A Cultural Explanation of Collapse Into Civil War Escalation of Tension in Nigeria

Abstract Culture has a central role in explaining Nigeria’s
collapse into civil war, and Mary Douglas’ cultural theory can
facilitate cultural analysis. Culture theory posits a limited number
of viable ways of life, consisting of patterns of social relations
undergirded by value systems. It explains preferences and can
show why events or ideas may be acceptable to one way of life
and unacceptable to another. In Nigeria, fundamental, salient
cultural differences existed between the dominant groups,
reinforced by pervasive social cleavages, in terms of ethnicity,
region, religion, class, and levels of access to power and wealth.
Intense competition for resources led to continual cultural
interpretation of ethnic antagonisms based on different values,
ways of life and institutions. While these struggles involved
many issues, they were defined in terms of cultural principles,
and made cultural differences more important. Culturally
focused rhetoric was developed by political leaders and was
interpreted within highly charged and competitive cultural
contexts, contributing to a cycle of attack, defense and counter-
attack, escalating inter-ethnic tension and sense of threat. The
long history of articulating and defending fundamental and
incompatible cultural values produced rhetoric and behaviors
which were irrational and fundamentally self-destructive for
Nigeria, though rational with respect to the cultural logic of the
groups, independent of ideology and pursuit of personal power.
Members of different groups reasonably came to fear cultural
destruction, and as violence and rhetorical intensity escalated,
distrust of other groups and fear of domination and cultural
obliteration became a slippery slope of hostility, increasing the
momentum for civil war.
Key Words Biafra, cultural theory, ethnic conflict, Fulani, Hausa,
hierarchy, Ibo, individualism, Nigeria, Yoruba
Nancy Spalding
East Carolina University, USA
A Cultural Explanation of Collapse

into Civil War: Escalation of Tension
in Nigeria
Nigeria’s collapse and subsequent civil war have been explained in
many ways, both historical and theoretical. All explanations cast light
Culture & Psychology Copyright © 2000 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
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Culture & Psychology 6(1)
on the complex situation which prevailed, and add to understanding

of the first major civil war in Africa’s independent history. However, I
suggest that the historical record cannot be understood apart from the
cultural base in which it was embedded, and that the culture clash
defined and explained the objective situation for the participants.
Cultural packages clarify the meanings of events, guiding policy pref-
erences and popular responses.
African political conflict is often seen as unique, and the term ‘tribal-
ism’ has been used pejoratively to explain conflict, especially in
Nigeria. However, such conflict cannot be legitimately distinguished
from other forms of political conflict as primordial ‘tribalism’ and
somehow beyond political solutions (Ekeh, 1972, p. 76; see also post-
Tito Yugoslavia). The intensity of primordial identification such as
ethnicity is not unique to Africa, and the existence of primordial iden-
tities does not create conflict; conflict arises for many reasons.
Furthermore, ethnicity is not a monolithic and rigid reality (see Le
Vine, 1997), and does not inevitably lead to conflict (Hislope, 1998).
Ethnicity, like any other identity, is entangled with secular politics and
the cultural meanings which people give to ethnic identity.
While there is no single explanation for the complex events leading
up to a civil war, I believe that culture has a central role in explaining
the clash of the dominant groups. Fundamental, salient cultural differ-
ences existed between the ethnic groups which dominated the three
regions. Pervasive social cleavages reinforced by ethnicity, region,
religion and class predated independence in Nigeria. Resources were
subject to intense competition. National politics involved a continual
cultural interplay of ethnic antagonisms, based on different values,
ways of life and institutions, and levels of access to power and wealth,
reinforced by colonial policy and educational differences. During the
period leading up to independence, institutions were built and
resources were struggled over, the groups’ spokesmen consolidated
support through appeals to self-interest and ethnic solidarity as well as
to cultural principles, articulating and defending principles which
were both fundamental and incompatible with other groups’ values.
Culturally focused rhetoric was developed by political leaders and was
interpreted within highly charged and competitive cultural contexts,
contributing to a cycle of attack, defense and counter-attack, escalating
inter-ethnic tension. Hislope (1998) suggests that ‘apprehensions can
easily spiral out of control as opportunistic ethnic politicians begin to
play a game marked by escalating demands, hyperbolic rhetoric, and
the ever-present threat of strife’ (p. 141). While such apprehensions can
be ameliorated by what Hislope calls a ‘moment of generosity’, this
52
Spalding Cultural Explanation of Civil War
proved impossible in Nigeria. The long history of articulating and

defending fundamental and incompatible cultural values produced
rhetoric and behaviors which were irrational and fundamentally self-
destructive for Nigeria, though rational with respect to the cultural
logic of the groups, independent of ideology and pursuit of personal
power. Members of different groups reasonably came to fear cultural
destruction, and in this context the power and class struggles intensi-
fied (Ekeh, 1972), order and government broke down, and the civil war
began. As violence and rhetorical intensity escalated, distrust of other
groups and fear of domination and cultural obliteration became a slip-
pery slope of hostility, increasing the momentum for civil war.
Culture, however defined, is intrinsic to the life and history of any
society. Culture both affects and is affected by events and the
environment (social, political and geographic). It resides in and is
reproduced by individuals, and is the means through which they
define their society. While people are not automatons, acting out a
predetermined cultural script, they do live within the limits imposed
by their cultural and material environments, and respond to cues,
both internal and social, which guide their behavior. Hence culture is
a central part of both the great events and the ordinary lives of soci-
eties, and cultural analysis will facilitate social analysis. While there
are many different ways to analyze culture, I will apply a cultural
theory which was developed by British anthropologist Mary Douglas.
Though developed from her work in Africa, it has been widely
applied to different issues and settings, especially in the US and
Europe, but has not been generally applied to African and other non-
western settings on a systematic basis. I believe that such applications
can enrich our understanding of these systems. Culture theory adds
to understanding of the situation in Nigeria prior to the Biafran civil
war as it helps us to think systematically about the way people
behave, and their reasoning. It suggests that ways of life are
composed of coherent, consistent packages of preferences, with
distinct and predictable implications for policy preferences.
Therefore, it may suggest parsimonious explanations for very
complex events.
In this paper, I lay out briefly Nigeria’s pre-civil war historical
context, explain Mary Douglas’ cultural theory and its applications,
explore the cultural biases of the three major ethnic groups, and
discuss the escalation of cultural tensions which preceded social and
political breakdown. I then make a case for the cultural conflicts which
coexisted with and exacerbated economic, political, ideological and
‘ethnic’ conflicts.
53
Nigerian Historical Context

Nigeria had been conquered by the British by the early 20th century,
and divided into three regions for administrative purposes: the East
(dominated by the Ibo), the West (Yoruba majority) and North (Hausa
majority; see Figure 1). While Nigeria remained one colony, the three
regions were governed separately. The Yoruba, in Western Nigeria,
were the first group to be thoroughly exposed to European influence,
and therefore had advantages in access to modern education and
employment (Anber, 1967; Coleman, 1958). The Ibo, in the East, were
integrated later, but were vigorous and competitive in pursuing
western education and work opportunities. The Muslim Hausa
communities in the North were insulated from exposure to western
influences far longer; the traditional rulers maintained their authority
and the area’s cultural integrity. This varying pattern of penetration set
up an imbalance between regions which continued throughout
colonial rule and influenced independent politics; while the Southern
(i.e. the Western and Eastern) regions experienced both penetration
and cultural disruption, the North, in preserving its cultural integrity,
relinquished the advantages of modern education which would have
allowed it to compete with other regions for economic and political
goods (Sowell, 1994, pp. 65–67).
The division and administration of Nigeria according to majority
ethnic group contributed to the confluence of region, political party
and ethnicity as reinforcing cleavages, and a ‘pattern of regional and
ethnic competition for state-controlled resources’ solidified (Berry,
1985, p. 2). Three regionally based political parties emerged, and ethnic
domination of the parties and regions consolidated both majority elec-
toral bases and opposition. At independence, Nigeria had a
parliamentary system with a federal constitution which replicated and
solidified the colonial division of the territory, each region with signifi-
cant autonomy, each dominated by its majority ethnic group, each a
participant in national government according to its population. A
three-way struggle for power characterized all political events of the
1950s and 1960s.
Independence (1960) intensified the imbalance between constitu-
tional and ‘real’ power bases. The North was the largest region in
territory and population, and could dominate and veto policies
approved by the other regions (Sklar, 1967), even though it lacked the
resources necessary to function in the modern context. Meanwhile, use
of public office to secure private gain became widespread throughout
54
Figure 1. Nigeria at independence: original regions and population distribution
Ethnic groups as percent of Nigerian population, 1953

Hausa and Fulani 28.1
Yoruba 16.6
Ibo 17.9
Regions as percent of Nigerian population at independence (1960)

North 53.8
West 20.5
East 25.6
Nigeria (Joseph, 1986). The struggle for political power between

regions intensified, since the primary source of wealth was control of
the government. Material rewards such as roads were distributed to
communities which had supported the victorious party, and withheld
from those which had not (Diamond, 1988; Joseph, 1986; see also
Achebe, 1967).
Nigeria proceeded from crisis to crisis through the 1960s, escalating
55
tensions between the regions as politicians pursued personal power

