Ma’rifah and ‘ilm: Two Islamic Approaches to the

Problem of Essence and Existence

Nicholas Heer

(1)

   Throughout much of Islamic history Sufis and theologians have ignored each other’s methods

for the attainment of knowledge. Sufis have in general stressed insight, inspiration and other

forms of mystical experience over reason as primary sources of knowledge. The theologians, or

mutakallimên, on the other hand, have considered sense perception and  rational demonstration

to be only valid sources of knowledge, and have been skeptical of claims that knowledge of any

sort could be attained through mystical experience. This paper examines the problem of essence

and existence as it was conceived by Islamic thinkers and attempts to explain why some of the

later theologians, although continuing to reject mystical experience as a source of knowledge,

nevertheless show an interest in certain Sufi doctrines concerned with essence and existence.

(2)

According to Sufi belief, mystical experience in the form of insight (‘iyan), unveiling

(kashf), or inspiration (ilhàm) was a valid source of knowledge. The Sufis asserted that there was

a difference between rational or cognitive knowledge, which they called ‘ilm, and the type of

knowledge that results from mystical experience. This latter type of knowledge they called
ma‘rifah, or sometimes ‘irfàn, terms which have often been translated by European scholars as

“gnosis.” The Sufis further asserted that God could be truly known only through gnosis and that

gnosis is achieved only as the result of strenuous spiritual exercises. Reason and demonstration,

they claimed, were useless in achieving this true knowledge of God. Al-Hujwiri (d. circa

465/1072), a 5th/11th century mystic, says in his Kashf al-mahjêb:

“Ordinary objects of search are found by means of demonstration, but knowledge

of God is extraordinary. Therefore knowledge of Him is attained only by

unceasing bewilderment of the reason.” 1

Comparing the knowledge gained from reason and the knowledge gained from mystical

experience, al-Hujwiri says:

“The knowledge gained is in the one case a matter of logic, in the other it becomes an inward

experience. Let those who deem reason to be the cause of gnosis consider what reason affirms in

the minds concerning the substance of gnosis, for gnosis involves the negation of whatever is

affirmed by reason, i.e., whatever notion of God can be formed by reason, God is in reality

something different. How, then, is there any room for reason to arrive at gnosis by means of

demonstration?”2

Al-Ghazàli (d. 505/1111) in a passage in his Mishkàt al-anwàr3 describes the human soul

as having five faculties. The first, which he calls the sensory spirit (al-ruh al-hassàs), receives

the information gathered by the senses. The second faculty, called the imaginative spirit (al-ruh

al-khayàli), records and saves this sensory information. The third faculty is the intelligential

spirit (al-ruh al-‘aqli.) This is the faculty which apprehends meanings and concepts along with
necessary and universal premises and propositions. The fourth faculty is that of syllogistic

reasoning and is called  the discursive spirit (al-ruh al-fikri). The fifth and last faculty is what al-

Ghazàli calls the transcendental prophetic spirit (al-ruh al-qudsi al-nabawi). He describes this

faculty as follows:

“This is the property of the prophets and some saints. By it the unseen tables and

statues of the Law are revealed from the other world, together with several of the

sciences of the Realms Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-eminently theology, the

science of Deity, which the intelligential and discursive spirit cannot compass.”4

Addressing the reader al-Ghazàli goes on to say:

“And here a word to thee, thou recluse in thy rational world of the intelligence!

Why should it be impossible that beyond reason there should be a further plane,

on which appear things which do not appear on the plane of the intelligence, just

as it is possible for the intelligence itself to be a plane above the discriminating

faculty and the senses; and for relations of wonders and marvels to be made to it

that were beyond the reach of the senses and the discriminative faculty?”5

Further on al-Ghazàli advises the reader to:

“Strive earnestly to become one of those who experience mystically something of

the prophetic spirit; for saints have a specially large portion thereof. If thou canst

not compass this, then try, by the discipline of the syllogisms and analogies set

forth or alluded to in a previous page, to be one of those who have knowledge of

it scientifically. But if this, too, is beyond thy powers, then the least thou canst do
 is to become one of those who simply have faith in it … Scientific knowledge is

above faith, and mystic experience is above knowledge. The province of mystic

experience is feeling; of knowledge, ratiocination; and of faith, bare acceptance of

the creed of one’s fathers.”6

A later Sufi of the 9th/15th century, ‘Abd al-Rahmàn al-Jàmi (d. 898/1492), says in his al-

Durrah al-fàkhirah:

