TOPIC #1 NATURE OF SUCCESSION Issue:

Is the solidary guarantor’s liability extinguished by his death?

NHA v. ALMEIDA G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
Ruling:
Facts:
NO. Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
Land Tenure administration (LTA) – DAR – NHA - awarded and sold to Margarita Herrera several to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
portions of land in Laguna with her 2 children Beatriz and Francisca as her heirs. The first child, Beatriz, others either by his will or by operation of law.
predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code “Contracts take effect only as between parties, their assigns and heirs,
Margarita passed away on October 27, 1971. EXCEPT in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible BY
THEIR NATURE [collateral], OR BY STIPULATION OR BY PROVISION OF LAW [substituted by another
Deed of Self-Adjudication by Francisca – 1974. NHA allowed Francisca to repurchase the subject guarantor because of conviction].” In this case, it does not fall within the exceptions.
properties. Private respondent protested.
This rule is a consequence of the progressive “depersonalization” of patrimonial rights and duties. What
Sworn Statement by Margarita – 1960. did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to
Issue: disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors.

Was the selling of property to Francisca proper?
Ruling:
NO. Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs.
As to the INTEGRITY, the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of
the contract of guaranty. The supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance
of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the
creditor to demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional -- it is his right, not his
duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain. 
The solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death. Thus the Luzon Surety had the right to
file against the estate.

Margarita had an existing CTS with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita’s demise, the CTS was neither
nullified nor revoked. The CTS was an obligation on both parties. OBLIGATIONS ARE TRANSMISSIBLE
at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.

NHA cannot make another CTS to other parties of a property initially paid for by the decedent. Such
would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.

ESTATE OF K.H. HEMADY v. LUZON SURETY November 28, 1956

Facts:

The Luzon Surety had filed a claim against the Estate of Hemady based on 20 different indemnity
agreements, or counterbonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased, a surety
solidary guarantor.

Stipulations in the indemnity agreements:

 As consideration for the suretyship, Hemady JOINTLY and SEVERALLY will pay the
Premiums
 To indemnify the company in case it sustain or incur in any consequence of having become
surety upon this bond
 To pay the interest of 12% per annum on the amount paid by the company
 That any question which may arise by the reason of this document, it shall be brought at the
jurisdiction of Manila
 That it shall not be necessary for the company to bring suit against the principal upon his
default, because the liability of Hemady is jointly and severally, meaning a primary one
The Luzon Surety prayed for allowance of value of the 20 bonds and asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and 12% interest thereon. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Luzon Surety stating that
whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death is not chargeable to his estate, because he ceased to
be a guarantor upon his death. It also reasoned that to qualify as a guarantor, he must possess integrity;
and integrity is personal and not transmissible.
DKC HOLDINGS v. CA and VICTOR BARTOLOME
Facts:
Subject of the dispute is the land originally owned by Encarnacion Bartolome. On March 16, 1988, DKC
Holdings entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion whereby petitioner was
given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within
a period of two years counted from the signing of the contract.
In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000 a month as consideration for the reservation of its option. In
case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession and lease for a period of 6
years with 15,000 as monthly rental.
January 1990 – Encarnacion died.
March 14, 1990 – DKC exercised its option to lease the property and tendered the amount of 15,000.
Issue: GR: Obligations derived from a contract are transmissible.

WON the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by Encarnacion Bartolome with DKC
Holdings was terminated upon her death
Ruling:
NO. It binds her sole heir, Victor.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code “Contracts take effect only as between parties, their assigns and heirs,
EXCEPT in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible BY
THEIR NATURE [collateral], OR BY STIPULATION OR BY PROVISION OF LAW [substituted by another
guarantor because of conviction].”
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and
obligations intransmissible. In fact, this case is transmissible in its nature.
PURELY PERSONAL – INTRANSMISSIBLE e.g. parental authority, legal support, cannot be performed
by others, personal act
XPNs: Not transmissible by their 1) nature 2) stipulation or 3) provision of law.
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the CA.
while he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or
portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.
DELA MERCED v. JOSELITO DELA MERCED
Facts:
In 1987, Evarista died intestate without issue. The three sets of heirs are: 1) Francisco and family 2)
niece 3) niece. They filed for an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Evarista. Joselito
filed for the annulment of the petition stating that he was omitted from the said settlement.
Issue:
Won Joselito has the right to inherit from his father in the estate of Evarista being an illegitimate child

The subject matter of the contract is a lease which is a property right. The death of a party does not Ruling:
excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. YES. Article 777 of the CC “Rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.”
Thus, Victor has the obligation to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner.
Scenario: An illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter’s share in or portion of, what the latter
BELAMALA v. POLINAR already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.

Facts:
Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced to pay damages
and indemnity to Belamala. During the pendency of appeal before the CA, Polinar died. The CA affirmed
the conviction of Polinar.
Respondent Joselito (illegitimate child of Francisco) has the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the
share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been transmitted to
his father upon the death of Evarista. 1/3 undivided share. Evarista (sister) – Francisco -- Joselito

Issue:

Whether the civil liability of an accused of physical injuries who dies BEFORE final judgment, is
extinguished by his demise

Ruling:

NO. Article 774 the decedent’s obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance. Hence, the
obligation of the offender’s heirs under Article 108 of RPC ultimately becomes an obligation of the
offender’s estate.

GENATO v. BAYHON August 24, 2009

Facts:

Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan from Genato in the amount of 1M. Bayhon allegedly executed a Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage and when respondent failed to pay the loan executed a dacion en pago. The
RTC declared the deed and dacion en pago void, AND ordered Bayhon to pay the loan. Bayhon
appealed to the CA.

Benjamin Bayhon died while the case was still pending decision before the CA.

Issue:

Does the death of Bayhon extinguish the obligation?

Ruling:

