Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

Facts:

Respondent Judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in petitioner’s civil case on the ground that
the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Issues:

1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;

2. Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, in which he declared “that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control,” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and

3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the
Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated
by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

Ruling:

1. YES. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the
governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.

2. NO. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,” has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said
judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. YES. It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “Law once established continues until changed by the
some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty.” (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict
of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise
on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): “There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law
comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of
human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition
until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of
constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change.”

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not
of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

REPUBLIC V. DPWH (G.R. NO. 181218; JANUARY 28, 2013)

FACTS: Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a 1,893-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Bulacnin North,
Lipa City. Respondents are their children. Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), acquired a 36-square meter portion of the lot for use in the STAR (Southern
Tagalog Arterial Road) Tollway project. Later on, DPWH offered to purchase an additional 1,155 square meters of the lot at
P100.00 per square meter to be used for the Balete-Lipa City Interchange Ramp B, but the spouses Bautista refused to sell.
Republic filed a Complaint with the RTC of Lipa City for the expropriation of the said 1,155-square meter portion (the
subject portion).
In an Order of Expropriation, the trial court condemned the subject portion for expropriation and constituted a panel of
commissioners, consisting of the Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of Lipa City, for the purpose of ascertaining
just compensation. On Republics Opposition, the trial court appointed a third commissioner in the person of Nimfa Martinez-
Mecate (Mecate), who is the DPWH special agent for Road Right-of-Way for Region IV-A.

The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds thus concluded that the just compensation should be within the range of
P1,960.00 and P2,500.00 per square meter.

On the other hand, Mecates Commissioners Report recommended that the reasonable value for agricultural, orchard, and
sugar land is P400.00 per square meter, and P600.00 per square meter for residential and commercial land.

The trial court rendered its Decision, fixing just compensation for the subject portion, including all its improvements, at
P1,960.00 per square meter. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed the appealed decision.

The Republic argued that the CAs reliance on the Joint Commissioners Report is erroneous because the said report failed to
consider all factors prescribed by law specifically Republic Act No. 8974 in determining just compensation.

ISSUE: Did the RTC err in fixing the amount of P1,960.00 per square meter as just compensation for the subject property?

HELD: What escapes petitioner, is that the courts are not bound to consider these standards; the exact wording of the said
provision is that in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the courts may consider them. The use of the
word may in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. In the absence of a finding of
abuse, the exercise of such discretion may not be interfered with. For this case, the Court finds no such abuse of discretion.

Mecates Commissioners Report evidently failed to consider factors other than the value of the subject portion as reflected
in the tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation, and its classification as an agricultural land. To make matters worse, Mecate
based her Report on the 1998 Appraisal Committee Report of the Lipa City Appraisal Committee, which is clearly obsolete
and does not reflect 2004 property values. The Complaint for expropriation was filed in 2004; thus, just compensation
should be based on 2004 valuations. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. DENIED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION. (G.R. No. 169903; February 29, 2012).

FACTS: Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land in
Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily offered these parcels of land, with a total area of 495.1374 hectares, to
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From the
entire area offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907 hectares.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the responsibility of determining the land valuation and
compensation for parcels of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative
Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.

When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being too low, Honeycomb Farms filed a case with
the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it be compensated
for its landholdings in the amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages and attorneys fees.

The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the just compensation for the subject
properties. Since the Board of Commissioners could not reach a common valuation for the properties, the RTC made its own
valuation. First, the RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a portion of the land, measuring approximately 10 hectares, is
commercial land, since it is located a few kilometers away from Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, Masbate, which is a
commercial district. The lower court thus priced the 10 hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and the remaining 476
hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare. Both parties appealed to the CA.

The LBP argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded the formula for fixing just compensation
embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994. The LBP also argued that the
RTC erred in taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the land in question is commercial land.

In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs were issued merely to serve as guidelines for the DAR and the
LBP in administratively fixing the valuation to be offered by the DAR to the landowner for acceptance or rejection.
However, it is not mandatory for courts to use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this would amount to an
administrative imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and prerogative of determination of just compensation for
expropriated lands specifically reserved by the Constitution to the courts.

The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment with respect to the computation of the amount fixed by the
trial court and the award of attorneys fees is deleted.
ISSUES: Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula for determining just
compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?

Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?

HELD: It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by
the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the DAR, as the
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to
determine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.

In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula provided in the
applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that: While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost
of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that
these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of
R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty
to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR [Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the
details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into
account. The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent DAR administrative
regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous error when they disregarded
the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right within the clear
boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very issue in the
present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property
before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. GRANTED.