“The basis of the position taken by the Sufis is mystical revelation and insight (al-

kashf wa’l a‘yàn) rather than reason and demonstration. For indeed, since they

have turned towards God in complete spiritual nudity by wholly emptying their

hearts of all worldly attachments and the rules of rational thought, and by unifying

the will, persisting in concentration, and persevering along this path without

slackening, interruption of thought, or dissolution of will, God has granted to

them a revealing light to show them things as they really are. This light appears

within at the appearance of a level beyond the level of intellect. Do not think the

existence of that improbable, for beyond the intellect are many levels whose

number is hardly known except by God.”7

(3)

The passages quoted above from al-Hujwiri, al-Ghazàli and al-Jàmi present a clear
picture of the Sufi method of attaining knowledge with its emphasis on mystical experience. In
sharp contrast to the Sufi method was that of the theologians, who relied exclusively on
reasoning, and rejected any form of mystical experience as a source of knowledge. The
theologians’ argument for their method started from the premises that it is the duty of every
Muslim to acquire knowledge of God and His attributes. According to the theologians, however,
this knowledge can only be acquired through reasoning (nazar), and reasoning, if it is to result in
certain knowledge, must be based ultimately on necessary (daruri) and self-evident (badihi)
premises, that is, on premises that are known for certain to be true. The importance of reasoning
in the acquisition of religious knowledge was stressed by ‘Abd al-Qàhir al-Baghdàdi (d.
429/1037), an Ash’arite theologian of the 5th/11th century, in the following words:

“The truth of religion is based on the truth of prophecy and the truth of prophecy
is known through reasoning (al-nazar) and demonstration (al-istidlàl). If it were
known by necessity through sense perception or were self-evident, then anyone
opposing it would be pigheaded (mu‘ànid) like the skeptics who deny sense
perception.”8

For the early theologians the premises on which such reasoning and demonstration could
be based were of three types: 1) premises based on reason (al-‘aql), such as the axioms of logic
and mathematics; 2) premises based on the senses (al-hawàs), and 3) true narrative (al-khabar
al-sàdiq).

Al-Nasafi (d.537/1142), a theologian of the sixth/twelfth century, explained these three

types of premises as follows:

The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative, and
reason. The senses are five, namely, hearing, seeing, smelling, taste, and touch, and by each of
these senses one is informed concerning that for which it was appointed.

True narrative is of two kinds: one of them the mutawàtir narrative, and it is the narrative
established by the tongues of people of whom it is inconceivable that they would agree together
on a falsehood. It brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in
past times and of the distant countries. The second kind is the narrative of the messenger aided
by an evidentiary miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge
established by it resembles the knowledge established by necessity in certainty and fixity.

Then as for reason: it is a cause of knowledge also; and whatever of it is established by

immediate perception is necessary, just as the knowledge that the whole of a thing is greater that
the part of it; and whatever is established by deduction is acquired.9

Later theologians usually adopted Ibn Sinà’s (d. 428/1037) division of these necessary
premises into six categories rather than three.10

These were: 1) first principles or axioms (awwaliyàt), such as the statement that the
whole is greater than any of its parts; 2) propositions containing their own syllogisms (qadàyà
qiyàsatuha ma‘ahà), such as the statement that four is an even number; 3) particular propositions
based on sense perception (mahsêsàt, mushàhadàt), such as the statement that this fire is hot; 4)
propositions based on the reports of a sufficient number of eye-witnesses to preclude to
possibility of their having agreed on a lie (mutawàtiràt, qadàyà tawàturiyah), such as the
statement that Mecca exists, for one believes this statement to be true regardless of whether one
has actually been to Mecca or not; 5) propositions based on experience (mujarrabàt, tajribiyàt),
such as the statement that scammony is a laxative, or that wine is intoxicating, or that fire burns;
and, finally, 6) propositions based on intuition (hadsiyàt), that is, what one might call universal
theories or hypothesis tested by experience and observation, such as the statement that the light
of the moon is derived form that of the sun.