NO. Article 1311

EMILIO EMNACE v. CA and ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO
Facts:
Petitioner Emnace, Jacinto Divinagracia and Vicente Tabanao were partners in a business. In January
1966, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution
of properties. Among the assets to be distributed were 5 fishing boats, 6 vehicles, 2 parcels of land, and
cash deposits in banks.
Throughout the existence of partnership and even after the untimely demise of Tabanao, Emnace failed
to submit to Tabanao’s heirs any statement of assets and render an accounting of the partnership’s
finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s heirs the deceased’s 1/3
share in the total assets of the partnership or in the amount of 10M. Thus, Tabanao’s heirs sued
Emnace.
Emnace filed a MTD arguing that heirs do not have the legal capacity to sue since she was never
appointed as an administratrix or executrix of his estate. The RTC denied the MTD stating that they have
the right to sue in their own names under Article 777 of CC which states that rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The CA affirmed RTC. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Does the surviving spouse need to be appointed as an executrix or administratrix to acquire legal
capacity to sue?
Ruling:
NO. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From
the very moment of Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted
to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted. The respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who
stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention
to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI v. CA and REYES
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti (married to Rosario Cuado) were co-owners of a property located in
Lucena City. On March 17, 1986, Lourdes Sampayo died without issue. Her collateral relatives -- sister
Josefina and niece Lydia; sister Remedios; brothers Luis and Manuel -- filed an action for partition of the
subject property.
The spouses Conti refused the partition on the ground that private respondents failed to prove that they
were rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Heirs of Sampayo, stating that
they were able to prove that they are collateral heirs of Lourdes. Hence, Heirs of Conti filed the petition
before the SC stating that a complaint for partition to claim cannot prosper without prior settlement of the
estate of the deceased.
Issue:
Is prior settlement of the estate necessary before the heirs can commence action pertaining to the
deceased?
Ruling:
NO. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased.
From the death of Lourdes Sampayo, her rights as a co-owner, which is the right to ask for partition at
any time, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. Thus, in so demanding partition private respondents
merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.
LEGAL or INTESTATE SUCCESSION takes place if a person dies without a will or with a void will, or
one which has subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouses, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent. It was established that Lourdes died intestate and without issues. Private respondents as
sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
TOPIC #2 TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
BALANAY JR. v. MARTINEZ
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age
of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children
named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B.
Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian
declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was
the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in
1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should
be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share
of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the
conjugal estate.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated
April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned
"Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of
respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six
children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected
before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of
the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28,
1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds
(a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and
(b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court
denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer
of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September
25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting
authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not
only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia
B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly
effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that
the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked
that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October
15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They
prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña
and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the
probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice
to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not
abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1,
1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974
that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion asked for the
reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no
authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied
the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own
independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
Issue:
1) WON intrinsic validity of the will must be passed upon even before its formal validity be established
2) WON the will is void
Ruling:
1) YES.
2) NO.
The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, UNLESS it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.” (ARTICLE 792, CC)
INVALID PROVISIONS OF THE WILL
 that she owned the “southern half of the conjugal lands” is contrary to law because although
she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But this declaration
does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
 That the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is
contrary to Article 1080 of the CC which reads:
“Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or
manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by
ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in
cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband
had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate
to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes
be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be
effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for
terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of
his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be
subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate
should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be
respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the
partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime,
the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's
estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without
prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass
thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that
such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to
another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal
estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only
her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister
and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister
of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its
uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically
void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate
of the will is mandatory.
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary
disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts.
788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention
on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the
language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of
the properties in his will should be upheld.
2 OTHER ERRORS:
Appointment of special administrator instead of a regular administrator.
Appointment of branch clerk of court as special administrator.
DY, BARBARA, VIRGINIA SEANGIO v. REYES
Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio, in RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners
before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence and enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin
at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis
kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang
araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta
siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi
ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center
of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were
consolidated.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance
by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called
upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of
the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that
it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the
probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
(There is no will to speak of because not all heirs are included in the same)
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other
heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy
Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.
Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will
Whether the holographic will is intrinsically void
Ruling:
1) A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in
the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,  the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.
The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose.
2) NO. There is no preterition since there is no institution of an heir. The will is simply a disinheritance.
The cause for disinheritance is sufficient under Article 919 (6) of the Civil Code which states
“maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant.”
The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of
the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
LOURDES DOROTHEO v. CA and QUINTANA, VICENTE, JOSE DOROTHEO
Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter
died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void."
RTC granted the Motion stating that the private respondents are the only heirs of Alejandro and Aniceta
whose estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on INTESTACY. Upon denial of
Lourdes’ MR, she appealed before the CA but was dismissed for failure to file the appellant’s brief within
the extended period granted.
The dismissal of the CA became final and executory on 3 February 1989 and entry of judgment was
issued. An Order was issued by Judge Angas setting aside the final and executory order on the ground
that it was only an “interlocutory” order. The CA nullified the Order by Judge Angas.
Issue:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect?
Ruling:
NO.
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous
it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect
nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy
of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit
erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of  res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being
for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated,7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,  that he was of
the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after
the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be
given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but
that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by
law constitutes waiver. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings.  It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws
of intestate succession.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine
its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by
the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or
properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns
the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not
married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA TARLAC v. BELINA RIGOR,
NESTORA, FRANCISCA RIGOR
Facts:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on
October 29, 1933 which was probated by the CFI Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as
devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
Provisions of Father Rigor’s Will:
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an
ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer the
ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the same up to
the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued
his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty masses with
prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his
successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated above, the
administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest
of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products thereof,
obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration and the fees
corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each year,
depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project containing the
following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative
who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic
Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the
real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
Four (4) titles with a total area of 44 hectares P33,090.00
About 13 years after the approval of the project partition, the parish priest filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition for the appointment of new administrator and the delivery of ricelands to the church
as trustee. The intestate heirs countered with a petition praying that the bequest be declared inoperative.
RTC ruled in favor of heirs. Granting the MR of Parish Priest, administrator was directed to deliver the
Riceland to the parish priest of Victoria. Heirs appealed to the CA and it reversed the order. It ruled that
since no legatee claimed the ricelands within 20 years after the testator’s death, the same should pass to
his legal heirs, citing Articles 888, 870 and 912 of the CC. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Interpretation on the testator’s will; how long after the testator’s death would it be determined that he had
a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation
Ruling:
Based on the provisions, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two
situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for
the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
The said bequest (#1) refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the time of his death. In order
to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is
clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of
his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally
expressed.
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a will. It
is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will".
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera
eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could
have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"? The
reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death,
who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the
seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew
entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be
entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship
would be terminated.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of
the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's
nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary
or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and
could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter
the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now
article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged
into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists".
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that
legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There
being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be
mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a
conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by
the said legacy.
 TOPIC #3 EXTRINSIC and INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF A WILL
IN RE: WILL OF RIOSA
Facts:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the
law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in
accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities
for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin
of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect
after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that
conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation
shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render
the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — xxx The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the
left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice,  as to a will made after the
date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. The court has
further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death
took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. The instant
appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No.
2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested
by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old
English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have
said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death,
is regarded."
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood is
regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the
mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that everyone is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a
case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
satisfied in security on that presumption. It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the
testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to
the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he
lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go
into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of
Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and,
when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of their making.
Issue: Is the will valid?
Ruling:
YES. This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our
selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality.
Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his
property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the
second and third rules on the subject.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect." The language of
Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary
succession.
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases,
the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become
part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and
attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe
that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634.
Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as
completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all
testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments
made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
IN RE: WILL OF SANCHO ABADIA
Facts:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he
died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees
in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the CFI Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses testified that in his presence and in the presence of his
co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios
or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The trial court declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator
and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills
were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under
a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952,
admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
appealed.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator
himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed
in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law
at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three
attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of
the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Issue:
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code
which not allows holographic wills?
Ruling:
Article 795 of the Civil Code provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the
wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa.
It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor
and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said
intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator
lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be
applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of
the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of
the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution
of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then
upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or
which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
BELLIS v. BELLIS
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward, George (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry, Alexander and Anna; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
In 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00
to his three illegitimate children, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, in equal
shares.
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including
the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children a total of P120,000.00.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their oppositions on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by
the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
RTC issued an order approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Issue:
Which law must apply? Texas law or Philippine law?
Ruling:
TEXAS LAW. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in
the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in  Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in
a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
MICIANO v. ANDRE BRIMO
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a Turk, executed in the Philippines a will, observing Philippine laws. In the will, he
stated that he wanted his estate distributed in accordance with Philippine law on succession.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it on the ground that the partition was not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality. Thus, they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among
other things, provides the following:
xxx, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well
as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
Issue:
1) What law shall govern the will of Joseph Brimo?
Ruling:
Turkish laws.
Article 10 of the Civil Code provides the following:
xxx, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
be complied with and executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
“Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.”
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
ANCHETA v. DALAYGON
Facts:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). In
1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
In 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then CFI of Rizal. As administrator of Audrey’s
estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati,
Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a
cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.
In 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for
his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also
admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Atty. Quasha was
appointed as ancillary administrator.
In 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625 [Audrey’s will], a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in
the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. (error) RTC approved.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 [Richard’s will] also filed a
project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent
on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent. (correct)
Respondent filed with the CA for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders in Special Proceeding No.
9625. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the
laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property
should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
CA annulled the Order of RTC in SP 9625. (correct)
Issue:
What law shall govern the will of Audrey and Richard?
Ruling:
Laws of Maryland, USA.
It is undisputed that Audrey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate
of her will, it was shown, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and
probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and
certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will
was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who
are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines.  Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession.
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of
the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland
on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and
upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is
expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand,
declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle
and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of
decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati
property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the
law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator
in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No.
9625.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument
known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the
creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati property.
As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos
from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of
legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on
to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys
of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
ADOLFO AZNAR v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA
Facts:
Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death; that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, The will of Edward Christensen
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
California;
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not
in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I
have now resides in Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen
with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY, now residing at California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue
of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Helen Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar
as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership.
The RTC ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose
of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred
and inviolable. Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
More detailed facts:
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.
PH – 1901 to 1904
California – 1904 to 1913
PH – 1913 to 1928
California – mid 1928
PH – 1929 to 1938
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945.
March 1951 – PH executed will
April 1953 – died at St. Lukes
Issue:
What law/s shall govern the testamentary dispositions of Edward Christensen?
Ruling:
Philippine laws. It was referred back to us back Californian laws.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of
the State of California.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by
the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps
to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile ."
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence
to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
“If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.”
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied
the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain
of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to
a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities.
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or
even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
— that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets
of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides
no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
TOPIC #4 TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY & INTENT
CATALINA BUGNAO v. FRANCISCO UBAG et al.
Facts:
The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased, was admitted to probate. The instrument was
propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested
by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased.
Appellants contend that at the time when the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and
memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag,
signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to
have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the
making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño, testified in support of the will.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that the
testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their presence attached his
signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each
other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up
in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while
the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he
signed his name.
On the other hand, the contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at
the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these
witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such
physical and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses,
upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six
in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which
the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a
contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close
relative. These witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or
about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing
witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to
understand, or to make himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the
testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in
evidence:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the presiding judge of
this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures;
nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures, and does not find that any material
differences exists between the same. It is true that the signature which appears in the document
offered for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his
movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other
fact, that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was
not in the habit of signing his name every day.
The court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of
sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of
asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself
to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not
speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of
testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished
them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical
description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to
give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the
disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there
are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that
"mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he
has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is
disposing of his property"; that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise"; that "it has not been
understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in
the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility
of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree,
break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the
rational faculties common to man"; and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind.
The question of soundness is one of degree"; on the other hand, it has been held that " testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound
mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease, or great bodily
infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of making a
valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the
nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in".
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
JULIANA BAGTAS v. ISIDRO PAGUIO
Facts:
The will of Pioquinto Paguio purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Bataan, in 1908. The
testator died on the 28th of September, 1909. The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas,
widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the
latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition is that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time
of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles
his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however,
and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his
wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin
Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.
According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following
manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of
his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them
in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to
attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary
dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the
will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after
looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it
in the presence of the testator and each other.
Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor
Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the
latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question
was propounded to Doctor Basa:
Q.       Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think
he was in his right mind?
A.       I cannot say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because
when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a
paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his
right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the
necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had
manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion
when he visited him.
In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden
is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do . There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that
mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and
that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid
will.
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The
testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed
man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and
memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of
his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in
his habits, although formerly he was observant of the properties of life. The court, in commenting upon
the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will,
if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it
be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and
mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his
life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent
events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for
sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when
he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he
was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was
pictured by the court in the case just quoted. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear
that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature
of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the
will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active
part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions
are those of a rational person.

