Professional Documents
Culture Documents
During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of persons who reported
their occupation as architects grew at an impressive rate in the United
States; the number of design competitions paralleled this rapid
growth. At first glance, the volume of construction appears to be a
common underlying link between the two developments. In particular
areas, the number of architectural firms, and therefore of archi-
tects in their employ, is closely related to the volume of construction;
more construction projects also imply a greater possibility that some of
them will be commissioned by competition. 1 However, design competi-
tions will continue attracting architects even in recessionary times, if
their professional ambition and their numbers push them into this
chancy and onerous method of looking for work. The relationship
therefore depends at least partially on something other than the econo-
my.
Indeed, on the one hand, the Design Arts Program of the National
Endowment of the Arts became active in promoting architectural com-
petitions during the 1970s, believing that the open selection of archi-
tects and designs gives the public and the press a better chance to
defend the built and unbuilt environment. The NEA started granting
subsidies (competitively) to non-profit sponsors, and obligating them
to respect NEA rules, especially that of hiring a professional adviser to
organize and oversee the contest; state Arts Councils and other public-
interest groups followed NEA's policy. On the other hand, in the 1970s,
postmodern eclecticism triumphed over the unitary language of cor-
porate modernism (symbolized by the ubiquituous "glass box") in
American architecture. Thus, during the commercial building boom
that started after the recession of 1973-76, competitions became a
favorite way for developers to sample styles and select an architect.
Developers' competitions, as we shall see, thrive on publicity. Publicity
open to all architects with time and ambition, is more likely to reflect
the diversity of the field and the jury's reading of emergent architectural
trends. Indeed, the belief that anonymous contests can reveal and
crown superior talent more effectively than the market and more equi-
tably than the profession's hierarchy attaches itself only to widely open
competitions. Because of its particularities, the open design competi-
tion sheds new light on the combination of market imperatives and
non-market aspirations, of economic weakness and ideological
strength, of dependency and autonomy, which characterizes many pro-
fessional practices.
One historian argues that these unproven and unspoken beliefs keep
young architects flocking to competitions (and architectural historians
paying them attention). 7 The notion seems to be, in summary, that
opening design opportunities to new people must induce more innova-
tion and originality than what can be expected from established de-
signers. However ideological, the notion is clearly "anti-professional." It
comes as no surprise, therefore, that the American Institute of Archi-
tects should have tried since the last century to reaffirm professional
control on the competition process. Because the composition of the
jury plays a determinant role in the contest's outcome, the AIA's code
of ethics demands that registered architects be a majority on any jury,
and it proscribes participation by- members in competitions that do not
follow its guidelines.8
472
I argue in the first section of this article that the method of architect
selection by contest rests on the bourgeois ideology of art. This specific
ideology also supports the market for architectural services and the cal-
culated use of competitions by business sponsors. Viewed from this
angle, architectural competition clouds the line between "art" and
"commerce," contributing to the "denial of economics" characteristic of
markets where symbolic values are bought and sold. 1° The traditional
identity and the traditional legitimations of the architectural profession
also appeal to the ideology of art. n This ideology makes significant
architectural competitions into events in architectural circles: built or
unbuilt, the projects ranked in an important competition are published,
diffused, examined, discussed, and entered as credits in their authors'
r6sum6s.
The second and third parts of this article explore the "innovation
effect" and the "career effect" of competitions through two detailed
case studies. The protagonists are Robert Ventufi mad Michael Graves,
two architects famous for their role in the post-modern shift of Ameri-
can architecture. Venturi won the competition for the Yale Mathema-
tics Building, which was never built, in 1970. Graves won at Portland in
1979, and his project was built. The decade is significant.
All contests have in common an obvious trait: They are all competitive.
They are not intended only to explore an idea but to find a winner. 15
Even in closed competitions the contestants know that they will be
judged against one another and who the others are. It is true that when
an architectural firm, its whole body of work and its management are
considered, not much in this pattern differs from the usual assignment
of architectural commissions to noted architects, except that the com-
petitors submit their work to a jury whose composition is known.
However, when designs only are judged, the jurors' evaluation is sup-
posed to rest on the project at hand, in either open or closed competi-
tions. This trait of competitions harks back to the essence of architec-
tural work.
and models are sufficient to predict the final result is the core of the
architects' specific competence and a premise in the comparative judg-
ment of their ability. This traditional understanding of design allows
architects to present prospective results in a form more concrete than
just reputation, yet separate from prior accomplishments.
For the competitors, today's contests still mix irrational beliefs and ele-
ments of ritual with rational calculation, such as gaining experience
where one may not have it; making one's name or, in any case, one's
ideas known to the jurors, even if one does not win; having a serious
project to include in a curriculum vitae; becoming visible through the
publicity and the display of works. Yet competitions clearly represent
for the hopeful contestants the possibility that the best person may win,
at least for this once; what happens after that is another story.