(Diamond, 1988, 1995). In the first crisis (1962–1963), the federal
government became involved in an internal Yoruba factional power
struggle, took over the Western Region’s government, dissolved its
legislature, replaced it with members of a competing faction, and jailed
a popular Yoruba nationalist on trumped-up treason charges
(Diamond, 1988). Census crises followed in 1962 and 1963. The census
had historically been controversial and highly politicized, and its
popular meaning concerned reapportionment of electoral districts,
hence changes in the regional balance of power resulting in redistribu-
tion of government benefits. The Southern results of the 1962 census
were severely inflated, showing an average 70 percent increase, when
local political leaders mobilized constituents to increase their regions’
apportionment of seats. In response, the North ‘found’ 8.5 million
people who had not been previously counted. The results were the
focus of public and bitter controversy, and were rejected. The census
was retaken at great expense in 1963, and again suffered from wide-
spread fraud, leading to even greater inflation of figures in all regions,
showing an impossible 83 percent increase in 10 years. Then the 1964
general election was characterized by organized violence and thug-
gery. Each party attempted to both maintain its core regional support
and pursue new supporters in other regions. Harassment and obstruc-
tion of opposition campaigns characterized the campaign and electoral
process.1 Irregularities were rife, and national dissolution was
narrowly averted. Northern victory inflamed opposition sentiment
and political disputes were characterized as fundamentally ethnic
conflicts. The subsequent Western Region electoral results pulled the
region into chaos (Diamond, 1988, p. 266).2
These crises strengthened the legacy of ethno-regional hostility and
suspicion, leaving the East marginalized while the Ibo were perceived
as pursuing domination (Diamond, 1988, pp. 141–149 and passim).
Much of the conflict was not the result of popular hostilities, but was
between political elites who manipulated and exacerbated ethnic
suspicion for political ends and to control the spoils of power
(Diamond, 1988, p. 241). Finally, the First Republic was ended with a
military coup d’état on January 15, 1966, which left the Federal Prime
Minister, Western Premier and Northern Premier dead.
In the ensuing confusion, the Army Chief of Staff, General Aguiyi
Ironsi, a respected soldier who had not been involved in the coup,
became interim head of state and restored order. However, political
wrangling intensified, and in May riots broke out across the North,
targeting the Ibo and other Easterners. In the mêlée, characterized by
56
burning, looting, rape and murder in the sabon garis (‘strangers’ quar-
ters’ or ghettos where Easterners lived in the North), perhaps three
thousand people were killed (Forsyth, 1969, p. 48). A bloody counter-
coup followed in July, explicitly targeting Ibo and other Southern
officers and soldiers. In mid-September, during negotiations over
Nigeria’s future, riots broke out in the North, again targeting resident
Easterners. The massacres had a larger scale and a broader scope of
atrocities than the May riots, leaving 30,000 dead and nearly two
million refugees (Forsyth, 1969, pp. 79–81). The riots continued long
into the fall, often organized by soldiers and police. While the North
and West reconciled, the East was irreparably alienated and in mid-
1967 seceded as the Republic of Biafra, beginning the Nigerian civil
war.
How did Nigeria move in seven years from a hopeful though trou-
bled newly independent democratic country with a highly educated,
westernized elite to civil war? While corruption and pursuit of power
by the elites were contributory factors, I argue that underlying cultural
conflict became the dominant polarizing factor, inflaming other issues,
and reducing the possibility of negotiation, compromise and resol-
ution. Culture can explain the underlying policy preferences of the
different groups, their vulnerability to manipulation, and the meaning
of the rhetoric which escalated into war. There was a rationale behind
behavior; even behavior which led to disaster was rational within its
cultural context. Cultural differences reinforced by political cleavages
and pursuit of personal gain laid the groundwork for the civil war.
Culture and Community Variation

Many have argued that ‘culture’ contributed to social breakdown and
civil war (Kirk-Greene, 1967). To be useful, the concept must be
defined and its specific role traced. I am approaching culture as an
explanation of the source of basic preferences, and the organization of
communities, policies and ‘ways of life’. Culture consists of systems of
coherent stable attitudes, values and patterns of social relations which guide
and define social life for a people, and there are various possible cultural
systems. The most systematic approach to this process is the cultural
theory developed by Mary Douglas based on her classical anthropo-
logical training and wide experience in Africa and New Guinea.
Cultural theory centers on a central social dilemma which tran-
scends regional and historical differences: how to build and sustain
shared moral commitment, or community. The theory analyzes
various practices, facilitates the exploration of systems of social behav-
57
ior, draws out underlying patterns, and attempts to explain underlying

similarities and differences between ways of life without tying them to
outward criteria such as wealth, religion or ‘traditional–modern’
dichotomies. In addition, the use of African data and settings gives us
broader scope to examine the useful limits of our theories, and explore
the extent to which explanations of human behavior are generalizable,
and institutions and values in one place and time tell us anything about
institutions and values in other places and times (Ross, 1988, p. 73),
such as the suggestion that development patterns in Africa reflect those
in Europe in earlier periods (Forrest, 1988; Neuberger, 1977).
Differences between peoples have been observed throughout history,
and differences within societies have fostered both violence and
advancement. Cultural theory facilitates the analysis of these differ-
ences and their impacts, without imposing value labels on them.
Various ways of life all have value and implications; each way of life
has its own costs and benefits, so there are consequences for pursuing
one rather than another.
Cultural theory posits four viable ways of life, rather than one mono-
lithic, universal or ‘correct’ pattern, or a steady progression from
‘traditional’ ways of life to ‘modern’ ones. For those with an ideologi-
cal or philosophical preference for a particular way of life, this
constrained variety is not comfortable. However, cultural theory adds
depth to the understanding of the world, and complexity to our
traditional social models, if it reflects and explains how people do
choose to live, rather than how we think they should choose to live.
People and societies take different approaches to deal with universal
issues, using varying combinations of strategies because ‘each society
works out its history in its own unique fashion, influenced by the
cultures, leaders, institutions, climate, geography, situation-specific
events, and other unique elements that make up its own distinctive
heritage’ (Inglehart & Carballo, 1997, p. 37). Given these distinctive
heritages, cultural theory attempts to address common approaches to
these universal issues. Below, I will lay out its basic tenets.
Cultural Theory
Is each ‘culture’ unique in its approaches to the problems of social life,
and in its perceptions of the way the world works, or are there
common qualities across cultures? If both unique and common quali-
ties exist, which are more fundamental? ‘Differences among groups,
and even among subgroups within a given people [on basic attitudes
toward work and social structure] are the rule rather than the excep-
58
tion all over the planet’ (Sowell, 1994, p. 3). Clear cultural differences
can be seen between, for example, the overseas Chinese and the
various peoples among whom they have settled, as demonstrated by
dramatically differing levels of educational and material success.
However, Mary Douglas found features in New Guinea which were
common to African cultures, suggesting that stereotypes describing
entire peoples as being either homogeneous or unique are mistaken,
and rich cultural variation coexists with significant cross-cultural
commonalities (Douglas, 1982, pp. 187–188).
Cultural variety is not merely cosmetic; it provides varied solutions
to the problem of social organization: how community and shared
moral commitment emerges, and is sustained. Either coercion or selec-
tive benefits are generally required to hold a group together;
communities organized without these features must find other organ-
izational tools and moral justifications to sustain them, or free-riders
and faction will weaken cohesion (Olson, 1971). Douglas’ cultural
theory addresses this organizational dilemma; it is built around nego-
tiating socialized individuals within a social context which provides
constraints to choice and action (Wildavsky, 1991, p. 4). Shared values
legitimize and reinforce behavior patterns or social practices, together
forming cultures or ways of life (Selle, 1991, p. 103). The context
provides certain patterns of rewards and punishments, which influ-
ence individual behavior. These patterns range from immediate
stimuli to far-distant influences of social and material realities
(Douglas, 1982, p. 190; Sowell, 1996). Individuals will find principles
which enable them to make sense of the environment and function
successfully, developing effective rules of action, judging others, and
justifying themselves to themselves and others. Hence, within a way of
life, individuals interpret, explain and respond to cues found in the
social environment, therefore contributing to the development, rein-
forcement and reconstruction of that social environment. People
respond to environmental cues, but they are not automatons; they
make choices, and their choices reinforce or weaken cultural commit-
ments.
A way of life is composed of a set of values (cultural bias) and a set
of social relations.
A cultural bias is a point of view, with its own framing assumptions and
readily available solutions for standardized problems. Scattered persons not
in any group at all may share a similar cultural bias. (Douglas, 1997, p. 128)
Culture involves a dialog concerning accountability and blame

between adherents of different cultural biases. The cultural biases
59
differ on attitudes to power and authority, and imply different social