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205728 July 5, 2016

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the herein respondents when the court has decided and granted in favor of the
herein petitioners in issuing TRO for the COMELEC in pushing to remove the tarpaulins posted by the herein petitioners and
the declaring that the letters dated February 22 and 27, 2013 are both void and unconstitutional. The case arose from when
the Diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within its compound stating its opposition on RH law, with the message
“IBASURA RH LAW” and another entitled “CONSCIENCE VOTE WITH THE LIST OF CANDIDATES CATEGORIZING TEAM
BUHAY AND TEAM PATAY” with a check mark and “X” mark. The COMELEC on its letter dated February 22 and 27, 2013
was ordering the removal of the 2 tarpaulins for the reasons that it is in violation of the election law and the constitution for
it is an election propaganda that can be regulated by them. The respondents reiterating in this motion for reconsideration
that 1.) the notice and letters are not final orders of the COMELEC En Banc thus it not subject to the Court’s review, that it
is in their jurisdiction pursuant to the constitutional provision Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on its power to
decide "all questions affecting elections." And thus petitioners have violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies; 2.) that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda thus falls within the regulation of the COMELEC ; 3.) that
Notwithstanding that petitioners are not political candidates, the subject tarpaulin is subject to the COMELEC's regulation
because petitioners' objective in posting the same is clearly to persuade the public to vote for or against the candidates and
party-list groups named therein, depending on their stand on the RH Law, which essentially makes the subject tarpaulin a
form of election propaganda and 4.) that the size limitation is a valid content-neutral regulation on election propaganda. As
such, only a substantial governmental interest is required under the intermediate test.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION WHEN IT
ELEVATED THE ISSUE TO THE SUPREME COURT RATHER THAN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE TO THE COMELEC;
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT TARPAULINS FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF ELECTION PROPAGANDA AND
THUS CAN BE REGULATED BY THE COMELEC;
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ORDERING THE REMOVAL
OR REGULATION OF THE TARPAULINS
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE REMOVAL IS A CONTENT BASED OR CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION.

HELD:
NO. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for
raising grave abuse of discretion.32
The urgency posed by the circumstances during respondents' issuance of the assailed notice and letter-the then issue on
the RH Law as well as the then upcoming elections-also rendered compliance with the doctrine on exhaustion of
administrative remedies as unreasonable.
NO. the tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that "primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily-
even almost incidentally-will cause the election or non-election of a candidate."34 It is not election propaganda as its
messages are different from the usual declarative messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression with political
consequences, and "[t]his court's construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of
censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker's viewpoint or the content of one's speech." 35
We recognize that there can be a type of speech by private citizens amounting to election paraphernalia that can be validly
regulated.36 However, this is not the situation in this case. The twin tarpaulins consist of a social advocacy, and the
regulation, if applied in this case, fails the reasonability test.
Petitioners are not candidates. They are asserting their right to freedom of expression. 31 We acknowledged the "chilling
effect" of the assailed notice and letter on this constitutional right in our Decision, thus:
Nothing less than the electorate's political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political
speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action . It is concerned with the sovereign
right to change the contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican government or the
revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our
evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of
COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium
because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELEC's notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents' acts are capable of repetition. Under the conditions in
which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case, it could result in a "chilling effect" that would affect other
citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views
regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC.
The regulation is content-based. The Decision discussed that "[t]he form of expression is just as important as the
information conveyed that it forms part of the expression[,]"38 and size does matter.

CASE DIGEST: CLARITA J. CARBONEL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS: Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel was an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She
was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO IV).

On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS)
Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of her Career Service
Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a
verification slip. The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioner’s personal and physical appearance
was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was
also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip.
Because of these discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.

In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she
accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service
Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00.

After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was
imposed on her.

Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV
decision.

Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decisions and
resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC.

ISSUE: Was the petitioner’s finding of guilt grounded entirely on her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses
charged and without the assistance of a counsel?

HELD: The Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect during a custodial investigation and not during an administrative
investigation.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed the CSCRO IV’s decision almost three years from receipt thereof. Undoubtedly, the
appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long become final and executory.

This notwithstanding, on petition before the CA, the appellate court reviewed the case and disposed of it on the merits, not
on pure technicality.

It must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during
custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. We
have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of
the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is replete with details that could have been known only to her.
Besides, petitioner’s written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the
CSCRO IV’s conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
parties during the formal investigation.

RODEL LUZ y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. (G. R. No. 197788; February 29, 2012).

FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and this prompted
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down
the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept
on getting something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic
violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to
contain shabu. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE: Were the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu incident to a lawful arrest?

HELD: There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under
arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely
as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At
the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. GRANTED.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered
to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the
bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to
the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA, GR No. 118295, 1997-05-02

Facts:

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks
and Bretton Woods. The first was the

World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries;
the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which... was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize
unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and

WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection
of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute... settlement.

Philippines joined WTO as a founding member

Issues:

does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization?

Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

Ruling:

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1
and 13

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of

Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries.
WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection
from the rush of foreign competition.

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy"[35] does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does
not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent
of a borderless world of business.

United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the
then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed
the UN

Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs
like the Security Council?

Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even
future and unknown circumstances.

petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the Congress.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties... it is however subject to restrictions and... limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution
did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State

Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."

One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --... international agreements must
be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such...
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact.

The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of... membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations.

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign
rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."

Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both bilateral and multilateral
-- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty.

The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other... contracting
states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.

The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres... to the policy of x x x
cooperation and amity with all nations."

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region
against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially
re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause
must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL . V . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL .
FACTS:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed
by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject
matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the
MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the
BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec.
Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without
operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents
from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the MILF starting
in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF
attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo
assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation
proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military
actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim
and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli
Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and
principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive
ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people
as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants
the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving
the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided
into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be
subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall
have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south
east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in
the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations
with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty
and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.
The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE
of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel
or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e.
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the
Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to
build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as
well.
Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when
they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.

right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework... of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination... arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.

External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek... relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of... people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a... great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous

Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional
, for the concept... presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will
not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the
MOA-AD establishing an associative... relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary... amendments to the Constitution and the laws
will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in

Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that
process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that
renders the MOA-AD fatally... defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and
hereby GRANTED.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008
FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners
be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
RULING:

Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,
removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and
the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters
of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003,
but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary,
for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
The petition is DENIED.