Pierre Judd B.

Alvizo
Civil Procedure M3
April 13, 2020

Civil Procedure Case Assignment no.4

1. In the matter of the petition for correction of entry: Almojuela

a. Facts:
i. For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname
"Almojuela." However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate
from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to discover that
he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela."

ii. Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor
of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased

iii. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been
known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using
the said surname in all of his official and legal documents

iv. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan,
Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full
name

v. In a Decision, CA held that Petitioner’s failure to implead and notify the

Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings as mandated by the rules precluded
the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case, thereby, reversing the
RTC’s Decision

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth
certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (NO)
1. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an
appropriate adversary proceeding.

2. A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2)
sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named
in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested
or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.

3. In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a

petition for a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil
 registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar, as
well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby be made respondents for the reason that
they are indispensable parties

4. Similarly, in Republic v. Uy, the Court nullified the trial court's order
to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure to implead and
notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents and
siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections sought.

5. In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead

both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he
claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him,
the procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the
requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest
if he so chooses.

6. Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has

allowed the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure
the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the
parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is
no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left out,
these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

7. In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed

requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an
entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial
alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.

8. In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial
court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners
therein failed to implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party,
in the petition for correction of entry, viz.:

9. The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the

proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not imp leaded in
this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of
the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of
entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case
renders ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment

10. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil

registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication
of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding
 of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned,
null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the
subject matter

2. Golarosa v Valencia 227 scra 726

a. Facts:
i. Raul Galarosa is the incumbent president of the katipunang bayan or
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the municipality of Sorsogon and
was appointed member of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant
to EO 342, the quondam local government code

ii. In August 1992, Rodolfo Lasay, the incumbent barangay captain of barangay
Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon and an aspirant for the position of
president of the ABC of the said municipality, filed with the RTC against the
SB of Sorsogon a petition for declaratory relief and injunction

iii. He claims that the term of office of Galarosa as an ex officio member of the
SB of Sorsogon is coterminous with that, of the said SB which expired on
June 30, 1992; hence there was a need for the new election of an ABC
representative. Lasay prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining the SB of
Sorsogon from recognizing Galarosa as an ex officio member and for the
holding in abeyance of GALAROSA's salaries

iv. The SB of Sorsogon asked for the dismissal of the petition because (a) Lasay
has no legal right to file the petition, it being is based on pure speculative
rights, and (b) the petition is premature since the resolution of the issues
raised may still be the subject of rules and regulations to implement Sec.
494 of the Code

v. RTC granted the injunction declaring that Galarosa can no longer serve after
the expiration of the term. Unable to accept the decision, GALAROSA filed
this petition which we have decided to treat as one for certiorari under Rule
65

vi. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment. While not explicitly
saying so, it asked the SC to grant the petition and to set aside the
challenged decision because there respondent Judge should have dismissed
the action on the ground that Galarosa who was to be directly affected by
the petition of LASAY, was not named a party-respondent; in view of this
"non-joinder of proper party," respondent Judge should have dismissed the
petition outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the court erred in not dismissing the action on the ground that
Galarosa was not named a party-respondent (YES)
1. The form and nature of the action filed by LASAY required the
inclusion of GALAROSA as an adverse party. It is his right to his office
that is challenged and he is the person who would be directly
affected by any decision therein
 2. No final determination of an action can be had unless he is joined
therein. He is therefore, an indispensable party. Under Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, the joinder of indispensable
parties is compulsory; consequently, no action can proceed unless
they are joined

3. The absence of an indispensable party in a case render ineffectual all

the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment. 13 LASAY should have been required to implead
GALAROSA and should he fail to do so, the petition should be
dismissed

4. GALAROSA in fact sought to intervene in the case by filing on 26

January 1993 an "Appearance with Motion to Annul the Injunction
Order." Unfortunately, after it was noted and LASAY was directed to
file his "comment and/or opposition thereto" after which the
incident would be submitted for resolution, the respondent Judge,
for reasons known only to him, never did resolve it.