relations:
There are two ways of exerting power, one bureaucratic and hierarchical,
and the other by bargaining and exchanging; there are two ways of resisting
the influence from these bases, one by active criticism, and the other by with-
drawal. (Douglas, 1997, p. 129)
If values and patterns of social relations support each other and are
mutually compatible, then a culture is ‘viable’, or internally consistent
and survivable.
This is the central argument of cultural theory; culture itself is
constrained. It cannot make any number of combinations and permu-
tations. Inclusion is logically different from hierarchy; inclusion and
hierarchy are different from equivalent exchange. Any human group
will be drawn to use one or another of these principles to legitimize its
collective action; in doing so it will encounter a specific set of organiz-
ational problems. Each initial choice will lead, by the logic of the
normative debate, to radically different solutions. Each resultant type
of culture will be legitimated upon a different logical base. (Douglas,
1992a, p. 136)
Douglas assumes that societies will be heterogeneous and competi-
tive, so will not fit neatly into one of the four ways of life. Ways of life
may also have some correspondence with the social, political or physi-
cal environment within which they develop (Douglas, 1982, p. 185; see
also Sowell, 1996, pp. 9–19), since it is difficult to maintain attitudes
which are at odds with one’s environment.
From the logical bases of their ways of life, communities will
develop consistent and effective means of constraining behavior, hence
addressing Olsen’s organizational dilemmas. Means will vary dramati-
cally, but they fill the same organizational needs:
Using the mechanisms of accountability and blame allocation as principal
organizers of our scheme, we may start again with the two recognized types,
bureaucracy and market. . . . The morally punitive universe in which ances-
tor power is an element can be identified with bureaucratic or hierarchical
regimes and the belief in secret weaponry such as fetish power or charisma
can be identified with market regimes (Douglas, 1992b, p. 71; see also Olson,
1971, p. 73)
However, ways of life are not limited to market and hierarchy, the
two traditional types; in cultural theory, there are also logical under-
pinnings for the more communitarian and apathetic social strains
particularly evident in this century. There are a limited number of
ways of life, based on the values which reinforce, reproduce and
60
explain social relationships, especially relations of power and auth-

ority. But people are not locked into a specific way of life; the approach
. . . floats upon the shifting interaction of intelligent subjects. What [is] stable
and determined is not their individual positions but the range of cosmolog-
ical possibilities in which they can possibly land themselves by choosing to
deal with their social problems in one way or another. (Douglas, 1982, p.
200).
Variety is constrained, but real. People are conditioned, but free.
Grid and Group: Dimensions of Culture

Douglas derives two dimensions, grid and group, for constructing the
various categories, based on the ‘polarizing of sociological thought
between individualism and group behavior’ (Douglas, 1982, p. 190).
Grid (prescription) ‘suggests the cross-hatch of rules to which individ-
uals are subject in the course of their interaction’ (Douglas, 1982, p.
192), the degree to which life is governed by rules, how many and
varied, and whether people make their own rules or have rules made
for them. Grid also suggests the symmetry or asymmetry of transac-
tions: Do relations occur between equals or unequals? What rules
define those transactions? Do different rules apply to different people,
depending on their position? High grid represents heavily prescribed or
regulated lives and status differentials, leaving little personal freedom.
Low grid represents few external prescriptions, so individuals are free
to decide how to behave, and transactions take place between nominal
equals. Group suggests the extent to which people are incorporated into
bounded groups, and therefore the extent to which interactions are
constrained or free. High group represents strong inclusion into
bounded groups, hence limits on competition between group
members. Relationships are defined, and the distinction between ‘us’
and ‘them’ is fairly clear. Low group suggests weak boundaries,
membership in multiple porous groups and negotiated relationships,
or exclusion from group membership, so life is not defined by strong
group ties and supports, and competition is free and unconstrained. In
the broadest sense, group is about whom you relate to, and grid is about how
you relate to them.
There are four ways of life based on these dimensions (see Figure 2):
hierarchy (high grid/high group), which supports bureaucratic auth-
ority relations; individualism or libertarian (low grid/low group),
which accepts power exercised through exchange and bargaining;
egalitarian (high group/low grid), which resists power by active criti-
cism; and fatalism or despotism (high grid/low group), which resists
61
STRUCTURE
high
FATALISM HIERARCHY
GROUP GROUP
low high
INDIVIDUALISM EGALITARIAN
STRUCTURE
low
Figure 2. Dimensions of group and structure
power through withdrawal (Coyle, 1994, pp. 223–227; Ellis &

Thompson, 1997, pp. 6–7; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, pp.
5–6).
Cosmologies: The Socially Constructed Nature of

Reality
‘A distinctive cosmological bias is generated by the character of expla-
nations and justifications that are plausible in each social context’
(Douglas, 1982, p. 208). Each way of life reflects a valid aspect of the
objective environment, and explains the natural laws, and therefore the
locus of blame when things go wrong (Dake, 1992). For hierarchists,
the world is predictable and tolerant of human activities, within limits.
The boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is
mapped and enforced through systems of rules and sanctions
(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). The welfare of the whole community far
outweighs the good of the individual, and if social deviants break the
rules they may bring harmful consequences on the entire group. Order
is the core value. Complex legalistic systems such as ancestor cults may
provide the structure and enforcement of social order, with experts
interpreting signs to determine who has violated the order, how, and
what amends or punishment is necessary.
62
Individualists expect an environment that is bountiful and forgiving,

responding to effort and innovation. Since the good of the individual
outweighs societal benefits, and individual actions will generally lead
to a positive outcome, the government can afford a laissez-faire atti-
tude. Freedom is the core value, so there is no true deviance. This way
of life requires an environment (material and social) which rewards
individual efforts. Personal responsibility is central, so blame for
trouble is placed on inadequate personal effort or ability, perhaps with
a bit of bad luck thrown in. While this way of life is often thought of as
being peculiarly modern, it has been documented in non-modern
settings (Mair, 1934). Reflecting these values, charisma, sorcery, fads
and fetish practices allow individuals to demonstrate their special
prowess and gather followings.
Egalitarians perceive a fragile world, easily harmed by ‘pollution’ of
varying kinds, as well as unequal distribution of resources and
exploitative institutions. Each person is an equal member, and there is
no structured leadership. The egalitarian blames the ‘system’ for prob-
lems and injustice, since human nature is fundamentally good, only
corrupted by evil institutions (see, e.g., Rousseau, 1754/1983).
Resources are fixed, and great care must be taken to maintain a delicate
balance (Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 44, 74). Hence, ‘voluntary’ poverty
may have egalitarian roots. There are few explicit sanctions except
expulsion and social rejection, but witchcraft accusations or factional-
ism serve the purpose of rooting out hidden evils and punishing those
who do not adequately uphold the community values.
Fatalists are also insecure, because they live in an arbitrary world,
and human nature is as random as events. The individual or family
must ‘cope as best he can with an environment over which he has no
control’ (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 43). Nature is a ‘lottery-controlled
cornucopia’ (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 43), and random chance is the
controlling principle. Fatalists blame an arbitrary and capricious fate
for both good and bad fortune, and rarely see any personal role or
responsibility.
Changes in the environment affect the reliability of cultural expla-
nations and the ability to deal with reality, and may over time push
people out of their way of life to one which more effectively explains
and predicts reality and therefore supports the behaviors which the
environment rewards (Thompson et al., 1990, chap.4). However,
cultural programming is deeply rooted, and may survive relatively
intact in different environments over long periods of time (Sowell,
1996).
Each ‘way of life’ is based on and pursues certain values which
63
underlie structure, and each has unanticipated consequences.

Hierarchy provides order, stability and predictability, but at its
extreme may produce rigidity and oppression. Individualism pursues
freedom, and supports productivity, but may marginalize and exploit
the weak, and untrammeled pursuit of self-interest may allow freedom
to degenerate into license, eroding individualist values of hard work,
merit and social cooperation. Egalitarianism promotes equality and is
compassionate toward the weak, but may strip members of initiative,
promote policies based on envy and victimization, or oppress non-
conformists. Fatalism is inactive; it promotes passive withdrawal and
resistance. However, a society is not monolithic; ‘competing ways of
life exist within a single nation’ (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 215), and
contribute to that society. Societies are coalitions of cultures, and they
are shaped by competition between ways of life (Wildavsky, 1993).
Configurations of cultures will explain social organization and policies,
and their alliances and struggles will impact on politics and policy. In
addition, combinations of cultures may contribute to social stability, as
secondary ways of life may provide values or means of conflict resol-
ution which the dominant culture lacks. These subcultures may be
porous and interact with other ways of life, or they may be monolithic
and more or less distinct from the larger society or from other groups.
Individuals within society define themselves in their rejection of
others’ values (Douglas, 1996).
Ethnicity and Culture

