kristin Ahlberg, James Siekmeier, and James Van Hook read and commented
on the entire manuscript. As command historian, U.S. Southern Command, since
March 2007, I have enjoyed the company of the men and women responsible for
the development and implementation of U.S. military policy toward Latin America.
They have shown great interest in this book. Still, the views contained herein are my
own. They do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.
A portion of this manuscript appeared as “The Colombian Army in Korea,
1950–1954,” in the Journal of Military History (October 2005). I presented other
sections as papers at the U.S. Army Historians Conference (August 2002), Ameri-
can Historical Association Annual Conference (January 2006), and U.S. Army
Combat Studies Institute Symposium on Security Assistance (August 2006). Au-
dience members, editors, readers, and panelists offered valuable comments and
suggestions. They made this a better book.
In 2003 I sent an early version of this manuscript to Joanna Hildebrand Craig
and Mary Ann Heiss at Kent State University Press. They identified the project’s po-
tential, recommended substantive improvements, and oversaw major revisions. To-
gether with Christine Brooks, Mary Young, and others, they then turned my work
into a finished product. Throughout, the Kent State editors and staff had tremendous
faith in my abilities. I will always be grateful for what they have done on my behalf.
On a personal note, I owe a particular debt to Kenneth Lee Myers for his unique
support and friendship. Juana Maria Rubio Fernández provided extraordinary as-
sistance and hospitality during my time in Bogotá. S. L. Dowdy expertly produced
preface xi
the maps. Kirstin Julian helped me find the photograph of Vice President Richard
Nixon in Bogotá. Evan Ward offered keen insight into several important aspects
of this undertaking; Jack Walsh entertained me during my midnight coffee breaks
in Athens, Georgia. My parents, Lynn and Stevonna Coleman, taught me about
the importance of higher education. They suggested that I study business admin-
istration, but eventually warmed to history. In all aspects of my life, I depend on
the basic skills and values I learned from them.
Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Keri-Lyn Coleman, my wife
and best friend, to whom this book is dedicated. She has been an invaluable source
of advice and assistance. She has provided unconditional love and support. Our
relationship began at roughly the same time as I started this project. At every
stage, she accepted far too many inconveniences, always with grace and dignity. I
hope this book justifies her sacrifice.
Introduction: A Global History
World War II and the cold war transformed U.S.-Colombian security relations.
After decades of bilateral tension, the Western Hemisphere’s leading democracies,
Colombia and the United States, came together to defend the Americas during
World War II. Although Colombia contributed less to the Allied victory than some
other Latin American republics, Colombian-American cooperation promoted
hemispheric solidarity, inter-American military readiness, and regional stability.
Controversies surrounding economic development dominated U.S.–Latin Ameri-
can relations after 1945. Yet mounting Soviet-American competition encouraged
hemispheric military collaboration. During a time of Colombian domestic dis-
cord, culminating in the collapse of democratic practices, the two countries con-
verted wartime security measures into peacetime institutions. Then, Colombian
and U.S. servicemen formed a successful fighting alliance in Korea. A Colombian
infantry battalion and warship joined the U.S.-led UN Command in 1951. The only
Latin American country to serve with the UN coalition, Colombia demonstrated
to the United States its reliability in the campaign against international commu-
nism, setting the scene for greater postwar bilateral cooperation. Between 1953 and
1957, the two governments gradually shed their conventional defense affiliation in
favor of a partnership designed to promote Colombian tranquility. Finally, in 1959,
U.S. authorities dispatched a Special Survey Team to evaluate Colombia’s internal
security situation. The group’s final report, the resurgence of Colombian democ-
racy, Washington’s heightened appreciation for Latin American insecurity follow-
ing the 1959 Cuban Revolution, and some intense Colombian lobbying completed
the remodeling of the bilateral relationship. By 1960 the two countries had formed
the basis of the modern internal security partnership.
This book examines the making of the Colombian-American alliance from 1939
to 1960, describing and analyzing bilateral cooperation as a dynamic multinational
experience. While Colombia lacked the strength of the industrialized countries, it
played a prominent role in collective security matters during World War II, the Ko-
rean War, and the 1956 Suez crisis. For that reason, the republic’s security relation-
ship with the United States is an ideal subject for a truly global history. Throughout
xiii
xiv introduction
Political Map of Colombia
this study, comparative vignettes complement the international approach. Com-

bining military and diplomatic history, it explores U.S.–Latin American relations,
multinational coalitions, and international conflict through the intensive exami-
nation of U.S.-Colombian cooperation. Also, since Colombian and U.S. officials
frequently connected hemispheric defense with Latin American internal stability,
domestic law enforcement, and modernization, this study pursues a broad defini-
tion of security relations. By extension, it devotes attention to Colombian national
history, particularly the intense political, social, economic, and religious convul-
a global history xv
sion known as la Violencia (1946–58). Employing multi-archival international re-

search and making use of available Colombian sources, this book de-centers the
great-power competition for Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In doing so, it
exposes the North-South implications of two subjects, World War II and the cold
war, which are traditionally studied on an East-West axis.
Overall, historians have devoted little attention to U.S.-Colombian relations.
They consistently produce insightful work on the major World War II and cold
war combatants while neglecting small countries such as Colombia. Some promi-
nent writers have examined U.S.–Latin American relations, and their publications
reflect scholarly trends relevant to this topic. Early historians of U.S. foreign rela-
tions, including Samuel Flagg Bemis, looked to hemispheric affairs to celebrate
American exceptionalism. During the 1970s and 1980s, revisionist scholars like
William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber found evidence of American
economic imperialism in U.S. relations with its southern neighbors. Recently,
Lester Langley and others have utilized cultural approaches and Latin American
sources to write innovative histories. In doing so, they present a more complicat-
ed, and vastly more interesting, account of inter-American relations. Colombia,
however, rarely appears in these histories. Scholars are often discouraged by the
complexity of the Colombian experience, its apparent inconstancy with broader
currents in Latin American history, and the relative scarcity of Colombian archi-
val sources. For these reasons, David Bushnell wrote in 1993, “Colombia is today
the least studied of the major Latin American countries, and probably the least
understood.”1 Bushnell’s observation is still valid.
As for Colombian-American security matters, English-language historians are
largely silent. The classic study, Colombia and the United States, 1765–1934 (1935), by
E. Taylor Parks, does not reach the outbreak of World War II.2 The only compre-
hensive treatment of bilateral relations, Stephen Randall’s Colombia and the United
States: Hegemony and Interdependence (1992), provides only cursory coverage of
military affairs.3 Bushnell looks at U.S.-Colombian relations during the Second
World War, although his narrative ends in 1942.4 The English-language literature
on Colombia and the Korean War includes only three articles and four master’s
theses.5 Dennis Rempe’s pioneering research examines Colombian-American af-
fairs between 1958 and 1960, albeit in ways unconnected to the World War II and
Korean War alliance.6 Collectively, these works, while admirable, present an in-
complete account of the Colombian-American partnership.
Spanish-language literature does not remedy this deficiency. In Colombia, tal-
ented scholars have focused on pressing economic, political, and social questions
to the detriment of military and diplomatic history. Indeed, la Violencia generates
far more literature than corresponding developments in Colombian foreign rela-
tions; most researchers ignore the Colombian military because of its historically
minor domestic political role.7 The 1940s and 1950s are chronically understudied
xvi introduction
for another logical reason: the Colombian archives contain few sources from the
years of conservative rule, 1946 to 1957. Still, several authors address germane issues.
Any study of the Colombian military begins with the collected works of General
Álvaro Valencia Tovar, particularly his six-volume Historia de las fuerzas militares
de Colombia (1993).8 Gonzalo Sánchez and César Torres Del Río offer impressive
accounts of twentieth-century Colombian national security policy.9 Álvaro Tirado
Mejía examines Colombian diplomacy in various international forums.10 Official
histories and nationalistic memoirs document Colombia’s experience in Korea.11
But none of these works systematically explores Colombian-American cooperation
or Colombia’s foreign military relations. Those writers (whether in Spanish or Eng-
lish) who cover related topics too often portray the United States as a hegemonic
power, fail to account for ideological variables, overlook domestic influences on for-
eign affairs, and disregard the multilateral dimensions of the bilateral partnership.
Recognizing these shortcomings, this global history of U.S.-Colombian rela-
tions concentrates on six major ideas. First, the Colombian-American alliance
developed in a truly international setting. Rather than a simple bilateral affair, it
must therefore be presented as a multinational event. Second, compatible values
allowed the two countries to capitalize on shared opportunities. Colombia and
the United States formed a broad-based partnership rooted in ideas such as de-
mocracy, liberty, Christianity, anticommunism, multilateralism, inter-American
solidarity, and collective security. Third, beyond ideology, material incentives and
self-interest stimulated Colombian-American cooperation. Colombian and U.S.
officials wanted to create in Colombia a prosperous and secure republic. Fourth,
internal affairs invariably shaped foreign relations. Importantly, la Violencia heav-
ily influenced Colombian-American relations. Fifth, Colombians, not Americans,
most often determined the conditions and pace of bilateral cooperation. Colom-
bia was not a pawn of the more powerful United States. Finally, Colombia lay in
a zone of transition between the areas of greatest U.S. influence in the Caribbean
and Central America and the more distant neighbors of South America’s southern
cone. Rooted in the geography of the inter-American neighborhood, a mixture of
independence and interdependence characterized U.S.-Colombian relations dur-
ing World War II and the cold war.
Organized chronologically, this book covers six distinct periods. The first
chapter examines the formation of the bilateral hemispheric defense partnership
during World War II. Geopolitical, ideological, pragmatic, and political forces
brought the two countries together; they simultaneously limited Colombia’s war-
time involvement. The second chapter shows how the republics carried their con-
ventional partnership into the immediate postwar era, 1945 to 1950. Colombia’s
rising domestic turmoil overshadowed larger hemispheric economic disagree-
ments and inspired U.S.-Colombian cooperation. Chapter 3 explores Latin Amer-
ica’s response to the Korean War, U.S. efforts to convince Latin American govern-
a global history xvii
ments to dispatch troops, and Colombia’s decision to defend South Korea. The
only Latin American country willing and able to fight, Colombia’s contribution
assumed heightened significance in the face of regional inaction. The next chap-
ter follows the Colombian armed forces through the Korean War. The preexist-
ing U.S.-Colombian military affiliation gave Colombian forces a major advantage
over other small-nation units in Korea. The successful fighting alliance kept the
two countries connected during a time when Colombian domestic unrest might
have pulled the countries apart. Chapter 5 investigates continuity and change in
Colombian-American relations from 1953 to 1957. Officials remained interested in
collective defense, illustrated by Colombia’s involvement in Middle Eastern peace-
keeping. But American assistance followed the needs of the Colombian military,
which began accepting new domestic responsibilities during that time. The final
chapter evaluates the conversion of the Colombian-American partnership into
a full-fledged internal security alliance between 1958 and 1960. A confluence of
extraordinary national and international events altered the direction of the U.S.-
Colombian security alliance. A short epilogue returns to the book’s organizing
themes and links this study to contemporary issues.
Today, U.S. involvement in Bogotá’s campaign against leftist insurgents, right
wing paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers has attracted considerable attention. In
2000 the U.S. government pledged $1.7 billion in military assistance to support Co-
lombian president Andrés Pastrana Arango’s (1998–2002) ambitious state-building
program, Plan Colombia. At that time, U.S. president William J. Clinton (1993–2001)
and the U.S. Congress limited American military aid to counter-narcotics opera-
tions. The United States relaxed these restrictions after the September 2001 al
Qaeda terrorist attacks. In August 2002 President George W. Bush (2001–) formally
approved Colombia’s use of U.S. assistance to combat insurgent and paramilitary
groups the U.S. Department of State deemed terrorist organizations. As part of the
arrangement, American special forces moved into Colombia, where they are now
involved in nearly every aspect of Colombian domestic security.12 These develop-
ments have stirred a lively debate over American involvement in Colombian inter-
nal affairs. Regrettably, that discussion has been conducted in an ahistorical fashion
that leaves many with the impression that Colombian-American cooperation is a
recent occurrence. In fact, as this study shows, the current partnership began during
World War II.13
Maps and Illustrations
Political Map of Colombia xvi

The Colombian destroyer ARC Antioquia in the Panama Canal, 1934 6
President Eduardo Santos (1938–42) 8
Political Map of the Western Hemisphere, 1939 10
Presidents Alfonso López (1934–38, 1942–45) and Franklin D.
Roosevelt (1933–45) 14
Latin American military leaders with General George C. Marshall, 1940 17
Colombian military pilots in the United States, 1942 28
U.S. Army Lend-Lease motor vehicles outside Bogotá, 1943 30
U.S. diplomats at the Bogotá Conference, 1948 54
The nueve de abril in Bogotá, 1948 56
Secretary of State Dean Acheson with Colombian ambassador
Gonzalo Restrepo 60
Map of the Korean Conflict, 1950–51 73
Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta (1949–55) 81
President Laureano Gómez (1950–53) 87
Colombian sailors in Hawaii, March 1951 99
Map of the 8th U.S. Army Advance, 1951 112
Colombian infantrymen defend a ridge in central Korea, 1951 115
Colombian troops fire at an enemy position, 1951 116
Colombia Battalion Headquarters Company, 1951 117
President Harry S. Truman (1945–53) 125
Colombian troops at Port Said, Egypt, 1956 145
Map of the UN Emergency Force, 1957 147
Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 149
Vice President Richard Nixon in Bogotá, 1958 173
Presidents Alberto Lleras (1945–46, 1958–62) and Dwight D.
Eisenhower (1953–61), 1960 196
xix
1
Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945
In 1938 U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered three U.S. Army bombers to
Colombia. The airplanes and crew, a U.S. government spokesman said, symbolized
“the solidarity and community of interest between the two republics” during the
inauguration of Colombian president Eduardo Santos.1 The B-17s landed at Techo
Airport outside Bogotá around 11:00 a.m. on 5 August. They taxied across the
field before parking near the airport terminal. A huge crowd of spectators cheered
when the flight commander, Major Vincent J. Maloy, and his men jumped down
from the “flying fortresses.” Over the days that followed, the aviators mixed with
hundreds of Colombian citizens, servicemen, and elected officials. They attended
formal and informal events, including a bullfight with the mayor of Bogotá. The
uniformed Americans inspired “great popular enthusiasm” at cocktail parties and
state socials.2 On 7 August, after the inauguration, President Santos thanked the
U.S. flyers for coming to the ceremony. The president then delivered a proposal
to special U.S. envoy Jefferson Caffery, also in Bogotá for the inauguration. Im-
pressed by the airmen, Santos asked if the United States would send military ad-
visers to Colombia. American training missions, Santos reasoned, would improve
Colombian military capabilities and promote bilateral cooperation during a time
of international insecurity. Delighted by the proposition, Ambassador Caffery re-
layed the invitation to Washington that night.3 The first U.S. advisers arrived in
Colombia just five months later.
The Santos overture launched the Colombian-American security partnership.
During World War II, Colombia and the United States designed and implemented
a program of bilateral cooperation that included conventional security and coun-
terespionage measures. The republics also collaborated on a variety of pressing
diplomatic and economic matters. Together, these activities promoted regional
tranquility, secured the Panama Canal, stabilized Colombia, and encouraged Co-
lombian state-building. The country’s wartime contribution, combined with the
efforts of the other Latin American republics, allowed the United States to focus
1
2 colombia and the united states
on overseas operations. Latin Americans advanced the Allied cause by protecting

Washington’s southern flank. Within this larger hemispheric effort, shared values,
geographic proximity, and Colombian internal affairs shaped the U.S.-Colombian
alliance. World War II, in turn, promoted the integration of U.S. and Colombian
institutions with important long-term political, economic, and military conse-
quences. Opening an era of concentrated bilateral cooperation, the global con-
flict produced a system of Colombian-American cooperation that made future
undertakings feasible. It likewise represented a major departure from the years of
controversy preceding the war.
The Republics before World War II
The Colombian-American relationship began before World War II and produced

a burst of conflict, but it also revealed the possibility for successful collaboration.
U.S. political and social philosophers inspired Latin American revolutionaries dur-
ing the early 1800s. American merchants smuggled military equipment to armies
fighting Spanish rule. In 1822 U.S. diplomats formally recognized Gran Colom-
bia (now Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), the first Latin American
state acknowledged by the United States. Although Britain then dominated Latin
American markets, Colombia and the United States signed their first trade agree-
ment in 1826. The volume of Colombian-American commerce thereafter exceeded
expectations in both countries. Around the same time, Colombian officials ac-
cepted U.S. opposition to the recolonization of the Americas as an expression of
hemispheric sovereignty. The U.S. government generally appreciated Colombian
president Simón Bolívar’s effort to form an inter-American confederation, even
though major cultural, economic, and political differences still separated the coun-
tries. In any case, more than foreign affairs, Colombia’s internal compartmental-
ization concerned Bogotá during the early national period. The rough landscape
divided the population, weakened the federal government, and limited internal
communications; tremendous internal diversities precluded the spread of national
sentiment. Venezuela and Ecuador left the union by 1830. A new constitution in
Bogotá created the Republic of New Granada in 1833.4
A competitive two-party political system soon developed in New Granada, the
legacies of which brought disastrous consequences in the 1940s and 1950s. At first,
clear ideological differences separated the political groups. The Liberal Party cam-
paigned for free trade, a decentralized government, and the separation of church
and state. The Conservative Party embraced the Spanish colonial legacy, authori-
tarianism, and the Catholic Church. While the parties differed on some important
issues, they had much in common. Elites endlessly debated political philosophy
but refused to disrupt the prevailing economic and social order. Controlled by
solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 3
affluent citizens, parties enlisted Colombians of all classes and occupations. Fam-
ily affiliations usually determined an individual’s membership. Peasants typically
followed their landlords to the ballot box. Accounting for persistent regional dif-
ferences, political arrangements sometimes varied from one region to the next. But
in most areas, more complex than a simple ideological contest, heated personal
disputes quickly dominated Liberal-Conservative relations.
Like its political parties, Colombia’s modern structure of government origi-
nated in the nineteenth century. The Constitution of 1886, drafted by a bipartisan
national council, created a unitary republic, renamed the Republic of Colombia. A
strong executive, selected by popular vote, introduced legislation, issued decrees,
maintained public order, and commanded the armed forces. The president ap-
pointed department (state) governors, who then selected municipal officials such
as city mayors. The sitting president, therefore, controlled—directly or indirectly—
political and administrative offices throughout the country; the constitution did
prohibit any individual from serving two consecutive terms as chief executive. The
document gave legislative duties to a bicameral congress. Elected to serve four-year
terms, senators and representatives passed laws; appointed judges; and selected a
president designate, or vice president, to act as executive in extraordinary situa-
tions. The third branch of government, the judiciary, included a supreme court
and council of state. The court administered the republic’s legal system, while the
council reviewed the constitutionality of the congressional legislation and presi-
dential decrees. A durable document, the 1886 Constitution nurtured Colombian
democratic institutions and provided for relative internal stability. Attaching a vast
spoils system to the office of the presidency, it simultaneously fueled the Liberal-
Conservative competition.5
As Colombia’s reputation as Latin America’s leading democracy grew, so too
did its relationship with the United States. Bilateral trade and investment built
stronger commercial ties, and Bogotá happily dispatched a delegation to the First
International Conference of American States in Washington (1889–90). The con-
ference created the International Bureau of the American Republics, later called
the Pan American Union, to disseminate information and organize future inter-
American consultations. Most often, Colombian and American interests con-
verged in the Department of Panama. The Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, negotiated
in 1846, guaranteed U.S. transit across Colombia’s strategic isthmus. American
involvement in the region swelled following the Mexican-American War (1846–
48), which expanded U.S. territory in the west. U.S. citizens who were headed to
California often crossed the isthmus. American entrepreneurs built a railroad in
Panama during the 1850s; others eyed the area as a possible site for an inter-oce-
anic canal. For Bogotá, the U.S. presence on the isthmus became a tremendous
source of revenue, and joint Colombian-American development projects turned
the region into showcase of inter-American cooperation. But at the same time, the
meeting place became a source of some tension. Many Americans thought Bogotá
too weak to properly control the region. Some Colombians believed Americans
threatened Colombian cultural and administrative power in the Department of
Panama. Recurring lawlessness and political disarray reinforced apprehensions
on both sides.6
Panama remained at the center of the Colombian-American relationship
through the early twentieth century. As the United States became a formidable in-
ternational force with global interests, the construction of an inter-oceanic canal
surfaced as a key American objective in Latin America. Most Colombians, realizing
the project would become a national treasure, also wanted to cut a waterway across
the isthmus. Still, in 1869 the Colombian Congress, fearing a loss of sovereignty in
the department, rejected a treaty that would have allowed the United States to build
the passageway. The following year, a second agreement faltered in the U.S. Senate,
which was busy investigating allegations of corruption surrounding the Ulysses S.
Grant administration. When Americans turned their attention to Nicaragua as a
possible site for the inter-oceanic route, Colombians took their aspiration for a canal
to Europe. In 1879 Bogotá brought famed French canal-builder Ferdinand de Les-
seps to Panama. When construction began in 1881, the U.S. government reactivated
its dormant mission in Bogotá to monitor the work. In the face of uncompromising
terrain, ravaging diseases, and Colombian instability, the canal project collapsed by
the end of the decade, a failure that reopened the possibility of U.S.-Colombian col-
laboration.7
Colombia’s civil disorder complicated the canal enterprise. The Thousand Days
War began as a local Liberal uprising in Santander in 1899. A countrywide conflict
between Liberals and Conservatives erupted soon thereafter. As pitched battles un-
folded in central Colombia, Panamanian secessionists launched a vicious campaign
against Colombian rule. To the separatists, Bogotá was a distant and unresponsive
entity. The federal government collected heavy taxes from Panama without return-
ing basic services. Panama, they asserted, would be stronger as an independent
country. Losing its control over the region, Bogotá urged Washington to intervene
on its behalf. In 1901 the United States landed troops, as it had on several occasions
during the nineteenth century, to defend Colombian rule and protect American
citizens and property. In November 1902 Liberal and Conservative leaders boarded
a U.S. Navy battleship, the USS Wisconsin, to sign a peace agreement. Many as-
sumed a U.S.-Colombian canal accord would soon follow. During the war, U.S. and
Colombian diplomats had negotiated an agreement to build a canal in Panama. The
U.S. Senate ratified the Hay-Herran Treaty in March 1903, but Colombian reserva-
tions quickly surfaced. Amid a swirl of political bickering, the Colombian Senate
killed the treaty in August.
In the wake of the Colombian decision, President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–9)
accused Bogotá of blocking the forward progress of civilization. He promptly re-
vised American policy toward Colombia. If another revolt erupted in Panama,

the United States would act in the interest of regional stability, not Colombian
sovereignty. American power had long supported Colombian control over the
isthmus. Indeed, without U.S. assistance Bogotá might have lost Panama years
before. When news of the new policy reached Panama, a Conservative minor-
ity, concerned that the United States would take the canal to Nicaragua, figured
the opportunity for independence had arrived. While disappointed by the lack
of explicit U.S. assistance, separatist Manuel Amador Guerrero and his followers
rose against the government in Bogotá in November 1903. Unable to negotiate
the dense jungle between Bogotá and Panama, Colombian government troops
moving overland never reached the isthmus. American warships fettered the
movement of Colombian seaborne forces, and when a Colombian commander in
Panama threatened to kill American citizens, U.S. Marines moved ashore. Wash-
ington quickly recognized Panamanian independence, signed a treaty with the
new government, and began building the Panama Canal.8
Colombia and the United States needed the next thirty years to undo the dam-
age inflicted in 1903. At first, American collusion with Panamanian separatists
spawned widespread anti-American sentiment in Colombia, precluding an early
settlement of Colombian-American differences. Colombian citizens railed against
Yankee gunboat diplomacy and commercial penetration. Some even attacked U.S.
businessmen and missionaries working in the republic. Elected officials regularly
denounced the United States in public settings. But Colombians could not sus-
tain the intensity of their dissatisfaction. The country’s history of compartmental-
ization, after all, partially explained the separation of Panama. In a move toward
reconciliation, U.S. and Colombian diplomats negotiated the Thomson-Urrutia
Treaty in 1914 that settled the Colombian-Panamanian border and transferred $25
million to Bogotá for its territorial loss. Colombia recognized Panama’s indepen-
dence as part of the agreement. A short time later, President Marco Fidel Suárez
(1918–21) theorized that since Colombia could not escape contact with the United
States, Colombia should use the relationship to its advantage. The Suárez Doc-
trine helped Colombians discard the Panamanian controversy and capitalize on
the inter-American commercial boom of the 1920s; the Suárez mindset guided
Colombian foreign policy through World War II and the cold war. Also in the
1920s, U.S. policymakers adopted a new attitude toward Latin America. President
Herbert Hoover (1929–33) embraced a program of noninterference, began pulling
U.S. troops out of Nicaragua and Haiti, and calmly arbitrated a 1927 oil dispute
with Mexico. These and other actions began the Good Neighbor Policy, a phrase
Hoover coined during his 1929 goodwill tour of Latin America.9
Colombian-American friendship broadened during the decade before World
War II. A 1930 Conservative Party split allowed the Liberal Party to capture the
Colombian presidency. Liberal presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930–34) and
The Colombian destroyer ARC Antioquia passes through the Panama Canal, June 1934.
The separation of Panama temporarily damaged U.S.-Colombian relations. Opened in
1914, the canal nevertheless benefited both countries. The defense of the Panama Canal
figured prominently in the minds of U.S. and Colombian authorities during World War II.
(Source: Department of the Navy, NARA)
Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38) launched state-sponsored development pro-

grams, not unlike those under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, that accelerated
Colombian modernization. Colombian Liberals and American Democrats quickly
established warm personal relationships based on philosophical compatibilities.
Simultaneously, the Good Neighbor Policy flourished under President Roosevelt.
At the Montevideo Conference in 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull renounced
intervention as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. President Roosevelt visited
Cartagena in 1934 and revised U.S. tariff laws to expand inter-American commerce.
In December 1936 hemispheric officials at the Buenos Aires Conference accepted
the principle of inter-American consultations to maintain regional peace and secu-
rity. The delegates also adopted a general statement of inter-American solidarity.10
Cumulatively, Colombian president López observed, these changes in American
policy “helped to create an atmosphere of active friendship” that permitted hemi-
spheric collaboration during World War II.11 In other words, by 1938 Colombia and
the United States were ready to cooperate in the defense of the Americas.
The Inter-American Coalition
Nestled near the center of the Americas, adjacent to Panama Canal, Colombia
emerged as an important U.S. ally during World War II. The same distance that
had sparked conflict in 1903 encouraged wartime cooperation. The country’s war-
time strategic value resided in its proximity to the Panama Canal. Opened in 1914,
the inter-oceanic passage created important lines of commerce, communication,
and defense. It promoted international trade by shortening the distance between
producers and markets and helped Colombia connect (for the first time) its Ca-
ribbean and Pacific coasts. Since the United States also relied on the canal to move
U.S. naval assets between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the canal occupied a
prominent place in the minds of U.S. strategic thinkers. The rise of air power after
World War I complicated canal defense. American officers realized that just a
modest airborne attack could close the canal until engineers repaired damaged
locks and dams. In 1939 the Roosevelt administration concluded that the threat to
the canal “could not be ignored,” nor could the United States neglect Colombia.12
The South American republic bordered Panama and controlled the coastal ap-
proaches at both ends of the canal. Hostile forces could easily strike the passage
from Colombia. Even a rogue group, operating from the Colombian backlands,
might render the Panama Canal inoperable, harming U.S. interests. Within the
larger U.S.-led multinational wartime alliance, the U.S.-Colombian partnership
therefore assumed special importance in the coalition against the Axis powers
during World War II.13
Liberal president Eduardo Santos emerged as the chief architect of Colombian-
American cooperation. Educated in Bogotá and Paris, Santos turned the fledg-
ling daily El Tiempo, which he acquired in 1913, into the country’s leading Liberal
newspaper. He held assorted political posts during the 1920s and 1930s, notably
as a Colombian senator and the governor of the Department of Santander. As
Enrique Olaya Herrera’s foreign minister, he headed the Colombian delegation at
the historic Montevideo Conference and represented the republic at the League of
Nations. A moderate Liberal, his tenure as president did not bring significant so-
cial or economic initiatives. He instead presided over the consolidation of reforms
adopted between 1934 and 1937. Santos, however, devoted considerable attention
to foreign relations, particularly Colombian-American cooperation. An “intel-
ligent and forceful” man, considered by U.S. officials to be “the most powerful
figure in the Liberal Party,” Santos admired Roosevelt and the United States.14 He
believed that democratic values made Colombia and the United States natural
partners. Moreover, strongly committed to the idea of inter-American solidar-
ity, he thought that the military, political, and economic security of each Ameri-
can republic depended on the welfare of the entire community. Over time, the
countries of the Western Hemisphere had created a system of interdependence
Colombian president Eduardo Santos

(1938–42). A strong proponent of
Colombian-American cooperation,
President Santos, pictured here in 1948,
guided Colombia through the opening of
World War II. (Source: New York World
Telegram & Sun Newspaper Photograph
Collection, Library of Congress)
that demanded further inter-American collaboration. Conversely, President San-

tos detested foreign totalitarianism, the ideas and actions of which were incom-
patible with Colombia’s republican principles. In November 1938 Adolf Hitler’s
Nazi Party mistreated three Colombian diplomats for collecting information on
anti-Semitism in Germany. The entire incident merely reinforced the Colombian
president’s low opinion of the Nazi government.15 These convictions shaped Co-
lombian foreign policy and determined Colombia’s position at the December 1938
Lima Conference.
The subject of Nazi aggression occupied delegates at the Eighth Conference of
American States. Earlier that year, Germany had annexed Austria and absorbed the
Sudetenland. Secretary of State Hull arrived in Peru expecting inter-American of-
ficials to pass a clear, unanimous resolution on the subject of hemispheric solidarity,
but he quickly encountered problems with the Argentine delegation. With strong
ties to Europe, a large German population, and aspirations to become a major in-
ternational actor, Argentina stubbornly opposed U.S. leadership. On the first day,
Argentine foreign minister José María Cantilo, doubting U.S. resolve in the face of
an Axis invasion, dismissed a proclamation of solidarity as unnecessary. The min-
ister then went fishing in Chile, entrusting Argentina’s interests to second-rate dip-
lomats, leaving Hull with the impression that Argentina “did not attach too much
importance to the conference.”16 The U.S. delegation brushed off the Argentine
antics and pushed for a declaration of solidarity. Colombian foreign minister Luis
López de Mesa supported the declaration, as did the Brazilian and Mexican repre-
sentatives.17 After considerable debate, a few heated exchanges, and the personal
intervention of Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas, the inter-American representa-
tives approved the Lima Declaration. Slightly weakened to accommodate Argentine
reservations, the document reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Americas, expressed
the U.S. and Latin American intention to resist extra-continental aggression, and
provided for further consultation as the international situation warranted. As part
of the agreement, Foreign Minister López de Mesa (together with the Dominican
representative) proposed a plan for the formation of an Association of American
Nations. The Santos administration, in short, wanted to replace the Pan Ameri-
can Union with a stronger inter-American organization. Considering the problems
they encountered passing a simple statement of solidarity in Lima, Colombian and
U.S. officials decided to shelve the plan until conditions improved.18
U.S.-Colombian cooperation accelerated after the Lima Conference. In early
1939 the American military missions opened in Colombia. Planned since the San-
tos inauguration in August 1938, the advisory groups immediately began laying
the foundation for wartime military cooperation. Also in January 1939, Bogotá
and Washington elevated their foreign legations to embassy status. The move,
recommended by Santos, increased communications and reflected the growing
importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries. Spruille Braden arrived
in Colombia that year as the first U.S. ambassador to Colombia. Miguel López
Pumarejo served as Colombia’s ambassador to the United States until Gabriel
Turbay arrived in Washington in November.
President Santos discussed these and other international developments during
his annual address to Congress in July 1939. The president reaffirmed Colombia’s
commitment to inter-American solidarity. He reviewed Colombian-American ini-
tiatives and reiterated the ongoing importance of bilateral cooperation. “The se-
curity of the Panama Canal is indispensable to the welfare of Colombia,” Santos
observed. The president pledged that “no one” would “be permitted to menace the
security of the canal from Colombian soil.”19 Colombian politicians and journal-
ists responded favorably to the president’s speech. Ambassador Braden, in frequent
contact with Santos, remarked that he was “deeply moved” by the president’s com-
mitment to hemispheric unity.20 The importance of inter-American solidarity, of
course, intensified as the international situation worsened. In September 1939, after
news of the outbreak of the European war reached Bogotá, the Colombian Con-
gress voted overwhelmingly to support Santos’s security program, including coop-
eration with the United States to defend the Panama Canal.
One month later, inter-American officials gathered Panama to study the hemi-
spheric implications of the European conflict. Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles, head of the U.S. delegation, worked harmoniously with Latin American
officials. Most Latin American countries supported the U.S. program of accel-
erated economic collaboration in order to compensate for overseas instabilities,
Political Map of the Western Hemisphere, 1939. The U.S. Department of State prepared
this map for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States in Panama, October
1939. In the Declaration of Panama, inter-American officials proclaimed hostile action by
non-American belligerent nations within the shaded zone unacceptable. (Source: U.S. De-
partment of State)
especially the loss of foreign markets; the officials also endorsed a general state-
ment of neutrality. Diplomats then adopted the Declaration of Panama, proclaim-
ing that the “waters adjacent to the American continent” should be “free from
the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation.”21 It
designated a three hundred to one thousand mile perimeter around the Western
Hemisphere, inside which it declared hostile action unacceptable.22
Military developments in the spring of 1940 heightened inter-American anxi-
ety. The spectacular German conquest of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
and France raised acute concerns among many hemispheric officials that Germany
would attempt to occupy western European colonies in the Caribbean. Facing this
possibility, inter-American officials convened in Havana, Cuba, in July 1940. Sec-
retary Hull proposed that the American republics both refuse to recognize any
transfer of colonies and, if necessary, place the possessions under a joint inter-
American trusteeship. Leopoldo Mezo of Argentina objected immediately, arguing
that such action would constitute a declaration of war. Hull eventually pulled the
Argentines into line, but only after direct communication with Argentina’s acting
president Ramón Castillo. The Colombian delegation, impressed by the need for
“complete agreement and unity in action as well as theory,” embraced the U.S. plan,
and had in fact arrived in Cuba with an independent study of the problem that
bore a striking resemblance to the U.S. initiative. Colombian diplomats played a
key role promoting hemispheric unity in Havana, going to great lengths to make
sure the meeting succeeded, efforts that earned Washington’s gratitude.23
The international conflagration swelled when Germany attacked the Soviet
Union in June 1941. Around the same time, the tone of Japanese-American rela-
tions pointed toward the possibility of a war in the Pacific. That summer, in a pri-
vate message to Roosevelt, President Santos reaffirmed his country’s commitment
to the “moral, religious, and political liberty” that Colombia and the United States
cherished.24 If the Axis powers prevailed, Santos told the Colombian Congress
in July, “Colombia would pass automatically into a state of slavery.” The republic
needed to work with the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere, particu-
larly the Panama Canal, which he described as “vital to the life of America and vital
to the defense of the United States.” The canal “constitutes for Colombia,” he added,
“an artery of communication whose interruption would occasion untold damage
on this country.”25
The president’s devotion to inter-American unity impressed U.S. authorities, but
some Colombians nurtured reservations. Considering the Axis successes in 1940
and 1941, several influential Conservatives thought Germany would win the war.
Open collaboration with the United States, they reasoned, might actually endanger
Colombia. While Colombia had few economic ties to Germany, Bogotá’s anti-Nazi
position might preclude future trade with a German-controlled Europe. If Ger-
many invaded the Americas, a neutral Colombia stood a fair chance of emerging
unmolested. In addition, Conservative Party chief Laureano Gómez Castro had
problems forgiving the United States for the separation of Panama. “The Panama
Canal affair is over and we don’t want to reopen it,” he said, “but it cannot be for-
gotten.”26 A New York Times writer, nevertheless, concluded in June that Colombia
was “the most likely of all South American republics to join hands with the United
States in the case of war.”27 Indeed, Colombia responded quickly to Japan’s attack
on Hawaii in December 1941. Bogotá broke relations with Tokyo less than twenty-
four hours after the Pearl Harbor raid. When Germany and Italy declared war on
the United States, the Santos administration severed ties with Berlin and Rome.28
An emergency inter-American meeting at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 ad-

dressed problems connected with U.S. involvement in the war. Diplomats agreed
to expand hemispheric defense activities and formed the Inter-American Defense
Board “to study and recommend measures necessary” for continental defense.29
Colombian and U.S. officials also drafted a decree that would have ended all rela-
tions between the American republics and the Axis powers. Many Latin American
governments, like Colombia, broke with the Axis in December 1941; most Cen-
tral American countries declared war on the Axis. But several South American
countries, separated from U.S. forces by thousands of miles, refused to act, fear-
ing that hostile diplomacy would provoke an invasion. Colombians hoped the Rio
de Janeiro Conference would inspire a uniform response. Argentina and Chile,
however, refused to accept the draft declaration. Instead of a binding declaration,
attendees produced a resolution that merely encouraged Latin American govern-
ments to break with the Axis. Several uncommitted governments, notably Brazil,
honored the recommendation, but others did not respond. Concerned that its long
Pacific coast would be an easy target, Chile attempted to remain neutral. When a
U.S. diplomat assured Chileans that the American fleet would protect their coun-
try, Foreign Minister Gabriel Rosetto asked: “What fleet? The one sunk at Pearl
Harbor?”30 Santiago finally embraced the Allied cause in 1943. Buenos Aires, like-
wise, resisted the Rio Conference recommendation, maintaining its relationship
with Germany. Attempting to isolate Argentina, Washington declared Buenos Ai-
res ineligible for U.S. economic and military assistance. Argentina responded by
trying to buy military equipment from Germany. In 1945, when the outcome of
the war became a forgone conclusion, Argentina sided with the United States to
improve the chances of postwar bilateral cooperation.31
The German submarine campaign in American waters furthered Latin Ameri-
can involvement in World War II. Germany’s sinking of Latin American vessels
showed that the war affected all countries, not just the highly industrialized ones.
In May 1942 a German submarine attacked a Mexican oil tanker in the Caribbean.
Berlin responded to the Mexican protest by sinking another Mexican merchant
ship. Soon thereafter, the Mexican Congress declared war on the Axis.32 During
the first seven months of 1942 German U-boats in the Atlantic sank eleven Bra-
zilian vessels, resulting in the loss of more than eighty seamen. Then, in August
1942, a concentrated Nazi campaign against Brazilian shipping sent six vessels and
six hundred people, mostly civilian ocean-liner passengers and military person-
nel, to the bottom of the ocean. Rio de Janeiro promptly entered into a state of
belligerency with the Axis countries. Other Latin American republics, including
Colombia, followed a similar path.33 In June 1942 a Nazi submarine torpedoed the
Colombian Navy schooner ARC Resolute in the Caribbean. To make the incident
more egregious, after the schooner sunk, the U-boat crew surfaced and began
machine-gunning survivors as they clung to their life rafts. The Santos adminis-
tration condemned Germany and froze all Axis assets in Colombia but did not
join the war as a belligerent. That final step came only after a second submarine
attack and, even then, only as part of a growing internal political drama.34
Between 1903 and 1940, Colombia enjoyed a period of orderly political, social,
and economic development. A wave of interparty fighting followed the 1930 elec-
tion, but a 1932–34 border war with Peru inspired Colombian nationalism and
ended the domestic conflict. Partisan conflict, however, crept back into Colombian
public affairs during World War II. Minor problems first surfaced during the Santos
years. In October 1941, Conservatives used allegations of Liberal corruption to force
several cabinet officials from the government.35 Then, in 1942, the Liberal govern-
ment tried revising the Concordat of 1887, an agreement with the Vatican that al-
lowed the Roman Catholic Church special privileges inside Colombia. The move
succeeded only in upsetting Catholic clerics and Conservative citizens. Within the
Liberal ranks, the president’s moderate social agenda upset those who wanted more
radical change. The Liberal Party, in turn, divided between the santistas (Santos
supporters) and the lopistas (López supporters). Backers of former president López
wanted the government to push modernization and reform, much as it had dur-
ing the mid-1930s. The hotly contested 1942 election matched López—despised
by Conservatives—against Liberal-Conservative compromise candidate Carlos
Arango Vélez. When López prevailed, the long-standing Liberal-Conservative feud
seemed poised to erupt again.
Alfonso López had played an important role in Colombia prior to 1942. The
son of a prominent Colombian banker, he studied in the United States and Britain.
He later worked in New York City and founded a commercial bank in Colombia.
López emerged as a major political and intellectual force at the 1929 Liberal Party
convention, and he served as the Colombian minister in London during the early
1930s. As president from 1934 to 1938, he implemented the revolución en marcha, or
“revolution on the march.” Although hardly “revolutionary,” his presidency brought
major changes to Colombia. He employed a program of government economic
planning, passed agrarian reform legislation, initiated public works projects, and
introduced an income tax. López also managed to restructure the church-state re-
lationship and secured universal male suffrage. Economic nationalism during his
first presidency precipitated some hostilities toward U.S. interests in Colombia, es-
pecially the United Fruit Company. At times, the president’s own behavior showed
traces of anti-American sentiment. During the 1942 campaign, opponents charged
that López would not do enough to support the inter-American war effort.36 When
the mercurial López prevailed, U.S. policymakers questioned the implication for
U.S.-Colombian relations. To alleviate these concerns, president-elect López trav-
eled to Washington in July 1942, a month before his inauguration, to assure U.S.
Colombian president-elect Alfonso López (1934–38, 1942–45) confers with President

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–45) on the White House lawn, July 1942. (Source: Office of
War Information, NARA)
officials of his goodwill and support. The discussions convinced U.S. policymakers
that the bilateral partnership would continue. The trip did nothing to end the po-
litical fighting that would carry Colombia into World War II.37
Once in office, President López confronted a growing number of domestic crit-
ics. Predictably, Conservatives objected to every presidential word and deed, from
tax policies to religious initiatives.38 Colombian Conservatives despised López in
the same way Republicans in the United States detested Roosevelt. Colombian
labor turned against the president when he failed to respond to their demands
for better working conditions, evidenced during the 1943 Bogotá transportation
strike.39 Rising tensions between the National Police and the Colombian Army
also created problems. López favored the National Police, intending to build the
police into a “Liberal counterweight” to the armed forces, which he believed loyal
to the Conservative Party.40 The Colombian National Police therefore received a
disproportionate share of government funds and equipment during the first and
second López administrations. Army officers resented their low status during the
López years; corruption within the police forces put the president on the defen-
sive.41 Then, serious accusations of bribery and fraud surfaced, suggesting that
the president’s family and friends, particularly his son Alfonso López Michelsen,
had benefited from illegal wartime contracts and business dealings.42 At the same
time, Liberal political maverick Jorge Eliécer Gaitán accelerated his campaign
against Colombia’s oligarchy. Still other Liberals criticized the president for not
distributing the “spoils” of Liberal control evenly among various party compo-
nents.43 The López administration soon found itself in a tenuous position.
The situation deteriorated when, in July 1943, administration officials uncov-
ered a plot to overthrow the government. López ordered the police arrest of several
conspirators, including the popular Colombian boxer Francisco A. Pérez, known
simply as “Mamatoco.”44 But instead of arresting Mamatoco, National Police of-
ficers knifed the man to death. The incident and inept government cover-up that
followed brought criticism of the López administration to new heights.45 That year,
Conservatives and Liberals fought a vicious war of words. In September Liberal
and Conservative legislators brawled on the floor of the Chamber of Representa-
tives.46 During the entirety of the 1943 session, Congress was “agitated and ster-
ile” and accomplished little meaningful work. It barely managed to pass a budget
for the next year, and did that only by working deep into the Christmas recess.47
In late September a political commentator observed that the president had “com-
pletely lost” the political “prestige” he had carried with him into office in August
1942.48 Then, in early November 1943, President López decided to leave Colombia
to accompany his wife, diagnosed with cancer, to the United States for medical
treatment. Although her illness would prove fatal, skeptics believed the trip was
a maneuver to escape the domestic political controversy. On 19 November, just
before President and Mrs. López went to New York City, the Colombian Congress
transferred the presidency to Darío Echandía Olaya, who would serve as chief ex-
ecutive until López returned to Colombia.49
The republic’s final move toward belligerency came during this time of political
reshuffling. On the night of 17 November, a German submarine attacked a Colom-
bian warship, the ARC Ruby, in the waters between San Andrés Island and Carta-
gena. Four Colombian seamen died, and seven others suffered wounds. American
merchant marines delivered survivors to safety. After a series of emergency cabinet
meetings Echandía confiscated all Axis assets in Colombia. The administration
then called Congress into a special session to consider a proclamation of bellig-
erency. The Colombian Senate adopted the measure on 27 November, formally
acknowledging the existence of conflict between Bogotá and Berlin, committing
Colombia to increase its involvement in hemispheric defense. Thirteen Conserva-
tive senators voted against the measure; Gómez downplayed the U-boat attack in
his opposition to the Liberal administration. Other Colombians wanted a stronger
response—a declaration of war on Berlin. But Minister of Government Alberto
Lleras Camargo and Foreign Minister Carlos Lozano y Lozano urged caution. Un-
der the Colombian Constitution, a formal declaration automatically imposed a
countrywide state of siege. The move would have limited civil liberties, perhaps
even delaying the elections scheduled for 1946. Liberal policymakers openly feared
that such a declaration would “provoke a strong reaction from the Conservative
minority” in Colombia.50 The republic would “act internationally exactly as though
it were in the war,” Foreign Minister Lozano explained. Only for “internal reasons”
did the republic limit itself to a state of belligerency.51
As a result of the 1943 declaration, Colombia became a more active member of
the international alliance against the Axis powers. While Colombia could not give
“the coalition much material aid,” a New York Times editor wrote, the republic was
“a welcomed member of the growing coalition of the United Nations” due to its
“important strategic value” and “profound moral influence in Latin America.”52
But the Colombian declaration of belligerency was more than just a response to
the sinking of a Colombian schooner. Prior to November 1943, López considered
increasing Colombia’s part in the war through a belligerency declaration. One
U.S. State Department official reported that the president hoped such a declara-
tion would “divert public opinion from the Mamatoco case and [other] scandals”
and “unite the country.”53 Although López had not acted by the time he handed
his presidential duties to Echandía, the idea survived among Liberal government
officials. In similar situations, citizens in other Latin American countries erupted
in anti-German protests after the sinking of their ships. In Colombia, however, re-
porters recorded “a surprising lack of interest on the part of the local populace.”54
Even without public pressure, the Echandía administration jumped at the oppor-
tunity to expand its involvement in the war. In the United States, López signed the
United Nations Declaration, a statement of Allied war aims, for the Colombian
government in January 1944. The move failed to restore domestic political har-
mony. It did accelerate the pace of Colombian-American military cooperation.55
Military Cooperation
As fighting in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific endangered the Americas, the United
States and Latin America worked together to improve hemispheric defense capa-
bilities. Between 1938 and 1941, U.S. diplomats advocated a multilateral approach
to regional security. Sumner Welles and the Department of State expected that
an inter-American military committee would organize and implement defense
activities. The approach would advance the Good Neighbor Policy, extend multi-
lateralism, and seemingly ensure widespread U.S.–Latin American cooperation.
By contrast, U.S. military leaders considered the multinational strategy cumber-
some, inefficient, and insecure. For practical reasons, military planners pushed
regional security through bilateral relationships; some also feared that large inter-
American organizations gave too much power to Latin America, diluting Ameri-
can influence and compromising American security. Between 1938 and 1941, the
Latin American military leaders visit U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall
in Washington, October 1940. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
U.S. government, unsure on the exact course to follow, mixed the two approaches.
The State Department promoted international cooperation in various diplomatic
settings while the U.S. military started building a network of bilateral relation-
ships. Then, just before the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Conference, President Roosevelt
expressed his preference for bilateral tactics. He wanted diplomats to create an
Inter-American Defense Board but insisted that it serve only an advisory role.
That decision accounted for the relative inactivity of the board during (and after)
World War II and smoothed the path for the U.S. government to pursue its secu-
rity goals in Latin America through bilateral arrangements.56 The United States
worked directly with individual countries to achieve stated objectives. In Colom-
bia, U.S. officials encouraged the development of a military establishment capable
of repelling “any probable minor attack from overseas.”57
In 1939 two important staff tours promoted bilateral understanding, critical
to accomplishing the Colombian-American military agenda in the years ahead.
In April Colombian Army chief of staff General Luis Acevedo and other Colom-
bian general officers traveled to the Canal Zone, inspected Fort Amador, studied
Balboa harbor defenses, and watched an American air power demonstration. The
Colombian officers visited the Panama Canal and observed a large U.S. Army field
exercise at Fort Clayton. They then met Panama Canal Department commander
Major General David L. Stone at his Quarry Heights headquarters. During that
session, the American general stressed the military and economic importance of
the canal. He also explained to the Colombians how mock air raids consistently
damaged the locks, spillway, and dams. In a real attack, even a minor enemy ef-
fort could render the passage inoperable. Speaking with Stone, the Colombian
Army chief of staff conveyed Colombia’s great interest in defending the canal and
expressed a keen appreciation for American regional security concerns.58
Two months later, in June 1939, General Stone led fifteen U.S. officers to Bogotá
to survey Colombian military preparedness. The Americans attended infantry,
artillery, and cavalry school maneuvers and inspected medical corps facilities and
the institute of military geography. General Stone met with prominent military
and political figures, including President Santos and his ministers. The conversa-
tions covered regional defense matters and helped officials from both countries
better understand their shared responsibility in the event war came to the Ameri-
cas. For his part, Stone left Colombia generally impressed with the readiness of
the Colombian military, at least the army, and returned to Panama convinced
that Colombia would help defend the Americas.59 Colombian officers believed
the visit successfully identified problems the two countries “held in common” and
“enlivened mutual respect.”60 These talks, the first serious discussions concerning
Colombian-American military collaboration, prepared both countries for future
cooperation.
The exchange, like other wartime goodwill gestures, increased contact between
the two militaries, nurtured bilateral confidence, made inter-American solidar-
ity tangible, and showed Colombians that U.S. forces were close enough to help
the country in the event of an emergency.61 Additionally, the visits brought real
improvements in Colombian-American military relations. In May 1939, after the
Panama visit, General Acevedo dismissed the German Army officer then serving
as the director of the Colombian War Department Administration Division. In
place of the German administrator, Bogotá asked Washington for an American to
“efficiently collaborate with the military-aviation and naval missions” and “better
install the administrative methods used by the United States Army.”62 Concerned
that the German had been working against American interests in Colombia, the
Roosevelt administration gladly complied with the Colombian request. Then, fol-
lowing General Stone’s trip to Colombia, the United States sent its first permanent
military attaché to Bogotá. At the time of the visit, Colombia shared an attaché
with its Central American neighbors: one American (stationed in Costa Rica)
served the entire region. In June, President Santos asked Stone to send a full-
time officer to Bogotá. Colombia would need the U.S. attaché, Santos believed, to
orchestrate the Colombian-American response to the Axis challenge. Later that
year, the first permanent U.S. military attaché to Colombia arrived in Bogotá to
coordinate a variety of bilateral security measures.63 The tours and these related
developments created an atmosphere of cooperation that served both countries

during formal bilateral security negotiations the following year.
In early 1940 the Roosevelt administration decided to open discussions with its
Latin American neighbors to determine how each state could best contribute to
hemispheric defense. President Santos agreed to the talks on 24 May, and a de-
tachment of U.S. military officials, headed by Major Matthew B. Ridgway, arrived
in Bogotá in June. The first meeting produced an agreement on the principles of
mutual defense. It also identified common security problems, especially with regard
to the Panama Canal.64 The second round of talks, held in Colombia in September
1940 under the direction of U.S. mission personnel, produced specific recommen-
dations as to how each country might support the other. The Colombian-American
discussions were cordial and productive. The only real problem came during the
September meeting when U.S. Army officers raised their concerns about German
espionage activities in Colombia, an intense U.S. fear the Colombians did not share.
In the final September agreement, the Santos administration committed itself to
prevent its territory from being used as a springboard for any attack on the Panama
Canal.65 The government would secure its territory against internal and external
enemies. Colombia, likewise, vowed to participate in regional defense. In case of
an Axis invasion of Colombia, the United States agreed to defend the South Ameri-
can republic. Should an extra-continental power attack elsewhere in the Americas,
Bogotá pledged to open the republic to U.S. forces as necessary to meet the threat.
In order to implement the agreement, the countries reiterated their dedication to
improving the Colombian military.66
During World War II, U.S. military advisers collaborated with Colombian of-
ficials in order to achieve fundamental Colombian-American security goals. Es-
sential agents of Colombian-American cooperation, they also coordinated activi-
ties like the 1940 bilateral military talks. In 1938 Santos asked the United States for
missions to help modernize the Colombian naval and air forces, thus improving
Colombian security. Most likely, Santos also sought to avoid a repetition of the July
1938 Colombian air show calamity, during which a military aircraft crashed into a
crowd of spectators, killing 53 and wounding 150; President López and President-
elect Santos narrowly escaped injury.67 The disaster confirmed Colombia’s needs for
foreign military assistance. Additionally, the Santos administration wanted Ameri-
can personnel in Colombia to encourage bilateral collaboration, provided that those
men did not force unwanted military equipment on Colombia.68 The Roosevelt ad-
ministration assured Santos that U.S. policy forbade American advisers from push-
ing arms on foreign governments. Foreign Minister López de Mesa and Secretary
of State Hull signed the mission contracts in Washington on 23 November 1938. The
agreements authorized American servicemen to work with the Colombian military
in an advisory capacity. Unlike the British and Swiss officers stationed in Colombia
before 1938, American personnel would not hold rank in the Colombian armed
forces. In fact, the Colombian-American agreement barred U.S. advisers from com-
manding Colombian military units. The contracts did not specify the exact number
of personnel that would work in Colombia. Instead, the teams would reflect the
republic’s need for expertise at any given moment. Finally, the Colombian govern-
ment agreed to finance the mission’s work, specifically salaries, travel, offices, and
transportation.69 Overall, the mission contracts gave Colombians great control over
the size, disposition, and influence of the U.S. military missions.
The first mission contracts did not assign American advisers to Colombian
ground forces. Between 1938 and 1940, Colombian policymakers, led by the na-
tion’s French-educated president, wanted the French Army to train Colombian
artillery, cavalry, and infantry units. President Santos considered the French Army
the most powerful in the world. Colombians, therefore, would benefit from an
affiliation with France.70 In early 1940, Paris sent three officers to teach at the Co-
lombian military college. Bogotá worked to enlarge the size of the French presence
in Colombia through May 1940.71 But Germany’s stunning conquest of Western
Europe forced the Santos administration to rethink its approach to improving the
Colombian Army. Renewing the mission agreements with the United States in
1942, Bogotá asked Washington to add ground force experts to the groups already
working in Colombia, an important development considering the army’s size and
influence within the Colombian military establishment.72
The military mission agreements promised to raise Colombian military readi-
ness during a time of great international upheaval. Most importantly, they initiated
a program of military cooperation that connected the two countries in a mutually
beneficial way. Colombian journalists broadly supported the government’s deci-
sion to hire American military advisers. The leading Liberal newspaper, El Tiempo,
owned and operated by President Santos and his brother, described Colombia’s
need for foreign assistance. It also explained the merits of working with the United
States. Geographic proximity made the United States a natural source of military
assistance. Moreover, Colombia and the United States shared a commitment to
military subordination to civilian authority.73 Reviewing the arrangement in June
1939, another Liberal paper, El Espectador, concluded that beyond the practical
benefit to Colombia, the U.S. teams embodied the “mutual trust” and “friendly
intercourse” between the two countries.74 Conservative writers also supported the
bilateral arrangement. Laureano Gómez’s El Siglo printed several favorable front-
page articles.75 Yet in their campaign to harass the Liberal Party, some Conserva-
tives objected to the arrangements for political gain. Diario de la Costa questioned
the financial wisdom of contracting with foreign military advisers.76 The Santos
administration, it charged, did not know how to manage the country’s economy.
American excellence, El Siglo editorialized, lay in the “building of excellent high-
ways . . . elevators, and moving pictures,” not in its military strength. Perhaps a
German military mission would better serve Colombia’s interests.77 These expres-
sions aside, Conservative and Liberal congressmen voted together to support the
administration’s decision to bring U.S. advisers to Colombia.
Americans were delighted to send military advisers to Colombia. A Washing-
ton Post writer claimed that the missions were “effective evidence of the growth of
practical inter-American solidarity.” U.S. advisers started working in many Latin
American countries during World War II. Yet Americans stationed in Colombia
were invaluable, as the strategically located country “has been of the first impor-
tance” to U.S. security since the Panama Canal opened.78 The U.S. War Depart-
ment expected that the U.S. servicemen would standardize inter-American mili-
tary practices, improve regional security, and foster hemispheric understanding. In
Bogotá, Ambassador Braden thought that new missions would become a tremen-
dous vehicle for Colombian-American cooperation. The Colombian president, he
added, likely had a compelling secondary reason to request the missions. Braden
thought Santos invited U.S. advisers to Colombia as an expression of confidence in
American leadership. President Roosevelt found this sentiment “extremely gratify-
ing” but hoped the missions would “prove their efficacy upon a purely professional
basis.”79 The first U.S. advisers set out to accomplish that very goal.
The U.S. military missions, arriving in Colombia in January 1939, found the
small Colombian military woefully unprepared for modern warfare. Since in-
dependence, a distinct class of professional Colombian soldiers and sailors had
played only a minor role in Colombian society, residing on the periphery of a
deeply embedded constitutional system. During the nineteenth century, Colom-
bians used personal relationships and wealth to acquire military commissions,
much like their counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. In Colombia, the promo-
tion and training systems lacked formal structure. Irregular militiamen (not ca-
reer servicemen) most often decided the outcome of Colombia’s internal conflicts.
In the early twentieth century, the Rafael Reyes administration (1904–9), enacted
a series of reforms that encouraged Colombian military professionalism. The gov-
ernment created service academies to educate and train officers and hired some
foreign officers to promote military proficiency. Still, the government invested
very little in its armed forces, and systemic problems persisted. The fight with
Peru in the early 1930s exposed the military’s ongoing weakness. Indeed, in 1939
the Colombian Army, the largest branch of the military, numbered just eighteen
thousand troops and lacked proper equipment and training. U.S. advisers found
Colombian naval and air forces in even worse condition. Colombian and Ameri-
can military personnel addressed these problems during World War II.80
In 1939 American naval mission chief Captain Lawrence F. Reifsnider encoun-
tered a Colombian Navy incapable of serious operations. The republic had so ne-
glected its two British-built destroyers (the heart of the Colombian fleet) that the
ships could not move under their own power. The lightly armed schooners and
patrol boats were not suitable for combat. After orienting themselves to their new
environment, the American naval mission concentrated on making the Colom-

bian force ready for battle. At the request of the Colombian naval commanders,
the U.S. advisers supervised the repair of the Colombian destroyers and outfitting
of coastal vessels. American officers taught classes on maintenance and logistics;
they also introduced Colombian sailors to U.S. naval customs, doctrine, and tac-
tics. But certain realities of life in Colombia frustrated the Americans. Captain
Reifsnider experienced difficulties communicating with the geographically scat-
tered elements of the Colombian Navy. After several months at the Colombian
naval base in Cartagena, he therefore moved the mission headquarters to Bogotá
in order to improve relations with the Colombian high command. The U.S. group
also lacked a sufficient numbers to meet all the Colombian requests for assistance.
Indeed, only six American servicemen worked in the naval mission during its first
year. The gradual enlargement of the advisory group eliminated that problem. By
the time Captain James Richard Barry assumed commanded of mission in August
1941, over twenty U.S. Navy personnel worked in Colombia.81
The U.S. aviation mission found Colombian pilots lacking skills and resources.
Unlike the U.S. Army Air Forces, the Colombian Air Force, established by Presi-
dent Suárez in 1919, functioned as an independent service branch. During its first
decades of operation, however, the Colombian Air Force confronted a terrible
shortage of qualified flyers, mechanics, and equipment. As late as 1941 the Colom-
bians operated only thirteen unarmed aircraft. The badly maintained Colombian
airfields posed great risks to incoming and outgoing flights. For example, in No-
vember 1941 two skilled American pilots demolished their P-40s trying to land
at one Colombian installation. Led by Major Wallace E. Whitson, the American
advisers labored to refurbish the existing air fleet but could find neither spare
parts nor qualified mechanics in Colombia. Those aircraft that did fly quickly
depleted Colombia’s reserve of aviation fuel, a precious wartime commodity. The
U.S. advisers made several trips to the Canal Zone to acquire basic supplies. They
then started teaching a variety of courses at the Colombian mechanics school (in
Madrid) and flight training center (in Cali). American airport engineers helped
Colombian officials enlarge and improve several key airfields. Flight school com-
mandant Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Santos Calvo and other talented Colom-
bian officers capitalized on the opportunity to work with U.S. advisers. As a re-
sult, the readiness of the Colombian Air Force greatly improved by 1943. Still, the
American aviation mission, then commanded by Colonel Charles D. Densford,
considered the Colombian Air Force incapable of modern warfare.82
Compared to air and naval units, the Colombian ground forces impressed the
U.S. military advisers. U.S. officers believed that the Colombian Army, while small,
simply needed better equipment and training. Beginning in 1942 U.S. instructors at
Colombian service schools taught classes on subjects ranging from infantry tactics
to leadership to conversational English. Lieutenant Colonel Ross Barr organized
seminars on camouflage, communications, fortification, and map reading. The ex-

perienced American infantry officer also introduced Colombians to a variety of
American weapons. Together, Colombian and U.S. officers organized a quartermas-
ter school, opened a motor vehicle training center, and started armored warfare
classes. Some U.S. officers even worked with the Colombian Army Construction
Division, creating engineer construction companies for internal development proj-
ects. During that work, U.S. military personnel had their first contact with Lieuten-
ant Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the chief of the Colombian Army engineering
section and future president of Colombia. In 1944 American officers advised the
Colombian general staff on the formation of a draft, making all young Colombian
males eligible for two years of military duty. In practice, the system was imperfect:
many illiterate soldiers spent most of their time on active duty learning how to read.
It nonetheless began the American military’s long-term investment in Colombian
Army personnel practices. During World War II the greatest problem the mission
encountered revolved around finding the right men to work with the Colombi-
ans. American personnel specialists, focused on supporting overseas U.S. combat
units, often dispatched underqualified officers, men with little or no experience in
Latin America, to Colombia. Too many Americans, for example, did not under-
stand Spanish, rendering them “practically useless” as advisers to a Spanish-speak-
ing army.83 Nevertheless, Colombians benefited from the advisory network. They
exploited American knowledge and experience to upgrade the Colombian forces.
While the Colombian military steadily improved during World War II, Colom-
bian and American officials realized that the South American republic could not
withstand a direct Axis strike without active U.S. military assistance. In 1940 Ameri-
can planners considered an invasion a real possibility; the Havana Conference and
bilateral security talks addressed that very issue. After the war, Washington learned
that Berlin did not intend to cross the ocean, or at least had no formal plans to at-
tack the Western Hemisphere. But, at the time, Americans feared the worst, creating
detailed operational plans for protecting Latin America. The most comprehensive
study involved Brazil: U.S. military officers envisioned sending a hundred thousand
troops to defend Brazil, the most likely target of a Nazi first strike, as it lay merely
eighteen hundred nautical miles from Vichy-controlled French West Africa. The U.S.
War Department devoted less attention to the defense of Colombia. The Germans,
after all, would have to fight U.S. forces in the Caribbean before landing in Colom-
bia. Nonetheless, the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command, formed in 1941 to defend
the Panama Canal and surrounding area, developed a plan to hold Colombia. Since
the American command, located in the Panama Canal Zone, lacked enough troops
to occupy the entire republic, U.S. planners divided the contingency plan into two
parts. In response to a German invasion through the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps would seize northern Colombia. American forces would concen-
trate their combat units around Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa Marta. Troops
from the 550th U.S. Airborne Infantry Battalion in Panama would simultaneously
occupy and defend Bogotá. If the Japanese attacked Colombia from the west, the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would secure strategic locations on Colombia’s Pacific
coast; again, American airborne infantry would hold the Colombian capital. Over-
seas military developments made a U.S. move into Colombia unnecessary. Allied
forces contained the Axis threat, and the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command retired
the package. The entire exercise demonstrated the extent to which the United States
would go to defend the Colombia from extra-continental aggression.84
Short of an Axis invasion, American authorities did not want to send combat
forces to Colombia. During the first months of the war, however, U.S. officers did
attempt to post small airport security detachments in Colombia. In January 1941
the Colombian minister of war agreed to allow U.S. airplanes to fly over Colom-
bian territory. Later that year the Santos government opened Colombian airfields
to U.S. flyers. American pilots could refuel in Colombia, even stay in the republic
overnight, as long as Washington notified Bogotá before the flights arrived. In the
case of an emergency, distressed American aircrews could land without warn-
ing. To protect and service these planes, the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command
wanted to station military service detachments in Colombia. On 22 December
1941, after the Pearl Harbor attack, the American ambassador took the proposal
to the Colombian president. In principle, Santos agreed to let U.S. servicemen
work at the airports. But he asked that the men either be assigned to the military
missions already in Colombia or disguise themselves as civilian airline employees.
The president said outright placement would violate Colombian sovereignty and
“subject his administration to criticism and embarrassment.”85
As U.S. officers considered Bogotá’s counterproposal, the Santos administration
dispatched Colombian Army assistant chief of staff General Pablo Emilio López
to Panama. Officially the Colombian military attaché in Panama, the general, in
fact, worked as a liaison between the Colombian government and the U.S. Carib-
bean Defense Command. Beginning in February 1942, the question of U.S. service
detachments in Colombia occupied much of the general’s attention. In mid-March
the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command decided that airport security details “should
be in the uniform of the U.S. Army in order that it may be apparent to all the
Nazi agents that solidarity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere is a very real
thing.” U.S. Army personnel in civilian clothes also raised certain legal problems,
and made it “difficult for the U.S. Army to exercise proper control over” the men.86
American officers raised the question with General López on 24 May 1942. In that
meeting, the Colombian general restated his government’s objection.87 U.S. Carib-
bean Defense Command representatives broached the topic with López again on
28 May. “The United States wished to act in an open and frank manner and did not
wish to masquerade in a manner similar to the Nazis.”88 The Colombian general
assured the Americans that the Colombian Army had secured the airfield. If the
United States wanted to pursue the matter, he said, it should use formal diplomatic
channels.89 Unwilling to change their positions, the two sides could not reach a
compromise. In the interim, Colombian forces demonstrated their ability to con-
trol the airfields, largely allaying U.S. concerns. The topic completely disappeared
from bilateral conversations by mid-1943.
Bogotá agreed to open its territory to U.S. forces in an emergency but continued
to guard Colombian sovereignty. Elsewhere in Latin America, some governments
allowed the United States to build bases in their countries during World War II.
Rio de Janeiro, for example, supported the construction of massive U.S. facilities in
Brazil that allowed the United States to project its military power to Africa and Eu-
rope. Other governments, including Mexico City, refused American overtures. The
Colombian position on airport security details, therefore, was not unique. Nor did
it preclude U.S.-Colombian cooperation on other bilateral defense projects within
Colombia. In 1942 Colombian authorities improved two strategic airfields that
would have accommodated U.S. forces during an emergency. Colombian and U.S.
officials then developed an Aircraft Warning System to alert the U.S. Caribbean
Defense Command to the activities of hostile aircraft. Bogotá granted American
forces permission to penetrate Colombian territory during regional security mis-
sions such as antisubmarine patrols. Colombian and American technicians also
collaborated to upgrade Colombia’s internal communications network in order to
improve the flow of intelligence, such as information on the location of German
submarines. In 1942 Bogotá granted the United States permission to station a sea-
plane tender in Cartagena; the unarmed U.S. ship moved to Barranquilla in 1943.
In both ports, the U.S. naval vessel required only a freshwater pipeline. President
López, however, hesitated when the U.S. Navy asked to send shore patrols into Co-
lombian port cities, acquiescing only after a Colombian woman knifed a U.S. sailor
in Barranquilla.90 Concurrently, the U.S. Navy operated a small refueling station
on Providencia Island, five hundred miles north of Cartagena. The eight-man unit
and seaplane tender allowed American aircraft to conduct antisubmarine opera-
tions over a larger section of the Caribbean. The U.S. Navy donated its equipment
and unused supplies to Colombia when it withdrew after the war.91
Colombian military forces also played a small part in regional defense. In Decem-
ber 1943, after Bogotá’s declaration of belligerency, the Colombian minister of war
brought the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command chief Lieutenant General George
H. Brett to Colombia to discuss how the republic could improve its cooperation
with the United States. President-designate Echandía hoped that the meeting, and a
larger Colombian role in hemispheric defense, would help citizens understand the
seriousness of the war.92 During the December meeting and a follow-up conference
in Panama, Colombian and U.S. officers reviewed the disposition and readiness of
the Colombian armed forces. Many Colombian officers, including naval represen-
tative Lieutenant Commander Antonio J. Tanco, wanted Colombia to play an ac-
tive role in hemispheric defense. After the conferences, Colombia increased the size
of its army and strengthened its coastal garrisons; Colombian Army officers also
joined U.S. forces in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters as combat observers.
From January 1944 onward, in conjunction with U.S. forces, the Colombian Navy
undertook combat patrols between Santa Marta and Bahía Honda. Additionally,
Colombian ships participated in search and rescue operations with U.S. forces. At
the same time, nine Colombian military airplanes monitored the Colombian coast-
line between Barranquilla and Turbo, flights coordinated with American air power
in Panama. Together, the commitment of Colombian forces to regional defense du-
ties constituted only a small addition to the total volume of active forces in the
region. They came as the real threat to the western Caribbean waned. Still, joint
Colombian-American activities between 1944 and 1945 exposed both sides to the
type of operational partnership that would flourish during the Korean War.93
While Colombian servicemen undertook some regional security chores during
World War II, Bogotá did not send forces overseas. In the early 1940s, some U.S.
diplomats believed that Latin American militaries should join the fighting alliance.
Latin American detachments would serve a larger inter-American political pur-
pose, even if they had little real battlefield impact. American military planners, on
the other hand, opposed using small-country forces in active combat. In Decem-
ber 1942 the U.S. War Department concluded that the “complications” connected
with using Latin American troops “seriously outweighed” the potential benefits.94
The Latin American republics generally lacked military institutions capable of
making an effective battlefield contribution. Therefore, U.S. officers, it was argued,
should not be bothered with the combination of diverse multinational units as a
mere political gesture. In this light, the U.S. War Department turned back Colom-
bians when they approached U.S. officials about fighting abroad. In February 1944
an American intelligence officer in Bogotá reported that Colombian Army offi-
cers were “anxious” for “an active part” in the military campaign against the Axis
powers.95 In April 1944 Bogotá informally proposed that Colombian airmen join
U.S. forces overseas. Considering U.S. military mission reports, American military
planners assumed they would have to train and equip the entire Colombian squad-
ron. The combat value of the unit would not justify the investment. U.S. officers
politely asked their Colombian counterparts not to pursue the matter; the López
administration dropped the idea in mid-1944.96 Variants of the exchange occurred
in other Latin American capitals. In most cases, U.S. officials succeeded in prevent-
ing Latin Americans from even offering military contributions. Only Brazil and
Mexico sent forces abroad during World War II.
The Brazilian and Mexican governments had good reasons to join the coalition
of fighting countries. Both believed that combat operations would improve their
military establishments. Brazillian president Getúlio Vargas and Mexican leader

Manuel Ávila Camacho thought overseas fighting would give their respective
countries a greater role in the postwar world. Domestic political forces and a de-
sire for a greater share of U.S. military and economic assistance further motivated
decision makers. The Roosevelt administration held that Brazil and Mexico, the
largest and most capable U.S. allies in Latin America, could make a real military
contribution. Since the active participation of the two leading Latin American
republics would also serve a larger political purpose, Washington agreed to train
and equip units from both countries. In July 1944 the 25,000-man Fórça Expedi-
cionária Brasileira (FEB) arrived in Italy. Integrated into the 5th U.S. Army, the
Brazilian division encountered some immediate supply and morale problems.
Fortunately, it managed to overcome most issues before it engaged the Germans.
The FEB pursued the German Army up the Po Valley and captured Monte Cas-
tello. It later seized Castelnuovo, Montese, Marano, and Vignola. On several oc-
casions, the Germans hammered the expeditionary force, inflicting heavy losses
on the Brazilians, but overall the FEB accumulated a good combat record in Italy.
Brazil suffered 3,500 combat casualties by the time the European war ended in
May 1945.97 The 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron joined the 5th U.S. Air Force in
the Philippines on 1 May 1945. Operating P-47s from Clarke Field outside Manila,
the Mexican flyers undertook close air support and air-ground operations over
Luzon and Formosa. Seven Mexican pilots died during the war, two in combat
action. Although the 5th U.S. Air Force commander maintained that the Mexican
accident rate was too high, the squadron’s combat performance, like that of the
FEB, was fully acceptable.98 In an inter-American military context, Brazil and
Mexico made extraordinary contributions to the Allied effort. In both countries,
it bred high expectations for postwar cooperation with the United States.
Colombian servicemen did not distinguish themselves by fighting abroad, but
they did attend U.S. service schools during World War II. The exchanges increased
Colombian military preparedness, familiarized Colombians with U.S. tactics and
doctrine, forged new personal relationships, and promoted pro-American senti-
ment among Colombian servicemen. Colombians attended armor, artillery, and
infantry courses in the United States.99 Colombian military surgeons and lawyers
studied at American institutions, including apprenticeships alongside U.S. col-
leagues. More than ten Colombian students matriculated with each class at the U.S.
service academies. In 1939 the Colombian minister of war sent several Colombian
Army quartermaster officers to the Canal Zone. They received “theoretical instruc-
tion,” as well as first-hand exposure to “the actual operation of a commissary; the
receiving, storage, and the warehousing of property; property accounting; cooks
and baker school; company storeroom and mess; and motor transportation and
shops.”100 Additionally, the Santos government petitioned Washington to accept
Colombian pilots to U.S. Army flight schools. After a physical examination and
Colombian military pilots Lieutenant Gustavo Artunduaga, Lieutenant Bernardo Escobedo,

Major Luis Pinto, and Captain Hector Materon prepare for a training flight at the U.S. Naval
Air Station in Corpus Christi, Texas, 1942. Colombian servicemen gained access to U.S. ser-
vice schools during World War II. (Source: Department of the Navy, NARA)
language test, Colombian flyers proceeded to the United States where they spent
three months in a basic flight-training course, six months learning their tactical
specialty, and three months at Air Corps Tactical School. By 1943, more than thirty
pilots traveled to the United States for flight training each year. Still others attended
the Central and South American Air School, later called the Inter-American Air
Forces Academy, which opened in Panama in 1943. Colombian Navy officers com-
pleted classes in ship maintenance, supply, leadership, and antisubmarine warfare
at U.S. naval schools. “Courses were fast and demanding,” remembered Second
Lieutenant Álvaro Valencia Tovar, who trained at the U.S. Armor School in Ken-
tucky.101 Professionally, Colombians learned more about the art of war. They also
became close friends with U.S. servicemen, some of whom they would encounter
again in Korea. The specialized courses, moreover, provided Colombians with the
skills they needed to deploy their new U.S. military equipment.102
In 1938 President Santos claimed to have little interest in acquiring American
arms. In fact, he explicitly asked Americans to refrain from pushing U.S. weap-
ons on the Colombian armed forces. By 1940, Santos had reversed his position.
Unable to purchase arms from European manufacturers, Colombia needed a new
source for military supplies. In order to take full advantage of the U.S. training
missions, Colombian authorities wanted American equipment. The U.S. advisers,
they discovered, knew little about weapons manufactured in foreign countries.
For its part, Washington wanted Latin American militaries to purchase and use
American gear. In the event U.S. and Latin American forces undertook combined
operations, standardized equipment simplified inter-American supply processes.
In 1940 Washington decided that it would distribute equipment to Latin America
in ways consistent with its hemispheric strategic priorities. The Roosevelt admin-
istration grouped the Latin American republics into four categories. Washington
decided to provide Mexico and Brazil with arms to maintain domestic stability and
repel a major Axis assault. After the United States satisfied Brazilian and Mexican
requirements, U.S. authorities resolved to send equipment to Colombia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela. Hostile forces in those countries posed a direct threat to the Pan-
ama Canal. Yet American forces could not easily defend the countries of northern
South America because of their distance from the United States. The third tier
included the Central American and Caribbean republics. The Roosevelt admin-
istration calculated that U.S. forces could easily protect countries within the zone
of greatest American influence. Washington, therefore, sought only to provide
enough military materiel for each government to maintain domestic order. The
remaining republics of South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru,
and Uruguay) composed the final group. Given the finite quantity of U.S. equip-
ment, American planners decided that these countries, a great distance from the
United States, would receive arms only after the needs of the other republics had
been fulfilled. The entire scheme mirrored the geography of the inter-American
neighborhood.103
The Lend-Lease program, which Roosevelt signed into law on 11 March 1941,
provided the means through which to distribute U.S. equipment. The measure
made defense materiel available to countries deemed essential to U.S. security.
On 6 May 1941, the Roosevelt administration declared Colombia and several of its
neighbors vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, making them eligible for
assistance; Colombia’s domestic political situation delayed the signing of the Lend-
Lease agreement until 17 March 1942. Once initialed, the contract allocated $16.2
million in U.S. military aid to Colombia. Bogotá agreed to pay roughly 44 percent
of the total cost. Between 1942 and 1945, however, Colombia received only $8.3 mil-
lion in Lend-Lease arms, half of the available American equipment. The Colombian
Congress neglected to pass the funding bill to receive the full package of U.S. assis-
tance. Liberal-Conservative fighting also held up legislation necessary to properly
deploy some of the American materiel. Despite these problems, Colombia acquired
airplanes, light tanks, trucks, motorcycles, artillery, antitank guns, and rifles (M-1
U.S. Army Lend-Lease motor vehicles outside Bogotá, 1943. Colombia did not take full
advantage of the Lend-Lease program. Still, it acquired modern U.S. military equipment,
for the first time, during World War II. (Source: U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA)
and M-31 carbines) during World War II.104 The republic also received U.S. military
uniforms. Colombian soldiers gradually replaced their prewar Prussian-style head-
gear with American helmets, a visual representation of the army’s new orientation
toward the United States. Most of the equipment, including helmets, arrived after
Colombia’s 1943 recognition of belligerency with the Axis, when Colombia began
to play a more active role in Caribbean defense, but after the real threat to the re-
gion passed.105 As the war drew to a close, Colombia also received some U.S. sup-
plies under the Surplus War Property Disposal Act, although most of those items
were nonlethal.106 Compared to Britain and the Soviet Union, Colombia received a
negligible amount of Lend-Lease materiel. Together, the Latin American republics
received less than 3 percent of the wartime equipment distributed by the United
States, with Brazil (Washington’s closest ally) taking 75 percent of the region’s total
allocation.107 Still, Lend-Lease assistance introduced Colombians to modern U.S.
military equipment, which they would rely upon in the years ahead.
Regrettably, the Lend-Lease program created unintended tensions among the
Latin American republics. From the beginning, some U.S. and Latin American of-
ficials feared that American military assistance would spark a hemispheric arms
race. Many Colombians, for example, believed that the Peruvian government re-
ceived Lend-Lease materiel disproportionate to its defense needs. Since Colombia
and Peru had clashed between 1932 and 1934, leaders in both countries suspiciously
watched their competitors. Bogotá expressed misgivings when Lima-bound U.S.
aircraft, some laden with supplies, refueled at Colombian airfields. Other interre-
gional rivals experienced variations of this problem. Indeed, on 15 February 1943 the
U.S. military attaché to Colombia noted strong “evidence of distrust and jealousies
between Latin American nationals, particularly on the subject of Lend Lease.”108 As
for Colombia and Peru, U.S. officials allowed Lima less military aid than Bogotá.
The public record, which included Lend-Lease allotments, did not allay Colombian
concerns. To convince Colombians that the United States did not favor Peru, U.S.
Caribbean Defense Command representative Colonel Serafin M. Montesinos took
a copy of the U.S. Lend-Lease ledger to Bogotá in mid-1944. It demonstrated that
the United States intended to send more equipment to Colombia than Peru.109 Yet
in the end, because Colombia did not accept everything the United States offered,
the American military delivered slightly more materiel to Peru.
As with the declaration of belligerency in 1943, Colombian internal affairs inevi-
tably influenced bilateral military cooperation. Colombia’s domestic political situa-
tion prevented the country from taking full advantage of the Lend-Lease program.
As for the frequent leadership turnovers, a U.S. military mission chief complained
in August 1943 that regular cabinet shakeups spawned confusion over Colombian-
American objectives.110 In fact, four different men headed the Colombian Ministry
of War in one twelve-month period. Political controversies distracted Colombian
ministers from their regular duties, creating obstacles to the efficient administration
of the bilateral relationship. Indeed, in October 1943 American ambassador Arthur
Bliss Lane, who had replaced Braden in April 1942, reported that Colombian inter-
nal “bickering” disrupted the smooth functioning of the alliance.111 It also forced
officials to abort some potentially useful ventures. In December 1943, for example,
U.S. and Colombian officials agreed to hold a bilateral military exercise in the Ca-
ribbean, one that would have included air, land, and sea forces.112 But in July 1944,
after months of preparation, Colombian planners asked U.S. officers to postpone
the maneuver. Bogotá intended to wait until its internal political situation calmed.
The two countries did not reschedule the exercise.113 In these ways, domestic affairs
influenced Colombian-American military relations. Throughout, political discord
raised U.S. concerns about Colombian internal security.
Internal Security
Colombian and U.S. officials worked together to promote Colombian domestic sta-
bility during World War II. Conventional defense matters, rather than internal se-
curity, dominated the Colombian-American affiliation between 1939 and 1945. The
two governments were nevertheless determined to protect Colombia from internal
enemies. Prior to the war, American interest in Latin American internal security
centered on protecting U.S. citizens, businesses, and friendly governments. During
World War II the focus of internal security efforts shifted. Inter-American agents
undertook hemispheric counterespionage operations to control Axis saboteurs,

