194 ENEMY OR FOE

Enemy or Foe: A Conflict of Modem Polities'

George Schwab

In 1927 Schmitt provided a fundamental criterion of international relations

in the epoch of the European sovereign state: the distinction between friend
and enemy.1 His criterion also held true in domestic relations when quarrels
reached the point of civil war. He measured political relations by die ever-pre-
sent possibility of conflict diat may cause deadi.2 By confining his discussion
of politics to die European sovereign state — roughly die period from die
16di and 17th century to our own — Schmitt saw international relations
between such states in time of peace as subject to certain accepted "rules of
die game." This, in turn, had definite repercussions on die conduct of states
in time of war. Since political relations in different eras assumed various
forms among independent political entities in time of peace, and since such
relations were not always bound by mutually accepted rules, die conduct of
such states in time of war also reflected diis fact. Widi die decline of die epoch
of die European sovereign state, Schmitt's account needs to be reconsidered
in light of die conceptual distinction between enemy and foe.
Aldiough die enemy-foe distinction may appear to be purely linguistic, die
distinction conceals a difference essential for a meaningful understanding of
modem politics. Some languages are more fortunate dian odiers in offering
two distinct terms to designate an adversary. The English words enemy and foe
have dieir linguistic counterparts in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, and die dis-
tinction has definite political implications. For example, die Hebrew Bible re-
fers consistendy to die private adversary as soneh and die public adversary as
ojeb. The Greeks similarly distinguished between echtrfs and polSmios; die Ro-
mans, between inimicus and hostis. Common English parlance, however, often
and mistakenly uses die terms enemy and foe synonymously.
Whedier international politics in time of peace is based on seeing die odier

* [Ed.] This essay has been specially edited for this issue. It originally appeared in
German in Epirrhosis: Festgabefiir Carl Schmitt, ed. by Hans Barion et al. (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1968), vol. II, pp. 665-682. A Japanese translation appeared in 1980. The ene-
my/foe thesis has also been discussed by Ion X. Contiades in "Echtr6s und Polemios in
der modemen politischen Theorie und der griechischen Antike," Griechische Huma-
nistische Geselkchaft, Zweite Reihe (Athens, 1969). pp. 5ff. See also Christian Meier, Die
EntsUhung des Politischen bei den Griechen (Frankfurt a/M, 1983), pp. 152-53, 208-209.
1. Cf. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriffdes Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei
Corollarien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963, 1979). See also my translation based on
the 1963 edition: The Concept ofthe Political (New Brunswick, N J.: Rutgers University Press,
1976). For a detailed discussion of Schmitt's friend/enemy thesis, see Julien Freund, L'es-
sence du poMque (Paris: Iibrairie du Recueil Sirey,1965), pp. 448 ff.
2. Schmitt, Der Begriffdes Politischen, op. cit., pp. 28ff.
 GEORGE SCHWAB 195

as "enemy" or "foe" usually becomes dear during hostilities. The distinction

can be best understood by ascertaining whether certain accepted rules gov-
erning warfare are followed by combatants. Excesses in war are often not the
consequence of ordinary propaganda campaigns but of profound religious or
ideological convictions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Since the major pillars of Western culture are grounded in the Hebrew Bi-
ble, Greek and Roman thought and practice, it is useful to examine the an-
cient Israelites' concept of politics. In the Hebrew Bible politics is based on
religion. The command to love one's neighbor is understood in light of the
distinction between soneh and ojeb (Leviticus 19:18). A "neighbor" meant a fel-
low Israelite; if private antagonisms among neighbors resulted in damages, or
if the Israelites committed detrimental acts against all of Israel, punishment
was meted out according to their laws. But matters were different in relations
between die Israelites and "others." In Deuteronomy die "others" are usually
those people who stand in die way of God's chosen people in their journey to
die Holy Land.3 In view of die fact that die Israelites considered diemselves
die chosen people, diey did not accept die "odiers" as equals, and this dis-
tinction became obvious during die holy wars diey waged widi God's blessing
and his direct intervention.4 Believing diey fought for just causes, die Israel-
ites did not find it necessary to draw distinctions between combatants and
noncombatants, or between combat and noncombat areas. During periods of
hostilities, foes were indiscriminately put to deadi and property diat had not
been damaged was eidier destroyed or confiscated.5
A changed pattern of politics gradually emerged in classical Greece and
Rome. Noticeable was die absence in peacetime of major religious considera-
tions in die conduct of international relations. Widiin this relatively secular at-
mosphere, it became possible to normalize international political intercourse
among independent political entities. This development is obvious in die va-
rious kinds of treaties diat were signed.6
The normalization of political relations was followed by die acceptance of
procedures regarding ways in which hostilities were to be started. Herodotus