As Helene Lipstadt observes, the myth and the hopes surrounding the
architectural competition remind one of the carnivalesque rituals, in
which hierarchies were symbolically inversed but not denied, putting
women, the poor, the wretched, for one day on top. 18 An obscure assis-
tant professor, an unknown draftman, a beginning architect can beat
the elite professional and the student can come ahead of her teacher, as
happened to Maya Ying Lin in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial com-
476
petition, which is for that reason an exemplar in our time. The fact that
experienced jurors - even more than the unexperienced or lay persons
are able to recognize an architect's style and manner is known by all,
but it is temporarily overlooked to permit participation in the ritual.
Taking creative work for its own reward emphasizes the status of archi-
tecture as an art. Art and aesthetics, in our society, are constructed as
essentially non-utilitarian: Businessmen and professionals do not give
their work "away for nothing; but artists can be expected to. It is again
not surprising that the AIA (which has acted since its foundation as the
guardian of the jurisdictional interests and economic health of the pro-
fession) should have opposed competitions without ever advocating
their complete eradication. For indeed, if the judgment of expert pro-
fessional juries can be substituted for that of the market, competitions
then reinforce rather than subvert professional control. 2°
Despite the real ways in which professional hierarchies are silently con-
firmed, the founding myth of the open, two-stage competition, signaled
by its very openness, is that artistic talent can be found anywhere,
among the humblest members of a profession as much as among its
elites. There are hints of this romantic and peculiarly Western ideology,
which allocates a transcendent status to art by allocating the gift of
genius to artists, in yet another aspect of design competitions. Work
done for a client entails adjustments, constraints, compromises, and
also improvements generated in interaction with the client's budget,
needs, and desires. The open competition is not similarly rooted in the
concreteness of commissioned design. Although the client seldom is
totally excluded from the jury, he is not assiduously and regularly in-
volved in the design. The client's absence is often compounded by the
reticence to discuss budgetary matters.
477
Once again, only the notion of architecture as art can explain the mis-
leading belief that artists give their best when they create in 'greedom,"
for one crucial competitive display. This is not, of course, freedom from
mundane economic preoccupations but freedom from the utilitarian
constraints that come, presumably, with the client's active intervention.
The romantic ideology expects the best art to spring free of material
constraints, in the absence of strict programmatic or budgetary con-
siderations, with the artist-architect confronting the telos of architec-
ture alone.
Michael Graves says: "They know many of us go after the same jobs
and so the competition is high. Although now, unlike the fifties and six-
ties, many of us like each other and although we are competitive, at the
same time we know.., there's going to be the right mixture and you'll
get the one that's really meant for you. But that's only true, I suppose, if
you have enough work. If you don't.., every one becomes crucial ....
We let the world know that we all need and want to work and that
makes us vulnerable to anybody who wants to use us.''21
thing back .... Why do we all do it? Because a lot of good firms do it ....
You might do it for fear of offending a good client, an important
client ... and fear of exclusion, fear that the other big names do it and
you don't .... Somebody says we pick the five top design firms in Amer-
ica or internationally, to be in competition. They ask you, you turn it
down, they get another one. Then your name never appears in the top
five." 22
sponsors, is part of the publicity they are looking for but architects also
welcome it, as long as it does not prevent the building from being built.
As Michael Graves says in a filmed interview in front of his Portland
building, controversy means that "everyone is talking about architec-
ture ... and that's great!"
Yale, proud as it is of its modem monuments, now finds itself looking again
toward the integration of new buildings into the strong existing fabric and to
the provision of workable, economically, generally nonmonumental space for
the conduct of its teaching and its research, as
Yale in the 1950s and 1960s had acquired "enough free-standing new
monuments to be called the greatest open-air museum of modern
architecture on the continent;' as Charles Moore wrote. In a much less
complimentary vein, the architectural historian Colin Rowe called Yale
"not so much a museum as a version of Mine. Tussaud's, a waxworks
480
Yale's architecture had been shaped first by George Howe, one of the
first American modernist architects, and by Paul Rudolph, from 1958
to 1965. Rudolph's "incredible intensity and commitment to building
bright ideas" (as a former student said), the publications and exhibi-
tions he supported, the distinguished visiting critics and the university's
ambitious building program, all went to make Yale's architecture a
focus of international attention. It was also, for all these reasons, a
school that exalted the conception of architecture as personal expres-
sion. 27 After 1963, the students' disappointment with the built results
of Yale's heroic preferences found a focus in Rudolph's new building
for the Art and Architecture school. Contemporaneously, Edward
Barnes's appointment as campus planner and architectural adviser to
President Brewster marked a departure from the old notion that one
gets appropriate architectural solutions by letting each "big name" firm
place its monumental signature on the campus.
For those who did not know the background, it was easy to misread the
intentions and the compefition's preface: workable, economic, non-
monumental.., for a building of that size? and at Yale? 3° And if that
was what was really desired, couldn't the campus architectural office
have provided such a space, without the expense and the bother of a
481
According to a source very close to the firm, "it was obvious that Scully
was going to pick Venturi the moment he saw the drawings, unless he
was handed something awful. And considering Scully's personality, you
knew he was going to dominate the jury. The people at Venturi and
Rauch sat down to make a design to convince Scully.T M Considering
the influence of Louis Kahn on a majority of the jury, considering that
most of them knew Venturi well and several shared his controversial
ideas, it was easy even for outsiders to know what was not going to win.