smugglers, and sympathizers. Evidence of Axis subversion in Colombia (and else-
where) excited Americans. The New York Times expressed American fears when
it reported in August 1940 “that a well-knit, secret Nazi military organization,
disciplined and ready for action” thrived in Colombia. That such an organization
“could exist in such a bulwark of democracy as Colombia under normal circum-
stance would appear ridiculous,” the writer continued, but the situation during the
early 1940s was anything but “normal.”114 Generally, Bogotá found the problems
less troubling than Washington. “All of Colombia is a potential airfield” that might
threaten the United States, President Santos laughed when Roosevelt publicly pos-
ited that the Germans had built secret landings in Colombia.115 Regardless, both
the Santos and López administrations cooperated with American authorities. After
the war, U.S. investigators learned that Tokyo and Berlin did not have a coordinated
espionage program in Colombia. Adolph Hitler, for instance, showed very little in-
terest in Latin America. During World War II, however, inter-American officials
uncovered sufficient evidence to conclude that the threat was real and immediate.
Wartime counterespionage cooperation involved a vast array of activities, all de-
signed to strengthen the Colombian government’s control over the country. Bilateral
collaboration protected Colombian institutions and installations against Axis sabo-
teurs. Counterespionage agents seized Nazi propaganda and fortified Colombia’s
coastal garrisons to “retard the action of enemy aliens and sympathizers.”116 Officials
forced German pilots out of Colombia; they attacked a widespread platinum smug-
gling network. Authorities even dismantled a clandestine radio operation known to
have tracked the movements of Colombian warships.117 This state-building exercise
in Colombia involved elected officials, diplomats, military officers, and law enforce-
ment agents. At the highest levels, the U.S. and Colombian presidents, their cabi-
nets, and diplomatic representatives defined the terms and conditions governing
counterespionage operations. The Colombian Army, National Police, department
authorities, and municipal police all worked to combat internal subversion, albeit
with varying degrees of proficiency. The U.S. military attachés, Office of Naval In-
telligence, and Military Intelligence Division gathered information on clandestine
activities. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, in Colombia at the request
of the Colombian government, also played their part, especially Quenton H. Plun-
kett, who served as an adviser to Colombia’s National Police director.118 American
embassy and consulate employees both collected and communicated intelligence
to the appropriate Colombian authorities. The enormous task of correlating and
analyzing information gathered by American agents fell to William Braden, the
ambassador’s son, as well as the wives of several U.S. officials who were all (at one
time or another) reported to have spent ten or more hours per day at the task.119
Several realities of life in Colombia frustrated U.S. and Colombian officials.
First, Colombian detectives maintained an ineffective domestic intelligence net-
work. Indeed, the United States provided an estimated 85 percent of the informa-
tion in Colombian counterespionage files. The deficiency directly led Colombia to
request FBI assistance, which the U.S. government promptly provided.120 Second,
the National Police and local authorities were often at odds with one other. In
other cases, Colombians did not trust the national government or its agents; the
killing by National Police of dozens of sports fans following a bullfight riot along
the Caribbean coast illustrated this distrust. The incident led local citizens to de-
mand (in vain) the withdrawal of the “interior police” from the region. In such
an atmosphere, many Colombians refused to cooperate with federal investigators.
Corruption simultaneously impaired the proper functioning of many Colombian
operations. American embassy consul Nelson R. Park noted that, even after a suc-
cessful 1940 raid that netted thirty-four illegal firearms, it was “practically impos-
sible to rely on the cooperation of local government because of their ignorance and
their being easily corruptible.”121 In another case, Nazi agents in Barranquilla had
been informed of a National Police raid before the agents conducting the operation
even left Bogotá.122
The experiences of Washington’s most active “Nazi-hunter,” Medellín vice con-
sul Vernon Lee Fluharty, embodied the ground-level problems and possibilities of
cooperation. Fluharty worked in the Department of Antioquia, the state with the
most pro-Nazi activity. The department shared a border with the Chocó mining
region (the origins of platinum smuggling) and included a peninsula on the Gulf
of Urabá, adjacent to Panama. Fluharty, equipped with a sidearm for his own pro-
tection, entered a dangerous underworld of smoky roadhouses and Nazi intrigue.
Medellín detective force commander Guillermo Upegui, a pro-German official
who repeatedly informed suspects before government raids, frustrated Fluharty’s
early efforts.123 Later, in November 1941 the Santos administration forced Upegui
to resign. The new Colombian commander, Mauricio Arango, forged an efficient
alliance with Fluharty. In fact, after Arango came to office, Medellín consulate of-
ficials met with city detectives on a daily basis to coordinate and plan intelligence
activities. The Fluharty-Arango team seized Axis literature, confiscated arms,
shut down clandestine radio networks, and trailed foreign nationals.124 Ambassa-
dor Braden repeatedly praised Fluharty’s “intelligent and valuable work”; as with
other ventures, the counselor’s counterespionage success depended on the coop-
eration of Colombian officials.125
A major wartime concern involved a potential air strike on the Panama Canal
launched from Colombian territory. The larger Colombian-American wartime al-
liance made a Colombian military offensive against the passageway unthinkable.
Instead, authorities feared that Axis sympathizers might launch a surprise attack,
perhaps simply by mounting munitions on a commercial airplane. Although such
an attack “might seem incredible,” an American journalist concluded, “so too did
the notion that Germany would overrun” Western Europe.126 In this context, the
United States and Colombia soon focused their attention on the Colombian-
German Society for Air Transportation (SCADTA), a Colombian airline founded
(with German capital) in 1919 by Austrian Peter von Bauer. During the 1920s
SCADTA turned a handsome profit and soon controlled a majority of Colombia’s
air traffic. In 1931 Pan American Airways purchased a controlling interest in
SCADTA to prevent the Colombian carrier from competing with its international
routes. Pan American president Juan Terry Trippe, however, kept his stake in
SCADTA quiet, and by the late 1930s few U.S. officials, and even fewer Colombi-
ans, knew that the U.S. firm held a controlling interest in the Colombian airline.127
As the war grew closer, the U.S. government became increasingly uncomfortable
with SCADTA because it employed German aviators, several of whom maintained
ties to the German Air Force. As U.S. anxieties became known in Colombia, Presi-
dent Santos calmly dismissed their “exaggerated fears.”128 Washington, however,
took the threat very seriously. Delighted when it “rediscovered” that Pan American
owned SCADTA, the Roosevelt administration tried to pressure the company to
remove SCADTA’s German employees. Much to the chagrin of administration of-
ficials, Trippe refused to cooperate, believing the idea bad business, and Pan
American Airways maintained the services of the German flyers.129
Bad for business or not, the Roosevelt administration wanted the Germans
out of Colombia. On 4 September 1939, three days after the outbreak of the Euro-
pean war, Ambassador Braden told Santos that Pan American effectively owned
SCADTA, news that changed the president’s position. By cooperating with the
United States against SCADTA, Santos realized he could return the airline to Co-
lombian control. In September 1939 Santos ordered that Colombian copilots fly on
all international flights and pressured SCADTA administrators to fire a few Ger-
man flyers. Soon thereafter, two suspicious German pilots took one-way vacations
to Japan. On 31 December 1939 the Santos administration ordered Colombian
Army guards to be stationed at all airports and Colombian copilots on all domestic
flights.130 Later that year, the Santos administration, encouraged by Washington,
started planning its takeover of SCADTA by invoking 1938 legislation that required
51 percent Colombian ownership of all Colombian airlines. Ironically, the law had
been designed to defend SCADTA and Von Bauer, then a Colombian citizen. Even
so, in 1940 Santos oversaw the merger of SCADTA and the Colombian Air Service,
a smaller Colombian airline, into a national carrier called Avianca. Avianca fired
its remaining eighty-four German employees after France fell in June 1940. The
outcome pleased Bogotá and Washington. Colombia put the airline under its con-
trol; the United States rid the country of German aviators. Only Pan American lost
in the deal.131
With the exception of Pan American Airways, American businesses in Colom-
bia thoroughly cooperated with the United States in security matters. When the
Conservative daily El Siglo ran a series of pro-German articles, the State Depart-
ment convinced American advertisers to threaten the editors. If the newspaper
continued its pro-German expressions, U.S. firms would take their business else-
where. At the same time, the Santos administration warned El Siglo to moderate its
editorial practices. The Colombian government threatened to withhold publish-
ing supplies if the paper failed to comply. El Siglo, thereafter, supported the Allied
cause. The Sherwin-Williams Paint Company, based in Cleveland, Ohio, agreed to
fire its pro-Nazi representative in Colombia. Managers at the International Busi-
ness Machines (IBM) headquarters in Colombia disposed of two openly Nazi em-
ployees, Frederick Frank Sendel and Klaus Jacoby. The company fired Sendel, who
returned to Europe, and transferred Jacoby to the United States, where the FBI
placed him under surveillance. In other instances, Washington used a proclaimed
list of dangerous individuals and firms to blacklist Axis nationals or pro-Axis busi-
nesses. Inclusion on the blacklist had the effect of cutting off scarce wartime re-
sources and driving away commercial associates for fear of U.S. retribution.132
With U.S. assistance, the Colombian government also tracked foreign nation-
als. In July 1940 the Santos administration compiled a comprehensive census of
foreigners residing in Colombia. Bogotá established guidelines for the entry and
movement of foreigners the following year.133 Because of strict Colombian immi-
gration laws, only five thousand Germans, and fewer Japanese, lived in Colombia.
Immediately following Pearl Harbor, Bogotá broke relations with the Axis and ex-
pelled all German, Italian, and Japanese diplomats, including German minister to
Colombia, Wolfgang Dittler, who had coordinated Nazi activities in Colombia.134
The Santos administration action disrupted the Nazi network in Colombia. Because
Colombian laws proved impotent against pro-Nazi Colombian and Latin American
nationals, a weakened network survived.135 As World War II developed, the United
States pressed Colombian authorities to follow the model of other Latin Ameri-
can nations and deport more foreign nationals. Peru, for example, sent thousands
of foreigners to the United States, where U.S. officials confined most for the dura-
tion of the war. Bogotá, in contrast, took relatively few steps to rid the republic of
“dangerous” individuals.136 Colombian officials became somewhat more responsive
after their November 1943 declaration of belligerency. The country’s new status, Bo-
gotá feared, would excite saboteurs and sympathizers. The Colombian government
therefore extradited some Axis nationals to the United States. The Roosevelt admin-
istration thought Colombia should have been more aggressive.
In addition, the two governments undertook an extensive survey of Colom-
bian territory to improve internal security and state control. A joint U.S.-Colom-
bian aerial photography program (which consisted of a U.S. cameraman aboard
a Colombian-piloted plane) provided information on suspected espionage facili-
ties and areas critical to hemispheric defense. The Colombian-American mapping
project also helped the Colombian government accurately chart its national terri-
tory for the first time. In 1939 U.S. Department of State geographer Wilson Pope-
noe and Colombian military officers Captain Hernando Herrera and Lieutenant
Eduardo Falon undertook an ambitious survey of Colombia’s Pacific coast.137
French Intelligence Service reports of a Nazi steamer landing arms and personnel
on Colombia’s Pacific coast inspired the mission to “obtain information regarding
the foreigners living in the area” and “investigate the report that airplane motors
and fuselage had been landed by German ships.”138 Aboard the Colombian gun-
boat ARC Carabobo, the team steamed from Buenaventura to the Panamanian
border. En route, the men made an extensive account of the coast, concluding
the allegations unfounded. The group determined that the suspicious movements
likely “arose from smuggling activities,” another persistent wartime concern in
both Bogotá and Washington.139
Colombian and U.S. authorities confronted the illicit platinum trade during
World War II. Manufacturers used the precious metal—an essential ingredient in
modern warfare—to make airplane, tank, and high-speed naval patrol boat igni-
tion contacts. Germany resorted to platinum smuggling to keep its war machine
moving. Colombia constituted one of the world’s major suppliers of the metal.
The Chocó, a dense jungle region in the northeast corner of Colombia, had been
the source of illegal platinum since the colonial era. The precious metal found its
way onto the black market through one of two channels. Small producers, who
panned on isolated rivers, sold the metal to illegal agents at prices above market
value. Also, corrupt officials at larger mining companies, such as the Chocó Pacific
Company, covertly diverted platinum to contrabandists for a compelling profit.
Once platinum appeared on the black market, commodity smugglers took it to
Germany via one of several elaborate routes. The most common path to Berlin
went from the Chocó, through Ecuador or Peru, down the Pacific coast to Chile,
and then to Buenos Aires. From Argentina, German agents smuggled platinum
to Europe aboard “neutral” Spanish ships. Traffickers transported platinum from
Spain overland to Germany. For the Allies, combating the traffic proved difficult
because even a small amount of the metal, such as the amount that might be con-
cealed in one’s pocket, had tremendous military value.140
In October 1943 the U.S. government estimated that 40 percent of Colombia’s
monthly production of platinum reached Germany, although the figure was likely
inflated.141 Theodore C. Barth, a German-born former Banco Aleman Antioqueño
representative in Colombia, orchestrated platinum smuggling in South America.
An intelligent, crafty, and violent man, Barth, along with his underlings, managed
to acquire platinum until the end of the war, despite significant Colombian govern-
ment efforts to apprehend him. Farid Cajale, a close associate of Barth’s, who used
no fewer than six aliases and traveled on a French passport, also escaped prosecu-
tion. The two men often used “mules,” typically female companions, to move the
metal out of Colombia. Two other prominent smugglers, Carlos Valero and Miquez
A. Correa, were not so fortunate: the former was arrested in Argentina and the
latter in Medellín.142 Colombian-American cooperation against the smugglers ex-
panded after 1942 as the magnitude of the problem became apparent to officials.143
Since the opening of the conflict, Bogotá permitted only the Banco de la República
and its agents to purchase platinum. In September 1943 the Colombian government
restricted the number of bank purchasing agents and declared any platinum not in
the possession of those agents contraband. The next month, the López administra-
tion placed all exits from the Chocó under surveillance and significantly increased
National Police presence in the area. Then, in 1944 the Colombian Army began to
patrol the region, especially important roads and waterways. One U.S. serviceman
in Bogotá praised Colombian military involvement because Colombian Army per-
sonnel were “less crooked” than civilian officials.144
Washington contemplated preventive purchasing on the Colombian and Argen-
tine black markets but decided that such a move would only encourage smuggling.
In December 1943 the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command chief asked Colombians
to do more to combat smuggling. Lieutenant General Brett hinted that Colombia’s
acquisition of Lend-Lease aid depended on the republic’s “attitude” against smug-
gling. He then accelerated the delivery of military equipment to inspire Colombian
action.145 By late 1944 Colombia and the United States had reduced, but not elimi-
nated, platinum smuggling. The Allied military campaign in Western Europe cut
overland routes to Germany; Colombian and American authorities exerted greater
control over the source of illicit platinum. Overall, the transnational assault on
smuggling, and other internal security operations, encouraged Colombian stabil-
ity, even if the real domestic threat never really matched prevailing concerns. The
entire undertaking formed the basis for U.S. involvement in Colombian internal
security and state-building affairs during the cold war.146
Economic and Political Disorder
Beyond conventional and internal security, the Colombian-American wartime

alliance required economic collaboration. World War II disrupted the global
economy, created new demands for Latin American exports, and limited the
availability of capital goods. U.S. and Latin American officials believed this eco-
nomic disorder threatened the stability of the Americas. Concentrated economic
cooperation therefore satisfied basic economic requirements and furthered inter-
American defense objectives. The collapse of overseas markets forced the Latin
American republics to find new commercial outlets, principally in the United
States. Less dependent on European trade than most Latin American countries,
Colombia sent roughly 25 percent of its exports to Europe during the mid-1930s.
By 1940 Colombia’s trans-Atlantic exports dropped to 10 percent of the national

total. At the same time, the American demand for raw materials exploded as U.S.
factories produced military equipment for U.S. and Allied forces. In order to meet
wartime production schedules, the United States needed to harvest the world’s
resources. This unusual economic situation affected different countries in differ-
ent ways; the war’s economic impact often varied among sectors within a given
country. In Colombia the volume of total exports actually grew by nearly 7 per-
cent between 1940 and 1945. Yet shipping shortages and scarce secondary goods
meant that the capital countries such as Colombia accumulated had few useful
outlets. Between 1941 and 1942 the total value of Colombian imports dropped by
50 percent. Colombia’s foreign exchange reserves increased 540 percent during
the war. This situation, common in Latin America, produced rampant inflation.
Bogotá adopted currency and price controls, described by one U.S. economist as
“the most complete and balanced” in Latin America; Colombia even divested it-
self of some money through aggressive debt payments.147 The wartime economic
turbulence nonetheless persisted.148
The Colombian and U.S. governments addressed these problems through a va-
riety of measures that lessened wartime hardships and created conditions theoreti-
cally conducive for postwar modernization. Indirectly, economic cooperation fos-
tered Colombian security by promoting internal communication, strengthening
the central government, expediting the movement of Colombian forces through-
out the country, and easing U.S. and Colombian access to strategic materials. It also
addressed conditions that might encourage social unrest and internal discord. At
the beginning of the war, Colombia first needed to restore its international credit in
order to receive U.S. economic assistance. The country had defaulted on its foreign
debt, held by private investors, in 1933. In 1940 the U.S. Department of Commerce
brokered an agreement between Bogotá and the Foreign Bondholder’s Protective
Council, which represented lenders, thereby making Colombia eligible for Ameri-
can assistance.149 Soon thereafter, the Roosevelt administration sent a $10 million
Export-Import Bank loan to Bogotá for public works and currency stabilization
programs.150 In 1941 Colombia took $12 million to develop transportation net-
works, and in 1943 the Export-Import Bank sent another $15 million to Colombia
for agricultural projects.151 Colombia accepted $3.4 million to construct a hydro-
electric plant in 1945. In conjunction with these credits, Washington dispatched a
cadre of U.S. economic advisers to Colombia. Recognizing Colombia’s great need
for “more and better transportation,” U.S. Bureau of Public Roads engineers col-
laborated with Colombian highway managers to upgrade and expand Colombia’s
road network.152 Other American advisers helped Colombians dredge waterways
and build (or improve) railroads. The scarcity of construction equipment slowed
work at many sites, but did not negate the usefulness of these Colombian-American
development projects. At the same time, Americans cooperated with Colombian
officials on medical and sanitation programs. Bogotá and Washington expanded

the country’s telephone network; Colombian farmers collaborated with U.S. ag-
ricultural experts to plan and implement irrigation and warehousing programs.
Private Americans also invested in Colombia during World War II. In general,
the conflict limited business opportunities in Europe and Asia. Latin America of-
fered capitalists attractive, relatively safe, options. With strong democratic values,
fair business laws, good courts, abundant natural resources, and an “energetic and
aggressive” population, Wall Street Journal analysts considered Colombia an excel-
lent investment.153 By mid-1945 the U.S. private sector had funneled just over $223
million into the South American republic.154
Concurrent with these activities, Colombia sent raw materials to the United
States. In order to guarantee U.S. access to essential commodities, Washington
signed contracts for strategic materials with many Latin American republics.
Bolivia shipped huge quantities of tin to the United States, while Mexico and
Venezuela accelerated their deliveries of crude oil. American industries relied on
Colombian platinum, accounting for the great interest of U.S. authorities in plati-
num smuggling. In February 1942 the Santos government signed an agreement
with the U.S. Metal Reserve Company, which stockpiled strategic materials, to sell
to the U.S. government all its platinum, minus that needed by Colombia or pur-
chased by U.S. banks.155 Bogotá also worked with the U.S. Rubber Reserve Com-
pany. In June 1942 the Santos administration agreed to ship to the United States all
Colombian rubber, again minus the sum required for domestic consumption.156
Wartime demand led to a modest increase in Colombian oil production, although
the shortage of drilling equipment, geographic inaccessibility of Colombia’s best
reserves, and legal barriers limited Colombian oil industry gains.157
World War II affected various sectors of the Colombian economy in differ-
ent ways. Despite dramatic fluctuations between 1939 and 1940, Colombian cof-
fee fared well during the war.158 The country’s principal product accounted for
approximately 54 percent of all Colombian exports. A labor-intensive crop that
employed thousands of Colombians, coffee was socially and economically vital to
country’s well-being. With the coming of the European war, the value of Colom-
bian coffee exports fell from 88 million pesos in 1938 to 74 million pesos in 1940.
That year, Bogotá signed the Third Pan American Coffee Congress Accord, an in-
ternational pact that stabilized coffee prices and established U.S. import quotas.159
As the war progressed and the U.S. defense establishment percolators brewed
around the clock, demand for Colombian coffee skyrocketed. By 1942 the total
value of Colombian coffee exports hit nearly 145 million pesos; prices remained
high through the end of the war.160 Colombian ranchers also profited from the
global conflict, shipping substantial quantities of beef to American forces in the
Canal Zone. Colombia’s textile industry, on the other hand, disappeared almost
overnight. The Pacific war cut off Colombian mercantilists from their East Asian
silk suppliers. With no way to acquire a sufficient stock of raw materials, many
factories folded. International affairs, domestic politics, and nature also conspired
to devastate the Colombian banana industry. Sigatoka, a banana plant disease, in-
fested Colombia’s banana growing region in the late 1930s. The United Fruit Com-
pany, the major producer of Colombian bananas, had the tools and expertise to
combat sigatoka. But the costly 1928 labor strike, memories of hostile Colombian
politicians, and shipping shortages discouraged further American investment. At
the same time, overseas military developments hurt Colombian banana produc-
ers. Before the war, the United Fruit Company sold the entire Colombian har-
vest to European purchasers. After 1939 the demand for bananas in that market
evaporated. American investors therefore divested themselves of their Colombian
holdings between 1939 and 1944, resulting in the collapse of the entire industry in
Colombia, with devastating effects on some local economies.
During World War II, Colombia and the other Latin American republics as-
pired to become industrialized countries, to shed their status as producers of raw
materials. Between 1939 and 1945 Latin American governments accumulated
unprecedented amounts of foreign capital. Yet the scarcity of heavy equipment,
building supplies, and industrial machinery left Latin Americans with few ways
to discharge the funds. To acquire even a modest volume of secondary goods,
President Santos established a Colombian commercial office in Washington. At
home, the new Superintendent of Imports helped distribute scarce materials.161
Some new Colombian industries emerged, and Latin Americans started trading
finished products among themselves at a respectable level. Yet since the republics
could not buy the equipment necessary to industrialize, they could not achieve
their long-term economic objectives. Rightly, the situation frustrated Latin
Americans. They had the financial resources to launch major industrial efforts
but lacked essential capital goods. Recognizing the region’s long-term economic
goals, the Roosevelt administration asked Latin Americans to be patient, to wait
until after the war. The American promise set the scene for a major conflict in
U.S.–Latin American relations after 1945.
While the Latin American republics shared an expectation of postwar mod-
ernization, Colombia alone inched toward the major internal crisis known as la
Violencia. In February 1944, after several months in New York City with his ail-
ing wife, Alfonso López returned to Colombia, optimistic that his political fortunes
would improve.162 López resumed his duties as Colombia’s chief executive and set
out to administer the republic. The Conservative Party immediately intensified its
campaign against the president. One El Siglo writer pledged to “hold the [López]
regime, which has directed robbery, assassination and embezzlement . . . up to the
disgrace of history.”163 Conservative officials committed themselves to fight what
they believed to be Liberal Party tyranny, corruption, and immorality.164 That same
month, Alberto Lleras, then minister of justice, charged Laureano Gómez with
slander. When Gómez refused to testify in court, Lleras imprisoned the Conserva-
tive Party leader.165 In response to Gómez’s imprisonment, riots broke out in sev-
eral Colombian cities, the most destructive of which occurred in Bogotá and Cali.
The disturbances continued until López ordered the police to release Gómez. Soon
thereafter, Colombian Army reservist José Rojas and a local priest led a revolt in Pu-
rificación.166 The Colombian armed forces subdued the rebellion; they also defeated
a Conservative uprising in Jericó in April 1944.167 López threatened to resign but
remained in office. The president’s closest advisers concluded that the country’s po-
litical crisis was “the most critical the country had ever faced.” While that diagnosis
was overstated, Colombia indeed found itself in a difficult situation.168
President López pinned the country’s problems on industrialists, Conserva-
tives, and Catholic Church officials. He even suggested, with doubtful sincerity,
that a vast Nazi conspiracy worked to foment domestic instability.169 But a gang
of disgruntled Colombian Army officers came closest to toppling the president.
President López went to Pasto, near the Ecuadorian border, to observe the Colom-
bian Army’s annual field exercise on 9 July 1944.170 Around 5:00 a.m. the follow-
ing morning, a group of junior army officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Diogenes
Gil Mojica, pulled the president from his hotel bed and placed him under arrest.
They then carried López to a hacienda outside town.171 With strong Conservative
feeling, the officers believed López and Colombian liberalism culturally and so-
cially dangerous. They also loathed the president’s preference for the National Po-
lice over the army. In any case, back in the capital, president-designate Echandía
took control of the government and declared a state of siege. Meanwhile, in Pasto
loyal Colombian Army officer Colonel Gonzalo Fajardo disguised himself as a
conspirator and (with forged documents) convinced the hacienda guards to re-
lease López. Free again, the president returned to Pasto and confronted Lieuten-
ant Colonel Gil. The renegade officer immediately surrendered to the Colombian
commander-in-chief. The capable efforts of key cabinet officials helped foil the
coup, compartmentalizing the crisis, as did the overall loyalty of the Colombian
armed forces. The failed revolt nevertheless convinced many Colombians that the
country was moving toward a crisis of immense proportions.172
López resumed his presidential duties on 12 July 1944. The investigation that fol-
lowed the events in Pasto indicted forty Colombian Army officers in the stillborn
coup. The relationship between the Conservative Party, especially Laureano Gó-
mez, and the conspiracy remained unclear. Liberal officials believed that Gómez
had collaborated with the officers. After the Pasto affair Gómez sought political
asylum in the Brazilian embassy. In late July the Conservative Party chief fled to
Quito, Ecuador, where he remained until December.173 Liberals never effectively
connected Gómez to the coup, nor did Conservatives offer a convincing defense
of their leader. On 31 July, Congress granted López special authority to reorganize
the Colombian Army and purge undemocratic elements.174 The move gave the
president more control over the Colombian military, but did not save López from
an early resignation. Alfonso López handed the Colombian presidency over to
Alberto Lleras in 1945.175 A relative calm then fell across the country as Liberals
and Conservatives geared up for the critical 1946 presidential election, a contest
that would unleash la Violencia on Colombia with important domestic and inter-
national consequences.
· · ·
Colombia and the United States partnered to defend the Western Hemisphere
during World War II. Elected officials brought the republics together after de-
cades of mistrust; diplomats collaborated at inter-American meetings; military
servicemen came together to plan, study, and train; authorities managed internal
security and economic problems. Colombian military forces might have fought
overseas, but U.S. policymakers discouraged small-nation contributions to the
fighting coalition. Constantly interacting with events in Europe and Asia, the
Colombian-American wartime partnership embodied inter-American coopera-
tion. Ideologically, shared democratic values made the Colombia and the United
States logical allies in the war against totalitarianism. As for material interests,
the United States secured a strategically vital region, obtained emergency access
to important facilities, improved an ally’s military capabilities, and gathered im-
portant raw materials. Colombia relied on the U.S. forces to defeat the Axis pow-
ers. It also received U.S. military and economic assistance. Colombia’s domestic
situation affected most aspects of the wartime partnership, including its decla-
ration of belligerency, Lend-Lease assistance, and counterespionage operations.
By extension, Colombians exercised tremendous control over bilateral relations.
Indeed, important provisions, such as the military mission contracts, empowered
Colombians. On the edge of the zone of greatest U.S. influence, Colombia and
the United States established important diplomatic, military, and economic links
during World War II. Those interlocking ties formed the basis of broader bilateral
cooperation during the 1950s, but only after the two countries passed through the
tumultuous postwar era.
2
Old Problems, New Possibilities, 1945–1950
The Ninth International Conference of American States opened in Bogotá on 30

March 1948. Diplomats gathered to form the Organization of American States
(OAS), a strong international body to replace the Pan American Union. They met
in Colombia to honor the country’s long devotion to Pan Americanism. After in-
troductory remarks, diplomats broke into six committees to write the OAS char-
ter. As delegates worked, on 9 April, Liberal Party chief Jorge Eliécer Gaitán fell
to the sidewalk outside his downtown law office, the victim of an assassin’s bullet.
Several Colombian policemen moved the gunman, Juan Roa Sierra, into a nearby
retail store, hoping to protect the shooter from the gathering crowd. But a gang
of men, assuming Roa a Conservative Party agent, smashed into the store, blud-
geoned Roa to death, stripped the corpse, and dragged it through the streets of
Bogotá. They eventually dumped the body at the presidential palace, adjacent to
the inter-American conference site. A short time later, when doctors announced
the Liberal Party leader’s death, a series of devastating urban riots erupted across
the republic.1 The Colombian capital, a New York Times writer observed on 10
April, “looks like London during the Nazi air attacks.”2 Amid rumors of a com-
munist conspiracy, the incident, known as the bogotazo or nueve de abril, sent del-
egates to the inter-American conference bolting for safety. The domestic tragedy
temporally derailed the historic conference.
Colombia’s mounting domestic turmoil collided with hemispheric diplomacy
in April 1948. Across the Americas, the 1940s brought the potential for funda-
mental economic, political, and social change. In Colombia, a dizzying spiral of
events left the country in the hands of a Conservative counterrevolution. The
country’s domestic conflict produced some Colombian-American disagreements;
it also provided the countries with reasons to extend their wartime partnership
into the postwar era. Importantly, la Violencia diverted Colombian attention away
from a larger U.S.–Latin American conflict that followed World War II. Having
cooperated with the United States during the war, Latin Americans expected U.S.
43
assistance to modernize their economies. Yet from 1945 to 1950 the Harry S. Tru-
man administration, preoccupied with its new global responsibilities, neglected
Latin America. Rather than hemispheric relations, Washington concentrated on
rebuilding European and Asian areas devastated by the war and containing the ag-
gressive tendencies of the Soviet Union. The Latin American republics that made
the greatest wartime sacrifice, Brazil and Mexico, strongly objected to U.S. policy.
Those countries that made smaller contributions were also disappointed. In many
ways, Colombia’s domestic drama insulated the U.S.-Colombian partnership. It
left Bogotá little time to fret over the deterioration of U.S.–Latin American coop-
eration. While the overall pace of bilateral military and economic collaboration
slowed immediately after World War II, the two countries succeeded in carrying
important institutions and relationships forward. They also collaborated in the
organization of international institutions, introducing new possibilities for collec-
tive security, a system of multilateral defense that would soon be tested in Korea.
Inter-American Security and Development, 1945–1947
Concerned about the future of multilateralism, hemispheric officials set the post-
war inter-American agenda at the Chapúltepec Conference in February 1945. The
meeting emerged from Latin American dissatisfaction with Washington’s draft
charter for the organization that would become the United Nations. Early in the
war, the Roosevelt administration had promised to consult Latin American officials
on all matters related to continental security. However, at the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference in the autumn of 1944, the United States, Great Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union produced recommendations for a postwar international organiza-
tion (United Nations) without Latin American input. Aside from feeling slighted,
Latin Americans objected to the proposed UN charter, which subordinated and
restricted regional security organs, such as the Pan American Union, and created
a Security Council dominated by perpetually seated, veto-wielding great powers.3
Mexican foreign minister Ezequiel Padilla invited diplomats to Chapúltepec Castle
in Mexico City to discuss Latin American misgivings and other issues connected
to the coming peace.4
The work of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at
Chapúltepec fell into several broad categories.5 Although some discussions evalu-
ated how the American republics might most effectively contribute to the suc-
cessful conclusion of the world war, urgent postwar issues dominated the meet-
ing. Latin American officials opposed Washington’s universalistic approach to the
United Nations, instead favoring a formula accommodating regional preroga-
tives. Colombian delegates, in particular, wanted to strengthen, not marginalize,
the inter-American system. The Dumbarton Oaks formula would have prohibited
old problems, new possibilities, 1945–1950 45
the reorganization of the Pan American Union. U.S. secretary of state Edward R.
Stettinius conceded that the UN document should be revised to accommodate
Latin American concerns about the Pan American Union. The American repre-
sentatives, on the other hand, refused to abandon the Security Council scheme;
Stettinius assured officials that two Latin American governments would sit on
the council at all times. Concurrent with these negotiations, Colombian foreign
minister Alberto Lleras chaired talks concerning the future structure of the inter-
American system. The committee outlined provisions for an organization with
increased social, economic, and security powers. Still other delegates evaluated
economic and social problems, especially the inevitable termination of wartime
raw material contracts, postwar commerce, and Latin American access to capital
goods. Latin American officials expressed their strong desire for economic mod-
ernization after World War II. They expected American assistance to accomplish
that goal. U.S. diplomats responded by guaranteeing their southern neighbors ac-
cess to capital goods and generous postwar economic aid. Finally, inter-American
delegates adopted the Act of Chapúltepec, which reaffirmed the solidarity of the
Western Hemisphere, called for collective defense through the end of World War
II, and pledged the American republics to form a postwar inter-American de-
fense pact. The issues discussed during the Chapúltepec Conference occupied the
Americas for many years.6
The United Nations Conference on International Organization convened in
San Francisco, California, one month after the Chapúltepec meeting. There, So-
viet officials resisted Latin American interests, especially in regard to the future
of the Pan American Union. Moscow believed that the Pan American organiza-
tion represented an international bloc hostile to Soviet interests. Also, according
to communist rhetoric, Latin American elites, represented in San Francisco, were
minions of western capitalists who oppressed and exploited the region’s underclass
majority. In this charged political environment, Colombian foreign minister Lleras
led the defense of the inter-American forum. On 30 April he stepped into the inter-
national spotlight to address the delegates. The chief Colombian diplomat began
slowly, praising the “spirit” behind the San Francisco gathering. While Colombia
had made a “moral” and “strategic” contribution to the Allied war effort, he admit-
ted, the republic’s World War II sacrifices had been “modest.”7 Regardless, Colom-
bia held an enormous stake in the future of the international organization. Lleras
aired his objection to the Security Council’s veto system. He conceded that small
nations could not “guarantee the peace and security of the world; only the large
ones can.”8 Conversely, the major powers posed the greatest threat to international
peace. Speaking for all Latin American representatives, Lleras then extolled the
virtues of the Pan American Union, concluding that if “four similar” organizations
functioned around the world “great progress would be made toward permanent
universal peace.”9 Indeed, since 1930, the inter-American federation secured peace
in the Americas and checked the once-imperialistic United States. A universal UN

system held great promise, but remained untested. Small countries such as Colom-
bia, Lleras claimed, needed a proven collective arrangement because they could
not defend themselves alone against great powers. The South American republic
would not jettison the Pan American Union.10
The minister’s forceful presentation started an intense campaign to save the
inter-American association in San Francisco. The Colombian foreign minister
battled Soviet officials in Conference Committee III/3, which dealt exclusively
with regional organizations. On 10 May Lleras delivered what Republican senator
Arthur H. Vandenberg, the U.S. Committee III/3 representative, called a “hum-
dinger” of a lecture on the importance of regional unions. For the Colombian
minister and other Latin American delegates, there would be no compromise,
causing Vandenberg, who personally believed that autonomous regional bodies
might weaken the United Nations, “extreme difficulties.”11 In meeting after meet-
ing, Latin American delegates refused to give ground to the Soviets or Americans,
eventually securing the inclusion of articles 52, 53, and 54 in the UN charter’s final
draft. Collectively, these provisions protected the rights of regional arrangements
such as the Pan American Union. For Colombia and its neighbors, they repre-
sented a major diplomatic victory. The articles, ironically, would also serve the
major powers in the years ahead, permitting the formation of the U.S.-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact.12
Colombia’s contribution to the UN Charter foreshowed its important role in
the international organization. The original fifty-one UN member states included
twenty Latin American republics. A key voting bloc, Latin American delegates
affected the UN agenda through sheer numbers; not until decolonization brought
twenty-five new African countries into the United Nations (1960–62) did the rela-
tive strength of the region seriously decline. Colombian diplomats, as evidenced
in San Francisco, often influenced and represented regional interests. Ratifying
the UN charter in November 1945, Bogotá dispatched a high-powered delegation,
including Darío Echandía and Alfonso López, to the 1946–47 session. During
the first years of the United Nations, Colombian representatives were produc-
tive members, exerting influence, in particular, over the UN’s First Committee
(politics and security) and Sixth Committee (international law). In November
1946 Colombia gained a seat on the Security Council, thus becoming only the
third Latin American country to obtain the important position (behind Brazil
and Mexico), symbolic of the republic’s strategic and diplomatic significance.13
On the council, Colombian officials attempted to broker a compromise between
Soviet and American representatives on the UN Military Staff Committee over
the size and composition of a standing UN army.14 Colombia failed to bring the
two sides together, but made clear the republic’s continued interest in collective
security through the United Nations.
As Colombia distinguished itself through its UN participation, Bogotá emerged

as a strong opponent of the Soviet Union. During World War II the Soviet Union
joined the Western powers to fight Germany. Bogotá established relations with
Moscow in 1943 as a gesture of wartime solidarity. After 1945, however, the wartime
alliance gave way to intense Soviet-American competition. At the London and
Moscow conferences in 1945, U.S. and Soviet officials clashed over the organization
of the postwar world. In 1946 British prime minister Winston Churchill, speak-
ing in Missouri, proclaimed that an iron curtain had descended across Europe.
The contest soon spilled into the United Nations. In a September 1947 General
Assembly meeting, López lamented that Soviet-American competition impaired
the UN’s ability to fulfill its promise.15 For its part, Bogotá blamed Moscow (and
the UN Security Council veto system Colombians had opposed) for paralysis at
the United Nations and the coming of the cold war. Colombian diplomats fre-
quently described Soviet foreign policy as aggressive, belligerent, and hostile to
international peace. Colombian officials also objected to communism on ideologi-
cal grounds. Elite members of both political parties found communism offensive;
Conservatives tended to be more emotional in their opposition. Undemocratic and
anti-Christian, communists, they believed, threatened Colombian values. Com-
munists also endangered their privileged place in society by challenging the pre-
vailing social order. Colombian diplomats at the United Nations, therefore, were
firm in their opposition to the Soviet Union and international communism.16
While Colombians opposed the Soviet Union, they also disliked aspects of
Washington’s postwar foreign policy. Whereas the Roosevelt administration
guaranteed Latin Americans postwar economic assistance, the Truman team
focused on other matters. Lacking interest in Latin American development, the
United States cancelled a June 1945 inter-American conference on Latin America’s
economic situation. Washington also fumbled opportunities to pass legislation
essential to inter-American military cooperation. Personnel turnovers in U.S. and
Latin American governments severed important wartime ties. Harry Truman,
who became president after Roosevelt died in April 1945, lacked his predecessor’s
appreciation for Latin America, especially from 1945 to 1948. At the Department
of State, reorganized in 1947, a collection of uninspiring administrators replaced
a cadre of gifted wartime officials.17 Key agents of hemispheric solidarity in Latin
America also passed from the scene. Fortunately for U.S.-Colombian relations,
many of Colombia’s postwar leaders obtained their education in the United States,
and were thus more favorably inclined toward cooperation than many other Latin
American officials.
In the midst of these changes, the United States and Latin America adopted very
different approaches to regional economic development. The Truman administra-
tion held that the diffusion of private capital, technology, and free trade would pro-
vide for Latin American modernization.18 Latin Americans believed that private
investment alone made the region dependent on the industrialized countries.19 In-
stead, they sought development through national industries, import substitution,
protective tariffs, and U.S. economic assistance. Truman administration sermons
on the importance of private investment irked Latin Americans. The much-antici-
pated program of U.S. economic aid failed to materialize.20 In short, the United
States and Latin America held divergent goals and priorities after World War II.21
The inter-American conflict developed as the cold war escalated. In 1947 the
Truman administration, building upon the work of George F. Kennan at the State
Department, adopted its policy of containment. On 12 March, before a joint ses-
sion of Congress, President Truman outlined the need for the United States “to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minori-
ties or by outside pressure.” The United States “must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their way.”22 Extending aid to Greece and Turkey, and
eventually other nations threatened by communists, Washington would contain
international communism, thus protecting itself and its allies. In the event of
a Soviet-American war, the likelihood of which seemed to be growing, despite
the U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons, Washington wanted the republics of the
Western Hemisphere bound into one inter-American alliance. The Truman ad-
ministration, therefore, organized the August 1947 Rio de Janeiro meeting to form
a hemispheric security pact, first discussed in Mexico in 1945.23
Under the chairmanship of Brazilian foreign minister Raúl Fernandes, delegates
to the Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security agreed
that the Americas should respond uniformly to an attack from overseas, that no
American state should be neutral. They differed, however, on the number of coun-
tries required to support action in order to trigger a binding response under the
proposed treaty. Argentina demanded a unanimous vote. Other officials thought a
simple majority sufficient. The U.S. delegates pushed for a clause requiring affirma-
tive votes from two-thirds of the republics. Secretary of State George C. Marshall
won approval for the U.S. standard, but failed to secure a provision for mandatory
participation in collective security operations. Delegates disagreed on whether a
strike on overseas U.S. forces should activate the treaty. The United States con-
ceded that in the event of such an attack, the American republics only needed to
convene for emergency consultations. In its final form, the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance—known as the Rio Pact—committed the American re-
publics to the peaceful arbitration of all disputes. Heralded by Colombian officials
as a landmark of hemispheric camaraderie, the treaty also reaffirmed the principle
of World War II solidarity by stating that “an armed attack by any state against an
American state shall be considered as an attack against all American states” and
pledged the republics to “assist in meeting” any such violations.24
Latin American delegates used the Rio de Janeiro Conference to press their
economic concerns. In June 1947 Secretary Marshall unveiled the European Re-
covery Program (ERP), a massive package of U.S. assistance to rebuild Europe. The
Marshall Plan buoyed Latin American spirits. The United States, they believed,
would finally deliver on its economic promises to Latin America. On the opening
day of the conference, Mexican foreign minister Jaime Torres Bodet stressed that
while the meeting would deal primarily with security issues, permanent peace
in the Americas could not be obtained without economic development. Chilean
foreign minister Germán Vergara Donoso reinforced this sentiment, stressing,
“Our solidarity may crumble and become meaningless unless it is perfected on an
economic basis.”25 Many Latin Americans expected U.S. diplomats to announce a
Marshall Plan for Latin America at the Rio de Janeiro meeting. Instead, Secretary
Marshall reminded officials of the “unusually heavy burden” the United States had
accepted since 1945. Washington needed “to meet the minimum economic re-
quirements of the areas devastated by war.”26 Disappointed with the U.S. position,
Latin Americans raised economic issues at all appropriate (and some inappropri-
ate) times. Americans convinced the conference steering committee to formally
delay economic discussions, but the chatter continued, surprising U.S. diplomats
who were only prepared to discuss security topics. The question of American eco-
nomic assistance became so important that President Truman, who traveled to
Rio de Janeiro for the treaty signing, tried to explain Washington’s position in his
address to the delegates. Truman indicated that Washington would “provide eco-
nomic assistance to those who are prepared to help themselves and each other,”
but cautioned that U.S. resources were limited. The president noted the “collective
responsibility of economic assistance.” His administration, however, must discern
“between the urgent need for rehabilitation of war-shattered areas and the prob-
lems of development elsewhere.” He assured the delegates that the United States
was “not oblivious to the needs of increased economic collaboration” with Latin
America. Washington, he said, would act with “the utmost good faith” in the years
to come.27 The United States walked away from Rio de Janeiro with its much-de-
sired defense agreement. Latin Americans, wanting economic assistance, contin-
ued to wait.
Politics and Violence in Colombia, 1945–1948
For Colombian authorities, the Rio Pact embodied hemispheric solidarity. The
conference also intensified their frustrations with U.S. foreign economic policy.
Yet neither attracted much public attention in Colombia. The country’s domestic
political turmoil, U.S. ambassador John Cooper Wiley (1944–47) observed, “over-
shadowed” Colombian international relations.28 The coming of la Violencia, in fact,
left little time to contemplate other matters. The Colombian political turmoil grew
from the wartime disputes that cut short the second presidency of Alfonso López.
As president, Lleras attempted to end the partisan conflict. He urged members of

both parties to remain calm and brought some Conservative politicians into his
cabinet.29 Sensing victory in the fast-approaching 1946 election, the Conservative
Party Directorate quickly disowned members who collaborated with Lleras and
continued its scathing critique of Liberal rule. The Liberal Party’s most pressing
problems, however, did not grow from vitriolic Conservative broadsides. Instead,
dissension within Liberal ranks threatened to tear apart the party. The most seri-
ous menace to Liberal unity centered on reform-minded Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who
stood poised to launch an independent bid for Colombia’s highest elected office.
Gaitán was the mixed-race son of a lower-middle-class Bogotá family. His fa-
ther, a committed Liberal Party member, operated a barely profitable used book-
store in the city. Encouraged by his parents to pursue a profession that might
reverse the family’s failing fortunes, Gaitán decided to study law, and, in 1920, he
gained admission to the Universidad Nacional, a notable achievement for some-
one of his social background. A mediocre university student, Gaitán nonetheless
read broadly and soon noticed Colombia’s socioeconomic problems. An intel-
ligent man and gifted public speaker, Gaitán proved well suited for the legal pro-
fession and earned acclaim as the defense attorney in a highly publicized murder
trial. In the late 1920s Gaitán became the center of national attention as an impas-
sioned critic of the Conservative government’s handling of the 1928 banana work-
ers strike that left hundreds of Colombians dead. In that capacity he played an
important part in ending decades of Conservative Party rule. His formal political
career began shortly thereafter as a member of the Colombian Congress.30
As an indefatigable middle-class reformer, Gaitán attacked the privileged posi-
tion of Colombia’s oligarchy. Large-scale capitalism, he argued, united all elites and
obscured any discernible differences between the Conservative and Liberal par-
ties. Moreover, secret closed-door deals ensured the survival of privilege and mar-
ginalized hard-working citizens. Gaitán, however, was not a socialist, unless one
defines “socialism” to mean “cooperation,” as Gaitán did.31 He campaigned for a
free market rooted in small-scale industry. Gaitán also claimed to be blind to class,
seeing instead “individuals” and wanting for the republic a genuine meritocracy.32
The reformer rejected elite paternalism. He cultivated a direct and intimate rela-
tionship with the Colombian people, or pueblo. In doing so, he challenged the fun-
damental norms of Colombian politics. Whereas traditional politicians remained
distant, Gaitán spoke to the pueblo, listened, and sought to advance their cause. He
became, in turn, an immensely popular and powerful force in Colombia.
Gaitán’s public career fit into an easily detectable pattern. As a private lawyer, he
attacked the oligarchy, including leaders of his own party. Liberal officials would
then try to co-opt the critic. After some time in office, Gaitán would go too far,
say something too outrageous, and the Liberal hierarchy would banish him from
government. The cycle began in the early 1930s when López incorporated some of
Gaitán’s demands into his revolución en marcha. In 1936 Gaitán became the mayor
of Bogotá. After Gaitán publicly criticized the administration, López dismissed
him, ostensibly for attempting to get city bus drivers to wear uniforms. In Febru-
ary 1940 President Santos pulled him back to serve as the education minister, a
position he occupied for less than a year. Between 1943 and 1944 Gaitán headed
the Labor Ministry. In that post he championed the cause of Colombian workers.
Liberals soon found Gaitán too cozy with labor and summarily dismissed him. By
1945 he was poised to launch his bid for the Colombian presidency.33
Gaitán reportedly offered himself as the official Liberal Party candidate for
the 1946 presidential election, but the Liberal Directorate refused, nominating
instead Gabriel Turbay, a former ambassador to the United States. Gaitán and
his followers continued their campaign for the Colombian presidency. Support-
ers soon plastered his posters on walls across the country; the candidate insisted
that they use only the most unflattering photographs.34 Throngs of people flocked
to hear him talk, and Gaitán traveled across Colombia, speaking and listening.
He also introduced radio as a political tool, broadcasting his addresses across
the republic. Gaitán’s powerful slogans reached nearly every corner of Colombia:
“el pueblo es superior a sus dirigentes” or “the people are superior to its leaders;”
and “yo no soy un hombre, soy un pueblo” or “I am not a man, I am a people.”
Turbay, in contrast, ran an uninspiring campaign, relying upon the Liberal Party
machine to deliver votes. The Conservative Party smelled blood. Laureano Gó-
mez announced that the party would not run a candidate, and El Siglo threw its
weight behind Gaitán. With no Conservatives to fight, Liberals turned on each
other. Then, at the final moment, the Conservative Party Directorate announced
the candidacy of moderate Mariano Ospina Pérez. The Liberals were finished.
When the polls closed on 5 May, Ospina had 565,894, Turbay 437,089, and Gaitán
363,049 votes.35 Conservatives prepared to take over the government as the Lib-
eral Party, the U.S. ambassador reported, began “the vigorous process of kicking
itself for having gone out of power because of its own stupidity.”36
The transfer of power in 1946 marked the beginning of la Violencia. The vio-
lence actually started during the election, and consisted largely of fighting be-
tween Gaitán and Turbay backers.37 After Ospina took office, the spoils system
in Colombia allowed the new administration to replace a legion of federal and
local government officials. In Colombia, political “paybacks” fell with a heavy
hand, and Conservatives used their new positions to harass Liberals. Open fight-
ing between the two parties soon erupted in the Department of Boyacá, a state
with a narrow Liberal majority. The Conservative Party, now in control of the
area, launched an investigation into Liberal corruption. Its dubious techniques,
including a search for illegal political identification cards, instigated a full-fledged
revolt. Ospina reorganized the National Police, purged the force of troublesome
“López” Liberals, and formed new “shock units” to deal with the rural violence.38
The principal Conservative forces in the fray, however, were Conservative para-
military groups, locally organized and independent of government control. Refu-
gees from the Colombian countryside moved to Colombia’s cities and across the
border into Venezuela, hoping to escape the growing conflict.
The divided Liberal majority had no intention of accepting minority rule
lightly. Aware of this fact, Ospina, at first, sought political reconciliation through
the formation of a National Union cabinet that included five Liberal officials. Still,
the most prestigious post, foreign minister, went to Gómez, an appointment that
infuriated Liberals. Ospina asked several Liberals to serve as department gover-
nors, and Liberals remained in the majority in Congress and many of the local
legislatures. But in shaping his new government, the president did not consult
with Gaitán, thus exposing himself to the charge that he sought only to close
the ranks with elite Colombians.39 When Liberals in the National Union cabinet
withdrew in protest after the government’s brutal response to a petroleum work-
ers strike in Magdalena, the country appeared to be at the verge of a civil dispute
unlike any since the Thousand Days War.
The Conservative conviction that communists fomented discord in Colombia
intensified the dispute. Influential Ospina administration officials believed that do-
mestic and international communists worked to undermine Colombia’s religious
values, cultural heritage, social order, and political tradition. More than a con-
test for Europe and Asia, the cold war was a pressing domestic problem. Fears to
the contrary aside, Colombian communists posed little threat to the new govern-
ment. Colombia’s traditional two-party system allowed little space for new political
groups. Infighting dissipated what chances the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had
for success. Disputes as trivial as changing the party’s name to include the word
“communist” consumed the PSD. After a sequence of major electoral setbacks, the
PSD divided into two factions in 1947. Augusto Duran, the self-proclaimed cham-
pion of Colombian labor, formed the Communist Workers’ Party (PCO), while
young intellectuals led by Gilberto Vieira established the Communist Party of
Colombia (PCC).40 The combined membership of these organizations numbered
fewer than four thousand Colombians. They managed roughly fifteen thousand
votes, less than 1 percent, in any given election.41 Neither the PCO nor the PCC
espoused especially radical beliefs. Both pushed for an orderly, nonviolent redis-
tribution of land. The Ospina administration, however, believed that the threat
from below was real, especially after the PCO and PCC declared open opposition
to the republic’s Conservative government in October 1949. Indeed, Colombian
war minister General Rafael Sánchez Amaya insisted that “communistic elements”
caused “a great deal of the political turmoil” in Colombia.42
The trials of Colombian liberalism were not unlike the difficulties of the
U.S. Left. In 1947 the House Un-American Activities Committee, for example,
launched its highly publicized investigation of communist subversion in the
United States. Federal investigators pushed hundreds American bureaucrats, ac-

cused of communist sympathies, out of the federal service. Yet the Colombian
variant was infinitely more violent; approximately fourteen thousand Colombi-
ans died during the first twelve months of Conservative rule.43 In February 1948
Gaitán, then Liberal Party chief, holding the president responsible for the conflict,
publicly begged Ospina to end the violence. Gaitán’s plea came only one month
before inter-American diplomats arrived in Bogotá for the Ninth International
Conference of American States. Ospina did not respond to Gaitán’s petition. The
Colombian president instead tapped Colombian foreign minister Laureano Gó-
mez to chair the Bogotá Conference, an appointment many Liberals, believing
Gaitán should preside, considered provocative.44
Bogotá, 1948
Despite Colombia’s growing internal conflict, Bogotá seemed a fitting location for
the Ninth Conference of American States in 1948, a meeting principally devoted
to drafting the charter for the Organization of American States. Simón Bolívar
first pushed for an inter-American confederation in the early nineteenth century.
Colombian diplomats, thereafter, had been among the most active and produc-
tive in the Americas. Colombians worked to strengthen the Pan American Union
during the 1930s and encouraged hemispheric solidarity during World War II.
Lleras then led the defense of the inter-American system at the Chapúltepec and
San Francisco conferences. U.S. and Latin American officials decided to hold the
historic 1948 meeting in Bogotá to recognize Colombia’s long devotion to Pan
Americanism. Yet the international attention would only add to the tragedy of the
neuve de abril. Colombian foreign minister Gómez opened the conference in late
March, intent upon reorganizing the inter-American system and tackling eco-
nomic development issues. The Colombian minister would soon flee the capital
for his own safety.45
Divided into working groups, the diplomats in Colombia hammered out the
form and substance of the Organization of American States. Mexican and Colom-
bian officials advocated for a strong organization with far-reaching powers.46 The
Argentine foreign minister believed that the draft charter compromised Argenti-
na’s national sovereignty. Brazilian foreign minister João Neves de Fontoura and
others dismissed Argentina’s objections, noting in a conversation with Secretary
Marshall that Buenos Aires was “usually against everything.”47 Overall, negotia-
tions proceeded in a friendly and constructive manner. The final charter bore a
stronger resemblance to Colombia’s vision than Argentine officials might have
liked. The document created a general assembly, secretariat, and several special-
ized agencies. The organization also assumed social, economic, and legal duties,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the U.S. delegation to the Ninth International
Conference of American States cross the Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá, March 1948. At the
meeting, diplomats formed the Organization of American States; they also clashed over
inter-American economic matters. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
as well as collective security responsibilities outlined at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. In

tandem with the OAS charter, officials also produced the American Treaty on
Pacific Settlement. The Pact of Bogotá, as it became known, pledged the Ameri-
can republics to peaceful settlement of disputes, and outlined provisions for the
investigation and arbitration of inter-American controversies.48
U.S.–Latin American economic discussions in Bogotá were far less cordial.
Prior to the conference, the U.S. delegation recognized that development was “a
foremost objective throughout all of Latin America.”49 They nevertheless arrived
in Bogotá woefully unprepared to handle Latin America’s pressure for increased
U.S. assistance. At the opening session President Ospina catalogued the region’s
economic needs, and the Brazilian foreign minister, who spoke after the Colom-
bian president, forcefully drove the issue home: Latin America wanted ERP-style
assistance.50 The Mexican foreign minister called for the formation of a U.S.-led
inter-American development corporation and lending bank. Yet in his address to
the delegates on 1 April, Secretary of State Marshall, chief of the U.S. delegation,
announced that there would be no Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere. He
urged Latin American officials to appreciate the “tremendous responsibility” and
“great burden” the United States had incurred since 1945 as the world’s leading
military and economic power.51 He acknowledged “the urgent need” for develop-
ment in the Americas, but called for “the utmost goodwill and understanding in
order to accommodate complex issues.”52 European recovery, Marshall argued,
was a “prerequisite” for Latin American development, and the United States only
had the resources for one Marshall Plan.53 In the secretary’s much-rehearsed “ex-
temporaneous” remarks at the end of the speech, he tried to inspire inter-Ameri-
can solidarity. Latin American delegates sat silently, shocked and disappointed,
as Marshall walked away from the podium. Wanting to rebuild the industrialized
countries of Western Europe before helping the underdeveloped Latin American
republics, the secretary had implied that Latin America should remain neoco-
lonial, resource-producing appendages of the industrialized world. In their pri-
vate meetings and public remarks following the speech, Latin American officials
voiced their grievances. The U.S. team scrambled to assemble a small aid package
to placate its critics.54 On 8 April American diplomats announced $500 million in
new U.S. economic assistance for Latin America. But “the fiasco was complete,”
one journalist wrote; the announcement received “not a single handclap” from
Latin American officials.55
The following afternoon, Friday 9 April, Roa gunned down Gaitán. The shooter,
investigators later learned, acted in revenge. During a recent trial Gaitán had suc-
cessfully defended a man who likely killed one of Roa’s relatives. At the time of the
assassination, Colombian’s urban population, filled with Liberal refugees, reached
a different conclusion. Believing the incident part of Colombia’s internal political
conflict, they called for retribution against Conservatives for killing their leader.
By the time the crowd burst into the inter-American conference hall, looking for
Gómez, the Colombian foreign minister and other diplomats had fled. The mob
quickly gutted the building that the Colombian government had spent over 1.5
million pesos renovating for the meeting, setting fire to conference records and
valuable government artwork.56 Rioters hurled dynamite into other government
buildings, overturned cars, and torched buses. Opportunists pillaged downtown
stores. Some bogatanos seized Colombian radio stations and began anti-Conser-
vative broadcasts. Foreign communists in Bogotá for the conference joined the
melee. The Soviet embassy’s clandestine radio billowed out calls for a revolution.57
Police either joined the crowds or fled.58 Searching for Gómez, one group fire-
bombed his private residence and the El Siglo offices; the Conservative Party chief
had already left Colombia. Mobs attacked Catholic churches (symbols of Conser-
vative power), chanting “Gaitán, Gaitán.” A handful of elite Colombian Army sol-
diers narrowly saved President Ospina. Bogotá hospitals were soon full; approxi-
mately fourteen hundred Colombians died in the city in forty-eight hours.59 As
news of Gaitán’s death spread across the country, similar disturbances erupted in
other cities. That night, as Bogotá burned, Liberal officials led by Darío Echandía
slid through the rubble and into the presidential palace. Face-to-face with Ospina,
they asked the president to resign. Ospina refused to yield. He offered only to
Rioters overturn streetcars in Bogotá following the assassination of Liberal Party chief Jorge
Eliécer Gaitán, April 1948. The disturbance intensified Colombia’s domestic turmoil, the in-
ternal convulsion known as la Violencia. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
form an emergency coalition cabinet to avoid civil war. The Colombian Army
moved into the capital to restore order.60
The work of the inter-American conference ground to a halt as vigilantes de-
molished the city. Some officials escaped to the Colombian Army barracks out-
side Bogotá, but most were trapped in the downtown area. At the hotel housing
conference officials, General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of a platoon of
Colombian infantrymen and organized a hasty but effective defense, assuring the
survival of U.S. and Latin American representatives. Secretary Marshall, who was
staying in a private residence several blocks from the main body of the conference
officials, found himself armed only with his orderly’s revolver. Unshaken, Mar-
shall sat in a second-story window seat and read a novel as rioters ran through
the streets. When a handful of Colombian soldiers arrived at the house, Mar-
shall counseled the commander on small unit deployment and the night passed
without incident.61 Understandably, the bogotazo shook the confidence of many
diplomats. Some wanted to move the meeting out of Colombia, and the Argentine
representatives even asked that U.S. paratroopers land in Bogotá to evacuate of-
ficials.62 U.S. and Colombian officials refused, convinced that international com-
munists were trying to disrupt the meeting.63
The conference eventually reopened under the direction of Colombia’s new for-
eign minister, Eduardo Zuleta Angel. Delegates met in an undamaged schoolhouse
until the Colombian government could prepare proper facilities. Latin Americans
obtained the Economic Agreement of Bogotá, a document that professed that “the
economic welfare of each state” relied “upon the well-being of others,” and ac-
knowledged a “duty to cooperate toward the solution of economic problems.”64 The
document contained no concrete provisions for U.S. economic assistance. On 22
April the diplomats adopted an anticommunist declaration, warning communists
against tampering with the Americas. Then, on 30 April delegates signed the OAS
charter at Simón Bolívar’s estate in Bogotá; the electricity failed in the middle of the
ceremony, forcing Colombians to hunt down candles to continue the event.65 The
notable OAS achievement notwithstanding, critics of the U.S. positions in Bogotá
hammered the Truman administration. “The United States had failed to show any
comprehension of our neighbor’s most vital problem,” former assistant secretary
of state Sumner Wells editorialized in the Washington Post. If the inter-American
system “is going to survive” the United States must “show our neighbors that we
have learned that the welfare of the other Americas is essential to the welfare of
the United States.”66 In early May, after the delegates left Bogotá, the Ospina ad-
ministration, convinced that Moscow had been involved in the urban destruction,
severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic note, signed by
Foreign Minister Zuleta Angel, cited only Colombian-Soviet “incompatibility” and
“basic geographic and political differences” for the decision.67
Bilateral Security Relations, 1945–1950
Amid rising Soviet-American tension, U.S. and Latin American delegates at the
conferences in San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, and Bogotá tried to build a reliable
system of multilateral defense. In addition to these international arrangements,
the Truman administration pursued bilateral security relationships to fortify the
Western Hemisphere. In doing so, the United States mixed multilateral and bilat-
eral approaches, as it had since 1939. During World War II, Latin America’s lack of
military preparedness required that 130,000 U.S. servicemen defend the Western
Hemisphere, troops that might otherwise have served overseas. In the event of
another global conflict, Washington hoped that its southern neighbors, includ-
ing Colombia, would make a greater contribution to hemispheric defense. Latin
Americans might also increase their presence on the fighting front.68 To achieve
these goals, U.S. policymakers wanted to integrate U.S. and Latin American mili-
taries through the standardization of arms, doctrine, and organization. Colombi-
ans, for their part, held that the World War II partnership benefited their armed
forces. Ongoing access to U.S. advisers, equipment, and service schools promised
to extend that trend. Maintaining its relationship with the United States, the re-
public also linked its security with the world’s leading military power and in-
creased the country’s chances of fulfilling its new international treaty obligations.
Additionally, in 1948, after the assassination of Gaitán, President Ospina ordered
the expansion of the Colombian military. During the first years of la Violencia,
the armed forces, still relatively small, performed only minor internal security
missions. Indeed, the Colombian Army, which reached just 22,000 troops in 1950,
would not undertake major domestic security operations until the mid-1950s.
Still, in the long run, Ospina reasoned, the military might become a stabilizing
force in Colombia. American assistance would help the government create just
such a military. Therefore, for both governments, the importance of the Colom-
bian-American military partnership continued after 1945.
In September 1945 Lieutenant General Brett, Commanding General, U.S. Ca-
ribbean Defense Command, traveled to Bogotá to discuss with Colombian of-
ficials the future of the Colombian-American security alliance. The Americans
arrived in the capital soon after President Alfonso López’s resignation, but found
their Colombian counterparts welcoming and well prepared. With instructions
to make the wartime affiliation a peacetime fixture, officers from both coun-
tries talked about hemispheric defense, shared security objectives, and bilateral
military support. They discussed a variety of topics related to the organization,
training, and funding of the Colombian armed forces. War Minister Luis Tamayo
agreed that Colombia would maintain a small standing military, backed by re-
serve troops, allowing for rapid expansion in times of emergency. The Colombian
military’s mission, he said, would remain twofold: it would prepare to repel a mi-
nor foreign invasion and maintain internal security.69 Bogotá also pledged to or-
ganize and outfit its armed forces in ways that would promote Colombian-Ameri-
can operational compatibility. The republic would labor to create units capable of
combined operations with U.S. or UN forces. Meeting with American officers,
President Lleras, Colombia’s representative at the San Francisco Conference, em-
phasized the importance of collective security, and Colombia’s new obligations
as a UN member state. The president also invited the United States to establish a
permanent naval base in Colombia. Although grateful for the offer, the Truman
administration, with facilities in nearby Panama, politely declined the invitation
later that year. In Bogotá, General Brett relayed the Truman administration’s com-
mitment to help Colombia achieve its security goals. The United States would
continue to provide the Colombian military with advisers, equipment, and train-
ing. In the event of another war, U.S. troops would defend the republic. Both sides
expressed high expectations for postwar bilateral military cooperation. From 1945
to 1950 Colombian-American collaboration did not match these lofty aspirations.
The two countries, nevertheless, succeeded in keeping their militaries connected
in beneficial ways.70
As during World War II, U.S. military missions were an important link be-
tween the armed forces of the two republics. The terms of the original contracts
carried the advisers into the immediate postwar period.71 In October 1946 Co-
lombian ambassador to the United States Carlos Sanz de Santamaría signed a new
naval agreement. Nearly identical to the original 1938 contract, it continued the
work of the U.S. naval team through the early 1950s.72 Captain Robert A. Cook,
a favorite among Colombian officials, directed the mission. U.S. naval advisers
helped Colombia form and run several specialized training schools and worked
as instructors at the Colombian naval academy.73 The U.S. team also oversaw the
creation of a Colombian naval aviation program, officially established in August
1950, and helped Colombians deploy U.S. military equipment.74 Under the di-
rection of Colonel Henry A. Barber Jr., the U.S. military mission worked with
both the Colombian ground and air forces from 1945 to 1949.75 Then, in February
1949, Santamaría’s successor, Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo, signed new agreements
that split the group, creating a separate team of advisers from the newly formed
U.S. Air Force.76 These missions, like their naval equivalent, worked closely with
their Colombian colleagues. American instructors served at Colombian training
facilities; a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel taught at the Colombian War College.77
As the Colombian Army grew between 1945 and 1950, U.S. advisers also helped
Colombians form a reserve officers training program to help enlarge the pool of
qualified military officers. The War Department, later the Department of Defense,
stocked Colombian military libraries with U.S. publications. When those items
were not available in Spanish, the U.S. military missions translated texts for their
Colombian colleagues. The literature exposed Colombian readers to a variety of
topics of prevailing concern to the U.S. military. Bogotá also made use of U.S.
expertise during field maneuvers and relied on the missions to help assemble and
utilize American material assistance. The Air Force advisers acquainted Colom-
bian flyers with the techniques of modern air combat. They played a major part in
the consolidation and reorganization of Colombian air assets at the Cali air base.
In addition to the education and training missions, Colombian access to U.S.
service schools also continued after 1945. In fact, the number of Colombian per-
sonnel studying at American facilities accelerated during the postwar period,
largely because Colombian authorities, who paid for tuition and other expenses,
found the schools extremely beneficial.78 Over one hundred Colombian service-
men took courses at U.S. military installations each year, studying topics ranging
from combat engineering to military law.79 In 1947 Colombians began to attend
the U.S. airborne school at Fort Benning, Georgia. Benning graduates soon filled
the ranks of Colombia’s elite paratrooper unit. Colombian airmen and infantry-
men also developed their skills in the United States.80 Colombian officers trained
at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Latin
American Center-Ground Division, opened in 1946 at Fort Amador in the Canal
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Colombian ambassador Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo
sign U.S military mission contracts, February 1949. The agreements renewed the U.S. ad-
visory mandate. The contracts also created a separate U.S. Air Force mission in Colombia.
(Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
Zone, offered Spanish-language military courses to Latin Americans, including

many Colombians.81 When Colombia requested specialized instruction beyond
the U.S. mission’s capabilities, U.S. training detachments toured Colombia to in-
struct and counsel Colombians. Heavy weapons experts from the Canal Zone, for
example, visited the republic in March 1947. Colombian cadets also continued to
enroll at the U.S. military academies. Through these and other programs, Ameri-
cans exposed Colombians to the U.S. military organization and doctrine, as well
as American culture and the English language.82 In 1948 U.S. advisers in Colom-
bia reported that the Colombian military had adopted U.S. war fighting principles
to the greatest extent possible considering the scarcity of U.S. military equipment
in Colombia.
While committed to building an arsenal compatible with U.S. standards, Bo-
gotá acquired only a limited amount of U.S. military equipment between 1945
and 1950.83 American bureaucratic disagreements complicated sales of military
gear to foreign governments. During World War II the Roosevelt administra-
tion used the Lend-Lease program to transfer arms, at below market value, to
the Latin American republics and other countries considered essential to U.S. se-
curity. After the war, however, the State Department questioned the wisdom this
policy. The department concluded that the cost of military materiel compromised
Latin American economic development.84 The possibility that Latin American
governments might use U.S. equipment to rob citizens of their “rights and liber-
ties” raised other, moral questions.85 Additionally, American diplomats wanted to
avoid a Latin American arms race and inter-American aggression, each inconsis-
tent with the larger objective of hemispheric solidarity.
U.S. military officers disagreed with the State Department. They reasoned
that foreign governments, not U.S. policymakers, should determine the size and
composition of their armed forces. Latin Americans had to balance their own
defense spending and economic development. The Pentagon urged civilian of-
ficials to trust Latin America’s “good judgment.”86 In any case, if the United States
did not sell arms to Latin America, the Pentagon added, allied countries would
purchase military equipment from non-U.S. suppliers. Indeed, Latin American
governments had long relationships with European arms producers. If Washing-
ton denied Latin American overtures, foreign officials would turn elsewhere; such
developments would undermine inter-American standardization goals and “im-
pair the effectiveness” of U.S. military missions.87 In Colombia, for example, the
overall lack of standardization reduced the efficiency of the entire military estab-
lishment. Various Colombian units used different equipment, generating a host of
supply and training problems. It also made the task of the U.S. military missions
difficult. American advisers were not experts on French artillery or Belgian rifles.
This lack of material compatibility made less likely the success of any future U.S.-
Colombian combined operations. As for the internal misuse of American equip-
ment, the task-oriented U.S. military missions could not police Latin America’s
domestic affairs. But if Latin American units adopted U.S. equipment, U.S. mis-
sions would have some control over their foreign counterparts.
In Washington the debate between U.S civilian and military officials produced
paralysis. In 1945, as the Axis threat ended, Washington restricted Lend-Lease aid.
The Truman administration delivered items already promised to Latin America,
but extended few new credits to the American republics. Immediately thereaf-
ter, without Lend-Lease, Washington relied on the provisions of the 1944 Surplus
Property Act to move equipment to foreign governments. When allied countries
depleted stocks of unused U.S. equipment, Congress ended the program, leaving
the Truman administration without the legislative means to sell arms abroad. In
1946 President Truman decided to send the Inter-American Military Coopera-
tion Act to Congress, which would have allowed the administration to sell arms to
Latin America. Bureaucratic infighting delayed the introduction of the bill; Con-
gress did not consider the measure. The White House sent the bill back to the leg-
islature in 1947. Many State Department officials opposed the legislation for prag-
matic and moral reasons. Still, Secretary of State Marshall and U.S. Army Chief of
Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower, testifying on its necessity, encouraged Congress to

take action. The bill cleared committee in July 1947, but soon encountered opposi-
tion from inside and outside the government. The Steering Committee chairman,
Republican senator Robert Taft, managed to keep the U.S. Senate from voting on
the bill. Two years passed before Congress finally accepted the 1949 Mutual De-
fense Assistance Act. The law allowed the administration to transfer arms to Latin
America, albeit under strict guidelines that required Latin American governments
to reimburse the United States in full for the cost of all military assistance.88
Given these legislative limits, surplus World War II equipment constituted the
preponderance of U.S. military aid to Colombia between 1945 and 1950. The Co-
lombian Air Force acquired sixty-two U.S. military aircraft, including C-47 trans-
ports, B-25 light bombers, and P-47 fighters. The U.S. military mission choreo-
graphed the delivery of the planes for maximum political effect.89 The Colombian
Army received rifles, sidearms, armored vehicles, artillery, and ammunition.90
The bulk of U.S. military aid, however, consisted of noncombat materiel such as
trucks, communication equipment, and construction supplies.91 The Colombian
Navy also profited from postwar purchasing. The greatest prize, a U.S. Tacoma-
class frigate renamed the ARC Almirante Padilla, arrived in Cartagena in March
1947.92 The South American republic also received cargo ships, landing craft, and
coastal gunboats.93 Non-military firms in Colombia likewise benefited from the
postwar sale. Colombia’s national airline, for instance, bought passenger airplanes,
engines, and spare parts, including gear from the abandoned U.S. naval air facility
in Colombia.94 Still, the lack of standardized equipment remained an ongoing im-
pediment to the development of an efficient Colombian military establishment.
During the postwar period, Colombian and American agents also undertook
limited counterespionage and internal security operations. In 1945 most war-
time activities, designed to protect domestic institutions from Nazi subversion,
promptly ended. Yet the two countries continued to monitor communist activi-
ties. Indeed, the anticommunist Ospina government insisted that domestic and
international communists jeopardized Colombian political, social, religious, and
economic stability. Although less alarmist, the Truman administration reached
similar conclusions. In fact, when Ambassador Wiley reported that Colombia’s
communists posed no threat to the republic, U.S. officials in Washington assumed
that their ambassador was “out of touch” with the Colombian people.95 Therefore,
as during World War II, FBI advisers worked with Colombian law enforcement
agents to improve information collection and analysis. Americans helped the
Ospina administration expand its domestic surveillance program, and the two
countries shared information on known communists. After the bogotazo, Colom-
bian and American officials collaborated to reconstruct the incident, cataloguing
ways communist agitators capitalized on the assassination. U.S. and Colombian
authorities also investigated the Soviet embassy and Centro Colombo-Soviético,

Moscow’s cultural center in Colombia. Each communicated with Colombian
communists, but the connection probably did not represent an international con-
spiracy to oust the Conservative government. Still, the April 1948 riots intensified
the Colombian government’s concern. The Colombian decision to break diplo-
matic ties with Moscow closed the embassy and cultural center.96 In general, dur-
ing World War II, Americans, not Colombians, were most alarmed by the threat
of internal subversion. The two sides reversed roles after 1946, an indication of the
strong anticommunist sentiment in the Colombian Conservative Party.
Overall, Colombia and the United States carried their military relationship into
the postwar period. The most successful programs—the U.S. military missions
and training of Colombian servicemen at U.S. schools—were direct expressions
of Colombian interest in bilateral cooperation. While the Truman administration
made advisers and schools available, Bogotá decided the scale of each activity
since it covered the expenses. Colombians were also the principal forces behind
anticommunist, internal security cooperation. In other areas, principally depen-
dent on U.S. action, the two countries were less successful. The United States did
not establish machinery for transferring military materiel to Latin America until
1949. By extension, the two countries did not outfit and train Colombian military
units for operations with U.S. or UN forces, a goal outlined in September 1945.
On the surface, therefore, the two countries failed to achieve a major bilateral
objective: the formation of Colombian units capable of combined conventional
operations. The Korean War would soon show, however, Colombian and Ameri-
can servicemen ready for just such a mission.
To the extent to which they thought about U.S.-Colombian military relations,
Liberal and Conservative Colombians endorsed the ongoing partnership. A 1946
El Tiempo report on the inter-American military cooperation praised the work of
the U.S. advisers in Colombia, adding that an increase in U.S. arms shipments to
the region would make the Chapúltepec agreement more effective.97 Around the
same time, Laureano Gómez’s conservative El Siglo, a critic of wartime collabo-
ration, applauded Washington’s commitment to combat international commu-
nism.98 Liberals and Conservatives uniformly endorsed the Rio Pact in 1947. Two
years later, in 1949, they worried that the Communist victory in China and Soviet
detonation of an atomic bomb marked the opening a more dangerous phase of
the cold war against communism. But Colombians, in general, devoted little at-
tention to their security relationship with the United States from 1945 to 1950.
Instead, la Violencia dominated the country’s attention. It even obscured inter-
American economic controversies.
Economic Relations, 1945–1950
Colombian-American economic affairs both embodied and contradicted post-

war inter-American controversies. Throughout the Americas, wartime economic
dislocation did not end in 1945. For years thereafter, Colombia and its neighbors
continued to feel the repercussions of the global conflict. During the war, raw
material–purchasing contracts, coupled with capital goods restrictions, spawned
inflation, with all its attendant consequences. In turn, Colombia accumulated a
sizable U.S. dollar and gold reserve, a sum in excess of $250 million by 1945.99 The
huge reserve, a key ingredient for industrialization, did not produce a desirable
effect since capital goods, used to rebuild Japan and Western Europe, remained
scarce. Trade deficits soon consumed Colombian capital. In 1945 Colombia’s econ-
omy remained dependent on coffee. Bogotá generally appreciated the continua-
tion of U.S. purchasing contracts and price controls, but it objected to the quotas
and profit ceilings on the republic’s most important product.100 Immediately after
the war, coffee held at approximately 13 cents per pound. In 1946 the Truman ad-
ministration responded to a protest from Latin American coffee producers with
a modest 3-cent-per-pound raise.101 Then, when coffee finally hit the free market
in 1947, over-anxious producers flooded the market and the price dropped.102 The
South American republic ran a $71 million trade deficit that year. By early 1949
Colombia’s financial reserve dwindled to a mere $70 million.103
Similar to its Latin American neighbors, Colombia wanted to modernize after
1945. To encourage the growth of Colombian business and industry, the Ospina
administration adopted protectionist measures that irritated foreign companies.104
Colombia had utilized tariffs before the Conservative government took office in
1946. Indeed, the federal government relied on import duties for revenue. Those
duties, however, lagged behind market conditions and had little impact on Co-
lombian business. When Ospina came to power, Conservatives revised tariff tables
and tax laws to make Colombian enterprises more profitable. The United States,
Colombia’s principal trading partner and a strong free-trade advocate, objected to
these practices. Several controversies soon emerged. The most hotly disputed one
concerned Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, a Colombian shipping company. In
1946 the Ospina government, aiming to make the firm competitive, waived the
company’s taxes. Bogotá also allowed Flota Mercante Grancolombiana to accept
payment for transporting American freight in pesos rather than U.S. dollars as
mandated in the 1935 Reciprocal Trade Agreement.105 In 1947 Washington pro-
tested, and the text of the official U.S. note soon found its way into Colombian
newspapers. Convinced that Washington was bullying the government, university
students in Bogotá sacked the office of W. R. Grace and Company, a U.S. shipping
firm that operated in Colombia, and demonstrated outside the U.S. embassy.106
The Flota Mercante Grancolombiana question, together with other Colombian

trade practices, precipitated the termination of the 1935 commercial agreement.107
Concurrently, the United States provided little direct economic assistance to
Colombia. The ranks of wartime U.S. economic advisers in Colombia quickly
dwindled, and the Truman administration offered only two major loans to the
republic. In May 1947, the U.S. government sent $1.8 million to Bogotá for the
construction of health clinics.108 Later, after the bogotazo, the United States re-
sponded to a Colombian request for reconstruction assistance with $10 million in
economic aid.109 The United States refused to help with the construction of a Co-
lombian steel plant, a venture it considered unsound, though it did allow Bogotá
to repay its Lend-Lease debt in pesos, a considerable savings to the Colombian
treasury.110 Instead of grants and loans, the Truman administration pressed the
need for private investment as a solution to Latin American underdevelopment.
In Colombia, however, political instabilities and domestic uncertainties drove in-
vestors away. Indeed, in the four years after World War II, U.S. investments in the
South American republic plummeted 90 percent.111
Despite the lack of U.S.-Colombian economic cooperation between 1945 and
1950, there were some reasons for optimism at the decade’s end. In 1949 a World
Bank commission under the direction of Lauchlin Currie toured Colombia to re-
view the republic’s economic situation. The Currie Commission found in Colom-
bia all the elements for economic success, an assessment that opened the door for
increased foreign assistance after 1950.112 Tariff and protectionism problems did
not disappear, but the two republics did reach understandings on some volatile
issues, including the Flota Mercante Grancolombiana question.113 Another sign
of promise appeared in 1949, when Truman used his inaugural address to an-
nounce the coming of a new U.S. technical and capital assistance initiative for less
developed regions. The fourth section of Truman’s speech, the so-called Point IV
program, passed by Congress in 1950, guaranteed certain U.S. private investments
in developing areas and offered foreign governments technical aid to promote ag-
ricultural, sanitation, and infrastructure projects.114 Then, importantly, the price
of coffee soared. The revival of European markets pushed the price of coffee above
$1 per pound. As American officials predicted, the revival of the European econ-
omy touched the Americas. But it did not directly contribute to industrialization
in Colombia specifically, or Latin America generally.
Colombians, like other Latin Americans, expected U.S. aid after World War II.
They especially wanted to acquire U.S. capital goods, a necessary component for
industrialization. When the aid U.S. diplomats promised at the 1945 Chapúltepec
Conference failed to materialize, Colombians had reason to criticize their Ameri-
can colleagues. But since Colombia made only a modest contribution to the Al-
lied victory, Colombians held relatively low expectations. At the major postwar
inter-American meetings, Colombians made only mild demands on the United

States. In private conversations, they struck a conciliatory tone. Officials were
disappointed with postwar U.S. foreign economic policy, but U.S.-Colombian
economic relations lacked the extreme passion that animated American dealings
with its major World War II allies: Brazil and Mexico. Also, Colombia’s domestic
conflict buried economic matters, just as it overshadowed Colombian-American
military affairs. Indeed, Colombia’s persistent political conflict left little time to
squabble with the United States.
The Quest for Stability, 1949–1950
The domestic unrest that followed the nueve de abril gave rise to the presidency of
Laureano Gómez, a surprisingly strong advocate of Colombian-American coop-
eration. The coalition government that emerged from the urban calamity in April
1948 proved a miserable failure. At first frightened by the riots, Ospina approved
Liberal plans to improve the conditions for Colombian peasants. The modest pro-
gram included housing assistance and a rural electrification project. Yet the co-
operative spirit evaporated when a mid-1948 lull in the violence convinced many
elites that the crisis had passed. In short order, the two parties began a rhetorical
war, and, by the end of the year, bandits and paramilitary groups were campaign-
ing in rural Colombia. In Conservative-dominated areas, party faithful harassed,
intimidated, and sometimes butchered Liberals; Liberals attacked their political
opponents with equal fervor in regions they controlled. In an attempt to impose
order on the countryside, President Ospina replaced Liberal department officials
with hard-line Conservatives in April 1949. Liberals promptly resigned from the
coalition government, claiming that the president had betrayed the agreement
upon which the bipartisan cabinet had been formed. When Liberals won a re-
sounding victory in the June 1949 Congressional elections, the majority party be-
came more confrontational. Flush with confidence, Liberal congressmen, calcu-
lating that an early presidential election would result in another electoral success,
moved the contest forward from June 1950 to November 1949. The partisan ploy
infuriated Conservatives.115
Laureano Gómez added fuel to the crisis. Having returned to Colombia in
June 1949 from his self-imposed exile in Spain, Gómez, the Conservative Party’s
presidential candidate, went on the offensive. He railed against Congress, Liberals,
communists, and the Supreme Court. Through his son, Congressman Álvaro Gó-
mez Hurtado, he distributed metal whistles to Conservative legislators to drown
out Liberal speakers.116 Soon enough, the republic’s political discourse became an
uncivil shouting match. In the countryside, the violence continued, subsuming
socioeconomic, religious, and partisan issues. Gómez stirred anti-Protestantism
through inflammatory language, ridiculing the Liberal conviction that church

and state should be separated, thus indirectly encouraging a campaign of ter-
ror against Colombian Protestants.117 Rural landholders used violence to intimi-
date labor and consolidate their holdings. In 1949 approximately 32,000 refugees
moved from the countryside to Bogotá in search of safety, severely straining that
city’s infrastructure.118 Rural bandits pillaged and murdered for personal profit
and crass pleasure. Ospina’s special National Police units were unable to end the
conflict, and the small Colombian Army soon found itself charged with maintain-
ing order in some volatile regions.
There were, of course, some reasons to expect that the armed forces could end
the fighting. In early 1948 the Colombian Army had occupied the unstable Depart-
ment of Norte de Santander, confiscating stores of arms from both Conservatives
and Liberals alike, and largely ending the violence.119 But the military had accepted
the task with many reservations, believing that resolution lay in Liberal-Conserva-
tive reconciliation, not Colombian Army involvement. Objections aside, the war
minister professed in a 1949 address to Congress that “the salvation of the country
rests in respect for the constitution”; the Colombian military was “resolved to de-
fend and support” that document.120 Following the address, Colombian soldiers
began patrolling some of the republic’s most contested regions. Colombian ser-
vicemen, as a result, exposed themselves to hit-and-run guerrilla attacks. Despite
the military’s attempt to remain apolitical, allegations soon surfaced that the Co-
lombian Army was not doing enough to protect all Colombians.121
Colombia, once Latin America’s leading democracy, was falling apart. Unwill-
ing to allow the Liberals to return to power, President Ospina was determined to
hand the election to Gómez and made arrangements to strong-arm Liberals at
the ballot box. The Conservative administration announced a program of voter
registration checks, forcing rank-and-file Liberals to reveal their party loyalty.
Armed with that information, Conservatives planned to use all means necessary
to dissuade Colombians from voting against Gómez. As Liberals planned their
next move, both parties evoked the language of Soviet-American East-West con-
frontation. Conservatives claimed that Liberals and communists were “engaged
in [a] Cold War” against the republic’s legitimate government.122 Gómez charged
that Liberals and international communists were collaborating to bring down
the government. Little reliable evidence supported such allegations. Some Liber-
als had contacts with domestic communists and sometimes cooperated with the
PCC to smuggle arms across the Venezuelan boarder. But as the crisis worsened,
most Liberals actually distanced themselves from known communists, support-
ing, for example, the purge of radical workers from Colombia’s state-sponsored
labor union.123
Ospina and Gómez, opponents charged, were brutal tyrants. After a Conserva-
tive gunman mowed down Liberals at a party rally in October 1949, Lleras urged
Liberals to sever all ties—public and personal—with Conservatives. Still control-

ling Congress, the party announced its plan to impeach the president and replace
him with a Liberal Party president designate. Ospina responded by declaring a
state of siege, suspending Congress, outlawing opposition meetings, instituting
media censorship, and changing Supreme Court voting procedures to allow the
minority Conservative judges to veto all court decisions. With the elections rap-
idly approaching, Liberal officials decided to withdraw their candidates from the
race. Laureano Gómez, uncontested, won the presidency on 27 November. Liber-
als claimed that Gómez was illegitimate. That Gómez won the presidency without
opposition did not render his government unlawful. In fact, many Colombian
presidents before Gómez had taken the office without formal opposition. His un-
willingness to reconvene Congress, lift the state of siege, or restore civil liberties
would nonetheless distinguish his regime. Indeed, with the election of the Con-
servative Party leader, Colombia, Latin America’s model democracy, stood on the
verge of a partisan dictatorship.124
The election of Gómez raised questions about the future of the Colombian-
American alliance.125 One U.S. foreign policymaker observed that Colombia had
been “one of the most democratic and orderly nations of the hemisphere,” a fact
that had “facilitated cordial relations” and “brought us [the United States and Co-
lombia] together on ideological grounds”; yet the turmoil of the late 1940s had
“shaken our [U.S.] faith in Colombian democracy and presented an obstacle” to
U.S.-Colombian harmony.126 Moreover, in his public discourse, Gómez frequently
expressed anti-American sentiments and attacked Liberal officials for cooperating
with the United States during World War II.127 The Roosevelt administration had
maintained that Gómez was pro-Nazi and sought (unsuccessfully) to place Gómez
and his newspaper El Siglo on the wartime blacklist.128 This, coupled with the du-
bious circumstances surrounding his election, prompted the State Department to
deny the president-elect’s request to visit Washington, a prerogative of incoming
Colombian presidents since 1930.129 Gómez understood Washington’s misgivings,
and he attempted to reassure the Truman administration of his goodwill through
foreign policy statements published in El Siglo.130 U.S. officials, however, remained
extremely skeptical. Few Americans could have predicted the degree to which Co-
lombia’s next president would seek to cooperate with the United States.131
A devout Catholic, Gómez hailed from a middle-class family in Bogotá. As a
boy, he attended a militant Jesuit school, and he later earned a technical degree
from Colombia’s Universidad Nacional. Instead of pursuing an engineering ca-
reer, Gómez began editing a pro-clerical newspaper. A fiery orator, he eventually
sat in the Colombian legislature and from 1923 to 1925 served as the Colombian
ambassador to Argentina. Later that decade, he lived in Europe, and served as
Bogotá’s minister to Berlin. While overseas, Gómez developed a strong affection
for all things French. He also came to respect Nazi efficiency, despite his dislike
for Martin Luther and Germany’s Protestant past. At home in Colombia during
the 1930s and 1940s, Gómez became the Conservative Party chief and led oppo-
sition to the republic’s Liberal leadership. He masterfully orchestrated Ospina’s
1946 election, exerted great influence over Ospina’s cabinet, and remained in close
contact with the government after he fled Colombia during the bogotazo.132
Short, stocky, and intense, Gómez was inclined toward metaphysics and spiri-
tuality. Friends and enemies alike referred to him as el monstruo, or “the monster.”
Admirers thought it captured the essence of his brilliant and passionate political
mind; opponents maintained the nickname best captured his tendency toward
brutality. Eternal optimism and “visceral pessimism” consumed Gómez.133 He
sincerely denied political aspirations, yet derived great pleasure from his pub-
lic endeavors. As a political opportunist, Gómez preyed on Liberal Party weak-
nesses, even at the apparent expense of his ideological convictions. He loathed
liberalism but maintained a close personal relationship with prominent Liberals
such as Alfonso López.134 Publicly, Gómez preached order, stability, and spiritual
serenity. Privately, he reportedly threw childish temper tantrums. At his core, Gó-
mez believed that materialism and immorality threatened Christian civilization.
Communists, he insisted, were fanatically committed to upsetting the proper
structure of human organization. To survive, Colombia must return to the church
and its cultural heritage. Scheduled to take office in August 1950, Gómez thought
he could shepherd Colombia through the conflict. To fulfill his mission, however,
he needed to cooperate with the United States. The outbreak of the Korean War in
June 1950 presented the Conservative leader with an opportunity of exceptional
proportions.
· · ·
Colombia and the United States converted wartime measures into peacetime in-
stitutions after 1945. Diplomats formed new multinational security mechanisms;
officers worked toward the standardization of Colombian-American military
equipment, organization, and doctrine. However, the Truman administration,
preoccupied with other regions, neglected Latin American economic aspirations.
Throughout the postwar period, the cold war influenced the U.S.-Colombian
partnership. It encouraged further security cooperation but limited economic ini-
tiatives. At the same time, anticommunism gradually displaced democracy at the
ideological center of the Colombian-American alliance. Other ideological vari-
ables, such as multilateralism and collective security, also affected bilateral rela-
tions. As for material interests, Colombians wanted to link their national security
to the more-powerful United States. They also needed military and economic aid.
The Truman administration sought Colombian political, diplomatic, and military
support in the cold war against communism. In many ways, Colombia’s domestic
turmoil continued to have an impact on the bilateral partnership. For Colombians,
la Violencia obscured inter-American controversies and encouraged many forms

of U.S.-Colombian cooperation. It likewise discouraged U.S. investment, troubled
U.S. policymakers, and altered the ideological composition of the Colombian-
American alliance. In military and diplomatic affairs, Colombian officials often
controlled the pace of bilateral cooperation. Colombians likewise showed their
independence at the San Francisco Conference, advancing national goals counter
to U.S. interests. While not without conflict, the postwar period bound Colombia
and the United States more closely, an inter-American partnership that would
soon become a fighting alliance.
3
The Korean War and the Americas, 1950–1951
The North Korean invasion began with a heavy predawn artillery barrage on 25
June 1950. Soviet-built T-34 tanks then spearheaded the ground assault into South
Korea. A series of UN Security Council resolutions, passed soon thereafter, failed
to stop the war. In July the U.S.-led UN Command, fighting for South Korea, suf-
fered a series of battlefield defeats. Colombian ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Angel,
“preoccupied” by the emergency, arrived at the State Department on 1 August to
discuss UN military operations. Sitting with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Edward Miller, Ambassador Zuleta announced that Colombia
wanted to help the United States, United Nations, and South Korea. The other
Latin American countries, he reported, were also “eager” to assist. The ambassa-
dor expected that Latin America’s support could be “quickly turned into action” if
the United States would “give them proper guidance.” How could Latin American
assistance “be most effective?” The Colombian overture “greatly cheered” Assis-
tant Secretary Miller, keen on collecting Latin American troops for the multi-
national UN force. But Miller admitted that he had no “specific answer” for the
ambassador as to how Colombia might help the UN Command. The Truman
administration lacked a coherent policy for turning international support into
military contributions. Still, the secretary promised to transmit the Colombian
offer to U.S. military officials. He asked Ambassador Zuleta to be patient until the
U.S. government established guidelines governing small-country involvement.1
The conversation between Ambassador Zuleta and Assistant Secretary Miller
began a series of secret bilateral conversations that culminated in Colombia’s con-
tribution of an infantry battalion and warship to the UN Command in Korea. Dis-
patching military units for ideological and material reasons, President Laureano
Gómez affirmed Colombia’s place alongside the United States in the campaign
against international communism. However, Ambassador Zuleta’s prediction aside,
U.S. diplomats discovered the other American republics unable or unwilling to join
the UN coalition. While local conditions patterned each country’s response, the
71
notion that South Korea’s fate lay in the hands of the industrialized countries domi-
nated U.S.–Latin American consultations. The Korean War, therefore, exposed the
deterioration of inter-American cooperation, particularly Latin American dissatis-
faction with U.S. military and economic assistance since 1945. Latin American inac-
tion heightened the significance of the Colombian contribution. The UN Command
needed troops from every continent to be a truly global effort. Without Colombia,
Latin America would not have been represented. In turn, Colombia, alone among
the Latin American republics, earned preferential treatment from the United States
for fighting in Korea. Before the republic could join the UN coalition, however, the
American bureaucracy needed to answer some basic policy questions.
Coalition Building, 1950
The origins of the Korean War predated 1950. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and
controlled the peninsula until the end of World War II. In August 1945 the United
States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula along the thirty-eighth
parallel to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces. The Soviet Army seized the
north; American units occupied the south. Washington wanted an autonomous,
unified, and independent Korean republic. But the growing Soviet-American
confrontation complicated Korea’s future. Moscow and Washington could not
agree on the form, function, or character of a unified Korean government. In 1948
UN officials supervised elections south of the thirty-eighth parallel, establishing
the Republic of Korea. In the north, the Soviet-sponsored Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea declared its independence that same year. Both governments
claimed sovereignty over the entire peninsula. Frequent border skirmishes erupted
between North and South Korea in the late 1940s. A Pyongyang-controlled com-
munist insurgency in South Korea tried to topple the Syngman Rhee government
in Seoul. Then, in March 1949 North Korean premier Kim Il-Sung asked Soviet
leader Josef Stalin for permission to invade South Korea. After a series of commu-
nications among Soviet, Communist Chinese, and North Korean officials, Stalin
endorsed the plan in early 1950. With Soviet and Communist Chinese support,
the North Korean military attacked in June 1950.2
The Truman administration interpreted the invasion as part of Moscow’s bid
for world domination. It wanted to block the North Korean move in order to con-
tain Soviet expansionism and defend U.S. interests in the region.3 Just hours after
the attack, American diplomats introduced a resolution at the United Nations
calling for the immediate termination of hostilities. The decree, passed by the UN
Security Council, summoned “members [of the UN] to render every assistance to
the United Nations” in support of the Republic of Korea.4 Boycotting the United
the korean war and the americas, 1950–1951 73
Map of the Korean Conflict, 1950–51