3. The Hebrew Bible contains a number of intermediary distinctions that have

definite legal implications, such as that between the clan and the foreigner — the pro-
tected sojourner, or the resident stranger. See Benjamin N. Nelson, The Idea of Usury:
From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1949), pp. xvff. But these intermediary designations do not obviate the fundamental
distinction.
4. For a general survey of the holy wars in the Hebrew Bible, see D. Gerhard von
Rad, Der heilige Krieg im Alten Testament (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1951), pp. 6ff.
5. Regarding war practices, Deuteronomy 20 states that cities located beyond the
borders of Israel which submitted to the Israelites were to be incorporated as
tributaries. If such cities refused to surrender, only males were to be put to death. All
inhabitants of cities within the confines of Israel were to be killed; the fruit trees were
to be spared and used by the victors.
6. For examples, see Henry Bengston, Die Vertrdge der griechisch-romischen Welt von
700 bis 338 v. Chr. (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962).
196 ENEMY OR FOE

observed that, prior to embarking on a war against a properly-organized politi-

cal entity, the Greeks usually made a public declaration of war.7 In reflecting on
Rome's practices, Cicero noted that just wars could only be waged against civil-
ized entities, not against persons living together in an irregular and precarious
association.8 For the Romans to embark on ajustum bellum meant that certain
formalities, particularly the act of declaring war, had to precede the actual out-
break of hostilities.9 Thus both Greeks and Romans drew a distinction between
a state of peace and a state of war — inter pawn et bellum nihil est medium.
Despite these developments, no profound change occurred in the meaning
of polimios and hostis insofar as actual war practices were concerned. Although
temporary truces were arranged at times for the purpose of attending to
wounded soldiers and removing die dead, war practices in general remained
cruel. Neidier the Greeks nor the Romans were much concerned with sparing
noncombatants during hostilities or (except for temples, graves, and other sa-
cred objects) drawing distinctions between combat and noncombat areas.
Phillipson explains this by the fact diat all persons on die opposing side, often
including their allies, were considered foes.10 The reasons were many: die re-
fusal to accept "odiers" as racial equals, as in die Persian and Punic wars; the
ideological differences diat became apparent during die Peloponnesian con-
flicts, etc. Apparendy die most important Greek and Roman concern was die
treatment of die vanquished. The claims of die victors in Greece depended
largely on dieir generosity. But the Romans at times accorded prisoners of
war and civilians humane treatment, as a rule in instances of voluntary sur-
render and not when die foe was defeated by assault.11
Christians during die Middle Ages also drew a sharp distinction between
die private and die public adversary. The command to love one's enemy
(Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27) reads in Latin diligite inimicos vestros, n o t diligite hostes
vestros. The inimkus is die private adversary; diere is no mention of die public
foe, die hostis. Because it was die Church which usually decided die public ad-
versary dirough most of die Middle Ages,12 die Church's attitude toward war
is relevant here.
From Christianity's inception until die end of die Middle Ages, diree distinct
positions can be discerned. At first, killings of any kind were considered incom-
patible widi die Christian ideal of love. This pacifist stage ended at the time of