Ethnicity is a complex and controversial concept, like culture. Ethnic
identity and culture can most effectively be linked when the groups
have multiple markers, coherent histories, geographical concentration
and clearly defined boundaries (social or physical). Ethnicity may be
strongly related to choosing ways of life, especially where reinforced
by geography, history and environment. The three ethnic groups
examined in this paper all have highly salient ethnic identities. In
Nigeria ethnic identity has been an important determinant of life
chances, and has defined the policies under which people have lived.
The ethnic groups have regional cores, and ethnicity has defined
members’ position in the larger society. Each of the three original
regions of Nigeria was dominated numerically, politically, economi-
cally and culturally by one of the three major ethnic groups.
I will identify the dominant way of life for each of the three ethnic
groups, focusing on indications of the principles of accountability and
blame and the fundamental value of order, freedom or equality.
64
Hierarchy, with its preference for order, will tend to develop clear lines
of authority and sanctions for deviance, with ascribed roles, limits on
competition, and impermeable boundaries between members and non-
members. Individualism values freedom, so will allow negotiation to
interpret relationships and values. Egalitarianism pursues equality,
especially reduction of status differentials.
This does not imply that the ethnic groups are homogeneous; they
are not geographically bounded, isolated, rigid communities. Nor are
they culturally monolithic. cultural theory does not suggest that all
members of a community will share one way of life, but rather that
there are a limited number of viable ways of life between which people
will move, which will compete to define the rules of the game and gain
adherents. Within any group or community there will be a variety of
cultural biases which compete to define the public debate and control
the direction in which society moves. One way of life may predomi-
nate, and define terms for the community, but there will generally be
competing ways of life. These ways of life will be found in dissenting
groups or practices, in rhetoric, and embedded within dominant insti-
tutions. Each society or community will reflect a mix of ways of life and
their relative strengths within the population and leadership. That
heterogeneity provides the health of the society, and the source for
change. Furthermore, in times of change, varied influences may lead to
accommodation or reaction (Wildavsky, 1985).
Hausa
What a man gets and what happens to him is written from the day of his
birth. (Hausa Proverb)
Northern Nigeria is culturally distinct from the South and historically
had more contact with Sahara and Islamic culture than with tropical
African societies. Under British rule, traditional Northern culture and
political structures maintained order for the British and so were
protected from modern influence. The North is dominated by the
Hausa and Fulani peoples, whose government and culture are inextri-
cable (Coleman, 1958, p. 21; Miles, 1994; Ver Eecke, 1998; Wilson, 1988,
p. 10). Hausa identity has become a linguistic category which includes
the settled, Muslim, Hausa-speaking population of Northern origin
rather than an ethnicity per se (Diamond, 1988, p. 21).
Hausa society traditionally was based around lineage groups (Watts,
1983, p. 43), and language, religion and residence were all shared.
Strong family relations determined status, opportunities and accept-
able behavior (Hill, 1972, pp. 38–39; Watts, 1983, p. 52). Group
65
identification was strengthened by Fulani sense of superiority, Hausa

ethnic cohesion and Islam’s role as a matrix for social cohesion and a
code of personal conduct (Miles & Rochefort, 1991; Watts, 1983, pp.
46–48). Leaders have encouraged separation from outsiders, including
mandated ‘strangers’ quarters’ (ghettos) within Northern towns and
cities. Across Nigeria, Hausa generally do not mix with other groups
through intermarriage or residential integration (Cohen, 1967, pp. 117,
122–125); for example, Hausa and Yoruba Muslims generally worship
in separate mosques.
Hausa life is hedged about with rules, rules which define virtue
(Kirk-Greene, 1974). Religious and traditional prescriptions reinforce
each other and are interpreted and enforced by social superiors,
especially traditional rulers; multiple layers of prescriptions order
every area of family and public life, and many roles are ascribed by
age, gender and family status. The ascribed roles are part of the overall
social pattern of patron–client relations, involving mutual benefits and
obligations such as protection, mediating services and general suste-
nance given by the patron, and political support and menial labor
provided by the client. Hence there is a clear division of labor, and
nested relations of authority. Sanctions for violating rules do not
distinguish individual morality from criminal behavior, since ‘all
conduct, no matter how ostensibly personal, has ramifications for the
entire community and thus is governed by the Islamic code of behav-
ior’ (Miles, 1994, pp. 292–293). Sanctions are applied within the family,
by traditional leaders or by government officials.
The traditional forms of village government reflect status distinc-
tions. A village chief is mayor and judge, and is responsible for dispute
resolution (including marriage counseling), accommodation of guests
and representing the community to outsiders. His residence is large
and centrally located, so he will be available for counseling yet separ-
ated from mixing with the people as ‘a sign of his elevated social
position’ (Miles, 1994, p. 151). He will not engage in manual labor, or
otherwise act to publicly lower his status; ‘the line between chief and
commoner remains high and uncrossable’ (Miles, 1994, p. 151).
Traditional leaders, locally and in the cities, are symbols of ‘stability,
permanence, continuity and legitimacy’ to the people, in the midst of
the corruption and confusion of modern politics (Miles, 1994, p. 158).
Preference for order and acceptance of social ranking clearly indi-
cates highly prescribed culture, or high grid. The scope and number of
activities which occur within the group and the impermeability of
group boundaries imply strong group identification, which is
strengthened by Hausa adherence to Islam (Gross & Raynor, 1985).
66
Religious solidarity is further intensified within family, community

and ethnic group (Ver Eecke, 1988). Group identification has been
intensified by the identification of the Hausa as a group in opposition
to other groups who presented threats to their identity (Joseph, 1986,
p. 50). Therefore, the Hausa form a hierarchical way of life, valuing
order first. As a Hausa man said,
[In democracy] . . . men wander around like cattle, without any direction.
They make all kinds of excited noises, but there’s no sense to it. Each goes his
own way, lost, until there’s no more herd. (Cited in Miles, 1988, p. 75)
Hausa political culture and Nigerian history combine to intensify
tension between the North and the rest of the country. Contact with
European culture was limited and the political system and elites were
reinforced by the British. This preserved and strengthened the
traditional hierarchical culture, but it also isolated the North from
access to resources (especially western education) which would enable
it to compete on an equal footing with other regions after independ-
ence. The North disdained the apparently chaotic and disrespectful
South, and yet was often governed by Southerners who had the requi-
site literacy and bureaucratic skills. Therefore, disdain combined with
distrust, envy and fear, as jobs and economic and political control
shifted to the South.
Ibo
No one knows the womb that bears the chief. (Ibo proverb)
The Ibo are dominant in Eastern Nigeria. While Ibo ethnic conscious-
ness did not predate British colonialism, historical pressures and the
political salience of group identification under colonial rule have inten-
sified the strength of that identity. Eastern Nigeria was heavily forested
and riddled with mangrove swamps. The difficult physical environ-
ment prevented development of large-scale settlements, travel and
communication, and central rule never developed. Within small,
scattered communities, the Ibo were all free and equal participants
in consensus-based community decision-making (Chazan, 1993;
Diamond, 1988, p. 65; Owusu, 1992), which formed the basis for
government and social life. Each Ibo village was an autonomous exer-
cise in direct democracy, and leaders emerged based on achievement
rather than lineage.
The Ibo traditionally viewed the world as a dynamic equilibrium. It
was constantly threatened by natural and social disasters, but reality was
contractual in nature, and amenable to bargaining and manipulation
67
(Uchendu, 1965, pp. 12–15). Even the spirits could be bargained with, and
could be manipulated through religious practices, so the dynamic natural
order could be controlled. The social order was based on interdepend-
ence, reciprocity and mutual obligations. Equality was defined as equal
opportunity to pursue and achieve success. Status was pursued aggres-
sively, and achieved through personal ability and success, though
helping others in family and village to achieve success was both a
responsibility of the successful, and an indicator of status and success.
Sanctions for anti-social behavior included social ostracism and ridicule,
with embarrassment being a major deterrent to unacceptable behavior,
along with exclusion from opportunities for advancement. However,
since all issues are subject to negotiation, even sanctions were not rigid.
An Ibo is a member of a village and several lineage groups, which
contribute to his or her identity and provide resources for meeting aspi-
rations, through the assistance of relations who have achieved success.
There is a strong community spirit which requires members of a
community to participate in its improvement, wherever they live, and to
help others from their village or lineage to ‘get ahead’. This assistance is
an essential part of leadership, and contributes to the respect and
following an individual commands. Networks are based on these
relationships, and structure social life and opportunities for advance-
ment. In general, family and village are the basis of the complex social
and economic networks, but do not determine them. Relationships tend
to be voluntary, based on mutual assistance and obligation (Uchendu,
1965, p. 14), and an Ibo primarily defines him- or herself as an individ-
ual, according to personal achievements. Hence, group boundaries seem
to be very weak overall, though there is a definite undercurrent of group
consciousness in social behavior, as the basic context for networks.
The Ibo have few prescriptions on their behavior, and emphasize
negotiation and self-regulation (Njaka, 1974, pp. 57–58). There are
some prescriptions within the family, and younger people are expected
to respect their elders, but elders will defer to youth with greater
expertise in a situation. High status, hence deference, is based on
achievements, rather than age or birth. Negotiation is central to all
aspects of life; pursuit of individual ambition and equal opportunity
for achievement place the Ibo firmly within the individualist category.
Economically and socially, this shows up in the phenomenal success
Ibos have had throughout Nigeria in education and business.
Yoruba
‘Yoruba’ includes a variety of linguistically and culturally similar
groups in Western Nigeria which were treated as homogeneous by the
68
British (Eades, 1980, p. 2), though they had been riven with conflicts
between empires, between fading and rising power centers, and
between different ethnic subgroups. While ‘Yoruba’ societies had
tremendous variation in values and patterns of relationships and
behavior, some general principles can be inferred.
The Yoruba have a history of strong kings, states and empires, and
so are generally characterized as hierarchical. However, the complex-
ity of Yoruba traditions confounds this characterization:
Theirs was a constitutional monarchy built upon overlapping family,
lineage, and clan units. At the center of a Yoruba state there was an oba or
king, but substantial power was also held by the heads of families and clans
and by subchiefs. (Wilson, 1988, p. 10)
The major features of Yoruba political institutions suggest a variety

