Adams Et Al 1981 Natural Selection Energetics and Cultural Materialism

Natural Selection, Energetics, and "Cultural Materialism" [and Comments and Reply]
Author(s): Richard N. Adams, Donald T. Campbell, Ronald Cohen, Richard A. Curtin,

Whitney M. Davis, A. De Ruijter, Paul Diener, Robert C. Dunnell, Jeffrey Ehrenreich,
Kajsa Ekholm, Jonathan Friedman, Ronn Parker, J. Iain Prattis and Jim Weil
Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Dec., 1981), pp. 603-624
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 22, No. 6, December 1981
? 1981 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research 001 1-3204/81/2206-0004$02.25
Natural Selection, Energetics, and
";Cultural Materialismn"
by Richard N. Adams
HARRIS'S Cultural Materialism (1979) may be presumed to be systems," "medical control of demographic patterns," and
the definitive statement of an approach that has produced "contraception," "structure" includes "domestic discipline,"
both heat and light in the anthropological journals. Harris ''war,'" and "clubs,'" and "superstructure" includes "art,"
(see also, e.g., 1968, 1977) applies the term "cultural ma- "sports," "science," and "rituals." Among "mental compo-
terialism" to a "strategy of research" which assumes that the nents" we encounter "magic, religion, taboos," listed as per-
search for causal explanations will be most fruitful when di- taining to all three categories (1979:52-54). Since all human
rected at the area that (following Marxist usage) he calls events are multifaceted, this formal classification makes it
"infrastructure." He proposes that the events of the infra- quite impossible to be sure where many things belong. Harris
structure of society will in the long run determine the events considers this procedure central to his analysis, and therefore
that would be classified as "structure" or "superstructure." the power of his strategy depends on the ability of indepen-
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that Harris's approach dent investigators to allocate human events to the correct
suffers from a failure to allow for the complexities of the categories. This, it turns out, is often impossible.
human social process and, in particular, that his method is As I have pointed out, "infrastructure" is especially impor-
difficult to apply because of its dependence on concepts that tant to Harris's arguments because it determines the events
are more remarkable for their venerableness than for their of the other categories: "infrastructure should consist of those
pertinence to the findings of contemporary science. aspects of a sociocultural system which enable one to predict
a maximum number of additional components, up to the be-
havior of the entire system if possible" (p. 64). More directly,
PROBLEMS it is "the principal interface between culture and nature, the
boundary across which the ecological, chemical, and physical
1. Central to Harris's view of his strategy is the division of restraints to which human action is subject interact with the
sociocultural events into a series of categories which in turn principal sociocultural practices aimed at overcoming or modi-
are classified as belonging to "infrastructure," "structure," or fying those restraints" (p. 57). The problem here is the dis-
"superstructure." "Infrastructure" combines "mode of pro- tinction between "culture" and "nature." If, for example, Levi-
duction" and "mode of reproduction." The operationalization Strauss wants to contrast culture and nature, we can accept it
of these categories presents insoluble problems because the as' part of his culture or of the cultures that he is describing.
definitions of subcategories are so broad. Thus we find that If, on the other hand, we as analysts want to use this contrast
"infrastructure" includes things as general and specific as "eco- to distinguish two orders of phenomena in the external world,
then we are up against the insoluble dilemma of casting cul-
ture as not being natural. If culture is not part of nature,
1 This essay has benefited from observations by Jonathan Fried-
where does it stand in the order of things?
mnan and other (anonymous) referees. Some of the perspective de-
scribed herein may be found, in a structural Marxist framework, One could accept the possibility that Harris was intention-
in Friedman (1974).
ally speaking somewhat loosely in this matter were it not for
the fact that every attempt that one makes to understand his
characterization of infrastructure leads to a similar dilemma.
RICHARD N. ADAMS is Professor of Anthropology at the Univer- Not even my energetic-mentalistic dichotomy (Adams 1975)
sity of Texas at Austin (Austin, Tex. 78712, U.S.A.). Born in is applicable here, because infrastructure is contrasted not with
1924, he was educated at the University of Michigan (B.A.,
a single other category (superstructure), but with two: "The
1947 and at Yale University (M.A., 1949; Ph.D., 1951). He
held positions at the Smithsonian Institution (1950-51), the order of cultural materialist priorities from infrastructure to
World Health Organization (1952-56), and Michigan State Uni- the remaining behavioral components and finally to the mental
versity (1956-62) before joining the faculty at Texas in 1962. superstructure reflects the increasing remoteness of these com-
His research interests are complex societies, the evolution of so-
ponents from the culture/nature interface" (p. 57).
ciety, and energy processes. His publications include Energy and
Structure (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), Crucifixion I am not qualified to discuss what Marx meant by "infra-
by Power (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), The Sec- structure" and "superstructure." This is a problem properly
ond Sowing (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), and A Commu- left to intellectual historians. My concern is with whether
nity in the Andes (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1959). these ideas as used are operable, and I suggest that, appro-
The present paper was submitted in final form 13 I 80. priately interpreted, they are. Godelier (1978a, b) effectively
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 603
argues that many of the areas other Marxists have assigned redistribution systems to develop, the redistributors must be
to the superstructure are in fact part of the infrastructure. able to act as 'energy gates,' opening and shutting the flow of
He points out (1972:99) that there is a hierarchy of struc- critical amounts of proteins and calories needed by the pri-
tures (e.g., kinship, political relations, religious relations, etc.) mary producers . . ." (and to this he appends a reference to
in society and that the relative position or dominance of a Odum's Environment, Power, and Society). On the surface,
given structure in the hierarchy will vary with "the productive such an "energy gate" would seem to fit the notion of "the
forces of the society, the distribution of social labor among interface between culture and nature." The evidence seems
the different kinds of production." Since he defines infrastruc- to be that such energy gates often were composed of exotic
ture in terms of functions rather than institutions (1978a:14) idea systems, complex and expensive ritual performances, and
and argues that the dominance of a particular structure is de- religious personnel. I believe Harris would argue that these
termined by the role it plays in the productive process, he are superstructural and structural and that they act on the
avoids the trap of formal definition into which Harris has infrastructural to control it. I would argue, however, that it is
fallen.2 not the infrastructure that is being controlled, but the energy
2. Harris depends heavily on two distinctions-emic/etic flow. It is the control that is part of the culture/nature inter-
and mental/behavioral-to help identify what pertains to the face. Therefore, not only do the gatekeepers and their behavior
various structures (1979:31-45). Neither of these is appro- in effect constitute the interface, but it could not operate
priate to his purpose. The term "etic behavioral" derives from without them. They may readily be classified as part of
these two classic distinctions, but they are really of little Godelier's infrastructure, but not as part of Harris's infra-
help. To label a thing as etic or emic says nothing about its structure. It is not that either Harris or I is closer to the
validity; it merely identifies its source. (Of course, trusting truth, but that the situation is entirely ambiguous; we cannot
one source more than another might allow one in a particular know on the basis of his differentiation of infrastructure and
case to judge that one description is more valid than another, structure/superstructure. The classification is inadequate to
but this does not follow on any theoretical basis.) The the task.
thought/behavior dichotomy is equally specious, and in addi- An outstanding case is a body of material that Harris him-
tion it is primarily a folk distinction of Western culture and self finds hard to categorize within the tripartite structure
has not moved far beyond that. Mental activity is certainly (pp. 54-55):
behavior, and it is inconceivable that there is any so-called Communication, including speech, serves a vital instrumental role
behavior that does not have mental concomitants. Can one in coordinating infrastructural, structural, and superstructural ac-
wiggle a finger without some correlated nervous activity? tivities; hence it cannot be regarded as belonging exclusively to
Similarly, it seems indisputable that for any mental activity any one of these divisions. Moreover, communication in the form
to have social relevance it must be manifest in overt behavior. of speech acts is also the very stuff out of which much of the
Cognitive or psychic models for which there is only indirect mental and emic superstructure is built. Hence language per se
cannot be viewed as an exclusive infrastructural, structural, or
evidence remain hypothetical. Many of the so-called infra-
superstructural component, nor as an exclusively behavioral or
structural events that Harris cites require, in fact, mental
mental phenomenon.
models that, insofar as their "mentalness" is concerned, are
no different from those which might be assigned to the super- I agree. The problem, however, is that much the same can be
structure. The difference is that some mental models are bet- said for almost all aspects of culture because all culture com-
ter than others in providing guides as to how parts of the municates. Proxemics and kinesics (Hall 1969, Birdwhistell
external world are working. The statements "No calves are 1952) are merely unconventional examples of what has long
starved to death" and "Male calves are starved to death" been a general understanding.