7. Herodotus, History VII, 9, 2.

8. Cicero, De Republka i, 25; see also Digest XLIX, 15, 7.
9. Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1911), II, pp. 179-180.
10. Ibid., p. 196. Phillipson unfortunately uses the words echtros,poUmios and hostis
synonymously (p. 166).
11. Ibid., pp. 234ff.
12. The whole question of private warfare cannot be dealt with here. However,
some characteristics of these wars survived and were subsequently incorporated into
wars waged among European sovereign states. See Maurice Hugh Keen, The Laws of
War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 24Iff.
 GEORGE SCHWAB 197

Constantine, when Christianity and Rome were closely linked. Among others,
St. Ambrose and St. Augustine formulated the Christian concept of the justum
bellum. The former considered the defense of the Empire linked with the protec-
tion of the faith against the Arians. St. Augustine defined just wars as those
which avenge injuries; to him, as well as St. Ambrose, the cause of Rome was
just because it was Christian. He ruled out violence for its own sake.13 But the
Church's attitude toward war changed when it grew in influence. This coincided
with the crusades, which were reminiscent of the holy wars waged by the
Israelites. The difference was that the crusades were "not fought so much with
God's help as on God's behalf, not for a human goal which God might bless but
for a divine cause which God might command." 14 The fact that the public ad-
versary was damned in advance meant in effect that he was possessed by the
devil and no quarter should be given him. The religious fanaticism that
anteceded crusades against infidels implied that they were not considered by the
Church as equals; in a sense, war with them was perpetual. True to their beliefs,
the crusaders generally drew no distinctions between combatants and
noncombatants or between combat and noncombat areas. The fate of the van-
quished was usually death; as a rule, to the victors belonged the spoils.
The spirit of the crusades came again to the fore in the internecine religious
wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. With the exception of the Anabaptists, and
subsequently also the Quakers, the various Protestant state churches opposed
Catholicism actively and often violently. Religious conflicts were particularly
savage in France, where Calvinism spread rapidly. Catholics refused to legalize
this heresy; the Calvinists fight for survival had no place for humane considera-
tions — it was a holy cause.15
The gradual fading of the concept of the foe in European politics coincided
with the decline of the European medieval order. The factors responsible for
this decline and the emergence of a new order — the European sovereign
state — can be traced to the effects of the crusades: the reopening of the Medi-
terranean, which resulted in the revival of trade; the growth of towns; the
emergence of a new class; and dissension within the Church, which led even-
tually to the religious split engulfing parts of Europe in bloody conflicts. In
the midst of these developments, and largely owing to the religious struggles,
the power of monarchs was strengthened. They finally dared to defy popes,
churchmen, and rebellious nobles. As monarchs solidified their power, they
sought legal justification for their claims to authority. Powerful thinkers justi-
fying the monarchs' actions were not lacking.
During the religious wars, monarchs slowly gained the upper hand and

13. Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey
and Critical Re-evaluation (New York: Abingdor Press, 1960), pp. 77, 85ff.; also Ernest
Nys, Les origines du droit international (Paris: Thorin & Fils, 1894), pp. 44-46.
14. Bainton, Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace, op. tit., pp. 45-46.
15. Ibid., p. 145; see also Franklin C. Palm, Calvinism and the Religious Wars (New
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932), p. 42.
198 ENEMY OR FOE

