THEFT

Art. 3081. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use
of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs
to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals,
or other forest or farm products.

Art. 310. Qualified theft2. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by R.A. 120 and B.P. Blg. 71. May 1,
1980).

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa)3. — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be

1
An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws [REVISED PENAL CODE], Act No.3815, art. 308 (1932).
2
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 310.
3
Id. art. 315 para. 2.
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.chanrobles virtual law library

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is
over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the offender shall deliver by
virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration.chanrobles virtual law library

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library

(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any
document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any third
person.chanrobles virtual law library

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.chanrobles virtual
law library

(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.chanrobles
virtual law library
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny
which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.chanrobles virtual law library

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be
prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885,
approved June 17, 1967.)]

(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house, or apartment house and the like without paying therefor, with intent to defraud the
proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging
house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning or surreptitiously
removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or
apartment house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation therein without paying for
his food, refreshment or accommodation.chanrobles virtual law library

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.chanrobles virtual law library

(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.chanrobles virtual law
library

(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or
any other papers.chanrobles virtual law library4

July 5, 2017

G.R. No. 2189105

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee

vs.

5
People of the Philippines v. Luther Sabado, et al. G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017, available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/218910.pdf (last accessed Nov.
25, 2018
LUTHER SABADO, SATURNINO SABADO y LOMBOY AND HOSPICIO HARUTA y MARTINEZ, Accused

LUTHER SABADO y PANGANGAAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

The Facts

The Information charging accused-appellant and two other accused of Qualified Theft reads as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of September 2006, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LUTHER P. SABADO,
while employed at Diamond Pawnshop, with intent to gain and grave abuse of trust and confidence
reposed on him, and in conspiracy with accused SATURNINO L. SABADO and HOSPICIO M. HARUTA who
are non-employees of the said pawnshop, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away an assortment of jewelry and cellular phones worth FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱500,000.00) Philippine Currency, belonging to said Diamond Pawnshop without the owner's
knowledge or consent, to his damage and prejudice.

Roger Alama (Alama) testified that, on September 13, 2006, at around 12:15 p.m., while he was at
Luzviminda 2, Dasmariñas, Cavite doing a regular task as collector of payments from the stall owners
thereat, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the pawnshop, as well as two unidentified men standing
near the pawnshop. He saw accused-appellant unlock the steel gate and called one of the men who
entered the pawnshop. The other unidentified man, who seemed to be a lookout, stayed outside and was
leaning against the glass window of the pawnshop. Thereafter, the man who went with the accused-
appellant inside the pawnshop came out carrying a small bag and immediately left the place. Shortly
thereafter, accused-appellant also came out, tied up and with a packing tape plastered to his mouth.
When the tape was removed, accused-appellant declared that he was robbed inside the pawnshop by the
two unidentified men.

Corroborating witness Gina Brogada (Brogada), the auditor and appraiser of Diamond Pawnshop,
confirmed that the pawnshop was robbed, and after the inventory, she found out that there were missing
items valued at PhP 582,200.00.

Meanwhile, Police Chief Inspector Dominador Arevalo (PCI Arevalo) and PO1 Efren Recare (PO1 Recare)
testified that, on September 20, 2006, SPO 1 Antonio Valdez and SP02 Mario Sanchez arrested the
accused-appellant and his co-accused. During the arrest, accused-appellant and his co-accused were in
possession of the following: (1) 18-K yellow gold necklace with anchor pendant; (2) 18-K yellow gold
men's ring with horseshoe design; and (3) 14-K yellow gold ring with scale design. These items were
turned over to the Dasmariñas Municipal Police Station. During a press briefing called for the purpose,
accused-appellant and his co-accused were presented to PCI Arevalo, who was then the Chief of the Theft
and Robbery Section of the Manila Police District. The photographs of the accused were also published in
a newspaper.

Meanwhile, when the said pieces of jewelry were showed to Brogada, the latter positively identified the
two men's ring and one necklace with pendant as those that were stolen from the pawnshop.

For his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on September 13, 2006, at around 12:00 noon, he was
working alone in the pawnshop. When he was about to go out and opened the gate, a dark-skinned
person wearing a hat blocked his way. He was then held at gunpoint to go inside the pawnshop. As they
were inside, another person carrying a bag came in. The man with the gun ordered him to open the vault
and threatened to kill him. After he opened the vault, his hands and feet were tied and his mouth was
covered with a tape. Then the two unidentified men took all the contents of the vault and fled.

Accused-appellant also claimed that he was admitted back to work after the robbery incident. He was
even instructed by the owner of the pawnshop to conduct an inventory of the contents of the vault and
to make a cartographic sketch of the robbers. But after five or six days, he was invited to the police
station for some questioning and, thereafter, a criminal information was filed against him.

After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft, thus:

In the case at bar, the amount stolen is Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 500,000.00). Pursuant to the
ruling in Astudillo, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Luther Sabado GUILTY of the crime of
Qualified Theft under the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused is likewise ordered to pay the amount of Php 500,000.00 to private
complainant Diamond Pawnshop.