(Harris 1979:38) are (using Harris's terms) equally emic and 4. Finally, the argument that the infrastructure determines
mental. That male calves are indeed starved to death is a the structure and the superstructure but can also be acted
separate fact. Thus the question is not the relative emicness/ upon, inhibited, and controlled by them raises the question of
eticness or mentalness/behavioralness of the mental models, just what kind of determinism this is. I have found no
but the degree to which each approximates the events of the guidance in Harris's work or elsewhere as to the circum-
external world. What is going on in Harris's "culture/nature" stances under which structure and superstructure may so act
interface here is neither of the mental models, as they are on infrastructure. Harris's assertion that the purpose of the
clearly part of culture; rather, it is the specific activity of exercise is to find the order in historical events is not well
pushing the male calf aside from the cow's teat so that it served by this omission.
eventually starves. One could, if one wished, argue that the
second of the two mental models was more salient-that it
even "caused" the overt activity. That would present serious
problems for the cultural materialist position, since the men- SOME ALTERNATIVES
tal model would then be the cause of the overt behavior that
NATURAL SELECTION
constituted, in turn, the articulation between culture and na-
ture. Idea would thus "cause" material process. Heaven Just as Marx's work did not really strike its mark in social
forbid! science until a century after it was written, so the recognition
3. There are concepts that have proven useful to anthropo- of the importance of Darwinian natural selection has been
logical theory and are relevant to the area to which the term delayed. The American geneticist H. J. Muller is quoted as
"infrastructure" is applied but do not seem to fall comfort- saying in 1959 that "one hundred years without Darwin are
ably within any of Harris's categories. A critical case is that enough!" (Gould 1979a:11). If biology has suffered from a
of energy-flow triggers. In discussing the rise of chiefdoms,lack of understanding of this transcendental process, social
Harris observes (p. 93) that "in order for large, asymmetrical science has been even more crippled. Indeed, the ideological
and political attractions of Marx's renaissance have probably
2 I have found in delineating power relations in society that the contributed to a further delay in natural selection's finding
Marxist terminology for the various components of production its rightful place as a major component of our social theories.
("forces of," "relations of," "means of," "organization of") is any- It is no surprise, therefore, that while Harris has drawn so
thing but clear and that the identification of the functioning power
usefully from both Marx and Malthus, he has not drawn on
structure in terms of its formal elements is a more convenient
approach (cf. Adams 1975:esp. 176). Darwin in a comparable way. Marx is seen to be close to
604 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
being the "Darwin of the social sciences" (1979:x), but Dar- Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
win's own relevance to the social sciences goes unrecorded.

Harris refers repeatedly to the process of natural selection relative light of day.3 Though at times Harris deals with se-
(chap. 3 and elsewhere) but explicitly employs it as an ana- lection, there is confusion in his work with reference to the
lytical device only in reference to sociobiology. He asserts variation-producing phase. At one point he denies that cul-
(p. 153) that "Darwinism and cybernetic models of evolution tural materialism deals with innovation (p. 59): "Cultural
are perfectly capable of dealing with slowly accumulating materialism is not addressing the question of how technologi-
strains that lead to a 'violent collapse of the whole system' cal inventions and other kinds of creative innovations origi-
as well as with 'evolution through the slow accumulation of nate in individuals but rather how such innovations come to
minor changes wrought by minor adjustments to minor assume material social existence and how they come to exert
stresses,' " but then he proceeds to assign to the hazily de- influence on social production and social reproduction." One
fined "infrastructure" a determining role in the extremely would have to conclude from this that whatever explanatory
complex cybernetic interplay that constitutes the ongoing natu- value this strategy may have rests in its explaining selection.
ral-selection processes. He presses a strategy of linear cau- There are, however, two major problems with this. One is,
sation on what we now know are extremely complex nonlinear as I have said, that one must be able to identify the infra-
processes. Harris's Newtonian world view has been penetrated structure before selection takes place if one is to use it in ex-
by phenomenal complexity only in his discovery of the Bose- plaining selection, and Harris provides us with no way of
rup (1965) intensification principle and his application of it doing this. A second problem is that, fast on the heels of the
indiscriminately all over the block (Harris 1977). assertion that cultural materialism does not deal with innova-
An evolutionary perspective is basic to any diachronic an- tion, we read that, in view of "the uncanny way in which the
thropological analysis. Mutation, replication, variation, and invention of the steamship, telephone, airplane, photography,
natural selection are as important to sociocultural as to bio- automobile, and hundreds of other patentable devices have
logical theory. Sociocultural anthropologists speak of mutation been subjected to conflicting claims of priority by independent
in terms of discovery and invention, replication in terms of individuals and laboratories, the conclusion seems inescapable
socially acceptable innovation and diffusion, and variation in that when the infrastructural conditions are ripe, the appro-
terms of concepts too numerous to be listed here. When it priate thoughts will occur, not once, but again and again."
comes to natural selection, however, they have been much less Harris's own illustrations contradict his assertion: "There is
inclined, for a number of reasons, to follow the Darwinian ample evidence to indicate that some of the greatest inven-
model. First, the notion of selection threatens the notion that tions ever made-for example, agriculture-were known in
humankind controls its own destiny. Second, since cultural thought [italics mine] for thousands of years before they
traits are combinations of energetic forms and mental mean- began to play a significant role in the infrastructures of pre-
ings, the disappearance of a trait may be ambiguous in that historic societies." If anything, then, it is not when infra-
either its form or its meaning continues separately in a new structural conditions are ripe that innovations are made
context. Third, our classically linear thinking makes it difficult "again and again," but when superstructural conditions are
to consider human activity as only one of a set of factors, ripe-whatever that may mean. Here again, it seems that the
cultural and noncultural, that acts in the ultimate selection of principal role infrastructure can play is a selective, not a mu-
events. tative one.
The process that Harris is trying to capture is really evo- The alternative that I want to suggest is not merely that
lution-an essentially Darwinian evolution-or it is nothing. natural selection is the core process in Harris's "infrastruc-
tural determinism," but also that it calls for an entirely dif-
Cultural mutations, innovations, inventions, discoveries, etc.,
may occur with reference to infrastructure, but they equally ferent kind of explanation. Linear processes permit statements
occur with reference to superstructure; that is, they come of cause and effect; nonlinear processes operate in convoluted
into being in the context of the culture as a whole. Like ways that make mincemeat of such explanations. The kinds
genetic mutations, innovations are innumerable. If Harris's of explanations that sufficed for classical or Newtonian dy-
infrastructure is determinant, what it determines cannot be namics cannot cope with the nonlinear processes characteristic
the nature of innovations; rather, it must be the process of of living organisms (Prigogine 1977). The strategy inherent in
natural selection that eventually leads to the institutionaliza- our framework for the explanation of living and social pro-
tion or the extinction of the innovations. Harris's infrastruc- cesses, derived from the logic of explanation of such classical
ture does not determine the invention of a new god; rather, processes, is to seek what is essentially a combination of
it is the locus of the process whereby that god becomes (or Aristotelian efficient and material causes of the event in ques-
fails to become) part of the culture. The idea of a new god tion. Even in simple cases, however, it has long been obvious
confronts one of three possibilities: it may be opposed to the that such statements are seldom adequate. Thus, the asserted
coming selective factors, positively congruent with or sup- cause of a person's getting up and moving from one room to
portive of them, or irrelevant to them. In the first case it will another may involve an interaction of psychological, physio-
probably be rejected or modified. In the second case it may logical, and environmental conditions far too complex for any-
persist and become institutionalized, but this is by no means thing more than the crudest kind of specification.
certain; it must, for example, compete with other gods that In the search for the reasons for complex social events we
also may work fairly well. In the third case, whether it per- sometimes resort to a very different kind of explanation. For
sists or not will depend on many other factors, and it is very example, the "cause" of the presence of communities among
likely to disappear. The problem with Harris's concept of human eings might be characterized in two ways: (1) human
infrastructure now becomes clearer. The reason it cannot beings live in communities because they are gregarious; (2)
specify empirical features ahead of time is that the process human beings live in communities because they are interde-
of natural selection has not taken place, and if the trait in pendent. The first asserts that there are antecedent conditions
question has any element of real novelty about it predictions in the human being that lead him to seek to form communi-
about its ultimate course are extremely precarious. ties. The second asserts that if human beings failed to live in
An explanatory model based on the evolutionary framnework
must account for variation as well as selection, but so far our 3 For further discussion of the role of explanation in historical
understanding of mutation lags behind that of selection. In study, see Adams (1980). Some of the material here is appearing
simultaneously in the cited publication with the permission of both
contrast to mutative processes, selective factors operate in the the Cambridge University Press and this journal.
Vol. 22 * No. 6 E December 1981 605
communities they could not survive. This kind of explanation the asserted "decline" of Britain in the late 19th century are
has been widely rejected by science as an appeal to final far too complicated and little known ever to be unraveled in
causes, but recently it has begun to be seen in another light. a way that will suit even a random minority of historians, and
In biology the old and the new kinds of explanation have consequently we must resort to an explanation based on se-
been characterized respectively as "proximate" and "ultimate," lection.