eventually succeeded in terminating such wars in their respective domains,

thus assuring order, peace and stability. For die first time in Christian Europe,
persons widi different Christian beliefs were able to coexist without fear of
physical harm. With die medieval order fading, die center of politics shifted
from questions of faidi to secular political relations among sovereign states.
The competence of popes to decide questions regarding armed conflia lost
its relevance, because such decisions became die exclusive concern of tempo-
ral sovereigns. Specifically, die medieval conception of justum helium was
stripped of religious overtones and formalized into diat of die just enemy; die
justa causa of die medieval period, widi its connotations of Christian morality,
was gradually subordinated to die exclusive judgment of die sovereign.16
The termination of religious conflicts in which human beings fought each
odier as if in a violent state of nature — helium omnium contra omnes — had two
repercussions, bodi of which enabled international relations to be normalized
on die basis of equality: religious coexistence became eventually a fact of do-
mestic life and rulers recognized each odier as equals. Once die principle of
equality was accepted, a body of rules governing peace and war gradually be-
gan to take shape.
According to diese rules, a state of war can commence only at die moment
specified in a declaration of war; in die event diat die time is unspecified, im-
mediately upon die communication of such a declaration; or at die initiation
of an act of force by one side regarded by die odier as constituting die crea-
tion of a state of war.17 Linked widi die distinction between peace and war was
die subsequent recognition of neutrality as a legal status of third parties.18 The
idea diat die cessation of hostilities must eventually be followed by die termi-
nation of war in die form of a peace treaty gained acceptance.19
Widi die turn against total war diat emerged during die Enlightenment,
and die acceptance of potential European adversaries as equals, effective and
acceptable rules governing war were codified in a series of conventions: (1) A
distinction was drawn between combatants and noncombatants, as well as be-
tween combat and noncombat areas. During a state of war, caution had to be
exercised not to harm unarmed civilians, and attacks against undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, and buildings had to be curbed as far as possible.
Properly identified religious, medical, art, science, and charity institutions

16. Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erie im VSlkerrecht desjus Publicum Europaeum, Second
Edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), pp. 112-115.
17. Arnold D. McNair, "The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relations of War to
Reprisals," Problems of Peace and War, Transactions of the Grotius Society (London:
Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 1926), Vol. II, p. 45.
18. Philip Jessup and Francis Deak, Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1935), Vol. I, p.4; also James L. Briely, The Outlook for
International Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1945), pp. 25ff.
19. For a discussion of the problems surrounding the question of when material
and formal wars end, see Lothar Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and
International Law (Geneva: librarie E. Droz, 1956), pp. 239-240, 250ff.
 GEORGE SCHWAB 199

could not be attacked at all. (2) The obligation to give quarter, which implied
that killing or wounding a properly-identified enemy soldier who had laid down
his arms was unlawful, and that prisoners of war had to be treated humanely
and, if necessary, accorded proper medical attention. (3) Because die legitimate
object of war was to weaken die enemy's military forces, certain kinds of de-
structive weapons diat produced excessive suffering, such as poison and pois-
oned weapons, were prohibited.20 By virtue of die fact diat die public adversary
was no longer considered a devil or an adversary fit for annihilation,21 war prac-
tices became circumscribed. As a result of diis transformation of die public foe
into die public enemy, wars, diabolical as it may sound, became, so to speak,
clean.22 The apparent shift in political relations — from seeing die odier as an
"enemy" rather dian a "foe" — also appears to have had definite linguistic re-
percussions. It is probably no accident diat die term foe in English gradually be-
came rhetorical and was supplanted by die term enemy. Widi die decline of die
epoch of die European sovereign state, die conceptual meaning of die enemy has
begun to fade. Widi die return of the foe, it may well become rhetorical.23