of checks, limits and controls on the wielding of power. The ruler had
ritual importance rather than a political role. People in the royal line-
ages were generally kept from any position of authority (though
sometimes given administrative roles), limiting the possibility of
tyranny. Commoner chiefs also had important roles to play in selecting
and if necessary deposing the king, and some chiefs were selected
through ‘secret societies’ where membership was open to all who
could pay fees. There were mechanisms which allowed rulers to
appoint officials who were loyal only to them, but the systems required
that such officials be slaves or die with the king (Eades, 1980, p. 96).
Yoruba social, economic and political organization centered on
family and community. Each group (household, family, town) had its
own principles regarding membership and distribution of resources.
Access to economic resources was related to social status, and medi-
ated by membership in various social units. Membership could be
inherited, or negotiated, through marriage, adoption, migration or
patronage (Berry, 1985, p. 8). Resources such as land, labor and seed
capital were distributed through this system. An increasingly import-
ant resource during and since colonial rule has been access to the state,
since it has come to mediate access to other major economic resources.
Within these social units, access to resources was generally defined
by kinship and seniority (Berry, 1985, p. 8). However, seniority was
both ascribed and achieved, so personal ability and success were
important determinants of status. Individuals were expected to achieve
success through ability, hard work and networks of relationships,
though deference patterns, patron–client interactions and family obli-
gations were essential aspects of these networks (Aronson, 1978; Eades,
1980). In this social environment, labor forces could be mobilized
69
quickly, though they might not be efficient, and they incurred exten-
sive future obligations. Because social relations provided access to
productive resources and status, people invested in consumption to
support relations, including relatives’ school fees, lavish ceremonies,
maintenance of dependants and building homes in villages of origin.
These investments were socially rather than economically productive
(Berry, 1985).
Social relations developed in response to the strains which dynamic
migration patterns placed on traditional patterns of relations. Ethnic
associations in cities replaced strong rural communities, and identifi-
cation as a member of a group (town, village, clan) continued to
provide ‘security, protection, and sense of belonging’ to migrants in
urban areas (Okonjo, 1967, p. 116). Migration also broadened freedom
to build networks of relationships based on interests and circum-
stances, rather than on kinship ties (Aronson, 1978, p. 28), since cities
provided more opportunities for interest-based networking. In cities,
networks are especially important, and family ties are only one of
many kinds of relationships, thus people have more freedom to decide
how close relations with kin will be (Aronson, 1978, pp. 50–51). There
are obligations to help the home village and relatives but these are not
absolute, and individuals may choose how they will fulfill them.
Generally family and other group ties are loose and negotiable.
Business success is based on the development of mutually beneficial
networks, which are fluid, based on relationships of patronage and
reciprocal obligation (Aronson, 1978, p. 158). The development of
fluid, ego-centered networks is a defining characteristic of individu-
alism. Strong group sense above the lineage seems to be more
prevalent when the Yoruba or subgroups are forced to define them-
selves in opposition to or competition with other groups. For
example, improvement associations may mandate fees and impose
heavy sanctions for non-participation (Okonjo, 1967, pp. 108–112). In
sum, taking into account variations, the group strength is much
weaker than for the Hausa, but there is still real attachment to
group identity, whether it is family, village or the more ambiguous
ethnicity.
The prescription dimension in Yoruba society is complex. While
there are strong patterns of deference accorded to older or more
respected individuals (Aronson, 1978, p. 94; Lloyd, 1967, p. 66), status
differences are not completely ascribed. Personal success is an import-
ant determinant of status (Mabogunje, 1967, p. 41), and is achieved
through modern as well as traditional avenues to status (Aronson,
1978, pp. 116–133; Eades, 1980, p. 91). Titles reflect rather than confer
70
status and power, and there is intense competition for them (Eades,
1980).
The qualities of Yoruba social and economic life suggest a predominant
culture of individualism. There are few prescriptions imposed on indi-
viduals by society; they are free to negotiate the conditions of their lives
for themselves, and function as individuals more than as members of a
group. Even women have had great freedom within families to pursue
goals and business opportunities. Individualism is reflected both in
development of personal networks and in the balancing of power which
seems to persist in the indigenous political system. However, the status
differentials and the varying sense of group identification suggest that the
individualist culture has strong underlying hierarchical qualities. Respect
for authority is balanced by restrictions on the Oba’s power and the
checking power of commoner chiefs (Eades, 1980, p. 96). The major
features of Yoruba political institutions also suggest the balance of indi-
vidual and hierarchical cultures. This balance varies by group; it may be
very fluid and depend upon the particular group or upon the context
(urban or rural), and it may change in response to the larger social context.
Inter-group Differences
The three dominant ethnic groups were based on very different cultural
preferences. Hausa society was organized on strong hierarchical princi-
ples, with many and varied prescriptions, clear status differentials and a
strong group sense. Order, deference and proper behavior were center-
pieces of society. Hence, Hausa rarely dispute with superiors or question
their decisions, they identify with their co-ethnics, and they follow the
rules appropriate for their station in life. The Ibo, in contrast, were indi-
vidualist; merit and personal achievement rather than ascription
determined status, high rank was open to all, and group obligations were
limited. The Ibo saw freedom, merit and competition rather than order as
legitimate driving forces of society, and believed they had the unassailable
right to compete openly. The hierarchical North could not see unfettered
competition as just or moral, but as destabilizing, therefore it was in funda-
mental conflict with the Ibo. The Yoruba walked a difficult balance, with a
culture which was a balance of individualism and hierarchy. They were
threatened by Ibo aggressiveness, and were torn by internal factional
conflicts and power struggles which were minimal in the other regions.
Escalation of Tensions
As the nationalist struggle progressed, tensions had several funda-
mental sources: the rivalry between Yoruba and Ibo; rivalry between
71
the South and the Muslim North; and tensions between dominant and
minority groups within each region (Coleman, 1958, p. 331). While the
majority–minority conflicts are not central to this discussion, they
increased tension and insecurity across Nigeria.
The Yoruba were the first group to be penetrated by European in-
fluence and had advantages in educational and employment
opportunities. The Ibo movement for collective improvement was
driven by boundless energy and competitiveness, rapid adoption of
western religion and education and determined ethnic organization,
and led to advances in western education and employment. This
advance increased competition for opportunities, threatening Yoruba
prominence. In response the Yoruba elite organized to defend its privi-
leged position, so in the 1940s, the struggle for socio-economic power
permanently split the nationalist movement on ethnic lines (Coleman,
1958, pp. 332–343; Diamond, 1988, p. 46). Culture played an important
role in this conflict, setting the terms for the communal competition.
The conflict was generally carried out in terms of North, West and
East. These are not meaningless constructs: the three regions were
social realities, representing the coincidence of territory, political party
and dominant ethnic group. Their leaders represented the cultures and
traditions of their regions in their persons and backgrounds.
Traditional rulers of the old Islamic Emirates led the North, with both
political power and moral authority. Eastern nationalists were led by
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, a prominent, successful Ibo journalist and busi-
nessman, publisher of one of the oldest nationalist newspapers in West
Africa. The West was led by Yoruba scholar and activist Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, who combined traditional status with personal achieve-
ment. The persons and backgrounds of the leaders reflected the
peoples from which they emerged, and the conflicts between them
reflected the conflicts between the peoples. Their personalities and
preferences also influenced the nature of the conflicts.
The state controlled economic activity, so control of the government
at any level represented control of both economic resources and the
instruments of repression, providing resources for political consoli-
dation and personal advancement. With such high stakes, suspicion
and manipulation of cultural difference increased, and the struggles
over politics and resources were easily translated into the idiom of
cultural threat. Enduring structural realities shaped Nigeria’s situation.
The first was the unequal penetration of modern education and skills
through the population; the second was the political, economic and
geographical distribution of power between the three regions so that
one region had political power disproportionate to its contribution.
72
These two factors represented reinforcing cleavages, and were inter-

preted differently by the cultural communities. Conflict arose and
intensified at several points of cultural interaction and friction. These
included the pan-Ibo movement for improvement and education, and
increased competition with the Yoruba for scarce resources; dynamic
Ibo migration, especially to the North; Yoruba discrimination against
Ibo in the West; and the alliance between pan-Ibo and pan-African
movements. The aggressive and competitive East became isolated from
even its natural allies in the South. Issues of great social importance
were raised, debated and placed within competing cultural contexts.
The central issues were distribution of education, employment and
power, and structure of government. A rhetorical war between Ibo,
Yoruba and Hausa was pursued in speeches and newspapers, and
hostile meanings were imputed to opposing policy preferences.
Differences in the core values and structural social-economic-cultural
circumstances undergirded competition for power. Opposing views
were often vilified with inflammatory rhetoric.
Distribution of Education and Power