"functional" and "evolutionary," the "how" and the "why," Selection explanations are of specific use in the examination
the "mechanism" and the "strategy," and the "immediate of novel historical events. Since every such event is unique,
environmental factors" and the "long-term consistent pattern an attempt at explanation requires that we explore a diverse
of environmental change" (Pianka 1978:15; see also Baker range of facts that have conjunctively participated in it.
1938; Mayr 1961; Wilson 1975:23). Pianka argues that the While it may occasionally be possible to account for the
difference between the two "is in outlook, between thinking course of history with a few factors, for larger and more
in an 'ecological' time scale (now time) or in an 'evolution- complex events we can at best have recourse only to selection
ary' time scale (geological time)." The term "ultimate" is explanations. For example, it is argued that the discovery of
applied to the second because it refers to the antecedent ge- analogies in comparative history will provide a kind of expla-
netic characteristics that continue to make themselves felt nation (cf. Stinchcombe 1978), but in fact such analogies are
over long eras, in contrast to the more immediate or "proxi- merely statements that similar outcomes seem to have evolved
mate" factors that can be seen to operate in a given case. out of similar sets of conditions, suggesting that there may be
It is not any desire to muddy the waters with additional patterns of selection that can be delineated.
terminology that leads me to prefer yet another term for this Given this perspective on the nature of the explanation of
kind of explanation: selection explanation. Its fundamental complex events, we can reflect again on the usages of the
characteristic is that it argues that some events are the prod- biologists and ecologists cited earlier. Terms such as "proxi-
uct of natural selection. Since natural selection usually takes mate," "functional," "mechanisms," and "immediate environ-
a long time, the time element may appear to be of major im- mental factors" describe an explanation distinct from what I
portance, but I would suggest that this element is relative; have called the selection explanation and concern the varia-
it is the process of selection, not how long it takes, that tion-producing phase or component of events. Such expla-
makes this kind of explanation different from the other. nations treat of innovation, mutation, the appearance of the
Moreover, the use of this term suggests further aspects of novel. What leads Wilson to prefer ultimate explanations to
the process that have perhaps not been sufficiently empha- proximate ones is that a really satisfactory proximate expla-
sized. First is that the events being explained are extremely nation would have to explain how a mutation occurred, and
complex, including both ancient factors (such as the pattern it is precisely this that biology finds most difficult. I would
of a gene) and much more recent ones (such as a forest fire argue that the study of culture and society equally finds it
that kills off the remaining members of a small genetic popu- difficult to predict the appearance of new things. Once in-
lation). A selection explanation does not pretend to search out vented, it is much less difficult to suggest that something will
and list all the historical events that have contributed to the be replicated or reinvented. Hence, "ultimate" or selection ex-
production of a given form. It merely asserts that the form planations must play a central role in social-science as well as
is the product of a series of events that may be too complex biological studies because there are many events for which
to ascertain. A proximate model of these events might be con- we may never have adequate proximate explanations.
structed, but it will have its share of estimates and impre- Harris's error lies in that he has tried to take the complex
cisions and will be necessarily incomplete. process of natural selection and reduce it to some institution-
Closely related to this characteristic of complexity is that ally identifiable and isolable elements of the human process.
selection explanations permit prediction only under stable con- Unfortunately, notions such as the thought/behavior dichot-
ditions. They are inherently ex post facto explanations for a omy, the culture/nature interface, and the tripartite structure
specific historical outcome of a long and complex selection of society are both empirically unidentifiable and theoretically
process. There is seldom any reason to anticipate that a given fuzzy. In these, he is specifically vulnerable. The larger fail-
selection process will be precisely repeated. However, to the ure to recognize the importance of natural selection and the
degree that an explanation based on selection identifies a spe- fact that it requires a different kind of explanation than is
cific set of factors that operate in other situations, it can be customary in the social sciences is one he shares with many
used as the basis for a hypothesis to predict some class of social scientists. I would agree with Harris's profession of not
event. To return to our original example of the community, attempting to explain the mutational phase of events, but I
it is a prediction (although an obvious one) that human would not pretend that an explanation based on selection can
beings who fail to participate in a community will have a also, in some "uncanny way," stand as an explanation for
very low probability of reproducing. mutation.
If selection explanations are so limited in the kinds of pre-
dictions they permit, what value have they? The answer to LAWS OF ENERGY
this must vary with the problem and the field of investigation.
Pianka points out that the two kinds of explanation are not My emphasis on explanations and on the nonlinear processes
mutually exclusive: ecological and physiological mechanisms that they must account for is fundamentally epistemologica
evolve in response to evolutionary and environmental condi- the focus on natural selection as an area of special importance
tions. Wilson (1975:23) is actually less sympathetic to the is methodological. There is an additional alternative that is
"proximate" arguments, holding that they tend to be phrased fundamentally theoretical and that provides a different frame-
in terms of "nebulous independent variables" that "can seldom work for the problems with which Harris is trying to deal.
be linked either to neurophysiology or evolutionary biology There are processes that are essential to nature and therefore
and hence to the remainder of science." In the present con- also to society. Models of processes that accord with the tra-
text the importance of selection explanations rests. I believe, jectory of nature are more likely to be useful than those in
on a somewhat different basis. Where we deal with aggregates the meaning/symbol systems that stand apart from the other
of antecedents that are too complex, too multitudinous, and/or processes of nature. Thus, activities that conform with laws
too little known to sort out, we have no choice but to resort that operate independently of the human symbolic process
to selection explanations. The proximate "causes" of, for ex- will take precedence over those that are based primarily on
ample, the relative deceleration of energy consumption and the latter. There are a good many natural laws that affect
human and nonhuman affairs equally. I want to illustrate the Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
alternative to Harris's approach with a discussion of three:

the Second Law of Thermodynamics, Lotka's principle, and it. According to Lotka's principle, those life forms that chan-
Prigogine's far-from-equilibrium theory. nel and degrade more energy will have a selective advantage
The Second Law of Thermodynamics has received increas- over others. Thus, once captured on earth in dissipative struc-
ing attention in social science since White (1943) argued its tures, the energy that comprises those structures accelerates
fundamental importance. I propose, as a working hypothesis, the operation of the Second Law by giving greater success to
that everything that we may want to deal with scientifically those that conforrm to it more rigorously.
will conform to the Second Law. However, there is much in It is of prime importance to recognize that dissipative struc-
culture that gives the appearance of not doing so. All cultures tures of the kind described by Prigogine operate in full con-
(including scientific ones) have propositions, models, expla- formity with natural selection. All such structures require in-
nations that do not conform to the Second Law. If we accept puts (i.e., appropriate environments) for their perpetuation
the Second Law, then we must accept the proposition that any and expansion, and a failure to provide those inputs will act
proposal that conflicts with it is subject to being diverted, on the structure in question selectively. The creation of such
modified, or displaced. structures is another matter, just as mutation has always been
The application of the Second Law to human social process in biology, and the precise conjunction of factors may be in
has long been a source of difficulty. The "dismal law" that cultural innovations. While Lotka's principle has nothing to do
sees the world as constantly "running down" has never proved with the problems of bringing such structures into being, once
successful by itself in characterizing the apparently order- they exist they follow the principle and the Second Law.
building behavior of human culture. The notion that there The final clause of Lotka's principle has sometimes been
are "islands" of order, of negative entropy or "negentropy," misunderstood. The law states that systems that circulate
in this otherwise declining scene is descriptively correct but more energy will be favored over those that circulate less "so
provides no model for understanding why some processes long as there is presented an unutilized residue of matter and
occur rather than others. After all, everything that one does available energy." This explains why under some circum-
consistently obeys the Second Law by degrading energy. stances the "expansive" or "hurrying" feature of the process
The first part of a solution to this problem was, so far as not only does not favor a given system, but may be respon-
I know, first formulated in a principle set forth by Lotka sible for its demise. Selection operates very harshly on dis-
(1922:148): "In every instance considered, natural selection sipative structures that have developed a specialized depen-
will so operate as to increase, the total mass of the organic dence on disappearing energy resources. Social scientists have
system, to increase the rate of circulation of matter through been slow in recognizing this aspect of Lotka's principle.4
the system, and to increase the total energy flux through the Understanding of the significance of Lotka's principle and
system, so long as there is presented an unutilized residue of Prigogine's clarifications is not yet widespread among anthro-
matter and available energy." Lotka offered this as an evolu- pological theorists. Berthoud and Sabelli's (1979) recent pro-
tionary principle that would describe how things in the "neg- posal that the emphasis in macrotheory should be on the pro-
entropic" world of biology presented the illusion of contra- duction of waste is a step in the right direction, but it misses
dicting the Second Law while actually observing it. Indeed, the point. The crucial process is, as Lotka suggested, the cir-
Lotka's formulation makes clear that life forms not only con- culation, expenditure, transformation of energy, in the process
form to the Second Law (since the production of any life of which, in accord with the Second Law, it is necessarily
always degrades a great deal more energy than is contained degraded. The same may be said of matter-a principle that
in the resultant construction), but even serve to speed up its may be deduced from the Second Law or, if one wishes,
operation. It argues that those forms that process, channel, stated separately, as Georgescu-Roegen (1977:269) does, as a
convert more energy and matter to a degraded state will take "Fourth Law": "In a closed system, the material entropy
precedence over others. The competition for life, for survival, must ultimately reach a maximum." Thus, the inevitable re-
thus becomes a mechanism not for the building of "islands" sult of doing anything is the production of entropy and waste.