DOLORES AVELINO v. VICTORIANA DELA CRUZ
Victoriana Dela Cruz contend that at the time of the making of the will the said Pascual de la Cruz was
blind had been for a number of years, and was incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention are the witnesses who signed the will and declared that the deceased was of
sound mind at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and signed the same in their
presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of
the deceased.
The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make his will because he was
blind at the time the same was executed and had been for several years theretofore. There is absolutely
no proof to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of
incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement of the law as to the
capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614,
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind persons from acting as
witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary capacity, except age
and soundness of mind.
In Re: Will of the Deceased Gabina Medina
ALEJANDRO SAMIA v. IRENE MEDINA et al.
Gabina Medina’s will purport to have been executed on September 22, 1928, in Arayat, Pampanga, and
bears her thumb mark, with her name written by Jose Berenguer who also signed the document. The
attesting witnesses were Mariano D. Vengzon, Luis Pineda and Lorenzo Tinio.
The grounds of opposition are that the will in question was not signed by the witnesses in the presence of
the others, and that at the time the will purports to have been executed, the deceased Gabina Medina
was mentally incapable of executing it.
The principal witnesses of the oppositors were Dr. Generoso Ocampo who treated the deceased Gabina
Medina in 1928, Father Roberto Roque and a servant, Juana Mallari, who, it is alleged, had taken care of
the deceased since the latter part of the year 1926 up to the early part of the year 1930.
Dr. Ocampo testified that in the year 1920 he treated the deceased and that since that time she has
shown symptoms of senility and of an illness known as "tabes dorsalis"; that in 1924 she had slight
atrophy in the hands and feet and could no longer stand up; that during the second quarter of the year
1928 he was again called to treat her and he found her suffering with "ataxia locomotrix with dementia
senile" and that she could not talk nor hear and could not move. Fr. Roque testified when he went to
confess her in May of that year, he could no longer understand her and she would laugh and weep in
answer to his questions. The witness Juana Mallari testified that from the year 1926 up to the time that
the deceased was moved to her new house in the year 1928 it was difficult to understand what she said,
and that two months later she had completely lost her power of speech and could not move her hands
and feet and that she was also suffering from inability to control her urine and bowel movements.
On the other hand, the evidence for the petitioner shows that previous to the year 1928, during that year,
and in the year 1929 the deceased was able to talk coherently and intelligibly although she was suffering
from rheumatism. There was a photograph of the deceased with petitioner's daughter who was then
about ten months old, which was taken about the month of October, 1928, just one month after the date
of the will in question. This photograph and its negative show the deceased seated on a chair with the
child on her lap, he arms around her and her hands clasped in front of the child.
Doctor Sixto de los Angeles testifying about "tabes dorsalis" stated that his illnes has no direct
relation to the mental condition of a person affected by it, and as stated by Drs. Church and
Peterson, in their work entitled "Nervous and Mental Diseases", page 454, 8th edition, "Tabetics often
manifest large mental activities and retain their business capacity to the end."
Admitting that the testatrix was physically ill in the year 1928, physical ailments and debility due to old
age do not preclude the possession of mental capacity to make a will. To have testamentary capacity
does not necessarily mean that the testator should be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties. The
presumption is that every adult is sane. In the case of Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez (48 Phil.,
772), this court held:
3. Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of
a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. The nature
and rationality of the will of some practical utility in determining capacity. Each case rests on its own facts
and must be decided by its own facts.
8. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession
of his reasoning faculties. The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by
the testator, as, had he a disposing memory?
TRINIDAD NEYRA v. ENCARNACION NEYRA
Issue:
Whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by
Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942. Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative.
Facts:
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and
two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by
his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra had
serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father.
That Encarnacion Neyra, remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will
disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other
relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no
provision in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter
enemy. Church declined.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on
October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the
Quiapo Church to make confession, after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her
house. After the mass, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between
the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra.
Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent
Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the
two sisters greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and decided to end
pending litigations regarding the properties left by their father.
They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying
the said agreement; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will
and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to
Encarnacion's express instructions; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and
testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia,
Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their
terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that
Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with
the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in
duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses. Father Teodoro Garcia was also
present at the signing of the two documents, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature of effects of Addison's
disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as ten (10)
years, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and
from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also
appear.
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart
attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of
witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the
alleged medical experts.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will,
to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental
faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs.Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The
testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or
last stage of tuberculosis. That the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose
condition for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity,
in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to
understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44
Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health,
nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his
will (Amata and Almojuela vs.Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator
intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or
stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances
show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from
Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on
account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest.
And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound
mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the
execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They had
forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian
faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They had also forgotten that there
could be no more sublime love than that embalmed in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The
approach of imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And
believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness, and that she had always
been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently what was her due, Encarnacion finally
decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or
wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the
beneficiary of her generosity, under her last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by
executing said agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.
BALTAZAR v. LORENZO LAXA
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not
of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound
to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so
long as it is legally tenable.
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" 7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The
Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia
twice. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 8 and then on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco)
and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their
signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the
presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this
last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and
Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose
of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to
the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala
in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew
whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and
cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family
until her death on January 4, 1996.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition  with the
RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition on the ground, among others, that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will
under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery.
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in
Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and
lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia
was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an
adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind,
deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s
death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed. Lorenzo
positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and
stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her transactions.
Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon
Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed. On cross-
examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the
USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.
Rosie testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes
leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.  On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was
"magulyan" was based on her personal assessment.
RTC denied the probate of will. CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.
Ruling:
YES.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings.This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners.
The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of
the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the
making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by
them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the
CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed.
She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of
how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to
his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and
was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure,
fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the
document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA v. JUDGE HONRADO
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which
on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and
which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary
as admitted by the notary himself?
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley,
married Marcelina Salvador in 1923. They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used
the surname Suroza. Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina Salvador becomes a pensioner’s widow.
Spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old,
was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to
Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her
granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in
English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that will, Marcelina
bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her
death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-
square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966.
Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed a petition for the
probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn,
were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn
was the instituted heiress.
Nenita filed an omnibus petition wherein she reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger
to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of
undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were
procured by fraud or trick.
Judge Honrado dismissed Nenita's counter-petition. In a motion, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her
contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and
because it is written in English which is not known to her.
Judge Honrado, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the
estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts
to withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the
probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore
that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he
notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would
bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his
commitment.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the
decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the
decedent's estate.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in
a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator,
is void.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.