5. That decision must be set aside for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an
indispensable party, GALAROSA was not effectively impleaded and
recognized as a party in the case and given the opportunity to file a
responsive pleading

3. Lozano v Balesteros 195 SCRA 681

a. Facts:
i. Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the
original registered exclusive owner of the land in question. However only Lot
Q is the subject of this present action. On March 6, 1958, by virtue of a deed
of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de Dios

ii. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana
de Dios who later mortgaged the land to Kaluyagan Rural Bank in San Carlos
City, Pangasinan.

iii. Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusta Lozano was
filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On
November 18, 1965, plaintiffs through the administrator filed an inventory
which included said lot Q

iv. De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name

v. Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios in Civil Case No. D-
1953, alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of
Lots Q, O and B. On June 8, 1967, the court rendered a default decision in
favor of the plaintiffs. However, the judgment was not satisfied on the
ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any registered property

b. Issue and Ruling:

 i. WON appellee is bound by the decision in the former reconveyance case
against De Dios even though an indispensable party like the defendant
herein was not brought as party therein (NO)
1. The failure of the plaintiffs to implead the present defendant in that
case, constituted a legal obstacle to the exercise of judicial power in
said case, and rendered any judgment therein an absolute nullity

2. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: Parties

in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants

3. As defined, "an indispensable party is one without whom the action

cannot be finally determined, whose interests in the subject matter
of the suit and in the relief sought are so bound up with that of the
other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity

4. We believe that the point of the appellee was well taken by the
court and We therefore conclude that the defendant-appellee was
correctly considered as an indispensable party, ergo, the court
cannot rule that said party is bound by the previous decision in favor
of the appellants

4. Go v Distinction Properties 671 SCRA 461

a. Facts:
i. Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium
developed by the respondent.

ii. In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint

before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and
violation of the MDDR, alleging that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in
their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that
would be available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation
to comply with the MDDR.

iii. In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was
“a mere preparatory draft”. HLURB rendered its decision in favor of
petitioners. DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
on the ground that HLURB acted without or beyond its jurisdiction.

iv. The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the
administrative agency’s authority

b. Issue and Ruling:

v. WON PHCC is an indispensable party (YES)
1. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in
the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest
 2. It is "precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court
(that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present

3. The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a

complete determination of all issues not only between the parties
themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected
by the judgment

4. PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, as

it would be directly and adversely affected by any determination
therein. Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC.

5. Florete v Florete GR 174909 Jan 20 2016

a. Facts:
i. This resolves consolidated cases involving a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People's Broadcasting
Service, Inc. and All Posterior Subscriptions and Increases thereto with
Damages

ii. The Complaint did not implead as parties the concerned corporation, some
of the transferees, transferors and other parties involved in the assailed
transactions. People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. (People's Broadcasting) is a
private corporation authorized to operate, own, maintain, install, and
construct radio and television stations in the Philippines

iii. In October 1993, People's Broadcasting sought the services of the

accounting and auditing firm Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co. in order to
determine the ownership of equity in the corporation. Sycip Gorres Velayo
and Co. submitted a report detailing the movements of the corporation's
shares from November 23, 1967 to December 8, 1989

iv. Even as it tracked the movements of shares, Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co.
declined to give a categorical statement on equity ownership as People's
Broadcasting's corporate records were incomplete. On June 23, 2003,
v. Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale
of Shares in People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages against Diamel
Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio
Florete, Jr.

vi. The Marcelino, Jr. Group seeks to nullify the following transactions on the
shares of stock of People's Broadcasting, as noted in the report of Sycip
Gorres Velayo and Co.The Rogelio, Sr. Group filed their Answer with
compulsory counterclaim

vii. The Regional Trial Court issued a Decision (which it called a "Placitum")
dismissing the Marcelino, Jr. Group's Complaint. It ruled that the
 Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause of action against the Rogelio, Sr.
Group. It also ruled that indispensable parties were not joined in their
Complaint

viii. The Regional Trial Court granted Rogelio, Sr.' compulsory counterclaim for
moral and exemplary damages amounting to P25,000,000.00 and
P5,000,000.00, respectively, reasoning that Rogelio, Sr. suffered from the
besmirching of his personal and commercial reputation. The Court of
Appeals denied the Marcelino, Jr. Group's Petition and affirmed the trial
court Decision

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON it was proper for the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the Complaint
filed by the Marcelino, Jr. Group on the ground that indispensable parties
were not joined in the Complaint (YES)
1. In this case, the Marcelino, Jr. Group anchored their Complaint on
violations of and liabilities arising from the Corporation Code,
specifically: Section 23 (on corporate decision-making being vested
in the board of directors), Section 25 (quorum requirement for the
transaction of corporate business) , Sections 39 and 102 (both on
stockholders' preemptive rights), Section 62 (stipulating the
consideration for which stocks must be issued), Section 63
(stipulating that no transfer of shares "shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation"), and Section 65 (on liabilities of directors and
officers "to the corporation and its creditors" for the issuance of
watered stocks) in relation to provisions in People's Broadcasting's
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws as regards conditions for
issuances of and subscription to shares