Nations over the international body’s refusal to seat Communist China, Soviet
officials were not present to veto the resolution. As the fighting continued, the
council adopted a second, stronger resolution on 27 June, asking UN members to
provide “assistance to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area.”5 In early July, with American troops already fighting on
the peninsula, the international organization created the UN Command under
U.S. leadership. UN secretary general Trygve Lie encouraged member states to
join the coalition to defend South Korea.6
Several factors shaped the Truman administration’s decision to assemble a
multinational UN coalition in Korea. Instrumental in forming the Republic of
Korea, the United Nations had a special responsibility for South Korea; UN mili-
tary operations might also strengthen the organization’s ability to deal with fu-
ture disputes. Washington also needed foreign troops to lessen the burden on
American forces, weakened by meager postwar U.S. defense spending, stretched
thin with other global commitments. The UN resolutions promised to deliver
multinational units to help the U.S. armed forces.7 Furthermore, an international
army guaranteed that the “aggressive effect” of an overt Soviet or Communist
Chinese strike in Korea would be “directed against the greatest possible number
of UN member nations,” assuring that the United States would not stand alone
in a world war against the communist powers.8 UN support likewise legitimized
U.S. action and frustrated the Soviet propaganda campaign to portray the Korean
conflict as an American war.9 Finally, working through the United Nations, the
Korean dispute afforded Americans the opportunity to align the world commu-
nity against the threat of international communism. Whereas the World War II
combat alliance involved mostly large-country forces, Washington actively sought
small-country involvement in Korea.
The State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs devoted special at-
tention to the political implications of the Korean War. Since postwar decoloniza-
tion produced few new states capable of fighting abroad, Americans expected that
most small-country forces would come from Latin America. In June 1950 Cuban
and Ecuadorian representatives to the UN Security Council delivered key votes
in favor of the UN action. The Organization of American States followed with a
resolution supporting the UN position in Korea.10 Latin American diplomatic
correspondence, while sometimes conflicting, initially suggested that the repub-
lics would defend South Korea. By late summer 1950, all but three Latin American
countries (Haiti, Honduras, and Guatemala) agreed to discuss contributions to
the UN campaign with U.S. officials. Most offers involved economic assistance.
American diplomats nevertheless planned to discuss military contributions with
several governments. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs did not welcome the
war, but hoped it would improve U.S.–Latin American relations, inspire anticom-
munism in Latin America, and rekindle hemispheric solidarity.
Unprepared to assemble a diverse multinational military force, the Truman

administration first looked to the United Nations and battlefield commanders for
guidance on how to assemble the coalition. In early July UN officials established a
general procedure for turning the war into a multilateral enterprise. The UN sec-
retariat instructed members to transmit offers to the international organization.
Secretary General Lie would then refer the pledge to the U.S. government, serving
as the executive agent for the UN Command. If the proposed contribution fur-
thered the UN cause, the Truman administration would accept the offer; Wash-
ington could also decline unacceptable proposals.11 That same month, General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN forces, sent Washington
his requirements for military contributions, criteria the Pentagon initially used
to grade the usefulness of individual offers. The general wanted ground forces
no smaller than an infantry battalion of regular soldiers, units numbering no less
than one thousand troops. The contingents, MacArthur warned, needed to arrive
in Korea with supplies sufficient to conduct combat operations for two months.
The UN Command would also accept individual warships. The Department of
Defense added that financial debts incurred by military forces in Korea should be
the responsibility of the government dispatching forces, not the United States. The
urgent situation in Korea, military officials believed, demanded high standards.
With UN forces struggling to control the North Korean onslaught, some observ-
ers believed South Korea was doomed. Indeed, seasoned veterans of the Chinese
civil war, equipped with advanced Soviet arms, filled the North Korean ranks. The
first U.S. soldiers in Korea were garrison troops armed with surplus World War
II equipment.12 MacArthur and others, therefore, wanted international units they
could immediately deploy. Undersized battalions or untrained volunteers, subsi-
dized by the United States, would hinder, rather than advance, the UN effort.
At the beginning of the conflict, President Truman asked the Pentagon to so-
licit, contract, and organize foreign military contributions. But civilian policymak-
ers feared that the military demanded too much, particularly from countries with
limited resources. State Department officials, in particular, doubted the military’s
support for a multilateral campaign, openly questioning the Pentagon’s apprecia-
tion for the conflict’s geopolitical implications. During World War II, American
diplomats recalled, the U.S. military actively discouraged smaller countries, such
as Colombia, from joining the fighting alliance. Moreover, the American military
made little progress collecting troops from UN member states during the first
weeks of the war. U.S. officers quickly enlisted traditional allies, such as those from
the British Commonwealth, but soliciting forces from underdeveloped countries
proved more challenging. The urgent situation in Korea and looming threat of a
Soviet strike in Europe left the U.S. military overworked. In addition, the Depart-
ment of Defense, designed for war-making purposes, lacked the skills and tempera-
ment necessary for intricate diplomatic negotiations. Recognizing these problems,
Truman transferred responsibility for gathering foreign troops to the Department

of State in early August 1950. Under the new arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
retained the right to decline offers it deemed militarily useless. Initiating the shift,
Truman asked that contributions “be encouraged by all proper means” and as-
serted that the geopolitical value of multilateral participation eclipsed the “military
difficulties” associated with combining “diverse” units.13
The Truman directive clarified bureaucratic duties, but the United States still
lacked a coherent, agreeable coalition-building policy. The State Department ques-
tioned certain U.S. demands, particularly the handling of financial matters. Two
days after Assistant Secretary Miller met with Ambassador Zuleta, officials at the
State Department launched an effort to clarify American policy. Led by individu-
als dealing with U.S.–Latin American relations, the department prepared a paper,
dated 3 August, for the National Security Council (NSC) to explain its position and
encourage interagency dialogue.14 “It has become clear,” Deputy Undersecretary
for Inter-American Affairs H. Freeman Matthews added on 9 August, “that little
if any military contributions can be expected from the Latin American republics”
if Washington made them “assume the major share of the cost of equipping and
supporting their forces.”15 Soon thereafter, Assistant Secretary Miller, concerned
that an opportunity for Latin American involvement would slip away, organized a
meeting of high-ranking government officials to settle outstanding problems.
The conference convened in General Ridgway’s Pentagon office on 24 August.
U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations Major General Charles
Bolté began by acknowledging the importance of the issues at hand and confirmed
that the UN Command “could use any Latin American soldiers it could lay its hands
on.”16 Military officers then restated that foreign contributions should be no smaller
than a battalion of regular troops, noting that battalion-sized forces, the smallest
unit capable of basic operational autonomy, fell within the capacity of most UN
member states. General Ridgway added that “the main difficulty” did not revolve
around “the military desirability of using Latin American forces in Korea,” as some
State Department officials feared, “but the legal question of reimbursement for
equipment, training, and logistical support which the Latin American [and other
small-nation] forces might need.”17 Bolté and Ridgway understood that their han-
dling of pragmatic financial issues would set an important precedent for future col-
lective security operations. Would the United States be required to support small
UN forces in Korea? And if so, would the Pentagon finance future UN actions?
Military officials noted that the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 allowed for
the transfer of U.S. military equipment, materiel, and services to foreign countries,
but only if the receiving government paid the full costs of the support.18
State Department representatives recognized the problem. They proposed
amending the legislation to allow the United States to donate military assistance
to UN Command participants but quickly conceded that the lengthy legislative
process might not produce results until after the war. Then, after further contem-
plation, the men reached a creative solution. Ridgway and Miller agreed that if
foreign governments could not pay for American support, diplomats could ne-
gotiate the cost of U.S. assistance.19 That is, a process of bilateral meetings would
resolve financial questions after small-country forces arrived in Korea. While
negotiations might yield only partial payment for U.S. aid, the compromise for-
mula did not technically violate standing legislation and upheld the principle of
reimbursement, albeit in a more flexible form. The Ridgway-Miller agreement
allowed U.S. and foreign diplomats to manipulate the cost of the war. Miller left
the meeting satisfied, having found “that the military establishment appeared to
be more nearly in accord with the views of the [State] Department” than he had
initially thought.20 Indeed, Defense officials had demonstrated that they were not
opposed, and in fact sought, Latin American involvement in the UN campaign.
The State Department subsequently sent a memorandum, explaining the meet-
ing’s outcome, to the president, military chiefs, and cabinet members.21
Then, suddenly, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson placed the Ridgway-Miller
deal in jeopardy. Having long since fallen out of favor with the cabinet over a va-
riety of personal and professional matters, the secretary either misunderstood or
purposefully misconstrued the 24 August reimbursement agreement. In early Sep-
tember Johnson informed Secretary of State Dean Acheson that debts incurred by
contributing countries should be satisfied by “reimbursement in kind or mutual re-
ciprocal aid.”22 In other words, small-country payments, if not in U.S. currency, must
be satisfied with equivalent foreign funds or goods. Infuriated, State Department
officials characterized Johnson’s position as “a gross misconstruction” of the reim-
bursement compromise.23 Upon learning of the problem, Treasury Secretary John
W. Snyder blasted Johnson, adding that the Treasury Department “feels strongly
that financial considerations should be secondary in determining whether or not
a foreign government’s offer of assistance in connection with the Korean operation
should be accepted.”24 Snyder was not alone in his dissatisfaction. The controversy
enraged President Truman, and on 19 September he forced Johnson to resign.25
President Truman promptly summoned retired general of the army and former
secretary of state George Marshall to fill the vacancy.26 Deputy Under Secretary
Matthews immediately pressed the reimbursement issue to the secretary. “In view of
the urgency of reaching a definite understanding regarding the immediate problem
of reimbursement,” he wrote, “I should appreciate an early indication of the view
of the Department of Defense.” “I am sure you will agree,” Matthews added, “that
no effort should be spared in the search for methods whereby the governments of
other American republics may be encouraged by the United States to increase their
active participation in the defense of the free world against aggression.”27 Negotia-
tions with the Latin American republics languished without answers to basic policy
questions. The Department of State needed the Pentagon to make a decision.28
Marshall ended the controversy with two notes to Secretary Acheson in late
September. First, on 26 September, he informed Acheson that a military contri-
bution to the UN Command did “not necessarily carry with it an intent to com-
mit forces in the combat theater.”29 This marked a subtle, yet important shift in
U.S. military policy, lowering the standard against which American authorities
would decide the usefulness of small-country contributions. The United States
should accept units for purposes other than combat operations. Foreign contin-
gents might be used to guard prisoners of war, transportation facilities, supply
depots, or communication lines. Also, the U.S. military no longer expected small-
country forces to arrive in Korea with their own supplies. Foreign troops could
instead draw equipment from the U.S. arsenal in the western Pacific. In the sec-
ond note, dated 30 September, Marshall indicated that the Department of Defense
agreed with the 24 August reimbursement formula. American negotiations with
foreign governments should move forward along those lines. Secretary Marshall,
however, cautioned against the complete exoneration of debts incurred by for-
eign governments operating in Korea. “In my opinion,” he stated, “the precedent
which we are now establishing in the case of Korea will set the pattern for future
collective military actions by the United Nations.” Military support and services
should not be “donated” to foreign countries for collective security efforts “with-
out creating any obligation on the part of their recipients.” The United States,
Marshall maintained, must “stimulate and awaken” the world community to the
challenge posed by aggression. It should make UN members aware of the “re-
sponsibilities” and “privileges” of participation in collective security operations.30
A flexible reimbursement policy, he believed, best served these objectives. Taken
together, Marshall’s September instructions reduced the standard against which
Washington would gauge proposed contributions. They improved the chances of
small-country involvement in Korea.
The changing fortunes of the UN Command in Korea partially accounted for
the new guidelines. In August 1950 the 8th U.S. Army checked the communist
advance along the Naktong River in southeastern Korea. With the North Korean
I and II Corps locked in action around the Pusan perimeter, General MacArthur
launched an amphibious assault at Inchon on 15 September 1950. The Inchon-
Seoul campaign placed Major General Edward Almond’s X Corps behind the
main North Korean battle line. The bold move against the communist rear threw
the enemy into disarray. Combined with the rapid 8th U.S. Army breakout in the
south between 16 and 22 September 1950, the X Corps strike drove the North
Korean Army back across the thirty-eighth parallel. When North Korean offi-
cials refused to surrender to the UN Command, the U.S.-led multinational army
moved north, beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, to defeat Pyongyang and unite
the peninsula. Meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on 15 October,
General MacArthur predicted that organized communist opposition would “end
throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving.” The UN Command, he

said, would need only one U.S. Army corps, supplemented with UN detachments,
to occupy the peninsula.31 Had the general’s forecast proved accurate, Colombian
servicemen would not have fought in Korea.
The Colombian Contribution
The North Korean invasion in June 1950 triggered a strong response in Colom-
bia. The Ospina administration condemned North Korea. It blamed Moscow for
encouraging and supporting international aggression.32 Fearing that the conflict
might start World War III, Colombian officials expressed their strong support for
the UN campaign; they assured Truman of their unwavering solidarity as the cri-
sis unfolded.33 Colombian officials described the dispute “as another maneuver in
Communist world expansion” and were quick to draw parallels between current
Soviet foreign policy and what had been Germany’s before World War II.34 In an
era of bitter partisan conflict and domestic upheaval, both Conservative and Lib-
eral journalists denounced North Korea and the Soviet Union. The Conservative
daily El Siglo described the attack as “barbaric violence,” ironic language given the
violence in Colombia.35 Championing the cause of collective security, the Liberal
El Tiempo speculated that the Soviet satellite might not have attacked South Korea
had a NATO-type organization been in place in the western Pacific.36 Among the
major newspapers in Colombia, only the left-leaning El Espectador seemed un-
enthusiastic about the UN operation, questioning the authenticity of South Ko-
rean democracy and criticizing U.S. foreign policy in Asia.37 Private Colombian
citizens did not seem to share those misgivings. Hundreds of Colombians wrote
encouraging letters to the U.S. embassy in Bogotá.38 Still others volunteered to
fight with the American military in Korea. Retired army officer Ernesto Puerto
Fernandez, for instance, traveled to the United States to join the U.S. Army “to
fight in the common cause” against communism.39 Considering the lackadaisical
response of most Colombians to their government’s entry into World War II, the
outbreak of the Korean War sparked a remarkable public reaction.
In this environment, two conditions determined the timing of Colombia’s mili-
tary contribution to the UN effort. First, Bogotá could not commit troops to the
campaign until Washington adopted guidelines for small-nation involvement. That
policymaking process consumed the first months of the war. Second, President
Ospina, unwilling to act during his final weeks in office, waited to pass the decision
to incoming president Laureano Gómez.40 The president-elect endorsed the UN ef-
fort but said little about sending Colombians to fight in Korea. In fact, much to the
contrary, Gómez’s own newspaper, El Siglo, stated on 16 July 1950 that the idea of
Colombian forces joining the UN was a “discarded possibility” and that Bogotá had
so informed UN secretary general Lie.41 In his 7 August inaugural address, Gómez

praised the U.S. effort to “save civilization,” mentioned the possibility of nonmilitary
aid but remained silent on the issue of Colombian troops for Korea.42 Behind the
scenes, however, Colombians actively pursued the subject with U.S. officials.
In the summer of 1950 Colombian military officers took their interest in the
UN effort to U.S. ambassador Willard L. Beaulac. On the same day that El Si-
glo dismissed the idea of Colombian participation in the war, the ambassador
optimistically informed Washington that Colombia would make an offer “deter-
mined by the obligations contracted [by the republic] as a member of the United
Nations Organization.”43 In early August Ambassador Zuleta, considered “one of
the ablest diplomats in Latin America,” approached State Department officials
in Washington, seeking information as to how Colombia could assist the United
States.44 Then, in mid-August, just after Gómez’s inauguration, the UN secretary
general issued a new call for UN troops. A few days later, Colombia’s UN ambas-
sador asked to begin formal negotiations with the United States to “arrange for
concrete assistance” to repel “the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea.”45
Given the ongoing uncertainties surrounding the financial cost of ground con-
tributions, Bogotá first explored the possibility of a naval contribution. Before
Gómez took office, Colombian Navy chief Admiral Antonio Tanco advocated
sending a warship to the western Pacific. Indeed, numerous Colombian sailors
had contacted the admiral to volunteer for service should Colombia dispatch a
ship, and Tanco calculated that an all-volunteer crew might man a frigate. Ad-
miral Tanco held that combat experiences would advance his five-year naval
improvement program. As a demonstration of solidarity with the United States,
a contribution might also accelerate U.S. support for his naval agenda.46 Dur-
ing World War II, the Colombian commander had been a strong proponent of
Colombian-American naval cooperation in the Caribbean. Now, he wanted Co-
lombia to join the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Also, the Colombian Navy
assumed that its involvement in a high-profile collective security operation would
improve the standing of the navy within the Colombian military establishment.
Concerned that the small Colombian Navy had been relegated to a “decorative”
status at home, fighting in Korea might enlarge its portion of the Colombian de-
fense budget.47 Admiral Tanco found a receptive audience in the Conservative
government. Ambassador Zuleta, known for his strong anticommunist sentiment,
encouraged the admiral and other policymakers to support the United States. As
foreign minister after the bogotazo, Zuleta himself drafted and signed the diplo-
matic letter that ended Colombian-Soviet diplomatic relations. In August 1950
Zuleta and the Colombian naval attaché in Washington went to the Pentagon to
explore the possibility of a contribution. They quickly relayed their findings back
to the government. In early September Gómez decided to dispatch a warship to
the western Pacific.48
Colombian ambassador Eduardo Zuleta (1949–55). Pictured

here in August 1953, Ambassador Zuleta staunchly supported
Colombian involvement in the Korean War. (Source: New York
World Telegram & Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection,
Library of Congress)
Ambassador Zuleta unofficially conveyed the decision to Assistant Secretary

Miller on 6 September 1950.49 Less than two weeks later, Colombian minister of
war Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez made the formal declaration, offering the ARC
Almirante Padilla to the UN Command; Washington accepted the frigate on 29
September.50 The Gómez administration agreed to pay the costs of maintaining
the warship, the precise sum of which would be the subject of future discussions.
Publicly and privately, Colombians presented the offer “as a clear demonstration
of the fact” that collective security operations were “the responsibility of all free
nations,” not just the United States.51 For its part, the Pentagon estimated that the
ARC Almirante Padilla, a Tacoma-class frigate launched in Wisconsin in 1944,
acquired by Colombia in March 1947, was in good condition and valuable to the
UN Command.52 Manned by two hundred sailors and officers, the 1,300-ton ship
supported three 75 mm cannons, two 40 mm antiaircraft batteries, four 20 mm

guns, and antisubmarine devices. The standardization of its batteries with those
of the U.S. Navy eliminated potential supply difficulties. As Admiral Tanco an-
ticipated, almost every sailor in the Colombian Navy (active and reserve) volun-
teered to serve on the frigate.53 Although the Colombian government oversold
the preparedness of the warship, the Truman administration, elated to have a
Latin American contribution to the UN effort, praised Colombia’s commitment
to collective security. The State Department heralded the move as an expression
of hemispheric solidarity. A New York Times writer celebrated the Colombian of-
fer as “the first practical step taken by a Latin American country to help out in
Korea.” Admitting that “a single ship” would not “make a great deal of difference
to the outcome of the conflict,” the editors nonetheless recognized Colombia for
its “willingness to sacrifice” and “risk lives in the democratic cause.”54
Colombia’s ground contribution to the UN Command materialized slowly for
economic reasons. The costs associated with equipping and deploying an infan-
try battalion greatly exceeded a naval contribution. At first, the Gómez admin-
istration believed the financial obligation too great for Colombia. For their part,
American officials did not press Colombia for troops. A U.S. military intelligence
survey concluded that the Colombian Army, while disciplined and motivated,
was “incapable of making an effective contribution” of ground forces.55 Twenty-
two thousand strong when the Korean War began, it had become more profi-
cient since 1939. Still, some U.S. planners quietly held that Colombian forces were
relatively poor in quality.56 In any case, given the republic’s domestic situation,
they assumed Gómez wanted to keep his troops at home. Yet when Washing-
ton adopted a more accommodating reimbursement policy, Gómez and Zuleta
discussed the possibility of dispatching infantrymen to Korea. Colombian Army
chief of staff Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla then came out in favor of
sending troops to Korea, an endorsement that carried considerable weight with
the president. According to a U.S. embassy report, General Rojas, through a series
of private conversations with Gómez, “played an important role” in the decision
to send an infantry unit to Korea.57 The army’s enthusiasm, which the U.S. mili-
tary mission found “almost unanimous,” buoyed Rojas, who, like his naval coun-
terpart, held ambitious plans for improving the Colombian military.58 Colom-
bian officers had expressed a desire for a larger role in World War II; the Korean
conflict seemed to offer Colombian servicemen a new opportunity to contribute
to an international military campaign.59 Involvement in the UN effort provided
a unique opportunity to train troops, enhance the army’s prestige at home and
abroad, and strengthen Colombian-American military relations. Service in the
western Pacific might be dangerous, but so too was life in Colombia during la
Violencia. In any case, with the UN Command advancing into North Korea, the
fighting appeared near its end. The Colombian troops would likely undertake only
noncombat duties in Korea. After some deliberation, Gómez therefore instructed

Colombian diplomats to open negotiations with the United States.60
On 17 October Colombian officials at the United Nations contacted Secretary
General Lie and signaled the republic’s intent to discuss a battalion-sized con-
tribution. In doing so, Bogotá indicated its firm desire to demonstrate its “soli-
darity with the cause of the United States and the United Nations” in Korea.61
At that time, the Gómez administration made clear that it had hesitated to send
troops earlier because of “insurmountable” obstacles surrounding U.S. require-
ments.62 But since Washington had established a more flexible reimbursement
policy, Bogotá now sought to make a greater contribution. A few days later, the
Colombian war minister traveled to Washington to make arrangements. On the
eve of the meeting, the Colombian foreign minister told Ambassador Beaulac in
Bogotá that Gómez had already decided “in principle” to offer a battalion to the
UN Command “for occupation purposes.”63 The two countries needed only to
resolve the details.
Colombian war minister Urdaneta discussed specifics with American authori-
ties in Washington on 24 October. Meeting with the Colombian representative,
General Ridgway proposed that the United States transport Colombian soldiers
to Korea. Because the Colombian troops lacked standardized weapons, Ridgway
then offered to outfit the soldiers directly from the U.S. arsenal. The U.S. military
would also provide logistical support for the infantrymen in Korea. In return,
the Colombian war minister acknowledged “a commitment to reimburse” the
United States for its assistance.64 As with Colombia’s naval contribution, the two
men agreed that the exact costs would be negotiated at some later date. Urda-
neta evidently calculated that the repayment rate would be roughly equivalent to
what Washington required for Lend-Lease equipment during World War II. The
strength of Colombian coffee on the international market and the revival of the
Colombian economy during 1950 diminished the financial hardships associated
with a military contribution. Nevertheless, Urdaneta asked Ridgway for details on
the cost of Korean War operations. The Gómez administration, he said, needed
concrete numbers to predict future expenditures.
After the meeting, Colombian and American officials expressed satisfaction
with the negotiations. On the surface, the only unresolved matter involved Co-
lombia’s request for additional financial information. Within two days, U.S. mili-
tary and civilian officials had generated a response for their Colombian counter-
parts.65 American diplomats, however, withheld their findings from Colombian
officials while the Truman administration resolved one additional, unexpected
problem. As Colombian-American talks unfolded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rec-
ommended that Washington cease its solicitation of small-country contributions.
Considering the Korean campaign nearly over, U.S. military planners calculated
that the difficulties of fielding small-country troops exceeded the dividends. The
military chiefs wanted to cancel all negotiations for additional UN troops. Given
the circumstances, the Pentagon may have been correct, but the State Department,
sensitive to the conflict’s ongoing geopolitical ramifications, strongly objected. In
the case of Colombia, for example, the termination of talks on the brink of a fi-
nal offer might adversely affect long-term Colombian-American relations. Such
a move might also damage UN solidarity and endanger future coalition-building
efforts. Secretary Marshall concurred, indicating that he was “deeply concerned
about the possible political implications in the United Nations” if the administra-
tion canceled negotiations. Marshall and other senior U.S. officials overrode the
Joint Chiefs of Staff suggestion on 2 November.66
Unaware of the internal U.S. bureaucratic controversy, Colombian diplomats
became frustrated with American officials, who had not responded to their re-
quest for financial data. Irritated, Colombians conveyed their unhappiness to
American authorities on 3 November.67 With the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem re-
solved, the State Department promptly delivered an apology and copious details
on expenses incurred by U.S. infantry battalions during Korean War operations.
Pentagon statistics showed that equipment would cost $539,000, transportation
$111,000, maintenance (per month) during combat $540,000, and maintenance
(per month) during police action $200,000.68 Satisfied with the U.S. response,
Colombians moved toward a formal contribution. President Gómez made the
final decision to send ground forces to Korea a few days later.
On 14 November Ambassador Zuleta officially committed a Colombian in-
fantrymen battalion to the UN Command.69 The ambassador acknowledged that
the Korean emergency had already passed. But conflicts in other regions (such
as Indochina) suggested that “a long period of warfare” lay ahead for the United
Nations. Making a military contribution to the UN Command, he said, Bogotá
wanted to demonstrate its support for the United Nations and the United States
during a “critical period” of world history.70 Reporting on the Colombian offer
on 26 October, U.S. newspapers also assumed the unit would serve only with the
UN postwar occupation force.71 Yet by the time Secretary Acheson formally noti-
fied the Gómez administration that the Pentagon had accepted the battalion, the
military situation in Korea had turned against the UN Command.72
Communist China intervened in the Korean War to protect the North Korean
regime, defend China’s Manchurian border, and enhance its profile in the cam-
paign against capitalism. In mid-October 1950 the Chinese People’s Volunteers
(CPV) secretly entered communist-controlled northern Korea. Then, on 25 Oc-
tober 1950 Chinese soldiers hit South Korean units in northwest Korea. In early
November the CPV struck the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division and 7th Marine Regiment.
Chinese infantrymen withdrew from these fights by 7 November, vanishing into
the mountains. The UN Command, unsure of the size and capability of its opposi-
tion in Korea, proceeded with its offensive to secure northern Korea. The Chinese
responded with a massive attack on the UN army, beginning an entirely different

war in Korea. By early 1951 the CPV had driven the UN Command back below the
thirty-eighth parallel. Although Bogotá had committed ground troops to the UN
effort under the impression that Colombian soldiers would not see combat, the
prospect of heaving fighting did not deter Colombia. In fact, as the CPV thrashed
the UN Command in December 1950, the president considered increasing the
country’s military commitment to the United Nations, perhaps to include an entire
army regiment. Gómez eventually jettisoned that idea as too large a sacrifice for
Colombia but remained committed to sending an infantry battalion to Korea.73
The authoritarian nature of the Gómez government, coupled with its censorship
of media outlets, shaped domestic reaction to Bogotá’s contribution. The Colom-
bian public’s general response to the outbreak of hostilities suggested broad domes-
tic support for the UN effort. But since Gómez had at first denied the possibility of
Colombia dispatching troops, there was little public debate before the government
announced its decision. When Gómez went public, El Siglo predictably praised the
commitment as “a logical sequence of Colombia’s policy of unrestricted adhesion
to its international obligations.”74 Colombian forces, the paper explained, would be
defending democracy, liberty, and Christian civilization. El Tiempo also endorsed
the move.75 Other newspapers, including Diario Grafico, noted the symbolism of
the commitment. The South American republic had assumed its place aside the
United States in the crusade against international communism. Published photo-
graphs of Colombian diplomats being congratulated by prominent Americans rein-
forced this image.76 To be sure, each of these accounts cleared government censors
before publication. But another, more powerful reality of political life muted poten-
tial critics. If liberal-minded Colombians had questioned the decision, even if just
for political gain, President Gómez would likely have attacked them as communist
agents, justification for further repression.
In Colombia, the apparent contradiction surrounding the government’s mili-
tary contribution therefore went unstated. At a time when Colombia grappled with
civil conflict, the Gómez administration sent military forces abroad. Colombians
would fight for South Korea as their own country disintegrated. Yet that paradox
partially explained how the South American republic came to fight in Korea. La
Violencia produced a foreign policy decision-making structure that allowed the
president to take bold unilateral action. When Gómez decided to support the UN
effort in Korea, the state of siege imposed by President Ospina in 1949 remained in
effect. A few elite decision makers controlled the policy-making process. During
the Second World War, Colombia’s Liberal presidents measured their response to
the totalitarian challenge amid interparty discourse, public debates, and govern-
mental oversight. By 1950 Conservative forces had dismissed Congress, strong-
armed the Supreme Court, censored the press, and outlawed opposition meetings.
Governing by executive order, Gómez charted foreign policy independent of the
checks and balances of Colombia’s normal constitutional and political culture.

While the president’s Korean War deliberations involved consultation with promi-
nent advisers (notably Admiral Tanco, General Rojas, and Ambassador Zuleta)
the final decision belonged to Gómez. Therefore, Colombia’s reason for fighting in
Korea cannot be separated from the president’s own motives.
Laureano Gómez and the Korean War
Ideological and pragmatic factors, many interwoven with Colombia’s domestic

predicament, shaped Gómez’s Korean War decision.77 In its official proclama-
tions, media releases, and authorized histories, the Gómez government cited
ideological incentives. To be certain, the president’s assertion that Colombians
joined the UN Command to defend democracy lacked credibility. While the
republic had a long democratic tradition, Gómez’s recent domestic record did
not sustain such declarations. The president’s devotion to anticommunism, how-
ever, cannot be discounted. A radical anticommunist, President Gómez fervently
believed that Colombia and the world confronted an epic crisis. Communism
threatened Christian civilization, he believed. Indeed, the Colombian strongman
defined the East-West conflict as communism versus Christianity. His anticom-
munist sentiment therefore involved more than intellectual or material objections
to socialism; it tapped into deeply rooted religious convictions. Throughout the
Korean War, the Colombian government portrayed South Korean president Rhee
as a champion of Christianity in Asia; Colombian officials, including Gómez,
rarely mentioned that Rhee was Protestant, not Catholic.78 Accordingly, Colom-
bia must help defeat communism to protect its most cherished institution. Also,
Gómez blamed Colombia’s domestic problems on international communists. For
the Colombian leader, the cold war against communism was desperately urgent.
By fighting in Korea, Colombia could actively participate in the fight against the
“universal enemy,” defending itself, its values, and the free world.79
The notion of multilateral defense also influenced President Gómez. North
Korea launched an unprovoked invasion of its neighbor. Other sovereign coun-
tries had a duty to respond. Ever since Bolívar’s drive for a Pan American fed-
eration in 1826, Colombians had compiled an impressive record of support for
multilateralism. Bogotá submitted its 1932–34 border dispute with Peru to the
League of Nations. At the 1945 San Francisco Conference, Colombian diplomats
shaped the UN charter as the leading advocate for Latin American interests. Gó-
mez briefly chaired the 1948 Bogotá Conference that produced the Organization
of American States. In the lives of both bodies, Colombian diplomats distin-
guished themselves as active and productive members. Between 1950 and 1951,
for example, Colombian war minister Urdaneta Arbeláez chaired the UN’s First
Colombian president Laureano Gómez

(1950–53). He sent an infantry battal-
ion and frigate to Korea for pragmatic
and ideological reasons. (Source:
Courtesy of the Republic of Colombia)
Committee, which dealt with political and security issues. Moreover, Gómez and
his colleagues thought that as a UN member state Colombia contracted certain
obligations, which included participation in collective security operations. Bo-
gotá acknowledged such during the September 1945 bilateral military staff talks
with the United States.80 Supporting the UN campaign in Korea, Colombia ful-
filled its responsibility as a UN member and strengthened the organization as a
mechanism for collective security.81 Gómez invested in the UN Command be-
cause Colombian security might someday depend on the United Nations.82
Related to collective defense, the idea of hemispheric solidarity informed the
president’s decision. Although Korea was a UN campaign, Gómez understood that
a military contribution to the UN Command equaled an endorsement for U.S. mili-
tary and foreign policy.83 This commitment to hemispheric solidarity, intertwined
with multilateralism, began during the 1820s. During the 1920s President Suárez
decided that Colombia should work with the United States. Beginning in 1933, Co-
lombian diplomats were critical agents of inter-American unity in the face of extra-
continental threats. Between 1939 and 1945 Bogotá embraced hemispheric solidarity
to defend the Americas. After World War II anticommunism emerged as the central
theme of inter-American solidarity, yet the essence of cooperation remained un-
changed. Gómez and his advisers despised the Soviet Union and gladly subscribed
to a program that promised to defeat communism. The president maintained a
keen appreciation for the balance of world power, Korea’s strategic value, and Latin
America’s geopolitical importance.84 Colombia and its Latin American neighbors

needed to stand with the United States for their own defense.85
At a material level, Gómez’s military contribution to the UN Command as-
sured Washington of his overall support and goodwill. In 1950 Gómez had an im-
age problem in the United States; his unflinching support for the UN campaign
might improve his standing.86 Considered by many in the United States to “have too
many attributes of a dictator,” Gómez’s presidency threatened to drive a “dangerous
wedge” between the countries.87 During World War II, Gómez had used Liberal
Party collaboration with the United States for political gain. His public expressions
of admiration for fascist order left many U.S. officials with the impression that he
was pro-Nazi and hostile to U.S. interests. American misgivings lingered into the
postwar era, and, when Gómez won the presidency in 1949, the Truman admin-
istration refused to let him visit the United States. Gómez recognized the predica-
ment and sought advice from officials at the Colombian embassy in Washington on
how to on improve his image.88 Ambassador Zuleta then launched a public rela-
tions campaign portraying Gómez as friend of the United States.89 The Colombian
president realized that the Korean War was important to Washington. He hoped to
reinvent his relationship with the United States by joining the UN Command.
Gómez wanted a good relationship with the United States because he needed
U.S. military and economic assistance. Although the question of aid beyond that
required to field Colombian forces in the western Pacific did not enter Colombian-
American conversations surrounding the contribution, it certainly influenced the
president’s decision. Bogotá’s contribution was not a simple arms grab. Nonethe-
less, rural bandits, paramilitary groups, and Liberal agitators resisted the federal
government, and the Gómez regime needed U.S. military aid. By late 1950 an es-
timated ten thousand Liberals had joined organized guerrilla units.90 The Colom-
bian Navy chief eyed assistance to build the republic’s fleet, and as early as October
1950 the Colombian Army chief of staff approached the U.S. military attaché with
his agenda for the nation’s ground forces.91 Each program required generous assis-
tance from Washington. Gómez also wanted U.S. economic aid and private invest-
ments to modernize the Colombian economy. The country had made progress to-
ward that goal over the previous fifteen years, but since 1945 the United States had
offered the republic only modest economic assistance. As Gómez decided to send
troops to Korea, U.S. and Colombian diplomats discussed both a new commercial
treaty and Point IV technical assistance. Fighting in Korea might help Colombians
in these talks. Aiding the UN Command might also improve the country’s reputa-
tion among private investors.92 Although the Colombian president did not trade
servicemen for American military and economic aid, he certainly expected a re-
turn on the republic’s investment in Korea.
Finally, aside from questions of domestic communism and U.S. assistance, in-
ternal factors provided the Colombian president with other reasons to make a
military contribution. Gómez likely anticipated that direct Colombian involve-

ment in Korea would inspire national unity and divert public attention from the
country’s own domestic woes. An astute politician, active in public life for decades,
Gómez surely remembered events surrounding the contentious 1930 election
and the subsequent transfer of power from Conservative to Liberal parties that
sparked domestic unrest not unlike la Violencia. Nationalistic sentiment stem-
ming from the Peruvian border conflict played a major part in settling that dis-
pute. Political controversies in 1944, in part, moved president-designate Echandía
to seek a declaration of belligerency against the Axis. Liberal leaders incorrectly
anticipated that an active role in the war would promote Colombian nationalism.
Along these lines, replaying the domestic impact of the Colombian-Peruvian con-
flict, Gómez expected that Colombian participation in the Korean War would en-
courage domestic order and stability. The elaborate departure ceremony he staged
for Colombian troops in May 1951, designed for domestic consumption, exposed
his determination to use Korea to promote nationalism.
Colombia did not have to intervene in Korea. None of its Latin American
neighbors would, and the United States applied only indirect pressure on Bo-
gotá. The decision belonged to Gómez, and he wanted to join the UN effort. The
president’s personal motives (ideological and material) were compatible with
Colombia’s diplomatic tradition. Colombia’s devotion to hemispheric solidarity,
collective security, multilateralism, and Christian civilization had precedent. Co-
lombian officials sought to use their relations with the United States to benefit
the republic for many decades. Still, la Violencia shaped the circumstances from
which the contribution grew. The domestic conflict brought the passionate anti-
communist to power. Gómez, in turn, sought to use the Korean War to inspire
nationalism and repair his relations with the United States. Colombia’s internal
problems heightened the importance of the East-West conflict. Possessing ad-
equate military strength to meet the Pentagon’s requirements for a military con-
tribution, Gómez was undeterred by domestic checks and balances. Importantly,
Gómez did not have to win congressional or public approval to send troops over-
seas. Gómez possessed the decision-making freedom, military capacity, and will
to dispatch troops. Among all the Latin American republics those three elements
only existed in Colombia.
The United States, Latin America, and the Korean War
At the beginning of the war, the Truman administration hoped for broad Latin
American involvement in Korea. At the United Nations and Organization of
American States, Latin American officials criticized communist aggression. U.S.
diplomats, however, failed to convert this political support into military assistance
for several reasons. In contrast to World War II, the North Korean invasion in 1950
posed only an indirect threat to the Western Hemisphere. In 1941 the Japanese
bombed U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor; Japan, Germany, and Italy declared war on the
United States; and the German submarine campaign endangered Latin American
interests. In 1950 the North Koreans attacked a U.S. client on the Asian mainland.
The Korean dispute, less clearly related to hemispheric security, did not require the
same measure of inter-American cooperation, Latin Americans concluded. Wash-
ington’s slow developing policy on small-country contributions to the UN Com-
mand also discouraged Latin American participation. In July and August 1950,
when inter-American support for the UN operation peaked, U.S. officials offered
unclear guidance on how Latin America could help South Korea. Regional dissat-
isfaction with postwar U.S. policy presented another barrier to Latin American in-
volvement. The United States, it seemed, only bothered with Latin America during
emergencies. “What has happened to our traditional friends in Latin America?”
a New York Times writer asked in 1951.93 American talks with the Latin American
republics revealed the answer and highlighted the exceptional nature of the Co-
lombian contribution.
In 1950 the Truman administration expected Brazil to fight with the UN Com-
mand. Rio de Janeiro had been Washington’s most important Latin American
ally during World War II; the Brazilian military served with U.S. forces in Italy
between 1944 and 1945. The Latin American giant could easily support troops in
Korea. Considering Brazil’s regional influence, U.S. officials expected that Bra-
zilian participation would encourage further Latin American involvement. In
Rio de Janeiro, officials perceived the North Korean assault as part of the larger
Soviet-American cold war. Brazilian diplomats at the United Nations supported
the military campaign, and they offered American officials vague indications of
Brazil’s willingness to fulfill its obligation as a UN charter member.94 But at home,
a chorus of skeptics urged caution. O Jornal, for example, warned against Brazil-
ian involvement, describing the Korean War as a “remote struggle not warranting
Brazilian intervention.”95 Moreover, Brazilians harbored a deep disdain for U.S.
foreign policy. Having sacrificed for the United States during World War II, Bra-
zilians had expected substantial postwar U.S. economic support. This resentment
soon overtook Brazilian-American negotiations.
On 17 July 1950 Brazilian officials informed the U.S. ambassador that they
wanted to provide the UN Command “real help,” implying that the country had
been a “nuisance” during World War II.96 Two days later, the Brazilian govern-
ment indicated some interest in discussing a military contribution to the UN
Command.97 In response, Secretary Acheson ordered the U.S. embassy in Rio de
Janeiro to pressure the Brazilians.98 The Brazilian minister of war’s public remarks,
however, held little promise for the successful conclusion of Acheson’s entreaties.
Responding to rumors that Brazilian soldiers might be sent to the western Pacific,
the minister stated that talk “surrounding” a Brazilian military contribution was
“altogether lacking [in] foundation.”99 Despite the minister’s statement, Brazil-
ian embassy counselor Afranio de Mello-Franco, military attaché Major General
Edgar do Amaral, and naval attaché Admiral Ernesto de Araujo met with U.S.
officials in Washington to discuss the UN effort in early August. Noncommit-
tal, Admiral Araujo only wanted to know what the UN Command needed. He
would then communicate the U.S. position to Rio de Janeiro.100 As during the
Zuleta meeting, U.S. diplomats offered few useful details because of the lack of a
coherent policy. Americans did express their strong desire for Brazilian soldiers,
preferably an infantry division.
With the report from the Brazilian team in hand, President Eurico Gaspar Du-
tra conferred with his advisers to discuss the possibility of a Brazilian contribution.
The Brazilian foreign minister relayed the outcome of the meeting to the American
ambassador on 7 August 1950. The Brazilian National Security Council, he stated,
had determined that Brazil did not have the “means” to participate.101 Reporting
to Washington, Ambassador Hershel Johnson concluded that Brazil’s delicate po-
litical and economic situation precluded Rio de Janeiro’s active support for the UN
campaign.102 An economic recession and the forthcoming election in the recently
democratized country bred anxiety and uncertainty. The principal office-seekers,
including presidential hopeful and World War II dictator Getúlio Vargas, opposed
sending troops to Korea.103 If the United States had helped Brazil modernize its econ-
omy after World War II, Vargas said, Brazil might have the means to defend South
Korea, but the United States had neglected Brazil, which was therefore not prepared
to fight abroad. Also, nationalistic elements within the Brazilian armed forces did not
want to fight alongside the United States again. They claimed that the United States
did not appreciate their effort during World War II.104 After the October elections,
the outgoing president refused to talk about the Korean War. In any case, by then,
the UN Command’s victory at Inchon diminished the need for additional troops.
Secretary of State Acheson told Ambassador Johnson to drop the issue.105
In late 1950 the Communist Chinese intervention reopened the topic, and
superficially appeared to bring Washington and Rio de Janeiro closer together.
Indeed, some Brazilian writers called for action. Previously opposed to the idea
of a military contribution to the UN Command, O Jornal urged the government
to send a force to Korea because to do “less would be immoral and cowardly.”106
Intending to capitalize on changing opinion, Washington decided to press Vargas,
who returned to office in January 1951. The new administration issued a dozen
contrasting policy statements regarding troops for Korea, reflecting a new Brazil-
ian approach to negotiations with the United States. Rio de Janeiro tried to keep
Washington’s hopes alive (and the possibility of a large package of U.S. economic
and military aid) while assuring its people that no Brazilian soldiers would go
overseas. In a pre-inaugural message to U.S. officials, Vargas stated that Brazil
would fight in Korea, but Rio de Janeiro expected an aid package including “me-
dium and long range term bank credits for the immediate execution of a rational
program of industrialization and public works.”107 Fixated on economic griev-
ances, Vargas wanted reciprocal U.S. aid for Brazilian cooperation.
In an April 1951 letter to Truman, the Brazilian president acknowledged his
country’s willingness to “contribute to the success of the defense program of the
hemisphere.”108 Truman responded with a strong appeal for Brazil to send an in-
fantry division to Korea.109 The Brazilian foreign minister replied to Truman’s re-
quest with a list of machinery the country needed to develop its oil industry.110 In
May Assistant Secretary of State Miller again asked Vargas for troops.111 Rio de
Janeiro then decided to send Lieutenant General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro
to Washington. Ostensibly, the general went to the United States to arrange a Bra-
zilian expeditionary force for Korea. But Miller and Acheson, who received Góes
Monteiro, admitted that “the purpose” of the general’s visit was “extremely vague,”
noting that the Brazilian officer “spent most of his” time “rehashing the familiar
Brazilian complaints against the United States.”112 Indeed, the general pushed aside
the UN question, stressing instead Brazil’s military and economic needs. Washing-
ton had ignored Brazil since the end of the Second World War, Góes Monteiro
observed. In order for Rio de Janeiro to make an effective military contribution,
the United States needed to send economic aid to Brazil.113 The general returned
to Brazil in October. Talk of a Brazilian contribution promptly ended.114
Postwar U.S. foreign policy similarly dominated Mexican-American discus-
sions. When U.S. officials approached Mexico City in August 1950, General Alberto
Salinas Carranza stated that the country was not “in any position to offer armed
assistance” to the UN Command.115 Since 1945 Washington had failed to provide
Mexico with proper economic and military support, the general asserted, and he
blamed the United States for Mexican unpreparedness. Despite Carranza’s posi-
tion, a U.S. intelligence report on global military forces concluded that the Mex-
ican Army, 48,000 strong, should send two infantry battalions to Korea. Armed
with this report, in September, the Truman administration again approached the
Mexican government.116 Mexican officials fired off a litany of criticisms, berating
Americans for not fulfilling their promise to help Latin America modernize. The
demonstration ended U.S. aspirations for a Mexican contribution.117
Whereas Mexico and Brazil lacked the will to fight with the UN Command,
the Caribbean and Central American republics, countries under the greatest U.S.
influence, offered to join the UN effort but could not meet the Pentagon’s mini-
mum requirements. On 27 July Costa Rican Under Secretary in Charge of the
Department of Foreign Affairs Ricardo Toledo indicated that his country would
raise volunteers to serve in Korea. Since Costa Rica did not have a standing army,
the United States needed to train and outfit the volunteer force “in order to en-
sure that they” would “not run greater risks” than “practiced troops.”118 Wash-
ington declined the offer, wanting only regular forces for service in Korea. Costa
Rican officials then proposed sending a unit of its National Guard to Korea for
occupation duties. That proposal became entangled in a debate over the status of
a police-type unit in combat. The United States eventually decided that a unit’s
function determined its status, but the republic never officially committed the
force.119 On 2 October Washington rejected El Salvador’s offer of an untrained
force for service in Korea. Then, in late November, Cuba proposed sending one
company of regular troops to the UN Command. The Pentagon appeared ready
to accept the unit for noncombat duties until Havana pulled the contribution for
ambiguous political reasons.120
On 2 August 1950 the Panamanian cabinet decided to recruit volunteers to fight
in Korea. It also authorized UN forces to use bases in Panama, offered Panamanian
ships to carry armed forces to Korea, and committed “land for the purpose of assist-
ing in the provisioning of the troops.”121 According to the Department of Defense,
the volunteers were not suited for service; the bases were of such poor quality that
they did not warrant an American investment; and the United States needed neither
transport ships nor farmland. Panama’s strategic location nonetheless demanded
that the offer receive special consideration. The Truman administration simply held
the Panamanian contribution in abeyance, neither accepting nor declining the of-
fer. American officers couched the U.S. response in language consistent with the
Washington’s appreciations in the isthmus’s strategic importance.122
Besides Colombia and Brazil, other South American republics also gave some
initial indication of their willingness to consider a commitment to the UN cam-
paign. On 15 July the Bolivian UN representative, Eduardo Anze Matienzo, com-
municated his government’s “support of the Security Council resolutions to re-
store international peace and security in Korea.” He pledged thirty Bolivian Army
officers to the UN Command, the maximum that nation could contribute “within
the limits of its resources.”123 Believing that the offer did not advance the UN
cause, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined the Bolivian proposal. On 12 October
Uruguay signaled that it wanted to send two battalions to Korea. A formal offer,
however, Uruguayan officials insisted, would have to wait until the force received
additional training. After a long series of discussions surrounding the exact num-
ber of troops the country would send, the tentative commitment fell from two
thousand to eight hundred men. Internal opposition to the commitment delayed
the formal offer. A final decision, Uruguayan officials said, would have to wait
until after upcoming elections. In the meantime, Montevideo requested that the
United States furnish the nation with military equipment to train the soldiers.
When the Truman administration received the Uruguayan aid request, it realized
that Montevideo wanted to arm its entire military in exchange for a military con-
tribution to the UN Command. When the Pentagon refused, Uruguayan support
for the UN Command evaporated.124
Chilean officials stated that their government wanted to participate, most

likely in the form of a naval commitment. But the issue needed to be delayed,
Chilean diplomats explained, until the Congress could address the topic in mid-
October 1950. Much to the chagrin of American diplomats, legislators in Santiago
failed to consider the matter. When the Chilean government later reopened talks
with Washington, the force under consideration changed from a warship to an
air unit. Department of State officials believed that prospects for Chilean par-
ticipation remained strong, concluding that Chilean officers would seek to atone
for their lack of World War II cooperation. On 16 November a U.S. counselor in
Chile reported that Santiago would “carry through with the plan” to send flyers to
Korea.125 All that changed following the 26 November election, when President
Gabriel González Videla’s political coalition suffered a major setback and Chilean
officials told Washington that it was politically impossible for them to send a force
to Korea. Chilean isolationism and anti-Americanism seized the day.
Struggling to secure troops for the UN Command, State Department officials
hatched a plan to create one Latin American unit composed of servicemen from
many countries. The number of private Latin American citizens who had contacted
U.S. officials stirred hope in Washington that a sufficient number of men might be
available for such an enterprise. Despite the numerous difficulties associated with
such an undertaking, U.S. military planners, acutely aware of the need for Latin
American participation, approved the concept in October 1950. On 10 November
Acheson asked U.S. posts in Latin America to report on the approximate number
of volunteers each could produce for an inter-American division, perhaps to be
organized and dispatched by the Organization of American States. The results of
embassy surveys were mixed. In time, Latin American apathy and massive practical
problems defeated the Latin American foreign legion scheme.126
Disappointed with the overall lack of Latin American military assistance, U.S.
officials did gather small amounts of nonmilitary aid. In late September the UN
secretary general levied specific requests for support on several UN members. Most
Latin American countries received petitions for contributions of medical supplies.
The UN secretariat asked Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina to furnish the
UN Command with foodstuffs. UN officials requested that Cuba, Mexico, and El
Salvador send sugar.127 Responding to a petition for wheat, Mexico informed the
UN secretary general that its reserves would not allow Mexico City to meet the
specific UN need; Mexico did offer a monetary gift of 3 million pesos and later sent
beans and chickpeas to Korea. On 4 October Cuba committed two thousand tons
of refined sugar, ten thousand gallons of alcohol, and human plasma to the UN ef-
fort. Paraguay offered financial assistance and medical supplies. Argentina made a
token contribution of frozen meat. Venezuela sent blankets, soap, powdered milk,
alcohol, and miscellaneous medical equipment. Chile contributed copper, salt, and
other strategic materials. The total monetary value of these goods reached nearly
$3.5 million, modest when compared to the sum sent by the United States and
Canada, but more generous than other less-developed regions.128
The Truman administration appreciated Latin America’s financial and mate-
rial contributions but remained determined to secure more troops. In late 1950,
following the Communist Chinese intervention, U.S. officials undertook another
major effort in Latin America on behalf of the UN Command. The diplomatic
campaign produced no additional Latin American units. Soon thereafter, with
only the Colombian commitment in hand, the Truman administration considered
abandoning its campaign for Latin American forces. Indeed, Acheson admitted to
Marshall that “there appear to be very few further prospects” for Latin American
involvement. Still, in February 1951, with U.S. casualties mounting, Assistant Sec-
retary of State Miller traveled to Latin America to make another plea for troops.
He again came up empty. Then, the State Department launched one final push in
June 1951.129 Latin American economic limitations, the lack of postwar U.S. aid,
and domestic political opposition carried conversations in directions often wholly
unrelated to Korea. “We can be grateful” for the Colombian contribution, a New
York Times editorial concluded, “but there ought to be more.”130
In an inter-American context, Colombia’s military contribution to the UN co-
alition was an aberration. Most Latin Americans believed the Korean War a dis-
tant event, marginally related to hemispheric security. Colombian decision makers
understood the profound global implications of the Korean War. During a time
of Latin American democratization, governments calibrated their responses amid
active political and public discourse. Colombia, in contrast, drifted toward partisan
dictatorship; President Gómez dispatched Colombian servicemen to defend South
Korea without involving public opinion or political opposition. Latin Americans
resented U.S. postwar foreign policy. Colombians, distracted by internal matters,
offered only a mild critique of American foreign policy since 1945. Several Latin
American governments tried to extort economic and military assistance from the
United States in return for their involvement in the Korean War. Beyond support
for Colombia’s UN forces, the topic of U.S. aid did not enter into Colombian-Amer-
ican Korean War conversations. The entire experience exposed the deterioration of
U.S.–Latin American goodwill. For Colombia and the United States, it launched a
defining episode in the history of U.S.-Colombian cooperation.
· · ·
In June 1950 the Truman administration resolved to create a multinational coali-

tion to defend South Korea. After establishing policies and procedures, U.S. of-
ficials engaged in secret talks with many foreign governments, including Bogotá.
By mid-November, Colombia had contributed a frigate and infantry battalion to
the U.S.-led UN Command. But the other Latin American republics sent only non-
military assistance to Korea. An international event in its origins and direction,
the Korean War rippled through the Americas, revealing the overall decline in
hemispheric cooperation. For Colombia and the United States, however, compat-
ible values helped the countries capitalize on the shared opportunity presented by
Korea. A devotion to anticommunism, multilateralism, inter-American solidar-
ity, and collective security brought the countries together. Self-interest also en-
couraged the Colombian-American alliance. The Truman administration needed
foreign troops on the battlefield and geopolitical support in the cold war against
communism. The Gómez regime wanted to fight communism, fulfill international
treaty obligations, improve relations with the United States, and inspire Colom-
bian nationalism. Internal affairs were therefore critical to Colombia’s response
to the Korean War. La Violencia placed passionate, anticommunist politicians in
a decision-making structure that allowed for bold action. It likewise produced, in
Bogotá, compelling incentives to fight overseas. For this reason, in their commu-
nications with U.S. officials, Colombians were key agents of cooperation. Indeed,
Colombians showed initiative throughout the 1950 Korean War negotiations; U.S.
authorities placed only indirect pressure on the Gómez government to send troops
to Korea. The two countries therefore embarked on a military campaign that would
connect the increasingly interdependent neighbors in important ways.
4
The Fighting Alliance, 1951–1953
Captain Luis M. Galindo led a company of Colombian infantrymen toward the

Chinese position at 4:30 a.m. on 21 June 1952. From a forward observation post,
Colonel Lloyd R. Moses, commander of the U.S. infantry regiment with which
the Colombians fought, watched the Colombians advance undetected into the en-
emy trenches. Then, the predawn calm gave way to the fight. Although taken by
surprise, Chinese soldiers put up stubborn resistance; a violent exchange of small-
arms fire gave way to intense hand-to-hand combat. When the Chinese rushed
reinforcements to the fray, the Colombians made expert use of artillery and tank
support to break the counterattack. On the verge of victory, the Colombian infan-
trymen tried to take communist prisoners, but the enemy refused to surrender
and the action devolved into a slaughter. The pace of fire tapered off after sunrise,
and the riflemen secured the hill. Two Colombian soldiers lay dead on the ground,
and several others were wounded. To signal the company’s success, Private Pedro
Pira proudly unfurled the Colombian flag and waved it above his head. The soldier
later boasted that he was a human flagpole. That night, Colonel Moses recorded in
his combat journal that “the Colombians [had] put up a splendid fight to a man.”1
Capturing Hill 400 the Colombians added a new link to the outpost line of resis-
tance, making more formidable the UN front.2
Colombian soldiers attacked the Chinese position as part of a larger UN effort
to defend South Korea. Between 1950 and 1953 the U.S.-led international coali-
tion featured combat divisions from industrialized countries, but it also included
forces from other UN member states. Fighting in Korea, small-country units like
the Colombia Battalion transformed the UN campaign into something more than
a simple test of American military prowess. A symbol of the world’s devotion to
collective security, the aggregate strength of small-nation forces, nearly 15,000
troops, bolstered the UN military position on the peninsula. Moreover, multi-
national participation helped restrict fighting to Korea by linking UN operations
to UN resolutions; coalition politics made the outbreak of a larger conflict less
97
likely. Colombia’s successful integration into the UN Command grew from its
decade-long partnership with the United States. The Colombian military’s pre-
existing knowledge of American doctrine, organization, and equipment gave the
Colombian Army and Navy a major advantage over other small-nation forces.
The Korean War, in turn, involved more than the defense of South Korea. It set
precedents for future UN military operations, improved Colombian military ca-
pabilities, increased Colombia’s prestige and confidence as an international actor,
and contributed to the rising domestic popularity of the Colombian armed forces.
For Colombia and the United States, the UN campaign was a shared professional,
social, and cultural experience that heavily influenced bilateral relations. Indeed,
between 1950 and 1953 Colombia’s ongoing domestic disorder created distance
between the Bogotá and Washington. Fighting communism on the other side of
the Pacific Ocean, Colombian and American servicemen kept the two countries
connected in a mutually beneficial way, even as Colombia drifted further from its
democratic heritage.
The Colombian Navy in Korea
Colombia’s part in the UN campaign began at the Bolívar Naval Base in Carta-
gena on 1 November 1950. There, the volunteer crew of the ARC Almirante Padilla
attended a patriotic mass; a sense of excitement hung in the air, chaplain Ernesto
Hernandez observed, as the nation sent its sailors overseas “to save liberty and
civilization.”3 After the service, Lieutenant Commander César Reyes Canal, who
postponed retirement to command the frigate, ordered his men to make ready for
departure. At 10:20 a.m. family and friends of the Colombian seamen watched
the frigate slip from its mooring and steam toward the mouth of the harbor. The
1,300-ton ARC Almirante Padilla passed through the Panama Canal before turn-
ing northeast toward the U.S. naval base at San Diego, California. The warship,
unable to make more than ten knots en route to the United States, needed work
before joining the UN Command. These preparations began immediately upon
arrival in San Diego, a port bustling with activity at the news of Chinese interven-
tion in the Korean War. After improving the frigate’s propulsion, communication,
and fire-control systems, the Colombian sailors took the frigate north to the Long
Beach Naval Yard, where Wilmington Welding and Boiler Works, under contract
with the Colombian government, continued the overhaul, including the last-min-
ute replacement of the ship’s main batteries.4
As the contractor worked on the frigate, the crew undertook a rigorous train-
ing program that involved activities ranging from battle drills to rifle manual. The
intensity of the Colombian exercise impressed the Americans, including the naval
yard manager.5 Colombian officers also used their time in California to visit with
the fighting alliance, 1951–1953 99
Dancette Peepee and Namanu Miller present leis to Colombian sailors Luis Garcia and Leon
Acosta at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, March 1951. (Source: Department of the Navy, NARA)
U.S. naval planners, outlining the Colombian Navy’s future combat role in Korea.
When not working, the Colombians explored Los Angeles. Many Colombian sail-
ors adored American films and enjoyed visiting Hollywood. Acting as impromptu
cultural attachés, Colombian servicemen addressed local civic groups; the officers
even attended the screening of Colombia: Gateway to South America as special
guests of Long Beach City College. The merits of these activities aside, by early
1951 the men grew impatient with their extended stay in the United States. The
experience of making the ship ready for war held valuable lessons, but their fight-
ing mission with the UN fleet still seemed distant.6
The long period of refurbishing the ship came to a conclusion when Lieutenant
Commander Reyes set a course for Pearl Harbor on 28 February 1951. In Hawaii,
he presented the ARC Almirante Padilla and its crew to the U.S. Pacific Fleet com-
mander. The men then began a four-week training cruise with the U.S. Navy to
prepare the Colombians for joint combat operations. The maneuvers, with bilin-
gual radio operators coordinating the action, included antisubmarine, antiaircraft,
coastal bombardment, escort, and at-sea replenishing drills, the type of duties the
warship would undertake in the western Pacific. Colombian sailors also made final
calibrations of the ship’s equipment. Although training occupied most of their time
in Hawaii, the Colombian sailors still did some sightseeing and even spent a few
lazy afternoons on the Oahu’s pristine beaches.7 Pleased with the overall state of
the Colombian warship, U.S. officers deemed the ARC Almirante Padilla ready for
combat in April. The Colombian frigate promptly steamed to the war zone, joining
the massive UN armada based in Japan on 30 April 1951.8
UN naval planners built the multinational navy around American assets. At
the start of the conflict, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy’s U.S. Naval Forces Far East
lacked men and materiel to conduct major combat operations. Recognizing these
critical shortcomings, Washington moved the U.S. 7th Fleet, designated Task Force
77, from the Philippines to Japan on 27 June 1950. During the weeks and months
that followed, combat ships from around the world enlarged the force, increasing
the UN navy from 86 to 274 warships between June and October 1950. Australia,
Britain, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, and
South Korea all joined the fleet. In September 1950 American authorities orga-
nized these multinational contributions into the UN Blockading and Escort Force,
dubbed Task Force 95. Officers further subdivided the unit into ten elements, each
with a specific role ranging from escort duties to minesweeping. The small South
Korean Navy, principally coastal vessels, operated as a separate entity (Task Force
96.7) during most of the war. Cultural, language, supply, and tactical differences
created some problems for UN naval leaders. Colombian, Thai, and South Ko-
rean sailors, for example, lacked experience in modern naval warfare. But since the
American and British Commonwealth navies had fought together during World
War II, the integration of multinational warships posed relatively few problems.9
Essential to the UN effort in Korea, maritime superiority allowed the United
Nations to transport ground forces and supplies to Korea. Control of the waters
adjacent to the Korean peninsula also provided the UN Command with opera-
tional maneuverability, witnessed during the September 1950 Inchon assault. The
constant threat of UN amphibious landings held communist ground units on the
North Korean coastline, forces that otherwise might have been deployed on the
fighting front; an international blockade closed North Korean ports while na-
val gunfire destroyed production, transportation, and communication facilities.
Then, on the sea, the UN navy recovered downed pilots and opened escape routes
for men trapped behind enemy lines. For UN seamen, these duties, however criti-
cal, often lacked glamour. Still, the UN campaign in Korea could not have been
won without victory at sea.10
Just one ship in a large fleet, the Colombian frigate nevertheless made a mean-
ingful wartime contribution. While UN planners feared a Soviet naval strike, the
communist countries directly engaged in Korea lacked large capital ships, and
UN forces rarely engaged in ship-to-ship action. Instead, UN warships frequently
undertook missions that required small, fast ships: mine sweeping, coastal raids,
intelligence forays, escort duties, and blockade patrols. These activities often
entailed significant danger, especially after communist armies improved their
coastal defenses, and the UN fleet confronted a constant shortage of shallow draft
warships. UN planners therefore valued vessels like ARC Almirante Padilla, ships
that could maneuver close to the shore. American officers therefore wasted no
time before attaching the ARC Almirante Padilla to Rear Admiral George Dyer’s
Task Force 95 at Sasebo Naval Base in Japan.11
The Colombian frigate embarked on its first combat mission at midnight on 13
May 1951. Just after sunrise the ARC Almirante Padilla rendezvoused with a collec-
tion of British and American warships, including two aircraft carriers headed into
the Yellow Sea. At 2:00 p.m. on 20 May Colombian gunners battered communist
shore positions on Cho-do, a strategic island off Korea’s west coast. South Korean
and British Marines landed on the island to collect intelligence under the cover
of UN naval gunfire.12 When a mine threatened another UN ship, Lieutenant
Alfonso Díaz Osorio’s first battery knocked out the explosive device at a range of
1,500 meters with marksmanship that impressed the British sortie commander.13
Shortly after dusk the brief, but intense, raid ended. The marines returned to their
ships and the naval group turned back to sea. Colombia had fired its first shots of
the Korean War.14
Soon after the Cho-do raid, the ARC Almirante Padilla began a period of con-
centrated combat operations, undertaking activities typical for UN ships. In early
June the Colombian frigate protected UN supply ships steaming to and from the
Wonson Harbor blockade; without the provisions carried aboard those transports,
the UN fleet could not have maintained its relentless attacks on North Korean
transportation facilities, oil refineries, and ground forces near the city.15 Then, the
ARC Almirante Padilla participated in a one-week bombardment of the North
Korean port of Songjin. During this time, the Colombians undertook their first
underway replenishment in the combat theater, a maneuver that required a steady
helmsman. On 14 June Lieutenant Commander Reyes and the ARC Almirante
Padilla picked up South Korean intelligence agents on the island of Yo-do. The
Colombians returned the men to the UN Command for debriefing prior to start-
ing a twenty-one–day patrol between Japan and Wonson Harbor.16 During this
time, ARC Almirante Padilla rescued an American pilot after his aircraft crashed
into the Sea of Japan.17 After a short break in Japan, the ARC Almirante Padilla re-
turned to escort duty, moving with otherwise vulnerable supply ships through the
combat zone. Although many U.S. sailors despised these assignments, the Colom-
bian crew embraced the tasks as unprecedented opportunities to master modern
naval warfare while demonstrating their commitment to collective security.18
The Colombian sailors quickly showed their aptitude for naval warfare with
the U.S.-led fleet. In fact, having worked with the U.S. Navy since 1939, the Co-
lombian Navy easily adjusted to life in the western Pacific. Colombian familiarity
with U.S. Navy customs and tactics facilitated their integration into the Korean
War combat alliance. Several crewmen had studied at U.S. naval schools; oth-
ers completed courses taught by American advisers in Colombia. Also, since the
Colombian officers and radiomen spoke English, they encountered few problems
working with the American or British navies. Conversely, many U.S. sailors spoke
Spanish, thus easing the combination of the Colombian and American seamen in
professional and social settings.
While the Colombian Navy arrived in Japan ready for action, active combat
alongside the most power navies in the world improved Colombian proficiency.
When the ARC Almirante Padilla underwent routine maintenance in September
1951, Colombian officers took advantage of the experience by rewriting the Colom-
bian Navy’s Book of Unit Organization, the republic’s comprehensive guide to na-
val combat. Lieutenant Commander Reyes and his officers combined Colombia’s
wartime lessons with U.S. Navy regulations, outlining and describing procedures
for every shipboard department, in every foreseeable naval scenario. In doing so,
the manual did not simply mimic American practices but assured the smooth
combination of Colombian and American naval forces in future operations.19
Beyond the Book of Unit Organization, Colombian sailors used the Septem-
ber recess to train and relax. They conducted various naval drills to maintain
their fighting edge and visited Colombian infantrymen hospitalized in Tokyo.20
Searching for ways to cope with wartime stress, they wrote letters to friends and
family in Colombia; they stayed connected to life in Colombia through mail de-
livered by the U.S. naval postal system. During tours of Japan, most Colombian
sailors posed for studio portraits, pictures that became mementos of their over-
seas adventure.21 The Colombian Navy soccer team played on the fields at the na-
val base, drawing large crowds after it dismantled the previously unbeaten British
Navy squad.22 The crew of the ARC Almirante Padilla then traveled to South Ko-
rea for the dedication of the UN Memorial Cemetery at Tanggok, outside Pusan, a
widely publicized international celebration of the UN’s commitment to collective
security.23
In early November the Colombian crew, energized after the month-long break,
returned to the Sea of Japan. During their second night at sea, a moment of high
drama unfolded when a ferocious storm enveloped the frigate. Massive waves
tossed the ship, rendering inoperable the machinery that controlled the rud-
der. While repairing the equipment, three sailors suffered serious injuries.24 The
shipboard medical team attended to the men, and once the crew completed the
repairs, the frigate returned to Japan to offload the wounded. The Colombians
then headed back to sea. On 5 November the frigate protected two large U.S. na-
val transports moving to South Korea, ships that carried a total of 4,000 Ameri-
can soldiers.25 After that mission the warship undertook almost constant escort
and bombardment duties until the end of 1951. The ARC Almirante Padilla’s final
wartime mission came in mid-January 1952, when it landed South Korean com-
mandos behind enemy lines. During its nine months in the western Pacific, the
Colombian frigate had steamed over 46,000 miles in combat operations with the
United Nations.26
The departure of the ARC Almirante Padilla did not end Colombia’s naval in-
volvement in the Korean War. As early as October 1950 the Gómez government
had noted its interest in purchasing an additional American warship to fight in
the war. Colombian and American officials hammered out the details in 1951, de-
ciding to transfer the USS Bisbee, docked in Japan, to the Colombian Navy.27 A
Tacoma class frigate identical to the ARC Almirante Padilla, the USS Bisbee had
seen action with the U.S. Navy during World War II; Washington loaned the ship
to the Soviet Union in 1945, part of a Soviet-American Lend-Lease deal. Back with
the U.S. Navy by 1950, the USS Bisbee fought under an American flag during the
first year of the Korean War. To operate the new ship, many ARC Almirante Pa-
dilla veterans volunteered to stay with the UN Command, a clear measure of their
devotion to duty. Some replacement sailors moved from Colombia to Japan while
Reyes, and a skeleton crew took the ARC Almirante Padilla back to Cartagena.
Then, on 12 February 1952, Lieutenant Commander Hernando Berón Victoria,
commander-designate of the new Colombian warship, took possession of USS
Bisbee. The crew renamed the frigate the ARC Capitán Tono and began making it
ready for combat.28
Like Colombia, Thailand used the Korean War to acquire new warships, albeit
under different circumstances than the Colombians. In July 1950 Prime Minister
Phibun Songkhram, fearing communist encroachment in Southeast Asia, decided
to send uniformed servicemen to Korea. He beat back domestic opposition to the
decision, notably members of the Thai Parliament who considered the move “pro-
vocative,” insisting that Thailand attach itself to the United States in the cold war
against international communism.29 Future U.S. military and economic assistance
alone, Phibun argued, justified sending combat forces to Korea.30 In November
1950 the HMRTN Bangpakong and HMRTN Prasea, two British-built Thai cor-
vettes, joined the UN navy. Because of their origins, the warships required British,
rather than American, supplies. American commanders and policymakers had
wanted to support small-nation contributions with U.S. gear but adjusted to ac-
commodate the corvettes. The Thai Navy’s lack of familiarity with U.S. naval tac-
tics, on the other hand, created serious problems. Whereas Colombians had trained
with the U.S. Navy before the Korean conflict, Thais had just started working with
the United States. Thai-American operational misunderstandings contributed to
the grounding of the HMRTN Prasea during combat operations in January 1951.
American sailors tried to free the corvette, jammed on the North Korean coast
south of Wonson, but eventually had to abandon and destroy it. Washington tried
to present the rescue operation as “an example of UN teamwork” in Korea, but

the uncertain blunder embarrassed Thai and U.S. officials.31 Immediately there-
after, the Truman administration decided to replace both Thai corvettes with U.S.
frigates, a move designed to standardize U.S.-Thai equipment. The decision also
helped American naval authorities better train their Thai counterparts.
The Colombians, conversely, had few problems working with U.S. forces, and
the ARC Capitán Tono was soon ready for action. The ship undertook its first mis-
sion with the Colombian Navy on 1 May 1952, escorting supply ships to Korea’s
west coast. Colombian gunners then pounded communist land forces near Saquio
Kaku and struck communication facilities near Konjapio.32 Later, the Colombians
picked up intelligence agents and their North Korean prisoners. That summer the
ARC Capitán Tono escorted ships through the combat zone and blasted North
Korean communication and transportation facilities. The frigate even knocked
out communist shore batteries that nearly sank a U.S. Navy minesweeper outside
Hungnam.33 In September the Colombian frigate also conducted antisubmarine
patrols alongside the USS Guadalupe and USS Mount Katmai. The Colombians
returned to escort, blockade, and bombardment duties later that year. In early 1953
the ARC Capitán Tono moved to South America, having fired roughly 1,200 shells
at enemy positions.34 A few months later, Colombia purchased yet another U.S.
frigate for service with the UN Command. Colombian officers in Japan boarded
the USS Burlington in June 1953, raised the Colombian flag, and renamed the ves-
sel the ARC Almirante Brión. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander
Carlos Prieta Silva, the new crew began combat operations on 18 July 1953, just
eleven days before the Korean War ended.35
The Colombian Navy made a certain contribution to the UN naval campaign.
In 1950 a Colombian officer had worried that the Colombian Navy “signified
almost nothing in the eyes of any strategist” and that the larger navies would
obscure the work of the small Colombian frigate.36 Yet throughout the conflict
American officers recognized the “persistence, dedication, and efficiency” of the
Colombian sailors during the war.37 The Colombian ships, they believed, con-
tributed on terms comparable to any U.S. frigate. In fact, conscious of the im-
portance of their work, the Colombian sailors showed a unique devotion to their
mission. On at least one occasion, the commander of an American transport ship
requested that the ARC Almirante Padilla escort his vessel through the combat
zone, because unlike many other UN warships, the Colombian frigate “actually
steamed with a sense of urgency.”38 As Colombia contributed to the naval cam-
paign, it also gained valuable knowledge and experience. Beyond the Book of
Unit Organization, roughly 60 percent of Colombian Navy personnel served with
the UN fleet, returning to the republic as practiced sailors. They formed the nu-
cleus of the republic’s postwar maritime force. The Colombian Navy, Lieutenant
Commander Reyes discovered, gained prestige and confidence while fighting “to
maintain the freedom” for which “all people strive.”39 During combat operations,
Colombians sailors capitalized on their familiarity with the U.S. military system,
improving throughout the likelihood of success. This feature of the naval cam-
paign also helped explain the Colombia Battalion’s exceptional performance.
Training the Colombia Battalion, 1951
The Colombian Army’s smooth integration into the U.S.-led UN Command grew
from its prewar affiliation with the United States. Colombians had begun attend-
ing U.S. service schools, working with American advisers, and operating U.S.
military equipment during World War II. Bilateral military cooperation contin-
ued through the immediate postwar period. In late 1950, capitalizing on this pre-
existing relationship, President Gómez asked Washington for special assistance
to prepare Colombian troops for Korea. The Truman administration agreed, and
U.S. Army mission personnel, led by Spanish-speaking Texan Major William T.
Gordon, committed themselves to helping the Colombian Army. In December
1950 Washington shipped a small amount of military equipment to Bogotá so the
soldiers could train with U.S. arms, the type they would use in the western Pacific.
While Colombia had acquired U.S. military materiel before Korea, Colombians
had dispersed the weapons to various domestic military installations; consolidat-
ing it now for the sole purpose of training the battalion proved impractical. In
addition to equipment, the Pentagon sent nine Latino-American servicemen to
South America to coach Colombian infantrymen. With this aid, the Colombian
government began building its Korean War battalion.
Colombia Battalion officers gathered on 31 January 1951. The enlisted person-
nel assembled at a Colombian military base north of Bogotá the following month.
Under American guidance, Colombian officers studied subjects ranging from
intelligence-gathering to leadership. The riflemen undertook extensive physical
training, attended weapons seminars, and practiced small-unit tactics. The Co-
lombian Army also adopted an American organizational model, which included
a headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company.
Surveying the battalion’s progress, a U.S. Caribbean Command officer reported
that he had “never seen a group of men so eager to learn” as the Colombia infantry-
men, selected for overseas service “on the basis of physical and technical aptitude,
cultural background, and enthusiasm for the task.”40 Still, the domestic training
program encountered some problems. The mountainous training grounds resem-
bled the type of terrain the unit would encounter in Korea but proved too small
for battalion-level exercises. Also, despite the fact that service in the battalion was
voluntary, some soldiers turned out not to be volunteers: several local command-
ers had sent troublemakers to Bogotá to clean out their commands. Colombian
officials eventually returned the unwanted men to internal posts, and the battalion
was ready to move to Korea.41
The Colombian government orchestrated a grand farewell ceremony for its
troops. Undeterred by the heavy rain that had fallen the night before, citizens
turned out in large numbers to see the soldiers on Saturday, 12 May 1951. Com-
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polanía Puyo, a widely respected English-
speaking infantry officer, the battalion marched through the city. At the end of
Calle 26, the unit turned south toward the Plaza de Bolívar. Standing in front
of the capitol building on the southern end of the plaza, the place where riot-
ers organized during the bogotazo, government and church officials reviewed the
infantrymen.42 In his public remarks, President Laureano Gómez praised the bat-
talion’s heroic mission to defend Christian civilization. The minister of war then
presented the soldiers with uniform insignia (a rampant lion on a red, yellow,
and blue shield) for having finished their preparations for war; battalion officers
also received a national banner to carry with them to Korea.43 A few days after
the review, the troops boarded railway coaches for their trip to Buenaventura, the
country’s principal Pacific coast port. On 22 May, the men filed onto a U.S. naval
transport, the USNS Aiken Victory, bound for Korea.44 The Colombian Army had
embarked on its first overseas military operation.
The men continued to train during their voyage across the Pacific Ocean. Co-
lombian officers examined military intelligence reports, reviewed infantry tactics,
discussed military ethics, and practiced their English.45 Enlisted personnel im-
proved their physical conditioning, studied American weapons, and memorized
the Geneva Convention rules for conducting war.46 The Colombian servicemen of-
ten worked late into the night, a demanding routine broken only by the USNS Aiken
Victory’s stop in Hawaii. At Pearl Harbor, a four-man team disembarked, boarded a
U.S. military aircraft, and flew to South Korea to prepare for the battalion’s arrival.
During their brief visit to Oahu, other Colombian troops slipped off the transport
to explore Honolulu; eight servicemen were so excited to be in Hawaii that they
missed the USNS Aiken Victory’s departure later that day, requiring that a U.S. air-
craft fly them to Korea. That miscue aside, American sailors on the USNS Aiken
Victory observed that the Colombians behaved in an “exemplary” fashion while
aboard ship, impressing U.S. seamen as hardworking, “cheerful and pleasant.”47
The USNS Aiken Victory delivered the Colombian soldiers to Pusan, South
Korea, on 16 June. South Korean president Syngman Rhee personally greeted the
Colombians, the newest members of a diverse international military coalition.48
With forces like the Colombia Battalion in Korea, the UN campaign was unlike
earlier multilateral military experiences. While infantry divisions were the basic
building blocks of the World War II combat alliance, new cold war geopolitical
considerations produced a tapestry of smaller UN units in Korea. In order to
successfully integrate these ground forces into a coherent army, UN planners first
had to make certain that each contingent was properly trained and equipped.49
Seasoned professional soldiers, such as those from the British Commonwealth,
arrived in Korea with considerable experience in modern warfare. But many
small-nation contributions required a period of preparation before moving into
combat. American military leaders fully realized this fact after attempting to de-
ploy the 10th Philippine Infantry Battalion Combat Team.
The first small-country contingent to arrive in Korea, the Philippine Battalion,
took its place on the front line in September 1950.50 The Filipino soldiers im-
mediately joined the Puerto Rican regiment of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division, an
American decision based upon the miscalculation that the Filipino soldiers would
speak Spanish.51 Attempts to train and equip the troops during the fluid campaign
that followed the Inchon landing proved unsuccessful. Personality clashes, com-
munication problems, and tactical incompatibilities further complicated matters,
and 8th U.S. Army commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker eventu-
ally assigned the battalion to defend communication and transportation lines.
The problems persisted after Communist Chinese intervention, and the Filipino
commander even petitioned Manila to withdraw the troops. Although the unit
stayed in Korea, the “embarrassing and difficult situation” moved U.S. planners to
reevaluate the process of multinational integration.52
In response to the problems associated with fielding the Philippine Battal-
ion, Lieutenant General Walker established the United Nations Reception Cen-
ter (UNRC) at Taegu University in October 1950.53 The UNRC mission involved
equipping new troops, establishing uniform operating standards, and developing
unit proficiency. Additionally, as the first UNRC commander Colonel John H. Mc-
Gee explained, the center sought “to gain by tact and understanding the respect
and confidence” of incoming UN units.54 Such “respect and confidence” would
in turn make the UN army more effective. The center, with the capacity to train
6,200 soldiers at any given time, received the Turkish Armed Forces Command, a
brigade of 5,000 troops and the first UN unit to train at the camp, on 18 October
1950. Like any organization, the UNRC needed time to function most efficiently,
but by June 1951 it had developed into a “smooth functioning organization.”55
The Colombian advance party (detached in Hawaii) arrived at the UNRC, then
located in the rural hamlet of Toko-ri, on 3 June 1951, approximately two weeks
before the main body of Colombian servicemen.56 By that time, the team (two
commissioned officers and two noncommissioned officers) had already estab-
lished a liaison with the UN Command in Japan; the Colombians, like all UN
contingents, would maintain a permanent presence in Tokyo, the seat of the UN
Command headquarters.57 In Toko-ri with UNRC staff, the men planned nearly
every detail of the unit’s rigorous, six-week training schedule. The Colombians
also translated U.S. Army instructional literature and post signs, often by tacking
Spanish translations over English-language text.58 To facilitate the training of the
Colombian soldiers, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division commander Major General Rob-
ert H. Soule dispatched eleven Puerto Rican soldiers from the 65th U.S. Infantry
Regiment to the UNRC.59 Before the battalion arrived, U.S. planners doubted that
the Colombians would ready for combat in just six weeks. While career soldiers
comprised over 50 percent of the battalion, some recruits arrived in Korea with
only basic training. Yet once the troops arrived, the UNRC staff found the Colom-
bian soldiers motivated, disciplined, cooperative, and well trained.
Immediately upon entering the reception facility, the Colombian soldiers received
immunization shots and drew supplies. Like most small UN units, the Colombians
arrived in Korea without sufficient arms and depended on the UN Command for
all of their supplies, including weapons, motor vehicles, and communication equip-
ment; U.S. military officials encouraged most UN units to use American equipment
to standardize and simplify quartermaster operations.60 After attending to supply
issues, the infantrymen began their formal training on 18 June. The opening phase
involved weapons instruction, and as the weeks passed Colombian soldiers moved
to squad, platoon, company, and battalion exercises. Colombians undertook day-
light and nighttime maneuvers, including live-fire drills to simulate combat. Be-
cause of the paucity of Spanish-speaking instructors, UNRC personnel often taught
English-speaking Colombian officers, who then tutored individual Colombian in-
fantrymen. While the battalion prepared for combat, Colombian officers rotated to
the front to acquaint themselves with the current military situation.61 As the sched-
ule progressed, U.S. military planners reorganized the unit along the lines of an In-
fantry Battalion Separate rather than a traditional battalion, as the group had been
ordered in Colombia. Most importantly, the change gave the battalion more motor
vehicles, making the unit less dependent on the 8th U.S. Army transportation net-
work. This last-minute adjustment, born from lessons learned in Korea, allowed the
Colombian unit more autonomy in the field.62
During their time at the UNRC, Colombian soldiers impressed U.S. instructors
as “apt students of warfare,” and the battalion received high marks for its perfor-
mance at the center.63 In fact, the battalion motto was “mas sudor, menos sangre”
or “more sweat, less blood.”64 After the initial training phase, Major Earl W. Bihl-
meyer reported that the “status of training [was] excellent” and that “prior train-
ing in U.S. weapons has done much to increase the proficiency of these troops.”65
Because many Colombians had used U.S. equipment since the beginning of World
War II, the soldiers quickly adapted to conditions in Korea. The UNRC staff did
critique the battalion’s performance, criticisms openly shared with Colombia Bat-
talion officers. The principal problem centered on the lack of aggressive leader-
ship. During one field exercise, for example, Colombian commanders deployed
the entire battalion against a single enemy platoon. Overly cautious officers also
hampered platoon deployments at the UNRC. Captain John E. Byron observed
that Colombian officers were “reluctant to make decisions” and appeared to “lack
confidence in their judgment and ability.”66 Since many of the Colombian leaders
had trained at U.S. service schools during the 1940s, they were familiar with U.S.
tactics. Still, because battalion officers saw the Korean campaign as an exceptional
career-building experience, some feared costly mistakes that might tarnish their
professional standing. Colombians worked to address the U.S. criticism; the prob-
lem nonetheless persisted throughout the war.
None of the U.S. instructors at the UN training camp questioned Colombia
Battalion morale. Indeed, Americans repeatedly described Colombian soldiers
as motivated, disciplined, and cooperative. In response to news of the opening of
armistice talks in July, Colombians, still at the UNRC, expressed concern that the
war would end before they had the opportunity to fight. Faced with the prospect
of an armistice before the battalion deployed, Corporal Miguel Conteras told an
El Tiempo reporter that he wanted to fight communism and hoped that the war
might last long enough for him to taste combat; Corporal Juvenal Forero added
that he “believed in the UN and wanted to fight for it.”67 The Colombian Army
was in Korea to fight. Anything less constituted failure. Also, because the Colom-
bia Battalion was a volunteer force, individual soldiers were typically adventurous
and committed to their mission, an important ingredient in the unit’s coming
success.68 The concerns of Corporals Conteras and Forero aside, Colombians
would have their chance to fight, and as the battalion prepared to move forward
to the front, UNRC administrators concluded that the unit was “one of the best
to pass through” the facility and “comparable” to the forces from Belgium and the
Netherlands.69 Indeed, the Colombia Battalion excelled at the UNRC, in marked
contrast to the performance of some other small-nation forces.
Among the independent nations of Africa, Ethiopia alone contributed ground
forces to the UN Command.70 Itself a victim of foreign aggression during the 1930s,
Ethiopia easily identified with South Korea’s plight.71 Emperor Haile Selassie I, a
leading spokesman for collective security since his much-heralded 1936 League of
Nations address against “international lawlessness,” committed an infantry battal-
ion to the UN effort in August 1950.72 Addis Ababa likely anticipated that its con-
tribution would strengthen U.S.-Ethiopian relations and that it might also bring
about a favorable UN Trusteeship Council decision relating to Ethiopian territo-
rial disputes. The Ethiopian government had made a territorial claim to British-
occupied Eritrea; in early 1950 a special UN commission had recommended that
the territory be joined with Ethiopia, but the United Nations had yet not taken
final action on the matter.73 If this outstanding situation entered into the emperor’s
Korean War decision, he made no mention of it in an April 1951 speech, claiming
instead that the men were “representing and defending” the “sacred” principles of
collective security with which Ethiopia was “imperishably associated.”74
Compared to other small-country contingents, the Ethiopian soldiers who
arrived at the UNRC in May 1951 were the least prepared for modern warfare.
Unlike the Colombians, they had little experience with the U.S. military before
Korea. Also, many Ethiopians were mechanically illiterate, a major problem in
modern warfare. Ethiopian servicemen struggled with motorized vehicles, weap-
ons, and communication gear. When they received M-1 rifles, for example, they
attempted to burn off the metal preservatives by placing the weapons in an open
fire. Three Ethiopians were killed and five others wounded as a result of mishan-
dling equipment.75 Many of the troops could neither read nor write, and fewer
Ethiopian officers spoke English than Addis Ababa promised. The men also con-
fronted some racial problems, such as when U.S. reporters classified Ethiopian
servicemen as “Negroes,” a label the Ethiopians vigorously protested. Then, in
contrast to the more disciplined Colombian unit, conflict within the Ethiopian
ranks caused problems. The most serious incident centered on a plan hatched by
several Ethiopian riflemen to murder unpopular officers. In spite of these prob-
lems, the Ethiopians later earned a reputation as brave and resourceful soldiers,
even if they could not read a map.76
For Ethiopian and Colombian servicemen alike, the completion of training at
the reception center marked only the beginning of their war in Korea. In order to
deploy small-nation forces, U.S. military planners decided at the beginning of the
multinational campaign to attach undersized UN contributions to larger units.
As both the executive agent for the operation and the principal military contribu-
tor to the campaign, U.S. military officials decided to join UN detachments with
U.S. forces.77 Eighth U.S. Army planners, in turn, attached battalion-sized con-
tributions to U.S. infantry regiments, and larger forces to U.S. divisions or corps.
Also, when possible, foreign units would remain and fight with their parent units
through the entire conflict. The rationale behind this move was threefold. First,
small-nation contributions simply lacked the structure to conduct operations in-
dependent of a larger force—the Colombia Battalion needed the infrastructure
of a parent organization to sustain itself. American officials also hoped to foster
esprit de corps among diverse forces that would enhance their fighting spirit. Fi-
nally, operational partnerships bred familiarity between units that soothed some
of the natural difficulties (operational and administrative) of integrating multina-
tional troops.78
In addition to inserting UN ground contributions into the 8th U.S. Army,
American officials decided to spread UN units across the battlefront. An even dis-
tribution of forces allowed for greater consistency in UN offensive and defensive
capabilities, especially in cases where small-nation forces lacked the proficiency
of their U.S. counterparts. American soldiers would always be close at hand to
assist, if necessary, unpracticed troops. In the field, U.S. guidelines encouraged
American commanders to keep foreign troops near the center of the American
line, sandwiched between U.S. infantrymen. The 8th U.S. Army distribution pol-
icy reduced the probability of a communist strike against a cluster of non-U.S.
units that might have diminished the will of a given country (or the international
community as a whole) to prosecute the war.79
When the Colombia Battalion completed its training at the UNRC, the 24th
U.S. Infantry Division remained the only U.S. division without a foreign unit. Ini-
tially, the Pentagon had hoped to keep the force exclusively American in composi-
tion to experiment with tactical innovations. Yet the political value of spreading
small-nation contingents across the front outweighed the need for a homogenous
U.S. unit, and the 8th U.S. Army commander, Lieutenant General James A. Van
Fleet, ordered the Colombia Battalion to join that division.80 Once transferred to
the 24th U.S. Infantry Division, Major General Blackshear M. Bryan attached the
Colombian soldiers to the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, a relatively easy decision
since regimental commander Colonel Ginés Pérez, an officer with a reputation as
an outstanding combat leader, spoke fluent Spanish.81 Ready for action and with
a parent unit waiting, the Colombia Battalion moved to the fighting front. With
staggered departures between 27 and 30 July 1951, the Colombians traveled north
aboard trucks; the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps shipped most of the unit’s
equipment via the South Korean railway.82 Captain Valencia Tovar rode with one
of the three motorized caravans as they snaked toward the battlefront. Years later,
he remembered the sights and sounds of Korea’s wartime suffering, making spe-
cial note of the debris-littered streets of Seoul, a city then ravaged by war.83 From
the South Korean capital, Captain Valencia Tovar and the Colombians passed
through Chunchon to the northwest and entered the Hwachon Valley near the
center of the Korean peninsula. The soldiers moved into the 21st U.S. Infantry
Regiment area on 1 August 1951. Nearly thirteen months after the fight began, the
Colombia Battalion stood on the cold war’s front line.84
Advancing the Line, 1951
The Colombian troops joined the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment as the dramatic ebb
and flow of the land war neared its conclusion. In April 1951 the UN Command
halted the Chinese spring offensive, a costly task that brought the destruction
of the 1st Battalion of the British Gloucester Regiment. A limited 8th U.S. Army
counteroffensive subsequently cleared most communist units from South Korea,
and representatives from the two sides began negotiating an armistice agreement
on 10 July. The main UN line of resistance, Line KANSAS, began near the mouth
of the Imijin River on the Yellow Sea and ran northeast to the thirty-eighth paral-
lel. The front then turned east toward the Hwachon Reservoir and the South Tae-
back Mountains. From there, KANSAS knifed northeast through rugged terrain
to the Sea of Japan, approximately twenty-five miles north of the boundary that
had separated North and South Korea before the war. Near the center of the line, a
Map of the 8th U.S. Army Advance, 1951
series of UN outposts known as Line WYOMING arched northward to the “Iron

Triangle” before looping back to KANSAS near the Hawchon Reservoir’s west
bank.85 From these positions, the Korean War developed into a string of limited
ground operations designed to strengthen defensive positions and inflict casual-
ties on the enemy while negotiators worked to end the conflict.
At the center of the UN line, the Colombia Battalion immediately moved into
regimental reserve, where the troops rehearsed for combat and made final prepa-
rations. From its parent unit, the battalion received interpreters, radio operators,
telephone switchboard personnel, and a liaison officer. To coordinate artillery
support, Colonel Pérez also dispatched a forward observation team that included
an officer, radio operator, and driver. As the battalion incorporated these new
elements, Pérez ordered a company of Colombian riflemen forward to test enemy
defenses in anticipation of a larger UN offensive. At noon on 6 August 1951 one
company of Colombian riflemen, under the command of Captain Valencia Tovar,
left the battalion camp. The men planned to raid a communist outpost in their
first ground combat of the Korean War.86
The Colombian unit, comprising one platoon from each of the battalion’s four
companies, reached the forward U.S. position around 12:30 a.m. That night, as Va-
lencia Tovar reviewed his plans and the soldiers waited for daylight, Chinese forces
crashed against the UN line, providing the men with their first exposure to the
“screams, fire, explosions . . . and cornets” of Korean War combat.87 The Colom-
bian company helped beat back the attack, suffering its first casualty of the war.
Then, around daybreak, three Colombian platoons started toward the opposing
line. Three hundred meters beyond the UN trenches, Lieutenant Rafael Serrano
Gómez’s platoon encountered heavy grenade and small arms fire from commu-
nists perched atop an adjacent hilltop. Valencia Tovar quickly moved forward with
the company’s reserve. Two Colombian soldiers hurled grenades into a bunker that
sheltered enemy spotters. The explosion ripped through the dugout, killing the
Chinese soldiers, effectively blinding communist mortar fire. The Colombians then
yelled “Viva Colombia” and charged the CPV trenches. Fire enveloped the riflemen
as they pressed up the slope, but by 8:10 a.m. the soldiers had seized the communist
position; eleven Colombians suffered wounds during the charge.88 Shortly after the
victory, a Colombian radio operator received a message, in English, from regimen-
tal headquarters. Valencia Tovar subsequently ordered the group to move back to
Line WYOMING. Concurrent with the attack, the platoon under Lieutenant Ber-
nardo Lema Henao’s command captured the battalion’s first communist prisoner of
the war.89 Safely behind the UN line, Valencia Tovar and Lema Henao correlated
information concerning the Chinese forces they had encountered and forwarded
that information, along with the prisoner, to regimental headquarters. Colombian
war correspondents proudly relayed news of the unit’s success to South America.90
Eighth U.S. Army planners used the information gathered by the Colombian
patrol to help plan a larger UN offensive. UN commander General Van Fleet
sought to improve the overall disposition of UN defenses by capturing a series of
dominant geographic features. American officers also hoped that a limited offen-
sive would provide more complete information on the preparedness of commu-
nist forces and help the UN army regain its fighting edge after a period of relative
inactivity. Beginning in the east, UN forces moved forward to seize the northern
rim of Punchbowl, a circular valley near Mundung-ni. That struggle involved
costly engagements on Bloody and Heartbreak ridges. In the west, Operation
COMMANDO advanced the UN line forward ten miles, clearing communist ar-
tillery from within striking distance of the strategic Ch’orwon-Kumhwa railroad.
In the center, the U.S. IX Corps, including the 24th U.S. Infantry Division and the
Colombia Battalion, pressed northward toward Kumsong.
Between 30 September and 2 October, Colombian infantrymen weeded out
pockets of Chinese resistance around UN outposts on Line WYOMING. The chore
entailed significant hazards, and three Colombian soldiers died overrunning one
communist position.91 Even when not under direct enemy fire, the Colombians
faced danger, as graphically realized when a booby trap mutilated one soldier.92 Af-
ter securing the UN line, the battalion moved forward for Operation NOMADIC,
the U.S. IX Corps’s drive on Kumsong. On 5 October, as the unit prepared for the
offensive, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the commanding general of the Colombian Armed
Forces, visited the troops. During his inspection of the battalion, General Rojas
(soon president of Colombia) wished the troops success, inspiring many on the eve
of their biggest operation to date.93 In conjunction with the 1st and 3rd U.S. Infantry
Battalions, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, the Colombians were ready to attack the
communist troops on Hill 561, just south of the Kumsong River.94
The Colombia Battalion surged forward at 5:00 a.m. on 13 October. Lieutenant
Colonel Polanía committed two companies to the attack. At first, the men made
decent progress, but around 10:30 a.m. severe enemy machine-gun and mortar
fire stopped the advance. The Colombian commander immediately requested
artillery fire, and shortly thereafter a battery of 105 mm howitzers pounded the
communist positions. Polanía then sent one company around the communist
flank, and at 2:15 p.m. the Colombians lunged toward the hill from two directions.
After two hours of tough fighting, they captured the objective.95 That same day,
the American infantry battalions took adjacent ground, moving the UN line to
a point four miles south of Kumsong. Anticipating a communist counterattack,
Colombian and U.S. soldiers immediately fortified their new posts. The Chinese
failed to break the Colombian-American line that night.96
Pleased with the disposition of his force following the 13 October push, IX Corps
commander Lieutenant General William Hoge decided to press the attack. A few
days after the action on Hill 561, Lieutenant Colonel Polanía received orders for a
second advance. Regimental planners asked the battalion to capture three protrud-
ing landmarks on Hill 552, designated points X, Y, and Z. American officers planned
to incorporate these positions into an outpost line of resistance that would reach
to within two miles of Kumsong. On 20 October the Colombians moved against
the first objective, yet failed to capture the position by nightfall. Although a
well-entrenched company of Chinese soldiers defended the hill, the 21st U.S. In-
fantry Regiment commander concluded that the “enemy resistance did not warrant
the slow progress of the [Colombia] battalion.”97 Fearing heavy casualties, cautious
Colombian officers failed to press the assault, a problem that first surfaced at the
UNRC. Unable to move forward, Colombian soldiers entrenched on the hillside and
organized a defensive perimeter, determined to resume the attack in the morning.
At first light on 21 October, two rifle companies moved forward at a modest pace,
slowed by communist mortar and machine-gun fire. Then, at 1:40 p.m. Lieutenant
Colonel Polanía radioed Pérez with news that the Colombians had finally secured
landmark X. Immediately thereafter, UN air forces pounded the battalion’s second
objective. On the heels of the air strike, one Colombian rifle company secured point
Y against light enemy resistance; Colombian infantrymen captured their final ob-
jective on 22 October.98 Concurrent with the Colombian advance, U.S. forces on
both flanks moved their sectors of the battlefront forward.
Colombian infantrymen defend a ridge in central Korea, October 1951.