or "castles" of negative entropy against the fearsome flow of To convert this into a hypothesis that in so doing human
the Second Law, but for making the wheel turn faster. beings are following a social or cultural principle (i.e., one
Lotka's principle thus explained the central process whereby that is in some sense independent of nature) is both redun-
natural selection worked and evolution followed its central di- dant and misleading. It is, in fact, theoretically inevitable and
rection of seeking disorder. It did not, however, provide a inherent in the Second Law and Lotka's principle. To propose
very clear understanding of how and under what conditions an economic theory with a "mode of destruction" to replace
life forms apparently stay the Second Law but in fact acceler- Marx's mode of production misplaces the dynamics. The en-
ate its operation. This was clarified by Prigogine's formula- ergy processes are independent of economics, independent of
tions on far-from-equilibrium processes (Prigogine, Herman, human wishes and desires; they are processes that go on
and Allen 1977). Prigogine argued that out of the constant whether we like them or not.
chaotic interplay of events there emerge nonlinear phenomena Culture provides human beings with the potentiality for
with autocatalytic components that provide the basis for the extrahuman extensions that allow them to capture energy and
maintenance of particular novel forms. These forms are con- degrade it more rapidly and effectively. Thus, the societies
stituted by specific flows of materials. and energy. So long as that will be favored by natural selection are those that have
the flow continues within limits appropriate to a particular cultures that "so operate as to increase the total mass of the
form, that form will persist. So long as there is wax to be
organic system, to increase the rate of circulation of matter
melted into combustible gas, the candle will stay lit, providing
through the system, and to increase the total energy flux
there are no elements to destroy it (such as a sudden wind
or a removal of oxygen); so long as there is an adequately
4 They are not, however, alone in this. The so-called maximum-
balanced set of nutrients and gases and nothing intervenes to
power principle of Odum and Odum (1976:239-41) is a castrated
destroy them, life forms will follow a trajectory of a life-span. version of Lotka's principle. Whereas Lotka made clear that the
Some forms channel energy more regularly, more consistently, law applied only when "there is presented an unutilized residue of
than others. Where life forms capture photons and convert matter and available energy," the Odums omit this element, and
this leaves them unable to explain why, under many conditions,
them to matter through photosynthesis, the Second Law comes
their "principle" does not work. They correct for this elsewhere
into operation. Thus the capturing of energy by life degrades but still prefer their own formulation to Lotka's more elegant one.
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 607
through the system, so long as there is presented an unutilizedterminant" role of mental activity depends on how effectively
residue of matter and available energy." Life forms that be- it fits into the larger energetic picture, not on its mentalness.
have to survive presumably do so through genetic mechanisms This approach provides, it seems to me, a more effective
that program future generations to follow these rules-that strategy for seeking the reasons some human behaviors ulti-
direct behavior that converts more available energy rather mately prevail over others. Those that conform to energetic
than less. Thus every individual is born with a better or principles-or any others that prove to be valid-are in fact
worse programming to survive. Competition for converting expressions of the operation of natural selection. Any behavior
energy occurs from time to time, becoming most critical and that facilitates, entails, or participates in a larger series of
salient when there is a scarcity of one or more of the inputs energy flows is likely to be favored by natural selection. To
necessary to sustain life. The operation of Lotka's principle, the degree that evolution is unpredictable, so are the indi-
however, begins at the individual level (or, if one prefers, atvidual strategies that come into play as a part of it. But to
the genetic level), since those forms are favored which suc- the degree that evolution is the expression of natural selection,
ceed both in capturing more energy themselves and in en- a strategy of research that tries to model those processes will
hancing the reproduction of their own genes. The sociobiol- be more successful than one that is encumbered by "infra-
structures," "superstructures," and fuzzy dichotomies such as
ogists' principle of "inclusive fitness" is thus, in one very im-
portant sense, merely an instance of the operation of Lotka's mental/behavioral and emic/etic. The strategy of research
principle (Hamilton 1964, Wilson 1975, Adams n.d.). Thus will be enhanced by seeking to understand the energetic world
the principle operates both for the expansion of the biologicalin energetic terms. The mind and its operations are as much
population and for the utilization of cultural mechanisms that a part of that world as the other, more massive energy forms.
serve to circulate more nonhuman energy through the social What are ultimately weak members are the mental models
system. It also covers the process that has become known as that fail to conform to the structure of natural processes.
the "intensification hypothesis" (Boserup 1965.; Spooner 1972;This is equally true of Indian peasants, of big-men, and of the
Wilkinson 1973; Adams 1975, 1980; and Harris 1977). anthropologist in pursuit of better models of human beings and
While all cultures enable their societies to seek survival in human societies.
conformance with Lotka's principle, a few thousand years ago
some of them succeeded in devising a new kind of social
order, a centralized or hierarchical order, whereby the society
could direct individuals in converting energy more consistently Comments
and rigorously. The emergence of complex societies (or states)
was the emergence of a series of autocatalytic social mecha-
by DONALD T. CAMPBELL
nisms (political by definition) that sought to insure that as
Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210,
many elements of the system as possible would be dedicated U.S.A. 24 v 81
to the conversion of more energy. Thus, from the individual
I applaud Adams's independent invention (or discovery) of the
level through successive levels of social organization, human
selective-retention theory of adaptation in cultural evolution.
beings dedicate themselves to trying to "survive," which means
Such theories have a long history (usually involving inde-
to continue to expend more energy for as long a time as is
pendent discovery) and substantial elaboration (Keller 1915;
humanly (i.e., naturally) possible. Complex social organiza-
Carver 1935; Childe 1951; Ginsberg 1961; Cohen 1962; Mur-
tions have provided better and better ways of doing this, just
dock 1949; Campbell 1965; Rappaport 1971; Ruyle 1973:
as have the technological inventions that have provided the
Cloak 1975, 1976; Durham 1976; Plotkin and Odling-Smee
means by which energy could be at least consistently and,
1981). In the recent renaissance they are being infused with
better, increasingly captured.
mathematical models adapted from population genetics
The energetic/nonenergetic distinction makes it possible to
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1973; Feldman and Cavalli-
understand the role of gatekeeping and energy-flow triggers.
Sforza 1975, 1976; Boyd and Richerson 1976; Richerson and
They, like Maxwell's demon, use energy in operating. The fact
Boyd 1978; Pulliam and Dunford 1980).
that the amount of energy they use may be minuscule com-
The individual vs. group selection issue is encountered for
pared with the amount that they release is not in itself a
social evolution (Campbell 1972, 1975, 1979) as it has been for
cause for theoretical concern. They operate as parts-very im-
biological. The model that seems to make the best case that
portant parts-of a larger energetic system. Moreover, the
cultural beliefs to some extent override individual biological
distinction allows us to locate mental activities within a larger
optimization is the revised nonlinear model of Boyd and
frame, for they can be readily identified as microenergetic
Richerson (1978; Richerson and Boyd 1978). Their first modi-
systems within the larger flows of human energy, commercial
fication is to permit multiple parents and cross-familial parent-
energy, and other energy forms. By recognizing this distinc-
ing for the offspring generation of beliefs, customs, skills, etc.
tion, it is possible immediately to see that since mental activi-
This corresponds to the "cross-lineage borrowing" noted by
ties use very little energy, they cannot hope alone to effect
the early social evolutionists (Childe 1951, Ginsberg 1961,
any very significant changes. Rather, it is only by acting as Waddington 1961, Campbell 1965) as a major disanalogy from
triggers, amplifiers, and inhibitors to larger flows that they the specifics of biological evolution, although not one which
become important to the system. It is in this way that lan- abrogates the shared blind variation and selective retention
guage and speech and other forms of communication that re- algorithm. In the linear version of this model, in the absence
quire relatively little energy find their place. If these micro- of selection, the proportion of offspring carrying the trait is the
flows of energy operate in a context in which they release same as that of the parent generation in the local communi-
great amounts of energy, then their importance is immediately cating group. Selection imposed upon this model favors indi-
magnified, and they become part of a larger complex of ener- vidual advantage under most circumstances and precludes the
getic activity that may have very serious consequences. An selection of beliefs, behavioral tendencies, and customs favoring
idea has significance only in the context of its effect on larger group effectiveness at the expense of the individual carrying
flows. Thus we find it useful to differentiate those ideas that such beliefs. (Thus the model parallels the best current analyses
conform to the operation of the natural world from those that of genetic selection in all but the very special circumstances of
do not. As I have argued, some have little relevance to the the social insects, making self-sacrificial altruism very unlikely.)
natural world and can be retained because they provide rein- In Boyd and Richerson's nonlinear version of social trans-
forcement to the operation of the human psyche. The "de- mission, the offspring are influenced to adopt the majority posi-
tion of the parent generation. Under these conditions, groups Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "sCULTURAL MATERIALISM"
move rapidly toward internal uniformity in social transmission.