It was also easy to suspect favoritism, and the architectural public did
more than just suspect. One first-stage competitor campaigned for a
year
The grumblings had a point. But Moore was to insist later that Yale,
already in the throes of financial difficulties, had no reason to squander
large amounts of money and unreimbursed time to select an architect
who was already most eligible for a Yale commission. 36 More tellingly,
he had declared at the time:
[I]t seems to me a tribute to this jury's cormoisseurship that their prize went
to such a simple solution instead of to one of the numerous entries which
bore a much larger number of devices generally associated with Robert Ven-
~ri's style? 7
Moore was saying, in fact, that it took the skill and the knowledge of his
jury to recognize the winning scheme as being not only the best, but
also Venturi's design. The real issue was not procedure, but design - or,
more exactly, the use of competition to legitimate a particular design
ideology and perhaps proselytize for it. However, in a society where
plurality of tastes is highly legitimate (and even incipiently so among
professional designers), it is easier to attack the jury for unfairness than
for the substance of its choice.
483
Venturi and Rauch's proposal was one of the three that abutted Leer
Oliver Hall, using the latter's grand entrance on Hillhouse Avenue.
Mixing styles with sure footing and making them into foil and comple-
ment to one another, the architects placed their wail flush against the
older building, leaning against it with a curved facade that crossed the
railroad tracks and opened the best views of the avenue to the faculty
offices, library, and lounge. Inside, the basement was perhaps the most
ingenious feature of the plan: auditoriums and large classrooms were
concentrated there, insulating the rest of the building from the heavy
circulation of undergraduates, as the program required. The extension
of basement and sub-basement in the back gained space and lig~htened
the bulk of the new building. Upstairs, unusually large corridors facili-
tated casual gatherings, following the mathematicians' wishes. In a
building with a deliberately "ord~ary image," a lounge with a view and
a two-story ceiling, a library all on one floor with mezzanine and the
484
same view, spacious and quiet offices, created interior amenities that
were all but "ordinary." The chair of the mathematics department had
feared he would have to fight the architects on the jury for this entry, in
which, he said, "the architect seems to have been able to visualize
rather clearly how flesh-and-blood mathematicians might actually use a
building. ''41
Colin Rowe, who was asked to criticize this "hotly and even sensation-
ally controversial" building, said the design was an "urbanistic failure."
The architects deferred too much to the pseudo-gothic Leet Oliver, and
not enough to the characteristic Yale spaces of courtyards, gates, and
quadrangles; their scheme made of Becton Plaza in the back "a stag-
nant cul-de-sac??' But perhaps Rowe's main complaint was that it had
become impossible to keep the reading of this building separate from
the torrent of words - Venturi's own and his admirers' - that ex-
pounded the architect's p h i l o s o p h y . 42
Although Venturi had explained that not only the image but the sub-
stance of his building was ordinary, he had never set out to provide an
ordinary building, on the contrary: 43
We say our buildings are 'ordinary' - other people have said they are ugly
and ordinary. But, of course, our buildings in another sense are.., extra
-ordinary... they are.., we hope, very sophisticated architecture designed
very carefi.dly, from each square inch to the total proportions of the
building .... Harmony with Leet Oliver is sought through contrast, as well as
analogy. The windows are different in type, yet similar in scale; the material is
different in type and texture, yet similar in color to that of Leet Oliver (gray
limestone). A t the back, the paving pattern of the plaza and the tracery of the
entrance are different in scale and material from the ornament of Leet
Oliver, yet similar symbolically. 44
This kind of statement led Rowe to accuse Venturi of the sort of under-
statement of rich women who line their "ordinary" raincoats with mink:
The public face is deadpan; the private world is chic. We rest upon our privi-
leges and dissimulate their existence, which is all a little like Park Avenue ....
Venturi's exterior and interior are, maybe, just a little too disrelated.
style" had scored a partial victory: Its exemplar, though unbuilt, had
become a discursive event.
Indeed, Moore and Pyle's slim book on the competition opened with
the statement that the Yale Mathematics Building had reversed the
"special twentieth-century pattern for memorable architectural compe-
titions: the winner is conservative but highly competent; among the
runners-up are designers of buildings of revolutionary importance for
modern architecture." With the implication that the truly revolutionary
thing in 1970 was to please the users as Venturi's project had done,
Moore gave to the Yale competition its full polemical import, revealing
it for that which it had always intended to be: a taking of position in a
debate on principles. 46
At Yale, the jury could escape the normal compromise and crown an
innovative and controversial architect because almost all the architects,
the influential art historian, and the professional adviser wished to pro-
mote that kind of architectural statement, "for the future of architec-
ture." As Moore admitted,
It can then come as no surprise that when this jury found an entry which met
the program requirements with unusual felicity and also carried a stylistic
messageof particular interest to them, they gaveit the prize. 47
This was a '~ixed" contest in the sense that it had been devised, no
matter how honestly, to publicize an ideological program with which
the winner was fully identified. It is obviously more difficult to establish
what the victory did for Ventufi's career, since the Mathematics
Building is, to this date, unbuilt; I argue that it confirmed Ventufi's dis-
cursive position, while doing nothing at all for the "track record" on
which clients judge architects.