(4)

In sum, for the theologians knowledge of God could be attained only through reasoning
that was based on premises known for certain to be true. Other ways of knowing God, they
asserted, did not exist. They maintained, for example, that no one has a necessary knowledge of
God, for His existence is not self-evident, nor can He be perceived by the senses.11

Furthermore, God cannot be known on the basis of faith in an authority, such as a

prophet, because authorities differ and only reasoning can determine which authority is to be
believed. One must, for example, be able to distinguish a true prophet from a false prophet, and
only reasoning can determine which is the true one and which the false.12

Reasoning, moreover, must be based only on those necessary premises known through
reason and sense perception, such as those enumerated by Ibn Sinà. All other possible sources of
knowledge are rejected by the theologians. They rejected, for example, emotions and feelings
(wijdàniyàt), which, although they provide certain knowledge to the person experiencing them,
are subjective in nature and therefore imperceptible to anyone else.13 They also rejected as a
source of knowledge the inspiration or illumination (ilhàm) which results from concentration or
meditation (al-tawajjuh al-tàmm), as practiced by the Hindus, or from the purification of the
inner self (tasfiyat al-bàtin), which was the practice of the Sufis. The reason for their rejecting
inspiration is that it is granted only to some people and not to others, and therefore it cannot be
considered a general source of knowledge for all people. Furthermore, they asserted, one cannot
be sure that the source of one’s inspiration is God rather than Satan.14 Al-Nasafi says in his creed:

“Inspiration (ilhàm) is not one of the causes of the cognition of the soundness of a
thing with the People of Reality.”15

Al-Taftàzàni (d. 791/1389), a theologian of the 8th/14th century about whom more will be
said below, explains this statement in his commentary on al-Nasafi’s creed:

“He meant that inspiration is not a cause by which knowledge results to creatures
in general nor by which it is right for one to force knowledge on another;
otherwise there is no doubt that knowledge does result from inspiration.” 16
 In a commentary on a work of his own entitled al-Maqàsid al-Taftàzàni says:

 “As for inspiration (ilhàm), he who experiences it cannot trust it unless he knows
that it comes from God, and that is [known] through reasoning [alone].17

In his commentary on al-Iji’s al-Mawàqif al-Jurjàni (d. 816/1413), another important

theologian of the 8th/14th century, takes a position on inspiration similar to that of al-Nasafi and
al-Taftàzàni.18 Both al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, moreover, reject the knowledge which Sufis
assert results from the purification of the inner self (tasfiyat al-bàtin). In his commentary on al-
Iji’s al-Mawàqif al-Jurjàni says:

“The Sufis said that the exercising of the self through exertions and its being set
free of human troubles and corporeal impediments by means of concentration (al-
tawajjuh) on the Eternal Presence, taking up seclusion and persevering in dhikr
and obedience, results in true beliefs about which there can be no shadow of
doubt.”19

He then goes on to say, however, that the knowledge gained from purification is like the
knowledge gained from inspiration. One cannot be sure whether it is from God, and therefore
true, or whether it is from some other source. “Do you not see,” he says, “that the [spiritual]
exercises of those who deny Islam, such as the Jews and Christians, lead to false beliefs.” He
concludes that reasoning is invariably required to distinguish those beliefs which are true from
those which are false. 20

The quotations cited above make it clear that for the theologians the only way to achieve
certain knowledge was through reasoning based on necessary premises, and that mystical
experience could not be a source of necessary premises nor could it be a substitute for reasoning.

(5)

Because the theologians rejected mystical experience as a source of knowledge, they took
very little notice over the centuries of Sufi thought in their works. Nevertheless, in the 8th/14th
century, two of the theologians mentioned above, al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, began to express an
interest in certain Sufi doctrines. In spite of their continued rejection of mystical experience as a
source of knowledge, both al-Taftàzàni, in his Shar al-Maqàsd, al-Jurjàni, in his glosses on al-
Isfahàni’s commentary on al-Tusi’s Tajrid, take up and discuss one of the principal doctrines of
the school of Sufism founded by Ibn‘Arabi d. 638/1240) and his followers in the 7th/13th century.
This is the doctrine that asserts that God is to be identified with absolute existence (al-wujêd al-
mutlaq).21
 Why do these theologians now show an interest in Sufi doctrine when earlier theologians
had for the most part ignored it? It cannot be because they now accept mystical experience as a
source of knowledge, for they both reject it. There are, I should like to propose, two reasons for
this interest in Sufi doctrine on the part of the theologians.

The first is the rationalization of Sufi doctrine which was carried out by Ibn ‘Arabi’s
followers. Many Sufis had traditionally written in a style that could not be fully understood
except by initiates, and even Ibn ‘Arabi himself, who was familiar with philosophical thought,
wrote in a very obscure manner.

His followers, however, began to take an interest in some of the philosophical problems
that had been of concern to theologians and philosophers and began to adopt the vocabulary and
logical terminology used by such writers.

Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi (d. 672/1273). For example, who was perhaps the most influential
of Ibn ‘Arabi’s disciples in the later development of his school, carried on a correspondence with
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274), the foremost philosopher of that period, on a number of
philosophical questions to which al-Qunawí believed his own views, based on knowledge gained
through mystical experience were relevant.22 This correspondence between al-Qunawi and al-
Têsi was possible only because al-Qunawi could use the language of philosophy. Later Sufis of
Ibn ‘Arabi’s school followed al-Qunawi’s example and continued to express their doctrines using
philosophical terminology and arguments.

 (6)

Nevertheless, the fact that theologians were now able to understand works written by
Sufis does not seem to be a sufficient reason for their showing an interest in their doctrines. I
should like to suggest that an additional reason for their interest was the fact that Sufis had
something important to say on a question which was of great concern to theologians. This was
the question of whether or not existence could be distinguished from essence, that is, whether
existence was the same as essence or superadded to it.

There were three positions on this question. The early Ash‘arite theologians, as well as
some of the Mu‘tazilites, had held that no distinction could be made between essence and
existence and that existence, therefore, could not be superadded to essences, but was, in fact,
identical with them. The position of the Islamic philosophers, on the other hand, was that the
existence of contingent beings was distinct from their essences and superadded to them, but that
the existence of God, or the Necessary Being, was identical with His essence and not superadded
to it. The later theologians, beginning with Fakhr al-Din al-Ràzi (d. 606/1209) took the position
that existence was superadded to essence in the case of both the Necessary Being and contingent
beings.
 Among the arguments given by the early Ash‘arite theologians23for their position that
existence and essence could not be distinguished was the argument that if existence were distinct
from  essence, then existence would have to be an accident inhering in essences, and essences
would constitute substrata for existence. If such were the case a number of absurdities would
follow.

One could ask, for example, what the state of an essence was before existence came to
inhere in it. If it was non-existent until existence came to inhere in it, then there was no existent
substratum for existence to inhere in. It was commonly held, however, that a substratum must
first exist before an accident can inhere in it. On the other hand, if the essence was already in
existence when existence came to inhere in it, and if this prior existence was also an accident
inhering in the essence, then an infinite regress of existences would result.

One might also inquire about the state of the existence inhering in the essence. Does it
exist or not? If one says that this existence does not exist, then existence is qualified by non-
existence, which is absurd. On the other hand, if existence exists, and its existence inheres in it as
an accident, an infinite regress of existences will again result. For reasons such as these the early
Ash‘arite theologians concluded that existence could not be distinguished from essence but must,
on the contrary, be identical with it.

There were also, however, a number of arguments, used particularly by some of the later
theologians, that seemed to indicate that existence was, indeed, distinct from essences and
superadded to them.24 For example, if existence were the same as essence, it would not be
possible to deny existence of an essence. One could not say, for example, that griffons do not
exist, because that would be the same as saying that griffons were not griffons. Similarly, one can
informatively predicate existence of an essence. To say that human beings exist is an informative
statement (mufid), that tell us the class of all humans is not empty.

The concept of existence, moreover, is a single concept predicated univocally of different

essences. If existence were the same as essence, it would not be a single concept, but many, and
could not be predicated univocally. Finally, one can distinguish in the mind between an essence
and its existence, because one can conceive of an essence while at the same time having doubts
about is existence. For these reasons among others both the philosophers and the later
theologians held that in the case of contingent beings existence was distinct from essences and
superadded to them.

With respect to the Necessary Being, however, the philosophers held that essence and
existence were the same. They argued that were the existence of the Necessary Being superadded
to its essence, then its existence would be in need of its essence for a substratum. Its being in
need of a substratum would indicate that it was contingent and in need of a cause. Its cause,
however, could only be its substratum, that is, the essence of the Necessary Being. A cause,
however, must always be prior in existence to its effect, and therefore the essence of the
Necessary Being would have to precede its own existence in existence, which is absurd.25

The later Ash‘arite theologians disagreed with this position, however, holding that the
existence of the Necessary Being was, in fact, superadded to its essence. One of their arguments
was that although God’s existence was known, His essence was not known, and that
consequently His existence could not be the same as His essence. Another of their arguments was
that because the concept of existence was a single concept, all instances of it being similar, it
followed, if God’s existence were not conjoined to an essence, that His being self-subsistent and
the basis or cause (mabda’) of contingent beings would be due to His existence alone. However,
since all instances of existence are the same, the existences of contingent beings would also be
self-subsistent and the causes of other contingent beings. This is absurd.26

 (7)