With small groups, chance pluralities are in different directions cultural materialism leads me to believe that it is a convenient
from group to group, and the model predicts both internal way to refer to the predominant features of variables. There
homogeneity within groups and large group-to-group differ- are problems for more precise research designs. It is difficult to
ences. This is the condition that permits effective group selec- operationalize definitions so that entities can be made to stay
tion and thus the selection of traits that are beneficial to the exclusively in one of the tripartite boxes. Recently, I suggested
group but costly to the individual. Such group selection at the to a student that she try to work with the tripartite division in
social-evolutionary level is a matter of the selective propagation order to add some explanatory power. The work soon bogged
of belief systems, for example, by the recruitment of new mem- down and the student balked because she and I could not agree
bers to apparently successful groups, by the influence of group on definitions that would restrict variables and indicators to
success on diffusion (i.e., the adoption by other groups of a one of the three major sets. We also found that it was wiser
successful group's beliefs and customs), or by the imposition and simpler to leave causal direction open (Knipp and Cohen
of beliefs upon conquered peoples. The biological extinction of 1981), but that is actually a matter of labelling; Adams must
whole groups, which is probably very rare, would only inci- surely understand that Harris's causal paradigm is really
dentally contribute to this process. This Boyd-Richerson theory systemic and therefore primarily unidirectional with feedback
allows social evolution some autonomy from individual-level loops, superstructure and structure being conceived as acting
biological evolution and some capacity for group selection. In back on infrastructure. The assumption underlying this notion
addition, it predicts the existence of dramatic group-to-group is that infrastructure changes are consistently prior in time
differences in socially transmitted traits which are neutral or and more powerful in their deterministic effects in the long run.
only slightly beneficial or harmful, thus obviating the need felt As a fully believing evolutionist (Cohen 1981), I accept
by earlier social evolutionists to try to explain all such difference Adams's attempt to theorize in accordance with natural selec-
as adaptations to unique circumstances. (In further theoretical tion, but nothing Harris has ever written leads me to believe
work, Boyd and Richerson have investigated the kinds of he would disagree. So far, so good. From here, we all go our
fluctuating environments that would have favored evolution separate ways. The crux of Adams's argument is his suggestion
of the capacity for social evolution over and above genetic that energy transformation provides the basic linkage between
adaptation.) human social evolution and its environmental context. This
In at least superficial contrast to the Boyd-Richerson model joins social science theory to other science theories and to ulti-
and my own (1972, 1975, 1979), the more general consensus is mate principles "fundamental to both nature and society"-
that social evolution cannot conflict with, but can only further, e.g., Lotka's law and its application in terms of dissipative
biological inclusive fitness (Wilson 1975; Alexander 1979a, b; structures. It is, however, at best a highly abstracted, gen-
Durham 1979; Lumsden and Wilson 1981). The issue is an im- eralized description of the effects of selection after the proce
portant one and highly relevant to the Adams-Harris debate. has been completed. Showing how resources are used up by
Accepting the Boyd-Richerson model makes it plausible that more and less complex systems doesn't explain the selective
cultures evolve beliefs and social control systems that tend to processes by which such systems evolved these differences. For
counter individually optimal behavior tendencies; the ritual example, nomad/sedentary competition at the pre-state level
burial sacrifice of useful tools, food, servants, etc., is but one often results in a nomad-dominated state-formation process.
example. If these individually uneconomic customs lead to in- Which are more complex, nomads or sedentary agriculturalists?
creased group productivity of food and offspring through sup- In other words, how can we apply Lotka's principle to explain
porting workers' belief in a rewarding afterlife, then collective what happens when two similarly complex groups compete and
inclusive fitness at the biological level may be served. From one supersedes the other, becoming more complex in the process?
the group-effectiveness point of view, some of the biologically Harris's approach seems to work better at this point. Thus we
based behavioral tendencies resulting from genetic competition can say that both groups are experiencing pressure on scarce
among the cooperators are obstacles to reaping the benefits of and required resources given their specific ecology (infrastruc-
social interdependence. Socially transmitted and enforced ture). This in turn produces intergroup conflict (structural
belief systems may often be interpreted as designed to counter relations), which produces new ideas and values (superstruc-
such biologically based tendencies for self-serving deviations ture) about organization, i.e., statehood. But the categorization
from collective optimization. problem is still present, and any precise definitions of ecology,
intergroup conflict, or statehood would include elements from
all three of the levels-unless, of course, we all agree to slice
by RONALD COHEN up reality so that the known phenomena fall neatly and by
Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, Evans- convention into infrastructure, structure, and superstructure.
ton, Ill. 60201, U.S.A. 4 VI 81 I'm sure that none of this will bother either Harris or Adams.
Adams is to be congratulated for focusing critical attention on Each can and will get around these criticisms-as well he
cultural materialism. Although Harris is certainly not alone in should. Cultural materialism and macroenergetics-and, for
using this "venerable" approach, his work in developing and that matter, sociobiology, psychoanalysis, classical economics,
systematizing it has made him its most visible proponent. By and Marxism-are not so much theories as paradigms. That is
offering what he feels are damaging criticisms and adding an to say, they are not disconfirmable in the sense argued by
alternative approach of his own, Adams highlights the episte- Popper and other positivist thinkers. If disconfirmation does
mological strengths and weaknesses of anthropological theory actually occur, then interpretations are created or brought
as a whole. His criticisms are well argued, but his solution is forward which preserve the basic theoretical position. If super-
less adequate than the one he attacks. structure precedes infrastructure and consistently necessitates
Whether Adams has hit the mark with his critique of cul- changes in it, the "theory" is in no danger. The negative evi-
tural materialism, and to what extent, is ultimately a matter dence is interpreted within the theory and labelled "feedback
of belief, opinion, and practice. Theories always have para- loop" or considered the effect of a prior set of infrastructural
digmatic components-basic assumptions about what is im- and structural changes farther back in time. Geertz (1980)
portant and about causality and definitions of elements of quite clearly believes that he has research results showing that
reality that make the theory appealing. I leave it to the prac- the symbolic elements of state and royal ceremonials are
titioners to answer on that score, since it is their theory that is fundamental causal forces. Leach (1981) disagrees but recog-
being attacked. My own experience with Harris' s version of nizes that the fundamental (cultural materialist) bases for his
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 609
disagreement are his materialist prejudices, not theory. The from this effort, not from the basic beliefs implied in a par-
same thing can be said for Adams's approach. If his energy ticular design.
paradigm cannot now explain political/social differentiation In relating problematic entities to other qualities that can
within the same level of complexity, I have every confidence be shown to affect them significantly, social science has a task
that he can and will "explain" this anomaly if pressed to do so. to perform that is demonstrably useful to the process of human
As Hume noted long ago, causal relations are based on evolution itself. If we sprnd too much time arguing over differ-
beliefs, not the clearly identifiable "facts" of an objective ences in untestable paradigms, i.e., our beliefs in ultimate
world. In this sense, theories are always to some extent para- causations, we shall waste a valuable resource-our own poten-
digmatic, that is to say, untestable. Cultural materialism and tial contributions to selection and evolution.
Adams's energy ideas neither confirm nor disconfirm each other.
Each is a belief system about how the real world is constructed.