Venturi, first of all, had the right academic pedigree for an East Coast
architect: private school, Princeton, the Rome prize after finishing lfis
M.A., an Ivy League assistant professorship. He had worked as a
designer for famous achitects: Oscar Stonorov, Eero Saafinen, Louis
486
Thus, in 1970, the firm seemed positioned for success, with excellent
leadership, remarkable collaborators, and some stable income from
teaching and lecturing. The projects built by the principal had been
very few and small in scale but there had been, however, much noted
entries in at least five competitions; of these and others, the book Com-
plexity and Contradiction made exemplary and intelligent u s e . 49 In
1965, a solo exhibit of "The Works of Venturi and Rauch" had toured
the United States, moving five years later to the Whitney Museum in
New York. Venturi's book had received attention in every national pro-
fessional journal and internationally, as did his "shocking" work on Las
Vegas with Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour. 5°
Yenturi was included in that mysterious but always named elite "cir-
cuit" of mostly Eastern architects who make the rounds of elite archi-
tectural schools, appear on award juries, and are talked about by cri-
tics, students, and other "intellectual" architects in places such as
London, Paris, Milan, and Tokyo, besides New York and New Haven.
However, signs that discursive controversy can breed real trouble had
appeared in 1968: Venturi Rauch Scott Brown, in association with the
large Texas firm Caudill Rowlett Scott, had won the competition for
Transportation Square in Washington, D.C. The scheme was rejected
by the capital's Fine Arts Commission of which the most prominent
member was Gordon Bunshaft of SOM-New York, the archetypal large
modernist corporate practice. Typical of professional elites anywhere,
the animosity evidenced by Bunshaft against Venturi was more than the
feelings of a man close to the mandatory retirement age of 65 at SOM
and threatened by the next "bright young architect full of promise."
Denise Scott Brown points out that a corporate architect might resent
Ventufi's intellectual reputation but, above all, a building like the Guild
House "outraged Bunshaft's philosophy."51
ment would try to close ranks against the young Turks. In the short run,
it was difficult for Venturi and Rauch to transfer that symbolic capital
outside the circles of intellectual architects and critics, a transfer indis-
pensable for the transformation of prestige into commissions. Because
important projects like Transportation Square or Yale remained
unbuilt, the clients did not set an example that others could choose to
follow. Controversy discouraged larger (and almost inevitably less
adventurous) clients than those who gravitate around architectural
elites.
After finishing his M.A. in 1959 and working for a year, Graves too
won a Rome Prize. That, he says, was a crucial factor in obtaining the
appointment at Princeton in 1962. Princeton, where he has been ever
since, gave him a stable income and an open teaching and learning
environment, under the guidance of Jean Labatut, the Beaux-Arts
architect who had been the teacher of Charles Moore, Donlyn Lyndon,
and Robert Venturi. In 1960, Peter Eisenman joined the Princeton
faculty. Graves says "Peter and I looked at each other and said ~11
right, we are the Young Turks.'" Together they obtained a huge grant
from the university and Prudential Life "to explore possibilities of
urban growth in a linear context." The nucleus of CASE - the Con-
ference of Architects for the Study of the Environment - self-
consciously modeled on Le Corbusier's CIAM and England's post-war
T E A M 10, was formed when the British critics Kenneth Frampton,
Anthony Eardley, and Anthony Vidler were brought to Princeton.
Almost fortuitously, Arthur Drexler, the Director of Architecture and
Design at the Museum of Modern Art, discovered the Graves-
Eisenman team on a visit to Princeton and ended up including their
project in the 1967 Museum exhibit "The New City Architecture and
Urban Renewal." By 1970, the CASE group had attracted so much
attention that Drexler offered them to hold a public meeting at the
museum, out of which Eiseuman drew a book, Five Architects, pub- "
lished in 1972. The press and the cognoseenti had found an architec-
tural avant-garde to talk about.
Unlike Venturi, Graves did not contribute his ideas in writing to the
debate, except for a few pieces. His buildings were few, as they had
been for Venturi in 1969, mostly rehabilitations. 56 "I was known as the
Cubist Kitchen King, the Painter-Architect," he says, "all kinds of things
489
that would say 'Good here, but he hasn't built. '''57 A solo exhibition of
Graves's projects had been held at Columbia in 1976 and toured the
United States. Graves was part of the rarefield New York art world, in
which his drawings of abstracted architectonic forms were known and
highly priced. He was in a central position from which to accumulate
symbolic capital, his drawings serving him in a way analogous to
writing for Venturi.
columns rise from a stepped green base toward an arching keystone at the
top, recalling both the splendors of Imperial Rome and the hard-edged geo-
metry of art deco. Perched at the top is a symbolic 'head, in the shape of a
small pavilion....' In addition to fanciful 'welcome garlands' on the sides, he
placed a blooming female figure, three stories high, on the front. 'I called her
Portlandia; he says. 'She says, in effect, 'the city is lively.'59
The design and especially the more decorative elements identified with
Graves's "signature" (there should have been a whole '~village" of small
pavilions on the roof) were modified several times over the course of
this uncommon and much criticized competition.