Let the instant case against Saturnina Sabado y Lomboy and Hospicio Haruta y Martinez, both of whom
are still at-large, be sent to the ARCHIVES until such time that they are apprehended and the Court
acquires jurisdiction over their persons.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the CA affirmed accused-appellant's conviction as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated September 25,
2012, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 3638-07 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue

Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

In Miranda v. People,6 the Court ruled that:

The elements of the crime of theft are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the. taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified when any of the
following circumstances under Article 310 is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation; (5) the property stolen· is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident
or civil disturbance.7

The elements aforementioned were all alleged and proved. First, there was a taking of personal property
consisting of pieces of jewelry, i.e. two men's rings and one necklace with pendant. Second, said pieces of
jewelry belong to the Pawnshop. Third, the taking of said pieces of jewelry was with intent to gain. Intent
to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of
the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain. Fourth, the taking was obviously without the consent of the Pawnshop; and, Fifth, the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.8
Theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of
confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party that might create a
high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused.9 Accused-appellant, as
established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop. Accused-appellant could not have
committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the trusted employee which gave him not
only sole access to the Pawnshop's vault but also control of the premises. The relevant portion of the
RTC's disquisition reads:

Based on the extant records[,] it appears that accused Luther Sabado was a trusted employee of Diamond
Pawnshop.1âwphi1 In fact, the following circumstances show the trust and confidence reposed on him by
the shop owners, to wit: he manages the shop alone; he has the keys to the locks of the shop; and he has
access to the vault and knows the combination of the same. x x x.10

The management of Diamond Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in the accused-
appellant, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and
prejudice of his employer.

We view with disfavor accused-appellant's plea of acquittal on the ground that there exists. no evidence
which linked him directly to or showed his participation in the robbery. He underscores in particular that
nobody witnessed what transpired inside the pawnshop during the incident, hence, he must be excused
from any criminal liability. This contention is unmeritorious because even if it was not shown that he
personally took away the pieces of jewelry, his overt act of opening the steel gate, facilitating the entry of
one of his co-accused inside the pawnshop, and opening of the vault despite his avowal that the vault
was controlled by a time delay mechanism, showed his complicity in the commission of the crime
charged.

The CA correctly appreciated conspiracy between accused-appellant and the other accused. It has already
been settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.11 Here, conspiracy is inferred from the conduct of
accused-appellant and the other accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. In
particular, accused-appellant's act of ushering in one of his co-accused inside the pawnshop already
constitutes an overt act of his coordination with and actual participation in the common purpose or
design to commit the felony.

Absent any showing that the RTC and the CA have overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which,
if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to their appreciation of the
facts and of the credibility of witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 13, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05984, finding accused-appellant Luther Sabado y Pangangaan GUILTY of
the crime of Qualified Theft is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA 6

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In an information[3] dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an
Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this
City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer
GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth P303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of P303,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his
father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number
PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he
would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
[5]

6
People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 254 (2004).
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return
it on the same day as he was supposed to.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.

Q: How much is your boundary?

A: P780.00, sir.

Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.

Q: What is that something you mentioned?

A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.

Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect
(sic) by your company when you return a taxi?

A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of taxi?

A: Daewoo taxi, sir.

Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?

A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.[6]

The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was
not returned.[7] Arriving at appellants house, he did not find the taxi there, appellants wife telling him
that her husband had not yet arrived.[8] Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth
Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing.[9]

On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.[10] Cipriano lost no time in repairing to
Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.[11]

Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25,
1996 as he was short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually
returned it on January 5, 1997;[12] and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of P2,000.00[13]
to his wife whom he instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee[14] and to
tell the latter that he could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.[15]

Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the
boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996),[16] Cipriano was already demanding the return
of the taxi.[17]
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,[18]
which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer P2,500.00[19]
as partial payment for the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.

Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his drivers license
with Cipriano;[20] that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his
drivers license, and with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife
started working on February 18, 1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of P1,300.00,
[21] until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation;
[22] and that with his obligation extinguished, his drivers license was returned to him.[23]

Brushing aside appellants claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid
the total amount of P4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft
by Decision of May 17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:

Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.[25]

It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if
they have not been specifically assigned.[26]

Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain
vehicles,[27] by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND
PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to
the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having
thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a
new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be
construed together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be
compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the
old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression
of the legislative will . . . [34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.[35]

Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a
domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is
either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.[36]

On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are
thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of
the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.[37]

Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,[38] the concept of unlawful taking
in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.[39]

In the 2000 case of People v. Tan7where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of
People v. Lobitania8 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the

7
People v. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, 39 (2000).
8
People v. Lobitania 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002).
unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on
qualified theft or robbery.

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and
theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with
the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to
gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute. 9
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor
vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run
only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.[43]

From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the
anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle
does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.

The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft
notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that
the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime.[44]

In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by
Cipriano without the latters consent.[45] Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of
carnapping,[46] and the prosecution proved the same.

Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.

9
People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002); People v. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, 39 (2000).
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he
was supposed to is admitted.[47]

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.[48]

While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver
and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to
company practice and against the owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an
unlawful one.[49] Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no
longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its return.

Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi
without the owners consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to
remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to
gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in character, he having returned it.

Appellants position does not persuade.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.[51] Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.[52] The term
gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may
be derived or expected from the act which is performed.[53] Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.[54]

In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission 10 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World
Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmens Insurance Co, Inc.11 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice),
interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of
another without the latters consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being
intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was temporary and for a joy ride, the
Court sustains as the better view[57] that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going
to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession

10
Villacorta v. Insurance Commission, 100 SCRA 467 (1980).
11
Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmens Insurance Co., Inc., 124 SCRA 618, 620-621 (1983).
of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives
therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work
Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it hurt de uso.[58]
12
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Besides, the trial court did not believe appellants claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5,
1997.

The Court can not (sic) believe accuseds assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997
to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of P4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted
boundary for ten (10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the
taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the
amount of P2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination,
he claimed that he gave P2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.[59]

The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered,
would alter the result of the case.[60] The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct
advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.[61]

Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he
indeed returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have any copy of that record?

12
People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 254 (2004).
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my drivers license with
them, sir.

Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over
any money to your employer when you returned the taxi?

A: I gave them [an] additional P2,500.00, sir.

Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short
boundary (sic)?

A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay P4,500.00.

Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this P4,500.00?

A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay the
balance in installment.[62] (Emphasis supplied)

While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned
the taxi on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of P4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary
fee, appellant did not produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such
alleged record book is in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant
has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.[63]

The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the
imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of
confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of
application, either by express provision or by necessary implication.[64]

Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the
application of penalties under the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or
applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.[65]

Thus, in People v. Panida[66] which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum,
this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law
provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years
and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules
for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions
based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty of
14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that
penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the
Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months, as maximum.[67] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not
more than 17 years and 4 months,[68] for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence cannot be appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,[69] as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same the penalty imposed
being a range.[70]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-
71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135904. January 21, 2000]

People vs. Tan13

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter TAN) seeks
his acquittal by a reversal of the 29 June 1998 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20688
which affirmed his conviction for violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping.[2] TAN's motion for reconsideration of said decision and motion for oral arguments were
denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its 6 October 1998 resolution.[3] Said decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 19 December 1994 judgment of conviction against TAN by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-93-45449.

TANs indictment[4] for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 reads as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) Mitsubishi Gallant car colored blue, bearing Plate No.
CGS-723 owned by one PHILIP SEE, of undetermined value, to the damage and prejudice of said Philip
See.

Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with the assistance of counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial immediately ensued as the parties waived the holding of a preliminary conference.

The trial court's terse recapitulation of the prosecution evidence proceeded in this manner:[5]

xxx [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-door valued
at P420,000.00, bearing plate no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no. 4G32-FG2704 and
serial/chassis no. A161UL-3011. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip by
Alvin's fiancee, one Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends and started to see each
other on several occasions thereafter.

On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip together with his wife Ruby See and Robert Chua (a
neighbor) was at his place of residence xxx when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to Philip that he
was intending to buy Philip's aforesaid car and that he wanted to test-drive it. On account of their
friendship and believing Alvin's assurance that he would return the car after he shall have test-driven it,
Philip granted Alvin's request xxx. On thus getting hold of the car, Alvin sped away and never returned. In
vain, Philip waited for Alvin to show up and return the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much less cause
the return of the car. Jksm
13
Tan, 323 SCRA 30.
Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin at his office at Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but Alvin avoided
him by refusing to answer the telephone calls or pretending he was not around; and Philip's attempts to
see Alvin at his office similarly proved futile, for whenever Philip would go to said office, Alvin would
refuse to see him. Dismayed though he was, Philip desisted as long as he could from reporting and
complaining about the matter to the authorities; Philip still believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually
would come around to returning the car to him. Meanwhile, sometime on March 5, 1993, with the
assistance of some personnel of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car's
1993 renewal registration in the absence of the vehicle and he was issued the corresponding official
receipt therefor.

Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to see Alvin at his place at Roosevelt. Again Philip was told
that Alvin was not around. One of Alvin's employees, however, advised Philip to the effect that the car
was parked and hidden right behind Alvin's warehouse. The location of the warehouse having been given
to him, Philip went to the place and at a distance of some five feet, he saw the vehicle parked at the rear
end of the warehouse. To his shock and surprise, he saw that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door,
and several interior accessories, had been dismantled and were already missing. Worse, several pieces of
wood were piled on top of the car as if purposely hide and conceal it from view.

Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about June 2, 1993, formally lodged a complaint for carnapping
against Alvin before the QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993, Philip reported the
loss of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Traffic Management Command and he accordingly
signed the corresponding complaint sheets. Too, an alarm for the subject car was issued. To his further
shock and consternation, Philip was informed by the PNP's Highway Patrol Group (HPG) that somebody
had applied for a clearance to sell the car and that the applicant was made to appear as one Philip See.
xxx Philip denied his alleged signature on the application and also denied having supposedly applied for
clearance to sell his vehicle.

Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by Philip against Alvin before the QC police station 1, the
police authorities scheduled a visit to the place of Alvin, with Philip being asked by them to pinpoint and
identify Alvin in the course thereof. Accordingly, at Alvin's place, he was identified and invited by the
police to the station for investigation. While still at Alvin's office, Philip saw on top of Alvin's table what
Philip believed to be accessories from his car, consisting of a two-way radio antenna and car stereo,
which appeared to him to have been dismantled from the subject car.

At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to test-drive it on November 7, 1992, the car was in top
condition, had low mileage, was 'fully loaded' with complete interior accessories including an imported
Kenwood stereo, and had imported magwheels. Chief

Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution's version and presented a completely diverse tale.
Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter SEE) filed the complaint to purposely collect a debt from
him and wittingly use the court as collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE instituted the
complaint in revenge of the quarrels they had over TANs girlfriend whom SEE wooed, and (2) in
retaliation against the complaint for grave threats and illegal possession of firearms filed by one of TAN's
employees against SEE.

TAN then traced this legal predicament to the time when his girlfriend introduced him to SEE in March
1992. TAN and SEE instantly became friends for they shared a similar acumen for business and passion for
target shooting. Inevitably, they engaged in and entered into several business transactions which resulted
in TAN's indebtedness to SEE in the amount of P800,000. Inspite of this, SEE still offered to sell the subject
Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for the amount of P280,000. TAN declined the offer. SEE persisted to the extent
that he brought the car to TAN's residence on 26 November 1992 and generously suggested that he
would just add into the latter's existing indebtedness to him the car's purchase price.

Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect the car's purchase price but TAN had still no funds. So
TAN suggested that he would apply with a bank for a car loan using the car as security and apply the
proceeds of said loan in payment for the car. SEE agreed. Subsequently, TAN submitted in his name a loan
application with the BPI Family Bank in Makati. In compliance with the requirements of the loan
application, SEE personally supervised the car's appraisal and inspection on 19 March 1993. TAN
additionally maintained that he and SEE signed a deed of sale covering the subject automobile but that
TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon SEE's pretext that he would use it for facilitation of the loan.

The bank approved the loan application but only in the amount of P129,000. Naturally, SEE considered
the amount insufficient and hence, refused to accept the terms of the loan. Consequently, TAN did not
seek the release of the loan. Esm

The friendship eventually soured and the resulting "misunderstanding" with SEE impelled TAN on 19 May
1993 to instruct his warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE's residence. TAN's employee drove the
car to SEE's house, parked the car outside the gate and then handed over the keys of the car to SEE's
wife, Ruby.

Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June 1993, police officers arrived at his residence and invited
him to the police station; this, to TAN's additional bewilderment, was in connection with SEE's complaint
for the carnapping of the car he already returned. TAN peacefully went with the police authorities to the
station.[6]

Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court believed in the prosecutions version, particularly in
SEE's clear, positive, and straightforward account - which said court found amply demonstrated - that SEE
had withdrawn the consent initially given to TAN when the latter went beyond test-driving and
appropriated the car for his own use and benefit. To the trial court, TAN's failure to return the car and his
consequent appropriation thereof constituted unlawful taking -- the gravamen of the crime charged. It
then concluded that TAN was obviously actuated by intent to gain. The trial court then considered as
completely undeserving of belief, TAN's supposition that despite his heavy indebtedness and given his
increasing difficulty to pay his loans, SEE had benignly extended him credit, delivered to him the subject
car and bestowed upon him the ultimate privilege of paying the car at his convenience. Thus, in a decision
promulgated on 19 January 1994, the trial court convicted TAN, the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:[7]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan y Lagamayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of carnapping charged herein, defined and punished in Sec. 2, in connection with Sec. 14, both of Rep. Act
No. 6539 xxx and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from fourteen years, eight months, and fifteen days as minimum, to seventeen years
and four months as maximum; to restore to the offended party, Philip See, the subject car x x x or in
default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of four hundred twenty thousand pesos;
and, to pay the costs, without prejudice to the application of Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused's favor. Esmsc

TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which was granted by the
trial court in its 4 July 1994 order. SEE then moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the trial court
in its 1 March 1995 order. SEE challenged these aforementioned orders of the trial court in a petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the appellate court gave due course to and
granted the petition. TAN assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
before the Supreme Court, which promptly dismissed the petition.[8]

Subsequently, based on TAN's "Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam," the trial court ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, TAN challeged the Court of Appeals' affirmance of his conviction. He argues before this Court
that the appellate court erred in (1) ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on carnapping, (2)
disregarding that there was no unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting circumstances on record which, if
considered, would be sufficient to acquit him on reasonable doubt.

In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law, TAN contends that the Court of Appeals should not have
employed as bases for his conviction the basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People v. Roxas,[9]
where rice was received, carted away and consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera,[10] where a bar of gold and
P200 in bank notes were received for examination and changing into coins but instead appropriated, and
(3) People v. Trinidad,[11] where a ring was received for pledging but was sold and the proceeds thereof
appropriated for the personal use of receiver.

A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the challenged Court of Appeals decision reveals that the
basic principles of theft alluded to pertain to the signification of unlawful taking and as to when this takes
place. Thus, the Court in Roxas, de Vera and Trinidad declared that "the unlawful taking or deprivation
may occur at or soon after the transfer of physical possession" where "an act done by the receiver soon
after the actual transfer of possession resulted in unlawful taking." In such a case, "the article was taken
away, not received, although at the beginning the article was in fact given and received." Hence, in
applying these principles, the Court of Appeals adopted the theory of the Solicitor General that SEE
entrusted his car to TAN merely for test driving, and the latter initially received the same for that purpose
only; TAN must perforce be deemed to have unlawfully "taken" the car soon after the test-driving for he
failed to show-up and return said vehicle.[12]

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crimes of robbery and
theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent of gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.[13] But a careful comparison of this special law
with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latters consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles.[14] Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent
to gain, without the owners consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence or
intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law,
such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was
certainly the case before the enactment of said statute. Esmmis

Obviously, TANs proposition that the rudiments of theft, particularly as regards unlawful taking, should
not have been applied by the Court of Appeals, was misplaced. We shall see later on that the appellate
courts interpretation redounded in TANs favor. As an element common to theft, robbery and carnapping,
unlawful taking -- its import, intention and concept -- should be considered as also common to these
crimes.[15] However, we reject the Court of Appeals acceptance, hook, line and sinker of the Office of the
Solicitor Generals thesis that there was unlawful taking in this case.

SEE asserted that on 7 November 1992 he turned over possession of his Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for
test-driving only, but the latter did not return the same after the lapse of not just several hours but a
number of months. SEE formally filed the complaint for carnapping on 2 June 1993. In the meantime,
during the seven-month interval when the car was allegedly in TANs possession, (1) SEE had persistently
and perseveringly attempted to talk to and see TAN but the latter adamantly refused to respond to his
telephone calls or personally receive him in his visits; (2) SEE was able to register the car with the LTO on
5 March 1993; and (3) SEE had seen his car on 19 May 1993 from a distance of some five feet, parked at
the rear of TANs warehouse and in the initial stages of dismantling. SEE also believed that "being a friend,
[TAN] eventually would come around to returning the car to him."[16] Esmso