(Source: U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA)
Colombian infantrymen dueled with communist troops in the days after captur-
ing Hill 552.99 The most serious challenge to the new Colombian outpost unfolded
on 8 November when the Chinese launched a full-scale attack on the Colombia
Battalion’s forward-most company. The communist drive dislodged the Colombi-
ans from the trenches, and at 2:30 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Polanía, concerned that
the troops would be isolated, ordered his men back to the main line of resistance.
Approximately thirty minutes later Lieutenant Francisco Caicedo Montúa led the
endangered men back to the battalion’s main body. Immediately thereafter, U.S.
artillery and air forces attacked the contested position. Then, at 6:30 a.m., two Co-
lombian companies, together with one platoon of American self-propelled quad
.50 caliber machine guns, counterattacked. Lieutenants Caicedo Montúa and Raúl
Colombian troops fire a .50 caliber machine gun at an enemy position, October 1951.
(Source: U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA)
Martínez Espinosa provided outstanding small-unit leadership during the fight,

and Colombian soldiers soon reoccupied the outpost.100
After the action, Colonel Pérez moved the Colombia Battalion into regimen-
tal reserve, where the Colombians remained until December.101 Back on the front
line on Christmas Day, the South Americans received a special Spanish-language
holiday greeting from the opposing CPV forces. The booming Chinese loudspeak-
ers marked the successful completion of the Colombia Battalion’s 1951 campaign.
During that year, Colombia and the United States had transformed a hemispheric
defense partnership into an overseas combat alliance. In doing so, the Colombian
soldiers demonstrated their aptitude for war, at the UNRC and during the Kumsong
offensive. Although just a small unit embedded in a larger force, the Colombian Bat-
talion contributed in proportion to its size. The 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, in par-
ticular, benefited from Colombia’s involvement, acquiring a capable fourth battal-
ion, improving the regiment’s combat effectiveness. Colombian officers might have
been more aggressive, especially during the first day on Hill 561, but the battalion’s
The Colombia Battalion Headquarters Company assembles for inspection behind the
fighting front, 1951. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
overall performance had been commendable. The Colombia Battalion received the
Presidential Unit Citation for its performance during Operation NOMADIC; U.S.
officers also decorated several individual Colombian soldiers.102 The impressive be-
ginning gave the unit confidence as it moved forward into 1952, a year that would
challenge the Colombians in new ways, on a different part of the UN line.
The Rhythm of Life in the Trenches, 1952
In 1952 the Korean War slipped into a period of protracted stalemate. As armistice
negotiations sputtered forward, both sides proved unwilling to undertake major
offensive action. At the beginning of this new phase, American authorities trans-
ferred the 24th U.S. Infantry Division to Japan. With its parent unit leaving Korea,
the Colombia Battalion moved west to join the 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S.
Infantry Division. The last group of Colombians arrived at their new post on 28
January. As a part of the arrangement, one Colombian officer served the regimental
commander as an active staff member, a move calculated to improve the integration
of the two units. On the far right of the UN Command’s westernmost sector, the
Colombian troops occupied a line of interlocking defenses that demanded of each
man faith in himself, his equipment, fellow soldiers, and adjoining units.103
The Colombia Battalion spent 1952 rotating between the front line and regi-
mental reserve.104 When in the trenches, Colombian infantrymen occupied a de-
fensive network reminiscent of that in the First World War. A series of fortified
bunkers, each burrowed deep into the earth, dominated the line. Soldiers used
heavy logs, sandbags, and loose earth to harden the dugouts from which they
peered above ground. A few bunkers served exclusively as living quarters, but
most were both firing position and residence. An elaborate network of trenches,
chiseled across the front, connected the shelters and allowed soldiers to move be-
tween posts without being exposed to communist snipers. In addition to provid-
ing passage, the trenches also concealed mortar and machine-gun emplacements,
as well as firing stations for individual riflemen.105
The men in the trenches held the line against enemy attacks. They also con-
ducted frequent patrols into the wasteland between UN and communist lines to test
enemy defenses, gather intelligence, and ambush communist sorties.106 Depending
on the objective, Colombian soldiers went forward during daylight or after dark.
The Colombia Battalion typically dispatched one patrol per day, and on a rotat-
ing basis each individual rifleman participated in one mission per week.107 On the
line, Colombian soldiers manned firing positions, cleaned weapons, and monitored
communist movement from observation posts. They also hunted rodents and main-
tained the physical integrity of the line. Daily communist artillery and mortar fire
damaged the bunkers and trenches.108 Exploding shells ripped gashes in the barbed
wire that guarded the approaches to the line. The weather also created some prob-
lems, as when heavy summertime rain eroded parapets and triggered mudslides.109
Colombian riflemen perpetually attended to their portion of the UN line. In those
duties, 31st U.S. Infantry regiment commander Colonel Lloyd R. Moses observed
that the Colombians excelled, wanting both to master the techniques of modern
warfare and represent their country with honor.110
The uncomfortable life in the trenches strained even the best soldiers. Night
patrols and a demanding daytime work schedule left little time for sleep. When
the moment for rest did arrive, soldiers slept on the ground or on beds fashioned
from logs, metal scraps, and surplus telephone wire. Inside the dugouts, potbellied
stoves provided heat on cold nights; there was little relief from summertime heat.
As circumstances allowed, Colombia Battalion vehicles or Korean Service Corps
porters delivered a warm breakfast and supper to the frontline troops. Infantry-
men ate prepackaged rations for their noontime meal.111 Like all wars, the Korean
conflict provided few opportunities for proper attention to personal hygiene on
the front. Riflemen came off the line for a shower just once a week, and a short
time afterward, they were again covered in dirt. While the lack of communist air
power made life in the trenches less dangerous than it might have been, combat
patrols, frequent communist raids, and incoming artillery fire made conditions
hazardous.
When not on the line, the Colombia Battalion sat in regimental reserve, typi-
cally for a period of two weeks. Colombian soldiers undertook any one of a num-
ber of diverse tasks while in the rear area. First, the Colombian riflemen stood
ready to support frontline units. The battalion occasionally conducted company-
size raids against communist outposts, such as the 21 June 1952 action against Hill
400. Weapons seminars together with squad, platoon, company, and battalion
training exercises maintained the unit’s combat readiness during periods of inac-
tion; Colombian troops still found some moments to rest and relax. The unit also
used its time in the rear to absorb replacement personnel. The Colombia Bat-
talion received the first batch of replacements in February 1952. The fresh troops
took the place of Colombian soldiers killed or wounded in action and allowed
other servicemen to return to South America.112
The Colombian Army personnel policy, nearly identical to the U.S. model, pro-
vided for the periodic replacement of infantrymen. The procedure of rotating sol-
diers through the battalion limited the combat service of any individual service-
man while maintaining a core of seasoned forces in the field. To administer the
process, the Colombian Army established a training and replacement facility at the
Colombian Infantry School in August 1951. American advisers in Colombia worked
closely with their Colombian colleagues to prepare and administer the center, and
much of the equipment used for training replacement troops came from the Canal
Zone. Under the command of Major Guillermo Pinzón Caicedo, the faculty (many
Korean War veterans) taught courses based upon wartime experiences that both
prepared soldiers for service in Korea and improved the army’s overall approach
to military instruction.113 Also, since by late 1952 the Colombian Army no longer
produced enough volunteers to fill the battalion, the Colombian Infantry School
developed classes on the importance of the UN fight in Korea, critical for the mo-
rale of the fighting men. On the peninsula, the new troops refined their abilities at
the UNRC before moving to the fighting front; infantrymen returning to Colombia
traveled to the United States with rotating American soldiers before moving back to
South America.114 The size of any given replacement group fluctuated but usually
numbered around 200 officers and men, or 20 percent of the total strength of the
infantry battalion. The single exception to the measured replacement of frontline
troops occurred in mid-1952, when three contingents arrived during a two-week
period, with the effect of replacing nearly 50 percent of the unit’s personnel. By the
time the battalion left Korea in 1954, 4,314 Colombian soldiers, or approximately 21
percent of all Colombian Army personnel, had served on the Korean peninsula.115
The Colombian Army rotation procedure contributed to its consistent readiness
in Korea. Since each UN force determined its own personnel policies, replacement
programs varied between units and partially accounted for the uneven perfor-
mance of some other small-nation forces. Ethiopian and Thai officials, for example,
replaced their entire battalions every twelve months. This move forced U.S. instruc-
tors to undertake the wholesale retraining of these units before reintegrating them
into the larger UN Command. The attendant delays diminished Ethiopian and Thai
combat efficiency until the new soldiers acquired combat skills and experiences. In
the case of the Thailand Battalion, American officers complained that “their com-
plete unfamiliarity with U.S. military organization, method, and weapons” continu-
ously taxed American instructors trying to prepare Thai soldiers for combat.116 Even
the 5,000-man Turkish Brigade, which removed nearly 2,000 soldiers from the line
every four months, struggled to maintain its proficiency while incorporating fresh
troops.117 Small-country forces that used American-style rotation programs gener-
ally avoided these difficulties.118
Although a large number of Colombian Army personnel passed through Korea,
discipline within the battalion’s ranks did not become a problem. The UN Com-
mand did not have legal power over international units, so the responsibility for
policing each UN detachment fell to that unit’s commander.119 The battalion oc-
casionally called on the U.S. military to deal with issues relating to Korean citizens,
but Colombian officers policed their own men with good results. The Colombia
Battalion experienced normal problems connected to military organization, in-
cluding several counts of theft, fighting, and insubordination. To the embarrass-
ment of Colombian commanders, one officer even involved himself in a Tokyo bar
fight. When infractions occurred, punishment often proved severe. A Colombian
military court sentenced one soldier to twenty-four months in a military prison for
what appears to have been no more than petty theft. After reaching the judgment,
officers promptly returned the offending soldier to Colombia to serve his time.
For smaller infractions, Colombian officials made use of U.S. military stockades
in the western Pacific. These predicable disciplinary problems aside, Colombians
maintained a superb record of conduct in Korea, thus improving their combat
performance. On this count, some other small-country units struggled. American
officials, for example, believed that the Philippine Battalion’s lack of discipline hurt
its combat efficiency, observing that the unit took “fewer precautions” in combat
than desired, resulting in heavier than usual casualties. Americans also noted a
“siesta complex” among Philippine soldiers that “caused U.S. officers anxious mo-
ments during battle.”120 The Colombia Battalion was not the most disciplined UN
force in Korea. The Turkish Brigade earned that distinction, in part through its use
of corporal punishment. Still, the 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment commander found
the Colombian infantry unit obedient and orderly.121
While discipline within small-country units varied, all relied on the network of
U.S. medical expertise in the western Pacific.122 The Colombia Battalion arrived
in Korea with its own medics, first aid specialists who plugged into a larger UN
medical system. American doctors and dentists often examined and treated rou-
tine ailments. When a Colombian soldier was seriously wounded, medics evacu-
ated him to a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. Once stabilized, he then proceeded
to a permanent U.S. medical facility before either rejoining the battalion or re-
turning to Colombia. The American Graves Registration Service (AGRS), U.S.
Army Quartermaster Corps, handled the remains of deceased Colombians. Each
UN force disposed of its war dead through the U.S. Army. The UN Command
allowed remains to either be buried in South Korea or repatriated to the native
country. When interred in Korea, the contributing government maintained the
option of returning fallen servicemen to their homeland after the war. Because
the piecemeal repatriations of human remains proved costly, Colombian officials
decided to place their dead in the UN Memorial Cemetery at Tanggok. Graves
registration workers cremated deceased Colombians, placed the cremains in
urns, and buried the cylinders. Upon the request of the Colombian government,
the AGRS disinterred the dead after the war, and the Colombia Battalion carried
the remains back to Colombia in 1954.123
Confronting the constant possibility of death, Colombian soldiers sought vari-
ous means to escape the pressures of war. For the Colombians, most of whom
were devoutly Catholic, religious services assumed special importance. Before
every combat operation, regardless of scale, the soldiers attended masses that ca-
tered to a serviceman’s individual spiritual needs and provided for greater unit co-
hesion by joining the men in communion. When circumstances did not allow for
the proper staging of services, the battalion chaplain held mass on an altar made
of empty ammunition crates or hastily spread across the hood of a jeep. The 31st
U.S. Infantry Regiment commander expressed some concern for the safety of the
soldiers when the entire battalion, over a thousand troops, celebrated mass within
range of communist artillery. Fortunately for the Colombian soldiers, Chinese
gunners did not strike the congregations.124
Large outdoor religious ceremonies posed a risk to servicemen similar to United
Service Organization (USO) performances. Like their American colleagues, Co-
lombian servicemen enjoyed USO programs, although U.S. officers observed Co-
lombians to be much better behaved than American soldiers.125 Many Colombian
infantrymen also traveled to Japan for rest and relaxation; nearly all discovered it a
novel and interesting place.126 Yet because the average Colombian had little money,
battalion personnel generally found the trip less appealing than did their U.S. coun-
terparts.127 Many Colombian soldiers volunteered to help Korean children displaced
by the war, and the battalion created a scholarship fund to support Korean students
studying in the United States.128 Personal correspondence also helped Colombian
servicemen cope with separation from loved ones, maintaining long-distance re-
lationships that relieved some wartime anxiety.129 Beyond family and friends, sol-
diers often acquired new pen pals once in Korea. Popular Colombian magazines
regularly published letters from soldiers, usually men seeking eligible Colombian
women with whom to correspond.
Other forms of recreational activities also helped Colombians deal with life in
Korea. The infantry battalion supported several groups of musicians, and band
contests often ran deep into the night. To entertain visiting U.S. soldiers, Colom-
bian musicians quickly added several American swing songs to their repertoire, a
musical display General Van Fleet described as “magnificent.”130 They also “added
some spice to the dreary operations in Korea” through the introduction of “lurid
bambuco dances.”131 In the area of athletic competition, Colombian servicemen
enjoyed baseball, competing in the 7th U.S. Infantry Division league. Much to the
chagrin of their American competitors, the Colombians were outstanding players
and took second place in the division’s 1952 tournament.132 In the end, Colombian
soldiers found many different ways to escape the demands of life on the fighting
front, but as was the case for all UN soldiers, the prospect of returning to family
and friends sustained most.133
Life in the trenches with the UN Command strained men from many coun-
tries. In the face of wartime hardships, Colombian soldiers demonstrated their
proficiency at arms. A November 1952 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff report concluded
that the Colombian soldiers had an “excellent record” in Korea.134 They greatly
exceeded prewar U.S. expectations. Forces from Colombia and the United States
had formed a close operational partnership; in fact, the 31st U.S. Infantry Regi-
ment commander believed the bond between U.S. and Colombian forces stronger
than U.S. ties to any other small-nation unit. Acknowledging a sense of inter-
American comradeship, Colonel Moses observed that the close U.S.-Colombian
partnership “was not fictitious” and grew from “a feeling” that the two countries
were “closely related.”135 Another U.S. officer remembered that the Colombians
“just fit in really well” with American soldiers.136 Colombian servicemen rein-
forced that observation. Captain Valencia Tovar, for example, found that the two
armies “functioned in a very harmonious way.”137 “After the battle” for Kumsong,
Lieutenant Colonel Polanía observed, “we all became soldiers from the same con-
tinent and fighters for the common cause.”138
The Gómez Regime, 1951–1953
The successful fighting alliance in Korea kept Colombia and the United States to-
gether during a time that might otherwise have pulled them apart. In 1950 Colom-
bian president Laureano Gómez promised order, stability, and moral regeneration
after years of domestic turbulence. In an effort to repair relations between the par-
ties, he invited some Liberals to join his government. The Liberal Party refused to
work with the man they considered an antidemocratic fascist; hard-line Conserva-
tives scolded the president for even making the offer.139 Gómez sought to inspire
nationalism through a media campaign that included frequent accounts of Co-
lombian military activity in Korea. He also expanded the authority of the Catholic
Church, urging Colombians to find unity in their common religious heritage.140
To pacify Colombia’s troubled eastern plains region, Gómez launched a military
campaign against Liberal guerrillas, units he considered international communists.
The government offensive exacerbated the conflict, and, as a result, sent streams of
refugees to the cities or neighboring countries.141 Gómez ruled by decree, arrested
(real and suspected) opposition leaders, strictly enforced curfews, and raided un-
friendly news organizations. Life in Colombia became untenable for such Gómez
opponents as former presidents Alfonso López and Eduardo Santos, who moved
overseas rather than stay in Colombia. In October 1951 Gómez tried stepping away
from the public spotlight after a near-fatal heart attack, one precipitated by years
of heavy cigarette smoking. Still running the government from behind the scenes,
he turned the executive office over to his trusted associate Roberto Urdaneta Arbe-
láez.142 The move, like others before, failed to end la Violencia. Young men joined
organized resistance groups in large numbers, and between 1951 and 1952 approxi-
mately 23,600 Colombians died as a result of domestic fighting.143 This “disturb-
ing” situation, a New York Times editorial lamented, stood in stark contrast to the
“bright heroism of the Colombian troops in Korea.”144
La Violencia trapped the Colombian armed forces between impassioned Liber-
als and Conservatives. Since Gómez preferred using the National Police or Con-
servative militia groups, not the military, in domestic operations, the Colombian
armed forces avoided many difficult situations. Radio and newspaper accounts of
Colombian gallantry in Korea generally strengthened the domestic prestige of the
armed forces, as did some successful domestic peacekeeping efforts. In 1951 the
Colombian Army united local citizens and reduced the pace of violence through
basic nation-building operations. On the eastern plains, the military negotiated
a temporary peace that succeeded in keeping the conflict there at a manageable
level. In other endeavors the military proved less successful. In 1952 military offi-
cers partnered with a bipartisan peace committee in an attempt to end the fighting
in Tolima, the country’s most ravaged department. Liberal guerrillas ambushed
Colombian military peacekeepers; they ruthlessly butchered the soldiers before
hideously disfiguring the corpses. After the attack, president-designate Urdaneta
ordered the Colombian Army to secure the region by eliminating all suspected
antigovernment forces. In the ensuing chaos, Colombian soldiers found it difficult
to discriminate between civilians and guerrillas. Approximately fifteen hundred
Colombians died in a series of unfortunate engagements, events that threatened
the military’s reputation as a nonpartisan institution.145
The hibernation of Colombian democracy during the early 1950s troubled
American policymakers. While Conservative Party censors prevented the most
damaging aspects of la Violencia from reaching the outside world, they could not
hide domestic turmoil. The Truman administration received reports from a variety
of sources, including regular intelligence updates from military attachés stationed
at the American embassy in Bogotá. Violence against Protestant missionaries in
Colombia became a particular problem for Washington. Across Colombia, Catho-
lic zealots firebombed churches and synagogues, burned missionary facilities, as-
saulted (or murdered) missionaries, and looted the homes of Protestants. Vigilan-
tes targeted Colombian and foreign nationals on account of their religion. Wanting
an end to the religious fighting, American congregations—supporting missions in
Colombia—exerted great pressure on the Truman administration, often through
their congressional representatives. In August 1951 the State Department warned
the Colombian ambassador that continued violence against Protestants would
have “an unhappy effect” on bilateral relations.146 Bogotá downplayed the prob-
lem, arguing that violence against Protestants in Colombia was a “social not legal
problem” and that the federal government could do little to end the conflict.147
To an extent, the Colombian government assertion was valid, and the fact that
almost all Colombian Protestants were also Liberals further complicated matters.
Yet Gómez’s inflammatory religious rhetoric fanned anti-Protestant sentiment;
his inability to restore domestic order created conditions that permitted violence.
For their part, Protestants too often contributed to their own suffering. Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Colombia, many from the United States, worsened the situation by
distributing offensive literature and mailing uncivil letters to prominent Colom-
bian clergymen.148 Nonetheless, Washington repeatedly pressed Bogotá to end the
religious fighting. The American protests produced few tangible results.149
Beyond anti-Protestant violence, the turmoil in Colombia created other, larger
problems for the Truman administration. Washington valued Colombia’s support
in the cold war against communism but did not want to encourage an oppressive
regime. Washington intended to support democracy, not tyranny, in Latin America.
In this regard, Bogotá’s Korean War contribution produced an unusual dynamic.
Colombia’s success in Korea gave its diplomats leverage against U.S. officials. As
Colombia’s domestic crisis spread, the prospect that Bogotá might withdraw the
Colombia Battalion from the UN coalition to undertake domestic security opera-
tions seemed plausible. Colombian diplomats occasionally hinted at that possibility,
making the Truman administration uneasy, as it attached “paramount importance”
to “the retention of the Colombian force in Korea.”150 The withdrawal of any small-
nation contribution from the UN coalition, Washington calculated, would inflict a
disastrous political effect on the multinational campaign. Beyond that scenario, as
Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller noted in 1951, Bogotá’s Korean War con-
tribution “had gained for Colombia great kudos” in Washington, making U.S. of-
ficials somewhat more inclined to assist the South American republic.151 American
officials also appreciated Colombia’s strong anticommunist position in a variety of
President Harry S. Truman (1945–53) addresses the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers
of American States, Washington, April 1951. As a result of the conference, the United States
established the Military Assistance Program to supply grant U.S. security assistance to al-
lied foreign governments. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)
international venues. For example, representatives from countries fighting in Korea

held regular meetings in Washington. Colombia’s contribution to the UN Com-
mand earned Ambassador Zuleta a seat at the conferences, sessions during which
the Colombian ambassador demonstrated strong pro-American and anticommu-
nist sentiment. At the United Nations, other Colombian officials, most often in line
with U.S. interests, toiled on commissions and committees tackling various cold
war issues. But, aside from Korea, the most impressive demonstration came during
the 1951 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Washington.
Fearing that the Korean War signaled the beginning of an era of overt com-
munist aggression, the Truman administration organized the March 1951 inter-
American meeting to coordinate the hemisphere’s response to the Soviet threat.
The dominant Latin American representative on the program committee, Co-
lombian ambassador Zuleta showed “a constant and special interest in supporting
the United States” at the Washington Conference.152 Colombian foreign minister
Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo chaired the crucial working group that handled inter-
American political and military cooperation. Together, these men played essential
roles promoting hemispheric solidarity and inter-American military readiness.

U.S. officials credited both with the successful outcome of the talks; they showered
the Colombian diplomats with accolades for their firm commitment to anticom-
munism.153 Before the conference adjourned in April, attendees produced a series
of recommendations for the coordination of inter-American political, economic,
and military activities. Importantly, diplomats suggested that the Latin American
republics enter into bilateral military agreements with the United States to improve
hemispheric defenses.154 Colombia emerged as a leader at the meeting, the Wash-
ington Post concluded, because it had already showed the “capacity” and “will-
power” to combat communism through its Korean War participation.155
In connection with the Foreign Ministers Meeting, diplomats asked the Inter-
American Defense Board, created in January 1942, to prepare a comprehensive
hemispheric defense plan. Previously just an advisory body, the panel took on a
new, albeit short-lived, mandate for planning inter-American security. During the
following months, Colombian representative General Rojas Pinilla worked with
the other Latin American and U.S. officers to produce “The General Military Plan
for the Defense of the Continent.” Formally adopted in November 1951, the study
identified the missions, duties, and responsibilities of each country in the event
of extracontinental aggression. Supporting Washington’s preference for bilateral
military arrangements, the plan endorsed a key proposal of the 1951 Foreign Min-
isters Meeting: the need for bilateral U.S.–Latin American security pacts, backed
by increased U.S. military aid, to help the hemisphere resist Soviet aggression.156
In response to the Foreign Ministers Meeting and Inter-American Defense
Board recommendations, the United States created a new foreign military assis-
tance program. Reflecting a broader trend toward the militarization of the cold
war, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Security Act in October 1951. The leg-
islation created the Military Assistance Program (MAP), a $40 million security
package of grant aid to help foreign governments develop and maintain military
units for collective security purposes. The legislation set another $22 million aside
for inter-American technical programs.157 Since World War II, the lack of effec-
tive legislation restricted inter-American military cooperation. The 1951 grant
assistance system eliminated that obstacle, clearing the path for new forms of
hemispheric collaboration. It would become the essential means through which
the United States provided military support to foreign governments around the
world, including East and Southeast Asia, in the decades that followed. The Mu-
tual Security Act also swept away an excuse the Truman administration had used
to deny the Gómez regime certain types of military aid.
During the early 1950s, Washington did not want President Gómez to use
American arms in Colombia’s civil conflict. Yet, several factors complicated the
question of American military assistance to Colombia. First, Washington greatly
appreciated Colombia’s strong stand against communism. Additionally, Colom-
bian economic prosperity, especially record-setting coffee profits, filled its coffers.
The South American republic could therefore acquire arms from other suppli-
ers.158 The Pentagon worried that Colombia might undermine Washington’s arms
standardization program by equipping its forces with non-American gear. Then,
Bogotá repeatedly argued, persuasively to some U.S. officials, Colombia’s domes-
tic instability was the work of an international communist conspiracy.159 In order
to protect the republic and U.S. interests in regional stability, Bogotá needed to
use its military resources, including materiel provided by the United States, to
reestablish domestic tranquility.
In late 1950, after Colombia announced that it would fight in Korea, Washington
approved Bogotá’s request to purchase trucks, aircraft, and small arms.160 Depleted
U.S. stockpiles slowed the delivery of those items, some arriving as late as 1953. Then,
just after the 1951 Washington Conference, Bogotá asked Washington for permission
to purchase more U.S. military materiel: equipment for an infantry division, several
warships, and dozens of aircraft.161 In an April 1951 conversation with Secretary
Marshall, Colombian foreign minister Restrepo argued that Bogotá needed the ma-
teriel to “place its military establishment in a position of readiness” to combat com-
munism.162 The minister also “referred” to Colombia’s effort against “communist
aggression in Korea,” making sure Marshall had not forgotten Colombia’s special
status as a Korean War combatant, even though the Colombia Battalion still had not
reached the peninsula.163 After a series of internal discussions, the Truman admin-
istration decided in May to make available to Colombia only “reasonable amounts
of military equipment,” albeit “on somewhat easier terms” because the Colombians
were helping the United Nations in Korea.164 Whenever possible, Washington de-
liberately stalled rather than transferring arms to the Gómez regime.
Claiming it needed time to study the April 1951 proposal, the Pentagon sat on
Colombia’s arms petition for over three months. In August the Department of
Defense politely rejected Bogotá’s request, claiming that the $100 million pur-
chase would drain the Colombian economy. The Truman administration asked
the Gómez government to wait for American arms until the 1951 mutual security
bill cleared Congress. In the meantime, Bogotá should reevaluate its needs “in
light of Colombia’s immediate defense requirements.”165 In late 1951 Colombian
officials produced a scaled-down proposal that included arms for thirteen Co-
lombian Army battalions. U.S. military mission chief Colonel Stewart T. Vincent,
who helped draft the new plan, described the package as “reasonable and logical,”
independent of Colombia’s “domestic problem.”166 The Gómez regime expected
that most of the American equipment would come through new MAP grant as-
sistance channels, adding urgency to negotiations surrounding the Colombian-
American Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.
U.S. legislators required Latin American countries to sign formal bilateral
military agreements with the United States in order to participate in the Mili-
tary Assistance Program. In early 1952 Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, chief
of staff, U.S. Caribbean Command—the unified command that replaced the U.S.
Caribbean Defense Command in 1947—led a team of U.S. officials to Bogotá.
After several weeks of cordial talks, U.S. and Colombian officials produced an
agreement that reaffirmed the Colombian-American commitment to provide as-
sistance to “any American state subjected to an armed attack” and to cooperate
“for the common defense” of the Western Hemisphere. Colombia pledged itself
to take “all reasonable measures” to develop and improve its military establish-
ment.167 Finally, the pact provided for grant U.S. military assistance for certain
Colombian military units designated as essential to inter-American defense. Co-
lombian officials praised the agreement as a vital extension of hemispheric soli-
darity and essential in the war against international communism. At the formal
signing ceremony in Bogotá on 17 April 1952, the Colombian foreign minister
emphasized that Colombia’s involvement in the Korean War “made known” the
country’s “readiness to fit into a world which would discard war as an instrument
of national policy;” Colombia was among the first Latin American republics to
enter into such an agreement with the United States.168
With the bilateral security pact in place, Bogotá renewed its effort to acquire
American arms. In June 1952, amid a “mounting wave of disorder” in Colombia,
War Minister José María Bernal traveled to Washington with the new thirteen-
battalion plan.169 The American ambassador in Colombia supported Bernal, and
he asked Washington to approve the scheme. Still, the State Department disliked
the proposal. Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas C.
Mann noted that he wanted to reject the Colombian request as it was “pretty ob-
vious” that Bogotá wanted the materiel to use against domestic guerrilla units.170
Some of the equipment was geared toward a conventional war, not the guerrilla
conflict the Gómez administration confronted; the Colombian president most
likely wanted tanks and warships to please Colombian military officers, men of
rising importance, upon whom the survival of his regime depended. But the State
Department rightly feared that Gómez wanted other items (napalm, riot gear,
and machine guns) for domestic security operations, a concern that shaped the
administration’s response to Colombia’s June proposal.
After weeks of deliberations, the Truman administration decided to scrap Co-
lombia’s thirteen-battalion plan. Instead, Washington agreed to help Colombia
form just three MAP units for hemispheric defense: one antiaircraft battalion, one
fighter-bomber squadron (fourteen F-47s), and one light-bomber squadron (four-
teen B-26s).171 Each of these units would receive U.S. grant aid; none would pose a
direct threat to the civil liberties of Colombian citizens. Through direct sales to the
Colombian government, Washington would also provide some other equipment,
including another American frigate. Secretly, however, American authorities de-
cided to expedite the shipment of the warships and training aircraft, items of no
value in the civil conflict, while delaying the delivery of antipersonnel weapons
“until the situation” in Colombia became “better clarified.”172 The Gómez regime
saw through the American strategy, protesting in early 1953, making no attempt
to hide the fact that some of the materiel was desperately needed for use against
antigovernment forces, stressing, as it had since the beginning, the link between
the guerrillas and international communism.173 Washington, nonetheless, held the
bulk of the materiel until after the Gómez regime collapsed in June 1953.
While withholding some equipment, the Truman administration sent a U.S.
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Colombia in 1952 to implement
the MAP agreement. Under the command of U.S. Navy captain Jay V. Chase, the
advisory group operated separately from the U.S. military mission. It worked
out of the U.S. embassy in Bogotá; its members were part of the embassy staff,
not accredited to the military missions. The Military Assistance Advisory Group
worked solely with the MAP units, training and equipping the new hemispheric
defense forces. As first, these American advisers received and distributed mili-
tary equipment. They then helped prepare Colombian servicemen for their new
hemispheric defense missions. Yet by late 1954 Colombian and American officials
discovered that the U.S. military mission could better handle MAAG duties; the
Eisenhower administration therefore transferred MAAG responsibilities to the
mission in 1955. Although only in Colombia a short time, the special advisers
played an important part in preparing the foundation for future U.S.-Colombian
MAP cooperation.
The U.S. military missions that arrived in Colombia during World War II also
continued to work with the Colombian armed forces between 1950 and 1953. The
U.S. Army and Navy missions concentrated on supporting Colombian forces
in Korea, especially through the training of Colombian servicemen bound for
overseas duty. American officers taught in Colombian service schools, and U.S.
military advisers played an important part in the April 1951 reorganization of
the Colombian armed forces. The 1951 the restructuring created the Colombian
General Command, a body similar to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the
Commanding General Colombian Armed Forces position, a post soon occupied
by General Rojas.174 The reforms also began to place the National Police under
direct military supervision, a structural adjustment intended to render the force
apolitical. Colonel Robert G. Turner, who took command of the U.S. Army mis-
sion in October 1952, arranged for several U.S. weapons demonstrations teams to
visit Colombia to provide specialized instruction to Colombian soldiers. He then
began a comprehensive study of the Colombian Army training system that would
produce a series of major initiatives after 1953. Beyond these activities, Colombian
military personnel continued to train at U.S. service schools. In 1952, for example,
159 commissioned and noncommissioned Colombian Army officers studied in
the United States. American planners selected many students based on the needs
of the Colombian armed forces in Korea; other students studied at U.S. service
schools as part of Colombia’s larger hemispheric defense role.
Colombian-American economic cooperation also continued during the early
1950s. Indeed, after several years of limited initiatives, bilateral economic coopera-
tion between 1950 and 1953 approached levels unseen since World War II. During
this time of paradoxical prosperity, Colombia’s economic growth mirrored a larger
trend in the Americas and outpaced most other Latin American countries. Coffee
profits accounted for some of the gains, as did the Gómez administration’s sound
fiscal policy, industrial development, and some peculiar side effects of la Violen-
cia.175 In the countryside the violence forced many landholders to abandon their
rural properties for safer, urban settings. Those who remained took advantage of
the situation, expanding and consolidating holdings, making Colombian agricul-
ture more efficient. To the frustration of U.S. free-trade advocates, the Conser-
vative government also used protective tariffs to promote Colombian industrial
growth, and the Paz de Río steel plant northeast of Bogotá moved forward, com-
mencing production in 1955.176 Violence-related migration to Colombian cities
benefited industrialists who used the pool of cheap laborers to expand operations
and lower costs. To encourage its nascent oil industry, the Colombian government
allowed a Standard Oil Company concession contract to expire in August 1951. It
then transferred the oil reserve to ECOPETROL, Colombia’s national oil company,
which partnered with several foreign firms to increase domestic oil production.177
Through all the prosperity, Gómez took some small steps to address the needs
of Colombian workers, increasing the nationwide minimum wage, introducing a
profit-sharing package, and forming a social security program.178
During the Korean War, the United States, while reluctant to sell arms to Gó-
mez, extended a relatively large package of economic assistance to Colombia. The
Truman administration, reviewing Colombia’s economic needs, wanted to reward
Bogotá for its service in Korea. In March 1951 Bogotá signed a Point IV techni-
cal assistance agreement with Washington that allowed for the improvement of
roads, railways, irrigation networks, and power plants.179 The Point IV program
brought a U.S. agricultural assistance mission under the direction of Michigan
State University professor Victor R. Gardner that accelerated the republic’s pro-
duction of foodstuffs. Between 1950 and 1952 the Export-Import Bank approved
approximately $50 million in loans, a figure equivalent to the total accrued the
previous decade, including $20 million to purchase U.S. cotton for Colombia’s
growing textile industry.180 Colombia and the United States reestablished nor-
mal economic relations with a new commercial treaty to replace the one that had
expired in 1949, and in April 1951 Bogotá cleared its remaining bill for World
War II Lend-Lease equipment, which was possible because of the country’s
strong financial position.181 Foreign investors, encouraged by Colombia’s impres-
sive economic performance, returned with significant sums of money. While still
concerned about Colombia’s internal conflict, a 1952 New York Times economic
review found that Colombia’s international reputation “tended to improve” as a
result of its participation in Korea.182 Although an economic nationalist, Gómez
worked to attract foreign investment, relaxing oil exploitation laws, siding with
foreign firms in labor disputes, and protecting foreign holdings in Colombia from
expropriation.183 Bogotá limited restrictions on foreign investment, guarantee-
ing investors the right to reexport, remit, or capitalize capital. The Gómez gov-
ernment even lured United Fruit Company (albeit through subsidiaries) back to
Colombia to revitalize banana production.
Colombia’s economic prosperity did not quell domestic dissatisfaction with Gó-
mez. Although the number of la Violencia–related deaths per month began to drop,
the incessant fighting spread to include a larger geographic area by the end of 1952.
It therefore became perceived as a larger problem affecting more Colombians. In
1952 Gómez ordered the writing of a new constitution, a document he expected
the country to adopt the next year. But the initiative raised the ire of fellow Conser-
vatives, even his handpicked Congress. As Conservative Party opposition swelled,
Gómez feuded with Conservative moderates like former president Ospina. The
president later beat back Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, the young Conservative leader
of an anti-Gómez movement opposed to old-style political leadership.184 Having
survived these challenges, Gómez likely would have become the dictator of Colom-
bia in mid-1953, had the armed forces not intervened. But before the Colombian
military took over the government, it first suffered a setback in Korea.
Victory and Defeat, 1953
In March 1953 the Chinese mounted a major effort against the 31st U.S. Infantry
Regiment, a move designed to give communist officials leverage at the negotiating
table in Panmunjom. The regiment, then commanded by Colonel William B. Kern,
occupied a sector of the UN line that included coveted outposts on Pork Chop
Hill and Old Baldy. Colonel Kern deployed three battalions along the front that
month: the 2nd Battalion stood on the left, the Colombia Battalion in the center
(Old Baldy), and the 3rd Battalion on the right (Pork Chop Hill).185 Behind these
units, rifle companies from the 1st Battalion assumed blocking positions. In the Co-
lombian area, Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruíz Novoa, battalion commander since
July 1952, posted Company B on Old Baldy, with Companies A and C in supporting
areas.186 The 141st and 67th CPV divisions, facing the UN line, began their attack
with a tremendous artillery bombardment.187 On 20 March just twelve 122 mm
artillery rounds fell on the Colombian outpost. Two days later, the Chinese fired 331
122 mm artillery shells at Old Baldy; the rate of incoming mortar and small arms
fire also increased dramatically. Colombian troops responded by launching 1,500
81 mm mortar rounds at opposing units on 22 March alone.188 The deadly barrage

killed or wounded several Colombian soldiers and severely damaged bunkers and
trenches. On the afternoon of 23 March, amid this vicious exchange, Lieutenant
Colonel Ruíz and Colonel Kern decided to relieve the battered men atop Old Baldy.
The Colombia Battalion commander ordered Captain Gustavo González’s Com-
pany C (and a 1st Battalion rifle platoon) forward. The move required several hours
to execute, time during which the heavy fight for the hill unfolded.189
Communist ground forces first engaged Colombia’s Company A, southeast of
Old Baldy, at 8:33 p.m. on 23 March. Colombian riflemen, commanded by Captain
Augusto Bahamon, beat back the attack, leaving dozens of dead Chinese soldiers
in front of their position. Then, just after 9:00 p.m., a regiment of Chinese infan-
trymen swarmed toward the Colombian outpost on Old Baldy. Incoming artillery
rounds shattered Colombian communications gear, and the defenders lost contact
with the regimental headquarters. With the relief of Captain Hernando Acevedo’s
Company B still incomplete, elements of two Colombian infantry companies, to-
gether with several U.S. riflemen, manned the trenches. In the action that ensued,
Colombian and U.S. gunners cut down Chinese soldiers advancing up the slope,
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. At one point during the assault, a Colombia
Battalion radioman intercepted a Chinese message reporting Old Baldy “impos-
sible” to capture.190 Committed to success at any cost, CPV commanders threw
more troops at the Colombians. The defenders rapidly depleted their stockpile of
ammunition, and deadly communist artillery fire on the narrow ridge connect-
ing the outpost to the rear crushed men moving forward with supplies. After two
hours of dreadful fighting, Chinese infantrymen reached the trenches, hand-to-
hand combat broke out, and communist troops pushed the Colombians back.
Bloodied infantrymen began trickling off the hill.191
Lieutenant Colonel Ruíz, involved in the frontline fight, came down from Old
Baldy around 10:30 p.m. The colonel met First Lieutenant Jack M. Patteson and
some American soldiers at a forward command post. An already chaotic situa-
tion became even more confused as the men talked. Ruíz held orders to contain
the Chinese advance at the base of Old Baldy; 1st Battalion officers had instructed
Patteson to counterattack. In an awkward bilingual conversation, the two officers
needed nearly one hour to clarify their orders and prepare for a counterstrike, a
delay that allowed Chinese troops time to consolidate their hold on Old Baldy. At
11:20 p.m. Ruíz gathered the surrounding Colombian soldiers, assumed command
of the U.S. rifle company, and moved back toward Old Baldy. The group only
reached the first outpost bunkers before the enemy halted the advance.192 One
U.S. soldier who fought under Ruíz that night remembered “nothing but dead
Colombians.”193
Meanwhile, Chinese soldiers overran the U.S. defenders on Pork Chop Hill.
A speedy counterattack there encountered only light communist opposition, and
U.S. forces soon recovered the position. The efficient American response on Pork
Chop Hill actually placed the Colombians on Old Baldy at a disadvantage: the U.S.
move siphoned men from the American rifle company behind the Colombian
outpost, leaving Ruíz with only a platoon for his attack.194 As the Colombian fight
continued, the new 7th U.S. Infantry Division commander, Major General Arthur
Trudeau, arrived at the 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment headquarters to take control
of the battle. Shortly after dawn on 24 March 1953, Trudeau ordered the Colom-
bians off Old Baldy, back to the reserve area to regroup and refit.195 He then told
the 1st Battalion and 73rd Tank Battalion to attack the outpost from the southwest.
First Lieutenant Willard E. Smith’s Company B led the assault, which made little
headway against the Chinese. Later that day, Colonel Kern committed two more
companies to the counterattack, but those men could only establish a precari-
ous foothold on Old Baldy. At 4:30 a.m. on 25 March Company C swung around
the communist flank and charged the mountain from the northeast. Again, the
Chinese pinned the Americans down. A tank detachment moved forward to help
isolated U.S. infantrymen escape.
General Trudeau pulled his forces back from Old Baldy that night, clearing the
way for U.S. fighter-bombers. The airplanes pounded the outpost, disorienting the
Chinese and allowing several Colombian servicemen, trapped behind enemy lines
since the first night, to slip back to the UN line. As bombs fell on the enemy, General
Trudeau designed a plan to regain Old Baldy. The 2nd Battalion, 32nd U.S. Infantry
Regiment, began rehearsing for the assault behind the main line of resistance. To
support Trudeau’s operation, the Colombia Battalion occupied a position behind
the battlefront on 27 March, ready to move when called upon by the general. But
the Americans never launched the attack. On 30 March UN commander Lieutenant
General Maxwell Taylor flew to Trudeau’s headquarters to discuss the situation. In
the course of their meeting, Taylor decided to cancel the counteroffensive because
Old Baldy “was not essential to the defense of the sector” and did not warrant fur-
ther loss of life.196 Although unhappy with the UN commander’s decision, General
Trudeau scrapped his operation. On paper, Old Baldy became a permanent com-
munist possession. In reality, near-constant U.S. artillery fire made it an uninhabit-
able addition to the wasteland that separated the UN and communist forces.
For the Colombian military, the engagement on Old Baldy demanded the great-
est sacrifice of the Korean War. Communist Chinese forces killed or wounded 143
Colombian soldiers during the battle. Enemy troops seized many others, who re-
mained prisoners of war until the end of the conflict.197 American officers esti-
mated that 600 to 800 Chinese died during the battle. In 1953 Colombian and
American journalists covering the battle focused on these losses, obscuring the
fact that the battalion lost Old Baldy. Over time, Colombian writers have also been
uncritical of the unit’s conduct. The debate surrounding the Colombia Battalion’s
performance on Old Baldy belonged to the combatants.
After the war, the 7th U.S. Infantry Division commander blamed Lieutenant
Colonel Ruíz for the defeat. The Colombian Battalion commander, Trudeau re-
membered, “was a fine man” yet had “limited combat experience” and “the pres-
sures [of battle] were just too great.”198 Ruíz’s “performance in that particular
episode was far from anything desired.”199 Although Trudeau acknowledged that
Old Baldy was “the most exposed spot” on the division front, he later declared,
“There was a question in my mind then as to their [the Colombia Battalion’s]
ability, frankly, to hold this position under any severe attack.”200 The general did
not explain how he formed such strong reservations in the mere three days he
commanded the division before the battle. In retrospect, Ruíz (and Kern) should
not have replaced frontline troops during daylight hours on 23 March. The easily
observable move encouraged communist forces at the moment the battalion was
least prepared for major fight.201 Even Valencia Tovar admitted that the move
was “a bad mistake.”202 Also, the colonel might have been more aggressive on the
first night. Rather than concerning himself with orders from Kern, he could have
returned to the hill with reinforcements immediately, a move that might have
given the unit a chance to retake Old Baldy before the Chinese reorganized. Nev-
ertheless, General Trudeau lost both Old Baldy (March 1953) and Pork Chop Hill
(July 1953). The 7th U.S. Infantry Division commander had found a convenient
scapegoat in Lieutenant Colonel Ruíz.
Rather than the battalion commander, Captain Thomas J. Ferguson faulted
“low level leadership” for the defeat at Old Baldy.203 The U.S. infantry captain who
fought with the Colombia Battalion on the night of 23–24 March praised indi-
vidual Colombian riflemen but suggested that company and platoon officers failed
to demonstrate the type of leadership necessary to prevail in heavy combat. In fact,
most of the junior officers involved in the action had just arrived in Korea. They
were inexperienced in combat and unfamiliar with defenses on Old Baldy. The Co-
lombia Battalion struggled to overcome cautious leadership throughout its time in
Korea, a problem that began at the UNRC in 1951. Timid leadership surfaced again
in March 1953, but proved less important than the enemy’s determination.
In 1953 Colonel Kern posited that the caliber and preponderance of Com-
munist Chinese forces, not Colombian shortcomings, decided the outcome on
Old Baldy. “The enemy troops,” he observed, “proved to be the best trained and
disciplined” the regiment faced during Korean War operations.204 Throughout,
the communists outnumbered and outgunned the Colombia Battalion. The CPV
concentrated on the Colombian position, not the U.S. outpost on Pork Chop Hill.
Yet by also hitting the Americans on 23 March, the Chinese swayed U.S. officers
into pulling some soldiers out from behind Old Baldy, men who would otherwise
have been available for the counterattack that first night. As for the quality of the
opposing troops, heavy U.S. counterattacks from 24 March onward, like the Co-
lombian effort, failed to displace the Chinese, and the same soldiers that prevailed
at Old Baldy beat the Americans on Pork Chop Hill in July 1953. Crediting com-
munist forces, Colonel Kern revealed the deciding factor on Old Baldy.
In many ways, the 1953 battle resembled another Colombia Battalion engage-
ment. In November 1951 Chinese soldiers pushed a Colombian rifle company
from an outpost in the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment sector, much like the commu-
nists did at Old Baldy. In 1951 the Colombians counterattacked and recaptured the
position, something the battalion failed to accomplish in 1953. The Colombian of-
ficers involved in the 1951 fight, veterans of the Kumsong offensive, demonstrated
outstanding leadership at all levels; the untested officers on Old Baldy might have
been more assertive. Yet, most important, the enemy brought a vastly superior
force to the field in March 1953, making a successful Colombian counterpunch
under even the best leadership improbable. Still, nearly fifty years after the battle,
Valencia Tovar concluded that the Old Baldy “episode stained with blood the
battalion’s heroic behavior in the war.”205 But it did not determine the outcome
of the war. Four months after Old Baldy, Communist and UN officials ended the
Korean War. Colombia Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ortíz
Torres, Ruíz’s successor, represented the republic at the historic armistice sign-
ing ceremony in Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. One hundred forty-one Colombian
troops died in action; 556 others were wounded fighting in Korea.206 In August
1953 communist officials released twenty-eight Colombian prisoners, part of the
larger exchange called Operation BIG SWITCH. The Colombia Battalion, ready
for any reoccurrence of hostilities, remained in Korea as part of the UN contin-
gency force guarding South Korea until late 1954.207
The March 1953 action on Old Baldy and the July 1953 armistice might have re-
ceived more attention in Colombia had they not coincided with the fall of Laure-
ano Gómez. As the Colombia Battalion struggled on Old Baldy, la Violencia spun
forward; most of that year’s 8,600 conflict-related deaths occurred between January
and June.208 In April Gómez indicated that he was ready to resume his presidential
duties. Many observers, including prominent military officers, believed that his re-
turn would wreck Colombia. Surveying the opposition, Gómez most feared Gen-
eral Rojas: the Colombian military commander, unhappy with the government, had
enough men at his disposal to topple Gómez. Also, since 1950 Rojas had become
widely popular in Colombia as the leader of the country’s armed forces in Korea,
although he never actually commanded troops in the field. Before June 1953 Gómez
had resisted the general’s rising influence and power, blocking, for instance, Urda-
neta’s plan to bring Rojas into the cabinet. The president later tried to dismiss Rojas
during one of the general’s overseas visits. While the general managed to retain his
command, the uneasy feeling between the two men continued to grow.
As speculation concerning Gómez’s return intensified, anti-laureanista Con-
servatives hatched a plan to deny Gómez the presidency. Behind Alzate Avendaño,
an influential Conservative Party faction cultivated relations with the military.
Disgruntled Conservatives believed that the Colombian armed forces, heroes of

the Korean War, were essential to the restoration of domestic order and stability.
These plans were starting to mature when, in April 1953, the Colombian Army de-
tained Gómez associate Felipe Echavarría on charges of conspiring (with Gómez)
to assassinate General Rojas. The army strapped Echavarría to a block of ice and
extracted a confession; whether Gómez actually planned to kill Rojas remained
unclear.209 Still, Gómez’s handling of the Echavarría situation precipitated the
June 1953 military coup. The Colombian strongman ordered president-designate
Urdaneta to arrest the general on the grounds that the military commander did
not have the authority to arrest a civilian. Urdaneta refused and Gómez decided
that the time to return to the presidency had arrived. On the morning of 13 June
1953 Gómez met with cabinet officials at the presidential palace, informing them
of his decision. During the conference, Gómez told his close friend War Minister
Lucio Pabón Núñez to detain Rojas. When Pabón demurred, Gómez replaced
him with Jorge Leyva, who dutifully issued orders for the general’s arrest. Hav-
ing set in motion the sequence of events that would end his regime by midnight,
Gómez returned to his private residence.210
Alerted to happenings in Bogotá, General Rojas cut short his vacation in the Co-
lombian countryside, arriving in Bogotá around noon on 13 June. When a party of
government officials came to his office to arrest him, he turned the tables and tossed
them in the stockade. He then ordered soldiers to find Gómez, but when troops
arrived at the president’s house, he had already fled.211 As night fell on the Colom-
bian capital, the general rushed to the presidential palace for an emergency meeting
with top civilian officials, including Ospina and Urdaneta. Rojas asked both former
presidents to take over the government. When they declined, Rojas found himself
holding the nation’s highest office. At 10:00 p.m. the general addressed the nation via
radio, explaining that the Gómez regime’s immorality, political discord, and public
disorder justified the coup. He then pleaded for the restoration of order. “No more
blood,” he asked, “no more depredations in the name of any political party, and no
more rancor between sons of the same immortal Colombia.”212 Conservatives and
Liberals across Colombia embraced the general.213 The Colombian armed forces
had only ruled the country twice before 1953. The dictatorship of General Rafael Ur-
daneta in 1830 lasted eight months; the government of General José María Melo in
the 1850s survived for approximately one year. But in 1953 the Colombian military
was the only domestic institution not completely discredited by partisanship.214 The
country, therefore, looked to its military leaders to end the violence. In Washington
the new administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to news of the coup
with some optimism, hoping that the general would first end Colombia’s domes-
tic conflict and then revive the country’s democratic institutions.215 Whatever the
character of the military government, Washington figured that it could be no worse
for Colombia than the Gómez regime.
· · ·
Colombia and the United States formed a fighting alliance during the Korean War.
Between 1950 and 1953 the Colombian military joined a U.S.-led international co-
alition, one that required the combination of diverse combat forces. In order to
make the UN effort most effective, U.S. military planners attached small-country
forces, some with little or no experience in modern warfare, to larger American
entities. Colombia’s successful integration into the UN Command grew from the
republic’s preexisting affiliation with the United States. The military partnership
formed a critical link between the two countries during an otherwise tumultuous
time in bilateral relations. A truly international event, the Korean War, therefore,
involved more than combat in the western Pacific. It shaped institutions and re-
lationships far beyond Korea. Contesting communism abroad, ideology occupied
an important place in Colombian-American relations during the early 1950s. But
just as it inspired cooperation in Korea, the hibernation of Colombian democ-
racy created other problems. Materially, Washington deeply valued Colombia’s
support in the cold war against communism. Colombia received large-scale U.S.
military and economic assistance for the first time since World War II. As for do-
mestic variables, authoritarian rule, religious conflict, and secular violence in Co-
lombia distanced the two countries. Not wanting to support tyranny, the Truman
administration denied the Laureano Gómez administration weapons for internal
security. Yet, in Korea and elsewhere, Colombians, agents of their own experi-
ence, supported the United States in ways American policymakers could not ig-
nore, thereby assuring the continuation of the Colombian-American partnership.
The Korean War therefore emerged as a defining, shared experience between the
neighbors, the legacies of which would contribute to the remodeling of the inter-
American alliance after 1953.
5
Continuity and Change, 1953–1957
The Colombia Battalion returned to South America aboard a U.S. naval transport
in November 1954. Colombian government officials and local citizens welcomed
the soldiers as they disembarked in Buenaventura. The Korean War infantrymen
attended a patriotic homecoming ceremony before boarding eastbound railroad
coaches. Around midnight, the battalion arrived in Cali, where an enthusiastic
crowd greeted the men. The soldiers responded with a spontaneous nighttime
parade through the city. The following day, the Korean War veterans attended a
mass, luncheon, reception, and formal dance. Municipal authorities also unveiled
a monument to the country’s wartime sacrifice. The infantry battalion received
similar welcomes in Ibagué and Armenia before arriving in Bogotá on 30 Novem-
ber. In the Colombian capital, the military government hosted an elaborate two-
day tribute to the Korean War servicemen, festivities that incorporated religious
and patriotic themes. In a variety of public events, Americans stood alongside
their Colombian counterparts. U.S. soldiers joined the battalion during a parade,
U.S. Army Caribbean commander Major General Lionel C. McGarr decorated
distinguished Colombian soldiers, and the U.S. embassy sponsored a lengthy ra-
dio broadcast honoring Colombia’s UN service.1 America’s high-profile involve-
ment, a Colombian journalist concluded, was “a symbol of the fraternal friend-
ship” between the two countries that foretold future bilateral cooperation.2
The Colombian writer identified just one of the lasting legacies of the country’s
involvement in the Korean War. Between 1953 and 1957, the Rojas administration
aspired to remake a country plagued by internal conflict. Exploiting its wartime
popularity, the Colombian military undertook an ambitious state-building pro-
gram to restore domestic order, promote national unity, and hasten moderniza-
tion. The armed forces ultimately failed to achieve these objectives. The Rojas
regime, nevertheless, transformed the Colombian military into a state-building
instrument with important long-term consequences. During the mid-1950s, U.S.
security assistance followed the changing needs of the Colombian armed forces; it
138
continuity and change, 1953–1957 139
also accounted for modifications (conventional to unconventional) in the Soviet

Union’s cold war strategy. While still committed to hemispheric defense projects,
the two countries gradually began concentrating on internal security activities
designed to promote Colombian domestic tranquility. Continuity and disconti-
nuity characterized U.S.-Colombian relations from 1953 to 1957. Throughout, as
allies against communism, Colombia and the United States capitalized on their
shared experience in Korea, supporting the Colombian military’s new state-
building mission, preparing for hemispheric defense, and developing a Middle
East peacekeeping force. Simultaneously, in the United States, the Eisenhower
administration started a policymaking process that would produce major changes
in U.S. policy toward Latin America after 1958.
Anticommunism and Development, 1953–1957
During the 1952 presidential campaign, retired general Dwight D. Eisenhower

criticized the Truman administration for neglecting Latin America. The Republi-
can Party candidate promised, if elected, to rebuild inter-American solidarity and
cooperation. Once in office, the Eisenhower team immediately strengthened the
National Security Council, which had been established in 1947, to study and recom-
mend changes in U.S. national security policy, including U.S. relations with Latin
America.3 NSC paper 144/1, issued in March 1953, contained the conclusion of the
preliminary review of inter-American affairs. A product of its time, the report mea-
sured hemispheric cooperation in a cold war context. The Eisenhower administra-
tion wanted to rehabilitate hemispheric unity to ensure Latin American political,
military, and economic support in the cold war against communism. Acknowledg-
ing Latin America’s interest in modernization, NSC 144/1 recognized the need for
“orderly political and economic development” in the Americas. Modernization, it
posited, would eliminate the conditions upon which communism fed.4 Still, at first,
the fiscally conservative Republicans, seeking a sustainable cold war strategy, did
not envision enlarged foreign assistance programs. In fact, an October 1953 NSC
report concluded that the United States should only provide allies with “limited
military aid, and limited technical and economic assistance” consistent with “the
calculated advantage of such aid to the U.S. world position.”5 Instead, American
authorities simply decided to devote more attention to Latin America.
Washington’s earliest efforts to rekindle inter-American cooperation therefore
came in the form of a public relations campaign. Beginning in 1953, the United
States increased its profile in Latin America, subsidizing foreign radio shows, circu-
lating anticommunist pamphlets, and distributing pro-American films. President
Eisenhower dispatched his brother, Milton, to South America in 1953 to survey
inter-American relations and impress upon Latin Americans the administration’s
commitment to hemispheric unity. The president made several high-profile ap-

pearances, including a well-received address to diplomats at the Organization of
American States, and Americans showered Latin American leaders with medals,
commendations, and awards.6 In the United States and abroad, opponents criti-
cized the administration for encouraging Latin American dictators. While the
details of U.S. relations with individual countries, such as Colombia, showed the
Eisenhower administration more interested in democracy and civil liberties than
critics acknowledged, the U.S. government did cooperate with undemocratic re-
gimes. Indeed, since strongmen then controlled thirteen Latin American coun-
tries, including Colombia, the Eisenhower administration decided to work with
those regimes to combat what it perceived to be a greater danger—international
communism. In fact, NSC 144/1 mentioned nothing about cultivating Latin Amer-
ican democratic institutions, a divisive issue during the Truman years. “There can
be no greater absurdity than to suggest that the U.S. should support only those
countries in the non-communist world that are truly governed by the consent of
the majority,” one NSC staffer later explained. In the cold war against communism
the United States “cannot afford the moral luxury of helping only those regimes in
the free world that meet our ideal of self-government.”7
Communism and Latin American economic issues dominated the March
1954 Tenth International Conference of American States in Caracas, Venezuela.
In particular, delegates devoted considerable attention to internal developments
in Guatemala. In 1944 a popular uprising in the Central American republic dis-
lodged longtime dictator Jorge Ubico, ushered in democratic institutions, and
sparked liberal reforms. In the years that followed, Guatemalan officials, who
openly collaborated with known communists, adopted increasingly radical posi-
tions, culminating in President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán’s (1951–54) expropriation
of United Fruit Company assets in Guatemala. The Truman and Eisenhower ad-
ministrations feared that Guatemalan communists were dangerously influential.
At Caracas, U.S. officials sought to secure a strong anticommunist resolution to
isolate Guatemala. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined the U.S. posi-
tion on 4 March. In his address to the delegates, he applauded the hemisphere’s
commitment to justice, freedom, and “moral law.” He also praised the tradition
of inter-American unity. He then observed that every country in the Americas
had “been penetrated by the apparatus of international communism.”8 The real
and immediate danger, he argued, threatened to subvert the spiritual unity of the
Western Hemisphere. Secretary Dulles asked the diplomats to take a firm stand
against communism in the form of a public declaration.
The Dulles speech began two weeks of vigorous debate in Caracas. Guatemalan
foreign minister Guillermo Toriello blasted the United States for economic imperi-
alism and interventionism. American officials, he claimed, did not know the differ-
ence between Latin American nationalism and international communism. When
Toriello asked the United States to define communism, Dulles openly wondered
how Guatemalan foreign policy could be “conducted by one so innocent.”9 In gen-
eral, the secretary of state discovered strong anticommunist sentiment among the
Latin American delegations. However, Latin Americans at the meeting accepted the
general thrust of the Guatemalan position: each Latin American republic should
be free to address its own social and economic problems. Concerned that a sweep-
ing declaration might be abused and manipulated by anticommunist governments,
Mexican and Argentine officials worked to weaken the U.S. draft resolution. Ameri-
can officials beat back most, but not all, of the proposed amendments. Defending
the principle of multilateralism, Colombian foreign minister Evaristo Sourdis, over
the expressed objections of U.S. diplomats, succeeded in securing provisions that
required formal consultations before the inter-American community could take
any actions against a communist-controlled government.
In its final form, the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Politi-
cal Integrity of the American States against International Communist Interven-
tion stated “that the domination or control” of an “American state by the inter-
national communist movement” posed “a threat to the sovereignty” of the entire
hemisphere.10 Inter-American officials agreed to take collective action against any
country in the Western Hemisphere controlled by communists. The resolution
also called upon each government to defend its domestic institutions from sub-
version and collaborate to monitor, contain, and disrupt communist activities. In
the final tally, the Colombian delegation voted with the United States and sixteen
other Latin American republics. Guatemala opposed the resolution, while Mexico
and Argentina abstained. To allay Latin American misgiving, diplomats also ad-
opted a second, shorter Declaration of Caracas that reaffirmed “the inalienable
right of each American state to choose freely its own institutions.”11
U.S. officials were pleased that they had secured an anticommunist resolution;
they nonetheless left Venezuela convinced that they could not depend on Latin
America to deal with Guatemala. In May 1954 Arbenz took delivery of a Czechoslo-
vakian arms shipment that seemed to confirm Washington’s worst fear, an overt al-
liance between Guatemalan and Soviet agents. The transaction diminished support
for Arbenz in Latin America. Colombia’s El Tiempo, which had previously defended
Guatemalan autonomy, characterized the arms deal as a “grave break in the spirit of
American unity,” and the Rojas government pushed for multilateral action against
the Central American republic.12 On 31 May 1954 the Colombian foreign minister
announced Bogotá’s position that “all communist parties were at the service of the
Russians and that their control over any American state was unacceptable.”13 Bo-
gotá called for consultations under the provision of the 1947 Rio Treaty, but events
outpaced Colombian diplomacy. In July 1954 a coup sponsored by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) overthrew of the Arbenz government. Colombian of-
ficers quickly recognized the new government in Guatemala.14
Latin American officials generally supported the United States at Caracas. In

return, they wanted to discuss economic matters, a source of inter-American con-
flict since 1945. Armed with the findings of the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America, delegates in Caracas were well prepared for the meeting. Under
the direction of Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, the UN commission gave
voice to “dependency theory,” the idea that the prevailing international economic
system subverted underdeveloped regions. Prebisch’s structural explanation for
Latin American underdevelopment focused on Latin American economic con-
cerns. The region needed to build its own manufacturing sector in order to shed
its status as a resource-producing client of the industrialized countries. The com-
mission offered no plan for Latin American development, mentioning only the
need for investment capital. It also ignored the urgent need for reforms within
Latin America. The commission’s work nevertheless dominated economic talks in
Caracas. As it had for every inter-American conference since 1945, the American
delegation arrived unprepared to handle complex economic issues. In Venezuela,
it adopted positions that one Colombian reporter described as “vague and disap-
pointing.”15 By the end of the conference, Latin Americans succeeded only in
convincing U.S. diplomats to attend a special conference on inter-American eco-
nomic affairs in Rio de Janeiro later that year, a meeting Washington had shunned
since the end of World War II.
In its foreign economic policy, the Eisenhower administration promoted trade
and private investment. Like Truman, Eisenhower believed that U.S. economic
assistance could not solve Latin America’s economic problems, and only the dif-
fusion of goods, capital, and technical expertise would yield modernization. The
responsibility for attracting private investment belonged to Latin Americans. In
1953, upon the suggestion of conservative Treasury Secretary George Humphrey,
the president decided to limit the lending capacity of the Export-Import Bank,
which Truman had used to fund long-term overseas development projects. Ex-
cessive foreign spending, Eisenhower initially concluded, jeopardized the overall
health of the U.S. economy. However, under pressure from Department of State
officials and his brother, Eisenhower reversed his decision just prior to the Caracas
meeting. Admitting that Latin American poverty might precipitate the spread of
communism, President Eisenhower also viewed U.S. foreign assistance as a reward
for Latin Americans who supported the U.S. declaration against communism. But
elements of the administration believed that the United States should do more for
Latin America. In Washington, U.S. preparations for the November 1954 Rio de
Janeiro Economic Conference therefore produced a considerable debate over the
proper form, function, and size of U.S. assistance. Foreign Operations Administra-
tion chief Harold Stassen and others argued that Washington should increase its
economic aid to Latin America. Humphrey and the Treasury Department, intent
upon a balanced budget, disagreed, wanting only to push inter-American com-
merce. On 15 November, just a few days before the meeting in Brazil, Eisenhower
finally sided with those lobbying for U.S. assistance, reminding Humphrey that the
U.S. foreign aid program played an important part in the cold war.16
Given Humphrey’s position on foreign aid, he was probably a poor choice to
lead the U.S. delegation to the 1954 Rio de Janeiro Conference. Nonetheless, he
announced in Brazil a $500 million increase in U.S. developmental loans to Latin
America. Latin Americans pressed the United States for a larger share of U.S. for-
eign economic aid, the stabilization of raw material prices, and the creation of a
special inter-American development bank. Several diplomats, including delegates
from Colombia, proposed the complete economic integration of the Americas,
presumably through the Organization of American States. The United States re-
jected the sweeping proposition. Latin Americans, although not necessarily sur-
prised, remained frustrated. On the eve of the conference, one Colombian del-
egate had called upon the United States to transform “the rhetorical formulas for
continental solidarity into living reality.”17 When that failed to happen, Medellín’s
El Colombiano characterized U.S. officials as “active obstacles” to hemispheric
economic collaboration.18
The inter-American economic debate, as during the 1945 to 1953 period, grew in
part from the fact that U.S. commitments elsewhere squeezed out Latin American
interests. Although the Marshall Plan in Europe had ended, Washington preferred
to direct its foreign aid into areas it considered most vulnerable to communist sub-
version, such as Indochina and the Middle East. It was for this reason that Bolivia
became Latin America’s leading recipient of U.S. economic aid. In 1952 Victor Paz
Estenssoro and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) assumed control of
Bolivia. Although the MNR reform agenda bore certain similarities to the Arbenz
program in Guatemala, Washington decided to work with its more distant South
American neighbor. During the 1950s the United States pumped $192 million in
economic assistance into Bolivia, with the desired result of moderating the “revo-
lution.”19 Its success in Bolivia notwithstanding, Washington did not adjust of its
economic policies toward Latin America during the mid-1950s.
While disappointed with U.S. economic policy in the Americas, the Rojas gov-
ernment in Colombia emerged as a reliable American ally against international
communism. In a major 1954 foreign policy address, Rojas argued that interna-
tional communism posed “an immense danger” to the Christian world and that
Colombia “must stand” with the United States to defend civilization.20 Colombian
officials cooperated with the United States in its effort to identify and track commu-
nist activity in Latin America. Constantly “on the lookout” for domestic and foreign
agents, Bogotá withheld passports from known communists and shared informa-
tion from its security files with Washington.21 As the Eisenhower administration
pushed the 1954 Communist Control Act that stripped American communists of
certain rights and privileges, the Rojas government attacked the Colombian Left,
sometimes with an overabundance of zeal. Bogotá refused to reestablish diplomatic

contact with Moscow and maintained only superficial relations with two commu-
nist countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Colombia also rebuffed a Soviet trade
offensive; the poor quality of Soviet goods and Moscow’s ugly 1956 invasion of Hun-
gary, however, did as much to limit commerce as anticommunist sentiment. At the
United Nations, Colombian diplomats repeatedly opposed the Soviet effort to seat
Communist China, and supported the U.S. campaign against Guatemala. Colom-
bian ambassador Zuleta distinguished himself as a strong opponent of communism
during the 1954 Geneva Conference talks on Korea.22 As important as these issues
were, the Eisenhower administration most appreciated Colombia’s contribution to
international security during the 1956 Suez crisis.
Middle East Peacekeeping, 1956–1958
In 1956 the United Nations applied lessons learned during the Korean War to peace-
keeping operations in the Middle East. The crisis grew from complex economic
and geopolitical issues. In December 1955 Soviet officials had decided to provide
military assistance to Egypt. Wanting to match the Egyptian buildup, Israel re-
sponded by accelerating its program of military preparedness. Yet the Eisenhower
administration, fearful that its support of the Jewish state might spark a Middle
East arms race, refused to deliver certain military equipment to the Israelis. In-
stead, the United States, Britain, and France offered Egypt economic assistance
for the Aswan Dam project. Washington, in turn, expected Cairo to distance itself
from the Soviet Union. When Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser refused,
Washington withdrew its aid proposal. In July 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez
Canal, intent upon using the passageway’s income as a source of funding for the
development project. The series of furious diplomatic negotiations that followed
yielded no results, so Britain, France, and Israel developed a secret plan to remedy
the situation. On 29 October 1956, Israel invaded Egypt. An Anglo-French mili-
tary force used the attack as a pretext for seizing the canal in the name of protect-
ing their national interests; British and French paratroopers soon controlled the
strategic passageway. The operation infuriated President Eisenhower; upset that
U.S. allies had not consulted with the administration before undertaking the risky
venture, he also worried that Moscow might use the incident to justify its own
intervention in the region. Soviet forces, after all, had invaded Hungary just one
week before the Israeli attack. By applying strong diplomatic pressure on Britain,
France, and Israel, the United States persuaded those countries to pull back, but
only after the United Nations, with the assistance of Colombian diplomacy, pro-
duced a Middle East security formula acceptable to all parties.
Colombian troops arrive at Port Said, Egypt, December 1956. The UN Emergency Force es-
tablished the pattern for future UN peacekeeping efforts. Colombia’s participation marked
the beginning of the country’s long involvement in Middle Eastern security. (Source: U.S.
Information Agency, NARA)
On 2 November 1956, immediately after the invasion, the UN Security Council

called for the termination of hostilities in the Middle East. To facilitate the peace
process, UN officials proposed sending UN military forces to the region to sepa-
rate the combatants. The original concept for the UN Emergency Force belonged
to Canadian foreign minister Lester Pearson: on the night of 3 November, he took
his peace formula to the UN secretary general and a select group of UN repre-
sentatives, including Colombian diplomat Francisco Urrutia Holguín. Enthusias-
tic about the Pearson proposal, General Rojas decided to cosponsor the UN plan.
With directions from Bogotá, Ambassador Urrutia Holguín began an energetic
campaign to persuade UN delegates to back the emergency force, explaining that “a
solution” to the Middle East dispute would only emerge if UN soldiers established
“a kind of safety belt” around disputed territories.23 Secretary General Dag Ham-
marskjöld, hoping to avoid some of the problems connected to the UN exercise
in Korea, believed the key to success lay in concrete offers of military assistance
before the final UN vote. Bogotá pledged an infantry battalion; Brazil also agreed
to send troops to the Middle East. Norwegian diplomats at the United Nations
lined up addition support for the peacekeeping operation. On 7 November the
General Assembly approved the joint Canadian-Colombian-Norwegian resolu-
tion, forming the UN Emergency Force to “secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities.”24
Throughout the UN peacekeeping mission, Bogotá drew heavily upon the
poise, experience, and prestige that grew from its Korean War participation. Ma-
jor Valencia Tovar, leader of the Colombia Battalion’s first ground action in Korea,
represented his country on the New York–based UN Emergency Force Military
Staff. In doing so, he relied on Korean War lessons, especially his time with the
Colombia liaison group in Tokyo, planning, coordinating, and implementing the
UN military effort. Colombian diplomats on the policy-oriented Advisory Com-
mittee worked with similar effect. Forward elements of the Colombia Battalion
left South America aboard a U.S. military transport on 11 November 1956. Within
a week, the entire battalion had arrived in the Mediterranean, and in December
1956 the soldiers traveled to Port Said at the Suez Canal’s northern terminus to su-
pervise the withdrawal of British forces. Then, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel César Augusto Cabrera Forero, the Colombian soldiers moved to Khan
Yunus in early 1957. There, the Colombian unit performed a variety of missions.
Part of a six-thousand-troop UN security force, the Colombia Battalion patrolled
the border between Egypt and Israel. In doing do, it served as a buffer between
hostile forces, guarding against further aggression. Also, not unlike its new role
in Colombia, the battalion undertook administrative duties in Gaza. Cabrera and
his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Hernando Espinosa Peña, served as military
governors. Colombian soldiers managed local affairs, including a huge number of
refugees. Overall, the work of the Colombia Battalion in Suez lacked glamour and
excitement, but Colombian soldiers and diplomats nevertheless made an impor-
tant contribution to the resolution of the 1956 Middle East crisis. The Colombia
Battalion remained in the Gaza Strip until November 1958, by which time a total
of 1,422 Colombian soldiers had served with the UN Emergency Force.25
More than the UN Command in Korea, the UN effort in 1956 established the
pattern for future UN peacekeeping efforts. Fundamentally different than the UN
Command in Korea, the UN Emergency Force did not conduct combat operations
but instead monitored a prearranged peace. UN Emergency Force commanders,
first Canadian major general Edmund L. M. Burns and later Indian major general
P. S. Gyani, reported directly to the UN secretary general; UN commanders in
Korea reported to Washington, which, in turn, periodically updated the secretary
general. Also, none of the major powers participated in the effort, although the
Map of the UN Emergency Force deployment in Gaza, August 1957. (Source: Courtesy of
the United Nations)
United States did provide some logistical support, such as the transportation of
Colombian troops to the Mediterranean. The enabling UN resolutions allowed the
Egyptian president to veto the participation of foreign troops he deemed undesir-
able. He subsequently barred NATO units from joining the UN Emergency Force.
Then, countries that participated in the undertaking were not expected to pay for
their contingent. Instead, the regular UN budget covered expenses. Diplomats used
annual UN dues to create an international payment schedule. The Latin American
republics contributed $1.5 million to the UN Emergency Force, while the United
States paid out over $12 million for the operation. Although less burdensome than
the Korean War enforcement exercise, Colombia’s service with the emergency
force nonetheless represented a sacrifice in the name of collective security, a com-
mitment again demonstrated when Colombian troops returned to the Middle East
following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.26 At the United Nations, international officials
praised Colombia’s performance during the Suez crisis; Bogotá again proved its
aptitude as an advocate for collective security. Extremely interested in a workable
Middle East peace program, the Eisenhower administration likewise expressed its
gratitude to Colombia. The entire affair supported UN ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge’s 1955 assertion that Colombian officials at the United Nations were “per-
haps the best and most effective friends” of the United States.27
Military Rule in Colombia, 1953–1957
Allied with the United States, the military government that ruled Colombia be-
tween 1953 and 1957 transformed the Colombian armed forces into a nation-build-
ing instrument. The circumstance that propelled General Rojas to power left the
military unprepared to govern Colombia, and rudderless behavior characterized
the military regime. Yet of all the institutions capable of ruling the country in 1953,
only the military could have ended la Violencia and built a new Colombia. More-
over, Rojas, a handsome fifty-three-year-old general with an outstanding service
record, seemed uniquely positioned to tackle Colombia’s problems. Born in the
Department of Boyacá in 1900, Gustavo was the youngest child of a prominent
rancher. He studied engineering at Colegío Boyacá until his father’s death in 1919
left the family in a difficult financial situation. Unable to afford civilian college
tuition, Rojas enrolled in the Colombian military academy. After graduation, he
spent just four years on active duty before resigning his commission and moving
to the United States. He sold shoes in New York City, labored in the Ford Motor
Company’s Detroit plant, and earned a civil engineering degree in Indiana before
returning to South America in 1928. He worked as an engineer for several years
until he rejoined the army during the Peruvian border dispute of 1932–34. During
that conflict, Rojas developed defensive positions around Buenaventura, a city
vulnerable to Peruvian assault.
The young officer steadily advanced after the war, holding important posi-
tions at the artillery school and war college. During World War II, he served as
chief of the Colombian Army engineering section; he later became director of
the Department of Civil Aeronautics and minister of mail and telegraph services.
As a brigade commander in Cali, he confronted the difficult task of maintaining
public order after the 1948 assassination of Gaitán. It was at that time that Ro-
Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla studies U.S. Army field manuals at Camp Blan-
ding, Florida, 1942. As president during the mid-1950s, General Rojas transformed the
Colombian military into a state-building instrument and expanded Colombian-American
cooperation. (Source: Office of War Information, NARA)
jas first demonstrated an inclination toward heavy-handedness through the use