2. The Marcelino, Jr. Group ultimately prays that People's

Broadcasting's entire capital structure be reconfigured to reflect a
status quo ante. The Pivotal consideration is whether the wrong
done as well as the cause of action arising from it accrues to the
corporation itself or to the whole body of its stockholders. An action
"seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts [of a
corporation]" entails a cause of action that "rightfully pertains to
[the corporation itself and which stockholders] cannot exercise
except through a derivative suit

3. What the Marcelino, Jr. Group asks is the complete reversal of a

number of corporate acts undertaken by People' Broadcasting's
different boards of directors. These boards supposedly engaged in
outright fraud or, at the very least, acted in such a manner that
amounts to wanton mismanagement of People's Broadcasting's
affairs.

4. The ultimate effect of the remedy they seek is the reconfiguration of

People's Broadcasting's capital structure. The remedies that the
Marcelino, Jr. Group seeks are for People's Broadcasting itself to
avail. The specific provisions adverted to by the Marcelino, Jr. Group
 signify alleged wrongdoing committed against the corporation itself
and not uniquely to those stockholders who now comprise the
Marcelino, Jr. Group

5. A violation of Sections 23 and 25 of the Corporation Code—on how

decision-making is vested in the board of directors and on the
board's quorum requirement—implies that a decision was wrongly
made for the entire corporation, not just with respect to a handful
of stockholders. Section 65 specifically mentions that a director's or
officer's liability for the issuance of watered stocks in violation of
Section 62 is solidary "to the corporation and its creditors," not to
any specific stockholder.

6. Transfers of shares made in violation of the registration requirement

in Section 63 are invalid and, thus, enable the corporation to impugn
the transfer. Notably, those in the Marcelino, Jr. Group have not
shown any specific interest in, or unique entitlement or right to, the
shares supposedly transferred in violation of Section 63

7. Accordingly, it was upon People's Broadcasting itself that the causes

of action now claimed by the Marcelino Jr. Group accrued. While
stockholders in the Marcelino, Jr. Group were permitted to seek
relief, they should have done so not in their unique capacity as
individuals or as a group of stockholders but in place of the
corporation itself through a derivative suit

8. As they, instead, sought relief in their individual capacity, they did so

bereft of a cause of action. Likewise, they did so without even the
slightest averment that the requisites for the filing of a derivative
suit, as spelled out in Rule 8, Section 1 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, have been satisfied.
Since the Complaint lacked a cause of action and failed to comply
with the requirements of the Marcelino, Jr. Group's vehicle for
relief, it was only proper for the Complaint to have been dismissed

9. Erroneously pursuing a derivative suit as a class suit not only meant

that the Marcelino, Jr. Group lacked a cause of action; it also meant
that they failed to implead an indispensable party. In derivative
suits, the corporation concerned must be impleaded as a party.
Hence, the Marcellino Jr. Group’s complaint must fail for failure to
implead People's Broadcasting, Inc

6. Galido v Magrare GR 206584 Jan 11 2016

a. Facts:
i. In this case Andigan caused the subdivision of Lot 1052-A into five lots. TCT
No. T-21405 was cancelled and new certificates were issued for the
subdivided portions

ii. However, Andigan did not turn over the new TCTs to Magrare, Palcat and
Bayombong, and the latter were unaware of the subdivision. Andigan
mortgaged the same three lots to petitioner and the latter came into
 possession of the owner's duplicate copies of 3 TCTs. Magrare, Palcat and
Bayombong registered their respective adverse claims on 3 TCTs.

iii. RTC directed that spouses Andigan to surrender or deliver to the Register of
Deeds for Antique the owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs. Spouses
Andigan through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal but was dismissed

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the heirs of Bayombong are Indispensable Parties (YES)
1. The Court found reversible error on the part of the trial court in not
impleading the heirs of Bayombong. Indispensable parties are
parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action.50 Petitioner's action was for the cancellation of titles,
including TCT No. T-22376

2. The trial court itself recognized that the controversy was

contentious in nature, and required the participation of Bayombong,
among others. Bayombong, like respondents Magrare and Palcat
stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the outcome of the case

3. Since he was already dead at the time the case was filed by
petitioner, the heirs of Bayombong stand in his stead not only as
parties in interest, but indispensable parties. Without the heirs of
Bayombong to represent the interest of Bayombong, there can be
no complete determination of all the issues presented by petitioner.

4. Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the

dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case is to implead the
party claimed to be indispensable, considering that parties may be
added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action

7. Almendras v CA, 293 SCRA 540

a. Facts:
i. Private respondents seek a reconsideration of the decision in this case
remanding it to the trial court so that private respondents may file at third-
party complaint against parties through whose property they claim a right of
way in favor of petitioner should pass since it would be the property least
prejudiced by the establishment of such easement

ii. In this case the court ruled that it is impossible to determine with certainty
which estate would be least prejudiced by the establishment of an
easement for petitioner until these parties have been heard. Any decision
holding them liable to bear the easement would not be binding on them
since they are not parties to this action

iii. Private respondents contend that a third-party complaint is not the proper
mode of joining other property owners in the suit because those owners
have no legal tie with the owners of the estate sought to be burdened with
 the easement (herein private respondents) so as to make them liable to the
latter for "contribution, indemnity, and subrogation,

iv. As provided in Rule 6, § 12 (now § 11) of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 12. Third party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON a third-party complaint is not necessary to effect a proper judgment
(NO)
1. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground
of direct liability to the plaintiff. It is liability to the defendant which
may be in the form of contribution, indemnity, or subrogation. On
the other hand, direct liability to the plaintiff may be in the form of
"any other relief in respect of plaintiff's claim

2. What is really important to remember is that petitioner's land is

surrounded on all four sides by the properties of other owners. She
therefore has a right to demand a right of way through any of the
neighboring estates in order to have access to the provincial road

3. In determining where the easement should pass, the owners of all

surrounding properties should be heard with respect to two
matters: (1) at which point establishment of the easement would be
least prejudicial to the owners of the servient estates and (2) at
which point the distance of the right of way to the public highway
would be shortest. As already stated, if these two circumstances do
not concur in the same tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be taken

8. Swagman Hotels v CA 455 SCRA 175

a. Facts:
i. Petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante
and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively,
obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three
promissory

ii. Private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the
petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante

iii. The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president,
filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of
the principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no cause of
action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable
 iv. In due course and after hearing, the trial court rendered a decision5 on 5
May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and
14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the
loans had been reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then
ordered the petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of $100,000
representing the principal obligation covered by the promissory notes

v. The TC held that when the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none
of the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date however,
the first and the second promissory notes have already matured. Hence,
payment is already due

vi. Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented
without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the
time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants' obligation are not yet due
and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two
promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the
obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and
demandable

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the action is valid because the cause of action was cured (NO)
1. In the case at bench, while it is true that appellant Swagman raised
in its Answer the issue of prematurity in the filing of the complaint,
appellant Swagman nonetheless failed to object to appellee
Christian's presentation of evidence to the effect that the
promissory notes have become due and demandable.

2. The afore-quoted rule allows a complaint which states no cause of

action to be cured either by evidence presented without objection
or, in the event of an objection sustained by the court, by an
amendment of the complaint with leave of court

3. Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence. - When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with
the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial
justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made

4. According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals,

this Section allows a complaint that does not state a cause of action
 to be cured by evidence presented without objection during the
trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause
of action when he filed the complaint for a sum of money and
damages because none of the three promissory notes was due yet,
he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes
dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, which became due during
the pendency of the case in view of the introduction of evidence of
their maturity during the trial, such interpretation of Section 5, Rule
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous

5. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of

action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the
complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For
example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition
precedent upon which the cause of action depends, evidence
showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the
complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the
complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter

6. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet
accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of
action while the case is pending.16 Such an action is prematurely
brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the
defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person
should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for
complaints which are immature

9. Gumabay v Baralin 77 SCRA 258

a. Facts:
i. Celestina Gumabay sued Juliana Baralin, Santiago Bunagan, Loreto Bunagan,
Basilio Mamba, Balbino Catabay, Arcadio Maggay, Lupo Guiyab and
Francisco Calimaran in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan to recover
possession of the said land

ii. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
inasmuch as it alleged a cause of action for forcible entry, which occurred
within one year before the complaint was filed, the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction over the case. it should be filed the proper inferior court

iii. Without awaiting the resolution of that motion, Celestina Gumabay filed an
amended complaint wherein she alleged that the defendants claimed to be
the owners of the land. She transformed her forcible entry action into an
action to quiet title