‘Distribution’ of modern education and skills is neither random nor
solely the result of external influences, though colonial penetration had
a great impact; some groups, especially the Yoruba and Ibo, pursued
western education vigorously and were more successful than
Northerners in obtaining that education and pursuing careers in the
modern sector. History tells us that educational disparities cannot be
quickly eliminated, since they are rooted in real cultural differences as
well as historical patterns: ‘gross statistical disparities in the “represen-
tation” ’ of groups in different occupations, industries, income levels,
and educational institutions have been the rule—not the exception—all
across the planet’ (Sowell, 1996, p. 372). Colonial policy contributed to
this disparity (Sowell, 1998, pp. 122–128, 335–338), and the policies of
each group helped to consolidate it. Therefore, Southerners have
succeeded throughout Nigeria disproportionate to their numbers,
especially the Ibo in the North. Another critical structural factor is the
distribution of political and economic power across Nigeria. Owing to
the size of its territory and population, the North could dominate any
government. It had close to a majority, with nearly as many people as
both Southern regions together, and therefore could veto any policy, or
pass its own without strong opposition. However, the numbers of
people did not mean economic dynamism. Much of the economy was
peasant agriculture and small-scale cattle husbandry. Much of the
wealth of Nigeria came from cocoa and palm oil, which were produced
73
in the South, so the politically dominant region was also the poorest
and least educated. The regional differences in levels of skill and
education, cultural goals and economic-political power, reinforced by
religious identification, were given negative but culturally supportable
interpretations, strengthening any prior sense of victimization, group
enmity or moral opprobrium.
The Northern View

In the North, Southerners dominated critical areas such as technical
and educational accomplishments which required control of the British
language and institutions of rule. Ibos had small businesses and
professional and clerical positions, so enjoyed a high level of pros-
perity. Their achievements in business, civil service, education and the
military led to disproportionate representation relative to their
numbers in the upper echelons of society, engendering resentment
(Diamond, 1988, p. 49). Southern, especially Ibo, dominance through-
out Nigeria in modern sector and government employment was seen
in the North as oppression by the immoral and disorderly Southerners.
Southern educational achievements were an unfair advantage, and
Southern intervention attacked religion and tradition. If Northerners
did not rule themselves, they feared that they would be impoverished
and weakened, subject to religious discrimination, and dismantling of
traditions. The sense of threat became so intense that in the
‘Northernization’ process of turning bureaucracy over to qualified
Northerners, a European was preferable to a Southern Nigerian, many
of whom lost their positions. Fear of domination and unrelenting
hostility towards ‘enemy’ ethnic groups were the themes of verbal and
written exchanges. The rhetoric, in combination with the close and
unequal contact between Ibos and Hausa, and the highly visible
cultural differences, all led to increasing tensions in the North, and the
‘preconditions for violent ethnic conflict’ (Diamond, 1988, p. 49).
The possibility of Southern domination was especially abhorrent to
the North due to cultural differences: the Northern hierarchical way of
life meant that the society was stable, secure, orderly and predictable,
structured by mutual responsibilities and clarity as to proper roles.
This was very different from conditions prevailing in the South,
especially among the Ibos, who, in their freedom and unlimited
pursuit of success, appeared chaotic, and lacked respect for authority,
social control, stability and order. Adding insult to injury, it was
widely believed that Southern clerks in the North discriminated
against Northerners (Coleman, 1958, pp. 360–361). An independent
Nigeria ruled by economically and educationally advanced
74
Southerners was a threat to Northern identity, culture, religion and

values, as well as the rulers’ power and position. The sense of threat
was exacerbated when radicals in the North called for reform and
received support from the South, thereby creating an internal cultural
threat to reinforce the external (Coleman, 1958, pp. 365–366).
Meanwhile, competition for dominance between the Yoruba and Ibo,
in the shadow of a Northern majority, became more intense. Ibo
aggressiveness was threatening to the Yoruba as it spilled over into the
West, where it was perceived as overly aggressive, threatening the
predominant position of the Yoruba in their own region, and interfer-
ing with their management of internal problems.
The Southern View

Weak modern education levels accompanied by strong and stable
traditions and religion in the North were interpreted in the South as
ignorance and backwardness, requiring more competent and modern
guidance from the South, whose accomplishments were due to their
ability to succeed on an equal playing field. Northern political domi-
nance was anathema, representing oppression of the worst kind,
especially unjust because dominance was not based on ability and
achievement on modern terms. Furthermore, Southerners did not
respect Northern culture, traditions and people. Traditional authority
was characterized as feudal repression, in opposition to the more
‘modern’ culture of the South, and the Southern press ridiculed the
Hausa and spoke disrespectfully of the Emirs. Northern actions rein-
forced these views: in pursuit of Northernization an ‘affirmative
action’ program was initiated, built upon regional preferments over-
riding merit, and blatant discrimination against Southerners in
government contracts and business opportunities (Diamond, 1988, p.
50). Ibos perceived this policy as unfair lowering of standards, and
public discussion showed clear Ibo disdain for the Hausa. This raised
group boundaries more, and confirmed each group’s view of the
competing groups as hostile to their own cultural, economic and politi-
cal interests.
Federalism
Divergent cultural preferences led to opposing stances on form of
government, and crystallized animosity. Federalism on a regional
base was supported by the North and the West, but Azikiwe, his
party, and the East generally rejected ‘artificial’ ethnic and regional
divisions and advocated a unified Nigeria. In addition, they saw
regionalism as a tool to continue to repress minorities, maintain
75
unjust power hierarchies and reduce development and free competi-

tion. Unitary government would have placed resources and authority
with a central power, and reduced regional monopolies. The East
argued that unitary government would be a truly national govern-
ment working for and protecting all people (Coleman, 1958, p. 350).
However, unitary government was seen by the North and the West as
a route to Ibo domination, due to Ibo prevalence in bureaucracies, and
their party’s greater inter-ethnic popularity. The Yoruba leadership
advocated regional autonomy, with majority hegemony within
regions, which would protect their embattled power base. The North
did not desire independence, since they saw the British as fair and
neutral arbitrators, and mistrusted the South. Since restructuring of
their society or being subordinate to the South was unacceptable, their
preference was to close ranks, maintain their power structure, and
work to increase Northern levels of education and presence in
modern sector employment. This entailed maintaining the regional
divisions.
The Eastern preference for unitary government thus increased the
sense of threat already felt by both the other regions, intensifying
distrust and marginalizing the East even more. A federal system
protected the system of regional power bases which enabled the three
largest groups to maintain regional autonomy and some control of
resources for their people. Fundamentally, a unitary government
would have reduced cultural autonomy and allowed for equal compe-
tition, which would not only have threatened power bases but also
been unacceptable to non-competitive ways of life. The Eastern
interpretation supports an individualistic preference for a level playing
field and free competition. The issue of federal vs unitary government
was raised again and again, and was framed in terms of ethnicity,
power bases and local advantage. Therefore, Eastern unitary rhetoric
was read as a threat of Eastern domination, however unrealistic such a
threat might be.
Conflict and Rhetoric

Rhetoric is generally consistent with a culture’s underlying values and
institutions, so rhetoric stemming from a hierarchical culture will
support authority, tradition, obligations and group unity. Social prob-
lems will be blamed on social deviants and non-conformists.
Individualist rhetoric will center on competition, equality of oppor-
tunity, and merit. It may be hostile to hierarchical deference patterns
and role structures because they limit opportunity, but will distrust
76
equalization of condition for the same reason. Egalitarian rhetoric will

center on anti-authority themes, emphasizing victimization and
blaming oppressive institutions and powerful individuals for the prob-
lems of society. It will promote equality of result and broad
participation. As statements of value and policy are made, they are
interpreted not only by those who consider them reasonable or self-
evidently true, but also by those who see them as attack. Therefore,
rhetoric intended for internal audiences, for clients, co-ethnics and co-
religionists, may be read by outsiders, potential opponents or allies,
providing a dynamic context for conflict. However, such rhetoric may
not only be cultural; as conflict intensifies, the rhetoric may focus so
much on vilification of opponents that cultural bases are distant.
The literature on Nigeria and its conflicts in the 20 years preceding
the civil war is fertile ground for drawing out culturally based rhetoric.
Overblown, inflammatory and baseless assertions about opponents’
policy intentions presented in newspapers included the claims that, if
victorious, the Yoruba would ban Islam in the North, the Hausa would
impose Islam in the South, and the Ibos would control all bureaucratic
positions in the North (Diamond, 1988, p. 43). These statements reflect
both fact and fear, since the different religions and resource bases
implied different policy and cultural positions, but such hostile and
extreme policies were not likely. From the Yoruba,
We never knew the Ibos, but since we came to know them we have tried to
be friendly and neighborly. Then came the Arch Devil [Nnamdi Azikiwe] to
sow the seeds of distrust and hatred. . . . We have tolerated enough from a
class of Ibos and addle-brained Yorubas who have mortgaged their thinking
caps to Azikiwe and his hirelings. (1948, in Coleman, 1958, p. 346)
This statement reflects a hierarchical concern with the corrupting influ-
ence of social deviants who lead astray weaker members of the
community, and hence threaten the whole. It raises group boundaries,
emphasizing that Ibo are untrustworthy and those who agree with
them are dupes. Responses from the Ibo raise the level of intensity:
Henceforth, the cry must be one of battle against Egbe Omo Oduduwa
[the Yoruba ethnic social-political organization]. . . . [I]t is the enemy of
Nigeria; it must be crushed to the earth. . . . There is no going back, until
the Fascist Organization has been dismembered. (1948, in Coleman, 1958,
p. 346)
. . . the God of Africa has specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children
of Africa from the bondage of the ages. . . . The martial prowess of the Ibo
nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer
others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver. (1949, in
Coleman, 1958, p. 347)
77
These statements provide an intolerant, egalitarian critique of the