of pájaros azules (blue birds), an unofficial Conservative militia, for the purpose
of maintaining public order. In 1951 Gómez elevated him to Colombia’s highest
military position; he thus oversaw every aspect of Colombian military, even su-
pervising Colombian forces in Korea. When Conservative Gómez grew fearful of
the general’s influence and prestige, he attempted to keep Rojas at bay, accounting
for the general’s time in Washington as the Inter-American Defense Board chief
of staff. His political inexperience aside, by 1953 Rojas was wildly popular, due in
part to Colombia’s success in Korea. In any case, Colombia had no real alterna-
tive to a military government. Both Conservatives and Liberals praised Rojas as
something of a savior. The general’s ultimate failure grew from his inclination to
believe such assertions.28
Philosophically, the Rojas government embraced “holy and patriotic concepts”
that would help Colombians realize their “greatness.”29 With strong religious con-
victions, General Rojas believed moral issues underwrote the country’s political,
economic, and social problems. His passionate anticommunism grew, largely, from
his religious beliefs; atheistic communists sought to destroy the “treasures” be-
stowed on Colombia by “the hand of Christ.”30 Convinced that Colombian identity
lay in its Catholic tradition, Rojas invoked Catholic religious and social doctrine
to inspire unity. Honoring the legacy of Simón Bolívar, the military government
also extolled the ideas of “loyalty, honesty, modesty, strength, and moderation.”31
Together, these virtues would help Colombia move beyond la Violencia, toward
some higher, albeit poorly articulated, purpose. Practically, Rojas thought that
Colombia’s political and economic elite had placed personal gain above national
interests. The 1953 to 1957 program of military populism, “the era of the common
man,” therefore, aimed to link the interests of the Colombian underclass and mili-
tary, allowing for new economic, social, political, and educational opportunities
for the country’s underprivileged majority. Since traditional political forces proved
incapable of governing, Rojas and his colleagues promised to remake Colombia.32
These organizing themes of military governance took some time to evolve, and
they never exactly translated into a coherent program of government action. Nev-
ertheless, the armed forces enjoyed considerable success during its first two years
in power. At first, Colombian servicemen treated Liberals and Conservatives with
dignity and respect. General Rojas repudiated media censorship and invited politi-
cal exiles to return to Colombia. He then developed an amnesty program to end
domestic fighting, inviting partisan fighters to rejoin mainstream society without
retribution. Responding to the military’s overture, approximately 16,000 irregular
fighters accepted the offer by December 1953. In 1954, la Violencia claimed just 900
Colombian lives, compared to 13,250 in 1952.33 The military government simulta-
neously launched domestic programs designed to rebuild and uplift the republic.
The Office for Aid and Rehabilitation assisted families affected by internal fighting
and opened new economic opportunities for irregular combatants returning to
peaceful enterprises. In 1954 Rojas formed the National Secretariat of Social Assis-
tance to help disadvantaged Colombians. The Ministry of Public Works, Institute
of Industrial Development, Institute for Water and Electric Power Development,
Institute for Colonization and Immigration, and regional development corpora-
tions undertook hundreds of projects designed to accelerate Colombian mod-
ernization. At the same time, the military government distributed low-cost farm
machinery, built a new international airport, inaugurated the country’s first steel
plant, reformed the tax codes, sponsored a new labor federation, launched two
political parties, unveiled a social security program, and opened dozens of new
educational facilities. In late 1953 the Eisenhower administration found the Rojas
government to be “one of the most popular regimes Colombia had known,” add-
ing that Rojas had “brought about a healthy improvement” to the country.34 The
New York Times, a strong critic of Latin American dictators, found “overwhelm-
ing reasons to welcome and encourage the Rojas regime” for bringing peace to
Colombia.35 The Colombian armed forces had officially entered the state-building
business with what appeared, at first, to be good results.36
Rojas and his colleagues, however, were incapable of escaping the limitations
of Colombia’s deeply rooted bipolar political tradition. On two occasions, the
general launched new political parties in Colombia, an effort to connect labor and
military interests against traditional organizations. The experiments, which one
U.S. embassy officer described as “reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini, and Perón,”
failed to transform the domestic political landscape.37 The military managed only
to alienate Liberals and Conservatives. Liberals, moreover, were disappointed that
Rojas refused to return Colombia to civilian rule. They became further disen-
chanted, over time, with the general’s inability to discern liberalism from commu-
nism. Eventually, Conservatives, industrialists, and clergy abandoned the general
for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons. General Rojas’s growing
unpopularity, consequently, allowed for the gradual coming together of Colom-
bia’s two traditional parties. The general responded to rising domestic opposition
with an authoritarian campaign of harassment and oppression. He imposed new
restrictions on the press and civil liberties. To secure his political power, he engi-
neered his own election, seated a puppet legislature, and remodeled the Supreme
Court. He also abolished department and municipal assemblies, creating in their
place military-appointed administrative councils. Throughout, he refused to lift
the state of siege (in place since the late 1940s), imposed strict regulations on labor
and political meetings, mishandled student protests, and allowed government-
sponsored pro-Rojas rallies to turn violent.38 The general became increasingly
dislocated from the realities of national life by his trusted but self-serving coun-
selors, a group led by right-wing radical Lucio Pabón Núñez. By 1957 the military
itself opposed General Rojas, especially young professional officers who valued
the tradition of military subordination to constitutional rule.39
To compound the military’s problems, the Rojas team, inexperienced in the
area of public policy, formed initiatives in haphazard ways, constantly charted
and recharted them, inspiring little confidence along the way. Importantly, the
general’s overall management of the economy brought hardship to Colombia. As
the government alienated its constituents, knowledgeable civilian administrators
turned away from the military government. Without this pool of civilian talent,
the Colombian military simply lacked the knowledge and experience necessary
to run a complex national economy. The gravest problems concerned government
spending: the military’s public works and social welfare projects cost millions of
pesos each year. The general also lavished the armed forces with new facilities and
prestige equipment. During his first eighteen months in power, Rojas covered
these expenses with high returns on Colombian coffee. Crop failures in Brazil
kept the price of coffee on the international market near $1 per pound. But in
February 1955 the coffee market collapsed, and by 1957 the military accumulated
a commercial debt exceeding $450 million.40 To add insult to injury, heavy rains,
floods, and a major earthquake wracked the country from 1954 and 1956, erasing
several high-profile development projects and creating exorbitant bills for disas-
ter relief. Allegations of corruption and misconduct further diminished public
support for the general, as did the reemergence of domestic fighting.41
The continuation of la Violencia was the final defining characteristic of the Rojas
years. Despite the military’s early success controlling the violence, the Rojas gov-
ernment failed to end the conflict. When Rojas extended amnesty to guerrillas in
1954, some hardened fighters remained at large, either for ideological or personal
reasons, while others who returned to peaceful enterprises kept their rifles close at
hand, thus ensuring the possibility of future disorder.42 As opposition to the mili-
tary government grew, so too did the la Violencia. In 1956 the conflict consumed
11,136 Colombians, an 80 percent increase over 1954 levels.43 General Rojas blamed
the fighting on international communist agents. The government’s occasional dis-
covery of Soviet or Chinese arms and literature only confirmed Rojas’s convictions.
An April 1956 U.S. evaluation of the situation found that although the guerrillas
lacked “centralized direction,” communists had “extended their influence in the
guerrilla movement.”44 But the U.S. embassy in Bogotá discovered “no overall
proof ” of widespread communist infiltration in Colombia, and the U.S. Air Force
attaché in Colombia recorded that “the mass of the guerrillas” wanted “nothing to
do with the communists.”45 These and other assessments of la Violencia substanti-
ated a 1949 U.S. embassy report that General Rojas could not “tell a communist
from a Liberal” and tended to see “Red hiding behind every coffee bush.”46
The ongoing disorder fueled Colombia’s religious controversies, which contin-
ued to cause special problems for Colombia and the United States. Violence against
Protestants in Colombia diminished after the 1953 coup, but when la Violencia
reemerged, so too did religious fighting. Several horrific incidents, including a
raid by machete-wielding Catholics on Sunday school services at a U.S. Protestant
mission in Caldas, alarmed American officials. In November 1955 Pabón Núñez
responded by closing Protestant missions in Colombia. To justify the move, Bo-
gotá pointed to Colombia’s 1953 agreement with the Vatican, which granted the
Catholic Church certain privileges to “convert” in “mission territories,” a broadly
defined area that encompassed nearly two-thirds of Colombia.47 In early 1956 Co-
lombian officials expelled U.S. missionaries from Chocó, Amazonas, Magdalena,
and other regions, and by the end of the year the Rojas government had closed 40
percent of Protestant missions, chapels, and churches in Colombia. By removing
foreigners from lawless areas, Bogotá provided for their safety; Rojas was also able
to improve, temporarily, his relationship with the Catholic Church. Even so, when
combined with the tendency of high-ranking government officials to clump Prot-
estantism and communism together as foreign ideas that impaired Colombian

unity, Bogotá’s solution to religious violence sparked diplomatic controversy.
The Eisenhower administration soon found itself buried under “an avalanche of
letters” from “indignant” Protestants. Only the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the
Suez crisis attracted more “fan mail” than the Colombian situation.48 The violence
against foreign Protestants, of course, was an international issue. Although most mis-
sionaries came from the United States, British and Canadian Protestants also prose-
lytized in Colombia. U.S. and Canadian officials reacted strongly to the incidents; the
Foreign Ministry in London protested after British citizens were harassed, though
British officials were more inclined to believe that the problem grew from “the mis-
application of Colombian regulations by overzealous local authorities” than their
North American counterparts.49 Indeed, Washington registered more than fifty com-
plaints about the treatment of foreign missionaries in Colombia during 1956 alone. In
March 1956 the Colombian ambassador admitted that “special conditions reign[ed]
in countries like Colombia and Spain,” which were hostile to Protestant interests.50
Nevertheless, in April 1956 Ambassador Urrutia Holguín assured U.S. officials that
Bogotá would, at least, discard “the Protestant-Communist line.”51 While such refer-
ences diminished during Rojas’s final year in office, the military government did not
reverse its mission policy. For some time, government officials, particularly Pabón
Núñez, apparently insulated Rojas from U.S. concerns. Indeed, when Philip W. Bon-
sal, American ambassador from 1955 to 1957, discussed the problem with President
Rojas in April 1956, Bonsal found the general strangely unfamiliar with Washington’s
position on the religious violence. Three months later, Rojas assured Secretary Dulles
that his government was “working to reduce” a crisis caused by “religious fanatics.”52
In early 1957 Bogotá reopened some churches, but the future of Protestant missionar-
ies remained unclear until after the Rojas government collapsed.
In addition to the religious conflict, the Eisenhower administration objected
to the Rojas regime’s handling of the Colombian press. In 1955 Rojas closed Co-
lombia’s leading Liberal daily, El Tiempo, for publishing stories critical of the Con-
servative Party and military government. Concerned, Ambassador Bonsal asked
President Eisenhower for permission to register an official U.S. complaint. After
winning Washington’s approval, the U.S. ambassador approached President Rojas
on 5 September 1955. The general responded by lecturing the U.S. ambassador on
how Liberals, intellectuals, and newspapermen brought bloodshed and anarchy
to Colombia.53 Undeterred by the Bonsal protest, Rojas soon thereafter insisted
that radio broadcasters submit all political programs to government reviewers
for editing; that law also granted the military government free weekly airtime
to catalogue its achievements. Rojas reserved for the government the exclusive
rights to television, recently introduced in Colombia, and took to distributing
television sets to Colombians for the purpose of turning the new media into a
special propaganda tool. Upon the suggestion of Pabón Núñez, the general also
reorganized the existing Diario oficial, which had previously published govern-
ment notices, decrees, and legislation, into a propaganda paper for the military
government. Rojas censored foreign films, limiting the distribution of U.S. cow-
boy and gangster films that depicted violence, and when foreign periodicals con-
tained unfavorable treatments of the military government, Rojas ordered them
confiscated.54 As with the closing of El Tiempo, the U.S. government questioned
Colombian authorities and their commitment to civil liberties. American protests
showed the limits of U.S. influence in Colombia. They likewise revealed that the
Eisenhower administration, while willing to work with undemocratic leaders like
General Rojas, did not abandon the longstanding U.S. interest in democracy and
civil liberties abroad.
The festering violence and internal discord involved the Colombian military in
new ways. Whereas former presidents Ospina and Gómez had used the National
Police and Conservative militias to control the violence, General Rojas pressed
the armed forces into domestic security duties. As such, the Korean War and Co-
lombia’s preexisting security alliance with the United States influenced the course
and direction of la Violencia. Wartime lessons in communication, sanitation, lo-
gistics, fortification, and combat were valuable and applicable in domestic opera-
tions. Moreover, soldiers “who had Korean War experience in night patrolling and
attacks,” concluded one Colombian officer, “were extremely effective against the
guerrillas.”55 Yet the Colombian Army’s commitment to conventional tactics in
the face of an unconventional conflict produced mixed results. In the years before
1950, the Colombian Army had developed a military outpost system. The Korean
campaign reinforced the utility of such a network, and by late 1954 the army main-
tained hundreds of outposts, including forty-two separate fortified stations in the
Department of Tolima. From these positions, Colombian infantrymen patrolled
the countryside. Soldiers often tangled with irregular forces that descended upon
the government formations. When attacked, the Colombian Army sought deci-
sive battles. In April 1955, after bandits ambushed a Colombian Army unit in To-
lima, Rojas declared a section of that department a Zone of Military Operations.
The army then isolated the area, encircled what it believed to be 3,000 commu-
nist guerrillas, and launched a full-scale military assault. The operation employed
thousands of Colombian servicemen and killed many antigovernment fighters. But
the Villarrica campaign also inflicted heavy casualties on innocent campesinos.56
Through its affiliation with the U.S. military, the Colombian armed forces had
trained for a conventional war, not counterinsurgency or police missions. Uni-
formed servicemen, therefore, grew frustrated with the guerrilla-style combat.
Many claimed to be reluctant to operate against guerrilla forces for fear of killing
innocent civilians.57 In some circumstances, these conditions resulted in miscon-
duct. When guerrillas ambushed and killed six Colombian soldiers near Chaparral
in late April 1956, Colonel Rafael Villate responded by rounding up and killing
approximately eighty persons who had provided “aid and comfort to guerrillas.”58
Similar incidents, although not common, occurred elsewhere. Remarkably, as the
fighting expanded, the Rojas government proved unreceptive to peaceful solu-
tions, such as when Pabón Núñes terminated a bipartisan peace effort in Tolima
for fear that members of the two traditional parties might grow too friendly and
threaten the regime.59 Rojas responded to the violence by enlarging the military
and its campaign against the guerrillas. By 1957 the Colombian Army enlisted over
47,000 troops (compared to 22,000 in 1950); the armed forces were still too small
to cover the large and geographically rugged country.60 More than one U.S. mili-
tary observer became convinced that Rojas Pinilla was not doing all he could to
control la Violencia, some even suggesting that the general was “allowing the fight-
ing to continue in order to justify” his continuation in power.61 In any case, begin-
ning in 1953, Colombian officials realized that they needed to remodel the military
establishment to cope with its new domestic security and state-building missions.
Colombian officers once again turned to the United States for assistance.
Military and Economic Cooperation, 1953–1957
As the requirements of the Colombian armed forces evolved, U.S. military policy
toward Latin America started to change. Beginning in 1953, the Eisenhower ad-
ministration pursued many traditional U.S. objectives, goals first outlined dur-
ing the Roosevelt and Truman years. American planners wanted to build Latin
American military forces capable of conventional operations alongside U.S. com-
bat units. They continued to work toward the standardization of inter-American
military organization, doctrine, tactics, and equipment. Yet American enthusiasm
for conventional U.S.–Latin American security cooperation decreased for strate-
gic and practical reasons. U.S. policymakers believed that Soviet-American atomic
parity and Stalin’s death made total war less likely. Instead, Americans feared that
communist insurgencies, not a conventional showdown, would tip the cold war in
favor of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The United States, according to
NSC paper 153/1, should therefore work “to strengthen the will and ability of other
nations of the free world, individually and collectively, to deter or oppose commu-
nist aggression and achieve internal security.”62 A key November 1954 NSC study
found that “the USSR has greatly modified its tactics and techniques for achieving
its objectives in the political, psychological, and economic fields” by embracing
subversive techniques.63 “In countries vulnerable to subversion,” the NSC added in
December, “the United States should, as one of its objectives, assist in the develop-
ment of adequate local internal security forces.”64 American authorities needed to
adapt to these new security challenges in places such as Indochina and also in Latin
America. A U.S. assessment of inter-American relations in September 1956, NSC

5613/1, found “no danger of an overt communist attack against Latin America.”65
Rather, communist insurgencies posed the most immediate threat to the Western
Hemisphere. Latin American government should therefore “hold down” military
expenses, maintain internal security, and invest in economic development. In
regard to combined overseas operations, U.S. officials decided in 1956, the Latin
American republics, generally unwilling to fight in Korea, should develop units for
collective security operations only “in exceptional cases.”66
In December 1954 President Eisenhower created an NSC working group to
study, develop, implement, and monitor the U.S. overseas internal security as-
sistance program. While members sometimes differed in their approaches, they
firmly agreed that the United States had “a vital interest in assisting free world
countries to defend themselves against communist subversion” and that “the in-
ternal security forces of these countries [must] be able to deal with all forms of
subversion and insurrection both effectively and economically.”67 At the highest
levels, Colombia seldom figured into U.S. discussions over foreign internal secu-
rity assistance. A reliable cold war ally, the country belonged to a friendly, non-
communist general, who despite domestic problems, “compared favorability” to
his predecessors.68 The NSC, nonetheless, believed that communists in Colom-
bia, although “small in actual number,” would “take advantage” of instabilities to
advance their cause.69 Wanting to defend Colombia against communism, “retain
and perfect Colombian cooperation” in the cold war, and encourage its strategic
neighbor to “keep its traditional place as a stable friendly democracy,” the United
States responded sympathetically to Colombian overtures for internal security as-
sistance.70 In doing so, the Eisenhower administration did not immediately dis-
card traditional hemispheric defense goals, but it did affect a gradual shift in the
tone and emphasis of U.S. military assistance. For Colombia and the United States,
those changes supported the Colombian military’s state-building effort and fore-
shadowed the future of the U.S.-Colombian security relationship.
The rise of the military government in Colombia delivered an extraordinary op-
portunity for closer bilateral military relations. Importantly, the Colombian armed
forces controlled their own development during the mid-1950s. Officers requested
and contracted U.S. services to advance their national and international objectives
without civilian oversight. General Rojas and other senior officials personally cul-
tivated Colombian-American military, diplomatic, and economic collaboration.
Since Colombia had fought in Korea, they believed that it was uniquely positioned
to help transform the Americas into an “impregnable bastion of liberty.”71 In cer-
tain ways, the new Colombian political situation also benefited the United States.
American military officials had more contact and influence over high-ranking Co-
lombian government officials than at any time since the republics came together in
1939. In 1951 a U.S. military adviser in Colombia had praised General Rojas as both
“a very able officer” and a man “keen” on American “ways and ideas.”72 This senti-
ment prevailed among U.S. military officers throughout the first years of Colom-
bian military rule. The Eisenhower administration also drew confidence from the
military government’s commitment to anticommunism, even as it lamented the
hibernation of Colombia’s democratic tradition. Moreover, Washington trusted
that Bogotá would work with the United States in future security operations. In
1954 U.S. naval mission chief Captain Jay V. Chase observed that Colombia’s Ko-
rean War contribution alone was “adequate evidence of mutual cooperation” to
justify the U.S. investment in Colombia.73 The Colombian Army’s work with the
UN Emergency Force further inspired U.S. confidence in Colombia. Under these
conditions, Colombia and United States, tailoring programs to support Colombian
internal security, expanded their military partnership.
Between 1953 and 1957, the two countries developed Colombian military units
capable of participating in hemispheric defense operations through the Military
Assistance Program. At the 1951 Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington, in-
ter-American officials had recommended that the Latin American republics form
special military units, financed by U.S. grants, for the purpose of hemispheric de-
fense. The Truman administration agreed to support a Colombian antiaircraft bat-
talion, two air squadrons, and two warships. Colombia received U.S. equipment
for the antiaircraft battalion in 1953. The United States simultaneously trained five
hundred soldiers to operate the 40 mm guns. Colombian officers and noncom-
missioned officers studied in the United States and the Canal Zone, while U.S. ad-
visers in Colombia, led by Lieutenant Colonel Mathew Santino, prepared enlisted
personnel.74 In August 1953, other U.S. advisers began flight training for Colom-
bian airmen assigned to the two MAP air squadrons. That same year, eleven F-47s
arrived in Colombia, and the fighter squadron was operational by 1954. U.S. sup-
ply problems delayed the arrival of the B-26 bombers until March 1956.75 The in-
ter-American defense program also provided for the improvement of Colombia’s
two destroyers. In 1953 and 1954, the U.S. Navy refitted the ARC Antioquia and
ARC Caldas in Mobile, Alabama. The Colombian vessels, in turn, participated in
several joint training exercises with the U.S. Navy. By 1950s standards, however,
the Colombian destroyers were still obsolete, and Colombian naval officials asked
Washington to loan Colombia modern warships. U.S. authorities transferred two
American ships, formerly the USS Stanley and USS Hale, to Colombia in 1960.76
In addition to the original MAP units, Washington supported Colombia’s Ko-
rean War infantry battalion after 1954.77 The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided in Oc-
tober 1954 that the Colombian infantrymen, then preparing to leave the western
Pacific, should retain their U.S. equipment, valued at over $400,000.78 The terms
of Colombia’s UN contribution did not account for the final disposition of U.S.-
furnished equipment. Regardless, American planners wanted to reward Colom-

bia for its wartime assistance. The donation also functioned as a public relations
opportunity for the United States throughout the Americas. In early November
1954, the U.S. Caribbean Command chief of staff traveled to Bogotá to formalize
the transfer. The donation of equipment, he told General Rojas, did not obligate
Washington to any further assistance. Colombian soldiers carried the small arms
back to Colombia; the weapons added to the pageantry of Colombia’s welcome-
home celebration. The heavy equipment arrived aboard a U.S. military transport
in January 1955. The United States had promised to deliver the equipment Co-
lombians soldiers had used in Korea. Colombian Army planners were therefore
confident that the materiel, which they had maintained in Korea, would arrive in
good condition. But the U.S. Far East Command instead pulled the jeeps, trucks,
communication gear, and heavy weapons from the U.S. stockpile in Pusan, and
much of the gear arrived in a state of disrepair. A U.S. Caribbean Command sur-
vey team, dispatched by the Pentagon to review the situation, confirmed that the
equipment was in terrible condition.79 Embarrassed, Washington refurbished or
replaced nearly all the equipment by 1956. These costs, together with supplemen-
tal aid to the battalion, amounted to roughly $600,000.
From the beginning, internal conditions affected the U.S.-supported units in
Colombia. U.S. legislation strictly limited foreign MAP forces to inter-American
defense activities. Accepting U.S. grant assistance, Colombian officials renounced
the right to use MAP aid for other purposes, such as internal security operations.
Nevertheless, the Truman administration had feared that Rojas’s predecessor, Lau-
reano Gómez, would misuse American MAP equipment. It withheld certain le-
thal military items until after the 1953 coup, thereby delaying the development of
Colombia’s MAP units. Once Colombian forces were operational, personnel issues
related to la Violencia created difficulties. The antiaircraft guns, for example, were
highly specialized weapons that required considerable practice to operate properly.
Yet Rojas often reassigned antiaircraft specialists to internal security duties, leaving
undertrained service members to work the guns. On several occasions, Colom-
bia Battalion infantrymen, minus their MAP equipment, joined the antiguerrilla
campaign. In other instances, Colombia’s best officers were pulled away from the
battalion to deal with domestic matters. The Colombian military’s contribution
to the UN Emergency Force compounded the difficulties by placing additional
demands on Colombian servicemen. Finally, Colombia’s internal fighting created
some difficulties in the areas of force protection, infrastructure, and communica-
tions, each directly or indirectly inhibiting the proper development of Colombia’s
MAP capabilities. For these reasons, the efficiency of Colombia’s MAP units lagged
behind U.S. expectations. Still, Bogotá’s contribution to UN operations in Korea
and the Middle East validated the purpose the mutual defense program.80
Having proven its willingness to participate in joint operations, Colombia, the

“exceptional case” described in NSC paper 5613/1, was the leading Latin American
recipient of MAP aid during the 1950s.81 Colombian officials nevertheless under-
took near-constant efforts to secure a greater share of U.S. grant assistance. In
doing so, the military government used its Korean War contribution to leverage
U.S. officials. Indeed, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy observed
that Bogotá based a “very large part” of its case for more MAP aid on the notion
that its part in the Korean campaign had afforded Colombia “a legitimate and
preferential claim” to U.S. military assistance.82 In 1954 General Rojas proposed
that the Latin American countries form a standing inter-American army, one in
which Colombia, as a result of its Korean War experience, would presumably play
a leading role. In early 1955, referencing Korea, Rojas asked the United States for
MAP arms to equip an infantry brigade, two engineering battalions, two artil-
lery battalions, a destroyer, and assorted air units. The request totaled nearly $150
million in value, more U.S. military aid than Washington had slated for the en-
tire Western Hemisphere.83 In Washington, Ambassador Zuleta, advocating for
more MAP assistance, suggested that the United States allow Colombia to use the
grant aid to “repress the activities of subversion and sabotage” discussed at the
1954 inter-American meeting in Caracas.84 Unwilling to support the enormous
Colombian request, unconvinced that MAP aid could legally be used for inter-
nal security purposes, the Department of Defense soon returned the plan to the
Colombian embassy. In April 1955 Ambassador Zuleta traveled back to Colombia
to discuss the military assistance issue with President Rojas. During one meeting
between Rojas and his ambassador, the general, perhaps to preserve his credibil-
ity, conceded that the petition had been “drawn up by a lot of idiots.”85
Bogotá subsequently scaled down the proposal and again pressed Washington.
With this new request, Zuleta moved outside traditional channels. In May 1955,
he drove to State College, Pennsylvania, to visit Milton Eisenhower, then presi-
dent of the Pennsylvania State University. Zuleta asked him to lobby American
government officials on Colombia’s behalf. According to the ambassador, Milton
Eisenhower “perfectly understood” Colombia’s defense requirements, agreed that
Colombia should play a leading role in hemispheric defense, and promised to
encourage his brother to fulfill Colombia’s needs.86 Privately, the Americans, in-
cluding Milton Eisenhower, were irked at the unusual diplomatic approach.87 The
Pentagon, nevertheless, reviewed the new Colombian MAP plan in good faith.
Again, it found no military justification to expand Colombia’s part in hemispheric
defense. The administration distributed grant aid, American officers reminded
Zuleta, to advance its global national security strategy, a plan designed to deter
and contain Soviet offensive action. In an era of limited U.S. foreign assistance,
Latin America would receive only a small share of U.S. military grant aid. In 1954,
for example, Pacific and Asian countries collected $583 million in MAP grants.
That year, the United States dispatched just $13 million to the Latin American
republics.88 The availability of U.S. funds, hemispheric capabilities, and global
threats determined each country’s share of MAP aid. In his communications
with President Rojas, Zuleta attributed the lack of U.S. support to “technical and
professional obstacles” and the “complicated mechanism of the North American
government.” U.S. officials, he said, had nevertheless “repeatedly told me that
they appreciated Colombian participation in Korea” and that Colombian requests
for assistance were a “top priority” for the U.S. government.89 Unhappy with his
ambassador’s inability to secure more grant aid, Rojas recalled Zuleta in Novem-
ber 1955. Colombia’s next ambassador to the United States, Francisco Urrutia,
likewise failed to persuade the Eisenhower administration to change Colombia’s
hemispheric defense mission.90
While unwilling to send additional MAP aid to Colombia, the Eisenhower
administration did relax oversight of the grant aid program during the mid-1950s
with important long-term consequences. At first, the Truman and Eisenhower
teams strictly monitored the U.S.-supported units, insisting that MAP forces
undertake only hemispheric defense activities. Then, during the 1955 military
campaign in Tolima, Colombian officers (without U.S. permission) deployed
some MAP air assets against guerrillas, resulting in the destruction of one U.S.-
furnished aircraft. During that same operation, the Colombian Army rushed
two MAP antiaircraft guns to the fighting front for use against ground targets.
Alarmed by the misuse of U.S. assistance, mindful of the legal restrictions gov-
erning MAP assets, U.S. diplomats began drafting a formal protest. But the Pen-
tagon and National Security Council intervened, informally advising the State
Department to drop the issue. Internal security, the administration explained,
was a fundamental aspect of Colombia’s hemispheric defense mission.91 Indeed,
the United States needed to better appreciate the interrelatedness of domestic and
hemispheric security. The administration decided that it would not encourage
Colombians to deploy MAP forces against antigovernment fighters, nor would it
seek to change standing legislation to permit such actions. Responding to chang-
ing cold war conditions, however, the United States did allow the 1955 incident to
pass without controversy. Around the same time, the Colombian and American
officials started contemplating ways to realign U.S. grant aid to better support the
Colombian military’s state-building work. The two countries began talking about
replacing the U.S.-supported antiaircraft battalion with an engineering unit that
might contribute to Colombian economic development, addressing some of the
root problems of la Violencia. The plan produced results only after the Rojas gov-
ernment collapsed, but (in combination with the U.S. response to the Tolima of-
fensive) reflected a major change in the overall thinking about MAP objectives.92
In addition to grant aid, Colombians purchased a substantial amount of Ameri-

can military equipment during the mid-1950s. The 1954 Mutual Security Act liber-
alized the conditions of U.S. arms sales, allowing foreign governments to purchase
weapons at a “fair value”—not real cost—and to finance those purchases over a
three-year period.93 Unlike it did for grant assistance, the U.S. Congress placed no
restrictions on direct purchase items. The Colombian military government could
use the materiel for hemispheric defense, overseas operations, and internal secu-
rity. Many foreign governments, however, found direct U.S. arms sales unattract-
ive. American equipment remained expensive, and the Pentagon was often slow in
delivering materiel. For Colombian purchasers, the Korean War diminished some
of these problems. In 1955 one Pentagon official admitted that “all U.S. military
officers were very conscious” of Colombia’s “comradeship in the Korean Conflict”
and considered Bogotá’s arms requests accordingly.94 Also, Colombian military at-
tachés in Washington, including former Colombia Battalion commander Jaime
Polanía, were often Korean War veterans who could call upon their U.S. comrades
to expedite sales. Bogotá purchased a large quantity of U.S. heavy weapons, ri-
fles, ammunition, land mines, and grenades. It outfitted a battalion of Colombian
Marines with U.S. arms, and acquired spare parts, munitions, and maintenance
equipment for airplanes and warships. Colombians also bought construction and
communication gear to support internal development projects: tractors, dump
trucks, bulldozers, backhoes, earth-moving explosives, radios, telephone wire, and
bridge-making tools. Overall, through the provisions of the 1954 Mutual Security
Act, Colombians purchased roughly $750,000 in U.S. equipment each year during
1954–57. Combined with MAP grant aid, it was the greatest infusion of U.S. arms
into Colombia to that point in history. Indeed, Colombia, a second tier recipient
of U.S. military aid prior to the Korean War, received more American assistance
during the 1950s than any other Latin American country.95
Although generous, Washington imposed some limits on sales. In 1955 Co-
lombian officers tried to buy napalm bombs from the United States. Assistant
Secretary of State Henry F. Holland urged the Colombian ambassador to consider
the “intense emotional opposition” that would develop in the United States as a
result of the sale of napalm to Colombia.96 After several meetings with the Co-
lombian ambassador, U.S. officials persuaded Colombia to drop the order. Rojas
instead purchased bomb-making equipment on the open market and manufac-
tured the napalm in Colombia, illustrating the fact that foreign governments with
money and determination would acquire arms with or without U.S. approval. In
fact, when Bogotá proved incapable of fulfilling its material needs through the
Pentagon, the military government, like its Latin American counterparts, turned
to suppliers in Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Dominican Republic. These
purchases undercut Washington’s objective of hemispheric arms standardization
and created supply problems for Colombian forces. They also saddled the Rojas
regime with debt, leading one U.S. military adviser in Colombia to conclude that
Bogotá “could pay off ” Colombia’s “commercial indebtedness in double-quick
time” if General Rojas just stopped buying foreign arms.97
As Colombian authorities increased their stocks of U.S. military equipment,
they also expanded the U.S. advisory role in Colombia. Since the beginning of
World War II, American missions, a key link between the two militaries, turned
the bilateral affiliation into a working alliance. Given their importance, diplomats
in both capitals were understandably alarmed when they discovered in 1954 that
the mission agreements had expired. That the U.S. teams had been working in Co-
lombia for several months without a written mandate impressed one U.S. embassy
worker as a demonstration of the “effective yet unobtrusive” character of the mis-
sions, as well as Colombia’s “favorable attitude” toward military collaboration.98
Bogotá and Washington, nonetheless, formalized the mission work through an
exchange of diplomatic letters in late 1954.99 By that time, the size of the U.S.
teams had grown considerably from pre-1953 levels. Soon after the coup, General
Rojas asked Washington to increase the number of U.S. advisers in Colombia.
In particular, the general wanted more U.S. instructors at Colombian military
schools. The Eisenhower administration responded by adding twenty permanent
positions to the teams already in Colombia. To satisfy other Colombian requests,
the Pentagon dispatched dozens of U.S. servicemen on contracts to perform spe-
cialized chores that ranged in duration from three to twenty-four months. As
outlined in the original mission agreements, the Colombian government paid for
the salaries and other expenses incurred by the advisers.
The transfer of MAAG functions to the service missions further increased the
size of the advisory groups. By 1955 U.S. and Colombian officials concluded that
separate advisers for the MAP-supported units confused U.S.-Colombian mili-
tary relations, created an unnatural separation of U.S. authority, and spawned a
duplication of effort. In September, diplomats therefore transferred MAAG duties
to the missions. The new arrangement designated the U.S. naval mission leader
as MAP chief, regardless of existing seniority among U.S. officers in Colombia. It
also charged individual mission commanders with the coordination of MAP ac-
tivities within their section. The Rojas government accredited remaining MAAG
personnel to their designated missions.100 The U.S. teams swelled as a result of
these adjustments. At any one point during the mid-1950s, the U.S. Army group
employed forty advisers in Colombia. The growth proved so dramatic that the
army mission outgrew its War Ministry office, and in 1954 the advisers moved
into new facilities in the Colombian Army headquarters.
The U.S. Navy and Air Force missions in Colombia expanded at a less impres-
sive rate. Because of the distribution of power within the Colombian military, naval
and air interests lagged behind those of the ground forces. Colombian Air Force
and Navy officers were not, generally, important decision makers during the Ro-
jas era, and thus were not especially effective advocates for their branches. None-
theless, in the area of naval cooperation, the two countries undertook a series of
joint maneuvers, including an intensive antisubmarine exercise in the Caribbean
in January 1956.101 Colombia’s Korean War frigate made regular visits to U.S. naval
facilities for repairs and refueling. The ARC Capitán Tono, manned by Colombian
midshipmen, visited Washington in September 1953. The U.S. chief of naval opera-
tions, Admiral Robert B. Carney, mindful of Colombia’s Korean War contribution,
made special arrangements for the young sailors to tour the U.S. Naval Academy
in Annapolis. U.S. naval mission personnel in Colombia increased their presence
in Colombian naval schools, expanded Colombian technical facilities in Barran-
quilla, and serviced Colombia’s warships. U.S. advisers helped train the new Co-
lombian Marine battalion, and in 1955 mission commander Captain Martin Adam
Shellabarger collaborated with Colombian naval officials to revise bilateral plans
for defending approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. Air Force mission, un-
der command of Colonel Algene E. Key, worked to establish a new airfield and
aircraft-maintenance center at Cali, with civilian and military applications, and
arranged for the servicing of certain Colombian aircraft at U.S. installations in the
Canal Zone.102 In 1955, anticipating Colombia’s purchase of modern jet airplanes,
Colombia and the United States launched a jet-pilot training program. Colonel
Gerald M. Clugston, who replaced Key in March 1956, enlarged that program, as
well as Colombia’s aircraft supply and repair facilities. These accomplishments
aside, the pace of Colombian-American naval and air force cooperation reflected
growing disparities among the branches of the Colombian military.103
The major beneficiary of the expanding partnership, the Colombian Army
used U.S. military assistance to support state-building activities like the creation
of a centralized recruit training center. In January 1954 Bogotá sent U.S. Army
mission chief Colonel Robert Turner on a tour of Colombian military facilities on
the eastern plains, hard hit by la Violencia, to review Colombian military organi-
zation, especially the outpost system and training practices. Turner’s report, sub-
mitted to the Rojas government in March 1954, criticized the Colombian Army
for not operating a central training facility. Instead, outpost commanders received
raw recruits, most often pulled from surrounding towns and villages. Bogotá
charged the local commands with the basic training of these soldiers. The rapid
expansion of the Colombian Army under Rojas exposed problems in Colombia’s
preparation of servicemen, dilemmas compounded by the fact that 50 percent of
new recruits were illiterate. This system, Colonel Turner found, placed an undue
burden on field units, failed to teach recruits necessary skills, and impaired the
army’s overall efficiency. After studying Turner’s report, Colombian officers asked
the United States to help them establish a specialized facility to provide for the
continuous and standardized training of new soldiers.104
Between 1954 and 1957, the Colombian Army Recruit Training Center became
General Rojas’s special project. In fact, the general made most of the major deci-
sions effecting the center. At Rojas’s request, the Pentagon arranged for ten Co-
lombian officers to spend several months at the U.S. basic training camp at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, to observe U.S. practices and procedures. Washington also
dispatched three officers to help Colombian officials develop recruit training-center
courses, literature, and schedules. A fourth adviser, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
colonel John C. Lowry, oversaw the physical construction of the center. Colombian
and U.S. officers disagreed on aspects of the undertaking. The Americans disliked
the location in Melgar; they believed the area too small to conduct major field ex-
ercises. Colonel Turner eventually dropped the U.S. objection, recognizing Melgar’s
appeal, a short distance from Rojas’s own country estate. Also, since General Rojas
spared no expense on the facility, U.S. officers in Colombia believed that the recruit
training center was too opulent and expensive. Again, the general’s interests pre-
vailed.105 Opened in January 1957, the recruit training center offered new soldiers a
diverse educational experience. Courses included instruction in reading and writ-
ing, personal hygiene, citizenship, Colombian history, and military science. Instruc-
tors taught students the fundamentals of military service, including self-discipline,
rifle and small-arms training, and small-unit tactics. For many recruits, most of
whom would not pursue military careers, the Colombian Army recruit training
was the only formal education they received during their lifetimes. The program,
therefore, did more than train enlisted personnel for military service; it endeavored
to prepare young Colombian men to be good citizens.
In addition to improvements in recruit training, Colonel Turner’s 1954 report
also proposed that the Colombian Army form special ranger units for internal
counterinsurgency operations. Colombian officers, having independently identi-
fied the need for special warfare training, petitioned the United States for help in
establishing the Escuela de Lanceros, or ranger school, at Melgar. The Eisenhower
administration threw its support behind the plan in mid-1954. Both governments
believed that counterinsurgency training for Colombian soldiers would improve
the country’s internal security situation. Captain Ralph Puckett Jr., a U.S. Army
Ranger and Korean War veteran, joined Colombian officers to establish curricula
and training schedules, as well as the center’s physical layout. When the Escuela
de Lanceros opened in late 1955, Captain Puckett served as a special ranger ad-
viser to the school commandant Major Hernando Bernal Duran. Four Colombian
lieutenants traveled to Ft. Benning, Georgia, to study at the U.S. Ranger School.
Upon their return to Colombia, these men formed the core of the lancero train-
ing cadre. The grueling eleven-week training program pressed students to their
physical and mental limits. The initial phase focused on physical conditioning,
small-arms training, survival techniques, and map reading. Instructors, many of
whom were specially trained in the United States or themselves lancero gradu-
ates, pushed students twelve hours a day. The second phase involved field ex-
ercises under simulated combat circumstances. To encourage self-criticism and
peer review, students constantly graded themselves and their fellow students. The
final exercise involved a series of long-range patrols, each lasting three or more
days. These actions involved tough geographic obstacles (mountains, rivers, and
jungles) and numerically superior “enemy” forces. Colombia’s Korean War vet-
erans often worked at the school as mock opponents for the lancero students. In
1959 the Colombian Army made the Escuela de Lanceros a requirement for all
second lieutenants, and by 1960 the special warfare school produced approxi-
mately 200 graduates each year. Lieutenant John R. Galvin, who replaced Puckett
in April 1957, reported that the efficiency of Escuela de Lanceros neared that of its
U.S. counterpart.106 The school was the first attempt to create Colombian military
units designed specifically to tackle Colombian internal security operations. Co-
lombian rangers played an important part in restoring domestic order after 1958.
Beyond counterinsurgency forces, the two countries collaborated on other mea-
sures designed to improve domestic security and combat communism. Building on
the 1954 Caracas declaration, U.S. and Colombian officers harassed known commu-
nists, disrupted Leftist conferences, and tracked foreign nationals. In some ways, the
Colombian-American anticommunist activities resembled the World War II coun-
terespionage campaign against Nazi sympathizers. The effort against communism,
however, more often involved Colombian nationals, making it difficult to “unmask
the agents of international communism and to distinguish them from genuine
national leaders of social and economic reform.”107 Also, whereas U.S. authorities
were most concerned about Axis sabotage during World War II, Colombian offi-
cials showed themselves to be most zealous during the early cold war. Nevertheless,
Americans worked with Colombian military police, intelligence services, and local
law enforcement in techniques from surveillance to record keeping. Then, in 1956,
U.S. military advisers collaborated with Colombian officers to write a general plan
for dealing with rural violence. The plan outlined certain military measures—or-
ganizational and tactical—to combat irregular, antigovernment forces. Around
the same time, a U.S. naval team counseled Colombian naval officers who were
developing plans to better control the country’s river network. Neither initiative
produced meaningful results before the Rojas regime collapsed; both contributed
to the remodeling of the bilateral security relationship after 1958.108
The registration of Colombian students at U.S. service schools also reflected the
changing interests of the Colombian armed forces. At the Colombian government’s
expense, the number of servicemen attending classes at U.S. military facilities in-
creased during the mid-1950s. Many Colombians completed traditional conven-
tional security courses. Colombian Air Force personnel received one-third of all
U.S. Air Force authorized training slots for Latin America. Army officers attended
artillery, armor, and infantry sessions. Yet Colombians simultaneously increased
their presence in military police, intelligence, civil affairs, and engineering classes
intended to enhance the military’s state-building capacity. Beyond advancing Co-
lombian military goals and encouraging Colombian-American operational com-
patibility, the programs facilitated cordial U.S.-Colombian military relations. In Jan-
uary 1956, after nearly fifteen years of cooperation in the area of military education,
the Eisenhower administration observed that “most key officers” in the Colombian
armed forces had studied at U.S. service schools.109 Officers such as Minister of War
Major General Gabriel París, a graduate of the Command and General Staff College
at Ft. Leavenworth, were more inclined to cooperate with the United States than
those without firsthand experience in the United States. The educational exchanges
added to the sense of comradeship developed in Korea, a wartime affiliation of great
importance as Colombian veterans of the conflict came to occupy nearly every im-
portant post in the Colombian armed forces.110
The United States also supported the Colombian military state-building work
through various other activities that merged U.S. civilian and military expertise.
The Rojas government made a large investment in developing a modern mili-
tary hospital in Bogotá. Planning for the facility began in 1949, and workmen
started construction in late 1951, but the medical center was far from finished
when General Rojas came to power. During the mid-1950s the United States fur-
nished equipment and technical assistance for the 750-bed facility. Colombian
medical personnel trained in the United States; the center opened in 1955 under
the direction of Columbia University graduate Dr. Alfonso Ramirez.111 In Octo-
ber 1956 Colombia and the United States signed a bilateral aviation agreement,
establishing direct commercial air service between the two countries for the first
time, with an immediate impact on the flow of persons and cargo.112 The two
governments reinvigorated the U.S. civil aviation mission, including a new team
of U.S. engineers who worked with the Colombian military to build Bogotá’s El
Dorado International Airport. The Colombian military and the U.S. Weather
Bureau, predecessor of the National Weather Service, constructed a Cooperative
Meteorological Observation Project on St. Andrew’s Island.113 The Colombian-
American agricultural station at Palmira, heralded by Milton Eisenhower in 1953
as “one of the best demonstrations” of international cooperation in the Americas,
addressed Colombian agricultural issues.114 American civilians, through a Point
IV technical assistance agreement, worked with Colombian military authorities
on housing and sanitation projects.115 Former Tennessee Valley Authority direc-
tor David Lilienthal, who later worked in Vietnam, advised military officers on
regional development projects. Then, in January 1957, U.S. and Colombian repre-
sentatives signed an educational agreement under the provisions of the Depart-
ment of State–sponsored Fulbright Program, which provided $100,000 a year to
support the exchange of Colombian and U.S. university professors, lecturers, and
students. A U.S. ambassador to Colombia later described the program as “the
most important way” Colombians and Americans came “to know” and “under-
stand each other better.”116
As it had for years, Colombia’s internal woes discouraged many foreign in-
vestors. The military government nevertheless worked to attract capital, and the
total U.S. direct investment in Colombia, $117 million in 1943, topped $300 mil-
lion in 1956.117 U.S. and Colombian businesses combined to begin construction
of a petroleum pipeline between Cali and Buenaventura. Standard Oil Company
invested in Colombian refineries, and the Colombian subsidiary of Philips Incor-
porated opened an incandescent and fluorescent lamps factory in Barranquilla.
United Fruit Company also continued to reconstitute its holdings in Colombia,
although it still generally preferred to purchase from Colombian producers. Co-
lombian banana production expanded from 450,000 metric tons to 513,000 metric
tons between 1954 and 1955. The Goodyear Corporation built a tire plant in Cali;
the Chicago-based department store Sears, Roebuck and Company expanded its
operations in the South American republic. U.S. firms were also involved in Co-
lombian public works projects that ranged from the construction of hydroelectric
plants to sewage systems. The steady rise in U.S. private business activity in Co-
lombia continued after the military government collapsed.118
Washington also provided Bogotá with some direct U.S. economic assistance.
Through Export-Import Bank credits, the United States committed between
$100,000 and $125,000 to Colombian health and sanitation programs each year.
Supplemental U.S. assistance often amounted to tens of thousands of more dollars.
In 1954 Colombia received over $3 million in Export-Import Bank loans for high-
way, telecommunication, and textile projects. After a series of disastrous harvests
in the mid-1950s left Colombia unable to feed itself, Washington sent $20 million
in food aid. The Eisenhower administration also dispatched humanitarian assis-
tance to Colombia following a series of natural disasters. When a Colombian Army
convoy loaded with thirty-three tons of dynamite exploded in downtown Cali in
August 1956, resulting in death or injury to nearly 900 Colombians, the U.S. Army
airlifted emergency medical supplies to the city.119 The International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD) funneled $14 million into the country for
highway development, $8 million for new agricultural equipment, $4.5 million for
hydroelectric plants, and $31 million for railroad projects. The United States also
provided indirect support through UN and OAS development projects. This as-
sistance, however, proved inadequate to forestall Colombia’s economic collapse. In
1957, as the Colombian financial situation declined, the Rojas government asked
American officials for a massive U.S. economic bailout, which many observers be-
lieved the general’s only chance to remain in power. Alerted to a bipartisan plan
to oust the general, the Eisenhower administration—hopeful that civilian action
might bring Colombia back to its democratic roots—purposefully balked while
anti-Rojas forces toppled the dictator.120
The Fall of Rojas
In 1954 the National Constituent Assembly had selected General Rojas to serve
a four-year term as Colombia’s chief executive. As the general’s mandate expired,
Rojas maneuvered to maintain his position. In February 1957 War Minister París,
under intense pressure from Rojas, publicly called upon the general to remain in
power until 1962. President Rojas then launched a campaign for reelection that
would have culminated in a government-supervised general election later that
year. The plan alarmed Liberal and Conservative civilians who had hoped for an
end to the military government. The Rojas scheme also upset the armed forces,
especially young officers frustrated with the task of governance. Military officers,
led by Major General Duarte Blum, quietly decided that Colombia should return
to civilian rule. Church officials also grew impatient with the military govern-
ment, as witnessed during Archbishop Cristiano Luque’s sharp moral critique of
the regime in April 1957. On 20 March, as the positions of these interest groups
crystallized, Liberals and Conservatives issued a joint declaration against the Ro-
jas government. Soon thereafter, when the general learned that the Civic Front—a
bipartisan anti-Rojas coalition—planned to nominate a presidential candidate, he
banned public meetings and political conventions in Colombia. On 8 April the
Civic Front, nonetheless, selected Conservative Guillermo León Valencia to run
against General Rojas. Two weeks later, disliking his chances in a general elec-
tion, Rojas recalled the National Constituent Assembly to extend his tenure as
president. The assembly, cleansed of dissenting voices and under the direction of
Pabón Núñez, began its work on 25 April. To ensure Civic Front compliance, Ro-
jas loyalists detained Valencia on 1 May, a move that proved to be, in the estimates
of one U.S. State Department official, the general’s “crowning mistake.”121
Colombian students were the first to react to Valencia’s arrest. On 2 May students
in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín took to the streets. Although General París persuaded
Rojas Pinilla to release León Valencia, the anti-Rojas rallies continued, and on Sat-
urday, 4 May, students brawled with police in Bogotá. Rojas ordered the army into
the city and imposed a curfew. Even with those precautions, another violent clash
between police and students erupted in the Chapinero residential district of Bogotá
the following day; three students died in that melee. As students faced off against
the general, Civic Front leaders prepared a nationwide strike. Organizers carefully
explained to military officials that the action would be directed against Rojas, not
the armed forces. Careful Civic Front planning and preexisting sympathies among
military officers guaranteed that the military would not interfere.
The strike that began on 6 May 1957 paralyzed the country. Shopkeepers shut-
tered their stores; bankers refused to process financial transactions. Factory own-
ers locked out employees, often paying workers to take unscheduled vacations.
With no business to conduct, the ranks of antigovernment demonstrators swelled
with working- and middle-class Colombians. On 8 May, the National Constitu-

ent Assembly elected Rojas to a second term. The radio broadcast of the general’s
acceptance speech fell upon an unreceptive audience. The next day, the desperate
general called leading Conservative Party officials to the Presidential Palace, where
he offered top leadership positions to party members in exchange for their sup-
port. On 10 May, after an all-night conference, Conservative leaders rejected the
plan. Army commander Brigadier General Rafael Navas Pardo carried the Civic
Front demands to Rojas. A few hours later, in a nationally broadcasted address, the
general announced his resignation. After the Eisenhower administration refused
Rojas’s petition to enter the United States, the former president made his way to
Spain.122 A five-member military junta immediately took over the government.
The day General Rojas left South America, the junta unveiled its fourteen-point
program for Colombia. The military officers pledged to uphold Colombia’s inter-
national obligations, maintain domestic order, end media censorship, cooperate
with political parties, supervise fair elections, and restore civilian government.
On all counts, the Colombian military fulfilled those promises. In the process,
it largely rehabilitated its reputation, which had been damaged during the Rojas
period. The officers dismissed the National Constituent Assembly, deactivated
the government censorship office, and investigated allegations of corruption. The
junta imposed new taxes on coffee exports and slashed military spending. The
junta chief, General París, extended new amnesty offers to guerrilla fighters and
replaced Rojas-era political appointees with more talented leaders. The country’s
reaction to the military’s selection of new department governors was especially
positive. Together with civilian economic experts, military officers reprioritized
government programs, trying to balance the country’s budget and stimulate the
economy. During the first six months of rule, the junta, for example, cut Colom-
bian Army strength by 8,000 men. The officers also worked closely with civil lead-
ers to shepherd the country back to civilian rule. Indeed, as the junta worked,
Liberal and Conservative leaders translated their truce into a workable political
system, the Frente Nacional, or National Front. The junta did not solve the coun-
try’s problems, but it showed how cooperative a military-civilian arrangement
might have been under a leader other than Rojas Pinilla. Indeed, in 1957 Alberto
Lleras, who would soon be Colombia’s next president, praised the junta’s “splen-
did” performance during an anxious time in Colombia.123 The military’s handling
of the difficult transition ensured that democracy would soon return to the ideo-
logical center of the Colombian-American alliance.
· · ·
The Colombian-American security alliance evolved and expanded during the

mid-1950s. In Colombia, the Rojas government transformed the Colombian mili-
tary into a state-building institution. Responding to the changing needs of the
Colombian armed forces, the Eisenhower administration relaxed oversight of the

Military Assistance Program; sold arms, engineering equipment, and other mate-
riel to Colombia; helped revise the Colombian recruit training program; trained
specialized Colombian counterinsurgency forces; and contributed financial and
technical assistance to support assorted state-building activities. The shared U.S.-
Colombian experience in Korea heavily influenced postwar initiatives. As since
World War II, the U.S.-Colombian partnership remained connected to larger in-
ternational events. The 1956 Suez crisis and the Soviet Union’s strategy of sub-
version shaped bilateral relations. At the same time, a shared devotion to anti-
communism bound the two countries. Materially, the United States wanted to
stabilize Colombia, its strategic neighbor; guard against communist infiltration;
and ensure its ongoing support in the cold war. The Rojas government looked to
Washington for leadership in the campaign against international communism. It
also wanted the United States to support its domestic agenda. Logically, la Violen-
cia defined Colombian military objectives between 1953 and 1957. The domestic
disorder likewise affected inter-American defense activities, impairing the effi-
ciency, for example, of Colombia’s hemispheric defense units. Emphasizing in-
ternal security concerns, Colombian officers were the principal force behind the
evolving alliance. During the era of Colombian military rule, Bogotá worked to
channel and direct U.S. military assistance in ways that complimented its state-
building mission. Overall, the mid-1950s deepened U.S. involvement in its neigh-
bor’s domestic security situation, preparing both countries for major changes in
years that followed.
6
The Partnership Transformed, 1958–1960
President Dwight Eisenhower welcomed President Alberto Lleras to the United

States on Tuesday, 5 April 1960. At National Airport outside Washington, the two
presidents exchanged friendly greetings, posed for photographs, delivered short
statements on U.S.-Colombian relations, and reviewed a ceremonial detach-
ment of American servicemen. That night, at a White House dinner, Eisenhower
expressed his admiration for Colombia and its president. Lleras responded by
thanking the U.S. president for his warm hospitality. In the morning, Lleras dis-
cussed economic, political, and security issues with various U.S. officials. He then
addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. A New York Times writer described
the speech as “an eloquent exposition of the political significance of foreign aid.”1
On Lleras’s final day in Washington, 7 April, he engaged U.S. officials on mat-
ters related to Colombia’s internal security situation. Importantly, during an im-
promptu helicopter trip to Maryland and Pennsylvania, the Colombian president
asked Eisenhower to release grant-funded U.S. military assistance to the Colom-
bian armed forces for internal security operations. The American president im-
mediately ordered the Department of Defense to explore the feasibility of such
assistance. Nine months later, Eisenhower authorized a package of special U.S.
military aid, MAP training, and equipment to support Colombian counterinsur-
gency forces.2
The state visit and related developments turned the Colombian-American
hemispheric defense partnership into an internal security alliance. In 1958, after
seven years of undemocratic rule, Colombians reestablished their constitutional
system. Led by President Lleras, the National Front coalition ended la Violencia
and returned democracy to the ideological center of the Colombian-American
affiliation. Yet the Lleras government confronted a staggering array of domes-
tic problems. Wanting to encourage stability and democracy in Colombia, U.S.
officials sent the country generous amounts of economic assistance. Also, to
advance bilateral objectives, American authorities decided to support, through
171
MAP grants, a Colombian counterinsurgency battle group to suppress residual

rural fighting. In doing so, the Eisenhower administration considered Latin
America’s rapidly changing political, economic, and social conditions. Specifi-
cally, Vice President Richard M. Nixon’s tumultuous South American tour (1958)
and the Cuban Revolution (1959) forced the United States to reconsider its ap-
proach to hemispheric relations. Linked to a major transformation in U.S. policy,
the remodeling of the Colombian-American alliance therefore embodied major
changes in U.S.–Latin American relations.
Inter-American Transformation, 1958–1960
Between 1956 and 1960, the Latin American political landscape dramatically
changed. Representative governments replaced dictatorships in ten Latin Ameri-
can countries, including Colombia. A renewed expectation for moderniza-
tion accompanied political developments. Recognizing the importance of these
events, the Eisenhower administration dispatched Vice President Nixon to South
America in 1958 to express U.S. support for emerging democracies, publicize U.S.
interest in Latin America, and discuss inter-American economic matters. The de-
mocratization of Argentina inspired the trip. After years of military government,
Argentine voters selected Arturo Frondizi to serve as president in February 1958.
The popular election, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy
Rubottom concluded, represented “a rare historical opportunity to establish a tra-
dition of friendship and cooperation with Argentina such as we have not enjoyed
in many years.”3 In Buenos Aires, U.S. ambassador Willard Beaulac, previously
stationed in Bogotá, suggested that Vice President Nixon attend Frondizi’s in-
auguration. Considering the fair results of the vice president’s two earlier visits
to Latin America (1955, 1956), the State Department soon enlarged Nixon’s mis-
sion to include visits to Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and
Venezuela. With little real interest in the region, Nixon objected to the trip. He
reluctantly left for South America on 27 April 1958.
While Nixon and his entourage enjoyed many cordial engagements, an escalat-
ing series of incidents marred the Nixon tour. Behind closed doors, Latin Ameri-
can officials lobbied, with unusual candor, for more U.S. economic assistance. The
United States, they said, should help Latin Americans fulfill their material aspi-
rations. In Colombia, President-elect Alberto Lleras warned that social and eco-
nomic upheaval would destroy the region unless the economic circumstances of
Latin American citizens improved. On the streets of Latin America, demonstrators
delivered a similar message, albeit in a less restrained manner. In Montevideo, stu-
dents harassed the vice president for suppressing the economic interests of Latin
America. In Lima, protesters accused the United States of supporting political and
the partnership transformed, 1958–1960 173
Vice President Richard Nixon (center, arm raised) and Ambassador John Moors Cabot (on
Nixon’s left) move across the Plaza de Bolívar, Bogotá, 12 May 1958. The following day, an
angry mob in Caracas attacked Nixon’s motorcade. Nixon’s experience in South America
forced the Eisenhower administration to reconsider U.S. policy toward Latin America.
(Source: Courtesy of the Nixon Presidential Library)
economic tyranny in South America. A few hecklers even hurled stones at Nixon.
“The vice president was grazed, but unhurt,” the embassy staff reported.4 Then, a
small group of picketers in Bogotá displayed unwelcoming placards. Finally, in
Caracas, Nixon’s motorcade encountered a larger anti-American demonstration.
When the Venezuelan police escort fled, the mob (apparently furious over U.S.
support for former Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez) attacked Nixon’s
limousine. The Venezuelan foreign minister and a State Department interpreter
were injured by broken glass. Before the hoodlums reached the vice president,
Venezuelan Army troops rescued the dignitaries, whom they promptly returned
to U.S. embassy compound. During the tense hours that followed, President Eisen-
hower considered sending U.S. Marines into Venezuela to retrieve the vice presi-
dent. But Venezuelan authorities regained control of the situation, making a U.S.
military intervention unnecessary. By the time the vice president returned to the
United States on 15 May, the immediate importance of the South America tour was
apparent.5 “We need a reappraisal of our policies” toward Latin America, Nixon
told reporters upon landing in Washington.6
American writers, politicians, and government officials connected the hostili-

ties to the cold war against communism. On the surface, many attributed the dem-
onstrations to communists and ultra-nationalists. “The Caracas mob,” according
to the Washington Post, “opened eyes in this country to the extent of the commu-
nist challenge to U.S. influence in Latin America.”7 Eisenhower administration of-
ficials also associated communist agents with the anti-American incidents. “The
pattern of organization and of slogans in all cases points to communist inspira-
tion and direction,” Deputy Assistant Sectary of State William Snow concluded.8
U.S. diplomats in Latin America collected detailed information on the incidents
in their countries, the sum of which highlighted communist involvement. The
minor anti-American displays in Bogotá, for example, “were certainly not sponta-
neous but were obviously contrived affairs led by communists and other malcon-
tents.”9 “We should all get clearly in [our] mind,” Nixon told the National Security
Council on 16 May, “that the threat of communism in Latin America was greater
today than ever before in history.”10
At the same time, Americans quickly identified several underlying issues that
fueled the disturbances. Previous U.S. support for dictators and inadequate U.S.
foreign economic assistance fostered anti-American sentiment in Latin America.
Tariffs passed by the U.S. Congress during the 1957 economic recession appeared
to target Latin American exports. Overseas political, economic, and social insta-
bilities highlighted the gap between U.S. and Latin American prosperity. Soviet
scientific and economic progress—embodied by the Sputnik satellite program—
seemed to offer Latin Americans a new model for rapid national development.
The United States had failed to properly publicize its commendable activities in
Latin America. As a short-term solution, the National Security Council decided
on 28 May to make “depicting the range, depth, and freedom of U.S. culture; dem-
onstrating U.S. dedication to the preservation of political and personal freedoms;
and publicizing U.S. developments in the fields of science and applied technol-
ogy” a high U.S. government priority.11 Three weeks later, President Eisenhower
ordered the National Security Council to conduct a large-scale, comprehensive
review of U.S. policy toward Latin America.12
Before the NSC finished its work, the Cuban Revolution challenged the United
States in the Caribbean, the zone of greatest U.S. influence in the Americas. In Janu-
ary 1959 antigovernment forces in Cuba dislodged Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista.
During 1959 and 1960, revolutionaries—consolidated under the control of Fidel
Castro—worked to dismantle the prevailing Cuban order through measures such
as land reform, social programs, and the expropriation of foreign assets. Since its
invasion of the island during the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States
had been closely bound to the pre-revolutionary system. Castro’s assault, there-
fore, necessarily evolved into an anti-American campaign. Gradually, through ac-
tions and reactions, the Cuban-American confrontation escalated. In August 1959
inter-American foreign ministers met in Santiago, Chile, to discuss the Caribbean

situation, including allegations that Castro was working to export his revolution to
surrounding countries, notably the Dominican Republic, where long-time dictator
General Rafael Trujillo remained in power. The meetings produced a flurry of dip-
lomatic correspondence and new attention to inter-American human rights but did
not mend U.S.-Cuban relations. In fact, soon thereafter, Castro formed an economic
and political partnership with the Soviet Union, establishing formal diplomatic rela-
tions with Moscow in April 1960, the same month Lleras visited the United States.
To eliminate the communist threat in Cuba, President Eisenhower turned to the
Central Intelligence Agency. Having toppled the government of Guatemala in 1954,
U.S. operatives began training Cuban exiles to “liberate” their island, a covert pro-
gram that culminated in the Bay of Pigs fiasco one year later. Meanwhile, as the
revolution became more radical, evidenced through the expropriation of U.S. assets,
Washington imposed economic countermeasures, including the October 1960 em-
bargo. In January 1961 Cuba and the United States ended diplomatic relations.13
The Cuban Revolution added urgency to the remaking of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration’s Latin American policy. Ordered by the president in 1958 and adopted
in February 1959, NSC report 5902/1 acknowledged that “Latin America plays a key
role in the security of the United States,” and “the long term security of the United
States requires the maintenance of harmonious relations with the other American
republics.” The paper recognized the legitimacy of Latin America’s major post–
World War II criticism of the United States. Washington “had neglected” the region
“while devoting attention and resources to more distant areas.” The study then pro-
posed that the United States deal with Latin America “primarily as an underdevel-
oped area.” Latin American “aspirations for higher living standards, more industri-
alization, and popularly-based governments are rising more rapidly than they are
being satisfied.” To improve U.S.–Latin American relations, the United States must
encourage the “evolutionary development of democratic governments” and pro-
mote “sound and growing economies capable of providing rising living standards
within the general framework of a free enterprise system.” The paper recommended
new U.S. political, economic, social, and security programs in the Americas to raise
the quality of life abroad, revitalize inter-American solidarity, and limit communist
influence in the Western Hemisphere. Without such encouragement, NSC 5902/1
warned that ongoing social, economic, and political deprivation would produce
conditions fundamentally hostile to U.S. national security. Also, from a material
perspective, the United States might need strong Latin American industries to re-
build in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. American policy
toward Latin American would serve humanitarian and security purposes.14
Concurrent with the rewriting of U.S. policy, changing American attitudes al-
tered U.S. positions on several important matters, many before the president ap-
proved NSC 5902/1. Just after the Nixon tour, Washington ended its long-standing
opposition to commodity agreements. In 1958 U.S. and Latin American officials

formed a multinational review group to explore ways to stabilize raw material
prices. Soon thereafter, the United States signed several inter-American commod-
ity agreements, including a September 1959 accord that fixed coffee prices through
international production controls. In July and August 1958, Milton Eisenhower
traveled to Central America to assess the area’s economic and political needs.15
When he returned to Washington, the Eisenhower administration announced its
support for the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), which Latin Ameri-
cans had pushed for since World War II. Hemispheric officials approved the bank’s
charter in April 1959. U.S. officials agreed to furnish 45 percent of the bank’s $1
billion capital. In another concession to Latin American interests, Washington
allowed the bank to make some soft loans. The scheme allowed Latin Americans
to repay borrowed U.S. dollars with local currency, thus saving Latin American
dollar reserves for other uses. Then, in February and March 1960, the president
went to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. In each capital, Eisenhower dis-
cussed, among other things, Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek’s Operation
Pan America, a $40 billion inter-American development plan analogous to Mar-
shall Plan for European reconstruction. Unveiled by the Brazilians a few days
after Nixon’s encounter in Caracas, American officials gradually accepted aspects
of the “far sighted initiative” as U.S. policy.16 Referencing Operation Pan America,
Eisenhower formed the Social Progress Trust Fund in July. Through the IADB,
the U.S.-sponsored fund provided $500 million in loans for housing, health, edu-
cation, and land-reform programs in Latin America. These initiatives, together
with Washington’s endorsement of a Central American Common Market, made
the September 1960 meeting of inter-American economic officials in Bogotá one
of the friendliest hemispheric conferences since 1945. Latin Americans praised
the new U.S. programs and pledged to enact structural reforms to capitalize on
U.S. economic assistance.17
Between 1958 and 1960, the United States launched major new initiatives in
Latin America. During the early cold war, American authorities offered trade and
private investments as solutions to Latin American underdevelopment. After 1958
the Eisenhower administration embraced direct U.S. support, including funding
for the IADB and Social Progress Trust Fund that foreshowed the coming of Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy’s (1961–63) Alliance for Progress. In the United States, the
administration’s revised approach to inter-American relations received resound-
ing approval. Indeed, certain opponents of U.S. aid for Latin America, such as
Secretary Humphrey, had left government by 1958. Newly elected congressional
Democrats, who controlled the U.S. Congress, including Eugene McCarthy and
Edmund Muskie, supported the administration’s economic and social programs
in Latin America. Aside from its humanitarian aspects, U.S. policy contained im-
portant national security provisions. Through political, economic, and military
assistance, American officials hoped to eliminate the conditions upon which com-
munists thrived. At the same time, U.S. policymakers identified Latin American
representative governments as most responsive to changing regional needs. The
United States, therefore, could no longer rely on foreign dictators to control com-
munism. For this reason, the Eisenhower administration decided to “give special
encouragement” to states “striving toward the establishment of representative and
democratic” systems, countries such as Colombia.18
The National Front, 1958–1960
Colombia’s democratic revival coincided with the remaking of U.S. policy toward
Latin America. During the early 1950s, former president Alfonso López proposed a
bipartisan power-sharing arrangement as a solution to the country’s political prob-
lems. President Laureano Gómez rejected the scheme, which he considered a Lib-
eral ploy to rob Conservatives of their hard-won political victory. Yet the political
coalition that toppled General Rojas Pinilla resuscitated the National Front plan in
1957. In Spain on 20 July Gómez and Lleras signed the Sitges Pact, which described
and formalized the new political arrangement. Approved by a nationwide referen-
dum on 1 December 1957, the National Front system provided for a sixteen-year
bipartisan government. It split elected and appointed posts evenly between the two
parties and alternated the four-year presidency between a Liberal officeholder and
a Conservative one. The arrangement also evenly divided legislative seats between
the two political organizations. Slates of Liberal and Conservative candidates
would compete to represent their party. To ensure parity, Colombian political lead-
ers increased the size of Congress, department assemblies, and local councils. As it
played out during the 1960s and 1970s, the consociational government diffused the
Liberal-Conservative discord that had nearly wrecked the country but altered the
dynamics of Colombian democracy. Colombian politics became noticeably less
exciting, and the arrangement created structural barriers to third party organiza-
tion.19 Still, the “mandatory bipartisanship,” an American journalist concluded,
was “a novel and interesting solution” to years of political conflict.20
At first, most observers believed that Guillermo León Valencia would be the ini-
tial National Front president. Valencia had, after all, been the bipartisan candidate
selected to challenge General Rojas, and National Front leaders had agreed that the
first president should be a Conservative. But Laureano Gómez harbored misgiv-
ings. The former president believed Valencia too closely associated with the ospini-
sta wing of the Conservative Party, which Gómez blamed for deposing him in 1953.
When the Gómez faction dominated Conservative Party returns in the March 1958
congressional elections, the once-discredited strongman was positioned to select
the Conservative candidate for the May presidential election. After canvassing the
country for a more suitable candidate, Gómez surprised the country when he de-
cided on Alberto Lleras, a Liberal. Politically brilliant, Gómez’s choice placed a
gifted public servant in the country’s highest office at a defining moment in Co-
lombian history. Indeed, in an open letter published by El Siglo, Gómez argued
that Lleras’s “ability, impartiality, and honesty” were the essential qualifications for
a bipartisan president.21 Also, by selecting a Liberal, the Conservative leader guar-
anteed that his party would select three (not two) National Front presidents: Lleras
and the two Conservatives. Amid instabilities connected to a failed coup by Rojas
loyalists, Lleras won the presidency on 4 May 1958 with nearly 2.5 million votes.
Jorge Leyva, a candidate sponsored by disgruntled Conservatives, gathered 614,861
ballots.22 “The junta and the army,” the U.S. embassy reported, “gave a splendid
demonstration to have an orderly election,” returning the country to civilian rule.23
As president of the Colombian Senate, Laureano Gómez administered the oath of
office to Alberto Lleras on 7 August 1958.
A man of extraordinary talent and experience, Alberto Lleras was an excellent
choice for the Colombian presidency. Born in Bogotá, July 1906, he left school at the
age of seventeen to become a journalist. He worked as a chief editor at El Tiempo
from 1929 to 1934. Lleras later founded the daily paper El Liberal and the magazine
Semana, Colombia’s equivalent of Time. During the early 1930s, he served as the
Liberal Party’s secretary general and congressional delegate from Bogotá. He held
important positions during the first and second López administrations, including
secretary to the president, minister of government, and ambassador to the United
States. As the Colombian foreign minister, he represented the republic at the Mexico
City and San Francisco conferences in 1945. At those meetings, he emerged as the
leading Latin American advocate of the inter-American system, multilateralism,
and collective security. When López resigned in 1945, Lleras served briefly as presi-
dent before turning the office over to Ospina in 1946, a difficult transition that he
handled in a dignified manner. In 1947 he moved to Washington to become the Pan
American Union’s director general. He then served as the first secretary general of
the Organization of American States. In that capacity, he solidified his reputation
as an outstanding inter-American statesman. The position also separated him from
the intense Colombian political fighting of the early 1950s. Relatively untarnished by
la Violencia, Lleras returned to Colombia in 1954 when he accepted the presidency
of the University of the Andes. A major opponent of the Rojas government, Lleras
became an organizer of Liberal-Conservative rapprochement in 1956 and 1957. Fifty-
two years old upon election, the hard-working Lleras was a moderate, measured,
and intelligent man of great integrity, respected by Liberals and Conservatives. By
U.S. estimates, Alberto Lleras was “one of Latin America’s most respected public fig-
ures and probably the greatest statesman modern Colombia has produced.”24
The Colombian president needed his considerable abilities to guide the re-
public back to economic, political, social, and constitutional stability. “He has
inherited a virtually bankrupt government, a frightful situation of wide-spread

violence in the countryside, [and] a country exhausted by ten years of bitter par-
tisan strife,” John Moors Cabot, U.S. ambassador to Colombia since July 1957,
sympathetically reported in 1958.25 While these problems were all interrelated,
Lleras and other leaders believed residual domestic violence posed the greatest
threat to Colombia. In August 1957, therefore, top officials from both parties pub-
licly rejected the use of violence for political gain.26 The election of the National
Front government in 1958 furthered Liberal-Conservative reconciliation. Indeed,
the coalition experiment ended la Violencia as a political competition, since no
amount of killing would gain either side a political advantage. In some regions,
however, years passed before these national political developments affected be-
havior. A U.S. representative to the Lleras inauguration in August 1958 observed
that “the hatred between” Conservatives and Liberals remained “appalling and
unbelievable,” penetrating “all levels of [Colombian] society.”27
Lleras devoted considerable attention to the violence during his inaugural ad-
dress. He then extended the military junta’s amnesty program through July 1959.
The president dispatched the republic’s most talented officials to govern difficult
departments (such as Tolima), and by October 1959 the Colombian Army had
deployed 1,200 U.S.-trained rangers to fight organized guerrilla groups. Still, in
mid-1959 Lleras’s special bipartisan commission on the violence confirmed that
the disorder had not ended. It recommended government-sponsored economic
and social rehabilitation efforts in the regions most heavily punished by a decade
of conflict. Over the months that followed, the initiative achieved some success
but proved expensive and susceptible to the very problem it sought to remedy,
as demonstrated in December 1959 when bandits butchered twenty government
workers in Quindío. Overall, annual violence-related deaths dropped 75 percent
between from 1956 and 1959, but lawlessness and banditry continued. Over 2,000
Colombians died from the incessant fighting each year between 1957 and 1963.
Given the ongoing internal security dilemma, Colombian political leaders rec-
ognized the vital importance of the Colombian armed forces to the success of the
National Front. Without loyal servicemen, the coalition government would fail.
From 1957 to 1958 the junta’s performance showed the sincerity of the military’s
commitment to civilian rule. Certain officers nonetheless feared returning to
civilian control. They worried that elected officials would prosecute the armed
forces for Rojas-era abuses. Indeed, at the Colombian War College graduation the
day before General Rojas retired, gloom, uncertainty, and dejection prevailed.28
Major cuts in the military’s budget, which began during the junta period, also
concerned some military leaders. Understanding the delicacy of civil-military re-
lations, President-elect Lleras defused these tensions in a remarkable address to
the Colombian officer corps on 9 May 1958. The future of the republic, he said,
depended on the military’s subordination to civilian authority. He then asked
military leaders to remain nonpartisan. Yet, rather than turning away from their
Rojas-era state-building mission, the Colombian armed forces must operate as a
source of national stability. In return for their loyalty to the constitution, Lleras
promised to respect the military, defend it against critics, and employ it only in
the best interests of the republic.29 The officers responded with a mixture of relief
and enthusiasm. The entire exchange embodied Lleras’s “political astuteness and
statesmanlike candor”; it significantly advanced the partnership between Colom-
bian soldiers and politicians.30
In the years that followed, civil-military cooperation protected the National
Front government and defended the military’s reputation. Subordinate to civil-
ian authorities, the Colombian armed forces supported the Lleras administration,
removing a potential threat to reemerging democratic institutions. Additionally,
Colombian service members, overwhelmingly loyal, deflected two 1958 attempts
by Rojas loyalists, some uniformed officers, to derail the bipartisan arrangement.
The military also remained idle when, after Rojas returned to Colombia, the Sen-
ate launched a trial of their former commander, a public display that found the
deposed dictator guilty of corruption, abuse of power, and other “unworthy acts.”31
The Lleras administration, with few exceptions, refused to pursue allegations of
military misconduct dating to the 1953 to 1957 period, thereby upholding the
tacit agreement Lleras outlined in May 1958.32 At the same time, President Lleras
and other National Front officials publicly praised the armed forces in an effort
to rebuild the military’s domestic prestige. General Rojas, not the military, had
rendered an injustice upon Colombia, the president argued in a major address in
January 1960.
Simultaneously, the National Front government changed the basic mission of
the Colombian armed forces. The major threat to the country, Lleras recognized,
lay within. Rather than preparing to repel foreign armies, the Colombian military
must become an effective internal security instrument. Colombian servicemen took
some important steps in this direction during the mid-1950s, but President Lleras
asked Colombian officers to concentrate on internal security. Indeed, in 1959 the
president directly challenged the Colombian Army to “keep abreast” of changing
trends in warfare.33 It must, he said, reform its tactics, doctrine, and organization
to enhance its counterinsurgency capabilities. Although a commitment to conven-
tional defense lingered, key officers accepted their new mission. In April 1960 the
Colombian War College held a one-month symposium for senior military officers
on the future of the Colombian armed forces. According the secretary to the min-
ister of war, Brigadier General Alberto Rueda Teran, the attendees concluded that
“the primary role of the Colombian Army is now internal security.”34
Beyond violence and civil-military relations, the National Front confronted a
major economic crisis. By 1958 poor coffee returns and Rojas-era overspending
had wrecked the Colombian economy. Advancing the work of the junta, the Lle-
ras administration slashed government spending, reduced military expenditures,

and revised the country’s tax structure. Bogotá adopted monetary and exchange
reforms to strengthen Colombia’s credit abroad and attract new investments. Be-
lieving that corruption and poor bureaucratic organization had contributed to
the financial crisis, Congress passed the Administrative Reform Bill in December
1958. The president later formed the National Administrative Reform Commis-
sion to reorganize government functions and facilitate economic development.
The National Front also adopted measures to control inflation, raise per capita
income, and lower the cost of living.35 Committed to austerity, Colombian of-
ficials limited spending on social programs during the late 1950s, leaving many
critical economic questions unanswered. During a time when the country needed
ambitious, government-sponsored modernization projects, federal authorities in-
creased funding only for education. Wanting to redistribute land to needy Co-
lombians, Lleras pushed for land reform, but Conservative and Liberal legislators
settled for a protracted political debate, denying the administration necessary leg-
islation—which emphasized colonization over expropriation—until late 1961.36
Identifying Colombia’s long-term economic needs, Colombian planners devel-
oped the Platform for Economic Development and Social Welfare in 1960. The
four-year plan married investment, technical assistance, and social programs into
a coordinated countrywide development strategy. To implement the platform,
Colombians needed U.S. assistance. If the economic hardship continued, Lleras
warned, the “Colombian people will lose faith in democracy,” with potentially
disastrous implications for both countries.37
Diplomatic, Economic, and Cultural Relations, 1958–1960
A confluence of extraordinary events during the late 1950s produced a period of

concentrated Colombian-American cooperation. Indeed, inter-American turbu-
lence, the revitalization of Colombian democracy, and the revision U.S. policy to-
ward Latin America produced major changes in the bilateral alliance. Both govern-
ments wanted to stabilize Colombia and its democratic institutions. To do otherwise
would invite chaos in the strategically located country. The “life and development”
of Colombia and the United States were “closely bound,” Colombian military junta
chief General París observed in June 1958. Nixon’s difficulties in South America,
he explained, exposed the interrelatedness of U.S.-Colombian fortunes; the two
countries must collaborate to achieve shared goals.38 U.S. officials agreed with the
general’s assessment. “At the present time,” Ambassador Cabot wrote in 1958, “the
most important” American objective in Colombia “is unquestionably to keep the
democratic government, which has just been installed, on an even keel.”39 Am-
bassador Dempster McIntosh, who replaced Cabot in July 1959, believed that the
United States must “help promote belief and confidence in a democratic form of
government and in democratic institutions” through political, military, and eco-
nomic assistance.40 A key partner since 1939, Colombia became a major beneficiary
of Washington’s new policy toward Latin America.
At the highest levels, Colombian-American diplomatic cooperation revealed
the ongoing compatibility of bilateral interests. In its foreign relations, the Lleras
administration advanced the principles of multilateralism, inter-American soli-
darity, and anticommunism. Lleras believed communism was inherently hostile to
Colombian society and culture. Soviet-inspired international communism sought
to bring “disaster to the Christian and democratic world,” he explained in June
1959.41 Victory in the cold war against communism, Lleras added, depended on
the coordinated efforts of democratic countries, among which Colombia could
again claim legitimate membership. As president, he openly criticized the Soviet
Union and Communist China. In the United Nations, Colombian diplomats, sit-
ting on the UN Security Council, provided key leadership during the 1958 crises
in Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits. Colombians defended Washington when the
United States lost a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. They blamed Moscow for
subsequent collapse of the Paris Summit between President Eisenhower and Soviet
premier Nikita Khrushchev. But the situation in Cuba, above all, exemplified U.S.-
Colombian diplomatic cooperation.
During the late 1950s, Bogotá emerged as a strong opponent of the Cuban
Revolution. From the beginning, Lleras feared that Cuban agents would penetrate
Colombian guerrilla groups and extend their revolution to South America, which
Cubans, in fact, did in 1964 through their partnership with Colombia’s National
Liberation Army (ELN). Behind the scenes, Colombian officials encouraged the
Eisenhower administration to take strong action against the Cuban revolutionar-
ies. After a short period of sympathy for the anti-Batista movement, Colombian
journalists echoed the president’s sentiment. In 1960 an El Espectador editorial
warned that Castro had become “a pawn of the Soviets.”42 El Tiempo suggested
that Castro had “betrayed the revolution” through his affiliation with commu-
nists.43 When Bogotá ended diplomatic relations with Havana in December 1961,
the only criticism came from Conservatives. The administration, they charged,
had moved too slowly.44 In 1960 and 1961 Colombian diplomats developed an
inter-American strategy for dealing with the Castro government. In doing so,
Colombians even hinted at the possibility of a multinational military operation
against Cuba. At the August 1961 Punta del Este Conference in Uruguay, the Co-
lombian proposal received international attention. It eventually led to the suspen-
sion of Cuba from the Organization of American States.45
Allied against communism, Colombian and U.S. officials extended their bilat-
eral intelligence cooperation into the National Front period. As they had since 1939,
the two countries shared information on the activities of foreign nationals deemed
threatening to inter-American security. Bogotá and Washington were especially

interested in the activities of Cuban revolutionaries. In this regard, the Lleras gov-
ernment faced the additional burden of rebuilding the national intelligence service,
which had been decimated by personnel turnover when the military government
collapsed in 1957. To strengthen the National Front, U.S. advisers provided advice
and training to Colombian agents during the late 1950s.46 The U.S. embassy staff
also supported the Lleras government by sharing extraordinary information it had
collected on Colombian internal affairs. In late 1958, U.S. personnel in Colombia
uncovered a cabal of Rojas supporters planning to overthrow the coalition govern-
ment. In December the U.S. ambassador delivered the complete portfolio of U.S.
intelligence to the Colombian president, detailed information Lleras used to foil
the coup. “I suppose that this is interference in their internal affairs,” Ambassador
Cabot recalled, but “it would have been a major disaster for Colombia and for our
relations with Colombia” if the National Front government collapsed.47
Colombia’s economic disorder likewise threatened the National Front govern-
ment. U.S. and Colombian officials, in turn, devoted special attention to Colom-
bian economic matters. To rescue Colombia from economic chaos, Ambassador
Cabot, an influential former assistant secretary of state, persuaded many U.S. pol-
icymakers to think about Colombia as a showcase for U.S. economic assistance.
“It would . . . be most unfortunate, under the social and economic circumstances
now existing here,” Cabot argued, “to continue to place on private trade and pri-
vate investment the emphasis we have placed on them in the past.”48 The United
States needed to give Colombia direct U.S. economic support. In Washington,
the Eisenhower administration, open to direct assistance after the Nixon tour,
decided that the United States must support Colombia for geopolitical, regional
security, and humanitarian reasons. A Korean War ally and promising democ-
racy, Colombia received an impressive $500 million in U.S. economic assistance
between 1957 and 1960.
The massive infusion began in May 1957, just days after Rojas resigned, when
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loaned the military junta $125 million.
Two months later, the Eisenhower administration approved a $60 million Ex-
port-Import Bank credit for Colombia; $27 million in supplemental assistance
from private American firms raised the package to $87 million.49 In April 1958 a
delegation of Colombian economic experts, led by former presidents López and
Ospina, traveled to Washington to review the country’s economic situation.50
Wrestling with the implications of Vice President Nixon’s tour, the Eisenhower
administration soon decided to send more aid to Colombia. In May 1958 the
Banco de la República secured $105 million from U.S. lending institutions. In June
Washington dispatched $78 million in direct assistance. The International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development approved a $10 million loan for a Colom-
bian hydroelectric facility in December. Then, from 1959 to 1960 the United States
pumped another $80 million into Colombia for transportation, communication,

educational, medical, and sanitation projects.51 U.S. economic advisers helped the
National Front capitalize on the U.S. assistance. They worked alongside Colom-
bian experts on a variety of industrial, agricultural, transportation, and sanitation
projects. American economists also helped National Front planners produce the
Platform for Economic Development and Social Welfare. In total, U.S. economic
assistance promoted stability in Colombia by financing international debts, gov-
ernment reform, public works, and essential imports.
As Colombia’s economic situation steadily improved, Colombian authorities
gradually resolved the problem of religious violence in Colombia, a source of bi-
lateral discord since the late 1940s. Before Lleras, U.S. diplomats had frequently
protested the treatment Protestants in Colombia, particularly attacks on American
missionaries and the closing of Protestant churches. Since the U.S. approach pro-
duced no change in Colombia, Washington adopted a less confrontational posi-
tion during the first years of the Lleras presidency. Colombian officials “flagrantly
violated” the principle of religious freedom, Ambassador Cabot observed, but the
United States should avoid confrontation with the National Front government.52
In January 1959 President Lleras ordered government investigators to study the
plight of “religious minorities” in Colombia during la Violencia. Released later
that year, the government’s report confirmed the seriousness of religious fight-
ing in Colombia. Between 1947 and 1959 Colombian Catholics had destroyed 88
Protestant churches and murdered 114 Protestants in purely religious violence.53
Although committed to religious freedom, Lleras decided to maintain many of
the restrictions on missionary activities imposed during the Rojas period. Dra-
matic change, he feared, would disrupt the bipartisan coalition government and
encourage new violence. Indeed, elements of the Conservative Party and Catholic
Church remained attached to the prevailing arrangement. In 1960, encouraged
by spreading domestic tranquility, the Lleras administration gradually began re-
opening Protestant churches and missions. By the mid-1960s the problems of re-
ligious freedom in Colombia had largely disappeared from U.S.-Colombian cor-
respondence.54
As the bilateral religious controversy waned, Colombia and the United States
expanded cultural relations. In 1958 American authorities concluded that poor
public diplomacy contributed to Nixon’s trouble in South America. Indeed, re-
calling his visit to Bogotá, the vice president told the National Security Council
that “leaders of Colombia were perfectly well aware of all the assistance which the
United States had provided and was providing,” but “the people of Colombia, the
ordinary run of people, were not aware of such U.S. assistance.”55 The Eisenhower
administration, therefore, expanded cultural activities throughout Latin America
to explain U.S. government policies, publicize American foreign assistance, and
highlight shared inter-American values and experiences. In Colombia, the Ful-
bright program quickened the pace of educational exchanges. U.S.-sponsored cul-

tural centers expanded their work; the U.S. embassy in Bogotá launched a public
relations campaign to increase public awareness of American assistance activities
and the historical significance of U.S.-Colombian cooperation, including the Ko-
rean War partnership. Ambassador Cabot regularly met with Colombian students
to discuss issues ranging from Latin American economic development to racial
segregation in the American south. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra, San
Francisco Ballet, U.S. National Symphony, and other performance groups visited
the South American republic during the late 1950s. The Colombian National Sym-
phony and Ibagué Choral Society toured the United States. Finally, there were
several high-profile meetings between Colombian and American political, mil-
itary, and business leaders. None matched the lasting importance of President
Lleras’s state visit in April 1960.56
Wanting to show its support for Colombia’s representative government, the
Eisenhower administration asked Lleras to come to the United States in Novem-
ber 1958. The fragility of the National Front coalition and administrative duties,
however, forced the Colombian president to delay. When Lleras finally arrived, on
5 April 1960, the U.S. president, secretary of state, army chief of staff, and other dig-
nitaries greeted the Colombian presidential party. At National Airport, President
Eisenhower praised Lleras and the National Front. The reconstruction of constitu-
tional government in Colombia, he said, gratified Americans.57 At a White House
dinner that evening, Eisenhower discussed Colombia’s Korean War contribution as
a “bright” and “inspirational” moment in the history of the Colombian-American
collaboration.58 On Wednesday, 6 April, Lleras met with IBRD president Eugene
Black, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, and President Eisenhower. Those
conversations covered issues of mutual interest, including U.S.–Latin American
economic cooperation, military relations, Cuba, and differences in Colombian and
U.S. democratic practices.59 That afternoon, President Lleras delivered his forty-
minute presentation to a joint session of the U.S. Congress.
Inside the U.S. capitol, American legislators greeted the president with re-
sounding applause; Lleras shook hands with lawmakers as he walked toward the
podium. Flanked by Vice President Nixon and House Speaker Samuel Rayburn,
President Lleras first talked about inter-American relations since the beginning
of World War II. The American republics, he declared, were interdependent en-
tities, “partners in the most effective enterprise for the elimination of war, for
collective defense, and for peaceful cooperation.” He expressed his admiration
for the American people and their democratic institutions, then praised U.S. ef-
forts “to maintain the peace and security of the world,” reaffirming Colombia’s
willingness—shown during the Korean War—to fight alongside the United States
against “despotism and misery.” The Latin American republics, he continued, had
entered a period of rapid social, economic, and political change. Acknowledging
the interrelatedness of U.S.–Latin American fortunes, the president urged the U.S.
Congress to help the region “purchase a decisive stake in the material civilization
of the West” before Latin American underdevelopment became “a retreat, a rout,
a historical disaster.” Ending his speech, Lleras professed Colombia’s “undeviat-
ing friendship” for the United States, “proven in our time by a long, respectful,
rewarding, and reciprocal collaboration.” That pattern of Colombian-American
fidelity, Lleras predicted, would continue “without impairment into the future.”60
The U.S. legislators responded with a thunderous, standing ovation.
The following morning, 7 April, the Colombian president discussed bilateral
issues with American government officials before a noontime appearance at the
OAS headquarters. Then, between 2:30 and 5:30 p.m. the two presidents flew aboard
a U.S. helicopter to Camp David, the presidential retreat in rural Maryland, and
the Eisenhower farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. During that trip, the men held
candid conversations on topics ranging from military policy to coffee production.
On 8 April President Lleras traveled to Baltimore, where Milton Eisenhower, John
Hopkins University’s new president, awarded him an honorary law degree. From
11 to 12 April, President Lleras visited New York City. He addressed the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, met the UN secretary general, toured the
New York Times offices, and consulted with Pan American Coffee Bureau officials.
On 13 April the Colombian president moved to Florida, where he appeared at a
Colombian art display at the University of Miami. Just before leaving the United
States on 17 April, Lleras thanked Eisenhower for the tremendous reception and
reiterated his commitment “to cooperate closely and fraternally” with the United
States in defense of their “common political concepts” and economic interests.61
“Dr. Lleras Camargo,” an American journalist wrote, “is an outstanding example
of the enlightened, liberal Latin American statesman with whom we will need to
cooperate closely if we are to see a substantial improvement in our relations with
the republics of the south.”62 Unknown to the writer, Lleras, aside from setting the
standard for Latin American statesmanship, had also quietly altered the U.S.-Co-
lombian security relationship during his visit.
Military Relations, 1958–1960
Between 1958 and 1960, Colombian and U.S. officials prepared an internal security
program for the South American republic that changed the course of bilateral mili-
tary relations. The notion that U.S. foreign military assistance might promote tran-
quility in developing countries had fermented in Washington since 1953. Indeed,
Colombian-American military relations gradually began emphasizing domestic
stability and state-building activities during the mid-1950s. Within the adminis-
tration, after 1958, most U.S. policymakers supported overseas internal security
projects. Following the Nixon trip, on 28 May 1958, an NSC subgroup dealing with
Latin America concluded that “factors such as unstable political systems, ultra-
nationalist sentiment, inadequate internal security forces, poverty and unstable
economic conditions, are susceptible to exploitation by communists.” Therefore,
the U.S. government “should assist in strengthening the internal security forces
in selected countries.”63 The Cuban Revolution greatly heightened U.S. interest in
Latin American internal security. Guerrilla forces on the Caribbean island seemed
to offer a model for communist action in the Western Hemisphere. In February
1959, six weeks after Castro seized Havana, Eisenhower instructed U.S. government
agencies to “proceed as feasible in selected countries with the implementation of
the program for strengthening the capabilities of the local public safety forces and
[other] activities necessary to maintain internal security and to render ineffective
the communist apparatus.” The major caveat accounted for lessons connected to
Nixon’s experience. That is, the United States should still “take into account the
dangers of U.S. association with local public safety forces which adopt extra-legal
and repressive measures repugnant to a free society.”64
In January 1960 the State Department produced a paper, “A New Concept for
Hemispheric Defense and Development,” that embodied the modified U.S. ap-
proach to inter-American security relations. Winning widespread support within
the administration, the report argued that the United States, “in conformity with
the realities of the nuclear age,” must accept “responsibility for the defense of Latin
America against external aggression.” The U.S. government should encourage the
Latin American republics to “conserve resources” by eliminating “programs in
which Latin American forces are unrealistically associated in continental defense
roles.” American officials should also “influence Latin American military leaders
toward greater emphasis on maintaining intra-hemispheric peace and contribut-
ing to the internal development of their countries.”65 Washington wanted leaner,
more efficient Latin American militaries focused on regional development and
internal security. President Eisenhower made the U.S. position known during his
visit to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in early 1960. An August 1960 meet-
ing among U.S. and Latin American military officials in the Canal Zone reinforced
these U.S. objectives, and by September the administration described overseas in-
ternal security as “a priority objective” in U.S.–Latin American relations.66
Yet outside the administration, foreign military assistance became the subject
of public and congressional scrutiny in 1958. The U.S. emphasis on “suppressive
police and military action” in Latin America, a Los Angeles Times writer claimed,
encouraged anti-Americanism abroad.67 Saddling Latin Americans with hemi-
spheric defense duties, others argued, retarded regional economic development. In
May 1958 Democratic senator Olin Johnson described MAP grant aid as a “global
giveaway” that promoted “mischief and mistrust in the world and caused us to be
scorned as suckers and in some instances strengthened our ideological enemies.”68
Republican senator William E. Jenner wanted to cancel all U.S. foreign military
assistance. “Riddled with inefficiency, stupidity, waste,” he said in June, the mu-
tual security program was an “outrageous invasion of the sovereign independence
of friendly nations” that squandered “our own people’s earnings.”69 That summer,
the Eisenhower administration defended the foreign military assistance proposal
against congressional critics. Although ultimately unable to dismantle the military
aid program, legislators routinely badgered administration officials over U.S. for-
eign military policy, reiterating restrictions on U.S. aid. Democratic senator Wayne
Morse, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee chair, secured an amendment to
the Mutual Security Act of 1958 that reaffirmed the limits on MAP aid: foreign
governments could not use grant assistance for internal security purposes.70 The
Morse provision required a formal, presidential order to bypass the law.
In November 1958, to allay congressional critics, Eisenhower formed a spe-
cial committee to review U.S. foreign military aid programs. Loaded with retired
U.S. military officers and directed by General William H. Draper, the commis-
sion predictably endorsed foreign military assistance. In its August 1959 report,
the Draper Committee also found a strong correlation between military aid and
socioeconomic development. It suggested that U.S. aid might simultaneously
promote Latin American security and development through what would become
known as “civic-action” enterprises. Unmoved by the report, congressional skep-
ticism continued unabated.
When the administration’s new foreign aid bill reached Congress in February
1960, detractors such as Democratic senator James William Fulbright criticized its
“absence of initiative, originality, and long-term provisions.”71 Senators Morse and
George Aiken, the latter a Republican, blasted the administration for exceeding a
congressionally imposed spending limit on military assistance to Latin America.72
The Eisenhower team responded with a coordinated domestic public relations
campaign. “Collective defense is not only sensible—it is essential,” Eisenhower
wrote to Congress.73 “Hemispheric cooperation is the natural outgrowth of inter-
dependence,” Assistant Secretary Rubottom told an audience in Wisconsin.74 “At
this highly dangerous point in history,” Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dil-
lon told Congress, the United States needed to support friendly countries to block
“communist dreams of world domination.”75 Secretary Herter added: “Military
strength is an imperative not only to prevent [communist] expansion by force but
to create an atmosphere of security and confidence within which the basic prob-
lems of human betterment can be attacked. Thus our efforts in the Mutual Security
Program have high purposes.”76 In May 1960 the U.S. Congress conceded by pass-
ing Eisenhower’s foreign assistance legislation, but lawmakers did not remove the
standing limitations on U.S. military grant aid.
For Colombia and the United States, the Eisenhower administration’s open-
ness to internal security projects and Colombian domestic affairs converged to
remake bilateral military relations. In Colombia, the National Front government,

having reintroduced democratic practices, looked to the United States for internal
security assistance. President Lleras wanted the Colombian military to become
an internal security force to combat domestic disorder. By 1960 Colombian mili-
tary officers had accepted the president’s challenge. The National Front austerity
program, however, left the Lleras administration unable to fund certain essential
internal security activities. At the same time, determined to support Colombia’s
representative system, U.S. officials recognized the need to improve internal secu-
rity in Colombia. “In the military field, Colombia’s immediate problem is to slap
down the violence which is so terribly prevalent in various parts of the country,”
Ambassador Cabot wrote in 1958. “While military measures alone will probably
not suffice to suppress the violence, it will certainly not be suppressed without
them.”77 The United States, Ambassador McIntosh added in 1959, must “support
and assure the continuance, in whatever ways may be possible, of the present
democratic government of Colombia,” including appropriate assistance to “Co-
lombia in combating and preventing the spread of communism.”78
The composition and organization of the U.S. military missions in Colombia
reflected changing U.S.-Colombian priorities. During the Rojas era, Colombian of-
ficials dramatically enlarged the presence of U.S. advisers, most focused on conven-
tional defense activities. Limiting federal spending, the Lleras government could
not afford large foreign military missions. Colombian and American officials, there-
fore, agreed to reduce the number of U.S. advisers serving in Colombia. In 1958 the
two countries cut the number of permanent U.S. naval advisers from twenty-one to
eleven; the U.S. Air Force mission shed a comparable percentage of its personnel.79
Colombians trimmed fewer advisers from the U.S. Army mission, but reordered
their expertise to connect with prevailing Colombian Army needs. American ser-
vicemen working with Colombian tank units, for example, returned to the United
States. American logistics, engineering, and counterinsurgency experts stayed—or
appeared—in Colombia.80 To help the National Front retain necessary advisory
support, the Eisenhower administration rewrote the mission contract’s financial
clauses in early 1959. New payment and benefits provisions allowed Colombians
to reimburse the United States in pesos, permitting Colombia to retain scarce U.S.
dollars.81
For financial reasons, Colombian enrollment in U.S. service schools also de-
clined during the late 1950s. Since students drew their salaries in U.S. dollars while
training at American schools, Bogotá was financially unable to send larger num-
bers of Colombian servicemen abroad. In 1959 the Colombian Navy filled just
fifteen of sixty-eight available openings at U.S. schools.82 “While in previous years
Colombia has sent many students to school in the United States and Canal Zone,”
U.S. Air Force mission chief Colonel Gerald M. Clungston reported in 1958, “their
participation in these training programs has been sharply reduced because of lack
of dollars.”83 “The training of military personnel in the United States,” assistant