iv. The lower court in its order of March 26, 1960 admitted the amended
complaint, ordered the defendants to answer it, and denied the motion to
dismiss
 v. At the ex parte hearing, Celestina testified that the land in question was
donated to her by her father at the time of her marriage; that her father had
possessed that land since she was a child (she was forty-eight years old in
1960 when she testified); that the land was cultivated by his tenants, Mateo
Luyun and the latter's two sons; that the land was planted to corn and
tobacco; that on August 5, 1959 the defendants entered the land and
harvested the corn crop over the opposition of her tenants; that the
defendants harvested five carts of corn and took four rolls of barbed wire,
and that the defendants persisted in working on the land

vi. The lower court in its decision declared Celestina Gumabay the owner of the
land and ordered the defendants to vacate it, restore its possession to her,
and to pay her damages

vii. The defendants contend that the lower court erred in not dismissing the
original complaint, in admitting the amended complaint, in assuming that it
acquired jurisdiction over their persons on the basis of the amended
complaint even without service of new summons, in declaring them in
default, and in not granting them relief from the judgment by default

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the court erred in admitting the amended complaint (NO)
1. We hold that the trial court's order admitting the amended
complaints is in consonance with e object of the Rules of Court to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding (Sec. 2, Rule 1).
2. The original complaint for forcible entry contained the basic prayer
"that the plaintiff be declared the absolute owner of the land in
question". That relief was retained in the amended complaint
3. To dismiss the original complaint and to require the plaintiff to file
another action to quiet title would have resulted in circuitour,
dilatory and expensive proceeding which, in the case of pauper
litigant like Celestina Gumabay, should have been avoided, as it was
a prudently avoided by the trial court

10. Soledad v Mamangun 8 SCRA 110

a. Facts:
i. Leoncio Solidad brought an action before the Municipal Court of Manila to
recover the unpaid rentals on certain leased premises at the rate of P180.00
a month and praying that Paulo Mamañgun be ordered to vacate and
surrender said premises to plaintiff

ii. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case because there is no allegation in the complaint
that he was illegally withholding the possession of the property even if there
is a request in the prayer that he be ordered to vacate the premises and
restore its possession to plaintiff

iii. Before action therein could be taken, plaintiff filed an amended complaint
wherein he included the requisite allegations which would cure the defect
pointed out by defendant.
 iv. Defendant filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint
alleging that, not having acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint,
the court "had neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion
for admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such
amendment since it is elementary that the court must first acquire
jurisdiction in order to validly act therein."

v. The court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the opposition to the
amended complaint, and thereafter allowed plaintiff to present his
evidence. Defendant did not participate in the hearing upon his belief that
the court had no jurisdiction over the case. And on the strength of the
evidence presented the court rendered judgment ordering defendant to
restore the property to plaintiff and to pay him the sum

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of want
of jurisdiction for the reason that the original complaint filed before the
municipal court failed to aver that it was an action for unlawful detainer and
the amount being recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of that court (NO)
1. In overruling this argument, the court, a quo acted on the theory
that appellee had the right to amend his complaint as a matter of
course considering that at the time he did it appellant has not yet
interposed any responsive pleading. Thus, the court said: "The
amended complaint admitted by the Municipal Judge was filed
before the defendant has entered his answer

2. The defendant contends that since said amended complaint was

filed after he has filed his motion to dismiss, the first sentence of
Section 1, Rule 17, (Supra) is not applicable. But this Court is of the
opinion that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading, so that
its filing would not deprive the plaintiff of his right to amend his
complaint at his pleasure."

3. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any

time before a responsive pleading is served upon him. And it is a
matter which cannot be disputed that a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading.2 The contention that the court a quo also erred
in admitting the amended complaint not having jurisdiction to act on
the motion for its admission is also untenable for appellee being
entitled to submit said amended complaint as a matter of course,
there was no need for the court to allow its admission, since
appellee's right to do so cannot be disputed