The Portland story opens with a mayor who had the ambition of
leaving behind him "a building design that was something special, not
the usual mute box squatting anonymously on the skyline: '6° A non-
profit corporation composed of business people and politicians was
established to sell bonds and act as owner; among the politicians was
Portland's future mayor Frank Ivancie. Edward Wundram, the architect
hired to prepare the program, budget, and schedule, came up with the
idea of an international "design-build" competition. "Design-build"
places the architect, always believed to be indifferent to and respon-
sible for cost overruns, in the employ of the contractor, not the client.
The budget of S 22,420,000 was non-negotiable; the teams would sub-
mit a bid and a schedule for which they would be responsible, at the
tune of a S 9,000 fine for each and every day over the promised com-
pletion date.
The city thus seemed to be of two minds about this project: on the one
hand, it wanted to tie the building team to a very tight budget (S 51 per
square foot!) and make it responsible for cost overruns. On the other
hand, it wanted to get Portland national and international acclaim.
Wundram says:
All Ivancie wanted was 'on time and on schedule.' As soon as that was taken
care of, the Mayor came to me and said: 'Now, c a n we get good design as
well? Is there a way?' I said 'Yes, but we need someone strong to carry that
message and I believe that Philip Johnson was the strongest influence on
design in this country. 61
The city sent out "requests for qualifications" to over a hundred firms
and over eighty responded with inquiries; only eleven teams, led by the
contractor, submitted their portfolios. By late November, Johnson and
Burgee, acting as consultants, had picked four teams of contractor/
designer/engineers; as had been announced, only three of these were to
compete with actual design submissions: Mitchell/Giurgola, Michael
Graves, Arthur Erickson, and their respective associates.63 Graves's was
associated with the architectural firm of Emery Roth and Sons, proba-
bly the most experienced designers of high-rise buildings in New York.
The presence of Emery Roth and Sons on the team was crucial, and
prominent in Johnson's timely "shove." In Graves's words (he held the
story from Ed Wundram),
We felt responsible in this position because we were being the sole judges.
We had to pick somebody and then defend it when it was done.., with
Graves you get the chance to have a real breakthrough building, something
that would be quite different than what you might be expecting. I don't
remember what the others were, but you would not want to put an Eisenman,
a Stern and a Gehry and make the competition out of those three ... what if
n o n e of them really did a civic building that was responsible? Any of them
could end up winning the competition. 65
By their own admission, the lay jurors leaned heavily on Philip Johnson
and John Burgee's analysis. That was what they were wanted for, after
all, but Johnson's presentation before City Councit, jury, competitors,
and public was thrashed by all those, and they were many, who would
probably not have been as incensed if they had liked Graves's design.
Johnson spoke of the future of architecture, and Aldo Giurgola later
said:
492
Philip came up with the phrase that Graves' project was avant-garde, ours
was in-betweenand Erickson's was modernist. I think a jury should discuss
these things only by themselves. Who wants not to be in the avant-garde? It
influenced people who were not professionals.66
Architectural circles knew that this would happen. Steven Izenour
recalls that "everyone knew Graves was Johnson's golden boy.., for
that year! We saw the jury and we knew there was no competition in-
volved, we said 'forget it, we are not entering this'!" Yet a source close
to Erickson's office at the time says that na~vet6 is hardly something
one would tax him with: The decision to enter the Portland competition
was taken advisedly. In 1979, Erickson was also involved in the design-
build invited competition for the redevelopment of Bunker Hill in Los
Angeles (which his team won in July 1980) and Mitchell/Giurgola in
the international competition for the Australian Parliament House in
Canberra, one of the most important commissions of the last twenty
years (they won in 1980 by unanimous vote of the jury). The publicity
received in a prestigious competition for a civic building, especially if
they made it to the final round, would obviously not hurt their chances
elsewhere.
One week after Johnson's public presentation, the jury of five chose the
Graves/Pavarini/Roth team by four votes and one abstention. None of
the finalists had been able to respect the impossible S 51 per square
foot and all three offered less space than requested, but Graves's team
offered the most footage, came in exactly under the budget and got the
best ratings from the construction managers hired by the city for energy
efficiency and other performance aspects. At that point, the battle
started, led by the local Fellows of the American Institute of Architects.
The uproar and the opposition in City Council were such that the
Mayor asked the jury to solicit a modified submission from Graves
(and only from him). Stripped of its decorations and redimensioned,
the design that had been likened to "an aristocratic cousin of R2D2
from Star Wars;' competed once again with Erickson's glass box on
pilotis, its only runner up. 67 The Graves/Pavarini team provided, as
before, more space and energy savings at less cost. In April 1980, the
commission was finally theirs. The ground was broken in July, while
Graves's design team ffast-tracked" the drawings; the Portland Building
opened two years later, in October 1982.