U.S. Army mission chief Lieutenant Colonel Lowell Pickett observed in 1959, “was
a lesser program than in previous years.”84 The educational opportunities Colom-
bians did pursue reflected their changing national security priorities. Many of the
slots in conventional warfare went unfilled while courses applicable to national
development and domestic security remained well attended.85 Still, Ambassador
Cabot lamented, “it is unfortunate that Colombia will have so little money avail-
able in the foreseeable future for the training of officers and non-com[missioned
officer]s in the United States” since “this training not only increased the efficiency
of those who receive it, but increased their friendliness for the United States and
imbues them with the idea of democratic, non-partisan service which has hereto-
fore so often been lacking in Latin American armed services.”86
As military advisory and educational programs changed, aspects of the bi-
lateral MAP cooperation remained focused on traditional hemispheric defense
goals. Since 1952, the United States had supported certain Colombian military
units for the purpose of collective security. The United States continued to furnish
such assistance between 1959 and 1960. Through the Military Assistance Program,
the Eisenhower administration provided the Colombian Navy with an additional
destroyer, and the two navies trained for conventional operations. “A very consid-
erable amount of practical fleet training was accomplished during the Combined
Colombian-U.S. Anti-Submarine Exercise conducted in the Pacific waters of Co-
lombia” in 1959, MAP coordinator and U.S. naval mission chief Captain Ernest
B. Ellsworth reported. But, “for economic reasons,” Colombian officers canceled
other joint activities, a “great part of the annual funds having been consumed
in the aforementioned combined . . . operations in the Pacific.”87 Two Colom-
bian Air Force squadrons also relied on U.S. grant aid. In 1958, to modernize the
fighter-bomber unit, the United States replaced Colombia’s F-47s with modern F-
80s. The upgrade cost the United States over $13 million.88 The Department of De-
fense provided spare parts and maintenance equipment to the Colombian light-
bomber force. To the disappointment of U.S. officers, the meager Colombian Air
Force budget limited flight training, reducing the efficiency of Colombian flyers.
Still, according to Colonel Clugston, Colombian officers and airmen were “very
capable, aggressive in seeking new ideas and means to accomplish more within
the limits of an austere budget.”89 Nevertheless, across Colombia, “operations of
all armed forces are severely restricted by a most austere defense budget,” the
MAP coordinator reported in 1959, with attendant implications for the readiness
of Colombia’s hemispheric defense units.90
While naval and air cooperation stayed centered on conventional defense, Co-
lombia and the United States reorganized MAP support for the Colombian Army
to promote Colombian internal security. The Eisenhower administration ended
U.S. grant assistance for Colombia’s antiaircraft battalion in 1958. In its place, the
United States added a Colombian Army Combat Engineering Battalion to the MAP
schedule. Colombian and U.S. officers first considered the switch during the Rojas
era. Both sides expected the move would improve “the mobility of the Colombian
Army” and “provide civilian benefits,” therefore encouraging Colombian modern-
ization and helping the army conduct internal security operations.91 In 1959 the
United States shipped $2.3 million in materiel to Colombia, including rock crush-
ers, concrete mixers, cranes, and paving equipment.92 At full strength by late 1960,
the engineers undertook a host of domestic construction projects that benefited
Colombia in ways beyond the abilities of the antiaircraft gunners.93 Also, in 1959,
U.S. and Colombian officials decided to add the Colombia Infantry Battalion to the
MAP roster. During the mid-1950s, the unit received special U.S. support through
the retention of its Korean War equipment. Its commendable service in Korea and
the Middle East convinced U.S. authorities that the unit deserved fulltime U.S.
grant aid. In July 1960 the Department of Defense assumed the maintenance costs
connected to the battalion. It was, after all, the Colombian military unit most likely
to join future multinational security operations. Also, considering the relaxation
of U.S. oversight of MAP assets since 1955, the two governments assumed the Co-
lombia Battalion would promote internal security through occasional domestic
action. According to a U.S. Army mission report, the few problems encountered
by the two U.S.-backed Colombian Army units “were caused by lack of facilities,
funds, or personnel, rather than lack of cooperation.”94
While pleased with the U.S.-supported MAP units, U.S. and Colombian officials
recognized that the hemispheric defense scheme—even with the introduction of
the engineering and infantry battalions—did not adequately address Colombia’s
principal national security problem. Indeed, the “only weakness” in Colombian-
American MAP activities, a key U.S. military officer wrote, “lies in its inability un-
der current guidance instructions to render practical support to internal security
which is one of Colombia’s most critical problems.”95 Ambassador Cabot likewise
recognized the shortcoming. “Despite our policy forbidding MAP support to inter-
nal security, I feel that the situation in Colombia is unique,” he wrote.96 Cabot later
admonished the administration for sending conflicting signals to the U.S. embassy
in Bogotá. NSC instructions “authorized aid to internal security forces,” he noted,
while congressional “guidance indicated that internal security shall not normally
be the basis of the military assistance program in Latin America.” In September
1958, wanting clarification, the ambassador asked that MAP guidelines “be altered
to permit MAP assistance for internal security purposes, should such assistance be
requested by the Government of Colombia.”97 The Eisenhower administration had
not responded to the ambassador when President Lleras asked for just such help.
Determined to remake the Colombian military, President Lleras called the U.S.
military advisers to the Presidential Palace on 8 June 1959. During that confer-
ence, the president explained Colombia’s need for counterinsurgency capabilities.
In doing so, Lleras talked about the Cuban Revolution to illustrate the danger facing
Colombia. The government needed to control internal fighting to protect Colom-
bian democracy, improve the lives of Colombian citizens, accelerate moderniza-
tion, and prevent communist infiltration. President Lleras then outlined his plan to
build a special military unit consisting of 1,500 ranger troops, transported aboard
U.S.-supplied helicopters, and armed with the latest U.S. arms. Because Colombia’s
economic situation prohibited the outright purchase of the equipment, Lleras asked
that the battle group receive MAP support.98 American military advisers in Co-
lombia welcomed the initiative but were uncertain, given legislative limits on MAP
assistance, whether the United States could support the plan. After receiving Co-
lombian Army commander Brigadier General Iván Berrío Jaramillo’s formal aid re-
quest on 11 June, the mission chiefs undertook a rigorous review of the Colombian
proposal. The U.S. advisers concluded that the United States should do more to pro-
mote Colombian internal security. But considering MAP restrictions, mission per-
sonnel believed that Bogotá would have to develop the new battle group within the
preexisting aid structure. Summarizing the view of the U.S. officers in Colombia,
U.S. Army mission chief Colonel Russell G. Spinney observed on 23 June that the
rural violence remained “a very serious and difficult problem” in Colombia and a
“mobile, air transportable, well-trained battle group of rangers” would promote do-
mestic tranquility and possibly contribute to hemispheric defense.99 Nonetheless,
since Bogotá wanted to use the force against guerrillas, Spinney believed that Wash-
ington could not support the unit with MAP aid. To do so, the colonel concluded,
would conflict with the “generally accepted” application of U.S. grant assistance.100
With their findings attached, the U.S. advisers sent the Colombian security plan to
Washington on 1 July 1959.101
In a separate message to Washington, Ambassador Cabot, then concluding
his service in Bogotá, opposed the recommendations of the U.S. military advisers
in Colombia. The ambassador urged the Eisenhower administration to support
Lleras’s battle group with MAP aid. President Lleras “today made [to] me strong
plea for helicopters which are vital to Colombian plans for suppression [of] com-
munist infiltrated bandit groups,” he wrote. “I recognize the difficulty of granting
this request in view [of the] shortage of funds and attitudes [in] Congress.” But
if the United States refused, he claimed, it would only “help communists in their
desire to weaken and eventually overthrow a friendly democratic government
overwhelmingly elected by Colombian people.” A communist government stra-
tegically positioned in northwest South America, adjacent to the Panama Canal,
“is surely not what Congress wants,” he added, and “favorable action would show
our support of democracy in Latin America and discourage communist inspired
banditry and guerrilla operations.”102
Despite the misgivings of American military advisers, the Colombian proposal,
supported by the outgoing ambassador, intrigued the Eisenhower administration.
With President Lleras’s consent, in September 1959, seven months after the Cuban
Revolution, the Eisenhower administration decided to send the Special Survey
Team to South America to review Colombia’s internal security situation. The sur-
vey group, under State Department supervision, drew its membership from the
Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency. The Pentagon and Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency selected six men with diverse yet relevant experiences
in Latin American affairs and counterinsurgency techniques: CIA officer Hans
Tofte, Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, Major Charles Bohannan, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Joseph J. Koontz, Colonel Berkley Lewis, and Lieutenant Bruce Walker. Aside
from Koontz, a former member of the U.S. Army mission in Colombia, each man
had some affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency. American authorities
asked the men to collect additional information on Colombian intentions, evalu-
ate the violence, study the factors contributing to the ongoing disorder, and make
recommendations for future U.S. actions.
After visiting with U.S. Caribbean Command leaders in the Canal Zone, the
Special Survey Team arrived in Colombia on 26 October 1959. The group inter-
viewed political, military, and religious leaders; toured dozens of Colombian se-
curity facilities; questioned former guerrillas and bandits; talked with hundreds
of Colombian refugees; and reviewed secret Colombian security documents, in-
cluding military plans, police reports, and intelligence estimates. In these tasks,
the Special Survey Team traveled throughout the country, visiting over 100 cities,
towns, hamlets, and military installations. The group confronted certain difficul-
ties. Some members of the U.S. embassy and military missions, guarding their
prerogatives in Colombia and apparently unaware of the coming survey group,
refused to cooperate with the mission. Also, within the Special Survey Team, a pro-
fessional and personal conflict developed between Tofte and Koontz, which con-
tinued after the men left Colombia. Finally, on 19 and 20 November, a small leftist
newspaper exposed the survey team, which it mischaracterized as a “FBI secu-
rity detail.”103 Charges of U.S. intervention in Colombian affairs swirled, alarming
some U.S. officials. But those stories soon dissipated, and the team continued its
investigation. The bulk of the survey group left Colombia in early December 1959.
Major Bohannan, however, remained behind to conduct some additional work,
including a frank conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Valencia Tovar on the civil
duties and responsibilities of Colombian servicemen. On 28 December, just before
returning to the United States, Bohnannan briefed President Lleras on the Special
Survey Team’s general impressions of the situation.104
During the first few months of 1960 the Special Survey Team produced several
reports that all reached the same conclusion: the United States should do more to
promote Colombia’s internal security. On 27 January 1960 the group’s preliminary
report sought to explain the Colombian violence, concluding that the social, eco-
nomic, and structural forces had precipitated the conflict. The team found that
violence remained a serious problem within Colombia. While communists had

not yet capitalized on the disorder, conditions in Colombia invited foreign sub-
version. The paper criticized the Colombian National Police and law enforcement
agencies. It took issue with the U.S. military assistance program’s “traditionalism”
and undue emphasis on conventional warfare doctrine. As for the Colombian
Army, the team found that as an institution it was apolitical, even after four years
of military government, and had a “great potential” for developing solutions to
Colombia’s internal security problems.105 The January 1960 report argued that
Bogotá needed to find ways to address the social, economic, cultural, and political
conditions that caused the fighting.
The team made several suggestions on how the United States might help its
neighbor. First, Washington should support Lleras’s counterinsurgency battle
group. Without that unit, the Colombian Army could not defeat active guerrilla
forces. The paper proposed that the United States must also help Colombia de-
velop and improve its intelligence, psychological warfare, and public information
programs. The team urged U.S. military advisers in Colombia to modernize and
refine their training of Colombian servicemen to better address the republic’s se-
curity problem. Then, Washington should assist Bogotá in the development of
civic-action programs to rehabilitate and improve certain rural areas, build trust
between the government and local populations, and eliminate some of the root
causes of rural violence. Finally, the team found that Washington must encourage
Bogotá to implement structural reforms, such as land redistribution, to effect the
long-term development and prosperity of the republic. Where these objectives
conflicted with standing legislation, the January report suggested that Washing-
ton utilize covert techniques, implying a special place for the Central Intelligence
Agency in future U.S.-Colombian cooperation.106
Lieutenant Colonel Koontz objected to the preliminary report on two counts.
In a February 1960 paper he argued that Colombia’s real need lay in technical
expertise. The South American republic, he wrote, did not require more U.S. mili-
tary aid. Also, Koontz believed that future U.S. assistance to Colombia should flow
through U.S. entities already at work in Colombia. The U.S. military missions, not
the Central Intelligence Agency, should train and equip the Colombian armed
forces. His dissenting paper swayed several Special Survey Team colleagues, but
it did not significantly alter the group’s final report. Issued in April 1960, the con-
cluding report reiterated the team’s January proposals. As for the debate between
overt and covert aid, the April paper suggested “quasi-covert” assistance, blending
established U.S. aid channels with “sterile” military equipment and some third-
country advisers. On the issues of congressional restrictions, the team found that
the Eisenhower administration had “interpreted” U.S. military assistance “leg-
islation too narrowly.” The United States must fully appreciate that insurgencies
had “become an accepted and probable mode of external aggression.” The Special
Survey Team’s final report closed by predicting that, since Colombian violence
was based on “criminality,” Colombian authorities, with U.S. assistance, could end
“active violence” within one year. Further U.S.-Colombian cooperation would be
necessary to prevent the reoccurrence of rural fighting.107
Ambassador McIntosh briefed Lleras on the team’s recommendations in late
March 1960. During that session, Lleras made “no significant comment” on the
report, which included heavy Colombian financial support for his counterin-
surgency units. The Special Survey Team’s conclusions, McIntosh surmised, had
disappointed the Colombian president by placing too much emphasis on U.S.
advisory assistance and public information programs, both “perilously close to
[American] intervention” in Colombian internal affairs. The president’s original
overture, McIntosh reminded U.S. policymakers, “was the alleged inability” of the
Colombian government “to handle [the] cost [of] military equipment needed”
for the counterinsurgency battle group.108 The central issue concerned U.S. grant
support for Colombian counterinsurgency units. The U.S. ambassador believed
that the Special Survey Team, though well intended, had produced recommenda-
tions beyond its mandate, perhaps offending Lleras. In any case, U.S. officials, the
ambassador advised, should be prepared to discuss the subject with Lleras during
the forthcoming state visit.
As predicted, in Washington on 7 April, President Lleras, Colombian ambas-
sador Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, Secretary of State Herter, Assistant Secretary
of State Rubottom, and U.S. ambassador McIntosh discussed U.S.-Colombian
security relations. President Lleras observed that the Cuban Revolution posed
a danger to the other Latin American countries; Cubans were promoting unrest
among Latin American peasants. The president therefore expected “a widespread
flourishing of guerrilla forces in Colombia” over the next ten years. He then asked
Washington to “re-orient its military missions in Latin America by instructing
them to teach the Latin American military to concentrate on the new internal
danger of guerrillas, rather then on the outdated external danger of aggression.”
U.S.–Latin American military cooperation should focus on internal security, not
conventional warfare. Assistant Secretary Rubottom concurred with the presi-
dent. The United States, he said, should “give priority to internal security.” He
then mentioned U.S. domestic objections to foreign military assistance. In the
U.S. Congress, the assistant secretary explained, “the idea is strong that the Latin
American militaries serve primarily to support dictatorships.” Yet, Rubottom
continued, armed forces actually helped many countries make “the orderly transi-
tion from dictatorship to democracy.” Colombia’s recent experience, Ambassador
Sanz de Santamaría injected, “furnished an example of the military’s playing such
a role.” President Lleras then talked about his efforts to change the Colombian
Army into a force capable of dealing with the “guerrilla problem.” He wanted
counterinsurgency battalions. Lleras mentioned the Special Survey Team’s report,
Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61) and Alberto Lleras (1945–46, 1958–62) walk
across the White House lawn toward a U.S. helicopter bound for Camp David, 7 April
1960. During this impromptu trip, the Colombian president asked Eisenhower to release
grant-funded U.S. military assistance to the Colombian armed forces for internal security
operations. The American president immediately ordered the Department of Defense to
explore the feasibility of such assistance. (Source: Photograph by Abbie Rowe, Courtesy of
the National Park Service, NARA)
which “recommended some conventional methods that I don’t think will solve
the problem.” Lleras did not elaborate but went on to stress the importance of
helicopters. The Colombian Army needed to be able to move highly trained coun-
terinsurgency forces rapidly around the country. Rubottom and Herter promised
to help Colombia develop internal security forces.109
That afternoon, during the presidential trip to Camp David, Lleras pressed
Colombia’s need for counterinsurgency capabilities. Lleras told Eisenhower that
the U.S. military advisers were “not training” Colombian soldiers for “what they
really needed.” The Colombian president asked for U.S. leadership, noting that,
given the twenty-one-year relationship between U.S. and Colombian forces, the
Colombian Army would not “do anything but emulate the American Army.”110
Lleras then inquired into the status of his plan for a counterinsurgency battle
group. Eisenhower agreed that Colombia needed such a force, but he suggested
that Bogotá cover the cost of the equipment. President Lleras said that his govern-
ment could not afford the materiel; the twenty-four helicopters alone cost over
$7 million. Seemingly convinced, Eisenhower immediately ordered the Pentagon
to produce a comprehensive list of materiel for the Colombian battle group. “Get
Defense to furnish a report as to what kind of Army would meet the requirements
of a country such as Colombia where there is little probability of attack from
outside but a high probability of guerrilla activity against the Government,” an
Eisenhower aide recorded.111 Assistant Staff Secretary Major John Eisenhower,
the president’s son, sent an official request to the Pentagon on 14 April.112
In tapping the U.S. military, the president, likely without knowledge of the
Special Survey Team’s debate concerning overt and covert channels, established
the Department of Defense as the lead agency for U.S. counterinsurgency assis-
tance to Colombia. On 5 May 1960, one month after the Lleras visit, President
Eisenhower authorized the U.S. government to use MAP funds to train Colom-
bian servicemen for internal security missions.113 In July 1960 the Central Intel-
ligence Agency sent one helicopter to Colombia for “demonstration purposes.”114
But bureaucratic indecision delayed a final decision on U.S. materiel support
for the Colombian counterinsurgency unit. By 4 August the administration had
decided to support the initiative, but questions about legal strategies remained
unanswered.115 Some officials wanted to send internal security equipment to Co-
lombia without congressional approval. Others insisted that the president sign
a MAP waiver, required by the Morse amendment to the Mutual Security Act
of 1958. For several weeks thereafter, U.S. officials rehashed the legal aspects of
grant aid for internal security purposes. Frustrated with the inaction, Ambassa-
dor McIntosh urged the U.S. government to support the National Front. The U.S.
government advanced its overall hemispheric defense objectives, he reasoned, by
providing MAP aid to Colombia for internal security. The ambassador reminded
U.S. officials that fifteen months had passed since Lleras’s original request. The ad-
ministration needed to answer the Colombian overture, he concluded; “urgency
is of the essence.”116 At a Joint Chiefs of Staff–Department of State meeting on 28
October, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer argued the United States “shouldn’t delay”
the internal security agenda “for congressional authorization.”117 Counselors at
the Department of State, however, withheld support until U.S. military officers
agreed to submit to the procedures described by the U.S. Congress.
The Eisenhower administration finally moved on the Colombian request in
late 1960. In November, the Department of State drafted a presidential directive
that authorized the U.S. government to furnish internal security assistance to Co-
lombia through the Military Assistance Program. Endorsed by the Department of
Defense, the document reached the president’s office on 31 December. Eisenhower
signed the waiver on 5 January 1961, fifteen days before his presidency ended.118
The following day, U.S. officials added $170,000 to the “anti-bandit” materiel pack-
age to expand counterinsurgency training for Colombian servicemen.119 Wanting
to avoid allegations of U.S. involvement in Colombian domestic affairs, Colom-

bian and U.S. authorities decided against publicizing the decision, agreeing that
any news of the internal security assistance would be dismissed as “simply supple-
mental” to existing hemispheric defense programs.120 In Bogotá, the Colombian
Army’s new commanding general, former Korean War commander Alberto Ruíz,
who had suffered on Old Baldy eight years earlier, assumed responsibility for de-
veloping detailed plans to capitalize on the new U.S. military assistance. In mid-
1961, a few months after President Kennedy moved into the White House, the
Colombian Army received a “special” delivery from the United States—the first
three helicopters for Alberto Lleras’s counterinsurgency force.121 A new era in
Colombian-American security cooperation had begun.
· · ·
A remarkable combination of events transformed the Colombian-American se-

curity partnership between 1958 and 1960. Vice President Nixon’s South America
tour and the Cuban Revolution triggered major changes in U.S. policy toward
Latin America. The Eisenhower administration decided to enlarge U.S. assistance
programs, with special attention to emerging democracies. At that very moment,
Colombia surged back to constitutional rule behind the leadership of Alberto Lle-
ras. Subsequently, the two countries undertook a variety of activities designed
to stabilize Colombia, including the remodeling of their security alliance. Con-
nected to the threat of cold war subversion, entangled with developments in Cuba
and Venezuela, the remaking of the U.S.-Colombian relationship occurred in a
broad international context. Yet without the rebirth of Colombian democracy, the
two countries might not have turned their military partnership into an internal
security alliance in 1960. Ideology, therefore, played a critical role in U.S.-Co-
lombian relations from 1958 to 1960. As for material interests, both governments
labored to improve political, economic, and social conditions in Colombia. The
United States wanted a strong, prosperous, and secure ally in northwestern South
America. The National Front government in Colombia needed U.S. economic and
military assistance to accomplish its basic domestic objectives. Internal develop-
ments, then, continued to shape bilateral security cooperation. Lingering rural
fighting in Colombia motivated the reorientation of MAP aid; economic woes
reduced the presence of U.S. military advisers in Colombia. Colombian domestic
developments were ever-present during the transformation of the Colombian-
American partnership. Colombians, likewise, showed their tremendous influence
over bilateral relations. In fact, President Lleras, the architect of change, drove the
process that produced a new security partnership. As a result, the neighbors fun-
damentally altered the trajectory of bilateral cooperation. The decision influenced
U.S.-Colombian relations for decades thereafter.
Epilogue
A decade of optimism followed the reorganization of the Colombian-American

partnership. In 1961 President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, a
U.S.-sponsored development program for the Americas, the long-awaited Marshall
Plan for the Western Hemisphere. Between 1961 and 1965, Colombia received $833
million in U.S. economic assistance through the initiative. The two countries has-
tened Colombian modernization through agrarian reform, housing, transportation,
and regional development projects. At the same time, military officials developed
a civic-action scheme known as Plan Lazo. Building upon President Lleras’s 1959
counterinsurgency proposal and the U.S. Special Survey Team’s final report, Gen-
eral Ruíz, the plan’s principal designer, combined psychological, educational, public
health, civil engineering, and counterinsurgency activities to pacify rural Colombia.
Backing the Colombian military, the United States supported twenty-six MAP units
in Colombia, including six engineering battalions and assorted counterinsurgency
units. Plan Lazo reduced domestic violence to an acceptable level for the first time
since the mid-1940s. Still, the republic’s transformation remained incomplete. Bo-
gotá failed to adopt necessary structural changes. Preoccupied with Vietnam and
U.S. domestic unrest, Washington turned away from the Americas after 1968. The
grand experiment did not achieve the desired long-term results.1
In the 1970s and 1980s, bilateral security relations tracked Colombia’s deterio-
rating internal situation. Colombian economic fluctuations, industrialization, and
urbanization exacerbated persistent social inequities. The Marxist-Leninist Rev-
olutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Cuban-backed ELN, and other
insurgency groups gradually improved their positions inside Colombia. Tapping
into legitimate grievances, these organizations offered an alternate model for na-
tional development. They also used violence, extortion, kidnapping, and terrorism
to manipulate peasants and subvert established institutions. The escalating drug
war greatly complicated Colombian internal security. The cartel corrupted domes-
tic political and legal systems through bribery, intimidation, and assassination.
199
200 epilogue
Guerrilla leaders used the drug trade to finance their military and political opera-
tions. Frustrated with the government’s apparent weakness, right-wing paramili-
tary self-defense forces soon entered the fray, throwing the country into further
confusion. As the crisis deepened, Colombia and the United States collaborated
on a variety of diplomatic, economic, military, and technical matters. But counter-
narcotics issues, which linked U.S. and Colombian domestic problems, dominated
Colombian-American relations. During the mid-1970s Colombian and U.S. agents
attacked some Colombian coca-paste processing facilities. Then, in 1978 Colom-
bian president Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–82) launched Colombia’s first major
campaign against the cartel. The U.S.-Colombian counter-narcotics partnership
expanded in the 1980s as cocaine consumption and production soared. Each year
between 1988 and 1992 the United States pumped approximately $100 million in
counter-narcotics aid into Colombia, assistance that supported interdiction, eradi-
cation, and other activities. U.S. and Colombian authorities worked together to
prosecute traffickers; American agents played an important part in bringing down
Medellín drug kingpin Pablo Escobar Gaviria in 1993. The best indicators, never-
theless, suggested the Colombian-American cooperation produced only limited
success. By the mid-1990s Colombia appeared on the verge of complete collapse,
an imploding, failed state at the geographic center of the Western Hemisphere.2
President Andrés Pastrana’s Plan Colombia, developed between 1998 and 2000,
represented a multifaceted solution to Colombia’s internal security dilemma. The
government proposed to break the drug trade through military and economic
action.3 In doing so, Colombian officials would weaken the destabilizing groups
that were dependent on drug money, organizations such as FARC and ELN. Plan
Colombia, Pastrana promised, would serve as the basis of lasting national peace.
As part of the proposal, Bogotá requested and received a massive infusion of U.S.
military assistance. The Clinton administration, however, imposed strict limits
on the use of American aid. The United States insisted that Colombians could
use U.S.-furnished Plan Colombia military assistance only for counter-narcotics
purposes. American-supported units would not engage insurgent forces. The re-
strictions prevailed until the beginning of the U.S. war against terrorism. Recog-
nizing the connections among the drug war, Colombian internal security, and
transnational terrorism, American officials supported Conservative president
Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s (2002–) aggressive domestic security agenda. In 2002 the
George W. Bush administration lifted the Clinton-era restrictions and enlarged
the U.S. advisory role in Colombia. While overshadowed by American involve-
ment in Iraq and Afghanistan, Colombia thereafter became an active front in the
fight against global terrorism.4 “Our strategic partnership is vital to the security,
prosperity, and freedom of both our countries and the Americas,” President Bush
commented in 2005. “The great enemy of Colombian democracy is terrorism,
and our great partner in defeating terrorism,” President Uribe responded, “has
epilogue 201
been the government and people of the United States.”5 Steadily improving condi-
tions in Colombia encouraged leaders in both countries.
Colombia and the United States created the basis of the modern bilateral alli-
ance between 1939 and 1960, a habit of cooperation that made further collabora-
tion more likely. In retrospect, three key moments dominated the making of the
Colombian-American partnership. First, during World War II, the republics part-
nered to defend the Western Hemisphere. Colombian-American wartime coop-
eration established valuable personal and institutional relationships. Second, Co-
lombian and American military forces formed a successful combat partnership in
Korea. At a time when la Violencia might have split the countries apart, the fight-
ing alliance strengthened U.S.-Colombian ties. Finally, in 1960 the republics con-
verted their conventional security affiliation into an internal security partnership.
The Eisenhower administration’s decision to support the Colombian counterin-
surgency plan fundamentally altered the purpose of the bilateral security alliance.
Two periods of transition—the immediate postwar years (1945–50) and the era
of Colombian military rule (1953–57)—bridged these defining episodes, extended
and enhanced bilateral linkages, and deepened U.S.-Colombian interdependence.
When Eduardo Santos assumed the Colombian presidency in August 1938, the
Colombian-American military relationship was, for all practical purposes, nonex-
istent. The two countries did not even support embassies in the other’s capitals. By
the end of 1960, the two militaries were thoroughly connected in a mutually ben-
eficial way. Establishing this partnership of lasting significance, the U.S.-Colom-
bian experience confirmed the importance of globalization, ideology, self-interest,
domestic variables, agency, and geography in U.S.–Latin American relations.
A truly international affair, the making of the Colombian-American alliance
involved many countries and regions. During World War II, the countries part-
nered to secure the Americas against extra-continental threats. At various war-
time conferences, U.S. and Colombian diplomats worked together to coordinate
the inter-American response to conflict in Europe and Asia. The Soviet-American
competition after 1945 shaped postwar bilateral defense planning. Colombia and
the United States influenced the formation of international organizations such as
the United Nations. From 1945 to 1950, U.S. preoccupation with European and
Asian reconstruction limited U.S.-Colombian economic collaboration. In 1950 the
great power competition for Korea produced a major foreign relations opportunity
for Colombia. Joining the multinational coalition, small countries such as Colom-
bia played a defining role in the UN campaign. Later, Colombians helped create
the UN Emergency Force during the Suez crisis. Colombia’s contributions to UN
coalitions made Americans more inclined to help the military government in Co-
lombia during the mid-1950s. Then, Nixon’s tour of South America and the Cuban
Revolution revealed the hemispheric importance of Colombian internal security.
Had the 1940s and 1950s been a time of international tranquility, the Colombian-
202 epilogue
American partnership would have developed in different ways. Conversely, U.S.-

Colombian cooperation touched areas far beyond the Americas. World War II and
the cold war were international events with global consequences.
From 1939 to 1960, compatible values allowed Colombia and the United States
to capitalize on shared opportunities. The two countries formed a broad-based
partnership rooted in powerful ideas such as democracy, liberty, Christianity, an-
ticommunism, multilateralism, inter-American solidarity, and collective security.
Often tangled, frequently complex, ideology carried with it some contradictions.
In Colombia and the United States, democracy existed as a product of time and
space, rather than the simple application of republican principles. In fact, the two
representative systems were imperfect; certain political features were remarkably
dissimilar. The countries nonetheless fashioned their affiliation around demo-
cratic convictions. Also, the importance of individual variables changed over
time. A common commitment to anticommunism, for example, briefly displaced
democracy at the ideological center of the alliance in the 1950s. Then, somewhat
paradoxically, some values became a source of unity and friction. While a faith in
Christian civilization galvanized the alliance against communism, it also spawned
conflict when Catholics lashed out at U.S. Protestant missionaries in Colombia
during la Violencia. Nevertheless, from high-level diplomatic meetings to Korean
War battlefields, Colombians and Americans relied on ideas to organize, under-
stand, and explain their partnership. Shared values moved Colombia and the
United States toward common objectives.
Beyond ideology, self-interest motivated U.S and Colombian policymakers dur-
ing the 1940s and 1950s. The security of the United States depended on a stable
southern flank. During World War II Americans rightly believed that a volatile or
unfriendly Colombia jeopardized U.S. military, economic, and political interests in
the Caribbean, including the Panama Canal. At the same time, Colombians relied
on U.S. forces to protect the Western Hemisphere. They also looked to the United
States for military and economic aid to overcome wartime hardships. Beginning in
1945, the Truman administration wanted Colombian political support in the cold
war against communism. U.S. officials particularly appreciated Colombia’s contri-
bution to the U.S.-led UN Command in Korea. The Ospina, Gómez, and Rojas gov-
ernments sought U.S. assistance to end la Violencia and modernize Colombia. After
1958 the National Front coalition required generous U.S. economic assistance to
stabilize the republic. The Colombian military needed U.S. MAP grants to develop
counterinsurgency forces. The Eisenhower team backed the National Front because
instability in Colombia threatened the entire region. The various forms of Colom-
bian-American cooperation between 1939 and 1960 pointed toward one major goal.
Bogotá and Washington wanted Colombia to be prosperous, secure, and stable. Ma-
terial incentives inspired Colombian-American cooperation.
Considering the purpose of U.S.-Colombian cooperation, Colombia’s internal
epilogue 203
affairs consistently shaped bilateral relations. Domestic political fighting impelled

Colombian policymakers to seek a declaration of belligerency against the Axis
powers during World War II. Wartime leaders used U.S. aid to support various
Colombian state-building activities. Beginning in 1946, la Violencia obscured
postwar inter-American economic controversies, making the U.S.-Colombian
partnership less controversial than U.S. relations with some other Latin Ameri-
can countries. The internal discord then produced a conservative counterrevolu-
tion committed to the international campaign against communism in places such
as Korea. During the mid-1950s, Colombian officers wanted the United States to
support the military’s domestic mission. In 1959 President Lleras, presiding over
a depleted treasury, proposed that the United States provide grant aid to mobilize
Colombian internal security units. In other instances, the conflict limited bilat-
eral cooperation. It temporarily reshuffled ideological variables, buried Colom-
bian democratic institutions, and created religious disorder. During World War
II, it prevented Colombia from taking full advantage of the Lend-Lease program.
In the 1950s la Violencia impaired the effectiveness of Colombia’s U.S.-supported
MAP units. After 1958 economic woes forced Colombians to trim personnel from
the U.S. military missions, limit the training of Colombian servicemen in the
United States, and eliminate some joint training exercises. Colombian domestic
affairs accelerated and retarded bilateral cooperation. Either way, internal devel-
opments clearly affected the U.S.-Colombian relationship.
Although Colombia lacked the military and economic strength of the United
States, Colombians exerted tremendous influence over the bilateral alliance; they
were neither passive international actors nor pawns of the United States. In 1938
President Santos pushed for the creation of U.S. military missions in Colombia.
Suspicions of Soviet involvement in Colombian internal affairs, not American co-
ercion, moved Bogotá to break relations with Moscow in 1948. Washington applied
significant pressure on some Latin American governments for troops during the
Korean War but did not expect Colombia to fight. Instead, President Gómez, Am-
bassador Zuleta, and other Colombians insisted on joining the UN coalition. From
1953 to 1957 General Rojas pressed the United States to enlarge bilateral military
cooperation. In 1960 President Lleras lobbied Eisenhower and other Americans
to turn the conventional defense partnership into an internal security alliance.
Throughout, Colombian officials packaged their needs to connect with prevailing
U.S. strategic concerns, but not to the detriment of their guiding ideology. And
when Colombian objectives differed from U.S. goals, the South American republic
broke with the United States. To the chagrin of American officials, Bogotá rejected
U.S. pressure to station U.S. security details at Colombian airports during World
War II. At major international conferences, including the Chapúltepec (1945) and
Caracas (1954) meetings, Colombian diplomats advanced positions contrary to
U.S. interests. When Ambassador Philip Bonsal delivered the U.S. protest over the
204 epilogue
Colombian military’s handling of El Tiempo in 1955, General Rojas, far from defer-
ential, lectured the American diplomat on the dangers of radicalism. With a rela-
tionship based upon a recognized body of compatible values, Colombian foreign
policy often bolstered American objectives. It did not simply mimic U.S. desires.
Governed by the dynamics of the inter-American neighborhood, a mixture of
independence and interdependence therefore characterized Colombian-American
relations. On the edge of the zone of greatest American influence, Colombia part-
nered with the United States without compromising its autonomy. During World
War II, President Roosevelt and U.S. defense planners recognized that Colombia
was too close to the United States to be neglected but too far away to be properly
defended by American military forces. The United States needed to help Colom-
bia develop an organic defense capability. On a personal level, many Colombian
soldiers and statesmen had studied or worked in the United States, including Pres-
idents López, Ospina, Rojas, and Lleras. The cumulative effect of their firsthand
exposure to the United States encouraged mutual understanding. In Korea, Colonel
Lloyd Moses, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment commander, believed that the U.S. Army
worked better with the Colombia Battalion than other small-country UN forces be-
cause Colombians and Americans were from the same place. “A hemispheric sense
of comradeship,” he reported, distinguished the U.S.-Colombian partnership.6 In
the late 1950s, American policymakers supported the National Front government
because the United States needed a stable democracy in Colombia. Between 1939
and 1960, the development, prosperity, and security of each American republic re-
lied on the welfare of the entire region. From geographic proximity, the American
republics forged cultural, commercial, diplomatic, military, and political linkages
of lasting significance. In the end, the making of the Colombian-American alliance
revealed the interconnectedness of the U.S.–Latin American experience—a condi-
tion of ever-growing importance in the twenty-first century.
Essay on Archival Research
Historians use evidence to reconstruct the past; this book is based on archival
collections in Colombia and the United States. The making of the Colombian-
American alliance involved many individuals. Between 1939 and 1960 these par-
ticipants—government officials, military servicemen, and others—generated
documents such as letters, telegrams, meeting minutes, memoranda, reports, and
speeches. Today, many of these records, primary sources, are housed in U.S. and
Colombian historical repositories. Gathering and interpreting archival material is
an exciting process, like collecting pieces of an unseen puzzle. Archival research
frequently exposes fascinating stories, revises preexisting theses, and raises new
questions. Yet primary research sometimes yields frustration. Archival collec-
tions thoroughly describe certain aspects of this study, such as U.S.-Colombian
cooperation during World War II. Available documents inadequately explain
other episodes, notably Colombia’s decision to enter the Korean War. The notes
following this essay offer citations for individual documents, thereby serving as a
detailed guide to the location of critical sources. My purpose here is to review the
essential archival collections more broadly. I employ short citations (title, date)
to identify newspaper articles in the notes. Researchers can find complete biblio-
graphic information, including the full text of each article, and other key docu-
ments in the Bradley Lynn Coleman Collection at the National Security Archive,
George Washington University (Washington, D.C.). My papers are now open to
the public (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/).
In 1989 the Colombian Congress passed legislation mandating the reorganiza-
tion and improvement of the country’s national archives system. As part of this
effort, the government built a modern, state-of-the-art facility for the Archivo
General de la Nación (Bogotá), the principal repository of federal records. Inside,
collections dealing with nineteenth century Colombian history are very impres-
sive. Material describing the twentieth century, particularly the era of la Violencia,
is far less abundant. In 1967, according to curators, a Ministry of Government fire
205
206 essay on archival research
destroyed a vast quantity of Colombian government records dating from 1949 to

1958. The suspicious event devastated the records of the Conservative and military
governments. The files of the Liberal administrations of Eduardo Santos (1938–42)
and Alfonso López (1942–45) were unscathed. Records from the Alberto Lleras
(1958–62) administration also survived, although during my time in Colombia,
very little was open to researchers. Fortunately for students of U.S.-Colombian
relations, the Ministry of Foreign Relations collections, located elsewhere in 1967,
were also not affected by the fire. This study draws heavily upon those files that
cover a good portion of the 1939–60 period.
The Archivo General possesses three categories of Foreign Ministry documents.
The first, the General Records of the Foreign Ministry, are the administrative files
of the Colombian foreign minister and other employees in Bogotá. The material is
arranged by administrative unit. Therein, documents are packaged in chronologi-
cal portfolios. The most extensive documentation relates to specific international
meetings, including the San Francisco (1945), Rio de Janeiro (1947), and Bogotá
(1948) conferences. Country files include reports, correspondence, and other items
dealing with bilateral issues. They document the difficulties of Colombian diplo-
mats in Berlin (Germany), Santos administration efforts to acquire French mili-
tary advisers (France), and aspects of U.S.-Colombian cooperation (United States).
The second category of foreign relations documents, the Records of the Colombian
Legation in Washington, is most useful for students of Colombian-American rela-
tions; these are the papers of Colombian diplomats in Washington. Organized by
subject and date, they include folders on topics of interest to Colombian officials.
Documents on U.S.-Colombian military relations, for example, are filed under
the title “Ministry of War.” Correspondence and telegrams between Bogotá and
its Washington embassy, located throughout, capture the Colombian perspective
on bilateral relations. Finally, the Records of International Organizations detail
Colombian diplomacy in multinational forums. Documents in this category are
arranged by organization, with extensive material on the Pan American Union,
League of Nations, United Nations, and Organization of American States. In sum,
Colombian diplomatic records were very useful in my research.
Several other manuscript collections in Bogotá deal with the period of U.S.-Co-
lombian relations described in this book. The Records of the Minister of War are at
the Archivo General. Unfortunately, this collection abruptly ends in 1946. Scholars
interested the Colombian military during World War II should consult this collec-
tion. The Archivo de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá), part of the Colom-
bian national archives network holds the Records of the General Secretariat of the
Presidency of the Republic. In 1898 Colombian authorities established the General
Secretariat to handle various administrative matters. The reports, memoranda,
and other documents—arranged chronologically—concern subjects of interest to
essay on archival research 207
the Colombian president. The Ministry of War folders, for example, contain some
documents on Colombian national defense and Colombian-American security re-
lations. The General Secretariat also maintained a useful correspondence file. Over-
all, the abundance and richness of the Records of the General Secretariat declines
dramatically during la Violencia, but there are still some useful documents from as
late as the presidency of General Rojas. Unfortunately, neither the Archivo General
nor the Archivo de la Presidencia has administrative or operational files of the Co-
lombian armed forces. The military certainly still possesses such records, but they
are not available to researchers. Regardless, the Colombian archives contain useful
information on the Colombian-American experience between 1939 and 1960. Be-
fore going to Bogotá, researchers should consult the Colombian national archives
system website, which has information on policies, procedures, and available collec-
tions (www.archivogeneral.gov.co/version2/).
Though not strictly archival, the Biblioteca Nacional (Bogotá) contains essential
sources on Colombian history. The library houses a complete set of Diario oficial
and Noticias de la semana, periodicals of published Colombian government laws,
declarations, and documents. Researchers will also find most of the Memorias in
the library. Generated by various government entities, these yearly reports describe
ministerial activities through narratives, statistics, and key documents. The Memo-
ria de guerra and Memoria de relaciones exteriors were especially valuable in my
work. The library also holds a remarkable collection of published memoirs and sec-
ondary literature, such as Alberto Ruíz’s official history of the Colombia Battalion
in Korea. Finally, researchers will find a comprehensive series of historic Colombian
periodicals at the Biblioteca Nacional, including major newspapers like El Tiempo
and El Siglo. While some of these items are available at university libraries in the
United States, the Biblioteca Nacional is the premier repository of published sources
on Colombian history. The library, like the Archivo General, maintains a useful
website and online catalogue for researchers (www.bibliotecanacional.gov.co).
The preponderance of the archival material dealing with U.S.-Colombian re-
lations is located in the United States. Indeed, beyond bilateral affairs, U.S. re-
cords constitute a tremendous source of information on Colombian history. The
massive scope of the U.S. collections, combined with the U.S. government com-
mitment to declassification, explains why foreign scholars often need to visit the
United States to learn about their own national experience. While filtered through
an American lens, documents generated by U.S. participants address nearly every
facet of the Colombian and Colombian-American experience. The National Ar-
chives and Records Administration (NARA) manages an extensive system of U.S.
repositories. Archives II (College Park, Md.) is the principal repository of twenti-
eth century U.S. diplomatic and military records. The collections are divided into
hundreds of record groups (RG).
The most useful diplomatic documents are collected in the Records of the De-
partment of State (RG 59). The group includes Decimal Files and Lot Files. The
Decimal Files are the centralized record of U.S. foreign policy. They contain re-
ports, papers, memoranda, meeting minutes, intelligence estimates, telegrams, and
other documents dealing with the formation and implementation of U.S. policy.
The records also describe conditions in other countries, such as Colombia. When
these documents were used by the Department of State, U.S. officials employed a
multidigit decimal filing scheme to arrange and access material. A numerical code
stamped on each document describes the subject, country, and date. U.S. archivists
maintained this original filing system when they accessioned the records. The Lot
Files are the decentralized office files generated by regional and functional offices,
such as the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of the Secretary of State.
The organization of Lot Files varies by office, but typically follows a logical subject
or chronological pattern. In addition to RG 59, U.S. foreign embassy and consul-
ate records are gathered in the Post Files of the Department of State (RG 84). This
book makes extensive use of the records of the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, which
includes documents on all aspects of the U.S.-Colombian relationship. Theoreti-
cally, the important post documents should also be in the Decimal or Lot Files.
American diplomats, after all, would have sent key reports to Washington. In real-
ity, the U.S. Foreign Service Post Files for Colombia contain invaluable and unique
items on matters ranging from bilateral military relations to la Violencia. The Post
Files are arranged by year and original security classification. That is, for 1944, the
Bogotá embassy records are divided into general, classified, and top-secret records.
Archivists have prepared a detailed box list for major embassy records, including
Bogotá. Some of the key items from RG 59 and RG 84, of course, are available
in the Department of State’s official documentary history, Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS). Much, however, can only be found in its original form at
Archives II. An electronic index to the Post Files, finding aids for Lot Files, and a
detailed explanation of the Department of State decimal filing system are available
on the NARA website (www.archives.gov).
The U.S. military records at Archives II are another critical source on U.S.-
Colombian relations. U.S. military mission reports, transcripts of bilateral staff
conversations, and assorted hemispheric defense papers are divided among the
Records of U.S. Army Forces in the Caribbean (RG 548), Records of Joint Com-
mands (RG 349), and Records of Inter-Service Agencies (RG 334). During the
Korean War, UN forces attached to U.S. units submitted command and after ac-
tion reports to their parent unit. The archival records of the two U.S. infantry
regiments with which the Colombia Battalion fought, therefore, include extensive
documentation on the activities of the Colombian Army in Korea. Organized by
military unit, the administrative and operational files of U.S. Army forces de-
essay on archival research 209
ployed during the Korean War are located in Entry 429, Records of the Adjutant
General (RG 407). Additionally, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218),
Records of the U.S. Army Staff (RG 319), Records of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (RG 330), and Records of International Military Agencies (RG 333)
contain documents on the UN Command, inter-American military relations, and
U.S.-Colombian military relations.
Part of the NARA system, the presidential libraries also hold primary sources
on U.S. foreign relations. Indeed, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library
(Hyde Park, New York), Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Independence,
Missouri), and Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Abilene, Kansas) are
critical facilities for researchers wanting to learn more about U.S. foreign rela-
tions during those administrations. The presidents’ papers include country, re-
gional, personal, and agency files. They are, in general, high-level documents that
describe White House policymaking, including memoranda for the president,
reports and transcripts of presidential conversations, and presidential correspon-
dence. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the NSC staff also
generated documents on national security issues, including bilateral relations and
overseas security programs. Researchers can find copies of the major NSC reports
at Archives II in College Park. The NSC staff files, which describe deliberative pro-
cesses, are only located at the presidential libraries. Finally, the personal papers of
many diplomats and government administrators, such as John Cooper Wiley and
Edward Miller, are located in the presidential libraries. Curators have prepared
finding guides for these and other presidential library collections. Scholars can
link to the presidential libraries’ websites from NARA’s main webpage.
Documents on U.S.-Colombian security relations are also available at several
other historical repositories. The U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washing-
ton, D.C.) maintains a useful historical manuscript collection. The series includes
U.S. Army accounts of Colombian-American cooperation during World War II
and inter-American military planning. The personal papers of important U.S. of-
ficers such as Matthew Ridgway, Arthur Trudeau, and Lloyd Moses are located at
the U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, Pennsylvania). A series of de-
briefing reports on U.S. officers returning from overseas service is also in Carlisle.
Most important, the institute has the debriefing of Colonel Joy Vallery, U.S. Army
mission chief in the 1960s. Returning from Colombia, Vallery collected, from
mission files, copies of essential documents dating back to the early 1950s. These
records are attached to his narrative description of mission activities. Portions of
the collections of the U.S. Naval Historical Center (Washington, D.C.) and Mari-
ners’ Museum and Library (Newport News, Virginia) deal with the Colombian
Navy during the Korean War. The George C. Marshall Papers at the Marshall
Research Library (Lexington, Virginia) cover his service as U.S. Army chief of
staff, secretary of state, and secretary of defense during the making of the Co-
lombian-American alliance. Foreign Office Records at the Public Records Office
(Kew, England) reveal British impressions on la Violencia in Colombia, especially
religious violence against Protestant missionaries.
This account of U.S.-Colombian security relations, then, is based on the combi-
nation of sources from many repositories in Colombia and the United States. My
research was not neatly limited to beginning of the project. Instead, I frequented
the archives, especially those in the Washington area, throughout the writing of
this book. This long-term exposure to the major archival collections influenced
my analytical conclusions. I hope, now, it will serve as the basis for further study
of this important bilateral relationship.
Abbreviations
AGN Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá, Colombia

AGRS American Graves Registration Service
APR Archivo de la Presidencia de la República, Bogotá, Colombia
ARC Armada de la República de Colombia
CDC U.S. Caribbean Defense Command
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CMH Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers
EL Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans.
ELN National Liberation Army
ERP European Recovery Program
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
HMRTN His Majesty’s Royal Thai Navy
HSTL Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo.
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IBM International Business Machines
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP Military Assistance Program
MM Mariners’ Museum & Library, Newport News, Va.
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHC Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
NSC National Security Council
211
212 list of abbreviations
OAS Organization of American States

OCB Operations Coordinating Board, National Security Council
OF Office File
PCC Communist Party of Colombia
PCO Communist Workers’ Party
PSD Social Democratic Party
PSF President’s Secretary’s Files
RG Record Group
SCADTA Colombian-German Society for Air Transportation
Stat. Statute
TIAS Treaties and Other International Acts Series
UN United Nations
UNRC United Nations Reception Center
USAMHI United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.
USNS United States Naval Ship
USO United Service Organization
USS United States Ship
UST United States Treaty
Notes
Introduction
1. David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berke-
ley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), vii. For the historiography of U.S.–Latin American
relations, see Mark T. Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.–Latin American Relations
since the Second World War,” Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 429–52; and Max Paul
Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on
United States–Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27 (Nov. 2003): 621–36.
2. E. Taylor Parks, Colombia and the United States, 1765–1934 (Durham, N.C.: Duke
Univ. Press, 1935).
3. Stephen J. Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdepen-
dence (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1992).
4. David Bushnell, Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor, 1938–1942 (Gainesville:
Univ. of Florida Press, 1967).
5. The articles are Bradley Lynn Coleman, “The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950–
1954,” Journal of Military History 69 (Oct. 2005): 1137–78; Mark H. Danley, “The Colom-
bian Navy in the Korean War, 1950–1953,” The American Neptune: A Quarterly Journal of
Maritime History and Arts 58 (Spring 1998): 243–61; and Russell W. Ramsey, “The Colom-
bia Battalion in Korea and Suez,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 9 (Oct. 1967): 541–60.
The master’s theses are Daniel Davison, “The Colombian Army in Korea: A Study of the
Integration of the Colombia Battalion into the 31st United States Infantry Regiment Based
on the Experiences of Major General Lloyd R. Moses” (University of South Dakota, 1972);
Christine Sutherland Galbraith, “Colombian Participation in the Korean War” (University
of Florida, 1973); Charles Lowndes Steel IV, “Colombian Experiences in Korea and Per-
ceived Impact on La Violencia, 1953–1965” (University of Florida, 1978); and Douglas Alan
Walthour, “Laureano Gómez and Colombia in the Korean War: Internal and External Fac-
tors in Foreign Policy Decision-Making” (University of Texas, 1990).
6. Dennis M. Rempe, “An American Trojan Horse? Eisenhower, Latin America, and
the Development of U.S. Internal Security Policy, 1954–1960,” Small Wars and Insurgencies
10 (Spring 1999): 34–65; idem, “Guerillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Coun-
terinsurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959–1965,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 6 (Winter 1995):
213
214 notes to pages xvii–xix
304–27; idem, “The Origins of Internal Security in Colombia: Part I—A CIA Special Team
Surveys la Violencia, 1959–1960,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 10 (Winter 1999): 24–61; idem,
The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958–1966
(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Monographs Series, 2002); and idem, “Counterinsurgency
in Colombia: A U.S. National Security Perspective, 1958–1966” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Miami, 2001).
7. For an English-language account of Spanish-language la Violencia historiography,
see Gonzalo Sánchez, “La Violencia: New Research, New Questions,” trans. Peter Bakewell,
Hispanic American Historical Review 65 (Nov. 1985): 789–807. See also Germán Guzmán
Campos, La Violencia en Colombia: Parte descriptiva (Cali: Ediciones Progresso, 1968);
Jaime Arocha, La Violencia en el Quindio (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1979); and
Arturo Alape, ed., La paz, la Violencia: Testigos de excepción (Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana
Editorial, 1985). For coverage of the role of the military in Colombian society, see James O.
Icehour, “The Military in Colombian Politics” (M.A. thesis, George Washington Univer-
sity, 1976); Anthony Maingot, “Colombia: Civil-Military Relations in a Political Culture of
Conflict” (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1967); Adolfo León Atehortúa and Humberto
R. Vélez, Estado y fuerzas armadas en Colombia: 1886–1953 (Cali: Pontificia Univeridad Ja-
veriana, 1994); and Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul
E. Sigmund (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989).
8. See Álvaro Valencia Tovar, ed., Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 6
vols. (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 1993); idem, Corea: Resurgimiento de las ceni-
zas (Bogotá: Canal Ramírez-Antares, 1977); idem, Testimonio de una época (Bogotá: Edito-
rial Planeta Colombiana, 1992); and Valencia Tovar and Jairo Sandoval Franky, Colombia
en la Guerra de Corea: La historia secreta (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001).
9. Gonzalo Sánchez, Guerra y políliticas en le sociedad colombiana (Bogotá: El Áncora
Editores, 1991); idem, Bandoleros, gamonales y campesinos: El caso de la violencia en Colombia
(Bogotá: Ancora, 1983); idem, Las diás de la revolución: Gaitanismo y el 9 de abril en Provin-
cia (Bogotá: Centro Cultural Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 1983); and César Torres Del Río, Fuerzas
Armadas y seguridad nacional (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2000).
10. Álvaro Tirado Mejía, Colombia en la OEA (Bogotá: El Àncora, 1998); idem, Co-
lombia en la negociación de conflictos armadas, 1900–1998 (Bogotá: Museo Nacional de
Colombia, 1999); and Álvaro Tirado and Carlos Holguín, Colombia in the U.N., 1945–1995
(Bogotá: National Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary, 1995).
11. General Alberto Ruíz Novoa’s El Batallón Colombia en Corea, 1951–1954 (Bogotá:
Imprenta Nacional, 1956) is the official history of the Colombian Army in Korea. The book
relies on wartime documents, chronologies, photographs, and rosters to tell the Colom-
bia Battalion story. Ruíz addresses the long-term importance of the war in Enseñanzas de
la campaña de Corea: Aplicables al ejército de Colombia (Bogotá: Imprenta Fotograbado,
1956). Valuable memoirs include Pablo E. Torres Almeyda, Colombia en la guerra de Corea:
Impresiones de un combatiente (Bogotá: n.p., 1953); Ernesto Hernández, Colombia en Corea:
Impresiones de un tripulante de A.R.C. “Almirante Padilla” en su viaje a Corea (Bogotá:
Imprimatur, 1953); Francisco Caicedo Montúa, Banzay: Diario en las trincheras coreanas
(Bogotá: n.p., 1961); Alejandro Martínez Roa, Sangre en Corea. (Bogotá: Editorial Gráficas
Mundo Nuevo, 1974); and Gabriel Puyana García, ¡Por la libertad . . . en tierra extraña!
Crónicas y reminiscencias de la guerra de Corea (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1993).
12. U.S. News and World Report, 10 Feb. 2003.
notes to pages xix–5 215
13. For more on Colombia’s contemporary situation, see Patrick L. Clawson and Rens-
selaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996); Abraham
F. Lowenthal, “United States–Latin American Relations at the Century’s Turn: Managing
the ‘Intermestic’ Agenda,” in The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First-Century
View, ed. Albert Fishlow and James Jones (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 109–36; Dennis
M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., Colombia: A Country Study, 3d ed. (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 253–312; New York Times, 31 Aug. 2000; U.S.
News & World Report, 4 Sept. 2000 and 10 Feb. 2003; and Washington Post, 31 Aug. 2000,
16 Apr. 2002, and 17 Apr. 2002.
1. Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945
1. New York Times, 3 Aug. 1938.

2. “Flight of Army Planes to Bogotá at the Time of the Inauguration of President
Santos,” 12 Aug. 1938, 821.00, Box 5620, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1930–1939,
RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter
NARA).
3. Caffery to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 9 Aug. 1938, Foreign Relations of the
United States (hereafter FRUS), 1938, 5:462–63; Hull to Winthrop S. Greene, 12 Aug. 1938,
FRUS, 1938, 5:463–64.
4. Randall, Colombia and the United States, 16; Parks, Colombia and the United
States, 124; and Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, 60–73. Ambassador Arthur Bliss
Lane discussed the compartmentalization of Colombia and its impact on Colombian opin-
ion toward the United States in Lane to Cordell Hull, 15 May 1942, 820.00, Box 133, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA.
5. Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia, 195–215.
6. Randall, Colombia and the United States, 18, 33–42.
7. See David McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama
Canal, 1870–1914 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 45–203; and Park, Colombia and
the United States, 338–61.
8. For more on the separation of Panama and the building of the Canal, see Mi-
chael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forces Alliance (Athens: Univ. of Geor-
gia Press, 1992), 66–67; Eduardo Lemaitre Román, Panamá y su separación de Colombia
(Bogotá: Banco Popular, 1972); Humberto E. Ricord, Panama en la guerra de los mil dias
(Panama City: n.p., 1986); and Federick Marks, Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theordore
Roosevelt (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979). For a critical appraisal of U.S. policy and
the canal, see Richard L. Lael, Arrogant Diplomacy: U.S. Policy toward Colombia, 1903–1922
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1987); and Walter LaFeber, The Panama Ca-
nal (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978.)
9. For more on U.S. diplomacy toward Colombia during the first decades of the
twentieth century, see John Milton Cooper Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson
and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ., 1983); Stephen
J. Randall, The Diplomacy of Modernization: Colombian-American Relations, 1920–1940
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977); and Marco Fidel Suárez, Doctrinas internacionales,
vol. 1 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1955).
216 notes to pages 6–9
10. For more on the Good Neighbor Policy, see Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neigh-
bor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1995); and
Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (Oxford: Ox-
ford Univ. Press, 1979), 38–39.
11. On this point, Colombian president-elect Alfonso López stated before taking of-
fice in 1942 that hemispheric solidarity “is due, without the shadow of a doubt, to the fact
that the Good Neighbor Policy, which has already enjoyed a decade of serious and hon-
orable practice . . . helped to create an atmosphere of active friendship.” See “Address of
Alfonso López at the Pan-American Society Banquet, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York,
20 July 1942,” 821.001/“López, Alfonso,” Box 4191, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
12. George C. Marshall interview, in George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminis-
cences for Forrest C. Pogue, ed. Larry I. Bland (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research
Foundation, 1991), 285.
13. Marshall to Daniel Van Voohis, 2 Sept. 1939, in The Papers of George Catlett Mar-
shall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press,
1986), 2:48–49; Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United
States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 118–19.
14. “Colombia,” 29 May 1944, 000.1, Box 344, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File,
RG 319, NARA.
15. “Cominicado sobre el incidente de nuestra legacion en Berlin,” in Colombia, Min-
isterio de Relaciones Exteriores, Boletín semanal (24 Nov. 1938). The first news account
of the situation appeared in El Tiempo on 11 Nov. 1938, although an article on Germany’s
“drastic and medieval laws” appeared the day before to set the mood for the breaking story.
See also El Tiempo, 12 Nov. 1938 and 25 Nov. 1938.
16. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1:604.
17. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 4 Mar. 1938, FRUS, 1938, 5:3; U.S. Department of
State, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Eighth International Con-
ference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 2–27, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1941); and idem, Report on the Results of the Conference Submitted
to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939). Secretary Hull visited Buenaventura, Co-
lombia, en route to Lima (Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Boletín semanal
[7 Dec. 1938]).
18. The plan provided for a permanent secretariat, a congress with political authority
and “other organizations which the association might establish.” President Santos inherited
the plan from President Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38); López took up the idea again
during his second presidency. See “Instructions to Delegates” [undated], FRUS, 1938, 5:60–
61; Greene to Hull, 17 Nov. 1938, FRUS, 1938, 5:41–42; Welles to López, 23 Mar. 1938, FRUS,
1938, 5:15–17; Kelchner to Welles, 30 Mar. 1938, FRUS, 1938, 5:18–19; and Colombia, Minis-
terio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria de relaciones exteriores, 1939 (Bogotá: Impreneta
Nacional, 1939), 12–13. For more on Colombia and the Lima Conference, see Colombia,
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Boletín semanal (19 Dec. 1938); and El Tiempo, 10 Nov.
1938, 11 Nov. 1938, 8 Dec. 1938, and 12 Dec. 1938.
19. Colombia, Presidente de la República, Mensaje del Presidente de la República de
Colombia al Congreso Nacional, 1939 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1939), 12–15.
notes to pages 9–12 217
20. Braden to Hull, 3 Aug. 1939, 800.1/803, Box 52, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
21. “Declaration of Panama,” Oct. 1939, FRUS, 1939, 5:36–37.
22. For published documentary records of the conference, see FRUS, 1939, 5:15–41;
U.S. Department of State, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Meet-
ing of Foreign Ministers of American Republics Held at Panama, September 23–October 3,
1939 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), and Report on the Meeting
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republic, Panama, September 23–October
3, 1939, Submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director
General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939). For a map with the
security zone see FRUS, 1939, 5:34. For more on Colombia’s position relating to the inter-
national crisis in 1939, see Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1939,
12–13, 48–59.
23. Braden to Hull, 24 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:200–201; and Braden to Hull, 12 July
1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:222; and “Inter-American Commission for Territorial Administration
of European Colonies & Possessions in the Americas, 1942,” Office File (OF) 4838, Roos-
evelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter FDRL). See
also “Havana Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” in U.S. Department of State,
Bulletin, 24 Aug. 1940, 128; Pan American Union, Report on the Second Meeting of the Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Havana, July 21–30, 1940, Submitted to
the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General (Washington, D.C.:
Pan American Union, 1940); and El Tiempo, 24 June 1940 and 1 Aug. 1940.
24. “Memorandum from President Santos,” June 1941, President’s Personal Files 7631,
Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
25. El Tiempo, 21 July 1941.
26. New York Times, 24 Apr. 1941.
27. New York Times, 17 June 1941.
28. “Conferencia dictada por el señor Presidente de la República,” 18 Dec. 1941, in La
Guerra Mundial y la politica internacional de Colombia (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1941),
9–21; “Mensaje del Presidente Santos al Presidente Roosevelt,” 13 Dec. 1941, 5–6; and “Naval
Attaché’s Report,” 22 Sept. 1943, 821.00/1563, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
29. For more on the Inter-American Defense Board, see Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, General Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA; and Welles to Roosevelt, 21 Mar. 1942
(and other documents) in OF 4857, “Inter-American Defense Board, 1942–1944,” Roosevelt
Papers, FDRL.
30. Quoted in William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Ath-
ens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1990), 114.
31. Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press, 1985), 14–121.
32. W. Dirk Raat, Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas (Athens: Univ. of
Georgia Press, 1992), 148–53.
33. “War History, 1939–1945,” Box 1, Department of State, Rio de Janeiro Embassy,
General Records, 1945, RG 84, NARA; John W. F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil (Austin: Univ. of
Texas Press, 1967), 233–34; and Frank D. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–
1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), 288–90.
34. Colombia, Presidente, Mensaje, 1942 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1942), 23.
35. These allegations centered on improper handling of scrap-metal sales to the
United States. See Braden to Hull, 16 Oct. 1941 and attached documents, 821.002/434, Box
4292, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
36. For more on the elections, see “Progress of the Campaign for President of Colom-
bia” and attached memorandum from Alfonso López Michelson, 18 Apr. 1942, 821.00/144,
Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
37. For more on López’s “unpredictable” personality, see Lane to Hull, 21 Apr. 1944,
821.00/1743, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. On
the trip, López spent one night in the White House with President Roosevelt. During that
stay, López again pitched the idea of an Association of American Nations, which would be-
come the Organization of American States, formed in 1948. For more on the trip, see Hull
to Lane, 15 June 1942, 821.001, “López, Alfonso”/133; Lane to Hull, 12 May 1942, 821.001,
“López, Alfonso”/134; and Hull to Lane, July 1942, 821.001, “López, Alfonso”/136, Box 4289,
Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
38. Braden to Hull, 14 Aug. 1942, 800.10, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA; and Duggan to Stettinius, 18 Mar. 1944, 821.00/1782, Box 4289,
Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. For more on the religious
controversy in Colombia, see Daniel H. Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin America: The
Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981).
39. “Colombian Political Review,” 31 July 1943, Box 4289, Department of State, Deci-
mal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; and El Tiempo, 19 Mar. 1944 and 20 Mar. 1944; Gus-
tavo Humerto Rodríguez, “Segunda administración de López Pumarejo,” in Nueva historia
de Colombia, ed. Álvaro Tirado Mejía (Bogotá: Planeta, 1989), 1:373–96.
40. J. Mark Ruhl, “The Military,” in Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in
Colombia, ed. R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman, and Maurio Solaún (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 183.
41. Lane to Hull, 2 Sept. 1943, 821.00/1518, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
42. Lane to Hull, 1 Oct. 1943, 821.00/1–524, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
43. Lane to Hull, 19 Apr. 1944, 821.00/1741, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. The career of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán is treated at greater
length in chapter 3. For more on his early activities, see Herbert Braun, The Assassination
of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press,
1985); and Richard E. Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography (Pittsburgh:
Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1978).
44. Peréz also distributed a small paper, La Voz del Pueblo, to citizens at no cost. Lane
to Hull, 2 Sept. 1943, 821.00/1518; and FBI Report, “Proposed Revolution in Colombia,” 18
Jan. 1944, 821.00/8–644, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59,
NARA.
45. El Siglo ran almost daily articles on the subject from July until late December
1943. See also, “Naval Attaché’s Report,” 22 Sept. 1943, 821.00/1563, Box 4289, Department
of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
46. Braden to Hull, 821.00, “López, Alfonso”/128, Box 4291, Department of State,
Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
47. See Lane to Hull, 17 Dec. 1943, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, RG
59, NARA. The trend toward congressional paralysis began in 1942. At one point, El Tiempo
characterized Congressional infighting as “stupid and criminal.” El Tiempo, 15 Sept. 1942.
48. Lane to Hull, 30 Sept. 1943, 821.00/1539, Box 4292, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
49. El Tiempo, 16 and 19 Nov. 1943; El Siglo, 19 Nov. 1943 and 10 Jan. 1944; Lane to Hull,
27 Jan. 1944, 821.00/1655, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59,
NARA.
50. Weeks to Commanding General, U.S. Caribbean Defense Command (hereafter
CDC), 27 Nov. 1943, 091.00, Box 252, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA.
51. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 27 Nov. 1943, FRUS, 1943, 6:5; Colombia, Min-
isterio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1944.
52. New York Times, 29 Nov. 1943.
53. Lane to Hull, 4 Oct. 1943, 821.00/1549, Box 4292, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
54. Land to Hull, 29 Nov. 1943, FRUS, 1943, 6:7.
55. Lane to Hull, 27 Nov. 1943, FRUS, 1943, 6:3–5; and Lane to Hull, 30 Nov. 1943,
821.00/1633, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
56. John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 34–37.
57. “Memorandum Prepared by the War Department, Revised by the Department of
State, Approved by President Roosevelt,” 27 July 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:12.
58. Minister of War José Joaquín Castro Mantínez to Braden, 29 Mar. 1939; Braden to
Stone, 31 Mar. 1939; Castro to Braden, 3 Apr. 1939; Castro to Braden, 29 Mar., 1939, 823.00,
Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
59. Minister of War José Joaquín Castro Martínez to Braden, 29 Mar. 1939, 823.00,
Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA. The
group included Major General David L. Stone, Brigadier General Richard C. Moore, Briga-
dier General Herbert A. Dargue, Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Brady, Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph B. Pate, and Major Mark Divine. See also El Tiempo, 7 June 1939, 10 June 1939; El
Espectador, 8 June 1939, 9 June 1939, 12 June 1939; and El Siglo, 9 June 1939.
60. Braden to Hull, 26 Apr. 1939, 823.00; and Stone to Braden, 13 Apr. 1939, 823.00,
Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA; El
Tiempo, 17–20 Apr. 1939; El Espectador, 15 Apr. 1939; “Memorandum for the Ambassador,”
Feb. 1943, 820.01, Box 133, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943,
RG 84, NARA.
61. For more on symbolic activities, such as U.S. naval visits to Colombian ports and
U.S. military air shows, see Lane to Hull, 28 Aug. 1942, 820.00/“military,” Box 114, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA; Anderson to Braden,
27 Mar. 1939; and Braden to Hull, 22 Mar. 1939, 833.00, Box 55, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA. See also La Razon, 22 Mar. 1939; Van
Voorhis to Braden, 17 Mar. 1941, 820/891; and Braden to Hull, 21 Aug. 1941, 820.00, Box 98,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1941, RG 84, NARA. El Tiempo, 10
Aug. 1944; and El Siglo, 6 Aug. 1941 and 7 Aug. 1941.
62. Braden to Hull, 22 May 1939, 820.70, Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA. Later that year, the Colombian Army also terminated
the contract of Colonel Gunter Braun, a German Army instructor at the Colombian War
College. See Braden to Hull, 14 Oct. 1939, Department of State, Box 54, Bogotá Embassy,
General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
63. Braden to Hull, 22 May 1939, 820.70; and Braden to Welles, 13 June 1939, 879.6,
Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
64. “Panama Canal Defense and Colombia,” 27 May 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:58–60; and
Braden to Hull, 11 June 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:60–65.
65. Braden to Hull, 26 Sept. 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:82–83.
66. Steteson Conn and Bryon Fairchild, United States Army in World War II, The
Western Hemisphere, The Framework for Hemispheric Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1960), 176–78. Keith to Hull, 23 May 1940; and Keith to Hull,
24 May 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:57–58. Braden to Hull, 13 Sept. 1940; and Braden to Hull 26
Sept. 1940; FRUS, 1940, 5:77–79, 82–83. Wright to Hull, 1 Oct. 1940, 810.20, Box 52, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1940, RG 84, NARA.
67. El Tiempo, 28 July 1938; and Washington Post, 25 July 1938.
68. José Joaquín Castro M. to Daniel Samper Ortega, 28 Dec. 1938, Folio 274, Box 165,
Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá,
Colombia (hereafter AGN).
69. “Agreement between the United States and Colombia Providing for a Naval Mis-
sion, Signed November 23, 1938” (U.S. Department of State, Executive Agreement Series,
No. 140) or [53 Stat. 2074]; and “Agreement Between the United States and Colombia for
a Military Aviation Mission, Signed November 23, 1938” (Department of State, Executive
Agreement Series, No. 141) or [53 Stat. 2084].
70. La Razon, 22 Aug. 1939.
71. New York Times, 28 Mar. 1940.
72. “Agreement Between the United States and Colombia Regarding a Military Mis-
sion to Colombia, Signed May 29, 1942” (Department of State, Executive Agreement Series,
No. 250) or [56 Stat. 1483].
73. El Tiempo, 19 Nov. 1938, 27 Nov. 1938.
74. El Espectador, 10 June 1939.
75. El Siglo, 27 Nov. 1938.
76. Diario de la Costa, 2 Dec. 1938.
77. El Siglo, 28 Nov. 1938. In a 14 June 1939 El Siglo editorial, another writer added
that “dictators [such as Adolf Hitler] are more practical and alert” and “more efficient than
speeches about good neighborliness.” Translation from Bushnell, Eduardo Santos, 13.
78. Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1939.
79. Roosevelt to Braden, 3 May 1939, OF 3193, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
80. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, La profesionalización militar en Colombia, 1907–
1944 (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987).
81. Braden to Wells, 28 June 1939, 830.00, Box 55, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA. Welles to Roosevelt, 6 Mar. 1942, OF 313,
Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
82. “U.S. Military Mission Report,” Nov. 1941, 319.1; and “U.S. Military Mission Re-
port,” Aug. 1943, 319.1, Box 255, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA. José Manuel
Villalobos Barradad, “Holocausto y glorias,” in Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas mili-
tares de Colombia, 5:149–57.
83. “U.S. Military Mission Report,” Dec. 1944; and “U.S. Military Mission Report,” June
1945, Box 454, CDC Decimal File, 1944–1945, RG 548, NARA. José Rodríquez R., “El nuevo
ejercito Colombiano,” in Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 2:371–72.
84. “Plans for the Effective Support of Latin American Republics,” 24 Nov. 1941,
381.00, Box 261, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA; and “Cooperation and
Collaboration of the Republic of Colombia with the United States in the Second World
War,” May 1945, Historical Manuscripts Collection, Center of Military History, Washing-
ton, D.C., 12–13 (hereafter CMH).
85. “Cooperation and Collaboration of the Republic of Colombia with the United
States in the Second World War,” May 1945, Historical Manuscripts Collection, CMH,
14–15, 17. President Santos talked about the importance of Colombian sovereignty in Co-
lombia, Presidente, Mensaje, 1941 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1941).
86. Brigadier General H. C. Ingles to Colonel Serafin Montesinos, 22 Mar. 1942,
321.02, Box 256, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA.
87. “Meeting Minutes,” 24 Mar. 1942, 321.02, Box 256, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943,
RG 548, NARA.
88. “Meeting Minutes,” 28 Mar. 1942, 321.02, Box 256, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943,
RG 548, NARA.
89. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 2 July 1942, 821.00 “López, Alfonso”/159, Box
90. “Shore Patrols at Barranquilla,” prepared by Minister of Foreign Relations Dr.
Carlos Lozano y Lozano, 31 May 1944, 830.00; and “Permanent Shore Patrol, Barranquilla,
Colombia,” Oct. 1944, 830.00, Box 133, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Re-
cords, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
91. “Memorandum Prepared by Admiral William D. Leahy,” 13 June 1938, 833.00; and
Greene to Hull, 9 July 1938, 833.00, Box 39, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, RG 84, NARA; “FBI Report: San Andrés and Old Providencia Islands, Posses-
sions of the Republic of Colombia,” 2 June 1943, 821.00/1485, Department of State, Box
4289, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; and Weeks to Wiley, 30 Jan. 1945, Folder 1,
Box 5, John Cooper Wiley Papers, FDRL.
92. Muccio to Brett, 30 Nov. 1943, 091.00, Box 252, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG
548, NARA.
93. Robert L. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987 (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1987), 169–70; Eduardo Wills Olaya, “La armada contemporanea,” in
Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 4:356–62; and Ramon Santo
Domingo to Embajador de Colombia, 18 June 1943, Folio 300, Box 166, Records of the
Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN.
94. “Employment of Latin American Units in Africa,” 12 Dec. 1942, in Bland and
Stevens, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 3:471.
95. “Current Situation in Colombia,” 15 Feb. 1944, 000.1, Army Intelligence Project
96. “Cooperation and Collaboration of the Republic of Colombia with the United States
in the Second World War,” May 1945, Historical Manuscripts Collection, CMH, 66–67.
97. “Brazilian Expeditionary Force Journal,” Willis D. Crittenberger Papers, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (hereafter USAMHI). João Mascarenhas
de Moraes, The Brazilian Expeditionary Force by Its Commander (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966); John N. Greeley, “Brazil’s Modern Army,” Military Affairs
(Spring 1944): 71–73; Frank D. McCann Jr., “The Fórça Expedicionária Brasileira in the Italian
Campaign, 1944–1945,” Army History (Spring 1993): 1–11; McCann, Brazilian-American Alli-
ance, 403–42.
98. Stephen I. Schwab, “The Role of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force in World
War II: Late, Limited, but Symbolically Significant,” Journal of Military History 66 (Oct.
2002): 1115–40; William G. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles: The Mexican Expeditionary Air Force,
Escuadrón 201 in World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 1997); Donald F.
Harrison, “United States–Mexican Military Collaboration during World War II” (Ph.D.
diss., Georgetown University, 1976).
99. Lane to Faris, 4 Nov. 1942; 820.00, Box 133, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
General Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA; and Hull to Lane, 1 Jan. 1944, 820.00, Box 149, De-
partment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
100. Brown to Lang, 15 Dec. 1939, 820.01, Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, General Records, 1936–1939, RG 84, NARA; Colonel J. M. Silva Plazas to Lieutenant
Ernesto Buenaventura, 26 Apr. 1943, Folio 300, Box 166, Records of the Colombian Lega-
tion in Washington, AGN.
101. Valencia Tovar to author, 6 Jan. 2001.
102. Hull to Braden, 12 Sept. 1939, 820.07; Welles to Dr. Gabriel Turbay, 20 Dec. 1939,
820.07; Braden to Hull, 15 Dec. 1939; 820.01; Whitson to Lang, 15 Dec. 1939, 820.01; Lane to
Hull, 28 Dec. 1943, 820.01, Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records,
1939, RG 84, NARA. Warren to Major Willock, 29 Apr. 1943, 830.07; Hull to Lane, 20 July
1943, 820.01; and Warren to General Domingo Esponel, 20 July 1943, 820.07, Box 133, De-
partment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA; and Welles to
Wiley, 10 Jan. 1945, Folder 1, Box 5, John Cooper Wiley Papers, FDRL.
103. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 10 July 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:71–72; “Joint Reso-
lution to Authorize the Secretaries of War and Navy to Assist the Governments of Ameri-
can Republics to Increase their Military and Naval Establishments,” 29 June 1939, Box 55,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1936–1939, RG 84, NARA. Col-
onel Rafael A. Pizarro to Braden, 30 Aug. 1939, 824.00; and Braden to Pizarro 30 Aug.
1939, 824.00, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, Box 55, RG 84,
NARA. “Lend-Lease Act ” [55 Stat. 31]; and “Agreement between the United States and Co-
lombia Regarding Principles Allying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War, Signed
at Washington, March 17, 1942,” in FRUS, 1942, 5:189–92. The Colombian government pre-
pared its request for military material with the assistance of the U.S. military mission.
Those orders were then handed to Colombia’s two Lend-Lease purchasing agents, the U.S.
military and naval attachés, who in turn submitted the orders to the Department of War.
Most Latin American republics, like Colombia, had one or two purchasing agents. Brazil,
the largest recipient of Lend-Lease material, had four such agents. “Report on Lend-Lease,
1943,” President Secretary’s Files (hereafter PSF), Lend-Lease, Folder “July 1943–January
1944,” Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. For more on the Lend-Lease program and U.S. strategic
priorities, see “Memorandum Prepared by the War Plan Division of the War Department,”
27 July 1940, FRUS, 5:12–13; and “Contributions of the Other American Republics to the
War Effort of the United Nations,” 31 Dec. 1942, 820.00, Box 113, Department of State, Bo-
gotá Embassy, General Records, 1942, RG 84, NARA.
104. For small arms, see Lane to Hull, 23 Feb. 1944, 821.00/1679; and Lane to Hull, 25
Feb. 1944, 821.00/1688, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59,
NARA. Hull to Lane, 26 Feb. 1944, FRUS, 1944, 7:804–5; and Hull to Lane, 31 Mar. 1944,
FRUS, 1944, 7:808–9. Espinel to Lane, 18 Jan. 1944, 851.00, Box 62, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
105. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría to General Domingo Espinel, 18 Jan. 1945, Folio 317,
Box 166, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN. “Memorandum of
Conversation,” Turbay and Duggan, 4 Jan. 1944, 851.00, Box 62, Department of State, Bo-
gotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
106. Through surplus disposal, Colombia received items ranging from sinks to engine
motors to rubber boots. The Colombian national airline acquired a large stock of aircraft
and spare parts. See Colonel Hernando Mora A. to Domingo, 11 July 1945, Folio 317, Box
166, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN; Warren to Lane, 13 Sept.
1944, 824.00; and “Policy for Disposal of Surplus Property,” 17 Oct. 1944, Box 149, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
107. Roosevelt to Stimson, 1 Aug. 1942, OF 4913, “Lend Lease, April 1941–April 1942,”
Box 12, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. U.S. Congress, Eighth Report to Congress on Lend Lease
Operations, December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945),
22–23, and Seventh Report to Congress on Lend Lease Operations, December 1943 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 36–37.
108. The attaché continued: “Most South American nations are recipients of Lend
Lease materials and each know in general what the others are receiving. Those countries
through which new aircraft must pass to reach their ultimate destination are often alarmed
at the fact that shipments destined for particular countries are in excess of those they
themselves receive. News reels sometimes display the pride of other nations in receiving
items not included in the Lend Lease requirements of the countries where the pictures
are displayed. This has led to unfortunate results in that it promotes distrust by suggest-
ing favoritism and as a corollary causes jealously. People feel that those who receive most
are in a position to dictate to their neighbors and that the United States is responsible
for their arrival at that position. As a concrete example, it has been said that the United
States is arming Peru to handle Chile; and as another, that Peru will not be long in using
her might against Ecuador.” See “Increase of South American International Antipathies
through Lend Lease and Propaganda,” 15 Feb. 1943, 851.00, Box 47, Department of State,
States in the Second World War,” May 1945, Historical Manuscripts Collection, CMH, 75.
110. “U.S. Military Mission Report,” Aug. 1943, Box 244, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943,
RG 548, NARA
111. Lane to Hull, 25 Oct. 1943, 821.00/1587, Box 4287, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
112. “Conference on Colombian Naval Affairs Held with the Colombian Chief of
Staff,” 29 Dec. 1943, 091.00, Box 252, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA.
States in the Second World War,” May 1945, Historical Manuscripts Collection, CMH, 65.
115. Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign
against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2003), 1.
116. “Minutes of Conference Held in the Office of Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command,” 28 Dec. 1943, 091.00, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548, NARA.
117. FBI report, “Colombia Today, 1942,” Box 141, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, FDRL;
and Welles to Roosevelt, 13 June 1940, Folder “Welles: June-December 1940,” PSF, Box 76,
FDRL. For more on German propaganda, see Forsyth to Hull, 18 Sept. 1940, 821.00-N/157,
Box 4291, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. To combat Ger-
man propaganda, the Colombian government and U.S. Department of State also cooper-
ated to distribute pro-Allied films, literature, and radio programs. “Colombian Cooperation
with the Coordination Committee for Colombia,” 31 Jan. 1945, Folder 1, Box 5, John Cooper
Wiley Papers, FDRL. See also “Military Attaché Report SI-379,” 21 Sept. 1943, 000.24, Box
345, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1940–1944, 1941–1945, RG 319, NARA.
118. For more on the FBI in Colombia during the war, see “Request of the Colombian
Government for the Services of a Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 4 Jan.
1940, 821.105/80, Box 4292, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
119. “Attaché Report,” 14 June 1940, 821.00-N/110, Box 4290, Department of State,
120. “Naval Attaché Report,” 14 Jan. 1941, 821.105/116, Box 4292, Department of State,
121. Park to Hull, 14 Aug. 1940, 821.00-N/126, Box 4291, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. On corruption, see “Military Attaché Report,” 5 Aug. 1940,
821.00-N/133, Box 4291, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
122. “Naval Attaché Report,” 14 Jan. 1941, 821.105/116, Box 4292, Department of State,
123. “Subversive Activities and the General Political Situation in Medellín Consular
District,” 7 May 1942, 821.00/1414, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–
1944, RG 59, NARA.
124. “Subversive Activities and the General Political Situation in Medellín Consular
District,” 7 May 1942, 821.00/1414.
125. Braden to Hull, 31 Oct. 1940, 821.00-N/169, Box 4291, Department of State, Deci-
mal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. For more on German propaganda, including samples
of seized literature, see Braden to Hull, 8 Jan. 1940, 821.00-P/2, Box 4291, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
127. Silvia Galvis and Alberto Donadio, Colombia Nazi, 1939–1945: Espionaje alemán, la
cacería del FBI, Santos, López y los pactos secretos (Bogotá: Planeta, 1986), 165–76.
128. “Remarks of Dr. Santos, 7 March 1939,” 800.10, Box 52, Department of State, Bo-
129. Generals George C. Marshall and Henry H. Arnold even paid Trippe a personal
visit to make their case. David G. Haglund, “De-Lousing SCADTA: The Role of Pan Amer-
ican Airways in U.S. Aviation Diplomacy in Colombia, 1939–1940,” Aviation Historian 30
(Sept. 1983): 177–82, 187–90.
130. Braden to Hull, 31 Dec. 1939, 820.00, Box 52, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
131. “Monthly Political Report, Aug. 20–Sept. 20, 1939,” Barranquilla, Colombia, pre-
pared by Consul Nelson R. Park, 800.00; “Monthly Political Report, October 20–Novem-
ber 20, 1939,” Barranquilla, Colombia, prepared by Park, 800.00, Box 52, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, General Files, 1936–1949, RG 84, NARA; “Nazi and ‘fifth column’
activities in Barranquilla,” 23 June 1940, 821.00-N/79; and Braden to Hull, 20 Mar. 1940,
821.00-N/55, Box 4291, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; and
documents collected in FRUS, 1940, 5:723–35.
132. Lane to Hull, 16 Dec. 1943, 821.00/1640, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. Braden to Hull, 22 Aug. 1940, 821.00-N/136; Braden to
Hull, 16 June 1940, 821.00-N/91; and F. C. Elstob, IBM, to Braden, 31 May 1940, 821.00-
N/91, Box 4291, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; “Report of
Inspection Trip to Bucaramanga,” William Lee Fluharty, 31 Oct. 1940, 821.00-N/169, Box
4291, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; Bushnell, Eduardo
Santos, 62–65; and Galvis and Donadio, Colombia Nazi, 101–40.
133. Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Diario oficial, 10 July 1940, 20 Oct. 1941, and
24 Oct. 1941 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1938–1954).
134. J. Edgar Hoover to Braden, 3 Sept. 1940, 821.00-N/148, Box 4291, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. Several Gestapo agents used diplomatic pa-
pers to cover their operations. FBI Report, “Colombia Today, 1942,” Box 141, Papers of Harry
L. Hopkins, FDRL.
135. Braden to Hull, 2 Feb. 1942, 821.111/142, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–
1944, RG 59, NARA; and Galvis and Donadio, Colombia Nazi, 55–60.
136. Lawrence A. Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle (Ath-
ens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1999), 159–68.
137. Arthur R. Williams, American Vice Consul to Braden, 5 May 1939, 820.02, Box 54,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
138. Braden to Secretary of State, 22 May 1939, 820.02; W. Boggs, Geographer, De-
partment of State to Braden, 19 July 1939; 820.02; Braden to Boggs, 18 Aug. 1939, 820.02;
“Report of Dr. Papenoe,” 820.02, Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
139. “Report of Dr. Papenoe,” 820.02, Box 54, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA.
140. For the historical development of mining in the region, and a better sense of the
difficulties presented by the environment of the Chocó, see William Frederick Sharp, Slavery
on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombian Chocó, 1680–1810 (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press,
1976). See also Randall, Colombia and the United States, 179–83. The Banco del República,
the only legal purchaser of platinum, paid 7.20 pesos per ounce. Black market prices hovered
between 13 and 16 pesos per ounce. “Platinum Smuggling in Colombia,” 28 July 1943, 863.00,
Box 52, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, RG 84, NARA.
141. “Memorandum: Platinum,” 26 Oct. 1943, 863.40, Box 52, Department of State,
142. Peruvian authorities arrested another major smuggler, Brazilian Alderedo Ruben
de Farias, in Lima. “Memorandum to the Ambassador,” 21 June 1944, 863.40; and “Plati-
num Smuggling in Colombia, 1 Nov. 1944, 863.40, Box 62, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, Classified Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
143. El Liberal, 15 June 1944.
144. “MIS report on Platinum Smuggling,” 10 Jan. 1944, 863.4, Box 62, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
145. “Minutes of Conference Held in the Office of Commanding General, Caribbean