11. Campos Rueda v Bautista 6 SCRA240

a. Facts:
i. Respondent Muyot was employed by petitioner at its gasoline station, he
filed a complaint against petitioner with the Court of Industrial Relations
(Case No. 1140-V) to recover compensation for alleged overtime, Sunday
and holiday services rendered during said period
 ii. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: that
the claims set forth therein were barred by (a) the statute of limitations; (b)
the decision rendered by Regional Office No. 1, Department of Labor in Case
No. C-4364 entitled "Manuel Muyot Complainant, vs. Super Service and
Auto Supply, Jose A. Campos, Manager, Respondent"; and by the decisions
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 30138

iii. Respondent Muyot opposed said motion to dismiss alleging that, as the
decisions relied upon therein were rendered by courts that had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the same did not constitute res
judicata; that his causes of action were not barred by the statute of
limitations because the legal period provided for in Section 7-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by Republic Act No. 1993, was
interrupted when he filed a case with the Department of Labor

iv. Petitioner filed its answer denying respondent's claim for overtime and
Sunday and holiday services pay. Among other affirmative defenses it
reasserted its contention that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case

v. The Court of Industrial Relations, through Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, denied

petitioner's motion to dismiss and required him to answer the complaint

vi. The court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration hence the present
original action for Certiorari, and Prohibition filed by Campos Rueda
Corporation, to annul the respondent court's orders

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON respondent Muyot’s amended cured the jurisdictional defect of the
court of Industrial Relations (NO)
1. The decisions quoted apply squarely to the present case, making it
clear and beyond question that the Court of Industrial Relations
does not have jurisdiction over respondent Muyot's claims
a. (Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations)
here the employer-employee relationship is still existing or
is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful
severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement),
the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all
claims arising out of, or in connection with employment,
such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the
Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the
relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims
become mere money claims, and come within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts

b. (Cecilia Saw Mill v. Court of Industrial Relations) It appears

from the "compliance" of the respondents . . . that they are
no longer in the service of the petitioner, . . . and that they
are not seeking reinstatement to their respective positions.
Hence no labor dispute is involved in the case and for that
 reason the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction
to hear and determine the respondents' petition

2. Respondent Muyot must have finally realized that the Court of

Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction over his claims for, according
to his answer filed in the present case, he had filed on July 14, 1961
— more than two years after the filing of his action — a motion for
leave to amend his complaint and to admit the amended complaint
attached to his motion, the amendment consisting precisely in the
addition of a third cause of action where inter alia, he alleged that
on May 31, 1953, he was illegally dismissed by herein petitioner and
that, as a consequence he was entitled to reinstatement, with back
wages from the date of his illegal dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement

3. Obviously, the purpose of the amendment was to make his case fall
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. This attempt is in our
opinion, of no avail

4. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is

determined by the allegations made in the complaint or petition. On
the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle
applies to proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations

5. The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place his

action within the jurisdiction of the respondent court could not be
cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we clearly held
that "a complaint can not be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on
the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action originally set forth
was not within the court's jurisdiction."

12. Vlason v CA 310 SCRA 26

a. Facts:
i. Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega
Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it requested
permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, to
unload its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine Ports Authority
compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to
Hongkong

ii. It was approved by the Bureau of Customs. However, the customs personnel
still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was the
hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its cargo
would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were seized

iii. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of
Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of Thailand. While
seizure proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and the
vessel ran aground and was abandoned. A salvage agreement was entered
into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel
 iv. The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud.
However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and even
forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture
and sale of the cargo in favor of the government. Seeking to enforce its
preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau.
PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were are named as
respondents.

v. Subsequently, Duraproof amended its petition as to include former District

Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises
Singkong Trading Company, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan
Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd as respondents. In both its
petitions, there was failure to allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a
relief against it.

vi. Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and
their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon the
alien respondents who had no representatives in the country. The cases
against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of litis
pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare them
in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in
default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon

vii. Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental

petition. The rest of the respondents were declared in default and
Duraproof was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason
Entreprises, it was alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and
harassment and incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable
damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof

viii. Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on the

grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It
also filed a special appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted
off its properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was
granted and the previous decision was reversed however, Duraproof
countered that although Vlason filed the motion for reconsideration in a
timely manner, it has otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making
its motion a mere scrap of paper Duraproof filed a motion to file a
supplemental petition impleading Vlason as one of the respondents

ix. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent them from
interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA
compound

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON Vlason Enterprises was properly served with summons (NO)
1. A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers
who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A
 summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of
its president binds that corporation

2. This is based on the rationale that service must be made on a

representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is
safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility
and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served
and to relay the same to Monica S. Cajucom the president or other
responsible officer of the corporation being sued

3. The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule

requires, however, that the secretary should be an employee of the
corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there
be an assurance that the secretary will “bring home to the
corporation [the] notice of the filing of the action” against it.

4. In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who

was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee
of VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be
resorted to when serving summons

5. Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under
its jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on
petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the
petition. But the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid.
Thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Not having been validly served summons, it would be legally
impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A default judgment
cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default