20. Valuable for a brief historical survey and details of laws governing war prac-
tices in the epoch of the European sovereign state is Friedrich J. Berber's Lehrbuch des
Volkerrechts (Munich and Berlin: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962), Vol. II
(Kriegsrecht), pp. 140ff. For difficulties in actual combat, see Lester Nurick, "The Dis-
tinction between Combatants and Noncombatants in the Law of War," The American
Journal of International Law, No. 4 (1945), pp. 680ff.
21. In this context, see also the discussion of the modern concept of continental
penal law by Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen
Verfassungsgeschichte Osterreichs im MittelaUer, Fourth Revised Edition (Vienna: Rudolf M.
Rohrer Verlag, 1959), p. 36. According to Brunner, by die 18th century the idea diat a
Rechtsbrecher was no longer designated as a foe and diereby expelled from the
Rechtsgemeinschafl had become well-entrenched: "Here the thought was also established
that only the opposing soldier constitutes an enemy in the international law sense."
22. On "civilized warfare," see Frederick J. P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism: How the
Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare Menaces our Future (Appleton, Wise: C.C. Nelson Pub-
lishing Company, 1953), Chapters IV and V.
23. In early usage, xhefoe was "an adversary in deadly feud or mortal combat": The
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933) IV, pp. 378-379. From
some of the examples cited, the foe was unmistakably equated with the devil, whereas
the enemy was defined in milder terms: "one that cherishes hatred, that wishes or seeks
to do ill to another" [ibid., p. 166). The center of gravity is either on the private or the
public enemy. Specifically stated is that xhefoe is "now somewhat rhetorical" (ibid. p. 378-
379). Interesting in this context are Halleck's remarks. He reminds the reader of the dis-
tinction the Romans drew between hostis and inimicus. Although he does not use the
termfoe, he draws the distinction between "legal hostility" and "personal enmity" and
between "private" and "public" enemies. His use of the term enemy coincides widi that
of die dictionary; his references to public enemies accord widi die conceptual meaning
inherent in it: "Private enemies have hatred and rancor in their hearts and seek to do
each other personal injury. Not so with public enemies. They do not, as individuals, seek
to do each other personal harm. And even when brought into actual conflict, as armed
belligerents, there is usually no personal enmity between the individuals of the contend-
ing forces." Henry Wager Halleck, International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse ofStates
in Peace and War (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), pp. 411-412. See also Albrecht
200 ENEMY OR FOE

The beginning of die decline of die European sovereign state can be traced to
die French Revolution, but especially to die second half of die 19di century.
This can be attributed to die emergence of die Anglo-Saxon concept of war as
opposed to die continental concept centered on die scope and meaning of the
"enemy,"24 or to die inclusion of non-European peoples in die relatively homo-
geneous European order. Technological development of certain kinds of weap-
ons also made it difficult to adhere to die legal distinctions governing war during
die epoch of die European sovereign state. Then diere was die impact of two
world wars on Europe's decline. However, important as these and odier fac-
tors were in undermining diis epoch, none was more potent dian die appear-
ance of new militant ideologies such as Communism and Nazism.
Communist political dieory challenged die entire existing political order,
and with it die sovereign state. Marx and Engels concluded diat die sovereign
state is nodiing but die embodiment of die organized will of die bourgeoisie,
meant to rudilessly exploit die proletariat.25 In view of die antidietical nature
of die two classes, a proletarian revolution is not only inevitable but also justi-
fiable in hastening die overthrow of die bourgeois order. In diis respect, com-
munist political dieory has important implications for die enemy-foe distinc-
tion. By condemning die bourgeoisie for exploiting die proletariat, Marxist-
Leninists injected a criminal element into the relations between diese two
classes and reduced domestic political relations to die friend/foe dichotomy.
The foe is die new devil, who must be eliminated; all crimes can be condoned
as historically necessary in die struggle against die bourgeoisie. This goal can
be achieved eidier by following legal bourgeois electoral mediods or by out-
right force.26 As in domestic politics, so also in international relations, die
pacta sunt servanda principle can be respected by equals only; it is rejected
when one system considers die odier essentially criminal. According to Marx-
ist-Leninist doctrine, bourgeois modes of behavior in international politics

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Der Kriegsbegriff des englischen Rechts: Erlduterungen zum Fall