Defense Command,” 28 Dec. 1943, 091.00, Box 252, CDC Decimal File, 1941–1943, RG 548,
NARA.
146. Lane to Hull, 3 Feb. 1944, 863.4, Box 62, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
Classified Records, RG 84, NARA. “Planned Police Action against Platinum Smuggling,” 22
Oct. 1943, 863.4; and “Platinum,” 26 Oct. 1943, Box 52, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
Classified Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA. “MIS report on Platinum Smuggling,” 10 Jan. 1944,
863.40; Hull to Lane, 11 Jan. 1944, 864.40; Fluharty to Lane, 3 Feb. 1944, 863.40; Stettinius to
Lane, 4 Mar. 1944, 863.40; and “Memorandum of Conversation,” 10 May 1944, 863.40, Box 62,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1944, RG 84, NARA.
147. Quoted in Rosemary Thorp, “Economies in the 1940s,” in Latin America in the
1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, ed. David Rock (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1994), 48.
148. “Economic and Financial Review,” June 1943, 850.00, Box 137, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA; New York Times, 30 Apr.
1941; “Resume of Political Situation,” 18 Sept. 1942, 821.00/1443, Box 4289, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA; and FRUS, 1943, 5:107–13.
149. These loans amounted to approximately $44 million, over half of which Colom-
bia owed to U.S. bondholders. The total including municipal and department loans figured
around $158 million, of which Colombians owed $115 million to U.S. bondholders. For a
complete breakdown of the loans, including the 1927 and 1938 federal government con-
tracts, see Welles to Roosevelt, 20 Nov. 1939, Folder “Welles, July–December 1939, Box 76,
PSF, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Braden to Hull, 21 July 1939, 800.10, Box 52, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1939, RG 84, NARA. El Tiempo, 21 July 1939. For
negotiations leading to the settlement of the debt problem, see FRUS, 1939; 5:469–519; and
FRUS, 1940, 5:695–723.
150. Braden to Welles, 19 Apr. 1940, FRUS, 1940, 5:698–700.
151. Hull to Braden, 25 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, 5:72–73; and Lane to Hull, 13 Jan. 1943,
FRUS, 1943, 6:69–71.
152. Wall Street Journal, 1 Dec. 1944.
153. Ibid.
154. “Correspondencia Eximbank,” Folio 129, Box 205, Records of the Colombian
Legation in Washington, AGN. For more on health and sanitation programs, see FRUS,
1942, 5:221–27. See also untitled memorandum, Folder 1, Box 5, John Cooper Wiley Pa-
pers, FDRL; “Memorandum on Progress of Work Undertaken by Mr. Worth D. Ross,” 22
May 1939, OF 313, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; and “Loan of Services of Road Construction
Superintendent for the Department of Cundinamarca,” 11 July 1940, 821.01A/28, Box 4292,
155. FRUS, 1941, 5:40–55.
156. Hull to Lane, 20 June 1942, FRUS, 1942, 5:188. Untitled Memorandum, 30 Jan. 1945,
Folder 1, Box 5, John Cooper Wiley Papers, FDRL; and “Strategic Materials,” 24 Feb. 1943,
820.00, Box 133, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA.
157. Gonzáles Fernández to Lane, 29 Mar. 1943, 820.00, Box 133, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA. Bramming, assistant field manager
Pato Consolidated Gold Dredging, to Benson, 23 Apr. 1943, 820, Box 133, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1943, RG 84, NARA.
158. See documents collected under OF 4217, “Inter-American Coffee Board,” Roose
velt Papers, FDRL.
159. Unlike some other Latin American coffee producers, Colombian coffee found its
principal market in the United States. Thus, U.S. coffee import levels proved to be of critical
importance to Colombia.
160. This is compared to 88 million pesos in 1938.
161. In addition to the Superintendencia Nacional de Importaciones, the Caja de
Crédito Agrario, the Instituto de Fomento Industrial, and Ministerio Industrial y Minero
worked to exploit Colombian resources and stabilize the economy.
162. El Tiempo, 20 Feb. 1944.
163. “Presidente López,” in Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Boletín se-
manal (3 Feb. 1944); El Siglo, 10 Feb. 1944; Hoover to Hopkins, 14 Feb. 1944, Box 141, Harry
L. Hopkins Papers, FDRL.
164. The Conservative Party worked to more clearly articulate its meaning and pur-
pose in 1944. El Siglo, 10 Mar., 12 Mar., 14 Mar., 15 Mar., and 17 Mar. 1944.
165. Gómez’s career and ideas are treated in chapter 3. “Ambassador Turbay’s Comments
on the Colombian Political Situation,” 11 Feb. 1944, 820.00/1706, Box 4289, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. See also “Monthly Political Report,” Feb.
166. Lane to Hull, 31 Mar. 1944, 821.00/1721, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
167. Fluharty to Lane, 12 Apr. 1944, 821.00/1745, Box 4289, Department of State, Deci-
mal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
168. Lane to Hull, 6 Mar. 1944, 821.00/1701; and “The Colombian Political Situation,” 12 Feb.
169. This fact is interesting in that later, during the late 1940s, Colombian leaders
would blame domestic political instability on a grand Communist plot. In both cases, the
real dilemma lay within Colombia. For López and his understanding of Nazi menace, see
“Colombian Political Situation,” 22 Feb. 1944, 821.00/1673, Box 4289, Department of State,
170. The Department of Nariño, in which the Pasto is located, was particularly hard hit
by wartime economic dislocation. Moreover, the region had strong conservative leanings.
See “Sentiment in Pasto,” 15 July 1943, 821.00/1508; and Oury-Jackson to Lane, 12 Aug. 1943,
821.00/1516, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
171. Other prominent actors in the attempted coup were Lieutenant Colonel Luis
E. Agudelo and Major José Figuero. The U.S. embassy had some information relating to
the coup as early as March 1944. See “Summary of Reports Regarding Possibility of Coup
d’Etat in Colombia,” 24 Mar. 1944, 821.00/1728, Box 4289, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA.
172. For coverage of the Pasto revolt, see FBI Report, “Attempted Army Coup in Co-
lombia,” 11 July 1944, 821.00/7–1144; FBI Report, “Attempted Army Coup in Colombia,” 12
July 1944, 821.00/7–1244; FBI Report, “Attempted Army Coup in Colombia,” 13 July 1944,
821.00/7–1344; Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, Box 4289, RG 59, NARA.
See also “Report on Rebellion of July 10–11 in Colombia,” 13 July 1944, 821.00/7–1344, Box
4290, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. There is also some
indication that President López knew of the plot before he went to Pasto. See Lane to Hull,
10 July 1944, 821.00/7–1044, Box 4290, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG
59, NARA. El Tiempo, 12 July 1944 and 13 July 1944.
173. El Tiempo, 14 Dec. 1944; and El Siglo, 14 Dec. 1944 and 15 Dec. 1944.
174. “Monthly Political Report,” Aug. 1944, 821.00/9–644, Box 4290, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1940–1944, RG 59, NARA. For list of officers “retired” from the Army
after the coup see El Tiempo, 31 Aug. 1944.
175. Humerto Rodríguez, “Segunda administración de López Pumarejo,” 392–93.
2. Old Problems, New Possibilities, 1945–1950
1. The best English-language treatment of the nueve de abril is Herbert Braun’s As-
sassination of Gaitán. In Spanish, see Gilberto Vieira, Nueve de abril: Experiencia de un
pueblo (Bogotá: Ediciones Suramérica, 1973); Roberto Restrepo, Nueve de abril: Quiebra
cultural y política (Bogotá: Tipografía Bremen, 1948); and Sánchez, Días de la revolución.
3. Colombian officials were strongly opposed to the proposal’s implications for the
future of the inter-American system. See “Propuestas Dumbarton Oaks—Conferencia San
Francisco,” 5 Apr. 1945, and “Sistima Interamericano,” 18 Apr. 1945, Folio 192, Box 28, Records
of International Organizations, AGN. For the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, see United Na-
tions, “Proposal for the Establishment of a General International Organization,” in Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1946–1947 (Lake Success, N.Y.: Department of Public Information,
United Nations, 1947), 4–9 (hereafter UN Yearbook). Chapter 8, section C addressed issues
relating to regional arrangements. For overall Latin American objections to the draft UN
charter, see “Record of Informal Meeting with Diplomat Representative of Certain Ameri-
can Republics, Held in Washington,” 31 Jan. 1945, FRUS, 1945, 1:39–43.
4. Padilla to Stettinius, 10 Jan. 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9:3–4.
5. See U.S. Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of Amer-
ica to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico,
February 21–March 8, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945); Pan
American Union, Report of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the Director-
General (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1945); idem, Diario de la conferencia inte-
ramericana sobre problemas de la guerra ye de la paz, 21 de Febrero–9 Marzo de 1945 (Mexico
City: Pan American Union, 1945); idem, Temario, programa y discursos (Mexico City: Pan
American Union, 1945); Thomas G. Bohlin, “United States–Latin American Relations and
the Cold War, 1949–1953” (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1985), 22–25.
6. Alberto Lleras Camargo, The Inter-American Way of Life: Selections from the
Recent Addresses and Writings of Alberto Lleras, Secretary General of the Organization of
American States (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1951), 5–8.
7. “Speech by Alberto Lleras Camargo, Colombian Delegate, to the UN Conference
on International Organization, on the Inter-American System,” 30 Apr. 1945, 6–7, in The
Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945–
1973, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 3:5–10.
8. “But the basis for this truth lies,” Lleras added thereafter, “in the fact that it is only
the great powers which can menace the peace and security of the world” (ibid., 7).
9. Ibid., 9.
10. Alberto Vargas to Alberto Lleras, 21 Mar. 1945, Folio 168, Box 28, Records of In-
ternational Organizations, AGN.
11. “Minutes of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San
Francisco, Thursday, May 10, 1945,” FRUS, 1945, 1:662–63.
12. U.S. Department of State, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America
to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California,
April 25–June 26, 1945 (Washington, D.C : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945); and Wil-
liam C. Widenor, “American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the
Right Questions?” Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 245–65.
13. UN Yearbook, 1946–1947, 34, 60, 118.
14. Jonathan Soffer, “All for One or All for All: The UN Military Staff Committee
and the Contradictions within American Internationalism,” Diplomatic History 21 (Winter
1997): 64.
15. United Nations, Official Records, 2nd session, 1947, 88th plenary meeting (Lake
Success, N.Y.: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1947), 221–31.
16. “Memorandum: Sobre las relaciones de Colombia y la URSS,” 20 Oct. 1950, Folio
211, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN; Torres Del Río,
Fuerzas armadas, 32; Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia, 247–48; and “Colombian Attitude
toward Communism and the Soviet Union,” 5 May 1945, 821.00B/3–2845, Box 5243, De-
partment of State, Decimal Files, 1945–1949, RG 59, NARA.
17. At the highest level, Truman’s secretaries of state, compared to Cordell Hull, were
at best inattentive to Latin America. Many personnel changes, however, were less damag-
ing to U.S.-Colombian relations than they were to U.S.–Latin American relations in gen-
eral. Spruille Braden’s move to assistant secretary of state for American republic affairs, for
example, proved disastrous to U.S.-Argentine relations. Yet as a former U.S. ambassador to
Bogotá who repeatedly praised Colombia as Latin America’s leading democracy, Braden
maintained a keen interest in Colombia and Colombian-American solidarity. New U.S.
ambassadors overseas also spawned some problems, as in Brazil where Adolf Berle failed
to nurture the Brazilian-American friendship that had been forged in no small part by the
gifted wartime ambassador Jefferson Caffery. U.S.-Colombian relations were spared when
John Cooper Wiley took over the U.S. embassy in Bogotá.
18. This approach, known as modernization or diffusionist theory, holds that the pro-
liferation of goods and technology will lead to the social and economic development of un-
derdeveloped regions. Both Truman’s Point IV program and the Alliance for Progress are
reflections of this mentality. The idea finds early expression in Samuel F. Bemis’s classic The
Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943).
See also Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995); and Samuel L. Baily, The United States
and the Development of South America, 1945–1975 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 12–15.
19. Dependency theory, popular with the rise of New Left history during the 1960s
and 1970s, coalesced around the idea that the Third World is held in a perpetual colonial
status by the United States and the industrialized countries of Western Europe. For a clear
expression of this line of reasoning, see Henrique Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, De-
pendencia y desarrollo en América Latina (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1969);
Frank Andre Gunder, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Stud-
ies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Stanley J. Stein and Barbara
H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Per-
spective (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970); and Peter F. Klarén and Thomas J. Bossert, eds.,
Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1986). In recent years, post-dependency, neoliberal, or postmodern theory finds that
local variants crush systems theories. See, for example, Thomas Whigham, The Politics of
River Trade: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plata, 1780–1870 (Albuquerque: Univ.
of New Mexico Press, 1991).
20. Stanley E. Hilton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945–1960: End
of the Special Relationship,” Journal of American History 68 (Dec. 1981): 599–624. In a com-
prehensive 1952 memorandum on U.S.–Latin American relations, the deputy secretary of
state for Inter-American Affairs wrote: “Our program of economic aid to Latin America is
small (annual expenditures of about 20 million for technical assistance, 40 million for the
inter-American highway and Rama Road, and 40 million in military grants-in-aid—about
1 percent of our foreign aid bill)—so small, in fact, that it could almost be financed by
Export-Import profits from loans to Latin America alone. The disparity in the amount of
grant aid given to Latin America and other parts of the world had caused deep resentment
in Latin America, especially in Brazil which considers that its size and importance, its
traditional friendship with U.S. and its participation in the Italian campaign entitles it to
preferential treatment.” Mann recorded these observations after an increase in U.S. aid dur-
ing the first years of the 1950s. “Latin American and U.S. Policy,” 11 Dec. 1952, Folder “Latin
America,” Box 182, President’s Secretary’s Files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo. (hereafter HSTL).
21. For general coverage of U.S.–Latin American relations during the early–cold war
era, see Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western
Hemisphere (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1989), 161–87; Roger R. Trask, “The Impact of
the Cold War on United States–Latin American Relations, 1945–1949,” Diplomatic History
1 (1977): 271–84; and Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy.
22. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presi-
dents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), 178–79.
23. Diplomats originally scheduled the conference for Oct. 1945, but Washington re-
fused to enter into a security pact with Argentina. For material relating to the postponing
of the inter-American meeting, see FRUS, 1946, 11:1–27.
24. “Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance issued by the Inter-American Con-
ference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Sept. 2, 1947,” in Schlesinger,
The Dynamics of World Power, 3:30–35. See also U.S. Department of State, Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Quitandinha, Brazil, Au-
gust 15–September 2, 1947: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).
27. “Address by President Harry S. Truman before the Inter-American Conference
for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, on Economic Rehabilitation and
Collective Security,” 2 Sept. 1947, Folder “Rio de Janeiro,” Box 23, Records of the Demo-
cratic National Committee, HSTL.
28. Wiley to Secretary of State, 22 Aug. 1946, 820.00, Box 183, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1946, RG 84, NARA.
29. Former U.S. consulate official Vernon Lee Fluharty observed: “Lacking a true
mandate in his one-year term, Lleras was content merely to keep from rocking the boat
until a new skipper could be chosen for the ship of state” (Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of
the Millions: Military Rule and Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930–1956 [Pittsburgh: Univ.
of Pittsburgh Press, 1957], 77–78, 81).
30. Antonio García, Gaitán y el problema de la revolución colombiana (Bogotá:
M.S.C., 1955); and José Antonio Osorio Lizarazo, Gaitán: Vida, muerte y permanente pres-
encia (Bogotá: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1979).
31. For Gaitán’s thinking on socialism, see Jorge Eliécar Gaitán, Las ideas socialistas
en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial América Libre, 1963).
32. Braun, Assassination of Gaitán, 53.
33. For more on Gaitán’s political career, see Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia, 104–8;
Braun, Assassination of Gaitán, 62–76; and Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, 197–99.
34. Braun, Assassination of Gaitán, 82–83.
35. “Results of the Presidential Election in Colombia,” 9 May 1946, Folder 1, Box 5,
John Cooper Wiley Papers, FDRL; and Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 83.
36. Wiley to Secretary of State, 16 Aug. 1946, 821.001/8–1646, Box 5246, Department
37. James D. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia: The Laureano Gómez Years,
1889–1965 (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2001), 296–97.
38. Germán Arciniegas, The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1952), 160.
39. Literature concerning la Volencia is vast and begins with the seminal work by
Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals-Bordo, and Eduardo Umaño, La Violencia en
Colombia: Estudia de un proceso social (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1962). The Spanish-
language historiography is the subject of Gonzalo Sánchez’s “La Violencia: New Research,
New Questions.” For the finest English-language treatments of the subject, see Paul Oquist,
Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia (New York: Academic Press, 1980); James D.
Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa: Univ.
of Alabama Press, 1985); and Russell F. Ramsey, “The Modern Violencia in Colombia,
1946–1965” (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1970).
40. “Split in Colombian Communist Party,” 11 Aug. 1947, 821.00B/7–2147, Box 5246,
41. “Colombian Communist Party,” 1 July 1947, 821.00B/7–147, Box 5247, Department
42. “Conversation between General Sánchez Amaya and Leroy Irwin,” 12 Oct. 1949,
355.11, Box 115, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files, 1949–1950, RG 319, NARA.
43. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 303.
44. Frequently, the chief of the political party not in power represented Colombia at
important functions, such as international meetings.
45. Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Novena conferencia inter-nacio-
nal americana, Bogotá, marzo 30 de 1948: Actas y documentos (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional
1954); U.S. Department of State, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá,
Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America
with Related Documents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948); and
FRUS, 1948, 9:1–72.
46. “Daily Summary No. 6,” 7 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:33.
47. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 2 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:26–28.
48. “Charter of the Organization of American States, Issued by the Ninth Interna-
tional Conference of American States,” and “Pact of Bogotá, American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement, Issued by the Ninth International Conference of American States,” 3:70–85, in
Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power, 3:49–70.
49. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the
American Republics,” 9 Mar. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:12–13.
50. Marshall to Acheson, 30 Mar. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:23–24.
51. “Daily Report No. 3,” 1 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:25–26.
52. “Address by Secretary George C. Marshall Before the Ninth International Confer-
ence of American States on the Interdependence of the Americas,” 43, in Schlesinger, The
Dynamics of World Power, 3:42–48.
53. Ibid., 3:44.
54. “Latin American Views on U.S. Assistance,” 19 Feb. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:5.
56. Indeed, Colombia had spent a sizable sum of money preparing the city for the
meeting, including a beautification program and new uniforms for city employees. For Co-
lombian investment in Bogotá for the inter-American conference, see Wiley to Secretary
of State, 21 Jan. 1946, FRUS, 1946, 11:29; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 4 vols. (New
York: Viking, 1963–1987), 4:392–93; and Sharpless, Gaitán of Colombia, 171–72.
57. Jack Davis, “The Bogotazo,” Studies in Intelligence 13 (Fall 1969): 78–79.
58. For more on the National Police and the riot, see Bernardo Echeverri Ossa, “De
la unión nacional, 9 de abril 1948,” in Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de
Colombia, 6:178–206; and Willard L. Beaulac, Career Ambassador (New York: Macmillan,
1951), 244.
59. Another thousand Colombians died in disturbances in other Colombian cities.
Braun, Assassination of Gaitán, 170.
60. Davis, “The Bogotazo,” 75–87; and Braun, Assassination of Gaitán, 132–72.
61. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 4:390.
62. Beaulac to the Acting Secretary of State, 11 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:40–41.
63. Many U.S. officials were inclined to see the event as an East-West affair. Instead, it
was a distinctly Colombian event, although opportunistic communist agitators did partici-
pate. Incidentally, a young Fidel Castro, then associated with the ortodoxos, was in the Co-
lombian capital at the time of the bogotazo. In fact, he had a meeting scheduled with Gaitán
for the afternoon of 9 April. For more on Castro, see Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New
York: Morrow, 1986); and Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and
Legacy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993). President Truman remembered that Colombians
“had a tremendous riot . . . stirred up by the communists. . . . But the conference, which the
communists were trying to prevent, was a very successful one.” See “Dictation,” 6 Oct. 1954,
Folder “Foreign Policy—Latin America,” Box 4, Memoirs Files, Truman Papers, HSTL. The
riots also lead to allegations of a U.S. intelligence failure referred to by some critics of the
newly formed CIA as the “South American Pearl Harbor.” See “Functions of the CIA; State-
ment of Roscoe C. Hillenkoetter to the U.S. House of Representatives,” 15 Apr. 1948, Folder
“NSC/CIA, 1948,” Box 3, Records of the NSC, Truman Papers, HSTL.
64. “Economic Agreement of Bogotá,” in Schlesinger, The Dynamics of World Power,
3:85–100.
65. New York Times, 1 May 1948.
66. Washington Post, 20 Apr. 1948.
67. “Memorandum: Sobre las relaciones de Colombia y la URSS,” 20 Oct. 1950, Folio
211, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN.
68. “United States Policy toward Inter-American Military Collaboration,” NSC 56/1,
27 Apr. 1950, NSC Policy Papers, Box 7, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA.
69. As such, in the event of another war, the Colombian military would protect the
republic’s natural resources, commercial routes, and communication lines so as to provide
the uninterrupted flow of raw materials to the United States.
70. Wiley to Stettinius, 18 Dec. 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9:860; and “Latin American and U.S.
Policy,” 11 Dec. 1952, Folder “Latin America,” Box 182, PSF, Truman Papers, HSTL; “Bilateral
Staff Conversations with Latin American Republics,” 15 July 1947, Historical Manuscripts
Collection, CMH, 146–55; and “Information Regarding Staff Conversations Between Mili-
tary and Naval Representatives of the United States and Colombia,” Sept. 1945, 4E, 820.00,
Box 70, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified Records, 1945, RG 84, NARA. For
more on U.S. dispossession of military facilities in Latin America, see “Conversation with
President Vargas,” 1 Oct. 1945, Folder 5, Box 41, Confidential Files, Truman Papers, HSTL.
71. Spruille Braden to Santamaría, 14 Mar. 1946, Folio 198, Box 167, Records of the
Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN.
72. “Agreement between the United States of American and Colombia Respecting
a Naval Mission, Signed at Washington, October 14, 1946; Effective October 14, 1946” [61
Stat. 2413].
73. Tamayo to Santamaría, 20 Dec. 1945, Folio 317, Box 166, Records of the Colom-
bian Legation in Washington, AGN.
74. Eduardo Wills Olaya, “Desarrollo de la armada contemporánea,” in Valencia
Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 4:439, 443–44.
75. Santamaría to Tamayo, 9 Dec. 1945, Folio 317, Box 166, Records of the Colombian
Legation in Washington, AGN.
76. “Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia Respecting an
Army Mission to Colombia, Signed at Washington, February 21, 1949” [63 Stat. 2334]; and
“Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia Respecting an Air Force
Mission to Colombia, Signed at Washington, February 21, 1949” [63 Stat. 2345].
77. José Jaime Rodrígues R., “El nuevo ejército colombiano,” in Valencia Tovar, His-
toria de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 2:361–80.
78. Augusto Tobón to Wiley, 12 Dec. 1946, 820.07, Box 183, Department of State, Bo-
79. Colombia, Ministerio de Guerra, Memoria de Guerra, 1947 (Bogotá: Imprenta
Nacional, 1947), 16–17.
80. Tamayo to Santamaría, 28 June 1946, Folio 198, Box 167, Records of the Legation
of Colombia in Washington, AGN.
81. In 1950 the Pentagon renamed the facility U.S. Army Caribbean School—Spanish
Instruction, and moved it to Fort Gulick on the eastern end of the Canal Zone. The center
became to School of the Americas in 1963; it moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1984. In
January 2001 the school changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation, complete with a new curriculum stressing democracy and human rights. See
remarks of former-Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera in the Atlanta Journal-Constitu-
tion, 10 Jan. 2001; and Geoffrey B. Demarest, “Redefining the School of the Americas,”
Military Review 74 (Oct. 1994): 43–51.
82. Arthur Goodfriend, “The Colombian Army Looks to the United States,” Infantry
Journal 61 (July 1947): 44–46.
83. Colombia, Ministerio de Guerra, Memoria de Guerra, 1947, 43.
84. Washington was not oblivious, however, to the fact the armed forces employed a
large number of civilians, and put sizable amounts of money in a country’s economy.
85. “Future Military Cooperation with the Other American Republics,” 29 July 1945,
FRUS, 1945, 9:249–55.
86. Acheson to Patterson, 19 Mar. 1947, FRUS, 1947, 8:105–6; and Patterson to Ache-
son, FRUS, 1947, 8:106–9.
87. Patterson to Acting Secretary of State, 17 Apr. 1947, FRUS, 1947, 8:111–12.
88. “The Subcommittee for Latin America to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee,” 15 Feb. 1945, 232, FRUS, 1945, 9:231–37; Symington to Marshall, 16 Oct. 1947, FRUS,
1947, 8:122–24; “Surplus Property Act” [58 Stat. 765]; “Inter-American Military Cooperation,”
Department of State, Bulletin (9 June 1946): 1001–3; “Memorandum by the Policy Commit-
tee on Arms and Armaments,” 27 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:212–13; “Answers to Questions on
Military Assistance,” Department of State, Bulletin (26 Sept. 1949): 476–82; “Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949” [63 Stat. 714]; and Child, Unequal Alliance, 90–94.
89. FRUS, 1946, 11:655–58.
90. “Direct Sales of United States Military Surplus under Authority of Public Law
457,” Department of State, Bulletin (26 Sept. 1949): 480.
91. Wiley to Secretary of State, 23 Jan. 1946, 834.50, Box 183, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1946, RG 84, NARA.
92. Santamaría to Tamayo, 30 Nov. 1946, Folio 198, Box 167, Records of the Colom-
bian Legation in Washington, AGN.
93. Byrnes to Wiley, 12 Apr. 1946, FRUS, 1946, 11:658.
94. “Inter-American Military Cooperation,” Department of State, Bulletin (26 May
1946): 1001–3; and “Memorandum by the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments,” 27
Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:212–13.
95. Davis to Wright, 3 Feb. 1945, 821.00B/1–2645, Box 5243, Department of State,
96. “Communist Party in Colombia,” 12 Feb. 1948, 821.00B/2–1248, Box 5246, De-
partment of State, Decimal Files, 1945–1949, RG 59, NARA; and Randall, Colombia and the
United States, 200.
97. El Tiempo, 9 May 1946.
98. El Siglo, 2 June 1946.
99. “Colombian Finances,” 1946, Folder 1, Box 5, John Cooper Wiley Papers, FDRL.
100. “Memorandum to President Truman,” 19 Mar. 1946, FRUS, 1946, 9:161.
101. Wiley to Stettinius, 5 Apr. 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9:880–81. Because of inflation, Co-
lombians did not want more U.S. dollars, and proposed to exchange coffee for capital
goods. Washington rejected the barter scheme, but did allow the republic to keep its profits
in U.S. accounts, thus preventing dollars from returning to Colombia. Wiley to Stettinius, 7
Feb. 1945, FRUS, 1945, 9:872–73. See also “Memorandum by Assistant Secretary Braden and
Pawley to Truman,” 19 Mar. 1946, FRUS, 1946, 9:161; and “Minutes of the Inter-American
Coffee Boards,” 2 July 1946, FRUS, 1946, 11:164–65.
102. Beaulac to Marshall, 25 Nov. 1947, FRUS, 1947, 8:567–68.
103. “Colombia,” Feb. 1949, Folder “Colombia 1952,” Box 4, Department of State, Re-
cords of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Miller), Subject Files,
1945–1953, RG 59, NARA.
104. Eduardo Sáenz Rovne, Industriales, proteccionismo y política en Colombia: Intere-
ses, conflictos y violencia (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1989).
105. “Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States and Colombia, Signed
September 13, 1935” [49 Stat. 3875].
106. El Tiempo, 1 Sept. 1947 and 11 Sept. 1947; and El Liberal 11 Sept. 1947. The students
argued that Flota Mercante Grancolombiana had no more advantage than U.S. companies
that carried import-export goods, items required by U.S. law to be transported by U.S.
firms. For more on controversy, including student protests, see Willard L. Thorp to Beau-
lac, 20 Aug. 1947, FRUS, 1947, 8:554–55.
107. “U.S.-Colombia Terminate 1935 Trade Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, Bul-
letin (7 Nov. 1949): 711–12. Colombian-American talks surrounding a General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also collapsed under these controversies (“GATT Applica-
tion Withdrawn,” U.S. Department of State, Bulletin [21 Nov. 1949]: 777).
108. “American Republics,” U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (18 May 1947): 958–59.
109. “Commitment for Reconstruction in Colombia Approved,” U.S. Department of
State, Bulletin (25 Apr. 1948): 549; and Secretary of Treasury to the Acting Secretary of
State, 14 Apr. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:45.
110. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 20 Sept. 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:454.
111. “Colombia,” Feb. 1949, Folder “Colombia 1952,” Box 4, Department of State, Re-
cords of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Miller), Subject Files,
1945–1953, RG 59, NARA.
112. Ralph A. Schweitzer to Department of State, 15 Nov. 1950, 821.331/11–1550, Box
113. Colombia agreed to phase out the pesos charges and replace them with U.S. dol-
lars. The United States accepted the company’s tax-exempt status. “Memorandum by Mr.
H. Gerberich of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of
State for American Republic Affairs,” 18 Aug. 1949, FRUS, 1949, 2:611–14; and “Policy State-
ment Prepared in the Department of State,” 22 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1297–305.
114. See “Memorandum for the President,” 20 Dec. 1948, and other documents, in
Point IV File, Box 2, Walter S. Salant Papers, HSTL.
115. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 100–107.
116. An even more troubling event unfolded in Congress when on 8 Sept., as Liberal
representative Gustavo Jiméz addressed the Chamber of Representatives, Conservative
Party officials brandishing handguns opened fire, killing Jiméz and fatally wounding an-
other Liberal official (Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 112).
117. In sum, the rigid hierarchy of the Catholic Church supported the political and
social stratification of the state. For treatment of the Church in Colombia, see Levine, Reli-
gion and Politics in Latin America.
118. “Persecution in Colombia,” 29 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–2049, Box 5243, Department

120. “Statement of the Minister of War regarding the position of the Army in the Pres-
ent Situation,” 7 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–749, Box 5243, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1945–1949, RG 59, NARA.
121. Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, 204–6.
122. The government claimed that seventy thousand communists were in Colombia
and working to foment discord, a number grossly inflated for domestic and international
consumption. Liberals, on the other hand, blamed both communists and falangists for the
crisis. Beaulac to Acheson, 2 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–249; and Beaulac to Acheson, 19 Nov. 1949,
821.00/11–1749, Box 5243, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1945–1949, RG 59, NARA.
123. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 322; and Bushnell, Making of Modern
Colombia, 211.
124. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 320; “Liberal Extremists Planning Im-
peachment Proceedings against the President,” 7 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–749; Beaulac to Ache-
son, 9 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–949; Beaulac to Acheson, 28 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–2849; “Report in
Colombia Elections,” 28 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–2849, Box 5243, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1945–1949, RG 59, NARA; and El Siglo, 10 Nov. 1949. Gómez polled 1,140,112 affirmative
votes. Twenty-two ballots were cast against him, and 501 ballots were submitted unmarked.
“Colombian Inquiry Regarding Department Attitude to a Possible Visit of President-elect
Laureano Gómez to the United States,” 28 Feb. 1950, Folder “Colombia 1945–1951,” Box 4,
Department of State, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
(Miller), Subject Files, 1945–1953, RG 59, NARA; and Ignacio Arizmendi Posada, Presidentes
de Colombia, 1810–1990 (Bogotá: Planeta Colombia Editorial, 1989), 255–58.
125. “What Kind of a Regime Will Laureano Gómez Head,” 5 Dec. 1949, 821.00/12–
549, Box 5243, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1945–1949, RG 59, NARA.
126. “Department of State Policy Statement,” 8 May 1950, FRUS, 1950, 2:817–19.
127. There was also a certain affinity between the U.S. Democratic Party and the Co-
lombian Liberal Party that caused further distress in Washington (Ambassador in Colom-
bia to Secretary of State, 13 Feb. 1950, FRUS, 1950, 2:807–9).
128. “Memorandum of Conversation: Lleras Restrepo and John Fishburn,” 30 Dec. 1939,
129. “Colombian Inquiry Regarding Department Attitude to a Possible Visit of Presi-
dent-elect Laureano Gómez to the United States,” 28 Feb. 1950, Folder “Colombia 1945–1951,”
Box 4, Department of State, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs (Miller), Subject Files, 1945–1953, RG 59, NARA.
130. Gómez embraced the idea of continental harmony, respect for international law,
equality among states, the principle of nonintervention, active engagement with the world
through multilateral organizations, respect for Colombia’s obligations incurred through
such organizations, and cooperation with the United States. El Siglo, 3 Jan. 1950.
131. If any U.S. officials did, it was Ambassador Beaulac, who in private conversations
with Gómez soon appreciated that the president-elect would seek a continuation of cordial
Colombian-American relations. See, for example, “Conversation with President-Elect Lau-
reano Gómez,” 10 Jan. 1950, FRUS, 1950, 2:802–7.
132. There are, regrettably, few scholarly treatments of Laureano Gómez. That most
Colombian academics despise the man certainly has influenced this trend, as does the lack
of archival material dealing with his administration. The most comprehensive treatment of
Gómez’s life and times belongs to Henderson, Modernization in Colombia. Collections of
the politician’s public remarks and writings such as Laureano Gómez Castro, Laureano Gó-
mez, discursos (Bogotá: Colección Populibro, 1968), and Ricardo Ruíz Santos, ed., Laureano
Gómez, obra selecta, 1909–1956 (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1982), are of significant interest.
Three older volumes are also of value: Flipe Antonio Molina, Laureano Gómez: Historia de
una rebeldía (Bogotá: Librería Voluntad, 1940); Néstor Forero Morales, Laureano Gómez:
Un hombre, un partido, una nación (Bogotá: Ediciones Nuevo Mundo, 1950); and Carlos H.
Parja, El Monstruo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nuestra América, 1955). For an outstanding in-
tellectual biography of Gómez, see James D. Henderson, Conservative Thought in Twentieth
Century Latin America: The Ideas of Laureano Gómez (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1988).
133. Henderson, Conservative Thought in Twentieth Century Latin America, 39.
134. Ambassador Wiley characterized the relationship as “bizarre.” “Prospect of the
Administration of Mariano Ospina Pérez at the Time of His Inauguration as President of
Colombia,” 16 Aug. 1946, 821.001/ “Ospina Pérez, Mariano,” Box 5246, Department of State,
3. The Korean War and the Americas, 1950–1951
1. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 1 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–150, Box 4306, Depart-

ment of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
2. For a concise treatment of Korea during the immediate post–World War II era,
see William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1995), 13–46. See also Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981–90); William Stueck, The Road to Confronta-
tion: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1981); and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 70–84.
3. “Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Re-
search, Department of State,” 25 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, 7:148–49. For more on the Truman
administration’s response, see Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24–30, 1950 (New
York: Free Press, 1968).
4. “Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council,” 25 June 1950, FRUS,
1950, 7:155–56.
5. “Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council,” 27 June 1950, FRUS,
1950, 7:211.
6. “Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council,” 7 July 1950, FRUS,
1950, 7:329.
7. For more on the U.S. military’s interest in foreign contributions, see James F. Schna
bel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
National Policy (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazer, Inc., 1979), 3:142–75.
8. NSC 76/1, “A Report to the National Security by the Executive Secretary on U.S.
Course of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter the Korean Hostilities,” 25 July 1950, Box
10, Entry 1, RG 273, NARA.
9. For more on Soviet propaganda, see “Memorandum of Conversation,” U.S. Ambas-

sador to the UN Warren Austin and British delegates Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Sir Terence Stone,
19 July 1950, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Department of State, Folder 6 “Con-
tributions to the UN Effort,” Box 5, Truman Papers, HSTL; and Stueck, Korean War, 56.
10. The Security Council required a two-thirds majority to pass a decree, and the U.S.
representatives were uncertain that the necessary number of votes would be achieved for the
27 June resolution. The Yugoslav delegation opposed the resolution, favoring a less aggressive
declaration. Because of a delay in receiving instructions from their governments, the represen-
tatives from India and Egypt chose not to vote. Without affirmative votes from Cuba and Ec-
uador, the resolution would not have been adopted. Yet both states supported the declaration,
interpreting the North Korean People’s Army assault as an egregious breach of international
peace. Furthermore, to both Cuba and Ecuador, South Korea represented the possible fate
of all small nations, like themselves, at the hands of Soviet expansionism. See John A. Hous-
ton, Latin America and the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1956); F. Parkinson, Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers (London: Sage
Publications, 1974), 21–22; and Tae-Ho Yoo, The Korean War and the United Nation: A Legal
and Diplomatic Historical Study (Louvain: Librairie Desbarax, 1965), 23–42.
11. For guidelines on the communication of offers, see “Military Assistance,” undated,
Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Department of State, Folder 7 “Contribu-
tions to the UN Effort,” Box 5, Truman Papers, HSTL.
12. For more on the early phase of the Korean conflict, see Roy E. Appleman, South to
the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June–November 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961).
13. “Memorandum from the President,” Truman to Acheson and Johnson, Aug. 1950,
795B.5, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
14. “Draft Paper for the National Security Council,” 3 Aug. 1950, FRUS, 1950, 1:643–46.
15. Matthews to Major General James H. Burns, 9 Aug. 1950, Selected Records Relat-
ing to the Korean War, Department of State, Folder 7 “Contributions to the UN Effort,” Box
5, Truman Papers, HSTL.
16. “Memorandum of Conversation: Military Assistance for Korea from Latin Amer-
ica,” 24 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–2450, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954,
RG 59, NARA.
RG 59, NARA.
18. Specifically, the act allowed “for the transfer of equipment, materials or services . . .
provided that prior to any such transfer or the execution of any such contracts, any such nation
shall have made available to the United States the full costs, actual or estimated, of such equip-
ment, materials, or services, and shall have agreed to make available forthwith upon request any
additional sums that may become due under such contracts.” See “Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949” [63 Stat. 720].
19. “Memorandum: Utilization of Offers of Foreign Military Assistance in Korea,” 24
Aug. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
RG 59, NARA.
21. “Memorandum for the President: Utilization of Offers of Foreign Assistance in

Korea,” 29 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–2950, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–
1954, RG 59, NARA.
22. Johnson’s position is particularly odd since he agreed to the compromise in two
earlier communications. See “Memorandum: Utilization of Offers of Foreign Assistance in
Korea,” prepared by Johnson, 1 Sept. 1950, 795B.5; and Johnson to Acheson, 12 Sept. 1950,
795B.5/9–1250, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
23. Doherty to Merchant, 14 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–125, Box 4306, Department of State,
Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and “Memorandum: Utilization of Offers of Mili-
tary Assistance for Korea,” 20 Sept. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
24. John W. Snyder to Johnson, 20 Sept. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4306, Department of State,
25. Indeed, by Sept. 1950 many Truman administration officials were upset with more
than just Secretary Johnson’s stand on the reimbursement question. Johnson’s demeanor, be-
havior, and job performance were questionable. President Truman himself noted that “Louis
[Johnson] began to show an inordinate egotistical desire to run the whole government,” and
that the secretary had “offended every member of the cabinet.” Johnson irked nobody more
than Secretary Acheson, who simply characterized Johnson’s behavior as “outrageous.” Johnson
was shortly thereafter diagnosed with a brain tumor that may account for some of his aberrant
behavior. Johnson harbored animosity toward several administration officials, especially Ache-
son. For more on the controversies surrounding the defense secretary, see Robert H. Ferrell, ed.,
Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 192;
Dean Acheson, Present at Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 1969), 374; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983), 502–3. See also Johnson to Truman, 12 Sept. 1950, Box 72, Folder “Correspon-
dence—Johnson/Truman—September 1950,” George M. Elsey Papers, HSTL.
26. Since the National Security Act of 1947 barred former military personnel from
serving as the secretary of defense, legislators amended the act before confirming General
Marshall. The former U.S. Army chief of staff took office on 20 Sept. 1950. Pogue, George C.
Marshall, 4:422–40.
27. Matthews to Marshall, 27 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–1250, Box 4306, Department of
28. “Summary of Situation Regarding Latin American Offers of Assistance to the
Unified Command to Date,” 25 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–2550, Box 4305, Department of State,
29. Marshall to Acheson, 26 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–2550, Box 4306, Department of
30. Marshall to Acheson, 30 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–3050, Box 4306, Department of
31. “Minutes of the Wake Island Conference,” 15 Oct. 1950, President’s Secretary’s File,
Folder “Wake Island,” Box 244, HSTL.
32. Newbegin to Acheson, 26 June 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
33. El Siglo, 27 July 1950; and Semana, 9 July 1950.
34. El Siglo, 27 July 1950.
35. El Siglo, 26 June 1950.

36. El Tiempo, 26 June 1950.
37. El Espectador, 22 July 1950.
38. Many letters survive in Box 233, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, RG 84, NARA. Gabraith treats issues relating to Colombian volunteers in her
M.A. thesis, “Colombian Participation in the Korean War,” 27–29.
39. Washington Post, 26 Oct. 1950.
40. Ospina was equally unwilling to address important issues relating to U.S. eco-
nomic and technical assistance that emerged during this time. See “Preliminary Sugges-
tions Relative to Point Four Program in Colombia,” 26 May 1950, 821.00TA/5–2650, Box
41. El Siglo, 16 July 1950 and 29 July 1950.
42. Ibid., 8 Aug. 1950; and Beaulac to Acheson, 9 Aug. 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
43. Beaulac to Acheson, 16 July 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
45. “Cablegram dated 14 July 1950 from the Secretary General to certain governments
concerning the security council resolutions of 25 June and 27 June, 7 July 1950,” Folder 6,
Box 5, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Department of State, Truman Papers,
HSTL; and Acheson to Zuleta, 16 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–2450, Box 4305, Department of State,
46. Angel to Acheson, 19 Oct. 1950, Folio 211, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Lega-
tion in Washington, AGN; and Galbraith, “Colombian Participation in the Korean War,”
29.
47. Oscar Herrera Rebolledo quoted in Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,”
249.
48. Angel to Ospina, 3 Aug. 1950, Folio 229, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Lega-
tion in Washington, AGN.
49. “Colombian Aid to UN Forces in Korea,” 6 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–650, Box 4306,
50. Urdaneta Arbeláez to Acheson, 18 Sept. 1950; “Colombian Offer of a Frigate to
United Nations Forces,” 18 Sept. 1950, 350.00, Box 233, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA; and “Colombian Offer of Assistance for
Korea,” Section 33, CCS 383.21, Box 41, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1948–1950,
RG 218, NARA.
51. “Second Colombian-U.S. Consultation on Aid to Unified Command in Korea,” 18
Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–1850, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59,
NARA.
52. For Joint Chiefs of Staff records on the ARC Almirante Padilla, see Sections 33 &
34, CCS 383.21, Box 40, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1948–1950, RG 218, NARA.
For more on the technical dimensions of the ARC Almirante Padilla, formerly the USS
Groton, see Roger Chesneau, ed., All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1922–1946 (New York: May-
flower Books, 1980), 148–49.
53. Beaulac to Acheson, 6 Oct. 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Department of States, Bogotá
Embassy, General Records, RG 84, NARA. Several factors inspired the sailors, including a
thirst for adventure, professional calculations, and a firm belief in the principles of the UN
effort. Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,” 244–47.
54. New York Times, 21 Sept. 1950.
55. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Proposed Mili-
tary Assistance in Korea From Certain U.N. Nations” [undated, 1 Aug. 1950?], Section 28,
CCS 383.21, Box 40, Korea, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1948–1950, RG 218, NA.
56. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did give the Colombian Army high marks in the areas of
discipline and morale.
57. “Briefing Paper on Colombia,” 1 May 1955, 820.00, Box 4, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
58. “Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from Field Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,”
30, U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and “Reorga-
nization Plan for Colombia Army,” 3 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–350, Box 4306, Department of
59. “Current Situation in Colombia,” 15 Feb. 1944, 000.1, Box 344, Army Intelligence
Project Decimal Files, 1941–1945, RG 319, NARA.
60. “Implementation of Colombian Assistance to the UN Force in Korean Campaign,”
10 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1050, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG
59, NARA.
61. “Offer of Military Assistance by the Colombian Government,” 17 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/
10–1750, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
62. “Offer of Military Assistance by the Colombian Government,” 17 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/
10–1750, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
63. Beaulac to Acheson, 23 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–235, Box 4306, Department of State,
64. “Colombian Contingent for Service in Korean War; Talks with Unified Com-
mand at Pentagon,” 24 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–2450, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
65. “Proposed Colombian Offer of Infantry Battalion for Korea,” 25 Oct. 1950, 795B/
10–250, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and
Beaulac to Acheson, 26 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–2650, Box 4306, Department of State, Deci-
mal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
66. Marshall to Acheson, 2 Nov. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and Frank Pace, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,”
27 Oct. 1950, Xerox 2729, GCMFNAP, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
67. “Reimbursement by Colombia for Logistic Support Supplied to its Battalion for
Service in the Far East,” 3 Nov. 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA; and “Implementation if Colombian Military
Assistance to Korean Campaign,” 1 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–150, Box 4306, Department of
68. “Proposed Colombian Offer of Infantry Battalion for Korea,” 25 Oct. 1950,
795B/10–2550, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA;
and Beaulac to Acheson, 26 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–2650, Box 4306, Department of State,
69. Zuleta to Acheson, 14 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–1450, Box 4306, Department of State,
70. Zuleta to Acheson, 14 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–1450, Box 4306, Department of State,
71. New York Times, 26 Oct. 1950.
72. Acheson to Zuleta, 15 Dec. 1950, 795B.5/11–1450, Box 4306, Department of State,
73. Hamlin to Acheson, 2 Dec. 1950, 795B.5/12–250, Box 4306, Department of State,
74. El Siglo, 21 Oct. 1950. Bogotá announced the decision to send troops to Korea
before the final arrangements had been made with the United States, accounting for the 21
Oct. 1950 newspaper report.
75. El Tiempo, 22 Oct. 1950.
76. Diario Grafico, 27 Oct. 1950.
77. Three theories surrounding Bogotá’s contribution can be discarded. First, public
pressure certainly did not impel Gómez to send troops to Korea. El Siglo announced in
mid-July that the republic would not dispatch military forces, and no trace of the question
appears again until the government announced in October that Colombians would fight
with the UN Command. In his M.A. thesis, “Laureano Gómez and Colombia in the Korean
War,” Walthour suggests that Gómez publicly denied that Colombians would serve with
the UN Command in July 1950 to kill the public debate, despite the president’s determina-
tion to support the United Nations. The assertion is plausible and well reasoned, yet it is
also possible that the president changed his mind after the July denial. No documentary
evidence exists to support either assertion. The end result, the absence of public discourse
on the issue, remains unchanged (71).
Another possibility advanced by some writers after the war is that Gómez committed
troops to remove dangerous military figures from Colombia, thus protecting his partisan
dictatorship. Robert Dix, the most credible historian to advance this notion, does so in Co-
lombia: The Political Dimension of Change (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), 114. David
Bushnell refutes the assertion in Making of Modern Colombia, 212–13. Certainly some Lib-
erals were among the officers that served in Korea, yet the fact that the troops were largely
volunteer and Colombian military rotation policy provided that any individual serviceman
would only be in the western Pacific for one year undermines this thesis. Moreover, Gó-
mez later celebrated Colombia’s veterans as national heroes. If he did send troops abroad
to banish Liberal officers, he did so in ways that actually raised their domestic stature.
Gómez’s overall record suggests that he was too wise, politically, to make such an error.
The notion that Colombia buckled under U.S. pressure to send troops to Korea is also
erroneous. Bogotá held the initiative in negotiations, and although Washington did ap-
ply significant pressure on some other Latin American governments, U.S. officials did not
press Bogotá. Colombian jurist Carlos Moracio Urán nonetheless argues this in his study,
Colombia y los Estados Unidos en la guerra de Corea (South Bend, Ind.: Helen Kellogg In-
stitute for International Studies, 1985).
78. El Tiempo, 2 Aug. 1950. The relationship between religion and foreign policy is the
subject of Andrew J. Rotter’s “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.–South
Asian Relations, 1947–1954,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 593–613. Patricia R. Hill wres-
tles with some of the problems of using religion as a tool for studying diplomatic history in
“Religion as a Category of Diplomatic Analysis,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 633–40.
79. Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Conferencia del ministro de relaciones exte-

riores, dictada desde la radiodifusora nacional el 20 de augusto de 1952 (Bogotá: Imprenta
Nacional, 1952), 7.
80. Gomez’s paper made this case in January 1950, over six months before the war
began. El Siglo, 9 Jan. 1950.
81. Moreover, the fate of South Korea, a small nation like Colombia, was one with
which the South American republic could identify. Bogotá firmly held that the Seoul had
fallen prey to Pyongyang, a satellite of a communist superpower. El Siglo, 4 July 1950 and 21
Oct. 1950.
82. La Nacion, 19 Mar. 1952.
83. “Colombian President Offers Full Support to the United States in Korean Situ-
ation,” 26 June 1950, 350.21, Box 233, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Re-
cords, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
84. Gómez to Angel, 8 Aug. 1950; and Angel to Gómez, 11 Aug. 1950, Folio 229, Box
87, Records of the Legation of Colombia in Washington, AGN.
85. Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Conferencia dictadad por el señor ministro de
guerra doctor Jose Maria Bernal B. en el ciclo conferencias de los ministros el viernes 29 de
august de 1952 (Bogotá: Impreneta Nacional, 1952), 10; and Angel to Gómez, 18 Sept. 1950,
Folio 229, Box 87, Records of the Legation of Colombia in Washington, AGN. Colombian
officials repeatedly marveled at how the UN campaign in Korea, the best thing the interna-
tional organization had done since 1945, was only possible since the USSR had boycotted
the Security Council (Valencia Tovar to author, 12 Jan. 2001).
86. Robert Newbegin to Acheson, 5 Dec. 1949, 821.00/15–549, Box 5243, Department
87. New York Times, 21 Sept. 1950; and Washington Post, 20 Oct. 1951.
88. Angel to Gómez, 21 Aug. 1950, Folio 229, Box 87, Records of the Legation of Co-
lombia in Washington, AGN.
89. See, for example, New York Times, 8 July 1950.
91. The plan called for a force augmentation, unit training, material standardization,
and greater interservice coordination. The Colombian Army wanted to purchase 105 mm
and 155 mm howitzers, as well as munitions and small arms. General Rojas candidly told
the U.S. official that “Colombia would need financial credit from the United States in order
to complete his reorganization plan.” “Reorganization Plan for the Colombian Army,” 3
Oct. 1950, 705B.5/10–350, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59,
NARA.
92. Fernando Gaitán de Narváez to Ganriel Betancur, Secretario Tecnico y Econom-
ico, 10 June 1950; and Diego Garcés G. to Gabriel Betancur, 12 July 1950, Folio 229, Box 87,
Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN.
94. Acheson to Johnson, 29 June 1950, 350.00, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de
Janeiro Embassy, Classified General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
95. O Jornal, 28 July 1950.
96. Johnson to Acheson, 17 July 1950, 350.00, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de
97. Johnson to Acheson, 19 July 1950, 350.000, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de
98. Acheson to Johnson, 28 July 1950, 350.000, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de
99. Correio de Manhã, 27 July 1950.
100. “Brazilian Military Consultation on Aid to Unified Command for Korea,” 1 Aug.
1950, 350.00, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de Janeiro Embassy, Classified General Re-
cords, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA.
101. Johnson to Acheson, 7 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–750, Box 4305, Department of State,
102. Johnson to Acheson, 7 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–750; and “Memorandum of Conversa-
tion,” 9 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–850, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954,
RG 59, NARA. Porto Alegre vice counsel Alexander L. Peaslee summarized Brazilian senti-
ment when he stated that Brazilians supported the overall mission of the UN Command
in Korea but “recoil[ed] at the idea of sending troops” to Korea. During the presidential
campaign, the other two major candidates, Eduardo Gomes and Christiano Machado, re-
fused to offer public support for the UN effort for fear that it would add momentum to the
campaign of the former dictator. Peaslee to Acheson, 4 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–450, Box 4305,
103. Johnson to Acheson, 7 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–750, Box 4305, Department of State,
104. In the postwar era, the Brazilian armed forces split over issues of national develop-
ment and foreign policy. The Sorbonne Group, headed by Castello Branco, favored coopera-
tion with the United States. Strongly anticommunist, the group generally supported a Brazil-
ian contribution to the U.S.-led UN Command. On the other side, the nationalists, mostly
junior officers, vocally objected to the idea of Brazilians fighting in Korea. They maintained
that Brazilians should focus on issues of national development. Furthermore, they thought
Brazil was too dependent on the United States. Although the Brazilian military was divided
over its support for the United States, it almost universally believed that Washington had
ignored Brazil’s World War II sacrifices (Sonny Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil–United
States Military Relations, 1945–1977 [Boulder: Univ. Press of Colorado, 1996], 123–24).
105. Kidder to Johnson, 31 Oct. 1950, 350.00, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de
106. O Jornal, 11 Dec. 1951.
107. For complete text of Vargas’s message see Johnson to Acheson, 15 Jan. 1951, Folder
“Brazil 1949–1950,” Box 2, Department of State, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin America (Miller), Subject Files, 1945–1953, RG 59, NARA.
108. Vargas to Truman, 4 Apr. 1951, Box 2, Department of State, Rio de Janeiro Em-
bassy, Secret General Records, 1951–1954, RG 84, NARA.
109. Truman to Vargas, 19 Apr. 1951, Box 2, Department of State, Rio de Janeiro Em-
bassy, Secret General Records, 1951–1954, RG 84, NARA.
110. Neves de Gontoura to Acheson, 12 Apr. 1951, Box 2, Department of State, Rio de
Janeiro Embassy, Secret General Records, 1951–1954, RG 84, NARA.
111. “Suggested Comments to be Made in Mr. Miller’s Talk with President Vargas,”
Box 2, Department of State, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America
(Miller), Subject Files, 1945–1953, Folder “Brazil 1949–1950,” RG 59, NARA.
112. Miller to Ridgway, 10 Aug. 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1212.
113. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 3 Aug. 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1204–6.

114. For coverage of the trip, see 350.00, Box 96, Department of State, Rio de Janeiro
Embassy, General Records, 1950–1952, RG 84, NARA; and FRUS, 1951, 2:1204–24.
115. “Memorandum: Mexican-U.S. Consultations on Aid to Unified Command in Ko-
rea,” 7 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–750, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954,
RG 59, NARA.
116. This rating placed the Mexican military establishment among the best in Latin
America. For a complete account of Latin American military strength, down to the precise
number and types of military hardware, see “Estimates for Latin American Military Con-
tributions,” 22 Sept. 1950, 795B.5/9–2350, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and “Proposed Military Assistance in Korea from Certain UN
Nations” [undated], Joints Strategic Planning Committee, Section 28, Box 40, Joint Chiefs
of Staff Geographic Files, 1948–1950, Korea, RG 218, NARA.
117. A report from the American embassy in Mexico City indicated that popular opin-
ion ran high against Mexican involvement in the war. Wellman to Acheson, 10 Aug. 1950,
795B.5/8–1050, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA. The
Korean decision proved to be an important episode in Mexico’s emerging opposition to U.S.
foreign policy. Mexico City had already refused to break with the Soviet Union. It would
later oppose U.S. cold war intervention in the Americas and cultivate cordial relations with
Cuba following the Communist revolution in that Caribbean country. For more on Mexico’s
post–World War II foreign policy, see Raat, Mexico and the United States, 158–59.
118. Toledo to Lie, 27 July 1950, 795B.5, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
119. Marshall to Acheson, 2 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–250, Box 4305; “Status Under Geneva
Convention of Troops Possibly to be Supplied [to] the Unified Command by Costa Rica,”
795B.5/10–2050, Box 4305; and Cale to Barringer, 10 Nov. 1950, 795B.11–1050, Box 4306,
Department of State, Decimal Files, RG 59, NARA.
120. Acheson to Mann, 17 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1750; Machado to Acheson, 30 Nov.
1950, 795B.5/11–3050, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59,
NARA. “Report by the Director on Cuban Offer of Assistance for Korea,” 15 Dec. 1950,
Section 41, JCS-CCC 381.21, Box 43, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1948–1950, Ko-
rea, RG 218, NARA. Hoyt to Department of State, 1 Dec. 1950, 795B.5/12–150; and Miller
to Marshall, 30 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1050, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
121. Mann to Miller, 2 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–250, Box 4305, Department of State, Deci-
mal Files, RG 59, NARA.
122. “State Department Memorandum: Panamanian-U.S. consultation on aid to Uni-
fied Command for Korea,” 4 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/8–450; and Austin to Acheson, 7 Aug. 1950,
123. Johnson to Acheson, 24 Aug. 1950, 795B.5/2450, Box 4305, Department of State,
Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and Matienzo to Lie, 15 July 1950, 795B.5, Box
124. “Memorandum: Uruguayan Ground Troops for Korea,” 12 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–
125. “Possible Chilean Participation in Korea,” 19 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1950; and Hall
to Acheson, 16 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–1650, Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
126. “Circular Airgram from Acheson,” 10 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–1050, Box 4306, De-
partment of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA. An estimated seven thousand
volunteers from Latin America could have been raised. See “Evaluation of Replies to De-
partment’s Circular Airgram of Nov. 10, 1950: Volunteers for UC in Korea,” 6 Dec. 1950,
127. Parminter to Lewis, 22 Sept. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
128. Asian states contributed approximately $5 million. Many colonies and/or recently
independent countries were scattered in Africa and the Middle East. The Middle East sent
$200,000 in material assistance and Africa approximately $75,000 (UN Yearbook, 1951,
250–51). For the contributions of individual Latin American republics, see Nervo to Lie,
30 Sept. 1950, 795B.5; untitled document, 3 Oct. 1950, 795B.5; “Offer from Cuba of Assis-
tance for Korea,” 795B.5/10–650; “Paraguayan Aid to the Unified Command for Korea,” 9
Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–950; Remorino to Lie, 5 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–950; Sparks to Acheson,
10 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1050; Sparks to Acheson 13 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1350; Barall to
Warren, 13 Oct. 1950, 795B.5/10–1350; and Boettner to Lie, 7 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–750, all
documents in Box 4306, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
For a complete listing of UN member state contributions to the force in Korea see “Listing
of Offers of Military Assistance to the UN for Korea,” 30 Nov. 1950, 795B.5/11–3050; and
“Summary of Offers of Assistance for Korea,” Nov. 1950, 795B.5, Box 4306, Department of
129. Bohlin, “United States–Latin American Relations and the Cold War, 1949–1953,”
188–200.
130. Lory to Rusk, 7 July 1950, 795B.5/7–750, Box 4305, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; New York Times, 24 Nov. 1951.
4. The Fighting Alliance, 1951–1953
1. Lloyd R. Moses, “Personal Journal,” 21 June 1952, Box “Journal, Correspondence,

Memorabilia,” Lloyd R. Moses Papers, USAMHI.
2. El Tiempo, 28 June 1952; Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra Corea,” in Histo-
ria de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 3:197; “Operational Report,” Colombia Battalion,
20–21 June 1952, Annex 7; and “Command Report,” June 1952, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S. Infantry Division, Box 3339, RG 407, NARA.
3. Hernandez, Colombia en Corea, 17.
4. Julio César Reyes Canal, “Actividades de la fragate ARC Almirante Padilla,” in
Valencia Tover, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 4:393–406. The ship took its
name from Admiral José Prudencia Padilla, the naval hero of the War for Independence
and the victor of the 1832 Battle of Lake Maracaibo. See Bushnell, Making of Modern Co-
lombia, 49, 69.
5. Angel to Urdaneta, 13 Oct. 1950, Folio 211, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Lega-
tion in Washington, AGN; and Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,” 248–49.
6. The men also found the American obsession with Santa Claus peculiar (Hernan-
dez, Colombia en Corea, 29, 46; and Reyes, “Actividades de la fragate,” 393).
7. Hernandez, Colombia en Corea, 71–72.

9. James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 368.
10. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Md.:
United States Naval Institute Press, 1957). A medical ship from Denmark also sailed with
the UN fleet. For a complete accounting of UN naval contributions, see UN Yearbook, 1952,
249–50.
11. Scheina, Latin America, 177; and Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,”
249–50.
12. Oscar Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripulante del ARC Almirante Padilla,”
131, Mariners’ Museum & Library, Newport News, Virginia (hereafter MM).
13. Reyes, “Actividades de la fragata,” 396.
14. Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,” 250–51.
16. Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripulante,” 149–51, MM.
17. Reyes, “Actividades de la Fragata,” 400.
18. Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripulante,” 197, MM; War Diary, June, July, and
Aug. 1951, UN Blockading and Escort Force, Task Force 95, Post-1946 War Diaries, Opera-
tions Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center (hereafter NHC), Washington, D.C.; and
“Colombian Frigates in the Korean War,” Office of Naval Intelligence Review 18 (Dec. 1953):
525–50.
20. Hernandez, Colombia en Corea, 169–77; Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripu-
lante,” 191, MM.
21. Martínez Roa, Sangre en Corea, 184–85.
22. Galbraith, “Colombian Participation in the Korean War,” 4.
23. Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripulante,” 178, MM.
24. Petty Officer Alfonso Falardo broke his right leg and left arm, Petty Officer Vidal
Martínez fractured his skull, and executive officer Jamime Parra Ramirez tore open his
abdomen. Reyes, “Actividades de la fragata,” 402; and Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un
tripulante,” 214–15, MM.
26. El Tiempo, 2 Feb. 1952; and Herrera Rebolleda, “Diario de un tripulante,” 161, 173,
254, 261, MM.
27. Angel to Acheson, 19 Oct. 1950, Folio 177, Box 185, Records of the Colombian
Legation in Washington, AGN; “Colombian Frigates in the Korean War”; “Memorandum
by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the Under Secretary of
State,” 15 Mar. 1951, FRUS, 1951, 7:1006–8; and “Colombian Interest in Further U.S. Military
Assistance,” 2 Dec. 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:812–13.
28. El Tiempo, 29 Jan. 1952. The Colombians named the ship after Captain Rafael
Tono, a prominent independence-era naval figure.
29. Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Govern-
ment in Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1997), 117.
30. Ibid., 115–19; Barbara Leitch LePoer, ed., Thailand: A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 32–36; and “Policy Statement Prepared in
the Department of State: Thailand,” 15 Oct. 1950, FRUS, 1950, 6:1529–39.
31. New York Times, 20 Jan. 1951.
32. Eduardo Wills Olaya, “Actuación de la fragata Capitán Tono,” in Valencia Tovar,
Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 4:408.
33. War Diary, May 1952, UN Blockading and Escort Force, Task Force 95, Post 1946
War Diaries, Operational Archives Branch, NHC.
34. Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,” 255–58; and Wills Olaya, “Actu-
ación de la fragata,” 4:409.
35. Wills Olaya, “Actuación de la fragata,” 4:411–14.
36. Quoted in Danley, “Colombian Navy in the Korean War,” 248.
37. Ibid., 251.
38. Ibid., 252.
39. “Memorial Plaque Presentation,” 26 Jan. 1952, Country File “Colombia,” 1952, Box
10, Headquarters UN Command, RG 333, NARA; Hernandez, Colombia en Corea, 103.
40. Christian Science Monitor, 4 Apr. 1951.
41. Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 171; idem, Testimonio de una
época, 150–51; “Trayectoria del Batallón Colombia,” in Vigesimo aniversario del Batallón
Colombia, ed. Colombia, Ministerio de Guerra (Bogotá: Imprenta y Litografia de la Fuer-
zas Militaras, 1971), 24–25; “Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from Field Assign-
ments: Joy K. Vallery,” 31, 33, USAMHI; Puyana García, Por la libertad, 58–77; Valencia
Tovar to author, 12 Jan. 2001.
42. El Siglo, 13 May 1951.
43. El Tiempo, 12 May 1951 and 13 May 1951; Jaime Polanía Puyo, “La entrega de la
bandera de guerra y notas de despedida,” in Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Vigesimo
aniversario del Batallón Colombia, 35–38; and Valencia Tovar, Testimonio de una época, 156.
44. El Tiempo, 23 May 1951; and Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 174.
45. Valencia Tovar, Testimonio de una época, 158.
47. Dan Kimball to Acheson, 16 Aug. 1951, 721.551/8–1651, Box 3288, Department of
State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and “S-1 Daily Journal,” 15 June 1951, UNRC,
8212th Army Unit, June 1951, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA.
48. El Tiempo, 14 June 1951; and Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 176.
49. Guttemberg A. Moranda, “Inter-allied Military Co-operation,” Military Review 31
(Feb. 1952): 85–90.
50. For the diplomatic dimension of the Philippine contribution, and motivations
surrounding Manila’s UN contribution, see Stueck, Korean War, 72–73. The Infantry Bat-
talion Combat Team consisted of one infantry battalion augmented with one company of
Sherman tanks and one battery of 105 mm howitzers.
51. The Filipino soldiers joined the 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment, composed of ser-
vicemen from the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico. Rather than Spanish, most Filipino service-
men spoke various native dialects, most often Tagalog. A few Filipino officers were fluent
in English. See Major William J. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation during Combat Opera-
tions” (Military History Section, Far East Command, 1952), 52–53, USAMHI. Although
the Philippines had been a U.S. colony until 1946, and UN Commander General of the
Army Douglas MacArthur served in the archipelago, American military planners seemed
to know very little about the Philippine military. For more on MacArthur and the Philip-
pines, see D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1970), 1:479–619.
52. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 9, USAMHI.
53. For documents relating to the formation of the UNRC, see “Historical Records,”
8212th Army Unit, UNRC, Oct. 1950, Box 4644, RG 407, NARA.
54. Colonel John H. McGee, “United Nations Talk,” Nov. 1950, in “Activities of the
UNRC,” 8212th Army Unit, Box 4644, RG 407, NARA. By the time the Colombia Battal-
ion arrived at the UN training facility, Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Wilson had replaced
Colonel McGee as the UNRC commander.
55. The UNRC processed ground contributions from Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia,
France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Thailand, and Turkey. The Colombia Bat-
talion was the last UN unit to pass through the UNRC. After the Colombians moved to
the fighting front, the training center prepared replacement personnel for UN forces (Fox,
“Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 11, USAMHI).
56. Ibid., 176.
57. Liaison officers from larger countries worked out of their country’s embassy in
Japan. Forces from smaller states, like Colombia, that did not have an embassy in Japan
linked themselves directly to the UN military headquarters (“Command Report,” June
1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA).
58. “S-1 Daily Journal,” 3 June 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA.
59. One U.S. soldier, deemed “unsatisfactory” by Colombia Battalion officers, re-
turned to the 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment soon after reporting to the UNRC (“S-1 Daily
Journal,” 12 June 1951; and “Command Report,” UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG
407, NARA).
60. The UNRC quartermaster provided the Colombians with M-1 rifles, Browning Au-
tomatic Rifles, .30 caliber water-cooled machine guns, side arms, 60 and 81 mm mortars,
and 57 mm recoilless rifles. The Colombia Battalion also received nonlethal supplies, includ-
ing thirty jeeps, four three-quarter-ton trucks, seventeen two-and-a-half-ton trucks, trailers,
tents, dog tags, combat boots, entrenching devices, and communication equipment (“S-4
Daily Journal,” 16–18 June 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA).
61. “Command Report,” June 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA.
62. An Infantry Battalion Separate also included more administrative personnel.
63. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 39, USAMHI.
64. Puyana García, Por la libertad, 131; and Valencia Tovar to author, 16 Jan. 2001.
65. “Command Report,” June 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407,
NARA.
66. “Colombia Battalion Dossier,” 26 July 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002,
RG 407, NARA. Captain Clifford H. Reynolds recorded similar remarks, concluding “the
[Colombian] unit commanders seem basically well founded in the principles of tactics but
lacking in troops leadership procedures” (15–27 June 1951).
68. Galbraith, “Colombian Participation in the Korean War,” 17.
69. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 39, USAMHI. See also M. D. Schaafsma, The Dutch
Detachment of the United Nations in Korea, 1950–1954 (The Hague: Royal Netherlands Army
General Staff, 1960); J. P. Gahide, Belgium and the Korean War (Brussels: Belgian Center of
Military History, 1991); and History Section, Department of the Army, The Greek Expedition-
ary Force in Korea, 1950–1955 (Athens: Ministry of Defense, 1977).
70. South Africa, the only other African country to send military forces to the west-
ern Pacific, dispatched a fighter squadron that flew with the UN air forces (UN Yearbook,
1951, 249–50).
71. The Ethiopians stood alone when Italy invaded the African empire in October
1935. The Ethiopian Army, headed by Emperor Haile Selassie I, fought a courageous seven-
month campaign against the Italians. The modern Italian Army used airplanes and chemi-
cal weapons to overwhelm the African soldiers, many armed only with spears and shields.
On 2 May 1936 the Ethiopian emperor went into exile, first in French Somaliland and later
Britain. A 1936 League of Nations speech subsequently launched the Ethiopian emperor
onto the international scene as a champion of collective security. In the years after the Italian
conquest, Ethiopians continued to resist fascist control, but not until the British entered the
war in September 1939 did a concerted effort to drive the Italians from Africa begin. In May
1941 Haile Selassie I triumphantly reentered Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital; the last Ital-
ian forces in the area surrendered in January 1945. The British dominated Ethiopia through
the end of World War II. In 1945 Haile Selassie I regained full control of the country and
launched an ambitious centralization program to provide his country with greater prosper-
ity and security. See Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassie’s War: The Italian-Ethiopian Campaign,
1935–1941 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984); Hans Wilhelm Lockot, The Mission: The Life,
Reign, and Character of Haile Selassie I (London: Hurst, 1989); and Harold G. Marcus, Haile
Selassie I: The Formative Years, 1892–1936 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987).
72. Thomas P. Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry, eds., Ethiopia: A Country Study, 4th edi-
tion (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 37.
73. Eritrea lies between Ethiopia and the Red Sea, and since the 1880s had been an
Italian colony. In December 1950 the UN General Assembly voted to place the area into
a federation with Addis Ababa. The British withdrew in Sept. 1952. Immediately after the
Second World War, the emperor also pressed territorial claims to Somaliland. In 1948,
however, the emperor dropped his demands in deference to UN declaration for self-de-
termination, although border disputes arose between Ethiopian and Somalia after the So-
malia’s 1960 independence. For more on the political dimensions of the dispute, see Lloyd
Ellingson, “The Emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941–1950,” Journal of African
History 18 (1977): 261–81.
74. “Address of H.I.M. Haile Selassie I on 12 Apr. 1951 upon the Departure of the Kag-
new Battalion for Korea,” in Kimon Skordiles, Kagnew: The Story of the Ethiopian Fighters
in Korea (Tokyo: Radiopress, 1954), 225. For more on Ethiopian foreign policy, especially in
relation to the “great powers,” see David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet
Union (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1986); and Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopia,
Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974: The Politics of Empire (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1983).
75. “S-3 Daily Journal,” 30 June 1951; and “S-1 Daily Journal,” 2 July 1951, UNRC,
8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA. In contrast, the Colombia Battalion training
resulted in only one minor injury (“S-1 Daily Journal,” 18 July 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army
Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA).
76. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 31–35, USAMHI. For coverage of Ethiopian
combat performance, see Samuel L. A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting
Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956); and
Skordiles, Kagnew.
77. By 1953 the Republic of Korea fielded 590,000 ground forces. That same year, the
total number of U.S. troops in Korea topped 300,000.
78. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, “Allied Interoperability in the Korean War” (Center
of Military History, 1963), 12, USAMHI.
79. Ibid., 12–13.
80. The natural location for the Colombia troops would have been with the Puerto
Rican regiment of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division, but 8th U.S. Army planners had already
attached the Philippine Battalion to the 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment (Cooling, “Allied In-
teroperability in the Korean War,” 12–13; and Fox “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 52, USAMHI).
81. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 55, USAMHI. Eighth U.S. Army officials had
taken this decision prior to the Colombia Battalion’s arrival. Colombian tactical observa-
tion teams traveled to the front while the main body of Colombian troops trained at the
UNRC. The Colombians familiarized themselves with the 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment dur-
ing those visits. Also, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment officers traveled to the UNRC to learn
more about the Colombia Battalion. The 24th U.S. Infantry Division’s G-3 had spent some
time with the U.S. military mission in Colombia during World War II; he too visited the
Colombian soldiers at the UNRC (“S-1 Daily Journal,” 30 June 1951; and “Command Re-
port,” July 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA).
82. “S-1 Daily Journal,” 27–30 July 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407,
NARA.
83. Valencia Tovar, Testimonio de una época, 161.
84. Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 176–78.
85. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1966), 74.
86. El Tiempo, 12 Oct. 1951; and Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 75, 104, USAMHI. The
Colombians channeled requests for air support via radio directly to 8th U.S. Army headquarters.
87. Valencia Tovar, Testimonio de una época, 163–64.
88. Ibid., 178.
89. “Command Report,” Aug. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry
Division, Box 3671, RG 407, NARA.
90. El Tiempo, 3 Sept. 1951 and 18 Sept. 1951.
91. Jamin Durán Pombo, “Sayamg-ni,” 20, in Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Vi-
gesimo aniversario del Batallón Colombia, 19–23.
92. “Command Report,” Sept. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry
94. “Command Report,” Oct. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry
96. El Tiempo, 19 Oct. 1951.
97. “Command Report,” Oct. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry Divi-
sion, Box 3673, RG 407, NARA; and Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 86.
Division, Box 3673, RG 407, NARA; and El Tiempo, 8 Nov. 1951.
99. On 23 October an incoming round wounded the battalion commander while
he moved between positions; Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruíz Novoa assumed command
until Polanía recovered (Ruíz Novoa, Enseñanzas de la campaña de Corea, 150; and New
York Times, 17 Nov. 1951).
100. “Command Report,” Nov. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry Divi-
sion, Box 3674, RG 407, NARA; and Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 189.
101. “Command Report,” Dec. 1951, 21st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 24th U.S. Infantry Divi-
sion, Box 3675, RG 407, NARA.
102. By the end of the war, Colombians would receive twenty-five Bronze Stars with
Valor, nine Bronze Stars, eighteen Silver Stars, and two Presidential Unit Citations (one
from the United States and one from South Korea). See Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la
Guerra de Corea,” 201.
103. Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001; “Command Report,” Jan. 1952, 31st U.S.
Infantry Division, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Box 3331, RG 407, NARA; and Torres, Colom-
bia en la Guerra de Corea, 107–8. The 7th U.S. Infantry Division had distinguished itself
in spearheading the Allied return to Leyte in Oct. 1944 and during the Sept. 1950 Inchon
landing. U.S. Department of the Army, 7th Infantry Division, Historical Division, Bayonet:
A History of the 7th Infantry Division (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Company, 1952), 8–9.
104. U.S. Department of the Army, 7th Infantry Division, Historical Division, Bayo-
net, 27–28.
105. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 370–71; Sergeant Pablo Torres Almeyda,
who served in the UN trenches, concluded that the entire network, etched between ar-
tillery craters and shattered tree stumps, embodied tragedy and death (Torres Almeyda,
Colombia en la Guerra de Corea, 107–8, 111).
106. El Tiempo, 21 Jan. 1952.
107. “Command Report,” May 1952, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Di-
vision, Box 3337, RG 407, NARA; and Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 112–14.
108. Hermes, Truce Tent on Fighting Front, 373.
109. Nineteen inches of rain fell in July 1952 alone (“Command Report,” July 1952, 31st
U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Box 3341, RG 407, NARA).
110. Moses noted in a 7 Feb. 1971 interview with Daniel Davison: “They [Colombians]
would always feel that they were learning from experiences as well as from the more senior
and experienced personnel, whether they were Colombians or Americans, and they always
felt that it was a privilege to learn how to do everything right, preferably the first time. As
a result, most of their work was of good quality. The firing positions of weapons were so
carefully selected that it would be difficult to find fault with the fields of final defensive fire,
defensive lines, supporting fires, cross-fires, routes to switch positions, routes to first-aid
stations, routes to water points, routes to the command posts, lateral routes, they were so
carefully laid out that they served as a model in the 31st Infantry and we oftentimes would
have a meeting in one area to show how something should be done, and I think the Colom-
bian Battalion was visited for this purpose more than any of the U.S. battalions and some
regiments” (interview in Davison, “The Colombian Army in Korea,” 52).
111. Colombian troops consumed the same rations as U.S. Army troops. The UN
Command quartermaster occasionally served ethnic meals to UN combat forces.
112. Ruíz Novoa, Batallón Colombia en Corea, 9; and El Tiempo, 18 Feb. 1952 and 21
Feb. 1952.
114. “Command Report,” Jan. 1952; “Training Schedule Colombia Battalion Replacements,”
UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5826, RG 407, NARA; and New York Times, 26 Sept. 1952.
115. Ruíz Novoa, Batallón Colombia en Corea, 67–148.
116. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,”66, USAMHI.
117. For more on the Turkish Army in Korea, see Turkish General Staff History Divi-
sion, The Battles of the Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Istanbul: Turk-
ish General Staff, 1975).
118. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 63, 128–29, 132–33, USAMHI.
119. UNRC staff addressed issues relating to disciplinary procedures. See, for example,
“S-1 Daily Journal,” 18 June 1951, UNRC, 8212th Army Unit, Box 5002, RG 407, NARA.
120. Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation,” 60, USAMHI. See also Lily Ann Polo, A Cold War
Alliance: Philippine–South Korean Relations, 1948–1971 (Manila: Univ. of the Philippines,
1984).
121. Ruíz Novoa, Enseñanzas de la campaña de Corea, 152; “Request for Confinement,”
24 Sept. 1953, Country File (Colombia, 1953), Box 16; and “Witness Statement,” Apr. 1954,
Country File (Colombia, 1954–1955), Box 22, Liaison Section, Headquarters UN Com-
mand, RG 333, NARA.
122. The system included some medical units from UN member states.
123. “Disinterment of Remains of UN Personnel,” 25 Sept. 1951, Country File (Colom-
bia, 1951), Box 3, Liaison Section, Headquarters UN Command, RG 333, NARA; and “Co-
lombia Cemetery Burial File,” Box 1, Allied Personnel Files, AGRS Korean War Records,
U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii.
124. Davison, “The Colombian Army in Korea,” 82.
125. Ibid., 87; and Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001. Betty Grable and Marilyn
Monroe were especially popular among Colombian servicemen.
126. Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001; and Puyana García, Por la libertad, 264–79.
127. Lack of spending money also kept Colombians from taking full advantage of the
Post Exchange, although the South Americans did purchase their share of Lucky Strike,
Camel, and Chesterfield cigarettes (Torres Almeyda, Colombia en la Guerra de Corea, 92).
128. New York Times, 2 July 1952.
129. Torres Almeyda, Colombia en la Guerra de Corea, 91.
130. New York Times, 17 Nov. 1951; and Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001.
132. Davison, “The Colombian Army in Korea,” 88.
133. Colombian participation in the Korean War also caused hardships and anxieties
for the families of Colombian servicemen. See “Asi son las madres colombianas,” in Co-
lombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Vigesimo aniversario del Batallón Colombia, 77–78.
134. “United States Policy toward Inter-American Military Cooperation,” 1 Nov. 1952,
President’s Secretary’s Files, 1945–1953, “National Security Council,” Box 195, Truman Pa-
pers, HSTL.
135. Moses Interview, 3 May 1971, in Davison, “The Colombian Army in Korea,” 107.
136. Author’s interview with T. C. Mataxis, 8 Aug. 2002.
138. Washington Post, 17 Jan. 1954.
140. The Pope even made such a plea in a 1952 radio address to the country (Krebs to
Acheson, 6 May 1952, 821.413/5–652, Box 4578, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–
1954, RG 59, NARA).
141. Memoria de Guerra, 1951–1952, 37.
142. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 123; New York Times, 1 and 6 Nov. 1951.
146. “Conversation with Colombian Ambassador Regarding Religious Persecution in Co-
lombia,” 29 Aug. 1951, 821.413/8–2951, Box 4578, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954,
RG 59, NARA. Private churches also petitioned the Colombian government for an end to the
violence, adding weight and urgency to official U.S. protests (Angel to Ospina, 19 Apr. 1950 and
11 Aug. 1950, Folio 229, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN).
147. Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Conferencia del ministro de relaciones, 17–18.
148. Evangelical Confederation of Colombia, “Third Report on Religious Persecution
in Colombia,” Apr. 1952, 821.413/5–2952, Box 4578; “Persecution of Protestants in Colom-
bia,” 7 Feb. 1950, 821.413/2–750, Box 4577; and “Intervention of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in
the Protestant-Catholic Quarrel in Colombia,” 13 Aug. 1952, 821.413, Box 4579, Department
149. “Briefing Memorandum on the Protestant Situation in Colombia,” 12 Nov. 1953,
FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:805–7.
150. “State-Defense-Treasury Position Paper on Colombian Reimbursement for Lo-
gistical Support,” 5 Sept. 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:78.
151. Miller to Harold Tittmann, 5 Nov. 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1601.
152. Memorandum of Conversation, 13 Mar. 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:947.
153. Randall, Colombia and the United States, 202.
154. U.S. Department of State, Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of American States, March 26–April 7, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1953); and idem., Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs: Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951).
155. Washington Post, 7 Mar. 1951.
156. Child, Unequal Alliance, 119.
157. “Mutual Security Act of 1951” [65 Stat. 373].
158. In the end, the Gómez government did purchase some arms from both Europe
and Mexico (“Summary of Ambassador’s Dispatch on Colombian Political Situation,” 18
June 1952, 721.00/6–1152, Box 3288; and “Purchase of Non-U.S. Equipment,” 5 Aug. 1953,
721.56/3–553, Box 3289, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA).
159. “Visit of the Colombian Minister of War to Discuss Purchase of Military Equip-
ment,” 6 June 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:767–68.
160. “Colombian Request to Purchase Military Equipment,” 23 Aug. 1950, 721.56/8–
161. “Plan Militar” [undated], Box 1951, War Ministry Files, Records of the General
Secretary, Archivo de la Presidencia de la República, Bogotá, Colombia (hereafter APR).
162. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 12 Apr. 1951, 721.56/4–1251, Box 3288, Depart-
163. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 12 Apr. 1951, 721.56/4–1251, Box 3288, Depart-
164. “Department of State Policy Statement,” 22 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1299.
165. “Presentation to Colombian Ambassador of Defense Department’s Pricing and
Availability Estimates on Colombian Request for Military Equipment and Services,” 13
Aug. 1951, 721.56/8–1351, Box 3288, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59,
NARA.
166. “Colombia Request for Infantry Equipment,” 16 May 1952, 721.56/5–1652, Box
167. “Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Colombia,” 17
Apr. 1952, 310.10, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records,
1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
168. “Remarks of Foreign Minister Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo upon Signing the
Agreement,” 17 Apr. 1952, 320.10, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified
General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; “Mutual Security Act of 1951” [65 Stat. 373]; and
Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Conferencia del ministro de relaciones exteriores, 11–12.
169. “Visit of the Colombian Minister of War to Discuss Purchase of U.S. Equipment,”
6 June 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:767–68.
170. “Memorandum of Conversation, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs,” 23 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:778. Mann added that if the United
States totally refused to assist Colombia, the United States “would risk antagonizing the
Colombian government to the point where they might resurrect their proposal to with-
draw their battalion in Korea on the grounds that the battalion and its equipment are
needed at home.”
171. “Memorandum from Bryon E. Blankenship, Officer in Charge of North Coast
Affairs,” 27 May 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 8:868–69.
172. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 25 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:779–80. The
U.S. government flatly refused Bogotá’s August 1952 request for one thousand napalm
bombs (Waynick to Department of State, 721.5/8–452, Box 3288, Department of State, Dec-
imal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA).
173. “Failure of Colombia to Receive Military Supplies,” 28 Jan. 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954,
4:795–96.
174. Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia, 260.
175. Gómez discussed economic and commercial matters with Ambassador Beaulac
on 10 January 1950. “Conversation with President-elect Laureano Gómez,” 10 Jan. 1950,
FRUS, 1950, 2:802–7.
176. Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Noticias de la semana (Bogotá:
Servicio de Información del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), 25 Nov. 1953; and “Paz de
Río Steel Plant,” 8 June 1954, 821.00/6–854, Box 4563, Department of State, Decimal Files,
1950–1954, RG 59, NARA.
177. “Annual Petroleum Report for Colombia, 1952,” 23 Jan. 1953, 821.2553/1–2353, De-
partment of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, Box 4575, RG 59, NARA.
178. Sáenz Rovner, Industriales, proteccionismo y política en Colombia; Bushnell, Mak-
ing of Modern Colombia, 208–11; and Carlos Miguel Ortiz Sarmiento, “The ‘Business of
the Violence’: The Quindío in the 1950s and 1960s,” and Medófilo Medina, “Violence and
Economic Development: 1945–1950 and 1985–1988” in Violence in Colombia: The Contem-
porary Crisis in Historical Perspective, ed. Charles Bergquist, Richardo Peñaranda, and
Gonzalo Sánchez, 125–54, 155–68 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1992).
179. “Point 4 Agreements,” Department of State, Bulletin 24 (26 Mar. 1951): 504; “The
Development of Irrigation, Drainage and Power Projects in Colombia,” 21 Aug. 1952, 821.00-
TA/8–2152, Box 4564, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and
“Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State,” 22 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:1297–305.
180. “Memoranda of International Bank and Export-Import Bank of Washington,”
Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Subject Files, 1945–
1951, Folder “Colombia, 1952,” Box 4, Lot 53026, RG 59, NARA; and “Colombia: Raw Cot-
ton Shipments,” Department of State, Bulletin 25 (19 Nov. 1951): 828.
181. The Rojas government resolved expenses incurred in Korea. For more on Lend-
Lease settlement, see Fernando Gaitán de Marváez to General Consul, 16 Oct. 1950, Folio
211, Box 87, Records of the Colombian Legation in Washington, AGN.
182. New York Times, 4 Jan. 1952.
183. “Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State,” 22 May 1951, FRUS, 1951,
2:1297–305.
184. Dix, Colombia, 113–14; Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 127–35; Bushnell, Mak-
ing of Modern Colombia, 214–15; Bogotá Embassy Dispatch Number 390 (5 Apr. 1952) and
Number 568, (22 May 1952), Box 4, Department of State, Records of the Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin America, Subject Files (Miller), 1949–1953, RG 59, NARA; and Waynick
to Department of State, 3 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:796–802.
185. “Command Report,” Mar. 1953, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Di-
vision, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA.
186. “Operational Report,” Colombia Infantry Battalion, 12–13 Mar. 1953, 31st U.S. In-
fantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Annex 3, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA.
187. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 395.
188. “Periodic Operation Report,” Colombia Battalion, 20–26 Mar. 1953, 31st U.S. In-
fantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA. Communist shell-
ing of the 3rd Battalion position on Pork Chop Hill increased in proportion with the bar-
rage on Old Baldy.
189. “Command Report,” Mar. 1953, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry
191. Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 205; and Ruíz Novoa, Batallón
Colombia en Korea, 52–53.
192. Torres Almeyda, Colombia en la Guerra de Corea, 134–37; and Jorge Robledo
Pulido, “Aniversario del Old Baldy,” in Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, Vigesimo ani-
versario del Batallón Colombia, 56–59.
193. General Roscoe Robinson Jr., U.S. Army (retired), interview, by Lieutenant Colo-
nel Duance E. Hardesty, U.S. Army Oral History Program (1988), 63–66, USAMHI.
194. “Command Report,” Mar. 1953, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Divi-
sion, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA
195. El Tiempo, 2 Apr. 1953 and 6 Apr. 1953.
196. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 395. General Taylor replaced General Van
Fleet on 11 Feb. 1953. The new commander saw the CPV offensive as a “face-saving propa-
ganda maneuver.” Aware of President Dwight Eisenhower’s desire to keep U.S. causalities
at the lowest possible level, Taylor flatly rejected Trudeau’s request for authorization to
retake Old Baldy. See Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (New
York: Times Books, 1987), 972; and Arthur G. Trudeau, “Memoirs” (Feb. 1986): 201, Arthur
G. Trudeau Papers, USAMHI.
197. These numbers include losses during the communist artillery barrage that preceded
the CPV assault. Causality figures drawn from “Operational Report,” Colombia Battalion,
19–23 Mar. 1953, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Annex 3; “Command Re-
port,” Mar. 1953, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Division, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA;
and Ruíz, Batallón Colombia en Korea, 53. After 23 Mar. 1953 the Colombia Battalion did not
submit another Operational Report until it regrouped in the regimental reserve area three
days later. See also Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 207.
198. Trudeau, “Memoirs,” 200–201, Arthur G. Trudeau Papers, USAMHI. See also
“Debriefing Program, Arthur G. Trudeau,” conducted by Colonel Calvin I. Trudeau, 3:3–5,
USAMHI.
199. Trudeau, “Memoirs,” 200–201, Arthur G. Trudeau Papers, USAMHI.
200. Despite the general’s apparent misgivings, on 27 Mar. 1953 he presented Lieuten-
ant Colonel Alberto Ruíz with a bronze star with valor for “his heroism and passionate
devotion” to duty during the action. See Trudeau, “Memoirs,” 200–201, Arthur G. Trudeau
Papers, USAMHI; Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,” 207.
201. A U.S. Army intelligence report suggested that the Communist Chinese might
also have intercepted 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment radio traffic, which helped them coordi-
nate their attack to coincide with the switching of Colombia’s frontline companies (Thomas
J. Ferguson, Korean War Questionnaire, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th U.S. Infantry Di-
vision, USAMHI).
203. Thomas J. Ferguson, Korean War Questionnaire, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th
U.S. Infantry Division, USAMHI.
204. “Command Report,” Mar. 1953, 31st U.S. Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Divi-
sion, Box 3392, RG 407, NARA.
206. One hundred thirty-one servicemen died in combat, ten in wartime accidents,
and two of natural causes. The whereabouts of two soldiers remains unknown. For a com-
plete accounting of the human cost of the war, and the names of every Colombian soldier
that served in Korea, see Ruíz Novoa, Batallón Colombia en Corea, 149–60.
207. The period after the armistice brought some drama. In May 1954 North Korean sol-
diers apprehended four Colombian servicemen, including Colombia Battalion commander
Ortíz Torres. The UN Command immediately arranged for the release of the men, part of an
observation team that strayed too close to the communist line. See Colonel Polanía to Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 17 Aug. 1954, Box 32, U.S. Army Operations Decimal File, 1954,
RG 391, NARA; and U.S. Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State, 12 May 1954, 721.55/5–1254, Box
209. Ibid., 360–61.
210. The narrative surrounding the coup is drawn from El Tiempo, 14–18 June 1953;
James O. Icenhour, “The Military in Colombian Politics” (M.A. thesis, George Washington
University, 1976), 89–98; Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, 136–38; Henderson, Moderniza-
tion in Colombia, 359–63.
211. Icenhour, “The Military in Colombian Politics,” 96.