TOPIC #5 FORMALITIES OF WILLS

JOSE RIVERA v. IAC and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA

Facts:
Venancio Rivera, a prominent and wealthy resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga died. Jose Rivera, claiming
to be the only legitimate son filed for issuance of letters of administration. It was opposed by Adelaido
Rivera claiming that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but left two holographic wills.
Adelaido Rivera filed for the probate of holographic wills. The lower court admitted the probate of the wills
and found that Jose was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio who was married to
Maria Vital. The Venancio whose state was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
seven children, including Adelaido. It was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, the petition.
Evidence of Jose: Marriage Certificate (parents of alleged Venancio are: Florencio Rivera and Estrudez
Reyes) , Jose’s Baptismal Certificate
Evidence of Adelaido: No marriage certificate because record of marriages in 1942 was destroyed
when Mabalacat was burned, Birth Certificate, Venancio’s Baptismal Certificate (parents are:
Magno Rivera and Gertrudes delos Reyes)
The main issue in this case was
Issue:
Are the holographic wills valid considering that the three-witness rule was not complied with?
Ruling:
YES.
Article 811 of the Civil Code provides that:
“In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”
In this case, Jose is not the son of the deceased. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to
contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have a legal effect of requiring three witnesses. The
testimony of Zenaida and Venancio, Jr. who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by
their father, was sufficient.
 TOPIC #10 PROBATE
The Incompetent CARMEN CANIZA represented by LG EVANGELISTA v. CA
Being then (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of
the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the UP, was declared incompetent by judgment 1 of the
court, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. 3 She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes
and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. Her guardian Evangelista commenced a suit in
the to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. It alleged that plaintiff Cañiza
was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada
Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that
Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house
since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her
own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC in Cañiza's favor, 6 the Estradas being ordered to vacate the
premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,8 the decision was reversed by the RTC. It held that the "action by which the issue of
defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, cognizable in the first instance by the
Regional Trial Court."
The CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed
an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not
been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort
of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the
plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be
the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen
Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so
that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or
authority to drive the defendants out."
Hence, the petition.
Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs — Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado,
her niece and nephew, respectively — substituted for her.
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial
remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b) assuming  desahucio (eviction) to be
proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c)
assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent
Cañiza after the latter's death.
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free,
did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense,
and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly,
but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the
house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different from that of a
tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case
there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand
to vacate. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully
obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to
fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . .
(its) continuing possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to
vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date
of the last demand, 28 the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on
previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by
Cañiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in
fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since
the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the  second (last)
written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission
was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was
made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it
of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property
to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after
demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the
will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the
property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right
of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of
possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on
the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them
— an event which still has to take place; in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any
assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving
the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to
postulate that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the
RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they
remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from
evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An owner's intention to
confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case
there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate
income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and
the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA
with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . .
" By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate
carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it,  and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
REMEDIOS NUGUID v. FELIX NUGUID
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died in 1962, without issue. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios filed in the CFI of Rizal for the probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise.
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
The court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the
estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a
will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity
of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the
will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally,
this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and
oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will
intrinsically a nullity?
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain
amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I
die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness
whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil
Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity.
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ...
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon
wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish.
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. And, the will completely
omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence
will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests
are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that
the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary
disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir
so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such
institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854,
states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests).
As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion.
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at
bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " Sanchez Roman emphasizes
the distinction by stating that disinheritance is voluntary; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
be "involuntaria".  Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause
specified in the will itself. 
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of
heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance
the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their
legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the  Neri case
heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second
marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the
Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total
or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at
all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies
or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of
construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article
814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And
they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article
but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property
that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But
again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire will is null.
LETIVIA VALMONTE ORTEGA v. JOSEFINA VALMONTE
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should
not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until
he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived
in San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years
after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
in 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause
written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages,
and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of
that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body
that:
‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in
accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided my
by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of
the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered
jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used
as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered
by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister,
Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account
bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever
found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it
is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City,
Philippines.’
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them
proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not
complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an
advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or
her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should
be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and
integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro
Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio
Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob,
Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed
at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator
would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made.
The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors,
and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament
of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that
she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the
said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more
or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because
despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked
and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone
to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, testified that it was in
the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his
house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come
back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept
it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date
but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9,
1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary
public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town,
the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public
also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he
affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the
testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City
and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended
will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983;
that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on
August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in
question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good
health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect
and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. And that during the execution, the testator’s wife, Josefina was not with them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are
other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the
mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator
was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in
1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him and they took care
of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations
and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy
and wanted to marry.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA
upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due
execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" 6 did
not make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Should the will be admitted to probate?
This Court’s Ruling
Probate of a Will
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented
for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for
the probate of a will. 10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be
disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of
some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time of affixing his signature thereto."
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she
alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public
and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the
will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common experience" 12 for an old man with
a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject
of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of
the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made."
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time
of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately, in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner,
no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in
his twilight years."
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
"because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the
same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more
credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.  In any
event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and
attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses."
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13,
1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses
were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing
therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on
the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as
well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9,
1983 on the acknowledgement.
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in
the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week
of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento
was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went
there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what
they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back
on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to
sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed
our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir.
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or
other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered
of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the
testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we
find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated
earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there
are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that
mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom
he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound
mind."
IN RE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GREGORIO TOLENTINO
ADELAIDA TOLENTINO v. NATALIA FRANCISCO
This petition was filed in the CFI of Manila by Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, for the purpose of
procuring probate of the will of Gregorio Tolentino, deceased, who died at the hand of an assassin, in his
home in Santa Cruz, Manila, on November 9, 1930. In the inception of the proceedings Eugene de
Mitkiewicz was appointed special coadministrator. Opposition was made to the probate of the will by
Ciriaco, Natalia, and Gervasia Francisco, all cousins of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial
court overruled the opposition, declared the will to have been properly executed, and allowed the probate
thereof. From this order the three opponents appealed.
At the time of his death, Gregorio Tolentino was 66. He had been married to Benita Francisco, but she
predeceased him years ago. The two had accumulated a very considerable estate which does not
appear to have suffered any material diminution in the years of Tolentino's widowhood. The pair had no
children, and the generous instincts of the survivor prompted him to gather around him in his comfortable
and commodious home a number of his wife's kin; and by him various younger members of the
connection were supported and educated. At one time Tolentino contemplated leaving his property
mainly to these kin of his wife, of the surname Francisco; and for several years prior to his death, he had
kept a will indicating this desire. However, in October, 1930, strained relations, resulting from grave
disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a
new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth
probably about P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.
To this end, on October 17, 1930, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney
at Manila, and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him.
After the necessary preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to Tolentino to return
later, bringing a copy of the will previously made. Accordingly, Tolentino again appeared in Repide's
office with the prior will; and the attorney proceeded to reduce the new will to proper form. Tolentino
stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with Repide himself as one of the attesting
witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office,
Monzon and Sunico, should serve. For this reason, in the draft of the will, as it at first stood, the names of
the three above mentioned were inserted as the names of the three attesting witnesses.
When the instrument had been reduced to proper form it was placed in the hands of Tolentino, the
testator, in order that he might take it home to reflect over its provisions and consider whether it
conformed in all respects to his wishes. On the morning of October 21 he again appeared in Repide's
office and returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the changes thus made
was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico, and Repide as attesting witnesses, these names
being substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. The
explanation given by the testator for desiring this change was that he had met Jose Syyap on the
Escolta, the day before, and had committed the indiscretion of communicating the fact that he (Tolentino)
was having a new will made in which Monzon, Sunico, and Repide would appear as the attesting
witnesses. Now Syyap had been the draftsman of the former will of Tolentino, and in this same will the
name of Syyap appeared as one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being Vicente Legarda and
Vergel de Dios. When, therefore, Syyap learned that a new will was being drawn up without his
intervention, he showed profound disappointment, saying to Tolentino that he considered it a gross
offense that he, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios should be eliminated as witnesses to the new will. Upon
this manifestation of feeling by Syyap, Tolentino decided to avail himself of Syyap, Legarda, and Vergel
de Dios as witnesses to this will also, and he therefore requested Repide to change the names of the
attesting witnesses. After this point had been settled Tolentino stated that he would request Syyap,
Legarda, and Vergel de Dios to appear at the office of Repide for the purpose of signing the will. To this
end Tolentino went away but returned later saying that he had spoken to Syyap about it and that the
latter strenuously objected, observing that the will should be signed at a chop-suey restaurant. Tolentino
further stated to his attorney in this conversation that he had arranged with Syyap and the other two
intending witnesses to meet at five o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, which was October 22, for the
purpose of executing the will.
Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in the will; and just before twelve
o'clock noon of the next day Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the criminal
document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the testator that the copy should be executed with
the same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be frustrated by the
possible loss or destruction of the original.
It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting
machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself. This precaution appears to
have been born of experience, and has been adopted by Repide to prevent the possible destruction of a
will by the mere erasure of the figures or letters indicating the pagination, — a disaster which, in Repide's
experience, had occurred in at least one case. Accordingly, upon delivering the completed will and
carbon copy to the testator, Repide took particular pains to instruct the testator to write the consecutive
paging of both original and duplicate before signing the instrument.
At his interview the testator suggested to Repide that the latter should also go to the place where the will
was to be executed, so that he might be present at the formality. The attorney replied that it was
impossible for him to do so as he had another engagement for the hour indicated, which would prevent
his attendance.
At about 4:30 p. m. on the same day, which was October 22, Tolentino started in his car to pick up Syyap
and Vergel de Dios at their respective homes on Antipolo and Benavides streets. He then caused his
chauffeur to drive with the three to La Previsora Filipina, on Rizal Avenue, where Vicente Legarda, the
third intending witness was to be found. Arriving at this place, the three entered the office of Legarda,
who was manager of the establishment, and they were invited to take seats, which they did. Tolentino
then suggested that the three should go as his guests to a panciteria, where they could take
refreshments and the will could be executed. Legarda replied that he must decline the invitation for he
had an engagement to go to the Cosmos Club the same afternoon. Upon this Tolentino asked Legarda to
permit the will to be signed in his office, and to this request Legarda acceded.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was his last will and testament,
done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed,
Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon
proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda",
etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original
will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of
the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting
clause, and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons
concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that
engaged their attention.
After the original of the will had been executed in the manner just stated, the testator expressed his
desire that the duplicate should be executed in the same manner. To this Syyap objected, on the ground
that it was unnecessary; and in this view he was supported by Vergel de Dios, with the result that the
wishes of the testator on this point could not be carried out. As the party was about to break up Tolentino
used these words: "For God's sake, as a favor, I request you not to let any one know the contents of this
will." The meeting then broke up and Tolentino returned Syyap and Vergel de Dios to their homes in his
car. He then proceeded to the law office of Repide, arriving about 6:15 p. m. After preliminary