Panatiellos (Mannheim: J. Bensheimer, 1915), pp. 26, 31, 33, 37, 39, 47, 54, 61 and 69ff.
24. Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History, op tit., pp. 48-49; also, Men-
delssohn-Bartholdy, Der Kriegsbegriff des englischen Rechts, op.cit, pp. 6ff.
25. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," Kapital and
Other Writings of Karl Marx, Edited and with an Introduction by Max Eastman (New
York: Modem Library, 1932), pp. 323, 343.
26. In Engels' 1895 Introduction to Marx' "The Class Struggles in France 1848-
1850," he wrote: "The irony of world history turns everything upside down. We, the
'revolutionists,' the 'overthrowers' — we are thriving far better on legal methods than on
illegal methods. The parties of Order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the le-
gal conditions created by themselves . . . . They cry despairingly with Odion Barrot: la
Ugalitt nous tue, legality is the death of us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles
and rosy cheeks and look like life eternal," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works
in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), Vol. I, p. 136. Len-
in observed that "revolutionaries who are unable to combine illegal forms of struggle
with every form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed," "Left-Wing" Communism,
An Infantile Disorder (New York: International Publishers, 1940), p. 72.
 GEORGE SCHWAB 201

must be adhered to only for as long as they are tactically advantageous.27

The sharp distinction between a state of peace and a state of war can no
longer be drawn in a world divided by two dominant antithetical systems. It is
in this context that an intermediary situation has developed, that of a status
mixtus.2* In this vein, Carl Schmitt pointed to the crucial setback to the Euro-
pean accomplishment of subjecting wars to rules that communist theory rep-
resents, since it is based on the assumption that the class enemy is an absolute
enemy, and because such enmity does not recognize any limits to the strug-
gle.29 In pursuing a total war against the Soviet Union, Hider sought both to
acquire Lebensraum and to prevent the onrush of communism. Furthermore,
in pursuing his racial policies, he condoned the enslavement and eventual ex-
tirpation of the Slavs.30 Thus the Nazis injected into politics their own concept
of the foe, based on Hitler's notion of racial superiority.31
Communism and Nazism notwithstanding, political relations today should
not be seen solely in terms of the foe. At present two epochs overlap — the
remnants of the epoch of the European sovereign state and the as yet
undetermined new epoch. But the latter is rapidly displacing the former: po-
litical relations are reverting to those reminiscent of the confessional civil
wars. European sovereign states succeeded in humanizing war — subjecting it
to certain "rules of the game" by neutralizing religion, and by accepting and
treating each other as equals. The introduction of a new kind of dieology —
militant ideology — is subverting mis achievement. But there are other
ideologies at work, less militant but perhaps no less dangerous. US foreign
policy is based on a complex of moral values that Americans believe to be
universally valid. In presuming the fight for the "just cause,"32 the US may
thus cease to regard its opponents as "enemies" and treat them as "foes."
Whatever the outcome, die conflict of politics will remain: enemy or foe.

27. Giindier Lummert, Marxismus-Leninismus und Volkerrecht (Cologne: Markus

Verlag, 1959), pp. 53-56; see also Kotsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History, op
at., pp. 65ff.
28. Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History, op.cit., pp. 241-243.
29. Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung turn Begriffdes Politischen
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), p. 56. Unfortunately, the German language
possesses only one term to designate an enemy or foe (Feind). Schmitt considered this
distinction critical. See Der Begriffdes Politischen, op. cit., pp. 17-19.
30. Walter Anger, Das dritte Reich in Dokumenten (Frankfurt a/M: Europaische
Verlagsanstalt, 1957), pp. 61-62, 193.
31. For not giving quarter to die "racially inferior" Slavs, die German army was
exonerated in advance by Hider, and it is in diis light mat we must understand Hider's
statement concerning war against Russia: "This struggle is a struggle of ideologies and
racial differences, and will have to be conducted widi unprecedented, unmerciful, and
unrelenting harshness. All officers will have to rid themselves of obsolete ideologies."
See Haider's affidavit at Nuremberg, November 22, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Vol. VIII, pp.645-646.
32. On die American "mission" in die world, see Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose
of American Politics (New York: Random House-Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 99ff. and
Chap. III.