We don't prove or disprove, confirm or disconfirm, such ideas by RICHARD A. CURTIN
-we like them or dislike them, find them appealing or not, Department of Human Ecology and Social Sciences, Cook
and use them to find meaning in our observations of a complex College, Rutgers University, P.O. Box 231, New Brunswick,
world. Confirmation of this rather distressing observation is N.J. 08903, U.S.A. 10 vi 81
available in contemporary research on scientific behavior. Adams quite rightly questions the utility of Harris's categoriza-
Mahoney and colleagues (Mahoney 1979, Mahoney, Kazden, tion of cultural phenomena into "infrastructure, structure, and
and Kenisberg 1978) distributed manuscripts on behavior superstructure," and I agree wholeheartedly with his desire to
modification for review to 75 reviewers of a scholarly journal. investigate human behavior in terms of the interactions between
Reviewers recommended publication and judged the method- different levels of cultural organization. I question, however,
ology to be adequate or excellent when the paper supported his attempt to use natural (Darwinian) selection as an exact
their own presumed positions. When procedures yielded nega- model of cultural processes. Any introductory text makes clear
tive results, manuscripts were consistently judged to be inade- the shortcomings of this approach: the creation of biological
quate. Mixed results were not well received, and, as these variability (for our purposes, mutation) and the selection of
results would suggest, reliability measures varied from 0.30 to successful forms are separate processes, but human invention
0.07 across several judgmental dimensions. Rubinstein, involves the interaction of accumulated cultural knowledge,
Laughlin, and McManus (n.d.) explain these results by point- intelligence, and practical necessity to forge a process that is
ing to Neisser's (1976) experimental work on perception, which both creative and selective. Adams's attempt to equate inven-
shows that people have no problem ignoring stimuli when they tion with mutation both robs man of his creativity and ob-
are following specific rules that stipulate paying attention to scures the true nature of biological evolution.
some and ignoring others, because people, including scientists, It may also lead to a misplaced faith in selective explanations.
anticipate what information is important. In biology, it is far from clear that "in contrast to mutative
Of the two paradigms, energetics and cultural materialism, processes, selective factors operate in the relative light of day."
the latter is clearly closer to the real world, and because it is Genetic mechanisms are quite well understood, but a con-
we will over time either accept its interpretation of how socio- tinuing problem in evolutionary studies arises from the fact
cultural systems evolve or reject it. If we accept it, the opera- that arguments from natural selection are as much post hoc
tional problems will clear up, because conventions will emerge as predictive. Even so, no biologist would contrast "functional"
about which variables are to go in which of the three divisions. and "evolutionary" in the same sense as "proximate" and
Those that overlap will be changed or broken up to fit, and "ultimate." Again, the equation of mutation and invention is
normal science will take over. Adams's notions, although misleading. Functional explanations are not "concerned with
interesting, are at such a high level of abstraction, and are so the variation-producing phase ... of events." Natural selection
irrefutable, that I cannot see them providing much impetus to operates on variability that ultimately arises from genetic
research. It's nice to know we don't need negentropy any more, mutations that occur at random; those that form the basis of
but what else can we do with this set of concepts? Possibly I'm enhanced function are selected and tend to become more fre-
myopic, but it is not clear at all where such a thrust can take quent in the gene pool.
us, except as a supporting argument for environmental con- The study of natural selection certainly provides useful in-
cerns, already well developed. sights to students of cultural change. Where, however, the
Finally, it is important to clarify the relation of the terms analogy between cultural and biological evolution is carried
"proximate," "ultimate," and "selection." I disagree, as I too far, it will lead to the creation of arbitrary categories for
think would most population geneticists, that selection as ex- which Harris is criticized; there is no useful parallel to point
planation points to "ultimate" rather than "proximate" mutation in human events.
mechanisms. The choice of one "ultimate" causal force over As is his use of natural selection, Adams's application of the
another as a basis for theory building is, as I have already noted, laws of thermodynamics is of great heuristic value but might
more a matter of belief-of likes and dislikes-than of em- be improved by a healthy skepticism. That plants "capture
pirical or theoretical science. The detailed study of selection in photons and convert them to matter through photosynthesis"
molecular biology and microbiology involves the experimental and that this "capturing of energy by life degrades it" are not
manipulation of selective factors on rapidly reproducing popula- widely held views, but the notion that energy transformation is
tions of microorganisms. In social anthropology, the analogous the essence of biological success is more deserving of anthro-
strategy is the quasi-experimental study of microdifferentiations pological comment. This is certainly a dangerous idea to live
among human communities over time spans long enough to pro- by in the modern world, and when it is generalized, as here, it
duce significantly different trajectories of development. I have also buries some interesting philosophical (and biological)
done this in oral historical work on state origins, but it can problems. Can less be more? There is a huge body of nonhuman
also be done for all forms of organization undergoing change, primate literature that demonstrates that "energy trans-
for roles within them, and, more practically, for technological formation" is one of the major parameters about which primate
changes (e.g., the mechanization of agriculture in the Third species separate niches; folivores gain less energy from their
World). Where ultimate causal selection announces truisms diets than frugivores and (are able to) expend less in their
such as reproductive success, energy utilization, or the dialectic, foraging. Few students of sympatric primate species would
microselection examines the specific processes whereby evolu- flatly equate the quantity of energy transformed with species
tionary changes occur. Progress and discovery in science arise success.
by WHITNEY M. DAVIS 4dams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
774 Wellington St. North, London, Ont., Canada N6A 3S3.
12 v 81 likely, just banal. Selection operates on frequencies of genes;
If I disagree with some of Adams's remarks, it is only because a behavior may be thoroughly adaptive without being heredi-
they are interesting and provocative and must be taken seri- tary. We may talk cogently, but not in terms of natural selec-
ously by anyone working through Harris's (1979) recent pro- tion, about how the idea of a new god is selected, that is, "be-
grammatic statement of "cultural materialism." I like the idea comes (or fails to become) part of the culture." Any rigorous
of cultural materialism much more than Harris's practice and nonmetaphorical discussion of its natural selection as a heredi-
think that Adams points out useful strategies of revision. tary trait in the human genetic complement seems strained
Problems with Harris's arguments. In general Harris is, per- even to the most enthusiastic Darwinian. Is this what Adams
haps paradoxically, less programmatic than Adams makes wants as a "selection explanation"? If not, his "selection ex-
him out to be. (la) Is Adams claiming that in distinguishing planation" may have structural similarities with natural selec-
"two orders of phenomena in the external world" Harris casts tion but is not identical with it. (3) I do not think Harris
culture as "not being natural"? "Orders of phenomena" is not adopts the one-way teleological determinism Adams appears
a meaningless concept. Materialism hopes to understand in to attribute to him. Adams says that Harris's concept of
what way culture is a subset of all known phenomena and infrastructure "cannot specify empirical features ahead of
exactly how what is true of phenomena is also true of cultural time"; Harris provides us with no way of identifying "the
phenomena (see below). (lb) Godelier's definitions may be more infrastructure before selection takes place." Selection, surely,
elegant, but in using institutional definitions for "infrastruc- is not moving inevitably toward some form known ahead of
ture" Harris surely takes it for granted that each institution time (some organismic Formwollen). We are interested in
is a network of functions. I don't quite follow Adams's worry. selective determinations in process as much as in result. That
(2) "The thought/behavior dichotomy"-by which I presume Harris does not address the issue of innovation and invention
Adams means Cartesian dualism-may be specious, but it is -in the metaphor, of "variation" and "mutation"-may be
hardly a "folk distinction." Adams appears to approve of limiting but is theoretically not unreasonable. In the process
mental materialism as explicated by Gilbert Ryle, J. J. C. of selection, a vast proportion of variation is shown to be
Smart, D. M. Armstrong, and others-there is no thinking, irrelevant or negligible in the selective determination of (an-
that is, which is not behavior-but philosophically this is thropologically interesting) forms of behavior. "How such in-
merely a point about mind-as-brain. "It seems indisputable," novations [variations] come to assume material social existence
Adams argues, "that for any mental activity to have social and how they come to exert influence on social production and
relevance it must be manifest in overt behavior." On the con- social reproduction" (Harris 1979:59) implicitly involves an
trary, thinking may be behavior of the brain, not necessarilyaccount of selection from variation, although the source of
overt or observable, or a disposition to behave in a certain way,variation itself is rightly seen to lie at least partly outside
likewise not necessarily overt. Adams gives the Cartesian as immediate social determination. (4) Adams's two varieties of
well as the alternative positions too passing a glance. (3) "causes" for forms of behavior depend on a third explanation
Harris might argue that superstructure could control infra- I take to be the one most firmly based upon natural selection:
structure. Adams would have the "energy flow" controlled, for behavior x can be observed at time t because it is the best
"the gatekeepers [of the energy flow] and their behavior in adaptation-"selected for" when conditions are of a certain
effect constitute the interface [between nature and culture]"; kind, "selected against" if they change sufficiently to imperil
but isn't this precisely what Harris means in saying, as quoted successful reproduction. The key concept is adaptation, a
by Adams himself, that "the redistributors [of production] must matter Adams does not sufficiently discuss. (5) A "proximate
be able to act as 'energy gates'" (Harris 1979:93)? Again, explanation" will "have its share of estimates and impre-
Adams's worry is unclear to me. Is it that Harris by Adams's cisions," but so will any explanation based upon natural
standard improperly identifies infrastructure with "energy selection, primarily a statistical description of the frequency
gates"? (4) As long as we admit that determinism may be of various hereditary traits in the gene pool of a population.