explanations had been made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe, as it was
already too late to place it in the compartment which Tolentino was then renting in the Oriental Safe
Deposit, in the Kneedler Building. In this connection the testator stated that he did not wish to take the
will to his home, as he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take advantage of any
carelessness on his part to pry into his papers. Also, in this conversation Tolentino informed Repide of
the refusal of Syyap to execute the duplicate of the will.
After a good part of an hour had thus been spent at Repide's office by the testator and after the original
of the will had been deposited in Repide's safe, Tolentino took the attorney to the latter's residence in
Ermita, and then returned to his own home, where he remained without again going out that night. But
promptly at nine o'clock the next morning Tolentino presented himself at Repide's office for the purpose
of securing the will. Repide happened to be out and Tolentino went away, but again returned the next
day and received the will. With the instrument thus in his possession he proceeded at once to the
Oriental Safe Deposit and there left the instrument in his private compartment, No. 333, in which place it
remained until withdrawn some two weeks later by order of the court.
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having perished by
the hands of an assassin.
The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of this proceeding for the probate of the will of the
decedent, two of the attesting witnesses, Jose Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their participation in
the execution of the will at the time and place stated; and while admitting the genuineness of their
signatures to the will, pretended that they had severally signed the instrument, at the request of the
testator, at different places. Thus Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will
to Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 — a time, be it remembered, when the will had not yet
left the hands of the draftsman — and upon learning that Syyap could not be present at the time and
place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested Syyap, as a mere matter of
complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated
action, claiming that he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios
in Intramuros.
We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on this point, the same
being an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the
affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing,
consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by Miguel
Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were
present in Legarda's office when the will was executed and who lent a discerning attention to what was
being done. In the second place, each of the seven signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the
natural eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing the
will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly
have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at
different times and places. In the third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of
contradictory statements made by them on different occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in
this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police
authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him
concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had
lately made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances
already stated, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting witnesses.
With respect to Vergel de Dios we have the following fact: On the day that Gregorio Tolentino was
buried, Ramon Llorente, a member of the city police force, was sent out to the cemetery in order that he
might be present and observe the demeanor on that occasion of such Tolentino's kin as might be
present. Llorente arrived before the funeral cortege, having been taken out to the cemetery by Repide.
While the two were waiting at the cemetery, Llorente noted the presence of Vergel de Dios, he requested
the policeman to introduce him. In the conversation that ensued Vergel de Dios stated with considerable
detail that Gregorio Tolentino had made a will just before his death, that it was executed at La Previsora
Filipina, and that he was one of the witnesses who attested the instrument at that time and place.
Again, on a certain occasion subsequent to the death of Gregorio Tolentino, Juan Concepcion the
husband of Adelaida Tolentino, accompanied by Genoveva de Mendoza, called upon Vergel de Dios,
and in the conversation that resulted Vergel de Dios told them that the will was properly executed, that he
was one of the attesting witnesses, and that it had been signed by all of them in the office of La Previsora
Filipina.
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that
Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with the
opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that said will was in all
respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting the will to
probate.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but
the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A
will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do
not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests.
(Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will
was executed and attested in the manner required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the
contested will was properly executed and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
 TOPIC #11
PECSON v. CORONEL
On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament
of Dolores Coronel, the document Exhibit A, which translated is as follows:
In the name of God, Amen:
I, Dolores Coronel, resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, Philippine Islands, in the full exercise of my
mental faculties, do hereby make my last will and testament, and revoke all former wills by me executed.
I direct and order that my body be buried in conformity with my social standing.
That having no forced heirs, I will all my properties, both movable and immovable, to my nephew,
Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to my niece Angela Coronel, in consideration of the good services with
he has rendered, and is rendering to me with good will and disinterestedness and to my full satisfaction.
I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that is willed and ordained in
this my will, without bond. Should he not be able to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason
whatsoever, I name and appoint as substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, a native and
resident of the town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond. 
All my real and paraphernal property as well as my credits for I declare that I have no debts, are specified
in an inventory.
In testimony whereof and as I do not know how to write my name, I have requested Vicente J. Francisco
to write my name at the foot hereof and on the left margin of each of its sheet before me and all the
undersigned witnesses this July 1, 1918.
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO          
"For the testatrix Dolores Coronel
The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be her last will and testament
in our presence, and as the testatrix does not know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J.
Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in our presence, at the foot, and on the left
margin of each and every sheet, hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed these presents in the
presence of others and of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the margin of each and everyone of the
two sheets of which this document is composed, which are numbered "one" and "two" on the upper part
of the face thereof.
(Sgd.)           "MAXIMO VERGARA           SOTERO DUMAUAL           MARCOS DE LOS SANTOS
                      MARIANO L. CRISOSTOMO           PABLO BARTOLOME           MARCOS DE LA CRUZ           and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life. And that this was not a whim of the
DAMIAN CRISOSTOMO
On the left margin of the two sheets of the will the following signatures also appear:
Mariano L. Crisostomo, Vicente J. Francisco for the testatrix Dolores Coronel, M. Vergara, Pablo
Bartolome, Sotero Dumaual Crisostomo, Marcos de la Cruz, Marcos de los Santos.
The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece of
the deceased Dolores Coronel.
The opponents are: Eriberto Coronel, Tito Coronel, Julian Gozum, Cirila Santiago, widow of the
deceased Macario Gozum, in her own behalf and that of her three minor children, Hilarion Coronel,
Geronimo Coronel, Maria Coronel and her husband Eladio Gongco, Juana Bituin, widow of the deceased
Hipolito Coronel, in her own behalf and that of her three children, Generosa, Maria, and Jose, all minors,
Rosario Coronel, Agustin Coronel, Filomeno Coronel, Casimiro Coronel, Alejo Coronel, Maria Coronel,
Severina Coronel, Serapia Coronel, Maria Juana de Ocampo, widow of the deceased Manuel Coronel,
Dionisia Coronel, and her husband Pantaleon Gunlao.
The probate of this will is impugned on the following grounds: (a) That the proof does not that the
document Exhibit A above copied contains the last will of Dolores Coronel, and ( b) that the attestation
clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645.
These are the two principal questions which are debated in this case and which we will now examine
separately.
As to the first, which is the one raised in the first assignment of error, the appellants argue: First, that it
was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the
document Exhibit A, her true being that the same be distributed among her blood relatives; and second,
that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence.
Let us examine the first point.
The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural
nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the
same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion,
inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid
relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her lands. It appears, however, from
the testimony of Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript of the stenographic notes) that Dolores Coronel
revealed to him her suspicion against some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery of
which she had been a victim.
As to whether or not Lorenzo Pecson rendered services to Dolores Coronel, the opponents admit that he
rendered them at least from the year 1914, although there is proof showing that he rendered such
services long before that time.
The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the
exclusion of relative one's estate an exceptional case. It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines
are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the
civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraph of article in the
following terms:
Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any
person qualified to acquire it.”
Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the Code embodying it has been in force in the
Philippines for more than a quarter of a century, and for this reason it is not tenable to say that the
excercise of the liberty thereby granted is necessarily exceptional, where it is not shown that the
inhabitants of this country whose customs must have been take into consideration by the legislator in
adopting this legal precept, are averse to such a liberty.
As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the
moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of
evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores
Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator
moment is shown by the fact that six years before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo
Pecson was named and appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the document Exhibit B, which,
translated, is as follows:
1. That my present property was acquired by me by inheritance from my parents, but a great part thereof
was acquired by me by my own efforts and exertions;
2. That I have made no inventory of my properties, but they can be seen in the title deeds in my
possession and in the declarations of ownership;
3. That I institute Lorenzo Pecson, married to Angela Coronel, and a known resident of the town, my heir
to succeed to all my properties;
4. That I appoint my said heir, Lorenzo Pecson, as executor, and, in his default, Victor Pecson, a resident
of the same town;
5. That as to my burial and other things connected with the eternal rest of my soul, I leave them to the
sound direction of the aforesaid Lorenzo Pecson;
6. That as I cannot write I requested Martin Pangilinan, a native and resident of this town, to write this will
in accordance with my wishes and precise instructions.
In testimony whereof I had the said Martin Pangilinan write my name and surname, and affixed my mark
between my name and surname, and don Francisco Dumaual, Don Mariano Sunglao, Don Sotero
Dumaual, Don Marcos de la Cruz and Don Martin Pangilinan signed as witnesses, they having been
present at the beginning of, during, and after, the execution of this my last will.
(Sgd.)          "DOLORES CORONEL           without explanation, the testimony of Pablo Bartolome, the presumption is against the opponents and
Witnesses:
(Sgd.)          "MARIANO
                    MARCOS DE LA
                    FRANCISCO
                    SOTERO
                    MARTIN PANGILINAN"
The appellants find in the testament Exhibit B something to support their contention that the intention of
Dolores Coronel was to institute the said Pecson not as sole beneficiary, but simply as executor and
distributor of all her estate among her heirs, for while Lorenzo Pecson's contention that he was appointed
sold beneficiary is based on the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of Dolores Coronel in 1918 and
administered all her property, he did not exclusively have this confidence and administration in the year
1912. Although such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly with others
and never exclusively, this fact does not show that the will of the testatrix was to appoint Pecson only as
executor and distributor of her estate among the heirs, nor does it prevent her, the testatrix, from
instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for determining
whether or not such institution in favor of Pecson was the true will of the testatrix.
We find, therefore, nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor
in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the
beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property,
and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty.
If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not
affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural,
unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious,
or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already been shown, the
unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be considered on the question of testamentary capacity. (40
Cyc., 1079.)
The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this case.
Passing to the second question, to wit, whether or not the true last will of Dolores Coronel was expressed
in the testament Exhibit A, we will begin with expounding how the idea of making the aforesaid will here
controverted was borne and carried out.
About the year 1916 or 1917, Dolores showed the document Exhibit B to Attorney Francisco who was
then her legal adviser and who, considering that in order to make the expression of her last will more
legally valid, though it necessary that the statement be prepared in conformity with the laws in force at
time of the death of the testatrix, and observing that the will Exhibit B lacked the extrinsic formalities
required by Act No. 2645 enacted after its execution, advised Dolores Coronel that the will be remade.
She followed the advice, and Attorney Francisco, after receiving her instructions, drew the will Exhibit A
in accordance therewith, and brought it to the house of Dolores Coronel for its execution.
Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores Coronel in her presence and that of the witnesses and asked
her whether the will was in accordance with her wishes. Dolores Coronel answer that it was, and
requested her attorney, Mr. Francisco, to sign the will for her, which the attorney accordingly did in the
presence of the witnesses, who in turn signed it before the testatrix and in the presence of each other.
Upon the filing of the motion for a rehearing on the first order allowing the probate of the will, the
opponents presented an affidavit of Pablo Bartolome to the effect that, following instructions of Lorenzo
Pecson, he had informed the testatrix that the contents of the will were that she entrusted Pecson with
the distribution of all her property among the relatives of the said Dolores. But during the new trial Pablo
Bartolome, in spite of being present in the court room on the day of the trial, was not introduced as a
witness, without such an omission having been satisfactorily accounted for.
While it is true that the petitioner was bound to present Pablo Bartolome, being one of the witnesses who
signed the will, at the second hearing when the probate was controverted, yet we cannot consider this
point against the appellee for this was not raised in any of the assignments of error made by the
appellants. (Art. 20, Rules of the Supreme Court.)
On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the opponents to present Pablo Bartolome to prove before the
court the statement by him in his affidavit, since it was their duty to prove what they alleged, which was
that Dolores Coronel had not understood the true contents of the will Exhibit A. Having suppressed,
that is, that such a testimony would have been adverse had it been produced at the hearing of the case
before the court. (Sec 334, subsec. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.)
SUNGLAO
CRUZ The opponents call our attention to the fourth clause of the document which says: "I name and appoint
DUMAUAL my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that is willed and ordained in this my will, without
DUMAUAL bond. Should he not be able to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name
and appoint as a substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, resident of the town of Betis, without
requiring him to give bond," and contend that this clause is repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo
Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her estate, for if such was the intention of the testatrix, there would have
been no necessity of appointing an executor, nor any reason for designating a substitute in case that the
first one should not be able to discharge his duties, and they perceived in this clause the idea which,
according to them, was not expressed in the document, and which was that Pecson was simply to be a
mere executor entrusted with the distribution to the estate among the relatives of the testatrix, and that
should he not be able to do so, this duty would devolved upon his substitutes.
But it is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute the estate, which in estate succession, such as the
instant case, has to be distributed with the intervention of the court. All executor has, besides, other
duties and general and special powers intended for the preservation, defense, and liquidation of the
estate so long as the same has not reached, by order of the court, the hands of those entitled thereto.
The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity of an executor does not imply a negation of her
desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It is to be noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was
ordered that her body be given a burial in accordance with her social standing and she had a perfect right
to designate a person who should see to it that this order was complied with. One of the functions of an
executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained in the will.
It is argued that the will of the testatrix was to will her estate to her blood relatives, for such was the
promise made to Maria Coronel, whom Rosario Coronel tends to corroborate. We do not find such a
promise to have been sufficiently proven, and much less to have been seriously made and coupled with
a positive intention on the part of Dolores Coronel to fulfill the same. In the absence of sufficient proof of
fraud, or undue influence, we cannot take such a promise into account, for even if such a promise was in
fact made, Dolores Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards and dispose of her estate as she pleased.
Wills themselves, which contain more than mere promises, are essentially revocable.
It is said that the true will of Dolores Coronel not expressed in the will can be inferred from the phrase
used by Jose M. Reyes in his deposition when speaking of the purpose for which Lorenzo Pecson was to
receive the estate, to wit:
in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner
Weight is given to this phrase from the circumstance that its author was requested by Attorney Francisco
to explain the contents of Exhibit B and had acted as interpreter between Dolores Coronel and Attorney
Francisco at their interviews previous to the preparation of Exhibit A, and had translated into the
Pampango dialect this last document, and, lastly, was present at the execution of the will in question.
The disputed phrase "in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner"
was used by the witness Reyes while sick in a hospital and testifying in the course of the taking of his
deposition.
The appellants interpret the expression "dispose in the most appropriate manner" as meaning to say
"distribute it among the heirs." Limiting ourselves to its meaning, the expression is a broad one, for the
disposition may be effected in several and various ways, which may not necessarily be a "distribution
among the heirs," and still be a "disposition in the most appropriate manner." "To dispose" is not the
same as "to distribute."
To judge correctly the import of this phrase, the circumstances under which it was used must be taken
into account in this particular instance. The witness Reyes, the author of the phrase, was not expressing
his own original ideas when he used it, but was translating into Spanish what Dolores Coronel had told
him. According to the facts, the said witness is not a Spaniard, that is to say, the Spanish language is not
his native tongue, but, perhaps, the Pampango dialect. It is an admitted fact based on reason and
experience that when a person translates from one language to another, it is easier for him to express
with precision and accuracy when the version is from a foreign language to a native one than vice-versa.
The witness Reyes translated from the Pampango dialect, which must be more familiar to him, to the
Spanish language which is not his own tongue. And judging from the language used by him during his
testimony in this case, it cannot be said that this witness masters the Spanish language. Thus is
explained the fact that when asked to give the reason for the appointment of an executor in the will, he
should say at the morning session that "Dolores Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson and in his
default, Victor Pecson, to act during her lifetime, but not after he death," which was explained at the
afternoon session by saying "that Dolores Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson executor of all her
estate during his lifetime and that in his default, either through death or incapacity, Mr. Victor Pecson
was appointed executor." Taking into account all the circumstances of this witness, there is ground to
attribute his inaccuracy as to the discharge of the duties of an executor, not to ignorance of the
elementary rule of law on the matter, for the practice of which he was qualified, but to a non-mastery of
the Spanish language. We find in this detail of translation made by the witness Reyes no sufficient
reason to believe that the will expressed by Dolores Coronel at the said interview with Attorney Francisco
was to appoint Lorenzo Pecson executor and mere distributor of her estate among her heirs.
As to whether or not the burden of proof was on the petitioner to establish that he was the sole legatee to
the exclusion of the relatives of Dolores Coronel, we understand that it was not his duty to show the
reasons which the testatrix may have had for excluding her relatives from her estate, giving preference to
him. His duty was to prove that the will was voluntary and authentic and he, who alleges that the estate
was willed to another, has the burden of proving his allegation.
Attorney Francisco is charged with having employed improper means of making Lorenzo Pecson appear
in the will as sole beneficiary. However, after an examination of all the proceedings had, we cannot find
anything in the behavior of this lawyer, relative to the preparation and execution of the will, that would
justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his personal and professional conduct, nor that he should harbor
any wrongful or fraudulent purpose.
We find nothing censurable in his conduct in advising Dolores Coronel to make a new will other than the