I think the Portlanders felt like guinea pigs, and asked themselves: 'Why
shouldn't this sort of thing h a p p e n in New York instead, where the media
helped create it?' Just the fact that an international competition was re-
moving an opportunity from the local architectural community was a threat
to local practices, and then the aesthetics was a further blow to the type of
architecture preferred there - a M o d e r n , commercial sort, but very good of
its type. 68
We had a very short time, three months, in which to design, present and cost
out a building with a very strict budget .... I was not interested ... in arriving
in Portland three months over that time with a building over budget. The
other two competitors, to my surprise, did not assume that this was a strict
rule, but I felt that it had been spelled out quite clearly, that the city had
recently had two cost overruns on a public works project which had b e c o m e
a c a u s e c d l k b r e - and there was a mayoral race in the balance .... We did not
feel that way [that the city should pay extra], though we found the cost prob-
lem frustrating throughout. 71
"Johnson's young men," he said, "have discovered that frivolous means get
immediate attention, and that fashions need not last. They tell us that content
and expression, function and form have no more fundamental a connection
in architecture than in scene painting, dress-making or hat-design.''73
It has fallen to Michael Graves to become the figure around which the
public's interest in post-modernism has coalesced .... It is a role that many
critics and historians had expected would be filled by Robert Venturi ....
[His] buildings, however, are an unusual mix of the highly studied and the
self-consciously plain, and they do not always have an easy appeal to the
untrained eye. He may be his generation's most gifted architect.., but he
does not seem destined to be this era's most popular one. 76
Both Yale and Portland were predictable or, even more, pre-judged
competitions, in the sense that the decision-makers were so biased in
favor of a new kind of architectural vision that one of its representatives
was bound to win, provided he did not submit something terrible. Con-
496
sidering the exceptional talent of the "favorite son" in both cases, this
was practically impossible. The lay members of the jury found that
both solutions excelled in something other than novelty and architec-
tural "delight": Venturi's in "comfort" and satisfaction of users' require-
ments, Graves's in technical performance, both of them in cost efficien-
cy.
Above all, Graves's winning design could disarm its critics because it
was built, while Venturi's could not. The Portland critics were able to
appreciate the architectonic amenities offered by the new building or,
as Belluschi admitted, "get used to it. ~'79 It would also be possible later
on to see how the building was aging in both architectonic and stylistic
terms. Also, critics seem to agree with Paul Goldberger that Graves's
"fundamental instincts are pictorial," which means, among other things,
that visual appeal matters more than texture and materials in his archi-
tecture. Graves's absolute determination to accept this commission
despite the miserly budget may thus have compromised his basic archi-
tectural vision less than it would have for other architects.
497
Were it not for the impact (both positive and negative) of his and Scott
Brown's written work, Venturi's career would be much closer to the tra-
ditional "good architect" pattern: going from smaller to larger commis-
sions locally, specializing in the "elite" non-commercial domain and
himself becoming slowly able over time to direct work to younger
architects in a local frame. Venturi, too, needed a visible major project
to build. He got it at Princeton in 1980, the same year of Graves's
award in Portland and he got it, according to his wife and partner, on
the strength of what his firm had built:
"I do not know how we got on the fist," says Scott Brown, "but what we
showed them was very interesting. We showed them our campus buildings, of
course, and advisedly we wanted to give them a rest from the heavy responsi-
bility and we showed them a couple of beautiful beach houses. The idea was
to turn them into little barefoot boys and to show them just beauty: After-
wards, I read somewhere a salesman's writing, about how you sell a cor-
porate jet: you sell efficiency to middle management, but you sell the presi-
dent real beauty. That's what we did there."8°
Despite the importance of realizations for the track record, Yale and
Portland do not prove that what matters most for careers is getting that
winning project built. The location of the work and the hullaballoo that
surrounds "big" competitions seem just as necessary,sl The trajectory
that a firm has already outlined for itself determines the kind of compe-
titions that will be entered.
498
Architects and architecture critics say that open competitions, like pro-
fessional award programs, are a means to make a name for oneself - or,
in the terms I have used, to gain right of existence in the profession's
discursive field. A "name" gets one invited to compete in restricted
contests. Success by itself (winning or placing among the finalists or
being otherwise noted) does not appear sufficient to create for an
architect networks he or she did not have before the event. Yet the
gains in self-confidence and the encouragement may spur a change of
course or trajectory for a beginning firm. So it was for Barry Elbasani
of Berkeley, whose award in the Binghamton Sports Arena competition
became the foundation of a successful practice, avoiding, he says, "the
ten years of floundering with houses, churches and schools." As he
rapidly adds, "[s]uecess from a competition requires a project big
enough to have holding power. Also it takes business sense to stay alive
when it's o v e r . ''82
Notes
1. The increase in the number of architects was 87.4 percent from 1960 to 1970 and
60 percent in the following intercensus decade. In absolute numbers, the initial
basis was small: 30,028 in 1960, 56,284 in 1970, and 90,026 in 1980. Growth con-
tinued after that. See Robert Gutman, Architectural Practice (New York: Princeton
Architectural Press, 1988), 9ff and Table 5, 120. For the correlation of firms with
volume of construction, see Magafi Saffatti Larson, George Leon, and Jay Bolick,
"The professional supply of design," in Judith Blau, Mark La Gory, and Samuel
Pipkin, editors, Professionals and Urban Form (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), 256ff.