Yoruba conservative ethnic organization since it rejects pan-African
and other Ibo goals, which are self-evidently good. It also provides an
individualist declaration of the right of the Ibo to lead by their achieve-
ments. Both support an ‘us vs them’ mentality of black and white, and
both mix cultural logic with vilification.
Ibo and Yoruba leaders regularly called each other traitors, fascists,
crooks, liars, hypocrites and ‘semiliterates’ (Diamond, 1988, p. 58). As
this conflict escalated, the passive North became more politicized due
to threats to Northern regional autonomy following independence:
‘there can be little doubt that the threat of Southern domination,
fancied or real, was the major stimulant in the northern awakening’
(Coleman, 1958, p. 363).
It is the southerner who has the power in the North. They have control of the
railway stations; of the Post Offices; of Government Hospitals; of the
canteens; the majority employed in the Kaduna Secretariat are all
Southerners; in all the different departments of Government it is the south-
erner who has the power. (1950, in Coleman, 1958, p. 362)
While this is a factual statement with respect to dominance of Ibo in

public employment in the North, it implied cultural destruction, and
encouraged the myth of the Ibo conspiracy. It strengthened the
position of Northern leaders encouraging fear of Southern domination.
Controversy was especially intense around Nnamdi Azikiwe, who
was a symbol of cultural pride for Ibos. He achieved wealth and high
status as a result of his work and ability, exemplifying Ibo individual-
ist culture, and he used his position to work for the betterment of
others. Azikiwe’s popularity was linked with his radical editorials,
which reached wide readerships, his association with the pan-Ibo and
pan-African movements, and his aggressive personal style. Azikiwe
displayed a strong strain of egalitarian thought found in many elites
who tended to focus on the conflict with the British surrounding the
independence struggle, assuming that intra-African struggles were
unimportant. He called Yoruba leaders and other traditional leaders
‘Uncle Toms’ and ‘imperialist stooges.’ Such remarks represent
common egalitarian characterizations of anyone willing to compro-
mise on key issues, and work with the ‘enemy’,’ but not surprisingly
were viewed as offensive personal attacks by Yoruba leaders so
targeted (Coleman, 1958, p. 342; see also Malecha, 1994, pp. 105–107).
East–West conflict was intensified by Eastern rhetoric concerning the
rights of minority groups in the West. Yoruba dominance and security
depended on majority control of political authority in the West
78
(Coleman, 1958, p. 347). Ibo support for minority rights in other

regions was both politically effective and consistent with support for
equality of opportunity. Leaders of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa created a
Yoruba-led political party, to strengthen Yoruba hold on power, and to
build on the regional and ethnic power base. The explicit electoral
campaign theme was opposition to Azikiwe and to Ibo domination.
Heightened Yoruba apprehensions of Ibo domination contributed to
ethnic political tensions and Eastern marginalization (Coleman, 1958,
pp. 341–342; Diamond, 1988, p. 47).
By 1966, Nigeria was caught in a downward spiral of cultural clashes
and struggles for personal power. Corruption escalated, centered on
politicians’ venal, self-serving behavior, and the prevalent and blatant
use of public resources for private gain. It undermined all ways of life,
threatened the society as a whole, and the social environment became
increasingly arbitrary. Indeed, when the coup took place it was popu-
larly supported due to widespread disgust with corrupt and
incompetent leaders.
The 15 January 1966 coup d’état unintentionally continued and exac-
erbated the prevailing cultural conflict. Most of the coup leaders were
Ibo, who dominated the officer corps. They blamed the politicians for
the condition in which Nigeria found itself, and they particularly
distrusted the Northern hierarchy, so the relatively bloodless coup
targeted top government officials heavily implicated in corruption and
repression, especially in the North (Ademoyega, 1981; Luckham, 1971).
The July 1966 counter-coup was explicitly Northern, and used those
earlier deaths to support a myth of Ibo conspiracy for domination.
Negotiations to resolve differences were unsuccessful, and the East
seceded as the Republic of Biafra in May 1967.
Conclusions: Why Biafra?

My argument is that Nigeria was divided by fundamental cultural
differences, and in the process of competing for resources and gaining
independence these cultural differences intensified and became more
salient. With culture and ethnic identity a political resource which
could be manipulated for personal and political ends, conflict escalated
to the point that cultural destruction became a real fear, so compromise
was impossible. While my argument is cultural, partial explanation for
Nigeria’s collapse lies in the structure of the society, the skeleton of
which is clear: Nigeria was divided into three regions under colonial
rule, each having a different ethnic and religious mix and a different
majority ethnic group holding political power; conflict between these
79
regions had developed and intensified over 60 years of colonial rule

and competition for resources; political power meant access to econ-
omic power. However, these reinforcing cleavages do not explain the
particular character and progress of the conflict. Many diverse and
divided societies do not collapse, and neither culture nor ethnicity
automatically generates conflict. This is where cultural theory can add
to our understanding. Culture provides the cues which can be
exploited to rally support, and cultural theory explains those cues by
systematically addressing issue content and preferences concerning
outcomes, which define the specific direction or shape conflict takes.
Cultural theory therefore helps to explain why people accept some
circumstances and challenge others (Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 55–59;
Wildavsky, 1987).
People do not blindly react to neutral events or willingly pursue
clearly self-destructive courses. Underlying the inflammatory rhetoric,
there must have been real issues which resonated with many people
for such a disastrous and destructive conflict to develop. Cultural
theory’s unique contribution is in suggesting why people might have
believed that the survival of their way of life was at stake, and so
responded to culturally rooted rhetoric, however venal the speakers
were known to be. Cultural theory provides the meaning which struc-
ture holds, and its implications for people who live within that
structure. This is especially critical in terms of the specific evolution of
the conflict. Why were the Ibos more likely to have problems relating
to other groups, and why were they the targets of so much hostility?
What was the source of widespread fear of Ibo domination, especially
given the East’s structural weakness? Clearly there are many reasons
for the Ibos’ position vis-à-vis other groups, but they are entangled
with the content of Ibo culture, and the content of cultures defined in
opposition to the Ibos. Based on these cultural differences, from
colonial rule and the independence movement to the political struggles
over resources, leaders of the three groups articulated and supported
cultural principles which were both fundamental and incompatible,
intensifying confrontation, hardening differences, and making
compromise impossible (see Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 116).
Colonial policies centered on regions and ethnicity, and distributed
resources through the groups, intensifying group identification, and
maintaining groups in competition. Indirect rule, by acting through
local institutions and by propping up local authority, strengthened
ethnic group identity rather than wider national identification. This
focus continued after independence, and kept primary social identifi-
cation local and ethnic, the level at which most people interacted and
80
had their needs met. Between groups, bitter competition prevailed,

contributing to intensified group identities, vilification of ‘race traitors’
and demonization of opponents, even in ways of life that normally
tolerate difference.
The salient division and the primary competition for resources and
power was between the three regions, each dominated by a majority
ethnic group. Ethnic identification intensified when issues were
national, inter-ethnic, inter-communal or inter-regional, reducing the
effect of cross-cutting cleavages. Furthermore, regions were not mono-
lithic: each dominant group had conflict with numerous minorities.
Therefore, group identity within ethnic groups was defined in opposi-
tion to others within the region as well as to other regions. That
identity was an essential political resource. Attacks on ethnic regional
dominance and encouragement of minority rights represented attacks
on leaders’ ability to protect their community and control essential
resources, as well as accumulate personal power and wealth. This
competitive and insecure context intensified group identities and
increased their political salience. Competition was between actors
whose identity had strong cultural content, and the stakes of competi-
tion were high, and continually being raised.
While there were shifting coalitions between the three regions, the
fundamental cultural conflict was between hierarchy and individual-
ism, order and freedom, ascription and merit. It played out most
clearly between the North and the East. The prevalence of Eastern or
Ibo merchants and bureaucrats throughout the North made obvious
both the cultural differences and the disparate levels of access to the
benefits of modern life. The presence of foreigners prospering within a
poor community anywhere tends to encourage hostility and resent-
ment (see, e.g., overseas Chinese: Sowell 1996). This constant
confrontation encouraged the ‘conspiratorial thesis’ of Ibo domination
and presented Ibos to the North as arrogant and self-righteous and the
North to Ibos as backward and inferior (Anber, 1967, pp. 167–168). The
fundamental cultural cleavage between individualism and hierarchy
was somewhat obscured by the prevalence of egalitarian rhetoric on
the part of some Ibo and Yoruba leaders, including the original coup
leaders. However, it was no less fundamental for that.
Douglas’ cultural theory suggests that people view the world
through the lens of their preferred way of life, and will generally inter-
pret events in ways that reinforce that way of life. The various regions’
leaders were in some sense representatives of their ways of life, and as
such responded to the cultural implications of opposition leaders’
behavior and rhetoric. Westernized leaders were somewhat alienated
81
from their traditional cultures, but the underlying assumptions of their