213. Ramsey, “Colombia Battalion in Korea and Suez,” 555. Carlos J. Villar Borda cap-
tures the sense of excitement surrounding the rise of Rojas in Rojas Pinilla: El presidente
libertador (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1953). See also Jorge Serpa Erazo, Rojas Pinilla: Una
historia del siglo XX (Bogotá: Planeta, 1999); and María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, Rojas
Pinilla, mi padre (Bogotá: Panamericana Formas e Impresos, 2000).
214. Icenhour, “The Military in Colombian Politics,” 98; and Henderson, Moderniza-
tion in Colombia, 363.
215. “Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America to the Secretary
of State: Recognition of New Government in Colombia,” 15 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954,
4:803.
5. Continuity and Change, 1953–1957
1. “Participation of the United States Embassy in Celebrations Honoring the Re-

turning Colombia Battalion from Korea,” Nov. 1954, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, General Records, 1954–1955, RG 84, NARA; El Espectador, 2 Dec. 1954; and La
Republica, 2 Dec., 1954.
2. El Tiempo, 2 Dec. 1954.
3. See Robert R. Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower
Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).
4. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America,”
NSC 144/1, 18 Mar. 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:6–10.
5. “Basic National Security Policy,” NSC 162/2, 30 Oct. 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 2:593.
6. Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticom-
munism (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1988), 33–41; and David F. Schmitz,
Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999).
7. “Observations and Suggestions Concerning the Overseas Internal Security Pro-
gram,” Albert R. Haney, 14 June 1957, Box 18, Operations Coordinating Board (hereafter
OCB) Central File, NSC Staff Paper, 1948–1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Li-
brary, Abilene, Kans. (hereafter EL), 9.
8. “Address by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, before the Tenth Inter-Ameri-
can Conference, on the Spirit of Inter-American Unity,” in Schlesinger, The Dynamic of
World Power, 3:237–43. U.S. Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Cara-
cas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America
with Related Documents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955); and
Pan American Union, Tenth Inter-American Conference: Handbook for Delegates (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1953).
9. “Statement by Secretary Dulles, before the Politico-Juridical Committee of the
Tenth Inter-American Conference, on Intervention of International Communism in the
Americas,” 8 Mar. 1954, in Schlesinger, The Dynamic of World Power, 3:243–49.
10. “Tenth Inter-American Conference Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation
of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Inter-
vention,” 28 Mar. 1954, in Schlesinger, The Dynamic of World Power, 3:260–61.
11. “Declaration of Caracas,” 28 Mar. 1954, in Schlesinger, The Dynamic of World Power,
3:262.
13. Ibid., 2 June 1954.
14. Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1982); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Response to
Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); and
Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–
1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991).
15. El Tiempo, 10 Nov. 1954.
16. “Memorandum of Discussion, NSC Meeting,” 15 Nov. 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954,
4:350; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 70–71.
17. El Tiempo, 10 Nov. 1954.
18. El Colombiano, 6 Dec. 1954; U.S. Department of State, Report of the United States
Delegation to the Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy of the American Republics
at the Fourth Extraordinary Meeting of Inter-American Economic and Social Council, No-
vember 22 to December 2, 1954, Quitandinha, Brazil (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1954).
19. Kenneth D. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens:
Univ. of Georgia Press, 1999), 91–113; and Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 77.
21. “Travel of Colombians to Communist Sponsored Conferences,” 4 Aug. 1954,
350.10, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955,
RG 84, NARA.
22. New York Times, 7 May 1954.
23. Quoted in Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1963), 83.
24. James M. Boyd, United Nations Peace-Keeping: A Military Appraisal (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1971), 119.
25. “La Fuerzas de Emergencia de las N.U.,” 26 Apr. 1957, Records of the General Secre-
tary, “War Ministry,” Box 1957, APR; Valencia Tovar, “Colombia y la crisis del canal de Suez,”
in Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 3:219–34; Ramsey, “Colombia
Battalion in Korea and Suez,” 550; and A. G. Mezerik, The United Nations Emergency Force:
Creation, Evolution, End of Mission (New York: International Review Service, 1969), 8–9.
26. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping (New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 33–56; William J. Durch,
ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1993); Boyd, United Nations Peace-Keeping, 171–81; “United Nations Emergency
Force,” 15 Nov. 1957, 312.00, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General
Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA; and Valencia Tovar, “En Egipto, el tercer batallón Colom-
bia,” in Valencia Tovar, Historia de las fuerzas militares de Colombia, 3:238–58.
27. Lodge to Dulles, 25 May 1955, 721.5-MSP/5–2555, Box 3002, Department of State,
28. Tad Szulc, Twilight of the Tyrants (New York: Henry Holt, 1959), 204–48; Silvia
Galvis and Alberto Donadío, El jefe supremo: Rojas Pinilla en la Violencia y el poder (Bo-
gotá: Planeta, 1988), 43–71.
29. El Tiempo, 8 Mar. 1954.

30. Diario de la Costa, 13 May 1954.
31. La Republica, 7 Aug. 1954.
32. El Tiempo, 13 June 1954; Bushnell, Making of Modern Colombia, 215–22; and “Presi-
dent’s Remarks on Publics Order and the Role of the Church,” 16 July 1955, 370.00, Box 6, De-
partment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
34. “Memorandum by Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs,”
12 Nov. 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 4:805; and Serpa, Rojas Pinilla, 213–18.
35. New York Times, 4 Sept. 1953.
36. Colombia, Dirección de Información y Propaganda, Seis meses de gobierno (Bo-
gotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1953); “Annual Radio Report of Minister of Development,” 10 June
1955, 361.2, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1953–1955, RG
84, NARA; El Tiempo, 6 June 1955; “Annual Report to the National by the Minister of Public
Works,” 11 July 1956, 821.261/7–1156, Box 4249; “Description of the Cauca Valley Project,”
25 May 1955, 821.211/5–2555, Box 4247, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG
59, NARA; Rojas, Rojas Pinilla, mi padre, 196–221; and Serpa Erazo, Rojas Pinilla, 237–38.
“Monthly Political Summary,” 1 July 1956, Box 5; Bonsal to Dulles, 14 June 1956, 350.00, Box
4; and “Summary and Assessment,” 9 July 1957, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
37. “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 July 1956, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá
38. “Report by Investigator of June 8 and 9 Student Shooting,” undated, 350.00, Box
4, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955; “Bullring
Ovation for Liberal ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo,” 31 Jan. 1956; and “Brutality in
the Bullring,” 15 Feb. 1956, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified
General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
39. Serpa, Rojas Pinilla, 246–49, 268–70; “Monthly Political Summary,” 3 Sept. 1957,
350.00; and Pigott to Secretary of State, 29 Apr. 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State,
40. “Monthly Political Summary,” 2 Jan. 1957; and “Monthly Political Summary,” 1
Oct. 1957, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–
1958, RG 84, NARA.
41. The U.S. embassy in Bogotá observed that some high-ranking government of-
ficials were more interested in “extra-curricular activities” than their official duties. When
the Pentagon asked one U.S. military adviser with privileged access to the highest circle of
Colombian authority about the allegations of corruption, the officer replied government
corruption was “a hard fact.” “Debriefing on Colombia by Lt. Col. Rex T. Barber, Air At-
taché at Bogotá,” 31 May 1956, 350.00, Box 4; and “Current Situation in Colombia,” 24 Aug.
1956, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records,
1956–1958, RG 84, NARA. See also El Tiempo, 1 Nov. 1958.
42. “Violence in Colombia,” 23 Jan. 1958, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá
44. “Communist Control of Guerrilla forces in NIE 88–56,” 11 Apr. 1956, 350.00, Box 4,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
45. “Situation of Violence in Colombia: Survey and Assessment,” 31 Oct. 1955, 370.00,
Box 6, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG

84, NARA; and “Debriefing on Colombia by Lt. Col. Rex T. Barber, Air Attaché at Bogotá,”
31 May 1956, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Re-
cords, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
46. Mills to Gerberich, 17 Nov. 1949, 821.00/11–1649, Box 5243, Department of State,
47. “Restrictions on Protestant Missionaries in Mission Territories,” 21 Apr. 1956,
48. “Monthly Political Summary,” 2 Jan. 1957, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá
49. Chancery to Foreign Office, 7 Dec. 1956, Foreign Office File 371/126512, Public
Records Office, London, England.
50. “Discussion with Ambassador Urrutia,” 1 Mar. 1956, 821.413/3–156, Box 4250, De-
51. “Protestant Situation in Colombia,” 9 Apr. 1956, 821.413/4–956, Box 4250, Depart-
52. “Religious Problem in Colombia,” 27 July 1956, 821.413/7–2756, Box 4251, Depart-
53. Bonsal to Holland, 22 Sept. 1955, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; and Rojas, Rojas Pinilla, mi
padre, 222–29.
54. “Motion Picture Censorship in Colombia,” 29 Dec. 1955, 821.452/12–2955, Box
4253, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA; and “Monthly Politi-
cal Summary,” 2 Jan. 1957, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General
Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
55. Quoted in Steel, “Colombian Experiences in Korea,” 45.
56. Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 181–252.
58. “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 June 1956, 320.00, Box 5, Department of State,
59. “Violence in Colombia,” 16 May 1956, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá
60. “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 Mar. 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State,
61. General Louis V. Hightower to Lieutenant General Clyde D. Eddleman, 21 Mar.
1956, Box 2, Records of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Classified Gen-
eral Correspondence, 1956, RG 319, NARA.
62. “Basic National Security Policy,” NSC 153/1, 10 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, 2:381.
63. “Paper Prepared by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,” 9
Nov. 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, 2:770.
64. “Basic National Security Policy,” NSC 5440/8, 13 Dec. 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954,
2:816.
65. “Statement on U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” NSC 5613/1, 25 Sept. 1956, FRUS,
1955–1957, 6:119–37.
66. Ibid.
67. “Report of NSC Action No. 1290-d Working Group,” 16 Feb. 1955, Folder “Internal
Security,” Box 18, White House Office Files, OCB Central Files, EL.
68. “Outline Plan of Operations for Colombia,” 6 Oct. 1955, Folder “Colombia,” Box
28, White House Office Files, OCB Central Files, EL.
69. “Outline Plan of Operations for Colombia,” 24 Jan. 1956, Folder “Colombia,” Box
70. “Outline Plan of Operations for Colombia,” 6 Oct. 1955, Folder “Colombia,” Box
31, USAMHI.
73. “Progress Report on Mutual Security Program,” 2 July 1954, 450.00, Box 1, De-
partment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
74. “Progress Report on Mutual Security Objectives in Colombia,” 8 July 1953, 450.00,
84, NARA.
75. “U.S.-Colombian Military Aid Situation,” 21 Nov. 1955, 320.10, Box 2, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; and
“MAAG Country Statement, Colombia,” 26 July 1954, Box 32, Army Operations Decimal
File, 1954, RG 319, NARA.
76. “Colombia: Loan of Vessels,” 5 Apr. 1960, 7 Apr. 1960, Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Acts Series (hereafter TIAS) 4464 [11 UST 1315].
77. “Amendment to the Plan of the Government of Colombia and the United States
for Their Common Defense,” 10 Nov. 1954, Box 32, Army Operations Decimal File, 1954,
RG 319, NARA.
78. “Retention by the Colombian Infantry Battalion of U.S. Equipment,” 19 Oct. 1954,
Box 32, Army Operations Decimal File, 1954, RG 391, NARA.
79. Eighth U.S. Army to Chief Colombian MAAG, 15 Dec. 1954, Box 23, Headquarters
UN Command, Liaison Section, Country File “Colombia,” 1954–1955, RG 333, NARA; and
Bonsal to Dulles, 1 July 1955, 721.5-MSP/6–3055, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA.
80. “U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Colombia Organization and
Instructions,” 20 Dec. 1957, 320.1, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Re-
cords, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA; and “Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from Field
Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,” 91, USAMHI.
81. “Statement on U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” NSC 5613/1, 25 Sept. 1956, FRUS,
1955–1957, 6:119–37.
82. Murphy to Davis, 5 July 1955, 721.5-MSP/7–555, Box 3002, Department of State,
83. “Briefing Paper on Colombia,” 1 May 1955, 320.00, Box 4, Department of State,
84. “Memorandum: Ayuda Militar,” 11 July 1955, Box 1955, Foreign Ministry Files,
Records of the General Secretary, APR.
85. “Conversation with the Colombian Ambassador,” 19 Apr. 1955, 721.5 MSP/4–2955,
Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA; and “Memoran-
dum: Ayuda Militar,” 11 July 1955, Box 1955, Foreign Ministry Files, Records of the General
Secretary, APR.
87. “Colombia: Military Aid,” 24 May 1955, 721.5-MSP/5–2455, Department of State,

88. Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1954 [68 Stat. 833].
90. “Assistencia Militar Entre la República de Colombia y los Estados Unidos de
America,” 1 Aug. 1955, Box 1955, Foreign Ministry Files, Records of the Secretary General,
APR; and “Military Equipment for Colombia,” 26 Jan. 1956, 721.5 MSP/1–2656, Box 3002,
91. “Colombian Use of U.S. Supplies Military Equipment,” 19 May 1955, 721.5 MSP/5–
1955, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA; and Rempe,
“An American Trojan Horse?” 34–64.
92. “U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Colombia: Organization and
Instructions,” 20 Dec. 1957, 320.1, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, 1956–1958, RG 84; and “Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from Field As-
signments: Joy K. Vallery,” 91, USAMHI.
93. “Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1954” [68 Stat. 833].
94. “U.S.-Colombian Military Aid Situation,” 21 Nov. 1955, 320.10, Box 2, Department
of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
67, USAMHI.
96. “Export of Napalm Bombs to Colombia to Be Used to Suppress Rebel Guerrilla
Forces,” 19 May 1955, 721.5 MSP/5–1955, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG
59, NARA.
97. “Current Situation in Colombia,” 24 Aug. 1956, 350.00, Box 5, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
98. “Lapse in Agreements for U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force Mission Agreements to
Colombia,” 30 Sept. 1953, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified
99. “Agreements of Army, Navy and Air Force Missions,” 6 Oct. 1954, 4 Nov. 1954,
320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–
1955, RG 84, NARA.
100. “Military Assistance Advisory Group,” 13 July 1955, 16 Sept. 1955, TIAS 3393 [6
UST 3904–1906]; and “Transfer of MAAG Functions to Military Missions,” 21 Sept. 1955,
320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–
1955, RG 84, NARA.
101. “Military Assistance Program in Colombia: Navy,” 23 Oct. 1956, 721.5-MSP.10–
102. “Military Equipment for Colombia,” 19 Apr. 1956, 721.5622/4–1956, Box 3002, De-
103. “Colombian Air Force,” 1957, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
104. Key to Schoenfeld, 7 June 1954, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; “U.S. Air Force Mission to Colombia,” 2
May 1956, 721.58/5–256, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA;
Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la guerra de Corea,” 213; Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001; and
“Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from Field Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,” 58, USAMHI.
105. “Request for Extension of Services of Colonel Lowry, U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers,” 24 June 1955, 721.58/6–2455, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–
1959, RG 59, NARA.
106. Ralph Puckett Jr. and John R. Galvin, “Lancero,” Infantry 49 (July–Sept. 1959): 21–
23; Puckett interview with author, 25 Apr. 2002; “Request for Officer to Establish a Ranger-
Type School for the Colombian Army,” 29 May 1955; and Cheston to París, 20 Mar. 1956,
Box 2, U.S. Army Missions, General Records, 1952–1964, RG 334, NARA.
107. “Organizing Security in the Americas,” John C. Dreier, in Department of State,
Bulletin (31 May 1954): 834.
108. “Outline Plan of Operations for Colombia,” 24 Jan. 1956, Folder “Colombia,” Box
28, White House Office Files, OCB Central Files, EL; “Communism in Colombia,” 8 June
1955, 350.10, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records,
1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; Turner to París, 6 Feb. 1956, Box 2, U.S. Army Missions, General
Records, 1952–1964, RG 334, NARA; and “Debriefing of Senior Officers Returning from
Field Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,” 58, USAMHI.
109. “Outline Plan of Operations for Colombia,” Operation Coordinating Board, 24
Jan. 1956, Folder “Colombia,” Box 28, White House Office Files, OCB Central Files, EL.
110. Key to Schoenfeld, 7 June 1954, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; “U.S. Air Force Mission to
Colombia,” 2 May 1956, 721.58/5–256, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–
1959, RG 59, NARA; Valencia Tovar, “Colombia en la guerra de Corea,” 213; and Valencia
Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001.
111. “Medical Specialists in Colombia,” 9 Mar. 1954; and Lieutenant Colonel Randall
Bryant to Colonel Jaime Polania Puyo, 9 Apr. 1954, Box 32, Army Operations Decimal File,
1954, RG 319, NARA.
112. “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 May 1957, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Em-
bassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA; “Air Transportation Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and the Government of Colombia,” 320.12, Box
2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA.
113. “Meteorological Station,” 14 Mar. 1956, 320.10, Box 3, Department of State, Bogotá
Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA; and “Weather Station:
Cooperative Program on St. Andrews Island,” TIAS 3611, [7 UST 2095–2104].
114. “Report by Milton S. Eisenhower, Special Ambassador, to the President of the
United States on United States–Latin American Relations,” 18 Nov. 1953, in Schlesinger, The
Dynamic of World Power, 3:224.
115. Rudolf E. Schoefeld to Evaristo Sourdis, 24 June 1954, 821.00-TA/7–654, Box 4564,
Department of State, Decimal Files, 1950–1954, RG 59, NARA; and “Technical Coopera-
tion: Program of Housing,” 24 June 1954, 30 June 1954, TIAS 3090, [5 UST 2296].
116. “Transcript of the Ambassador’s Press Conference,” 11 Aug. 1959, 320.00, Box 1,
Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1959–1961, RG 84, NARA. “His-
tory of the Fulbright Commission,” 25 Nov. 1957, 320.11, Box 3; and “Educational Agree-
ment, 1956,” 320.11, Box 1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1956–
1958, RG 84, NARA.
117. “Economic Summary,” June 1958, 821.00/7–958, Box 4242, Department of State,
118. “Contract Signed for Petroleum Pipeline,” 11 Mar. 1955, 821.2553/3–1555, Box 4248;
“UFCO Investment in Colombia,” 10 July 1959, 821.2376/7–1059, Box 4248; “Economic and
Financial Review, 1955,” 7 June 1956, 821.00/6–756, Box 4241; and “Contracts Signed for
Bogotá Aqueducts,” 22 June 1955, 821.2612/6–2255, Box 4249, Department of State, Decimal
Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA.
119. “Cali Disaster,” 9 Aug. 1956, 571.00, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy,
120. “Agreement for Health Program in Colombia,” 8 Feb. 1955, 320.1, Box 1, Department
of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; “Agreement
Covering the Extension of Cooperative Health Programs,” 6 July 1955, 821.55/7–655, Box 4253,
Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA; “Briefing Paper on Colom-
bia,” 1 May 1955, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records,
1953–1955, RG 84, NARA; “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 May 1957, Box 5, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
121. “Monthly Political Summary,” 1 June 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State,
122. Pigott to the Secretary of State, 5 May 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State,
123. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 23 Oct. 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of
State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA. Major Gen-
eral Gabriel París (minister of war), Major General Deogracias Fonseca (National Police
commander), Rear Admiral Ruben Piedrahita (minister of public works), Brigadier Gen-
eral Rafael Navas Pardo (Army commander), and Brigadier General Luis Ordoñez (chief
of Colombian Intelligence Services) formed the junta. See “Improvement in Colombian
Situation,” 13 May 1957, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified
General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA; Jonathan Hartlyn, “Military Government and
the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience, 1957–1958,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs 25 (May 1984): 245–81; and “Debriefing of Senior Of-
ficers Returning from Field Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,” 68, USAMHI.
6. The Partnership Transformed, 1958–1960

2. “Memorandum for General Goodpaster,” 7 Apr. 1960, Folder “Colombia,” Box 3,
International Files, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
3. “Study on United States–Argentine Relations,” 27 Jan. 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960,
5:460.
4. “Vice President Nixon’s Trip to South America,” 9 May 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960,
5:44–45.
5. “Attack on Vice President Nixon and His Party,” 13 May 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960,
5:226–27; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978),
185–93; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 100–16; and New York Times, 16 May 1958.
6. Quoted in New York Times, 18 May 1958.
7. Washington Post, 18 May 1958.
8. “Vice President Nixon’s Trip to South America,” 15 May 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960,
5:236–38.
9. Bogotá Embassy to Department of State, 23 May 1958, 033.1100-NI/2358, Box
10. “Memorandum of Discussion,” National Security Council, 16 May 1958, FRUS,

1958–1960, 5:240.
11. “Operations Plan for Latin America,” National Security Council, 28 May 1958,
FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:28.
12. “Memorandum of Discussion,” National Security Council, 19 June 1958, FRUS,
1958–1960, 5:27–31.
13. Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 238–63; and Pérez-Stable, Cuban Revolution.
14. “Statement of U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” NSC 5902/1, 16 Feb. 1959, FRUS,
1958–1960, 5:91–116.
15. Department of State, Bulletin (25 Aug. 1958): 309.
16. “Inter-American Cooperation Moved Forward,” address by Secretary Herter to
the Council of the Organization of American States, 20 Apr. 1960, Department of State,
Bulletin (9 May 1960): 754–57.
17. “Promoting Economic and Social Advancement in the Americas,” Department of
State, Bulletin (3 Oct. 1960): 533–41.
1958–1960, 5:91–116.
19. Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1988); Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 380–95; and Bushnell,
Making of Modern Colombia, 223–30.
20. Washington Post, 5 Apr. 1960.
21. El Siglo, 16 Apr. 1958.
22. “Final Results of the Presidential Elections,” 19 June 1958, 350.00, Box 5, Depart-
ment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
23. “Post Mortem on the May 2 Revolt and the May 4 Elections,” 12 May 1958, 350.00,
84, NARA.
24. “Bibliographic Report: Alberto Lleras Camargo,” 23 Mar. 1960, 350.00, Box 5, De-
partment of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Records, 1959–1961, RG 84, NARA;
and Alberto Lleras: Address Delivered during His Visit to the United States, April 1960 (Bo-
gotá: Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., n.d.), 8–18.
25. “The Religious Question in Colombia,” 11 July 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Micro-
fiche Supplement, CO-11, 84–2773–80.
26. El Tiempo, 7 Aug. 1957.
27. Jay Gould to Eisenhower, 12 Aug. 1958, OF 169, Folder “Colombia (2),” Box 857,
Eisenhower Papers, EL.
77, USAMHI.
29. El Independiente, 24 May 1958.
30. Richard A. Poole to Albert H. Gerberich, “Lleras Speech to Officers of the Armed
Forces,” 29 May 1958, 361.1, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Re-
cords, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
31. El Tiempo, 10 July 1958; “Rojas Pinilla: A Review of Developments from his Return
Through His Senate Trial,” 10 Apr. 1959, 361.1, Box 6; and “Re-imposition of State of Siege,”
12 Dec. 1958, 350.00, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified General Re-
cords, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
32. “Cuervo Araoz Case,” 10 July 1958, 350.00, Box 4, Department of State, Bogotá
34. “Memorandum of Conversation on the Role of Colombian Armed Forces,” 2
May 1960, 721.5/5–260, Box 1547, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1960–1963, RG 59,
NARA.
35. “Administrative Reform Bill,” 18 Dec. 1958, 361.4, Box 2, Department of State,
Bogotá Embassy, General Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA.
36. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 391–92.
37. Cabot to Department of State, 13 July 1959, 821.10/1359, Box 4243, Department of
38. París to Eisenhower, 14 June 1958, Folder “Colombia (3),” Box 8, International
Series, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
39. Cabot to Department of State, 26 Aug. 1958, 721.5-MSP/8–2658, Box 3002, De-
40. McIntosh to Department of State, 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–559, Box 3002, De-
42. El Espectador, 28 Mar. 1960.
43. El Tiempo, 27 Mar. 1960.
44. El Siglo, 19 Dec. 1961
45. “Situation in the Caribbean,” 15 June 1960, 320.00; and “Foreign Minister on Cu-
ban Policy,” 13 Nov. 1961, 320.00, Box 2, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, Classified
46. “Colombian Intelligence Service (SIC) Revamped,” 8 Feb. 1960, 721.52/860, Box
47. Cabot to Rubottom, 12 Dec. 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche Supplement,
CO-16, 84–2794–95.
49. “Economic Monthly Summary, July 1957,” 8 Aug. 1957, 821.00/8–857, Box 4242,
50. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 11 Apr. 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche
Supplement, CO-8, 84–2765–69.
51. “Economic Monthly Summary, November 1959,” 15 Dec. 1959, 821.00/12–1559, Box
52. “The Religious Question in Colombia,” 11 July 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche
53. Colombia, Ministero de Gobierno, La minorias religiosas ante el Congresso de
Colombia (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1959), 10–11.
54. “Government Decision Against Altering the Status Quo in Protestant Problem,”
23 Jan. 1959, 821.413/1–2359, Box 4252, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG
59, NARA.
55. “Memorandum of Discussion,” National Security Council, 22 May 1958, FRUS,
1958–1960, 5:242.
56. Cabot to Milton Eisenhower, 25 Nov. 1958, 501.6, Box 5; and “Memorandum of
Conversation,” 11 Apr. 1958, 310.00, Box 5, Department of State, Bogotá Embassy, General
Records, 1956–1958, RG 84, NARA. “Student Meeting, Apr. 24, at Universidad Javeriana,”
27 Apr. 1959, 821.432/4–2759, Box 4252, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG
59, NARA.
57. “Remarks by President Eisenhower,” Folder “Colombia (2),” Box 7, International
Series, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
58. “Toast of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, at the State Dinner in the White
House, April 5, 1960,” Folder “Colombia (2),” Box 857, OF 169, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
59. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 6 Apr. 1960, Box 3, Folder “Colombia,” Interna-
tional Files, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
60. “Joint Meeting of the Two Houses of Congress to Hear an Address by His Excel-
lency the President of Colombia,” Congressional Record, U.S. House of Representatives,
1960, 7458–60; and New York Times, 7 Apr. 1960.
61. Lleras to Eisenhower, 17 Apr. 1960; and “Program for the State Visit of His Excel-
lency Dr. Alberto Lleras, President of the Republic of Colombia and Señora de Lleras to
the United States of America, April 4–17, 1960,” Folder “Colombia (1),” Box 7, International
Series, Eisenhower Papers, EL; New York Times, 7, 8, and 14 Apr. 1960.
62. Quotation from the New York Herald Tribune published in Los Angeles Times, 19
Apr. 1960.
63. “Operations Plan for Latin America,” National Security Council, 28 May 1958,
FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:20–27.
1958–1960, 5:99.
65. “A New Concept for Hemispheric Defense and Development,” 18 Jan. 1960, FRUS,
1958–1960, 5:178–89.
66. Lester Mallory to John Irwin, 12 Sept. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:215.
67. Los Angeles Times, 15 May 1958.
68. Quoted in New York Times, 30 May 1958.
69. Quoted in New York Times, 4 June 1958.
70. Mutual Security Act of 1958, 30 June 1958 (PL 85–477) [72 Stat. 261].
71. Quoted in Washington Post, 28 Apr. 1958.
72. New York Times, 26 Feb. 1960.
73. “Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” 16 Feb. 1960,
in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961): 177–88.
74. “The United States and Latin America: A Maturing Relationship,” address to the
Fourth Annual Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 12 Mar. 1960, pub-
lished in Department of State, Bulletin (4 Apr. 1960): 519–23.
75. “The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1961,” Remarks to the Senate Appro-
priations Committee, 13 May 1960, Department of State, Bulletin (6 June 1960): 924–25.
76. “The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1961,” Statement by Secretary
Herter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 22 Mar. 1960, published in Depart-
ment of State, Bulletin (11 Apr. 1960): 567–68.
78. McIntosh to Department of State, 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–559, Box 3002, De-
79. “Memorandum for the Ambassador,” 26 Aug. 1958, 721.5-MSP/8–2658, Box 3002,
80. “Request for Reduction in Complement of United States Army Mission to Co-
lombia,” Department of the Army, 31 Mar. 1958, 721.58/3158, Box 3003, Department of State,
81. “Exchange of Notes Amending Military Mission Agreements,” 9 Apr. 1959,
82. “Military Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1959, Navy,” 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–
83. “Memorandum for the Ambassador,” 26 Aug. 1958, 721.5-MSP/8–2658, Box 3002,
84. “Evaluation of the Army MAP Program for FY59,” 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–559,
85. “Reorganization U.S. Army Mission to Colombia,” 28 Mar. 1958, Box 2, U.S. Army
Missions, General Records, RG 334, NARA.
87. “Military Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1959, Navy,” 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–
88. “Memorandum for the Ambassador,” Colonel Gerald M. Clungston, Nov. 1959,
721.5-MSP/11–559, Box 3002, Department of State, Decimal Files, 1955–1959, RG 59, NARA.
89. “Information Regarding Certain Aspects of Latin American Military Expendi-
tures,” U.S. Air Force Mission, 25 May 1960, 721.5/5–1260, Box 1547, Department of State,
90. “Evaluation of the Military Aid Program in Colombia,” 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–
91. Cabot to Department of State, 3 Sept. 1958, 721.5 MSP/9–358, Box 3002, Depart-
92. “Evaluation of the Army MAP Program for FY59,” 5 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–559,
99, USAMHI.
94. “Military Assistance Program,” U.S. Army Mission, Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–559,
95. “U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group,” 26 Aug. 1958, 721.5-MSP/8–2658, Box
97. Cabot to Department of State, 3 Sept. 1958, 721.5-MSP/9–358, Box 3002, Depart-
98. U.S. Embassy to Department of State, 24 June 1959, 721.00/6–2459, Box 4254, Depart-
99. “Formation of Battle Group,” 23 June 1959, Box 3, U.S. Army Missions, General
Records, 1952–1964, RG 334, NARA.
100. Spinney to Commanding General, U.S. Caribbean Command, 23 June 1959; Brig-
adier General Ivan Berrio Jaramillo, Commandant Colombian Army, to Spinney, 11 June
1959; and “Formation of Battle Group,” 23 June 1959, Box 3, U.S. Army Missions, General
Records, 1952–1964, RG 334, NARA.
101. U.S. Embassy to Department of State, 1 July 1959, 721.5/5–260, Box 4254, Depart-
102. Cabot to Secretary of State, 13 July 1959, 721.5-MSP/7–1359, Box 3002, Department
103. La Voz de la Democracia, 19 Nov. 1959 and 20 Nov. 1959, attached to U.S. Embassy
to Department of State, 30 Nov. 1959, 721.5-MSP/11–3059, Box 3002, Department of State,
104. My treatment of the Special Survey Team follows Rempe, “The Origins of Inter-
nal Security Policy in Colombia,” 24–61.
105. “Report of the Colombian Survey Team,” 1960, Tab I, “Debriefing of Senior Of-
ficers Returning from Field Assignments: Joy K. Vallery,” USAMHI.
106. “Colombian Survey,” Apr. 1960, 721.00/4–3060, Box 1547, Department of State,
107. “Colombian Survey,” Apr. 1960, 721.00/4–3060, Box 1547, Department of State,
108. McIntosh to Department of State, 25 Mar. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche
Supplement, CO-26, 84–2815–2819.
109. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 7 Apr. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche
112. “Memorandum For Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin,” 14 Apr. 1960, Folder
“Colombia,” Box 3, International Files, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
113. “Actions by the President,” 5 May 1960, Box 10, Records of the Staff Secretary,
Eisenhower Papers, EL.
114. McIntosh to Department of State, 17 May 1960, 721.5622/5–1760, Box 1548, De-
115. “FY 1961 Military Assistance Program for Latin America,” 4 Aug. 1960, FRUS,
1958–1960, 5:213–14.
116. McIntosh to Frank Devine, 15 Sept. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche Supple-
ment, CO-36A, 84–2840–46.
117. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 28 Oct. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:216–18.
118. “Memorandum for the President,” 31 Dec. 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 5:Microfiche
119. Chester Bowles to Robert F. Kennedy, 15 May 1961, 721.5/5–1561, Box 1547, Depart-
120. Department of State to Embassy in Bogotá, 25 Jan. 1961, 721.5/MSP/1–2561, Box
25–26, USAMHI.
Epilogue
1. Fabricio Cabrera Ortiz and Germán Eduardo Ayala Amaya, “Influencia de USA,”
Revista Militar 54 (Sept. 1999): 37–45; Torres Del Río, Fuerzas armadas y seguridad nacio-
nal, 130–46; Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics;” and Hanratty and
Meditz, Colombia, 266–69; Randall, Colombia and the United States, 231–42.
2. Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia, 302–7; Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerillas, and
Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973); Clawson and
Lee, Andean Cocaine Industry, 99; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 5 Jan. 1999; John R. Glavin
“Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later,” Military Review
66 (Aug. 1986): 5–15; Álvaro Valencia Tovar, Insugurdad y violencia en Colombia (Bogotá:
Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 1997); Arnaldo Claudio, “United States–Colombian Extradi-
tion Treaty: Failure of Security Strategy,” Military Review 71 (Dec. 1991): 69–77; Randy J.
Kolton, “Combating the Colombian Drug Cartels,” Military Review 70 (Mar. 1990): 49–63;
and Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).
3. New York Times, 23 June 2000; and El Tiempo, 21 Jan. 2001.
4. U.S. News and World Report, 10 Feb. 2003.
5. “President Bush, President Uribe of Colombia Discuss Terrorism, Security,” Craw-
ford, Texas, 4 Aug. 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08 (accessed 4
Aug. 2005).
6. Valencia Tovar to author, 14 Jan. 2001; and Daniel Davison, interview with Colo-
nel Lloyd Moses, 3 May 1971, in Davidson, “The Colombian Army in Korea,” 33.
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294 index
Index
Acevedo, Hernando, 132 Antioquia, ARC, 157

Acevedo, Luis, 17 Anze Matienzo, Eduardo, 93
Acheson, Dean, 60, 77, 78, 90, 94, 95 Arango, Mauricio, 33
Act of Chapúltepec (1945), 45 Arango Vélez, Carlos, 13
Acosta, Leon, 99 Araujo, Ernesto de, 91
Advisers, British Military, 19 Arbenz Guzmán, Jorge, 140, 141
Advisers, French Military, 20 Argentina, 8–9, 11, 12, 29, 48, 94, 172, 176
Advisers, German Military, 18, 20–21 Armies, U.S.: 5th, 27; 8th, 78, 108, 110–12, 113–14
Advisers, Swiss Military, 19 Army, Colombian: competition with National
Advisers, U.S. Economic, 38–39, 65, 130–31, 166– Police, 14, 41; during the cold war, 59, 62, 82,
67, 183–84 88, 129–30, 154–155, 157–58, 163–66, 190–92;
Advisers, U.S. Military. See Mission, U.S. Air during World War II (1939–45), 17–18, 20, 21,
Force; Mission, U.S. Army; Mission, U.S. 23, 25–26, 34, 37, 41; early development of,
Navy 21; internal security mission, 25–26, 32, 34,
Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia. See Aviancia 37, 41, 55–56, 58, 67, 123, 154–55, 160, 179–80,
Afghanistan, 200 189, 195–96; in Korea, 105–22, 131–35, 138;
Aiken Victory, USNS, 106 overthrow of Gómez (1953), 135–36; Pasto
Airborne Infantry, U.S. See Battalion, 550th U.S. coup (1944), 41; recruit training, 119, 163–64;
Airborne Infantry in Suez (1956–58), 145–48; transition to civil-
Air Force, Colombia: during cold war, 62, 128, ian rule (1957–58), 168–69. See also Battalion,
157, 162–63, 165, 190; during World War II Colombia (in Korea); Battalion, Colombia
(1939–45), 22, 26, 59; establishment of, 22 (in Suez); Rangers, Colombian
Air Force, German, 34 Army, U.S.: during World War II (1939–45), 17–
Air Force, U.S. 5th, 27 18, 19, 22, 24–25, 17; in Korea (1950–53), 75,
Air Force, U.S., 59–60, 165. See also Mission, U.S. 78–79, 107, 108, 110–12, 113–14, 121, 204. See
Air Force. also Mission, U.S. Army
Air Forces, U.S. Army, 22, 27 Attachés, Brazilian Military, 91
Airport Security Detachments, 24–25 Attachés, Colombian Military, 18, 24, 80, 161,
Alliance for Progress, 176, 199 222n103
Almond, Edward, 78 Attachés, U.S. Military, 18, 31, 32, 88, 124, 152,
Alzate Avendaño, Gilberto, 131, 135 223n108
Amador Guerrero, Manuel, 5 Australia, 100
Amaral, Edgar do, 91 Aviancia, 34
American Graves Registration Service, 121 Ávila Camacho, Manuel, 27
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (1948), 54
Anti-Americanism, 5, 11, 13, 64, 68, 94, 172–74, 187 Bahamon, Augusto, 132
Anticommunism. See Communism Bananas, 40, 131, 167
294
index 295
Banco de la República, 37, 183 War II, 26–27; and Lend-Lease aid, 29, 30,
Bangpakong, HMRTN, 103 222n103; postwar foreign relations, 44, 48,
Bank, Export-Import. See Export-Import Bank 53, 54, 66, 176, 229n17, 230n20, 244n104; re-
Banking, Colombian, 37, 38, 168, 183 action to Korean War (1950–53), 90–92, 94,
Barber, Henry A., Jr., 59 224n102, 244n104; UN Emergency Force
Barr, Ross, 23 (1956), 146; and UN Security Council, 46;
Barry, James Richard, 22 U.S. bases in, 25
Barth, Theodore C., 36 Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 26–27
Batista, Fulgencio, 174 Brett, George H., 25, 37, 58
Battalion, Belgium (in Korea), 109 Brigade, Turkish, in Korea, 107, 120
Battalion, Colombia (in Korea): daily life, 118–19, Brión, ARC, 104
121–22; departure for Korea, 106–7; disposi- Britain: and Ethiopia, 250n71, 250n73; and Korean
tion of dead soldiers, 121; entertainment, 121– War (1950–53), 100, 101, 102, 103, 111, 144, 153;
22; equipment for, 76–78, 83, 105, 108; first and religious violence in Colombia, 153; and
combat, 112–13; homecoming, 138; Kumsong Suez crisis (1956), 144, 146; trade in Latin
offensive, 113–17; liaison team, 106–7; Old America, 2; and United Nations, 44
Baldy, 131–35; personnel policy, 119–20; post- British Commonwealth Forces (in Korea), 75,
war U.S. support for, 157–58; prisoners of war, 100, 107
135; religion, 121; training of, 105–11, 119–20 Bryan, Blackshear M., 111
Battalion, Colombia (in Suez), 146–48 Bryon, John E., 108
Battalion, Colombia Engineering, 160–61, 191 Buenos Aires Conference (1936), 6
Battalion, Ethiopia (in Korea), 109–10, 120 Burlington, USS, 104
Battalion, The Netherlands (in Korea), 109 Burns, L. M., 146
Battalion, Philippine (in Korea), 107, 120 Bush, George W., xix, 201
Battalion, 550th U.S. Airborne Infantry, 24 Bushnell, David, xvii
Battalion, Thai (in Korea), 120
Bauer, Peter von, 34 Cabot, John Moors, 179, 181, 183, 189, 190, 191, 192
Beaulac, Willard L., 80, 172 Cabrera Forero, César Augusto, 146
Belgium, 161 Caffery, Jefferson, 1
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, xvii Caicedo Montúa, Francisco, 115
Bernal, José María, 128 Cajale, Farid, 36
Bernal Duran, Hernando, 164 Caldas, ARC, 157
Berón Victoria, Hernando, 103 Cali, disaster in (1956), 167
Berrío Jaramillo, Iván, 192 Camp David, Maryland: Lleras visit to, 171, 186, 196
Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty (1846), 3 Canada: and Korean War (1950–53), 95, 100; re-
Bihlmeyer, Earl W., 108 ligious violence in Colombia, 153; and Suez
Bisbee, USS, 103 crisis (1956), 145–46
Black, Eugene, 185 Cantilo, José María, 8
Blue Birds, 149 Caracas Conference (1954), 140–41
Blum, Duarte, 168 Caribbean, Defense of, 25–26, 30
Bogotá Conference (1948), 43, 53–55, 56–57 Caribbean Defense Command, U.S., 23–24, 25, 31
Bogotá, Pact of (1948). See American Treaty on Caribbean Command, U.S., 105, 128, 158, 193
Pacific Settlement Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 186
Bogotazo (1948). See Nueve de abril (1948) Carney, Robert B., 163
Bohannan, Charles, 193 Castillo, Ramón, 11
Bolívar Naval Base, 98 Castro, Fidel, 174–75, 182, 232n63
Bolívar, Simón, 2, 53, 86, 150 Catholic Church, Colombian, 2, 13, 41, 55, 67, 69,
Bolivia, 29, 39, 93, 143, 172 121, 123, 152, 168, 184, 235n117
Bolté, Charles, 76 Central and South American Air School, 28
Bonsal, Philip W., 153, 204 Central Intelligence Agency, 141, 175, 193, 194, 197
Braden, Spruille, 9, 21, 33, 34 Central American Common Market, 176
Braden, William, 32 Centro Colombo-Soviético, 63
Brazil: coffee production in, 151; defense of, 23; Chapúltepec Conference (1945), 44
diplomacy during World War II (1939–45), Chase, Jay V., 129, 157
8–9, 12, 13; expeditionary force during World Chile, 29, 94, 176
296 index
China. See People’s Republic of China (Commu- Congress, U.S.: foreign economic and social as-
nist China) sistance, 176–77; limits on Plan Colombia aid,
Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), 84, 113, 115– xix; Lleras address to, 171, 185–86; and MAP,
17, 131–33, 134 126–27, 187–88, 192, 194, 195, 197; post–World
Chocó Pacific Company, 36 War II foreign military assistance, 61–62, 161;
Ch’orwon-Kumhwa Railroad (South Korea), 113 tariffs of 1957, 174; and la Violencia, 124
Churchill, Winston, 47 Congress, Mexican, 12
Civic-Action, 188, 194, 199 Congress, Chilean, 94
Civic Front, 168–69 Conservative Party, Colombian: anticommunist
Clinton, William J., xix sentiment in, 47, 52, 63, 182; during Gómez
Clungston, Gerald M., 163, 189, 190 administration, 122–23, 124, 131, 135–36; dur-
Coffee, 39, 64, 65, 83, 127, 130, 151 ing Ospina administration, 51–52, 64, 66–68;
Coffee Congress (1940). See Third Pan American election of 1930, 5, 89; election of 1949, 67–68;
Coffee Congress Accord (1940) and military government (1953–58), 136, 149,
Colegío Boyacá, 148 151, 153, 167, 168–69; and National Front, 177–
Colombia Battalion. See Battalion, Colombia (in 78, 179, 181, 184; and 1946 election, 51; opposi-
Korea); Battalion, Colombia (in Suez) tion to Liberal rule (1938–46), 11, 13–14, 15–16,
Colombian Air Service, 34 20, 40–42, 50; origins of, 2–3; reaction to Ko-
Colombian-German Society for Air Transporta- rean War (1950–53), 79–80, 85–86; Thousand
tion (SCADTA), 33–34 Days War, 4
Colombiano, El, 143 Conteras, Miguel, 109
Columbia University, 166 Containment, policy of, 48, 72
Command and General Staff College, U.S. Army, Constitution, Colombian, 3
59, 166 Cook, Robert A., 59
Commodity Agreements, 176 Corps, U.S.: IX, 113; X, 78
Communist Party, Colombian. See Communism. Corps, North Korean I and II, 78
Communism: and Alberto Lleras, 182–83; in Co- Correa, Miquez A., 37
lombia, 52, 55, 62–63, 67, 79, 227n169, 232n63, Corruption, 4, 13, 14, 33, 36, 40, 51, 152, 169, 180,
236n122; and Colombian diplomacy, 45, 47, 181, 260n41
56–57, 71–72, 79–80, 85, 125–26, 127, 128, 129, Costa Rica, 92–93
140–41; and Colombian military, 52, 109, 123, Counterespionage, in Colombia: during cold
154; and Laureano Gómez, 66, 69, 85, 86–87, war, 62–63, 165, 182–83; during World War II
123; and Rojas Pinilla, 143–44, 149–53, 157; in (1939–45), 19, 31–36
the United States, 52–53; and U.S.-Colombia Counterinsurgency, 154–55, 164, 165, 170, 180,
relations, 56–57, 62–63, 127, 165–66, 182–83, 189, 191–98, 199
202–3; and U.S. foreign policy, 48, 56–57, 72, Counterinsurgency Battle Group, Colombian,
74, 139–42, 155–56, 174–75, 187–89 172, 194, 195–98
Communist China. See People’s Republic of Cuba, 74, 93, 94; Colombian relations with, 182;
China (Communist China) revolution in, 174–75
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Currie Commission, 65
Peace and Security (1947). See Rio de Janeiro Currie, Lauchlin, 65
Conference (1947) Czechoslovakia, 141, 144
Conference of the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council (1961). See Punta del Este de Lesseps, Ferdinand. See Lesseps, Ferdinand de
Conference (1961) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North
Congress, Colombian: and building of the Pan- Korea): formation of, 72; invasion of South
ama Canal, 4; conflicts within, 15, 52, 66, 68, Korea, 71–75, 78, 90–91; UN military opera-
219n47, 235n116; and contemporary archival tions in, 78–79, 82, 84–85, 100–101, 104
system, 205; cooperation with the United Densford, Charles D., 22
States during World War II (1939–45), 9, 11, Dependency Theory, 47–48, 55, 142, 229n19
21; Declaration of Belligerency (1943), 15; dur- Diario de la Costa, 20
ing Gómez presidency, 131; and Lend-Lease Diario Grafico, 85
Program, 29; and National Front, 177, 181; or- Diario oficial, 154
ganization of, 3; suspension of (1949), 68, 85. Díaz Osorio, Alfonso, 101
See also National Constituent Assembly Diffusionist Theory. See Modernization Theory
index 297
Dillon, Douglas C., 188 gressional, 66; 1949 presidential, 66–68; 1958
Dittler, Wolfgang, 35 congressional, 177; 1958 presidential, 177–78
Divisions, U.S. Army: 1st Cavalry, 84; 3rd Infan- Elections, U.S.: 1952 presidential, 139; 1958 con-
try, 107, 108; 7th Infantry, 117, 122, 131–35; 24th gressional, 176–77
Infantry, 111, 113, 117 Ellsworth, Ernest B., 190
Dominican Republic, 161, 175 Escobar Gaviria, Pablo, 200
Draper, William H., 188 Espectador, El, 20, 79, 182
Draper Committee, 188 Espinosa Peña, Hernando, 146
Drug War, 199–200 Espionage. See Counterespionage, in Colombia
Dulles, John Foster, 140–41, 153 Ethiopia, 109–10, 120, 250n71, 250n73
Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1945), 44 European Recovery Program, 48–49, 54, 143, 176
Duran, Augusto, 52 Export-Import Bank, 38, 130, 142, 167
Dutra, Eurico Gaspar, 91
Dyer, George, 101 Fajardo, Gonzalo, 41
Falon, Eduardo, 36
Echandía Olaya, Darío, 15, 25, 41, 55, 89 Far East Command, U.S., 158
Echavarría, Filipe, 136 Ferguson, Thomas J., 134
Economic development: Colombian, 6, 13, 38, 40, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 32, 35, 62
64–65, 138, 150–51, 181; and postwar U.S.–Latin Fernandez, Raúl, 48
American relations, 45, 47–49, 54, 91–92, 95, First International Conference of American
139–40, 142–43, 160, 167, 173, 175–76 States (1889–90), 3
Economic relations, U.S.-Colombian, 2–3, 38–40, Fleet, U.S. 7th, 100
64–66, 127, 130–31, 183–84 Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 64
Economy, Colombian: before 1939, 13; during la Fluharty, Vernon Lee, 33
Violencia (1946–58), 83, 130–31, 142, 151–52, Foreign Bondholder’s Protective Council, 38
175, 167, 169; during National Front era, 180– Forero, Juvenal, 109
81, 183–84; during World War II (1939–45), 7, Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
11, 37–38, 40, 66 Foreign Affairs of American States (1951). See
Economic Advisers, U.S., 38, 65, 130 Washington Conference (1951)
Economic Agreement of Bogotá (1948), 57 France, 100, 144, 161
Economic Assistance, U.S., 38, 45, 65, 130–31, Frente Nacional. See National Front
183–84, 199 Frondizi, Arturo, 172
ECOPETROL, 130 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
Ecuador, 2, 29, 74, 94, 172 (FARC). See Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Education, 150, 166, 176, 181, 184, 199 Colombia (FARC)
Educational exchanges, U.S.-Colombian, 166–67, Fulbright, James William, 188
184–85. See also Military Schools, U.S. Fulbright program, 166–67, 184–85
Egypt, 144, 146–48
Eighth International Conference of American Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 15, 52–53, 232n63; assassina-
States (1938). See Lima Conference (1938) tion of, 43, 55–56; background of, 50–51
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 62, 136, 139, 142, 144, 156; Galindo, Luis M., 97
with Lleras at Camp David, 196–97; and Lle- Galvin, John R., 165
ras visit, 171, 173, 176, 185, 186, 188; and MAP Garcia, Luis, 99
waiver for Colombia, 197–98 Gardner, Victor R., 130
Eisenhower, John, 197 Gaza, 146
Eisenhower, Milton, 139; with Zuleta, 153, 159, 176; Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Lleras visit to, 171, 186
Lleras visit, 186 Germany: Colombia relations with, 8, 11–12, 13;
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). See Na- espionage in Colombia, 31–33; submarines,
tional Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia 12–13, 15–16, 25. See also Air Force, German;
El Dorado International Airport, 166 Advisers, German Military
El Salvador, 93, 94 Gil Mojica, Diogenes, 41
Election, Argentina (1958), 172 Global War on Terrorism, 200–201
Election, Brazilian (1950), 91 Góes Monteiro, Predro Aurélio de, 92
Elections, Colombian: 1930 presidential, 13, 89; 1942 Gómez Castro, Laureano, 11, 15, 40–41; background
presidential, 13; 1946 presidential, 51; 1949 con- of, 68–69; election of, 67–68; and Korean War
298 index
Gómez Castro, Laureano (cont.) Institute for Water and Electric Power Develop-
(1950–53), 71, 79–82, 85–89, 242n77; and Na- ment, Colombian, 150
tional Front, 177–78; 1946 election, 51, 55, 66; Internal Security, Colombian: 31–37, 58, 62–63,
overthrow of, 135–36, 154; 158; presidency of, 126–29, 123–24, 155–56, 165, 171, 179–80, 186–
122–31; relations with U.S., 68 98
Gómez Hurtado, Álvaro, 66 Investment, private U.S., 39, 65, 130–31, 167
González, Gustavo, 132 Iraq, 200
González Videla, Gabriel, 94 Israel, 144, 146
Good Neighbor Policy, 5, 6 Italy, 12, 27
Goodyear Corporation, 167
Gordon, William T., 105 Jacoby, Klaus, 34
Grant, Ulysses S., 4 Jenner, William E., 188
Guadalupe, USS, 103 John Hopkins University, 186
Guatemala, 75, 140–41 Johnson, Hershel, 90–92
Gyani, P. S., 146 Johnson, Louis, 77, 239n25
Johnson, Olin, 187
Haiti, 74 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 83–84, 93, 122, 157, 197
Hale, USS, 157 Jornal, O (Brazil), 90, 91
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 144–46 Joy, Charles Turner, 100
Hay-Herran Treaty (1903), 4 Junta, Colombian Military (1957–58), 169, 178,
Hernandez, Ernesto, 98 179, 181, 183, 265n123
Herrera, Hernando, 36
Herter, Christian, A., 185, 188, 195, 196 Katmai, USS, 103
Highways. See Roads Kennedy, John F., 176, 198, 199
Hoge, William, 114 Kennan, George F., 48
Holland, Henry F., 161 Kern, William B., 131, 133, 134–35
Honduras, 74 Key, Algene E., 163
Hoover, Herbert, 5 Khan Yunus, 146
Hull, Cordell, 6, 8, 19 Khrushchev, Nikita, 182
Humphrey, George, 142–43, 176 Kim Il-Sung, 72
Hungary, 144, 153 Koontz, Joseph J., 193, 194
Hydroelectric Plants, 38, 167, 183. See also Power Kubitschek, Juscelino, 176
Plants
LaFeber, Walter, xvii
Industrialization, 39, 50, 64, 65, 130 Lanceros. See Rangers, Colombian
Indochina, 84, 103, 126, 143, 156, 166, 199 Lane, Arthur Bliss, 31
Inter-American Air Forces Academy, 28 Langley, Lester, xvii
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance Latin American Center-Ground Division, 59–60,
of Peace (1936). See Buenos Aires Conference 234–35n81
(1936) League of Nations, 7, 86
Inter-American Conference on the Problems of Lema Henao, Bernardo, 113
War and Peace (1945). See Chapúltepec Con- Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 197
ference (1945) Lend-Lease Program: 29, 60, 61, 83, 222n103; and
Inter-American Defense Board, 12, 17, 126 Colombia, 29–32; controversies surrounding,
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 176 30–31; settlement of Colombian debt, 65, 130
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 4
(1947), 48 Leticia Dispute (1932–34), 13, 21, 86, 89, 148
International Bank for Reconstruction and De- Lewis, Berkley, 193
velopment (IBRD), 167, 183, 185 Leyva, Jorge, 136, 178
International Bureau of the American Republics, 3 Liberal, El, 178
International Monetary Fund, 183 Liberal Party, Colombian: anticommunist senti-
Institute for Colonization and Immigration, Co- ment in, 47, 182, 192, 195; divisions within, 13,
lombian, 150 15, 50–51; during Santos administration, 7–8,
Institute for Industrial Development, Colom- 13; during second López presidency, 13–14,
bian, 150 15–16, 29–30, 40–42; election of 1930, 5; elec-
index 299
tion of 1949, 67–68; and Gaitán, 43, 50–51, 55; Mello-Franco, Afrancio de, 91
and military government, 136, 149, 151, 153, Melgar, 164–165
167, 168–69; and National Front, 177–78, 179, Melo, José María, 136
181, 184; and 1946 election, 51; opposition to Mexico, 25, 27, 29, 39, 44–45, 46, 53, 66, 92, 94
Conservative rule, 52–53, 66–68, 88, 122–23; Mexican Fighter Squadron, 201st, 27
origins of, 2–3; reaction to Korean War Mezo, Leopoldo, 11
(1950–53), 79, 85; and Revolución en marcha, Michigan State University, 130
6, 13, 51; Thousand Days War (1899–1903), 4 Military Academy, Colombian, 21, 148
Lie, Trygve, 74, 75, 80, 83 Military Academy, U.S., 27, 60
Lilienthal, David, 166 Military Advisers, U.S. See Mission, U.S. Air
Lima Conference (1938), 8–9 Force; Mission, U.S. Army; Mission, U.S.
Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 15, 40–41, 42, 45–46, 58, Navy
67, 169; background of 178; election of (1958), Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG),
177–78; first presidency of (1945), 42; request 129, 162
for internal security assistance, 191–98; 203– Military Assistance Program (MAP): Colombian
4; second presidency of (1958–62), 179–81, MAP units, 127–29, 157–60, 190–91; estab-
199; visit with Nixon (1958), 172; visit to the lishment of, 126; impact of la Violencia on,
United States (1960), 171, 185–86, 195–97 128–29, 157–58, 159–60, 190–92; and internal
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 148 security, 171, 187–88, 191–92, 195–98, 199
Long Beach City College, 99 Military Attachés. See Attachés, Brazilian Mili-
López de Mesa, Luis, 8, 9, 19 tary; Attachés, Colombian Military; Atta-
López, Pablo Emilio, 24–25 chés, U.S. Military
López Michelsen, Alfonso, 14 Military Equipment, U.S., 28–31, 37, 60–62; con-
López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 6; background of, 13; troversies over the distribution of, 60–62,
and National Police, 14, 40; Pasto Revolt, 41; 157–62. See also Lend-Lease Program
resignation of, 42, 69, 123, 183, 204; second Military Government, Colombia (1953–58), 148–
presidency, 14–15; second presidential elec- 55
tion, 13; trips to the United States, 13–14, 15, Military Mission, British, 19–20
218n37 Military Mission, France, 20
López Pumarejo, Miguel, 9 Military Mission, Swiss, 19–20
Los Angeles Times, 187 Military Mission, U.S. See Mission, U.S. Air Force;
Lowry, John C., 164 Mission, U.S. Army; Mission, U.S. Navy
Lozano y Lozano, Carlos, 15, 16 Military Schools, U.S., 27–28, 59–60, 129–30, 165–
Luque, Cristiano, 168 66, 189–90. See also Command and General
Luther, Martin, 68–69 Staff College, U.S. Army; Military Academy,
Colombian; Military Academy, U.S.; Naval
Maloy, Vincent J., 1 Academy, Colombian; Naval Academy, U.S.;
MacArthur, Douglas, 75, 78 War College, Colombian
Mann, Thomas C., 128 Miller, Edward, 71, 76–77, 81, 92, 95, 124
Marines, British, 101 Ministry of Public Works, 150
Marines, Colombian, 161, 163 Mission, U.S. Air Force: activities of, 59, 62, 129,
Marines, U.S., 5, 13–24, 84, 173 162–63, 189–90, 192; contracts governing, 59,
Marshall, George C., 48, 53–55, 56, 61; and Ko- 189; military aviation mission before 1947,
rean War (1950–53), 77–78, 84, 95, 127 19–20, 22
Marshall Plan. See European Recovery Program Mission, U.S. Army: 1, 9, 18, 20, 24, 31, 82; activi-
Mapping projects, 35–36 ties of, 22–23, 29, 59–60, 61, 62, 105, 127, 129,
Matthews, H. Freeman, 76, 77 162, 163–64, 189; contracts governing, 19–20,
McCarthy, Eugene, 176 189; and MAP internal security aid, 191, 192,
McGarr, Lionel C., 138 193, 194, 195
McGee, John H., 107 Mission, Civil Aviation, 166
McIntosh, Dempster, 181–82, 189, 195, 197 Mission, U.S. Navy: 1, 9, 18; activities of, 21–22,
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American 59, 129, 162–63, 189, 192, 195; contracts gov-
States (1939). See Panama Conference (1939) erning, 19–20, 189
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States Missionaries, Protestant, 5, 124, 152–53, 184, 202
(1951). See Washington Conference (1951) Modernization Theory, 47–48, 142–143, 229n18
300 index
Montevideo Conference (1933), 6. Neves de Fontoura, João, 53

Montesinos, Serafin M., 31 Nicaragua, 4, 5
Morse, Wayne, 188 Ninth International Conference of American
Morse Amendment: to Mutual Security Act States (1948). See Bogotá Conference (1948)
(1958), 188, 192, 197 Nixon, Richard M.: Lleras visit, 185; visit to South
Moses, Lloyd R., 97, 118, 122, 204 America, 172–74, 181, 183, 184
Murphy, Robert, 159 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 46,
Muskie, Edmund, 176 79, 147
Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949), 61–62; North Korea. See Democratic People’s Republic
and Korean War (1950–53), 76 of Korea (North Korea)
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1952), Norway, 146
U.S.-Colombian, 127–28 Nueve de abril (1948), 43, 55–56, 62
Mutual Security Act (1951), 126
Mutual Security Act (1954), 161 Office for Aid and Rehabilitation, 150
Mutual Security Act (1958), 188 Oil, 5, 39, 92, 130–31, 167
Olaya Herrera, Enrique, 5
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 144 Old Baldy, 131–35
National Constituent Assembly, 168–69 Operation Pan America, 176
National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia, 182, Organization of American States (OAS): and
199, 200 Cuba, 182; economic projects, 143, 167; and
National Front, 169, 171, 177–181 Eisenhower, 140; formation of (1948), 43,
National Police, Colombian, 14, 15, 32, 33–34, 37, 53–54, 57, 218n37; and Korean War (1950–53),
41, 51, 67, 123, 129, 154, 194 74, 89, 94; and Lleras, 178, 186
National Security Council, Brazil, 91 Ortíz Torres, Carlos, 135
National Security Council (NSC), U.S., 76, 139, Ospina Pérez, Mariano: election of, 51; expansion
174, 184, 187 of the Colombian Army, 58, 67; and Korean
NSC Report 144/1, 139 War (1950–53), 79, 80, 136, 154, 183; Nueve de
NSC Report 153/1, 155–56 abril, 55–56; presidency of, 52–53, 66; state of
NSC Report 5613/1, 156, 159 siege, 68
NSC Report 5902/1, 175
National Revolutionary Movement (Bolivia), 143 Pabón Núñez, Lucio, 136, 151, 152, 154, 155
National Secretariat of Social Assistance, 150 Padilla, ARC: acquisition of, 62; in combat,
National Weather Service, 166 100–103, 104; contribution to UN Command,
Naval Academy, Colombian, 21, 59 80–82; preparation for service with UN
Naval Academy, U.S., 27, 60, 163 Command, 98–100
Naval Forces Far East, U.S., 100 Padilla, Ezequiel, 44
Naval Mission, U.S. See Mission, U.S. Navy Pájaros azules. See Blue Birds
Naval Refueling Station, U.S., 25 Pan American Airways, 34
Navas Pardo, Rafael, 169 Pan American Coffee Bureau, 186
Navy, Colombian: after Korea, 157, 162–63, 189, Pan American Union: origins of, 3; strengthen-
190; during Korean War (1950–53), 80, 81–82, ing of, 9; 43, 44, 45, 178
98–105; during postwar era, 62; during World Panama: and Korean War (1950–53), 93; separa-
War II (1939–45), 2, 12–13, 21–22, 28. See also tion of, 4–5, 11; U.S. presence in, 3–4, 23–24,
Mission, U.S. Navy; Military Schools, U.S. 58. See also Panama Canal
Navy, United Nations, 98–105 Panama Canal: building of 3–5; defense of, 7, 9,
Navy, U.S.: during World War II (1939–45), 23– 11, 17–18, 19, 21, 33–34, 163, 192, 202
24, 25; during Korean War (1950–53), 99–101, Panama Conference (1939), 9–10
103, 104. See also Military Schools, U.S.; Mis- Panama, Declaration of (1939), 10
sion, U.S. Navy Paraguay, 29, 94, 172
Navy, Thailand, 103–4. See also Battalion, Thai París, Gabriel, 166, 168, 169, 181
(in Korea) Park, Nelson, 33
New Granada, Republic of, 2–3 Parks, E. Taylor, xvii
Netherlands, 100 Pasto Coup (1944), 41
New Zealand, 100 Pastrana Arango, Andrés, xix, 200
New York Times, 16, 43, 82, 90, 95, 123, 131, 150, 186 Patteson, Jack M., 132
index 301
Paz de Río Steel Plant, 130 Recruit Training Center, Colombian Army, 164
Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 143 Regiment, 7th U.S. Marine Corps, 84
Pearson, Lester, 145 Regiments, U.S. Army: 21st Infantry, 111, 113, 114,
Pennsylvania State University, 159 116, 135; 31st Infantry, 117–18, 120, 131–33; 32nd
People’s Republic of China (Communist China), Infantry, 133; 65th Infantry, 107, 108
63, 72; intervention in Korea, 84–85, 182 Regiment, British Gloucester, 111
Pérez, Francisco A., 15 Reifsnider, Lawrence F., 21
Pérez, Ginés, 111, 112, 114 Religion, Colombian. See Catholic Church, Co-
Pérez Jiménez, Marcos, 173 lombian; Missionaries, Protestant; Protes-
Peru, 21, 29, 30–31, 35, 86, 172–73. See also Leticia tants, in Colombia; Violencia, la (1946–58)
Dispute (1932–34) Rempe, Dennis, xvii
Phibun Songkhram, 103 Republic of Korea (South Korea): creation of, 72;
Philippines, 27 North Korean invasion of 71; UN military
Philips Incorporated, 167 operations in, 74, 75, 78–79, 85, 111–22, 131–35
Pickett, Lowell, 190 Resolute, ARC, sinking of, 12–13
Pinzón Caicedo, Guillermo, 119 Restrepo Jaramillo, Gonzalo, 59, 125, 127
Pira, Pedro, 97 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Plan Colombia, xix, 200 199, 200
Plan Lazo, 199 Revolución en marcha, 6, 13, 51
Platform for Economic Development and Social Reyes, Rafael, 21
Welfare, 184 Reyes Canal, César, 98
Platinum: shipments to U.S., 39; smuggling of, 32, Rhee, Syngman, 72, 86, 106
33, 36–37, 225n140 Ridgway, Matthew B.: Nueve de abril, 56; and UN
Plunkett, Quenton H., 32 Command, 76–77, 83; World War II plan-
Point IV Program, 65, 88, 130, 166 ning, 19
Polanía Puyo, Jaime, 105, 114, 115, 122, 161 Rio de Janeiro Conference (1942), 12
Poland, 144 Rio de Janeiro Conference (1947), 48–49
Policía Nacional, Colombia. See National Police, Rio de Janeiro Economic Conference (1954), 142–
Colombian 43
Popenoe, Wilson, 36 Rio Pact (1947). See Inter-American Treaty of Re-
Populism, Colombian Military, 149–51 ciprocal Assistance (1947)
Pork Chop Hill, 131, 132–33, 134, 135 Roa Sierra, Juan, 43
Power Plants, 130, 150. See also Hydroelectric Roads, 38, 130, 230n20
Plants Robuttom, Roy, 172, 188, 195, 196
Prasea, HMRTN, 103 Rojas, José, 41
Prebisch, Raúl, 142 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo: background of, 148–49;
Prieta Silva, Calos, 104 during World War II (1939–45), 23; foreign
Proclaimed List, 35 policy of, 143–44, 145; and Korean War (1950–
Protestant Missions, in Colombia. See Mission- 53), 82, 114, 126; military coup (1953), 135–36;
aries, Protestant presidency of, 143, 149–55, 156, 158, 159, 160;
Protestants, in Colombia, 66–67, 68–69, 86, 124, and recruit training, 163–64; removal of, 168–
152–53, 184 69; trial of, 180, 204
Puckett, Ralph, 164 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17, 21, 32, 47,
Puerto Fernandez, Ernesto, 79 204, 218n37
Punta del Este Conference (1961), 182 Roosevelt, Theodore, 4–5
Rosetto, Gabriel, 12
Quindía, 179 Rubber, 39
Ruby, ARC, sinking of, 15
Railroads, 3, 38, 130, 138, 167, 230n20 Rueda Teran, Alberto, 180
Ramirez, Alfonso, 166 Ruíz Novoa, Alberto, 131–34, 198, 199
Ranching, 39
Randall, Stephen, xvii Salinas Carranza, Alberto, 92
Rangers, Colombian, 164–65, 179 San Francisco Conference (1945), 45–46
Rayburn, Samuel, 185 Sánchez Amaya, Rafael, 52
Reciprocal Trade Agreement (1935), 64 Sánchez, Gonzalo, xviii
302 index
Sanitization projects, in Colombia, 39, 65, 166, Suárez, Marco Fidel, 5, 22, 87
167, 184 Submarines, German, 12–13
Santamaría, Carlos Sanz de, 59, 195 Suez Canal, 144
Santino, Mathew, 157 Suez Crisis (1956), 144–48, 153
Santos, Eduardo: after 1942, 123; background of, Surplus War Property Disposal Act (1944), 30, 61
7–8; foreign policy of, 8–9, 11, 18, 19–20, 38, Sweden, 161
32–34; inauguration of, 1; presidency of, 13,
34–35, 39–40 Taegu University (South Korea), 107
Santos Calvo, Francisco, 22 Taft, Robert, 62
SCADTA. See Colombian-German Society for Tanco, Antonio J., 26, 80, 82
Air Transportation Tamayo, Luis, 58
School of the Americas. See Latin American Tariffs, 48; Colombian, 64, 65, 130, 235n107; U.S.,
Center-Ground Division 6, 174
Sears Roebuck and Company, 167 Task Force 77. See Fleet, U.S. 7th
Selassie I, Haile, 109, 250n71 Task Force 95. See UN Blockading and Escort
Semana, 178 Force
Sendel, Frank, 35 Task Force 96–7, 100
Serrano Gómez, Rafael, 113 Taylor, Maxwell, 133
Seventh International Conference of American Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 166
States (1933). See Montevideo Conference (1933) Tenth International Conference of American States
Shellabarger, Martin Adam, 163 (1954). See Caracas Conference (1954)
Sherwin-Williams Paint Company, 35 Textiles, 39–40
Sibert, Edwin L., 128 Thailand, 103–4. See also Battalion, Thai (in Korea)
Siglo, El, 20, 40, 55, 63, 68, 79, 80, 85, 178 Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Sitges Pact, 177 of the American Republics (1942). See Rio de
Smith, Willard E., 133 Janeiro Conference (1942)
Snow, William, 174 Third Pan American Coffee Congress Accord
Snyder, John W., 77 (1940), 39
Social Progress Trust Fund, 176 Thomson-Urrutia Treaty (1921), 5
Songkhram, Phibun. See Phibun Songkhram Thousand Days War (1899–1903), 4, 52
Soule, Robert H., 108 Tiempo, El, 7, 20, 63, 79, 85, 141; closing of, 153–54,
South Korea. See Republic of Korea 178, 182, 204
Sourdis, Evaristo, 141 Tirado, Álvaro Mejía, xviii
Soviet Union, 11, 30, 44, 48, 174; cold war strategy Tofte, Hans, 193–94
of, 63, 72, 125–26, 138–39, 141, 155; Colombian Tolima, 123, 154–55, 160, 179
relations with, 46–47, 55, 57, 63, 79, 87, 144, Toledo, Ricardo, 92
152, 182; division of Korea, 72; and Korean Tono, ARC, 103, 104, 163
War (1950–53), 73–74, 100; and Middle East, Toriello, Guillermo, 140–41
144–45; partnership with Cuba, 175; at San Torres Bodet, Jaime, 49
Francisco Conference (1945), 45–46 Torres Del Río, César, xviii
Special Survey Team, U.S., 193–96 Transportation. See Panama Canal; Railroads;
Spinney, Russell G., 192 Roads; Waterways
Sputnik, 174 Trippe, Juan Terry, 34
Stalin, Josef, 72 Trudeau, Arthur, 133, 134
Standard Oil Company, 130, 167 Trujillo, Rafael, 175
Stanley, USS, 157 Truman, Harry S., 47, 49; and Korean War (1950–
Stasson, Harold, 142 53), 75–76, 78, 125
Stettinius, Edward R., 45 Turbay, Gabriel, 9, 51
Stone, David L., 18 Turbay Ayala, Julio César, 200
Strategic Materials, 38, 39, 40, 45, 64, 94, 143, 176, Turner, Robert G., 129, 163–64
233n69
Strikes: banana workers (1928), 40, 50; national Ubico, Jorge, 140
(1957), 168–69; petroleum workers (1946), 52; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet
transpiration (1943), 14 Union
Suárez Doctrine, 5, 87 United Fruit Company, 13, 40, 131, 167
index 303
United Nations (UN), 44, 45–46, 71, 72–75, 144, Villarrica, 154
182 Villate, Rafael, 155
UN Blockading and Escort Force, 100 Vincent, Stewart T., 127
UN Command: formation of, 71–75; operations, Violencia, la (1946–58): and Colombian military,
78, 106–7, 110 58, 82, 123, 135–36, 148, 150, 152–53, 154–55,
UN Conference on International Organization 158–62, 163–65; definition of, xvi; economics
(1945). See San Francisco Conference (1945) of, 130–31, 65, 167; ending of, 178–79, 202–3;
UN Declaration, 16 evolution of, 51–53, 122–24, 131, 135–36, 148,
UN Economic Commission for Latin America, 150, 152–53; historiography of, xvii, 214n7,
142 231n39; impact on U.S.-Colombian relations,
UN Emergency Force (Suez), 145–48, 158 xviii, 43, 58, 63, 65, 85, 88–89, 123–24, 126–27,
UN General Assembly, 146 152–54, 158–62, 163–65, 201, 202, 203; origins
UN Memorial Cemetery (South Korea), 102, 121 of, 40–42, 43, 49–50, 51, 66–67; religious
UN Reception Center, 107–10, 119 fighting, 5, 124, 152–53, 184, 202
UN Security Council: Korean War (1950–53), 71, Von Bauer, Peter. See Bauer, Peter von
72–75; origins of, 45–46; Suez crisis (1956),
145–46, 182 Walker, Bruce, 193
United Service Organization, 121 Walker, Walton H., 107
Universidad Nacional, 50, 68 Wall Street Journal, 39
University of the Andes, 178 War College, Colombian, 20, 59, 148, 179, 180,
University of Miami, 186 219–20n62
Upegui, Guillermo, 33 War on Terrorism. See Global War on Terrorism
Urbanization, 55, 67, 199 War of a Thousand Days (1899–1903). See Thou-
Urdaneta Arbeláez, Roberto, 81, 83, 123, 135–36 sand Days War (1899–1903)
Urdaneta, Rafael, 136 Warsaw Pact, 46
Uribe Vélez, Álvaro, 200, 201 Washington Conference (1951), 124–26, 157
Urrutia Holguín, Francisco, 145, 160 Washington Post, 21, 126, 174
Uruguay, 29, 93, 172, 176, 182 Waterways, 4, 37, 38, 165
Weather Bureau, U.S., 166
Valencia, Guillermo León, 168, 177 Welles, Sumner, 9, 16
Valencia Tovar, Álvaro, xviii; in Korea; 111, 112, 113, Whitson, Wallace E., 22
122, 134; with Special Survey Team, 193; and Williams, William Appleman, xvii
UN Emergency Force, 146; during World War Wiley, John Cooper, 49, 62
II (1939–45), 28 Wonson Blockade, 101
Valeriano, Napoleon, 193 W. R. Grace and Company, 64
Van Fleet, James, 111, 113, 122
Vandenberg, Arthur H., 46 Yom Kippur War (1973), 148
Vargas, Getúlio, 9, 27, 91–92
Venezuela: 2, 29, 39, 94; Nixon in (1958), 172–74 Zuleta Angel, Eduardo: Bogotá Conference (1948),
Vergara Donoso, Germán, 49 57; and Korean War (1950–53), 71, 80–82, 84;
Vieira, Gilberto, 52 and MAP assistance, 159–60; Washington
Vietnam. See Indochina. Conference (1951), 125–26, 144

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Colombia and the United States

NEW STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mary Ann Heiss, editor

Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance,

The Kent State University Press

library of congress cataloging-in-publication data

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.

Introduction: A Global History xiii

Maps and Illustrations xix

1 Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945 1

2 Old Problems, New Possibilities, 1945–1950 43

3 The Korean War and the Americas, 1950–1951 71

4 The Fighting Alliance, 1951–1953 97

5 Continuity and Change, 1953–1957 138

6 The Partnership Transformed, 1958–1960 171

Essay on Archival Research 205

List of Abbreviations 211

C. Marshall Research Library (Lexington, Virginia), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presi-

Political Map of Colombia

this study, comparative vignettes complement the international approach. Com-

sion known as la Violencia (1946–58). Employing multi-archival international re-

Political Map of Colombia xvi

on overseas operations. Latin Americans advanced the Allied cause by protecting

The Republics before World War II

The Colombian-American relationship began before World War II and produced

vised American policy toward Colombia. If another revolt erupted in Panama,

Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38) launched state-sponsored development pro-

The Inter-American Coalition

Colombian president Eduardo Santos

that demanded further inter-American collaboration. Conversely, President San-

An emergency inter-American meeting at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 ad-

Colombian president-elect Alfonso López (1934–38, 1942–45) confers with President

developments created an atmosphere of cooperation that served both countries

environment, the American naval mission concentrated on making the Colom-

seminars on camouflage, communications, fortification, and map reading. The ex-

military establishments. Brazillian president Getúlio Vargas and Mexican leader

Colombian military pilots Lieutenant Gustavo Artunduaga, Lieutenant Bernardo Escobedo,

undertook hemispheric counterespionage operations to control Axis saboteurs,

Economic and Political Disorder

Beyond conventional and internal security, the Colombian-American wartime

By 1940 Colombia’s trans-Atlantic exports dropped to 10 percent of the national

officials on medical and sanitation programs. Bogotá and Washington expanded

The Ninth International Conference of American States opened in Bogotá on 30

Inter-American Security and Development, 1945–1947

in the Americas and checked the once-imperialistic United States. A universal UN

As Colombia distinguished itself through its UN participation, Bogotá emerged

Politics and Violence in Colombia, 1945–1948

As president, Lleras attempted to end the partisan conflict. He urged members of

United States. Federal investigators pushed hundreds American bureaucrats, ac-

as well as collective security responsibilities outlined at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. In

Bilateral Security Relations, 1945–1950

Zone, offered Spanish-language military courses to Latin Americans, including

Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower, testifying on its necessity, encouraged Congress to

authorities also investigated the Soviet embassy and Centro Colombo-Soviético,

Economic Relations, 1945–1950

Colombian-American economic affairs both embodied and contradicted post-

The Flota Mercante Grancolombiana question, together with other Colombian

inter-American meetings, Colombians made only mild demands on the United

The Quest for Stability, 1949–1950

through inflammatory language, ridiculing the Liberal conviction that church

Liberals to sever all ties—public and personal—with Conservatives. Still control-

la Violencia obscured inter-American controversies and encouraged many forms