Even solely from this testimony, this Court finds that there was no unlawful taking. A felonious taking may
be defined as the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable property without
his privity and consent and without animus revertendi.[17] Thus, an unlawful taking takes place when the
owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to the taking; or, if the consent was given, it was
vitiated; or in the case of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera, where an act by the receiver soon after the actual
transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the last scenario, the receivers act could be
considered as having been executed without the consent of the giver. SEEs testimony clearly evinced his
assent to TANs taking of the car not only at the time he yielded the physical possession thereof for the
alleged test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his consent nor withdrew the same
during the seven month period the car was with TAN. At the very least, SEE tolerated TAN's possession of
the car. A contrary conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if the car was truly carnapped, why did SEE wait
for seven months before he reported the same? Further, TANs alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his
repeated attempts to do so should have sufficiently alerted him of the formers supposed malevolent
intent, yet he still did not report the taking. Even if he failed to report the taking, months after the alleged
test-driving, he had allegedly seen his car in the initial stages of dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet,
again, he did not report the carnapping on that day nor on the next, but much later on 7 June 1993 or
almost a month thereafter.

SEE said he believed and expected that the car would inevitably be returned to him. This is not only
unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and contradictory with his imputations of carnapping. For if he believed
that the vehicle would be returned to him for friendship's sake then he could not have at the same time
also believed that this friend carnapped his car. Clearly, SEEs behavior immediately preceding,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged unlawful taking was definitely not the distraught
conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He was even able to register the averred stolen vehicle
without sounding the alarm.

A fortiori, the cases of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera cited by the Court of Appeals have no application here
as no unlawful deprivation or taking of SEEs possession of, enjoyment and benefit over the car occurred
soon or long after his initial consent to the transfer thereof. Neither was there an act executed by TAN
soon after the alleged test-driving that would constitute unlawful taking. These conclusions are
buttressed by TANs testimony, duly supported by documentary evidence, that SEE cooperated with him
for the availment of a car loan with the BPI Family Bank in Makati, and that SEE personally attended to
the inspection and appraisal of the subject car. The records, therefore, do not support the finding of
carnapping. Msesm

Noticeably, the Court of Appeals' erroneous contrary conclusions were heavily predicated on the
arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General that TANs failure to show a written deed of sale and to
seek the release of his car loan "were inconsistent with [the latter's] idea of sale." It then posed four
questions which it concluded "certainly debilitated the pretensions of [TAN]," thus:[18]

If there was really a deed of sale, why could not [TAN] present a copy thereof?

Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TANs] copy of the deed of sale, why did he not secure another copy
from the notary public who notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he not present the notary public
to testify on the fact of the sale?

Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to [TAN] at P280,000.00 when the latter was admittedly
indebted to the former to the tune of P800,000?
If [TAN] really bought the subject car from private complainant, why did he have to return the same (car)
to the latter on May 14, 1993?

From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that the Court of Appeals simply equated the lack of a
written deed of sale to SEE's lack of consent to TAN's taking of the car. But the mere absence of a written
contract of sale in this case does not necessarily mean that SEE did not also consent to the taking nor that
TAN's possession of the car was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus probandi of showing that
TAN's taking was unlawful. What took place in these proceedings was that the appellate court magnified
the weakness of the defense and overlooked the prosecutions failure to discharge the onus probandi -- to
show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of carnapping was indeed perpetrated. In short, the Court
of Appeals and the trial court simply believed and accepted the prosecutions tale. It ignored the basic
legal precepts that conviction rests upon the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense; and assuming that the evidence of the accused is weak, the
same is no reason to convict, especially, as in this case, where the case of the prosecution is not strong
enough to sustain a conviction.[19] To reiterate, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and
unless the State succeeds in proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest on nothing less
than the moral certainty of guilt.[20] Exsm

There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, for upon this
principle hinges the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law. However, it appears on record that the appellate
court overlooked, ignored, and disregarded some fact and circumstance of weight or significance that if
considered would have altered the result. Cogent reasons therefore exist justifying the disregard of the
findings of the appellate court, superseding the same with our own determinations and conclusions, and
ordering the reversal of the questioned decision and resolution of said Court of Appeals.[21]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the herein impugned 29 June 1998 decision and 6 October 1998
resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts judgment convicting accused-appellant Alvin
Tan of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new judgment
is entered ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on ground of reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 213913, September 02, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN A.K.A."JUL" AND
"REY", Accused-Appellant.14

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated May 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated October 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Comt (RTC)
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11421 and MC08-11422.

The consolidated cases for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, and Qualified Theft were filed on January 16, 2008 against accused Julkipli Asamuddin y
Salapudin (appellant). The accusatory portions of the Informations alleged as
follow:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421:

For Violation of R.A. No. 6539

That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, ste[a]l and carry away a motorcycle, Honda XRM with plate no. UU-9142 amounting to P49,000.00
belonging to EMELINA GLORIA Y UMAL[I] without the latter's consent, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned sum ofP49,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3cralawrednad

Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422:

For Qualified Theft

14
PEOPLE v. JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN A.K.A."JUL" AND "REY", G.R. No. 213913, September 02,
2015, available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/september2015/213913.pdf (last accessed Nov. 25, 2018).
That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as a messenger of
E. Gloria's Money Changer owned by Emelina Gloria y Umali, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of the trust reposed upon him, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash
money of various denominations P800,000.00, Yen 660,000.00, Pounds 50.00, Dirham 530.00, Brunei
Dollar 100.00 and Singapore Dollar 467.00 with an aggregate amount of P1,077,995.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P1,077,995.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The criminal cases were temporarily archived, but were revived with the arrest of appellant in
Zamboanga City on February 25, 2009.