My remarks on competitions follow Robert Gutman's manuscript "Design com-
petitions in the U.S.A.," published as Appendix to Great Britain, Ministry of the
Environment Briefing Competitions (London: Bulstrode Press, 1987). Having
failed to locate the published text, I quote from the typescript made available to me
through Professor Gutman's courtesy. Gutrnan says that the increase in the number
of competitions from the mid-seventies to the mid-eighties may have been as much
as one thousand percent (manuscript, p. 1). See also ArchitecturalPractice, 71.
2. Gutman, "Competitions," Ms., 22.
3. The "design-build" competition, recently popular in the United States, can be either
open or closed; it is mainly a mechanism for controlfing costs and making the com-
plete team of architects-engineers-contractors responsible for the schedule and the
budget.
4. See Gutman, "Competitions," ms. 26-30. For the developers' interest in "product
differentiation," see my Behind the Postmodern Facade: Architectural Change in
Late Twentieth Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993),
ch. 3.
5. See Magali Saffatti Larson, "The production of expertise and the constitution of
expert power," in Thomas Haskell, editor, The Authority of Experts: Historical and
Theoretical Essays (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1984).
6. Steven Izenour, of Venturi Scott Brown and Associates, personal communication.
7. This is the argument advanced by Htl~ne Lipstadt. See her introduction to the col-
lection by Lipstadt, editor, The Experimental Tradition (New York: Princeton
Architectural Press, 1988).
8. The Institute, however, has little effective authority over the sponsors and not much
over its constituents. Therefore, the AIA cites additional practical reasons for op-
500
posing competitions: they add to the costs, mainly by delaying the building process;
and they exaggerate cosmetics, "the superficialities of design that can be reviewed
in the short period of the jury process," because contests do not give architects the
time to investigate carefully the technical complexity of modem building. Gutman,
"Competitions," ms. 7.
9. The expression "watershed" is from Dennis Sharp, "Introduction," in de Haan,
Hilde, and Ids Haagsma, Architects in Competition: International Architectural
Competitions in the Last200 Years (London: Thames & Hudson, 1988). Two of the
most famous international competitions, which became a stage for the conflict
between modernists and "traditionalists," were the Chicago Tribune competition of
1922 and the competition for the League of Nations palace in Geneva of 1927.
Eliel Saarinen placed second in Chicago and Le Corbusier in Geneva. See the con-
tributions by Dennis Sharp and Kenneth Frampton in De Haan and Hagsma, ibid.
10. I owe the comment that a general pattern in the commercial arts is worked out in
the design competitions to an anonymous reader for Theory and Society. The idea
that markets for symbolic goods are based on the denial of economics is, of course,
Pierre Bourdieu's. See, in particular, "La production de la croyance," Actes de la
Recherche en Sciences Sociales 13 (February 1977): 4-43.
11. See Magali Sarfatti Larson, "Emblem and exception: The historical definition of the
architect's professional role," in Judith Blan, Mark La Gory, and John Pipkin,
editors, Professionals and Urban Form (Albany: SUNY press, 1983).
12. My heuristic definition of "discourse" is obviously derived from Michel Foucault.
See L'Ordre du Discours (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), trans. Rupert Swyer as "The dis-
course on language," in Michel Foncault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New
York: Pantheon, 1972).
13. See Bourdieu, "Production de la croyance."
14. ArchitecturalForum, "Mathematics at Yale: Readers respond," 1970 (Oct.): 65.
15. Close to the study competitions and to classic architectural pedagogy, "idea" com-
petitions are not related to any building project: They ask the contestants to devel-
op ideas for the solution of a problem that has particular technical or social rele-
vance.
16. See John Goldthwaite, The Building of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1980), 365 ff.
17. Lipstadt, Experimental, ix.
18. Lipstadt, Experimental, xii.
19. Robert Gutman estimates that between 1,500 and 2,000 firms and individuals
regularly enter architectural competitions of all kinds in the United States. Most of
the participants, he says, are young, architects employed by large offices or by archi-
tecture schools. Gutman, Practice, 70-71.
20. In France, for instance, public competitions among registered architects are obliga-
tory for all important official buildings. In the words of Serge Chemetoff, an award-
winning French architect, architectural competitions have become "a system of
architectural commission regulated by the profession itself.., some fifty or so pro-
fessionals compete regularly among themselves." [Symposium on Competitions,
Architectural League of New York, May 1988]. In the United States, where official
government competitions are much rarer and professional regulation much weaker,
the professionalism of the jury gives respectability to a contest and legitimacy to its
outcome. There is evidence of the professional uses of competition, even in the
United States: architects who teach in universities want competitions and awards to
count for their tenure as equivalent of articles and books; they emphasize that the
501
43. Venturi and Rauch's design was indeed economical. Yale's Director of Building
and Grounds, a member of the jury, gave economics as one of the reasons for his
enthusiasm: the university had estimated a S 5 million budget, but Venturi's could
possibly come in at S 4.5 (Berkeley: "Mathematics," 66).