neither one-way nor teleological, the old chestnuts about "feed- Random variation, which by probability must occur, environ-
back cycles" show how structure and superstructure may "act mentally conditioned mutation (e.g., irradiation), and the
on infrastructure." Some accounts of the determination may accidents of selection and environment are the "raw material"
be empirically more sensitive, but this is an entirely different of evolution. If biology "finds [this matter of variation] most
issue. Adams's point would be well taken if more comment difficult," it may be in practice but is certainly not in theory.
showed Harris's determinism to be inconsistent or ambiguous. An account of selection, then, clearly is not only for "stable
Alternatives to Harris: Natural selection. (1) As Adams notes, conditions"; change in conditions-genetic, chromosomal,
Harris does refer to natural selection; unlike Adams, I find ontogenetic, environmental-offers the dramatic evidence of
Harris's accommodation to Darwinian principles pragmatic selection and adaptation toward further equilibrium. It is un-
and thoroughgoing. If Harris's definition of infrastructure isnecessary to separate variation and selection in theory-both
vague, most social scientists nonetheless give biocultural or are the process of adaptation-and, Adams's complaint not-
sociobiological factors, at the "interface" of nature and culture, withstanding, cultural materialism does its best to maintain
more weight in anthropological explanation than merely the interrelation and yet attempt an analytic exposition of the
genetic ones; I do not see that Harris's interests are necessarily variables and their determinations. (6) Causes, either proxi-
misplaced. (2) That our emphasis on selection must be "essen-mate or evolutionary, are empirically most difficult to specify,
tially Darwinian" strikes me as a little hagiographical. Somegiven the probabilistic foundations of all phenomena and the
multiple interrelations of determination. (It is only a probability
propositions rooted in the empirical findings of modern neo-
that electron x is in orbital y of atom z at time t.) Adams seems
Darwinian synthetic evolutionary biology-such as punctuated
too willing to credit this as a theoretical difficulty. In theory
equilibrium or phenocopy-may be very useful even though
the problem would be that the network of reductions might
widely and controversially regarded as not "essentially Dar-lead us to a determination-for instance, the structure of space
winian." The empirical evidence for selective regulation of and time-which is not observable, definable, or knowable,
human psychological and cultural "traits" is even now hardly even in terms of probability. "Selection explanation" faces
adequate. As Adams knows, for this reason many writers regard
this danger as much as any other explanation.
Darwinian intervention in human affairs as negligible or, more Alternatives to Harris: Laws of energy. I found this section
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 611

stimulating-like Adams, I suppose I am a physicalist-but I upon it. The mind operates in a certain kind of universe; as-
do not think this is enough for an account of human society. suming it is even correct, the description of this universe
(1) Adams states a well-known paradox: "the 'dismal law' that hardly goes any way toward telling us anything anthropo-
sees the world [i.e., the universe] as constantly 'running down' logically or psychologically interesting about the mind and its
has never proved successful by itself in characterizing the ap- behavior. (7) One major philosophical tradition argues, in fact,
parently order-building behavior of human culture." What he that our minds in some determinant sense actually generate
goes on to say depends upon taking this initial problem seri- this "larger energetic picture." The metaphor has some power:
ously. I wonder, however, if it is not something of a nonprob- as a probabilistic phenomenon, and as dependent upon the
lem. Energy cannot be destroyed and always shifts in locus relative position of the observer, the description of the energetic
and organization. That energy should "mass" at some points constitution of the universe is somehow "determined" by
in time and space and "decay" at others, and continuously, is a mental acts-even if these are only the acts of observation,
necessary basis for the adaptation of organisms. Variation measurement, and calculation. We need much more discussion
represents a tendency toward disorder, selection toward the of the notions of determinism we want to adopt here. The uni-
preservation (not always the increase) of order. These are not verse presents itself as a certain system to us as observers;
contradictory or opposed processes, but actually the single what foundations of our knowledge are in our mentalness and
unitary process of adaptation-the physical continuity of or- what in its physicalness? (8) I agree with Adams that in theory
ganismic structures in continuous energy transformation. (2) all accounts of the human mind and human society must
Selection does not, as Lotka claims, necessarily operate to in- accord with a testable, coherent, physical description of the
crease the total mass of the organic system, nor does the cap- universe. On the other hand, I don't think Adams sufficiently
turing of energy by life necessarily degrade energy. The final proves that materialisms do not ordinarily assume biological
clause of Lotka's principle actually has no meaning unless we and physical reduction or that they contradict biological or
remember that organismic systems of energy organization very physical principles. Quite to the contrary, one would think:
often, for physico-chemical or environmental reasons, reach materialisms attempt to lock "orders of phenomena" in re-
the limit of particular consumptions. Adaptation is a notori- ductive relation. Cultural materialism attempts to account for
ously conservative process. As much energy is conserved and the particular form of energetic constitution at a particular
as little as possible expended in any adaptational adjustment. local point in the continuous transformation of energy and of
One business of biologists and anthropologists is to investigate course assumes that this particularity accords with "universal"
the balance of imperatives in any particular instance. (3) The physical laws. Our criticism is better aimed at any of its fail-
matter to be considered, then, is not the "degradation" or ures to be empirically satisfactory.
"dissipation" of energy-the loss of organization in an ordered
system-but its redirection in the continuous conservation of
energy. If I eat a chocolate bar and then lift a heavy load, I by A. DE RUIJTER
have not so much dissipated or consumed energy (although in Drossaardslaan 11, 4143 BD Leerdam, The Netherlands.
a restricted sense I have done so) as redirected it (to whatever 18 v 81
biologically or anthropologically interesting ends). The ends Adams presents us with some interesting suggestions concerning
of my behavior I might conceive ahead of time, with infinitesi- the applicability of certain notions borrowed from biology. I
mal expenditure of energy, and in this sense my act "deter- want to comment first on the discussion of Harris's materialism
mines" all subsequent energy transformations. (4) Lotka and secondly on Adams's alternatives.
rightly stresses the totality of energy in the universe as at any I completely agree with Adams that Harris's distinction be-
given point in space and time more or less organized. This ex- tween "infrastructure," "structure," and "superstructure" and
plains not only Adams's "expansive" feature of energy use in his conceptual pairs emic/etic and mental/behavioral are of
the organic system, but also the fact that this feature often little value in analyzing sociocultural processes. I am less satis-
never appears at all. It is meaningful in evolutionary biology fied, however, with his appeal to Godelier's treatment of the
to speak of selection for less and slower consumption. Expan- concepts "infrastructure" and "superstructure." I do not
sion of the biological population mass and programming for the think that Godelier's redefinition of these concepts in terms of
conversion of ever greater amounts of energy are not necessarily functions rather than institutions adds anything. I see it
true of things if at some points in the history of the universe partly as an attempt to save from falsification the Marxist
and its organisms they happen to be locally true. (5) All of this maxim that "in the last instance" or in the "final analysis"
adaptational process is, as Adams says, independent of human every society is determined by the mode of production. This
affairs, but only in the sense that we have not designed the stand has, I admit, the advantage of simplicity and certainty
universe in this way. I may, of course, consciously decide or and offers clues to guide research, but it entails too much risk
unconsciously desire to consume one type of energy in order to of imposing the same basic order on all societies, regardless of
reinforce the organization of another type-a fact ordinarily their differences. I share the general point of view that societies
assumed in anthropological accounts of behavior. Likewise, I are internally organized systems consisting of a multitude of
may decide to forego this or that consumption. Selection favors distinct but connected subsystems, but I do not subscribe to
the homeostatic optimum of efficiency (in work with energy)the more specific assumption that the "mode of production"
and conservation (in quantity of energy available to me). (6) is a universally valid determining variable. Thus, in my opinion,
In a universe described in terms of energy quantities and the internal organization or structure of a society-in other
transformations, "mental activities.. . cannot hope alon e to words, the nature and scope of each subsystem and its rela-
effect any very significant changes," and "an idea has signifi- tions to others- cannot be given in advance; it has to be the
cance only in the context of its effect on larger flows." Who result of concrete ethnographic research.
has ever argued differently in general terms on the large scale? As far as Adams's alternatives are concerned, I wonder what
Any further mechanization of mental things-a thought or the relevance of his selection-explanation approach in this
behavior only matters if it does work with energy-is much too sketchy form isAto anthropological research. His redefinition of
limiting. (I leave aside the likelihood that enormous energy Harris's concept "infrastructure" in terms of natural selection
shifts might be "triggered" by a few neurons, a fact Adams is leads to a concentration on the ways in which natural selection
careful to note.) Of course we know that the human mind operates. However, as he admits, natural selection is an ex-
occupies an insignificant place in the total energetic constitu- tremely complex and long process allowing only very general,
tion of the universe, but our focus as anthropologists must be global, ex post facto explanations. Besides, Adams's elabora-
tion, using three natural laws-the Second Law of Thermo- Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
dynamics, Lotka's principle, and Prigogine's far-from-equi-
librium theory-, does not give us much to go on. It merely 1979 for literature review and Diener 1980 for application to
illustrates an adherence to "final-cause" explanations cast in cultural theory). In fact, natural selection in biology probably
physical-biological terms. This is my principal objection. I does not account for very much of the diversity of life.