Assisted by a counsel de oficio at his arraignment on August 19, 2009, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
both charges.5cralawrednad

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Emelina Gloria y Umali (Emelina), proprietor of E. Gloria
Money Changer where appellant works as a messenger; and fmee Gerbon6 (Imee), domestic helper of
Emelina. Among the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution were (1) the list of currencies
Emelina entrusted to appellant that fateful day of July 11, 2007 (Exhibit "F"7); and (2) Sales Invoice Retail
No. 16607 (Exhibit "I"8), Official Receipt (Exhibit "J''9), and certification (Exhibit "K"10), all issued by
Triumph JT Marketing Corporation, which show that the Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-
9142 was purchased by Emelina's husband.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He denied the charges against him.

THE FACTS

Emelina hired appellant as messenger in E. Gloria Money Changer, Mandaluyong City, sometime in 2006,
with the main function of delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers.11
Assigned to appellant to be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM motorcycle with
plate number UU-9142.12cralawrednad

At 12:30 in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, Emelina handed to appellant the cash amount of P800,000.00,
and various foreign denominations consisting of 66 pieces of lapad,13 50 pounds, 530 dirhams, 467
Singaporean dollars, and 100 Brunei dollars,14 with a peso value of P277,995.00.15 She instructed
appellant to bring the currencies to her friend Rina Rosalial, a money changer in Mabini, Manila.16 After
receiving the monies from Emelina, appellant left aboard his service motorcycle on his way to
Manila.17cralawrednad

Imee, the domestic helper of Emelina, was then inside E. Gloria Money Changer, and saw Emelina hand to
appellant currencies of various denominations,18 and as appellant left his service
motorcycle.19cralawrednad

By 1:30 p.m. of the same day, Emelina received a call from Rina Rosalial informing her that appellant has
yet to arrive in her shop.20 Emelina's calls to the cellular phones of appellant and his wife were at
naught,21 prompting her to lodge a complaint against appellant at the Philippine National Police,
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Camp Crame.22cralawrednad

In August 2007, the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 was found abandoned in
Silang, Cavite, and was returned to Emelina.23cralawrednad

Appellant vehemently denied asporting currency totaling P1,077,995.00, and the subject motorcycle. He
admitted working as a Messenger/Runner at the E. Gloria Money Changer starting October 2006 but he
resigned from his job on July 10, 2007. Appellant asserted that the money he received from Emelina on
July 11, 2007 was his last salary for the period July 1 to 10, 2007. His family's return to Zamboanga City on
September 7, 2007 was due to the high cost of living in Metro Manila which he could no longer
afford.24cralawrednad

Relying on the categorical and straightforward testimony of Emelina, and rejecting the defense of denial
advanced by appellant, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict in both criminal cases,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused JULKIPILI ASAMUDDIN Y
SALAPUDIN @ ''Jul" and "Rey" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972)[,] as amended[,] and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, as maximum. Likewise[,] the court finds JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua but with all the accessories of the penalty imposed under Article 40 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accused is also condemned to pay the offended party, EMELINA GLORIA Y UMALI[,] the sum
of Php1,877,995.00, as actual damages representing the total amount of the money entrusted to him by
the said offended party.

Further, let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused JULKlPLI ASAMUDDIN Y
SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey" from Mandaluyong City Jail to the BBureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.25cralawred

On November 6, 2012, appellant timely tiled his Notice of Appeal.26 The consolidated cases were
subsequently elevated to the CA, and was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870. Before the CA,
appellant ascribed to the RTC the following errors:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING [APPELLANT'S] TESTIMONY.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND
CARNAPPING DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.27

In the Decision dated May 22, 2014, the appellate court dismissed the appeal but modified appellant's
civil liability in Criminal Case No. MC08-11422 by reducing the awarded actual damages from
P1,877,995.00 to P1,077,995.00.28 The appellate court emphasized that the amount alleged in the
Information for Qualified Theft, and established by Exhibit "F" was only PI,077,995.00.29cralawrednad

Appellant perfected his appeal to this Court with the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal on June 16,
2014.30 The Solicitor General and appellant separately manifested to adopt their respective briefs filed
before the CA as their supplemental briefs.31cralawrednad

The main issue for resolution is whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of the appellant for
Qualified Theft and Carnapping.

The Court rules in the affirmative and finds the appeal without merit.

Appellant primarily assails the testimony of Emelina to be inadequate to anchor his conviction for the
crimes charged. Branding Emelina's testimony to be self-serving, unsubstantiated, and uncorroborated by
documentary and credible testimonial evidence, appellant asserted that no credible proof was presented
by the prosecution to establish that he actually received from Emelina the subject peso and foreign
currencies and that he used and unlawfully took away the service motorcycle.

When the credibility of the witness is in issue, the settled rule is that the trial court's assessment thereof
is accorded great weight by appellate courts absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain
matters which, if taken into consideration, would have materially affected the outcome of the case.32
And where the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.33 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial
court judge because of his untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness on
the stand and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth.34 After a circumspect scrutiny of
the records of the case, we find no reason to modify, alter or reverse the factual finding of the lower
court and affirmed by the CA that in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, appellant received money from
Emelina; used his service motorcycle; and disappeared with the money and the motorcycle.

Moreover, appellant failed to establish the alleged ill-motive of Emelina in implicating him in the present
case. No evidence was presented to show that the business of Emelina incurred losses that needed to be
concealed from her business partners. Absent any improper motive to falsely testify against the
appellant, Emelina's declarations are worthy of full faith and credence.35 In like manner, Imee's
employment as the domestic servant of Emelina is not a ground to disregard her testimony. Relationship
alone is not enough reason to discredit and label Imee's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. It
is settled that the witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or
her testimony.36cralawrednad

We now resolve the criminal liability of the appellant for the unlawful taking of the service motorcycle,
and the peso and foreign currencies amounting to a total of P1,077,995.00.

I. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421 (For Violation of R.A. No. 6539)

The elements of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;

(2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and

(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37cralawrednad

All these elements were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Exhibits "I"38 "J"39 and "K",40 proved that the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142
used as a service vehicle by appellant was acquired from Triumph JT Marketing Corporation by Manolito,
Emelina's spouse, establishing the first element.
It is the second element that the appellant claimed was not proven because the prosecution's evidence
failed to show that he took the motorcycle without the consent of Emelina. Indeed, Emelina herself
tasked the appellant to proceed to Mabini, Manila, and permitted him to use the service motorcycle.

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.41 In Roque v. People,42 the Court ruled that qualified theft may be committed even
when the personal property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the
felony. The concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same,43the holding in
Roque v. People44 equally applies to carnapping. Henee, in People v. Bustinera,45 appellant, who was
hired as taxi driver, was found guilty of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539 after he failed to return the
Daewoo Racer taxi assigned to him by the cab company where he was employed.

In the present case, the Solicitor General aptly argued that appellant's failure to return the motorcycle to
Emelina after his working hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.46 constitutes "unlawful taking". Emelina
lodged a complaint against appellant with the PNP-CIDG for the loss of the service motorcycle47
confirming that appellant's continued possession thereof is without her authority.

The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle will not preclude the presence of the third element.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain or animus lucrandi.48 Intent
to gain is an internal act presumed from the unlawful taking49 of the motor vehicle which the appellant
failed to overcome with evidence to the contrary. Verily, the mere use of the thing unlawfully taken
constitutes gain.50cralawrednad

Appellant is thus guilty of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539.

II. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422 (For Qualified Theft)

Appellant asserted that he cannot be convicted of Qualified Theft because his employment as messenger
did not create a fiduciary relationship that will qualify the crime of theft. He also insisted that Exhibit "F"
is self-serving and is incompetent to establish the amount of money handed to him by Emelina.

For the successful prosecution for Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence, the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) taking of personal
property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's consent; (5) that it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave
abuse of confidence.51cralawrednad
All these elements are present in the instant case. Emelina positively and credibly testified that she
entrusted to appellant the amount of P800,000.00 and foreign currencies valued at P277,995.00. Instead
of delivering the money to the designated money changer as directed by Emelina, appellant breached the
trust reposed in him and disappeared with the cash bills.

We agree with the RTC and the CA that a fiduciary relationship between appellant and Emelina, his
employer, existed contrary to the assertion of appellant.

In Candelaria v. People,52 petitioner Candelaria was the driver of the truck loaded with liters of diesel
fuel for delivery to a customer. Instead of delivering the fuel, petitioner Candelaria disappeared together
with the truck and its cargo. With the recovery of the truck, petitioner Candelaria was convicted of
Qualified Theft for the lost fuel.

Here, the function of the appellant as a messenger of the E. Gloria Money Changer is to deliver amounts
of money, both peso and foreign currency, to the clients or to exchange the currency with another money
changer. Emelina routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily basis, various amounts of money from
P50,000.00 to P500,000.0053 without requiring the latter to acknowledge receipt thereof. Emelina
testified that she does not have proof that he handed to appellant P800,000.00 and various foreign
currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total trust and high degree of confidence on appellant
("tiwalaan lang po").54 This exhibited the trust and confidence of Emelina to the appellant which he
exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the former.

The straightforward and credible testimony55 of Emelina is adequate to establish the exact amount of
money handed to appellant. She could not have forgotten about the denominations given to appellant as
the same is subject of her transaction with a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and she counted56 the
same before handing it to appellant. Thus, the testimony of Emelina sufficiently proved beyond
reasonable doubt that she delivered to appellant monies valued in the total amount of P1,077,995.00.

APPELLANT'S DEFENSE

The lame defense of denial is all that appellant could offer against the prosecution evidence. Denial is a
negative and self-serving evidence that requires to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence of
nonculpability to merit credibility.57 Otherwise, it will not overcome the testimony of the prosecution
witness/es who testified on affirmative matters.58 Except for the testimonial assertion of appellant in
the present case, no credible corroborating evidence was presented by the defense to bolster his denial.
Emelina's positive assertions that she handed to appellant the money to be delivered to a money changer
in Mabini, Manila, and that he did not return the service motorcycle, prevail over the denial of the
appellant. Appellant's admission59 that he was at E. Gloria Money Changer shop in the morning of July
11, 2007 further served to bolster the testimony of Emelina.
In the face of the overwhelming and positive evidence against the appellant, even if his return to
Zamboanga City is disregarded as an indication of his guilty conscience, his conviction should still be
sustained. Unfortunately for appellant, there is no case law holding non-flight as an indication or as
conclusive proof of innocence.60cralawrednad

THE PENALTIES

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed in Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421 (for carnapping) the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, which is within
the range of the imposable penalty under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for Qualified Theft in Criminal
Case No. MCOS-11422. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one. prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year tor each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

The basic penalty when the value of the stolen item exceeded P22,000.00 is the maximum period of the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods which is 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10
years of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the difference after deducting
P22,000.00 shall be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The amount of
cash stolen by appellant is P1,077,995.00. Thus, 105 years61 shall be added to the basic penalty.
However, the penalty for Simple Theft cannot go beyond 20 years of reclusion temporal, and such will be
the sentence of appellant if he committed Simple Theft.
The penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher under Article 31062 of the Revised Penal Code, thus
appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. However, appellant is disqualified under R.A.
No. 9346,63 in relation to Resolution No. 24-4-1064 to avail the benefits of parole.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated May 22, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.65cralawrednad

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez* and Mendoza,** JJ., concur.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Endnotes:

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2084
dated June 29,2015.