44. Venturi in Cook and Klotz, Conversations, 248,258.
45. Rowe, "Robert Venturi," 16 and 19, emphasis mine.
46. Moore and Pyle, Yale Mathematics, vifl.
47. Forum, "Mathematics," 66.
48. Venturi was to share the appointment with James Stirling and, in 1969, with Denise
Scott Brown (his wife and associate), as well.
49. Four private residences (including the famous house for his mother in 1963), a few
restorations and additions, a nurses' association headquarters, a fire station, and the
largest one, the Guild House for the elderly in Philadelphia, completed in 1965.
Among the competitions was the Walker and Dunlop office building at Transporta-
tion Square in Washington, with the firm of Caudill Rowlett Scott, which won first
prize but was rejected by the Art Commission (t 968).
50. See Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, Learning from Las
Vegas (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972).
51. Scott Brown, personal communication to the author.
52. In a twenty-page interview with Venturi and Scott Brown for their 1973 book John
Cook and Heinrich Klotz devoted seven pages to the Yale project, which had been
reviewed in the major American architectural journals and included, thereafter, in
the exhibitions of the firm's work in the United States and abroad, generating more
reviews. By 1973, besides, the ideas of Venturi and Scott Brown were more and
more frequently mentioned by architectural art, and "culture" critics in the daily
press of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Houston, Lima, and Madrid, in campus
newspapers, and in periodicals such as Newsweek and Life. This, however, was due
much more to the "shock value" of Learning from Las Vegas than to the Yale com-
petition!
53. Scott Brown, personal communication to the author.
54. Izenour, personal cornmunication to the author. Despite the stir raised by James
Stirling, who was one of the rejected competitors, the winner was maintained.
Venturi's project received the blessings of Prince Charles, who had become a
Trustee of the Gallery, and therefore part of "the client," after having contributed
to kill the contrasted scheme by a British firm, winner by default of a previous con-
test. The complex story is told by the British architectural newsletter Blueprint
(May 1987): 4.
55. Michael Graves, interview in GlobalArchitecture, Special Issue on Graves (1982):
5.
56. Just before the competition, Graves appears to have had the same number of built
projects to his credit as Venturi had had before Yale (20 for Graves, 19 for
Venturi, with or without Rauch, including 3 urban planning projects). However,
since Graves had started his practice in Princeton in 1964, the same year that
Venturi and Rauch had founded their partnership, both firms had been 15 years in
practice. By 1979, the firm of Venturi, Rauch and Scott Brown had realized 53
various projects, including 16 urban design studies, as well as 8 installation designs
for important exhibitions in New York and Philadelphia. The work of the firm had
been shown by itself, nationally and internationally, in nine exhibitions, against only
one for Graves; the latter, in turn, had been more active than Venturi in collective
exhibits (he participated 23 times, in the U.S. and abroad, and Venturi 16, 6 times
in the same exhibitions as Graves).
503
competition that was not even mentioned by the press). In a thoughtful and very
critical review, the historian Kurt Forster acknowledged that the building "pos-
sesses an undeniable presence and radiates a power of its own." But Forster, like
others before and after him, noted that Graves "conceives of architecture strictly in
terms of planar articulation," that he had "progressively drained his architectural
ideas of physical presence in favor of graphic signs. Disembodied and abstract,
these signs quite willingly lend themselves to logo-like reduction, because they are
far more removed from the bodily qualities of architecture than the modernist
buildings tend to be" (in Skyline (January 1983): 16, 18). Writing in 1983, Forster
did not believe that Graves's latest buildings would change from the "flat" approach
that he thought Graves transferred from the collages and murals that were his "true
field of experimentation."
76. Patti Goldberger, On the Rise: Architecture and Design in a Postmodern Age (New
York: Penguin, 1985), 317.
77. The competition set up by Humana consisted of five invited submissions by
Graves's office, Cesar Pelli and Associates of New Haven, Murphy/Jahn Asso-
ciates of Chicago, Ulrich Franzen/K. Kroeger and Associates of New York, and
Norman Foster and Associates of London. Richard Meier, also invited to par-
ticipate, withdrew before the design stage. The jury of five consisted of Humana
corporate officers "that included architects Jan~es J. Waiters, AIA, vice-president
and Robert B. Harris, AIA, design coordinator" (Record [July 1982]: 59).
78. Goldberger, On the Rise, 319.
79. See David L. Gilbert, "The Portland building," in Marder, CriticalEdge, 168.
80. Communication to the author.
81. Thus, David Calder Richardson, who won the competition for the Gulf South
Research Institute in Baton Rouge, declared to Andrea Dean that neither clients
nor commissions followed: "No one cared, although Gulf South won a regional and
state A I A award." Dean, "Competitors View," 58.
82. Ibid., 58.
83. Kolm adds with regret that the organized profession is not now and has never been
strong enough to decide a boycott of competitions, which might in any case be in
violation of anti-trust laws. Communication to the author.
84. Interview with the author.
85. On these "vernacular" concepts, see my Behind the Postmodern Facade: Architec-
tural Change in Late Twentieth Century America (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993), chapter 4.
86. Communication to the author.