last one, Exhibit B (in the drawing of which he does not appear to her intervened), so that the instrument
might be executed with all the new formalities required by the laws then in force; nor in the preparation of
the new will substantially in accordance with the old one; nor in the selection of attesting witnesses who
were persons other than the relatives of Dolores Coronel. Knowing, as he did, that Dolores was
excluding her blood relatives from the inheritance, in spite of her having been asked by him whether their
exclusion was due to a mere inadvertence, there is a satisfactory explanation, compatible with honorable
conduct, why said attorney should prescind from such relatives in the attesting of the will, to the end that
no obstacle be placed in the way to the probating thereof.
The fact that this attorney should presume that Dolores was to ask him to sign the will for her and that he
should prepare it containing this detail is not in itself fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to
presume, and it appears that he asked her, through Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the
document in her stead.
No imputation can be made to this attorney of any interest in favoring Lorenzo Pecson in the will,
because the latter was already his client at the execution of said will. Attorney Francisco denied this fact,
which we cannot consider proven after examining the evidence.
The conduct observed by this attorney after the death of Dolores Coronel in connection with the
attempted arrangement between Lorenzo Pecson and the opponents, does not, in our opinion, constitute
any data leading to the conclusion that an heir different from the true one intended by the testatrix should
have been fraudulently made to appear instituted in the will exhibit A. His attitude towards the opponents,
as can be gathered from the proceedings and especially from his letter Exhibit D, does not show any
perverse or fraudulent intent, but rather a conciliatory purpose. It is said that such a step was well
calculated to prevent every possible opposition to the probate of the will. Even admitting that one of his
objects in entering into such negotiations was to avoid every possible to the probate of the will, such
object is not incompatible with good faith, nor does it necessarily justify the inference that the heir
instituted in the instrument was not the one whom the testatrix wanted appointed.
The appellants find rather suspicious the interest shown by the said attorney in trying to persuade
Lorenzo Pecson to give them some share of the estate. These negotiations were not carried out by the
attorney out of his own initiative, but at the instance of the same opponent, Agustin Coronel, made by the
latter in his own behalf and that of his coopponents.
As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried,
through fraud or any undue influence, to frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate
to her blood relatives. The opponents insinuate that Lorenzo Pecson employed Attorney Francisco to
carry out his reproachable designs, but such depraved instrumentality was not proven, nor was it shown
that said lawyer, or Lorenzo Pecson, should have contrived or put into execution any condemnable plan,
nor that both should have conspired for illegal purposes at the time of the preparation and execution of
the will Exhibit A.
Although Norberto Paras testified having heard, when the will was being read to Dolores Coronel, the
provision whereby the estate was ordered distributed among the heirs, the preponderance of the
evidence is to the effect that said Norberto Paras was not present at such reading of the will. Appellant
do not insist on the probative force of the testimony of this witness, and do not oppose its being stricken
out.
The data furnished by the case do not show, to our mind, that Dolores Coronel should have had the
intention of giving her estate to her blood relatives instead of to Lorenzo Pecson at the time of the
execution of the will Exhibit A, nor that fraud or whatever other illegal cause or undue influence should
have intervened in the execution of said testament. Neither fraud nor evil is presumed and the record
does not show either.
Turning to the second assignment of error, which is made to consist in the will having been probated in
spite of the fact that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the provision of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, let us examine the tenor of such clause which
literally is as follows:
The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be her last will testament in
our presence, and as testatrix does not know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco
to sign her name under her express direction in our presence at the foot and on the left margin of each
and every sheet hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed these presents in the presence of others
of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the margin of each and everyone of the two pages of which this
document is composed. These sheets are numbered correlatively with the words "one and "two on the
upper part of the face thereof.
(Sgd.)          "Maximo Vergara,          Sotero Dumaual,          Marcos de los Santos,          Mariano L.
Crisostomo,           Pablo Bartolome,           Marcos de la Cruz,           Damian Crisostomo."
Appellants remark that it is not stated in this clause that the will was signed by the witnesses in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which on this particular point provides the following:
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.”
Stress is laid on the phrase used in the attestation clause above copied, to wit:
each of us signed in the presence of others.
Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to the expression "of others." One, that insinuated by
the appellants, namely, that it is equivalent to "of other persons," and the other, that contended by the
appellee, to wit, that the phrase should be held to mean "of the others," the article "the" having
inadvertently been omitted.
Should the first interpretation prevail and "other persons" be taken to mean persons different from the
attesting witnesses, then one of the solemnities required by law would be lacking. Should the second be
adopted and "of others" construed as meaning the other witnesses to the will, then the law would have
been complied with in this respect.
Including the concomitant words, the controverted phrase results thus: "each of us signed these presents
in the presence of others and of the testatrix."
If we should omit the words "of others and," the expression would be reduced to "each of us signed
these presents in the presence of the testatrix," and the statement that the witnesses signed each in the
presence of the others would be lacking. But as a matter of fact, these words  "of others and" are present.
Then, what for are they there? Is it to say that the witnesses signed in the presence of other persons
foreign to the execution of the will, which is completely useless and to no purpose in the case, or was it
for some useful, rational, necessary object, such as that of making it appear that the witnesses signed
the will each in the presence of the others? The first theory presupposes that the one who drew the will,
who is Attorney Francisco, was an unreasonable man, which is an inadmissible hypothesis, being
repugnant to the facts shown by the record. The second theory is the most obvious, logical and
reasonable under the circumstances. It is true that the expression proved to be deficient. The deficiency
may have been caused by the drawer of the will or by the typist. If by the typist, then it must be presumed
to have been merely accidental. If by the drawer, it is explainable taking into account that Spanish is not
only not the native language of the Filipinos, who, in general, still speak until nowadays their own
dialects, but also that such language is not even the only official language since several years ago.
In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476), this court said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisite
entirely unnecesary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase "of others" as meaning "of the other
witnesses," and that a grammatical or clerical error was committed consisting in the omission of the
article "the".
Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance when the intention is
manifest in the will.
The court may correct clerical mistakes in writing, and disregard technical rules of grammar as to the
construction of the language of the will when it becomes necessary for it to do so in order to effectuate
the testators manifest intention as ascertained from the context of the will. But unless a different
construction is so required the ordinary rules of grammar should be adhered to in construing the will. (40
Cyc., 1404).
And we understand that in the present case the interpretation we adopt is imperative, being the most
adequate and reasonable.
The case of In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque (43 Phil., 405), decided by this court and
invoked by the appellants, refers so far as pertinent to the point herein at issue, to an attestation clause
wherein the statement that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other is totally absent. In
the case at bar, there is the expression "in the presence of others" whose reasonable interpretation is, as
we have said, "in the presence of the other witnesses." We do not find any party between the present
case and that of Re Estate of Geronima Uy Coque above cited.
Finally, we will take up the question submitted by the opponents as to the alleged insufficiency of the
evidence to show that the attesting witnesses Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at
the execution of the will in controversy. Although this point is raised in the first assignment of error made
by the appellants, and not in the second, it is discussed in this place because it refers to the very fact of
attestation. However, we do not believe it necessary to analyze in detail the evidence of both parties on
this particular point. The evidence leads us to the conclusion that the two witnesses aforementioned were
present at the execution and signing of the will. Such is also the conclusion of the trial judge who, in this
respect, states the following, in his decision:
As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and witnesses signed the document Exhibit A in
accordance with the provisions of law on the matter, that is, whether or not the testatrix signed the will, or
caused it to be signed, in the presence of the witnesses, and the latter in turn signed in her presence and
that of each other, the court, after observing the demeanor of the witnesses for both parties,  is of the
opinion that those for the petitioner spoke the truth. It is neither probable nor likely that a man versed in
the law, such as Attorney Francisco, who was present at the execution of the will in question, and to
whose conscientiousness in the matter of compliance with all the extrinsic formalities of the execution of
a will, and to nothing else, was due the fact that the testatrix had cancelled her former will (Exhibit B) and
had new one (Exhibit A) prepared and executed, should have consented the omission of formality
compliance with which would have required little or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix
and the attesting witnesses were all present when their respective signatures were affixed to the will."
And the record does not furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and findings of
the trial judge.
In conclusion we hold that the assignments of error made by the appellants are not supported by the
evidence of record.
The judgment appealed from if affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
ACAIN v. IAC, FERNANDEZ, DIONGSON
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII,
a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner
of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise
that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and
his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English
(Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained
provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will
provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in
Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be
heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents
herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11,
1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on
June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents'
Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed
on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not
the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to
probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition
mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line,"
and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere institution of a
universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite
distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and
should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No.
591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.”
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even
if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said
of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that
both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion"
Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-
without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be
respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited
by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an
oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v.
Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and
Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118
SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial
court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court
of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982];
Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206
[1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us
on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.”
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving
spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully
substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld
the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with
the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held
that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have
denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet
the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591
ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985
for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a
hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when
on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right
to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the
case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may
be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court
of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23,
1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six children named
Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia
Akutin, five children named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia, daughter in
the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of said
Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen,
Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate on March
21, 1932, he willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his
estate, as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the hearing for the
declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his will, that all his
children by the first and second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of
the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership,
which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the
modification that the will was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely
dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be reviewed in this petition
for certiorari.
The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the foregoing facts, the omission of the children of
the first marriage annuls the institution of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or
whether the will may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the testator may
dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment, to said children of
the second marriage.
The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code, which read in part as
follows:
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is
not proven, ... shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited; but
the legacies, betterments, and other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no encroach upon the
legitime, shall be valid.”
The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the impression that the testator had
intended to disinherit, though ineffectively, the children of the first marriage. There is nothing in the will
that supports this conclusion. True, the testator expressly denied them any share in his estate; but the
denial was predicated, not upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the belief, mistaken though it was, that
the children by the first marriage had already received more than their corresponding shares in his
lifetime in the form of advancement. Such belief conclusively negatives all inference as to any intention to
disinherit, unless his statement to that effect is prove to be deliberately fictitious, a fact not found by the
Court of Appeals. The situation contemplated in the above provision is one in which the purpose to
disinherit is clear, but upon a cause not stated or not proved, a situation which does not obtain in the
instant case.
But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el terreno de los principios)
and not on the express provisions of the law. Manresa himself admits that according to law, "no existe
hoy cuestion alguna en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos, ya se refiera a
personas vivas al hacer el testamento o nacidas despues. Este ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a
los descendientes legitimos, siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima." (6 Manresa, 381.)
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one of voluntary preterition of four of the children
by the first marriage, and of involuntary preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia, also of the
first marriage, and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code, which read in part
as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious.”
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children of the first
marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without
expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The
omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the
purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art.
814 of the Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.
(Art. 814, Civil Code; Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908 and February 27, 1909.)
In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or
betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where
no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had no intention
to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 479.) In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of
the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting
of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second
marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares.
Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have
been to divide his property equally among all his children.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed, without prejudice to the
widow's legal usufruct, with costs against respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA
CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special
Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was
opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and
still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however,
dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The
respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with
the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner
Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,
in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed
as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a
quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as
follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et
al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several
adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben
Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and
advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently
dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners
Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine
Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which
appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them
denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben
Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing
arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez who entered an appearance separately from that of
her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed
of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently
submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963,
delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the
will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from
the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was
summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963
and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included
in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the
deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood
relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz,
Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the
deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the
heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will — immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the
imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent
Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had,
however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material
nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious,
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil
Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.”
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory
heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary
disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the
will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption
acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to
them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's
will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain
efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
such cause.”
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court
and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:
III
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na
tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
apelyidong Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa
kaparaanang sumusunod:
A.—Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at
Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan
(en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati (½) ng aking kaparti sa
lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa
Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV
ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati (½) ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo,
Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati (½) ng ilang lagay
na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was
deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the
deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all — the
basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the
falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to
intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in
barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by
the decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites
must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;  second, the cause must
be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory
heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed
what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if
she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own
wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their
legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete
agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly
speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails,
however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause
for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain
implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false
assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the
testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when
one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the
revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and
uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the
language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted
and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have
willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make
allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate ( libre disposicion) which largely
favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita
Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought
the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed
to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the
Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to
prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate
court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.
In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will. 4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. 5
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959,
suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to
clarify the first — an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend
and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices. 6 That the
court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by
the Rules of Court.7
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
DONATO LAJOM, petitioner,
vs. HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and RAFAEL
VIOLA, respondents.
The factual background of this case may be found in our decision in G. R. No. L-6457, entitled "Donato
Lajom vs. Jose Viola, et al." (promulgated May 30, 1956), from which we quote:
Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 4741) and closed on March 17, 1937. An agreement of
partition and distribution (dated October 25, 1935) was executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael
Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby the properties left
by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided among themselves. On March 17, 1939, Donato Lajom
(plaintiff-appellee herein) filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint, amended on May
16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly
recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being
a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola (defendants-appellants); that the agreement of
partition and distribution executed in 1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be
declaired null and void after collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits, anew partition be
ordered adjusdication one-seventh of the estate left by Maximo Viola by Donato Lajom and two-seventh
to each of the three appellants. The latter filed a demurrer to the amended complaint which was
sustained by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of July 31, 1939, holding that the
allegation of the amended complaint called for the exercise of probate jurisdication and that as the
complaint showed that the will of the deceased Maximo Viola had already been probated in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan which had first taken cognizance of the settlement of his estate, the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija could not subsequently assume the same jurisdiction. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court by the plaintiff-appellee, the order sustaining the demurrer was reversed and the case
was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceeding.
On December 21, 1942, the defendants-appellants accordingly filed an answer to the amended
complaint containing specific denials and setting up the affirmative defenses that the appellants are the
sole heirs of Maximo Viola; that corresponding judicial proceedings of his testate estate were duly
instituted and terminated in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, of which plaintiff-appellee was fully
aware; that the action was filed by the appellee two years after the termination of said testate
proceedings and almost six years after the death of Maximo Viola, without having previously asserted
any right whatsoever to any part of said estate, and he is therefore now barred from doing so; and that
assuming the appellee to be an acknowledged natural child of Maximo Viola, his right of action had
prescribed. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
EN VISTA DE LAS CONSIDERACIONES ARRIBA EXPUESTAS, el Juzgado falla este asunto a favor
del demandante y contra de los demandados, declarando al demandante, Donato Lajom, hijo natural,
implicita y tacitamente, reconocido por su padre, el difundo Dr. Maximo Viola, de acuerdo con la Ley de
Toro; se declara la particion y distribucion hecha por los demandados "Convenio de Particion y
Adjudicacion de los Bienes Dejados por el Difundo Dr. Maximo Viola, ilegal, nulo y de ningun valor; se
ordena la colacion de los bienes en cuestion, poniendo los mismos en manos de un administrador
judicial; se ordena a todos y cada uno de los aqui demandados a presentar una liquidacion de los frutos
y ptoductos provenientes de dichas propiedades asignadas a cada uno de ellos desde el Octubre 25,
1935, con el fin de una nueva distribucion; se ordena a los demandados Jose P. Viola y Silvio Viola a
someter una liquidacion de los frutos y productos de las tres parcelas de terreno mencionadas en los
parrafos 1 y 2 del Annex "A" que han sido puestas bajo su administracion en el Procedimiento Especial
No. 4741 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bulacan a partir del 3 del Septembre de 1933; y
finalmente, se ordena la particion y adjudicacion a favor del demandante de una septima (¹/7) parte de
dichas propiedades y productos; dos septimas (2/7) parbes a cada uno de los aqui demandados, cuando
todas esas propiedadespertenecientes al finado Dr. Maximo Viola sean colados, todas las deudas
pagodas y los frutos rendidos. Con costas.
Said decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija was, on appeal, affirmed by this Court in said
case No. L-6457 on May 30, 1956.
When the decision of this Court became final, the records were remanded to the lower court where
plaintiff filed a motion for the execution of the judgment, the collation of all properties of the late Dr.
Maximo Viola and the redistribution of his estate as indicated in said judgment. Acting on the motion,
respondent Judge issued an order dated October 30, 1956, pertinent parts of which are of the following
tenor:
The decision annulled the partition entered into by the defendants and ordered the "collation of all the
properties in question", placing the same in the hands of a judicial administrator. What the properties in
question are, do not clearly appear. In the inventory attached to the original complaint, 75 parcels of land
were enumerated. In the agreement of partition which was annulled, the inventory of the estate of the late
Dr. Maximo Viola enumerates only 47 parcels of land. These 47 parcels, according to the agreement of
partition, were all conjugal. In the motion for execution, plaintiff now enumerates 84 parcels of land. The
decision did not state what properties belonged to the late Dr. Maximo Viola, but it did provide for the
partition of all the estate belonging to the late Dr. Viola after the same had been collated and all the debts
paid and the fruits me liquidated. It would he manifestly unfair to either party to consider the 75 parcels of
land enumerated in the inventory attached to the amended complaint as the conjugal properties of the
late Dr. Maximo Viola and his deceased wife, or to limit the same to the 47 parcels enumerated in the
inventory of the estate of the late Dr. Maximo Viola attached to the agreement of partition. As a starting
point, however, ½ of the 47 parcels enumerated in the agreement of partition and marked, as Exhibit F-1,
which is Exhibit A of the deed of partition, are undoubtedly the properties of the late Maximo Viola which
must be partitioned among the plaintiff and the defendants in accordance with the decision. Accordingly,
the defendants, who are in possession of each and everyone of these 47 parcels, are hereby ordered to
deliver the same to the judicial administrator to be hereinafter appointed, for his administration until the
final partition in accordance with the decision of this Court. As there is a disagreement among the parties
with respect to the other properties, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to submit within 15 days upon receipt
of this order a list of such other properties which he believes belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola. The
defendants shall file their opposition thereto within a like period after which the same shall be set for
hearing to determine whether or not such properties belong to he late Dr. Maximo Viola and which should
be partitioned among his heir's.
The decision ordering the defendants to collate is questioned by the defendants, first, on ground that
what has been left by will should not be collated, and second, that what has been left by way of donation
to some of the defendants should not also be collated. The decision requires the defendants to collate all
the properties of the late Dr. Maximo viola so that they may be partitioned among the heirs. That decision
is now final, and it is not for this, Court to say that the Court rendering the decision had committed an
error. If error there had been, it is now beyond the power of this Court or any Court to correct the same.
However, the will having completely omitted the plaintiff who is a compulsory heir, and having disposed
of all the properties in favor of the defendants, it naturally encroached upon the legitime of the plaintiff.
Such testamentary dispositions may not impair the legitimate (Art. 1037, Spanish Civil Code). In another
sense, the plaintiff, being a compulsory heir in the direct line, and having been preterited, the institution is existence of said property. Hence, the same was not in question in case No. 8077, and was not covered
annulled in its entirety (Art. 814, Spanish Civil Code now Art. 854, N.C.C., Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 322). by the decision therein rendered and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Case No. L-6457.
With respect to the properties donated by the late Dr. Maximo Viola and his wife to some of the It is not accurate to say that the order of October 30, 1956, had directed the collation of all property of the
defendants, the same must be collated, but the donation having been made jointly by the spouses, only deceased. It did not even require the collation of 75 parcels of land enumerated in the inventory already
½ thereof must be brought into collation in accordance with Article 1046 of the Spanish Civil Code. adverted to. It expressed the view that one-half of the 47 parcels covered by the agreement of partition
Moreover, the same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition, but only their value at therein nullified, should be delivered to the administrator to be hereinafter appointed. Then it added:
the time of the donation in accordance with Article 1045 also of the Spanish Code.
. . . As there is a disagreement among the parties with respect to the other properties, the plaintiff is
In accordance with the agreement of the parties, Mr. Manuel V. Gallego, Jr. is hereby appointed hereby ordered to submit within 15 days upon receipt of this order a list of such other properties which he
administrator of the properties herein collated and may take his oath and assume the performance of his believes belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola. The defendants shall file their opposition thereto within a
duties upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P20,000. like period after which the same shall be set for hearing to determine whether or not such properties
belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola and which should be partitioned among his heirs.”
In accordance with the dispositive part of the decisions, the defendants Jose P. Viola and Silvio Viola are
hereby ordered to submit a liquidation of the fruits and products of the three parcels of land mentioned in Thus, it left the question whether other properties should be collated or not open for future determination.
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex A. Each and everyone of the defendants is hereby ordered to submit a In any event, respondent Judge was merely enforcing a decision that had already become final. Any
liquidation of the fruits and products of the properties assigned to each and everyone of them from order directing what was not required in said decision — and the same contained no pronouncement with
October 25, 1935, all within 15 days from the receipt of this order.” respect to the riceland adverted to above — would be in excess of his jurisdiction and therefore, null and
void.
When Rafael Viola filed the report required in this order, Donato Lajom noticed that nothing was said in
the aforementioned report concerning the fruits of a riceland, with an area of 215 hectares, allegedly It is next alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by the
donated by Dr. Maximo Viola to said Rafael Viola. So, Lajom asked that Rafael Viola be ordered to deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into
include the products of said riceland in his report, in order that the property may be included in the an intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There
redistribution of the Viola Estate. Rafael Viola objected thereto upon the ground that said property was might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for the settlement of the
not "mentioned or included in the complaint filed in this case." The objection was sustained and the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the
petition was denied in an order dated October 30, 1957, stating that: character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all
properties of the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the
. . . In paragraph II of the amended complaint (p. 43 of the record) only the donation inter vivos in favor of court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
the defendants Jose Viola and Silvio Viola were questioned. The dispositive part of the decision required admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.
the defendants to collate the properties in question. The properties which were donated to Rafael Viola
had not been put in issue by the pleadings and they are not in question and, therefore, cannot be Without prejudice, therefore, to the institution of the corresponding intestate proceedings by the proper
deemed to have been embraced in the dispositive part of the decision requiring the defendants to collate party, the petition herein should, therefore, be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the petitioner. It
the properties in question.” is so ordered.
A motion for reconsideration of said order of October 30, 1957 was denied, on January 30, 1958, upon
the ground that:
The decision required the defendants to collate the properties in question. The properties donated to
Rafael Viola and which are sought to be collated by the plaintiff are not in question, not having been put
in issue by the pleadings. Neither are they mentioned in the inventory of the 75 parcels which are
annexed to the complaint. If the court, in its previous orders, made mention of collation of all the
properties of the deceased, the court had committed an error, and, therefore, corrects that error in
accordance with this order and in the order of October 30, 1957.”
Thereupon Lajom instituted the present case for certiorari and mandamus, with the prayer:
. . . that the respondent Judge be ordered to set aside his Order of October 30, 1957 and January 30,
1958 and reinstate his original Order of October 30, 1956 requiring 'the defendants to collate all the
properties of the late Dr. Maxinio Viola so that they may be partitioned among the heirs' and 'with respect
to the property donated by the late Dr. Maximo Viola and his wife to some of the defendants the same
must be collated.”
Petitioner maintains that the riceland aforementioned was involved in case G. R. No. L-6457, because
respondents maintained in their brief and in the motion for reconsideration filed by them in the Supreme
Court that the lower court had erred in ordering the collation of all the properties of the deceased.
Moreover, he urges that the order of respondent Judge of October 30, 1956, had already declared that all
properties of the deceased, including those donated by him, were subject to collation; that said order
became final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom; and that, consequently, said order
could not be validly modified or reversed by the aforementioned orders of respondent Judge, dated
October 30, 1957 and January 30, 1958.
We find no merit in this pretense. The decision affirmed by this Court in G. R. No. L-6457 ordained the
collation of the "properties in question". The properties in question were described in an inventory
attached to petitioner's original complaint in case No. 8077 and did not include the aforementioned
riceland, with an area of 215 hectares. Indeed, Lajom admits that he did not include, and could not have
included or mentioned it, in his complaint because, at the time of its filing, he did not know of the
 TOPIC #12 SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, defendants-appellants.
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as  La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose
heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the
defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara,
husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said
judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so
attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary
heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs made in the will
of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in
dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen
Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with
me, I institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my
debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of this will, and after the report of the
committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix
and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my
own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired
to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his
surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the
hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in
their minority, I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her
default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein
given must not be considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez
Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his
character is not adapted to management and administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the
appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a
simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would
in the instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of
inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the
administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the
substitute heirs are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by
the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the
substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple
substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it cannot be a simple
substitution in the light of the considerations above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is a
fideicommissary substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that
upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee
on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this
clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does
not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the
testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot
be disregarded if we are to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word  sole does not necessarily
exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means that the
plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not
incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple
substitution, where the heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the
inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to
pass it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and
143, 5th ed.), says:
Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as held in the Resolution of June
25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part
of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another, namely that the fideicommissarius
be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from
the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred to in articles 783 of the
Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the
fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly
equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to
dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an
indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the death of the
heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that
in making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary
substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision,
"in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it
is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the
substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil
Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond
the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that
the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to
preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary
heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to
our quotation from Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is
therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the
case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the
inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution,
according to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now
under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an
heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a
part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall
pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to
dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said
clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs
both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that the fideicommissarius or
second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant
case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but
from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the
plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the
testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the
association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be
subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary
heirs.
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.]
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672), Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
and AVELINA A. MAGNO, Respondents.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE
OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672) PCIB, administrator-appellant, v.
LORENZO CARLES, ET AL.
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court, not finding any new matter in the said motions sufficient to induce a modification of
its judgment, reaffirmed its previous opinion, denied the first two motion, and authorized the trial court to
make the assessment to the damages prayed for. Because of the length of time that the subject estates
have been pending judicial settlement, the parties were enjoined to exert all efforts to have the
inventories of said estates finalized and to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences. The
respondent court was likewise directed to expedite proceedings and to close the same upon the payment
of the corresponding taxes due within three months from notice.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENTS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF
THE SAME WHERE NO NEW MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE THE
PREVIOUS DECISION OF THE COURT; DIRECTIVE TO RESPONDENT COURT TO EXPEDITE AND
TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THREE MONTHS SUPERSEDES PRO TANTO THE
DISPOSITION IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION. — The resolution’s directive to respondent court to
expedite and terminate the protracted proceedings within three months supersedes pro tanto the
disposition in the original decision of March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the minimum one-fourth of
the community properties adjudged to be the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery and to exclusive
administration by respondent as her estate’s administrator, with the other one-fourth to remain under the
joint administration of said respondent and petitioner and Charles Newton Hodges’ one-half share to be
administered by petitioner exclusively as his estate’s administrator, since such physical segregation and
separate administration could not possibly be accomplished before the more pressing and indispensable
matters of submittal of the two estates’ inventories and determination by respondent court within the
limited three-month period given in the Court’s resolution.
RESOLUTION
Motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner-
appellant Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and motion for modification filed by Joe Hodges and
"the other heirs of Charles Newton Hodges" in regard to the decision of this Court of March 29, 1974.