These, then, were the arguments which the theologians and philosophers gave in support
of their respective positions on the question God’s essence and existence. What did the followers
of Ibn ‘Arabi’s school of Sufism have to say on this question that was of interest to theologians
like al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni? The central doctrine of Ibn Arabi’s school was that God, or the
Necessary Being, was to be equated with absolute existence (al-wujêd al-mutlaq). Existence was
not an attribute of God, but was, on the contrary, God Himself. Being God, absolute existence
was not a universal concept which could be predicated of many essences; it was, rather, a single
individual entity or substance, which could not be predicated of anything else. Thus, what is
meant by saying that something exists is not that it is qualified by existence in the sense that the
accident of existence inheres in it or is superadded to it, but that it has a certain relation to
existence. And to say that something does not exist is to deny that it has such a relation.27

How is this relation between an essence and absolute existence to be conceived? It is not
the relation of substance to attribute or substratum to accident in which existence is an attribute
or accident inhering in an essence. It is, rather, the reverse of this relation, one in which existence
is the substance or substratum and essences are attributes or accidents inhering in existence. In
such a relation essences are predicated of existence rather than existence being predicated of
essences.28 Another way of thinking of the relation of existence to essence is by analogy with
form and matter, with existence corresponding to matter and essence to form.29

Sufis often mention in their works the image of the sea and its waves, the sea being
analogous to existence and the waves representing essences.30

 What is important to note with respect to this Sufi theory is that it preserves the
distinction between essence and existence, but makes existence a necessary and self-subsistent
substance rather than an attribute inhering in substances or essences. The problems stemming
from the assumption of both theologians and philosophers that existence is an attribute
predicated of essences are thus removed.

(8)

In view of this Sufi “solution” to the problem of essence and existence, it is not surprising
that theologians such as al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni should find Sufi doctrine of sufficient interest
to warrant their views and including it in their works when discussing the relation of God’s
existence to His essence.

Although both theologians show an equal interest in the Sufi position on this question,
their reactions to it differ. Al-Taftàzàni rejects the Sufi claim that existence is a substance that can
be equated with God. He claims that absolute existence cannot be God because existence has
certain qualities that are inapplicable to God. In his Sharh al-Maqàsid he says that absolute
existence is a mental predicate (mahmêl ‘aqli) and a universal of the secondary intelligible
(ma‘qêl thàni) and that neither of these can exist in the external world. Absolute existence can
also be divided into necessary and contingent existence, and it becomes multiple with the
multiplicity of its subjects (mawduàt) or substrata. Moreover, it is, he says, predicated
analogically (bi’l tashkik) rather than univocally of individual existences. Thus, if God were
absolute existence, He would exist only in the mind, be divisible into parts, would be multiple
rather than one, and would be an accidental concept since only accidental concepts are
predicated analogically.31

Al-Jurjàni on the other hand, in his glosses on al-Tusi’s Tajrid, makes no attempt to
criticize or refute the Sufi doctrine equating God with absolute existence, but simply presents it
as another possible theory, along side those of the theologians and philosophers. He is careful to
point out, however, that the Sufi theory could only have been arrived at on the basis of
knowledge gained through mystical experience. It could not have been derived by means of
demonstrative reasoning.32

(9)

To summarize the attitude of the theologians to Sufi doctrine, one can say that the early
theologians ignored it, because they rejected mystical experience as a source of knowledge and
consequently held that beliefs based on mystical experience could not be justified. Later
theologians, such as al-Taftàzàni and al-Jurjàni, although still formally rejecting mystical
experience as a source of knowledge, nevertheless are willing to discuss and criticize doctrines
which were of interest to them regardless of the epistemological source of such doctrines. It is no
longer necessary for doctrines to be justified on the basis of their sources; it is sufficient that they
be judged on the basis of how well they stand up to rational criticism.
 Using the terminology of Karl Popper, one might say that the theologians have shifted
from an epistemology of justification to one of criticism and falsification.

It should be noted in conclusion that many of the Sufis of the 8th/14th and 9th/15th centuries
welcomed this shift on the part of the theologians, and devoted much of their energy to the
rational defense of Sufi doctrine. Some of them, such as al-Jàmi and his disciple, al-Làri, went so
far as to adopt a principle attributed to al-Ghazàli that beliefs based on mystical experience could
never contradict reason, even though they considered mystical experience to be on a plane above
reason.33

NOTES

1. Al-Hujwiri, Kashf al-mahjêb, pp.269-270 (Nicholson translation), p.345 (Zukovskij edition).

2. al-Hujwiri, Kashf al-mahjêb, p.270 (Nocholson translation), p.346 (Zukovskij edition).

3. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.143-149 (Gairdner translation), pp.76-78

4. ( ‘Afifi edition).

5. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, P.146 (Gairdner translation), p. 77 (‘Afifi edition).

6. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.146-147 (Gairdner translation) pp.77-78 (‘Afifi edition).

7. al-Ghazàli, Mishkàt, pp.148-149 (Gairdner translation), p.78 (‘Afifi edition).

8. al-Jàmi, al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, pp.5-6 (Arabic text), p.37 (English translation).

9. al-Baghdàdi, Usêl al-Din, p.15.

10. al-Nasafi, ‘Aqidah, p.308 (Macdonald translation), p.15 (Elder translation).

11. Ibn Sinà’s premises may be found in al-Ishàràt, I, 213-219; Danishnamah, I, 109-117; Le Livre de
Science, I, 68-70; al-Najàh, pp.60-66; Burhàn al-Shifà, pp.63-67.

12. al-Baghdàdi, Usul al-Din, p.15.

13. See, for example, Elder, Commentary, p.27; al-Taftàzàní, Sharå al-Maqàæid, I, 34; al-Jurjàní, Sharå
al-Mawàqif, II, 49.

14. See, for example, al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsd, I, 20; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 123-124.
15. See, for example, Elder, Commentary, p.27; al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 34-35; al-Jurjàni,
Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 257-258; al-Baghdàdi, Usul al-Din, p.15; al-Ràzi, Muhassal, p.27; al-Isfahàni,
Matali’ al-Anzàr, p.34.

16. Elder, Commentary, p.15; Macdonald, Development, p.309.

17. Elder, Commentary, p.27.

18. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 35.

19. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 258.

20. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 257.

21. al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawàqif, I, 258.

22. See al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 55-56, and al-Jurjàni, Hashiyah ‘alà Sharhal-Tajrid, fols. 62b-
63b.

23. The correspondence comprises al-Qênawi’s al-Risàlah al-Mufsihah, written to al-Tusi, al-Tusi’s
Risàlah written in reply, and al-Qênawi’s al-Risaleh al-Hadiyah, written in reply to al-Tusi’s Risàlah.

24. These arguments are summarized in al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 50-51, and al-Jurjàni, Sharh
al-Mawaqif, II, 127ff.

25. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 47; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 142f.

26. al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-Maqàsid, I, 47; al-Jurjàni, Sharh al-Mawaqif, II, 136ff.

27. These arguments and others may be found in al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al-maqàsid, I, 48-49; al-Jurjàni, Sharh
al-mawàqif, II, 156-169; al-Ràzi, al-Arba‘in, p.57; al-Mabàhith, I, 30-37.

28. This Sufi theory may be found in numerous works. See, for example, al-Qênawi, al-Nusus, pp.294-299;
al-Fanàri, Misbah al-uns, pp.52-76; al-Qaysari, Matla’ Khusês al-Kilàm, pp.5-13 (Tehran ed.), pp.4-11
(Bombay ed.), pp.8-107 (Ashtiyani commentary); al-Khàshàni (al-Qashani) Sharh Fusês al-hikam, pp.3-4;
al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus, pp.20-23; Lawà’ih Flash 25, pp.29-37; Risàlah fi’l wujêd, pp. 223-256; al-Durrah
al-fàkhirah, pp.33-43 (English translation), pp.1-12 (Arabic text); al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas‘alah, pp.3-
13.

29. See, for example, al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus p.21, gloss 5; al-Jàmi, al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, p.92 (English
translation), p.55 (Arabic text).

30. See, for example, al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas’alah, p.38.

31. See, for example, al-Nàbulusi, Nukhbat al-mas’alah, p.62; al-Jàmi, Lawà’ih, p.35 (English translation),
fol. 23b (Persian text); al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nusus, pp.22-23.

32. .al-Taftàzàni, Sharh al- maqàsid, I, 55-56.

33. al-Jurjàni Hàshiyah ‘alà Sharh al-Tajrid, fols. 16a-16b, 22a, 62b-63b.

34. See, for example, al-Jàmi, Naqd al-nususæ, p.24, al-Làri, Sharh al-Durrah al-fàkhirah, p.82, English
translation p.122-123. And Mullà Sadrà (Sadr al-Din al-Shiràzi, d. 1050/1641) mentions that this is the
position of some Sufis in his Risàlah fi Sarayàn al-wujêd, p.138.

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