ways of life were not so easily shed, and were used to mobilize support
from the masses. There was cynical and corrupt manipulation of
culture in pursuit of personal aggrandizement, but it occurred from
within the ways of life and was defined in cultural terms; ‘We know
[the politicians] are eating, but we are eating too’ (Achebe, 1967, p. 117)
and ‘our own son should go and bring us our share’ (p. 119).
Competing preferences centered on the hierarchical preference for
order, ascribed status differentials, deference and socially defined
relationships, and the individualist preference for freedom, achieved
status and negotiated relationships. These preferences were funda-
mentally opposed to each other, and accommodation would have been
difficult under any circumstances. Cultural cleavages were reinforced
by opposing ethnic and religious identities and competition for
resources. The conflict was built on fundamental and incompatible
principles which could not be compromised. Competition for scarce
resources would have led to tension even without overt evidence of
threat and hostility, but the rhetoric and behavior of various leaders
did contribute to an environment of threat.
A complicating factor is the European view of the various African
groups, and the perceived dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and
‘modern.’ The Eastern preferences resonated more closely with atti-
tudes of the former colonial power and other ‘modern’ parties. Modern
society seems uncomfortable with hierarchy, so the North could look
for little support or sympathy in its conservative attempt to preserve its
way of life, making its position seem more precarious. Eastern and
European views of the nature of the conflict are summed up neatly by
the American Consul James Barnard:
. . . the single immutable political reality of this country . . . is: in any race for
the material benefits of life, starting from the same point and on the basis of
equal opportunity, the Easterners are going to win by a mile. This is intoler-
able to the North. The only way to prevent it happening is to impose artificial
shackles to progress on the East. This is intolerable to the Easterners. (Cited
in Forsyth, 1969, p. 47)
The ‘injustice’ of domination by people who were perceived as less
civilized, less educated, ‘primitive’, was particularly bitter to the Ibo
elite. ‘[T]he Ibos of the East . . . were the most traveled and best quali-
fied of the major ethnic groups, and amply confident of their ability to
compete on equal terms with anybody’ (Forsyth, 1969, pp. 45–46).
There was little reticence concerning the South’s low opinion of the
North. The Northern response was therefore built on fear of Southern
domination and cultural destruction, and resentment of Southern
82
economic advantages: ‘The Ibos have never been true friends of the
North and never will be’ (Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto,
Premier of the Northern Region, in Forsyth, 1969, p. 29). Southerners
were accused of pursuing domination and unfair advantages, and
threatening religion and tradition. As Anber’s conspiratorial thesis of
Ibo domination suggests, the pace and nature of Ibo modernization
intensified group difference and suspicion (Anber, 1967, pp. 167–168).
The leaders therefore pursued a defensive path of rhetoric and politi-
cal behavior, consolidating internal support for cultural survival and
political control. All sides defined themselves as virtuous and princi-
pled, and defined their opponents as opportunists jockeying for power
and its spoils. Southern leaders repeatedly characterized their
positions as ‘progressive,’ and the Northerners as ‘feudal’. Northern
leaders said they were upholding morality and religion against the
blatant immorality of the South. Such rhetoric was aimed at their
domestic audiences, and resonated with cultural values, but it was also
read by their opponents, and intensified the environment of threat.
In Nigeria the stakes became so high, and the conflict so intense, that
the perceived consequence of loss or compromise would be annihila-
tion as a social and cultural entity. Cultural values reinforced regional
competition for position and personal competition for power and
wealth. There were no incentives to compromise or reduce the inten-
sity of rhetoric. Cultural theory therefore explains the issue content and
the fundamental social basis for inflammatory rhetoric, conflict
between these groups, mass responses to leaders’ rhetoric, and the
inability to compromise, even though compromise would have been in
all groups’ long-term interest. Leaders embedded within competing
ways of life, with little tolerance of opposing values and institutions, in
an environment of intense competition for scarce resources and
personal power, inveighed against each other in words and action. The
atmosphere of threat continued to escalate until options were closed
off, and demonization of opponents made compromise impossible.
This rhetorical and cultural war undergirded the power struggles and
the crises, and eventually the civil war. Had the competition been less
long and bitter, and had there been cross-cutting cleavages, positions
might not have been framed in terms of fundamental and incompatible
principles, and so some compromise would have been possible.
However, a cultural war is a very intense and unmanageable form of
political conflict, much easier to escalate than to wind down.
The differences between the groups, their ways of life and resources,
intensified by policies which separated them and strengthened their
group identity, created a delicately balanced, fragile environment. A
83
sense of vital and threatened cultural integrity developed, to which

each group responded defensively. This reinforced and was reinforced
by regional and political competition and personal pursuit of power.
Nor was it only elite behavior which suggested threat: popular demon-
strations against Northern leaders visiting the South and
counter-demonstrations in the North legitimized inflammatory rheto-
ric, as did anti-Ibo rioting and the arrogant attitudes of some
Southerners holding positions in the North. Each statement and policy
was framed with respect to fundamental cultural principles, and so
was simultaneously reasonable to one group and completely hostile to
opponents, threatening opponents’ integrity, and their economic and
cultural survival. Defensive and attacking responses accelerated,
increasing distrust and raising the stakes of political action and of
competition for power. The power struggle between elites of different
ethnic groups accelerated and intensified cleavages in society. Fear of
cultural subjugation and group annihilation became a slippery slope of
hostility and intransigence, a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to social
breakdown and civil war.
Notes
The work for this paper was begun at the National Endowment for
the Humanities Summer Seminar on Political Culture, University of
California, Berkeley, June–July 1993. East Carolina University
provided partial funding for my participation in the seminar. I am
grateful to Aaron Wildavsky for his invaluable help in understand-
ing and applying cultural theory, and for his encouragement and
advice on many projects. In his untimely death we have all lost a
great scholar and teacher.
1. For example, opposition rallies were banned; local police jailed opposition
party members and destroyed their property; candidates were attacked
and beaten; properly filed nomination papers disappeared so opposition
candidates did not appear on ballots; private ‘security forces’ and attendant
violence prevailed; homes and farms of opposition supporters were
burned; prominent politicians and candidates could not go about without
bodyguards. Hundreds died in rioting in the volatile ‘middle belt’.
2. Many deaths resulted from the violence, and police action was ineffective.
See Chinua Achebe, A Man of the People (1967), for a richer description of
the crimes, violence and ensuing social breakdown
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Biography
NANCY SPALDING is an Associate Professor of Political Science. She has
written widely on cultural explanations of African social phenomena,
especially concerning Tanzania and Nigeria. She taught in Nigeria on a
Fulbright, 1990–1991. address: Nancy Spalding, Department of Political
Science, East Carolina University, A-124 Brewster, Greenville, NC 27858,
USA. [email: spaldingn@mail.ecu.edu]
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A Cultural Explanation of Collapse Into Civil War Escalation of Tension in Nigeria

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Abstract Culture has a central role in explaining Nigeria’s

A Cultural Explanation of Collapse

on the complex situation which prevailed, and add to understanding

proved impossible in Nigeria. The long history of articulating and

Nigerian Historical Context

Figure 1. Nigeria at independence: original regions and population distribution

Ethnic groups as percent of Nigerian population, 1953

Regions as percent of Nigerian population at independence (1960)

Nigeria (Joseph, 1986). The struggle for political power between

tensions between the regions as politicians pursued personal power

Culture and Community Variation

ior, draws out underlying patterns, and attempts to explain underlying

Culture involves a dialog concerning accountability and blame

differ on attitudes to power and authority, and imply different social

explain social relationships, especially relations of power and auth-

Grid and Group: Dimensions of Culture

Figure 2. Dimensions of group and structure

power through withdrawal (Coyle, 1994, pp. 223–227; Ellis &

Cosmologies: The Socially Constructed Nature of

Individualists expect an environment that is bountiful and forgiving,

underlie structure, and each has unanticipated consequences.

Ethnicity and Culture

identification was strengthened by Fulani sense of superiority, Hausa

Religious solidarity is further intensified within family, community

The major features of Yoruba political institutions suggest a variety

These two factors represented reinforcing cleavages, and were inter-

Distribution of Education and Power

The Northern View

Southerners was a threat to Northern identity, culture, religion and

The Southern View

unjust power hierarchies and reduce development and free competi-

Conflict and Rhetoric

equalization of condition for the same reason. Egalitarian rhetoric will

These statements provide an intolerant, egalitarian critique of the

While this is a factual statement with respect to dominance of Ibo in

(Coleman, 1958, p. 347). Ibo support for minority rights in other

Conclusions: Why Biafra?

regions had developed and intensified over 60 years of colonial rule

had their needs met. Between groups, bitter competition prevailed,

from their traditional cultures, but the underlying assumptions of their

sense of vital and threatened cultural integrity developed, to which

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