92. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuaresma, G.R. No.

200055, 10 Sept
2014.
FACTS:
On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured
with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent
Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an
accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioner, claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a
reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint [7] for Sum of Money with the
MeTC of Manila against respondents
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented
testimonies of its assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's insurance policy with
petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses.
The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner 
The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC on the ground that the
Officer who made the Traffic Investigation Report was not presented in court.

ISSUE: WON THE RTC WAS CORRECT?

HELD:
YES.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for
the repair of Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-President
and other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the
damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the respondents.
The Traffic Accident Investigation Report [21] cannot be given probative weight.
Section 44 of Rule 130 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
For the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites must be present:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
 (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above.
As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation
Report was exhibited as evidence, the investigating officer who prepared
the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or
through official information.[23] Neither was there any explanation as to why such
officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that
the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal
knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that
transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by other
preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that
respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage sustained
by Cham's vehicle.

93. Asian International Manpower Service, Inc. vs. DOLE, G.R. No.
210308, 06 April 2016.

FACTS:
On November 8, 2006, the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA,
pursuant to Surveillance Order No. 033, Series of 2006, conducted a surveillance of
Asian International Manpower Services, Inc. (AIMS)
The operatives reported that their surveillance did not reveal the information
needed, so another surveillance was recommended.
On February 20, 2007, another surveillance was conducted on the premises
of AIMS' office pursuant to Surveillance Order No. Oil. This time the POEA operatives
observed that there were people standing outside its main entrance, and there were
announcements of job vacancies posted on the main glass door of the office.
Posing as applicants, the POEA operatives, inquired as to the requirements
for the position of executive staff, and a lady clerk of AIMS handed them a flyer.
Through the flyer, they learned that AIMS was hiring hotel workers for deployment
to Macau and grape pickers for California. They also saw applicants inside the office
waiting to be attended to. 
In the Order dated June 30, 2008, then POEA Administrator ruled that on the
basis of the Surveillance Report of the POEA operatives, AIMS was liable for
misrepresentation under the 2002 POEA Rules, since the POEA records showed that
AIMS had no job orders to hire hotel workers for Macau, nor grape pickers for
California, as its flyer allegedly advertised.
The flyer and the alleged distributor was not presented in court.
ISSUE:
WON the fact of advertisement can be admitted as evidence?
HELD:
NO. The flyer advertising the jobs in Macau and California was never presented or
made part of the record, and neither was the AIMS lady clerk who allegedly
distributed the same even identified.
It is true that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is needed, or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence against AIMS to speak of, much less
substantial evidence. 
DUE PROCESS ISSUE:
"The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard."
"Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself." "The observance of fairness in
the conduct of an investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process."  As
long as he is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he is not
denied due process.[24] In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity to the person charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
Considering that AIMS was not furnished with the Surveillance Report dated
February 21, 2007, it cannot be expected to second-guess what charges and issues
it needed to clarify or rebut in order to clear itself. Needless to say, its right to due
process consisting of being informed of the charges against it has been grossly
violated.

94. Anna Marie L. Gumabon vs. PNB, G.R. No. 202514, 25 July 2016,
FACTS:
In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her siblings Anna Elena
and Santiago, (the Gumabons) deposited with the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and
$16,830.91, for which they were issued Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time
Deposit (FXCTD).
When she went to the bank on April 14, 2003, she was informed that she could not
withdraw from the savings accounts since her bank records were missing and
Salvoro the PNB employee handling her accounts could not be contacted.
PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform her that the PNB refused to honor its
obligation under the FXCTD.
Anna Marie filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against
the PNB.
Anna Marie contended that the PNB's refusal to pay her time deposits is contrary to
law. The PNB cannot claim that the bank deposits have been paid since the
certificates of the time deposits are still with Anna Marie.
The PNB alleged that it had already paid the balance of the consolidated savings
account. It presented:
1.  The photocopies of manager's check to prove that Anna Marie purchased the
check using the amounts covered by the Gumabon's two savings accounts
which were later part of Anna Marie's consolidated savings account.
2. Photocopy of Anna Rose Gumabon's SOA.
3. Affidavit of the PNB New York's Bank Officer which was not formally offered
as evidence.

ISSUE:
WON such pieces of evidence admissible?
HELD:
NO.
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications: (a) relevance and
(b) competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce a belief in its existence or nonexistence. On the other hand, evidence is
competent if it is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the competence of
evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the
content of the document is under inquiry.
However, there are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of
secondary evidence in the absence of the original document. Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court enumerates these exceptions:
(a) when the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)  when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of the subject
documents for the original copies without showing the court that any of the
exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies. The PNB's
failure to give a justifiable reason for the absence of the original
documents and to maintain a record of Anna Marie's transactions only
shows the PNB's dismal failure to fulfill its fiduciary duty to Anna Marie.
The Court expects the PNB to "treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The business
of banking is imbued with public interest. The stability of banks largely
depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of
banks.
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost
fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to
the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. 

The SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify as relevant evidence. As the

RTC correctly stated, the SOA "does not show which of the amount stated therein
came from the funds of Certificate of Time Deposit.

The affidavit of the PNB New York's bank officer is also inadmissible in the
light of the following self-explanatory provision of the Rules of Court:
"Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered
Formal offer means that the offeror shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts
cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked and
identified.
Courts are mandated to rest their factual findings and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. The formal offer
enables the judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. It also affords the opposing parties the chance to examine
the evidence and to object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized
by the trial court.
In People v. Napat-a, People v. Mate and Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. Escolastico
Saves, et al. we recognized the exceptions from the requirement of a formal offer of
evidence, namely: (a) the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded; and (b) the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of
the case.
It is unmistakable that the PNB did not include the affidavit of the PNB New York's
bank officer in its formal offer of evidence to corroborate Anna Rose's SOA. Although
the affidavit was included in the records and identified by Fernandez, it remains
inadmissible for being hearsay. Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or maker did not take the witness stand.