Anent the motion of respondent-appellee Avelina Magno 1 the assessment of the damages she claims
she and the Estate Linnie Jane Hodges have suffered by reason of the preliminary injunction in this case
which was lifted per resolution of 1 Court of September 8, 1972, the Court resolved to authorize trial court
to make the assessment prayed for, subject to appeal, to this Court, if necessary.
Considering the substantial value of the subject estates the length of time they have already been
pending judicial settlement and for the reason that the payment of the corresponding taxes thereon are
being unduly delayed, and because the properties of said estates have to be disposed favor of Filipinos
before May 27, 1976, the Court enjoins the parties to exert all efforts to have the inventories of said
states finalized without further delay, and if possible to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences to
further complications, expenses and unnecessary loss time. The respondent court is directed to expedite
processing by giving due priority thereto, requiring the parties to submit the inventories within thirty days
from notice hereof, and to resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court’s decision and to close
the proceedings upon payment of the corresponding taxes within three months from notice hereof.
Respondent judge is further directed to report to this Court from time to time the action taken by him
hereon. 
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 and G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and
resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error
affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of
the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of
the whole situation be made together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal
aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife,
Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which
were executed on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and
debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to
have and to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the
death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the
other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special
administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14,
1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as
Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties
left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges",
the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his
administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no
person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will
and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962.
Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to
be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime"
and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided
among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that
the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his
wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such
liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although
relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the conjugal
partnership and then merely divided the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased
wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns for
each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs.
Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in
asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he
was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance tax
authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which
attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here
in the Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and
renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife,
since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent
and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may
be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26,
1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies
was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate
of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time
appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno
and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each
administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the
beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted
the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however,
differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and
independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers
whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno
and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged
solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal
partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own
expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and
dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they
actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of the
two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the
differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins
and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate
association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the
approval by the court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that
the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned
orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have
any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the
estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue
acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has
been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in
Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a
testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further
contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines,
following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the
estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership,
notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to
Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and
allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts
of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of
lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing
deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of
Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders
are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the
principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of
Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and
contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as
executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her
position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a
lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her
brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable
law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime,
hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership
properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced
his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters
effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule
PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to
Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the
remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband
at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find
that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court
intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders
furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the
proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done.
At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in
advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no
possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes
have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the
assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the
time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from,
May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to
remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or
property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he
had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what
would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective
positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the
purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her
brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it
appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges,
PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said
conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter,
whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the
matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to
claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a
party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the
other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision,
Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the
condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during
his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges'
death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other
hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional
simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory
condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the
institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be
more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle
of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that
Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had
legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently
obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a
final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues
for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated.
We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our
considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole
share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the
resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for
even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under
Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its
orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be
distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof,
the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as
administratrix, covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related
earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered
into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by
appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be
implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to
pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on
the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges
would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which
reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no
showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the government,
the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical
approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And
inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has
objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said
orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition
in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders
of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the
existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof
is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner
of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2)
the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally
renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of
the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957,
minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date
until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall
continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by
the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of
August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of
September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated,
and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of
their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should
immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the
one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court
should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause
the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the
half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its
removal as administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two
issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result
from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court  a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in
all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the
Court in the foregoing opinion.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted
an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te la Escolta, Manila................................................ P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust Co......................................................................... 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garantizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota .... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first
heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions
are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in
the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz
(Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated
May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership.
They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the
Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides
for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to
one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under
the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime
will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime
and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter
into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are
several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the  simple and the fideicommissary.
The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in
case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept
the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance,
shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living
at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the
sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third
usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because
as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct
over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or
stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the
only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is
void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The
Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be
only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code
has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one
degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be
related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These
are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by
Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the
establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to
be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion
that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
TOPIC #13 CONDITIONS, MODES AND TERMS
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone
the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions
of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things,
provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.”
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns
as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph
G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws
in force, must be complied with and executed. 
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.”
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907
ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee.
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de
la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone;
should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by
me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother
Vicente or his children should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one
of the properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the
will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she
alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-
mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed
by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that holding
the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente,
appealed.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand it,
that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at
his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could
be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court below is not accepted by
the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by
the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death
of the testatrix.  Rabadilla.
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article
793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon
the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon
the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to be observed that by the second
clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he
must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall
lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does
leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall
forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again
he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the
property contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by
anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference
to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not
say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy
above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference
to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In
the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the
will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code,
which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we think that it may be argued from what is said
in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly
appear from the language used in the will.
Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate children
we do not decide, for no such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause
not having arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the
husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will. That was the only question
before the court below. the judgment of that court, denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725               June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
2 
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-
G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod
City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511,
855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said
Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P.
Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942),
which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I
shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have
already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of
the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly,
the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have
left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs
of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the
buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil),
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the
latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the
obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further
command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey
and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my
near descendants and my sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner),
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-
mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint
alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants
and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75
piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the
sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No.
1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of
Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the
herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived
at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be
delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central;
and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance
of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash
equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on
or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed
as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the
non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children
of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it
is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;
ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of
sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its
reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to
order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of
Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's
estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal
heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of
sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-
appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling
that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article
882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882
of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the
absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find
application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution -  i.e.
the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the
testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision
cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted
heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a
definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 8 and
8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals
deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that
the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal
institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the
petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent 10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and
the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon
the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by
the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action
against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable
because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the
testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of
sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others,
as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir. 15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants
or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to
the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir. 17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all
related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law
in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his
heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they
may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take
effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to
and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession
as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object
of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir. 18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it
does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. 21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended
that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the
latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in
nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of
such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the
heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right
of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize
was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of
any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold
the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of
sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said
obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-
interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally
apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner
had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and
constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and
the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of
subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect after his death. 25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, v. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, GO
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