** Designated additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated
September 17, 2014.

1 CA rollo, pp. 104-117. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Edwin D.
Sorongon and Pedro B. Corales concurring.

2 Id. at 40-47. Penned by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.

3 Records, p. 1.

4 Id. at 19.

5 Id. at 72-73.

6 Emie Garbon and Immie in some parts of the records.

7 Records, p. 166.

8 Id. at 69.

9 Id. at 170.

10 Id. at 171.

11 TSN, August 2, 2010, p. 10.

12 Id. at 12-13.

13 A lapad is the colloquial term for a 10,000 yen.

14 TSN, August 2, 2010, pp. 16-19.

15 Exhibit "F," supra note 7. [(¥660,000 X .3785) P249,810.00 + (£50.00 X 93.10) P4,655.00 +(Dirham
530.00 X P12.25) P6,492.00 (Brunei 100.00 X P30.05) P3,005.00 + Singapore $467 X 30.05) P14,033.00].

16 TSN, August 2, 2010, pp. 17-19.

17 Id. at 19-20.

18 TSN, November 21, 2011, pp. 15-18.

19 Id. at 18-19.

20 TSN, August 2, 20 I0, pp. 20-21.

21 Id. at 21-22.
22 Records, pp. 9-11.

23 TSN, August 2, 2010, pp. 32-35.

24 TSN, May 16, 2012, pp. 6-40.

25cralawred CA rollo, pp. 46-47.

26 Records, p. 236.

27 CA rollo, p. 32.

28 Id. at 116.

29 ld. at 110.

30 Id. at 121 and 124.

31Rollo, pp. 33 and 38.

32Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333 (2001 ), citing People v. Rimorin, 387 Phil. 925, 933 (2000).

33Polo v. People, 591 Phil. 76, 80 (2008), citing Danofrata v. People, 458 Phil. 1018, 10?6-1 027 (2003).

34People v. Dela Cruz, 433 Phil. 739, 757 (2002), citing People v. Castro, 346 Phil. 894, 905-906 (1997);
People v. Rehato, 410 Phil. 470, 478-479 (2001).

35 People v. Guillera, 601 Phil. 155, 165 (2009), citing Tadeja v. People, 528 Phil. 592, 600 (2006) and
People v. Celis, 375 Phil. 491, 505 (1999).
36People v. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696,716 (2002), citing People v. Quilang, 371 Phil. 241, 255 (1999).

37People v. Lagat, 673 Phil. 351, 366 (2011), citing People v. Bernabe, 448 Phil. 269, 280 (2003).

38 Records, p. 169.

39 Id. at 170.

40 Id. at 171.

41 People v. Lagat, supra note 37, at 367, quoting People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, 431
SCRA 284, 295.

42 486 Phil. 288, 305-310 (2004).

43People v. Bustinera, supra note 41, at 292, citing People v. Fernandez, 460 Phil. 194, 211-212 (2003);
People v. Sia, 421 Phil. 784, 798 (2001); People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1006 (2000).

44Roque v. People, supra note 42.

45 Supra note 41.

46 TSN, May 16, 2012, p. 9.

47 Records, p. 9.

48Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 622, 631-632.

49Sazon v. Samliganhayan (Fourth Division), 598 Phil. 35, 46 (2009).

50 The term "gain'' is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. See People v. Bustinera, supra
note 41, at 296, citing 3 R. Aquino & C. Grino-Aquino, TilE REVISED PENAL CODE 206 (1997).

51People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 906 (20 II), citing People v. Puig, 585 Phil. 555, 562 (2008); Roque v.
People, supra note 42, at 311.

52 G.R. No. 209386, December 8, 2014.

53 TSN, August 2, 2010, p. II.

54 Id. at 37.

55 Sec id. at 16-23.

56 TSN, August I, 20 II, p. 25.

57People v. Astrologo, 551 Phil. 916, 928 (2007).

58 People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 457 (2001), citing People v. Quilatan, 395 Phil. 444, 450 (2000).

59 TSN, May 16,2012, pp. 16-19.

60People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 89 (2003).

61 P1,077,995.00 less P22,000.00 equals P1,055,995. P1,055,995 divided by P10,000.00 equals

P105.5995.

62 ART. 310. Qualified theft. -The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 254 (2004)
People v. Lagat, G.R.No. 187044, Sept. 14, 2011
People v. Nocum, G.R.No. 179041, April 1, 2013

GR. No. 203466, February 25, 201515

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and
prosecuted, states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]

x x x x

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,

namely:

x x x x

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the

prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the

15
 duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other
property[.]
cralawlawlibrary

The elements of Estafa16 iunder this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender
of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received. cralawred

Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession17 means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. cralawred

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is

42
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.  The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the
employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-
43
perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.  Hence, conversion of
personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said
property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property
18
constitutes Estafa. cralawred

Pwede gayahin as CONCLUSION

In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through misappropriation has not been
established, insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely material and not
45
juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime. cralawred

The Court agrees.

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the
end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together with the
46
corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag.  As such, the money merely passes into her
hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employeeof
47
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.

48
In Chua-Burce v. CA,  the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-Burce)
of Estafaon the ground that the element of juridical possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the
Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v.
49
CA, where a travelling sales agent was convicted of the crime of Estafa for his failure to return to his
16
D'Aigle v. People, 689 Phil. 480, 489 (2012).
17
Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 15, 26 (2000).

18
Matrido v. People, 610 Phil. 203, 214 (2009).
principal the proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the
distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal
liability for Estafa, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
i