accept the proposition that culture is a part of nature, but I Perhaps even worse, Adams tends to conceive of natural
would emphasize that culture cannot be completely explained selection as inevitably leading to ecological positive functions,
by appealing to biological-natural laws. One has to take into as his citation of Lotka indicates. Biological evolutionists
account the human faculty for attributing meaning to phenome- recognize that evolution can lead to dysfunctions and that an
na. Although I readily admit that the attribution of meaning is evolutionarily stable strategy may be one with very negative
made possible by nature, in particular by the structure of the features (Gould 1980). Evolution means change, not the emer-
brain, I have to add that this symbolizing cannot be reduced gence of the good and useful. This error should be carefully
to nature. Consequently, a research strategy devoted to under- noted, for in an extreme form it becomes Social Darwinism.
standing culture solely or primarily in terms of "energy flows" But then, Adams is hardly alone in overemphasizing the role
is reductionist, overlooking all kinds of variables. In my of positive functions in evolving systems. Gould points out
opinion, a satisfactory explanation has to acknowledge first (p. 48) that even in biology it is difficult to escape from "the
that man functions at different levels (the physiological, the Panglossian view that each separate structure is designed ex-
neuropsychological, the societal), secondly that each level plicitly (and best) for its function." We really haven't come
obeys its own principles, and thirdly that although these differ- very far since Herbert Spencer, as this anecdote from Galton
ent principles cannot be reduced to the lower levels they must (1909:257), by way of Gould, illustrates:
be compatible. By the way, I think this criterion of com-
Much has been written, but the last word has not been said, on the
patibility can be related to selection explanation, especially in
rationale of these curious papillary ridges; why in one man and in
view of Adams's proposition that some human behaviors ulti- one finger they form whorls and in another loops. I may mention a
mately prevail over others. I am sure that an elaboration of characteristic anecdote of Herbert Spencer in connection with this.
Adams's perspective in this direction will enhance its relevance: He asked me to show him my Laboratory and to take his prints,
by avoiding reductionism, a more complete and more detailed which I did. Then I spoke of the failure to discover the origin of these
explanation can be given. In this process, perhaps "proximate" patterns, and how the fingers of unborn children had been dissected
and "ultimate" or "functional" and "evolutionary" kinds of to ascertain their earliest stages, and so forth. Spencer remarked
explanation could be combined. that this was beginning in the wrong way; that I ought to consider
the purpose the ridges had to fulfill and to work backwards. Here,
he said, it was obvious that the delicate mouths of the sudorific
glands required the protection given them by the ridges on either
by PAUL DIENER
side of them, and therefrom he elaborated a consistent and ingenious
Department of Anthropology, Southern Illinois University at
hypothesis at great length. I replied that his arguments were beautiful
Carbondale, Carbondale, Ill. 62901, U.S.A. 18 v 81 and deserved to be true, but it happened that the mouths of the
Adams's paper consists of three parts: (1) a critique of Harris's ducts did not run in the valleys between the crests, but along the
ideas, (2) a discussion of "energetics" and Prigogine's idea of crests of the ridges themselves.
dissipative structures, and (3) a discussion of natural selection.
Adams is most successful in showing up the logical flaws in
Harris's thought. Although this has been done by others before, by ROBERT C. DUNNELL
Harris's approach rumbles on. Perhaps at some point all the Department of Anthropology, University of Washington,
logical lapses and factual errors characteristic of "cultural Seattle, Wash. 98195, U.S.A. 15 VI 81
materialism" will finally begin to tell. One certainly hopes so. Adams's article joins a growing literature (e.g., Coombs 1980;
Adams's discussion of energetics is, to my mind, less success- Dunnell 1978, 1980; Rindos 1980) that explores the implica-
ful but still of interest. Energy flow is clearly part of the tions of evolutionary theory for cultural phenomena. To judge
answer for many cultural problems, and Adams is at the fore- from his citations and terminology, Adams has reached this
front of the application of this body of ideas in cultural anthro- position independently, giving his conclusions all the more
pology. One problem here is his failure to make the distinction import. In common with this literature and departing from the
between energy and information more clear-cut. He flirts with traditional anthropological approach, Adams has not sought to
this but seems to want to reduce information and description rationalize venerable anthropological notions with a new
to thermodynamics. One is disappointed that he fails to cite terminology, but rather has attempted to deduce the implica-
the biophysicist Pattee (1977), whose concept of comple- tions of evolutionary concepts for cultural phenomena. As a
mentarity he might find useful. As Pattee points out, complex consequence, his discussion is not just an alternative among a
systems are often composed of complementary (distinct but series of equally plausible views, but a fundamentally different
related) dynamic (energetic) and linguistic subsystems. Indeed, approach to explaining cultural phenomena. The differences
it is exactly the complementarity between dynamics and are even more fundamental than Adams judges; they are
description which makes evolution possible (von Neumann metaphysical (cf. Meltzer 1979).
1956, Diener, Nonini, and Robkin 1980). All evolving systems Adams's consideration of the relation of cultural materialism
have both dynamic and description, both "phenotype" and
to evolution is most enlightening. This area has attracted little
"genotype." In culture, the "genotype" is symbolically en-
attention in the past (e.g., Wenke 1981), and Adams's discus-
coded. As Adams notes, it is crucial for anthropology to recog-
sion is an important addition. His critique is sound as far as it
nize the importance of energy flow; however, it is equally im-
goes. It could have been profitably extended, particularly with
portant to recognize that symbolic structure and change are
not a simple outgrowth of energetic processes. Humanity is
reference to the peculiar notion of causation characteristic of
two-dimensional, and we need a model that allows for both cultural materialism, by drawing upon the argument developed
energetic and symbolic aspects. by Gould and Lewontin (1979). Adams's assertion that evolu-
The least successful aspect of this paper is the discussion of tion is basic to any diachronic understanding of cultural phe-
natural selection. Adams doesn't seem to be aware of the great nomena is well supported. That a diachronic understanding is
debate going on in biology concerning the role of natural selec- essential to distinguishing causation from correlation is not
tion versus speciation in evolutionary emergence (see Stanley developed.
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 613
Perhaps the most insightful part of Adams's discussion is stuff. It will, when systematically applied, specify the things
the recognition, shared by only a few, that evolutionary ex- that can be explained, and that set of things will not be coter-
planation focuses on why particular behaviors become fixed minous with traditional anthropological interests.
and not on the sources and kinds of initial variation. Thus, it
is possible for Adams to accord natural selection a meaningful
role in explaining change, and this places his model fully by JEFFREY EHRENREICH
within the scientific approach to cultural change. His asser- Department of Anthropology, Graduate Faculty, New School
tions on this point, however, may be too strong. Cultural for Social Research, 65 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003,
change has traditionally and implicitly been assumed to be U.S.A. 9 vi 81
Lamarckian in nature (i.e., change is the product of directed The impression left by Adams's paper is that the research
variation) simply because it appears to be so from the point strategy of cultural materialism, as represented in the work of
of view of the participants and because, as Adams and others Harris (1980, 1979, 1977, 1974, 1968), is irreparably flawed by
(e.g., Gould 1979b) note, this is a comforting position. Clearly, difficulties which originate in the concepts "infrastructure,"
much cultural change can be accounted for in strictly selectionist"structure," and "superstructure" (see Harris 1979:51-58).
terms; however, the possibility that some cultural change is Adams attacks the priority given by Harris to the "determin-
Lamarckian should not be excluded a priori (e.g., Dunnell ing" influence of infrastructure and charges that this strategy
1980, Dunnell and Wenke 1980). "suffers from a failure to allow for the complexities of the
Adams's specific arguments under "Laws of Energy" are human social process." He further attacks Harris for his
less convincing. It is not clear why, particularly in this initial neglect of Darwin and his failure to apply the concept of
exploration of a new paradigm, any effort should be made to natural selection to sociocultural phenomena. Many troubling
connect cultural change to the laws of physics. Certainly, the issues and questions result.
significance accorded evolutionary theory does not derive from Are Harris's definitions usable? Harris bases his usage on in-
such connections; in fact, the optimal engineering relationship clusion by institution, as did Marx. Adams correctly identifies,
implied by such connections, apart from doing violence to the in contrast, the advantage in following Godelier (1977:122-24)
importance of historical factors, is empirically false (e.g., for these terms, namely, that meaning is based on function.
Gould and Lewontin 1979). While Adams's understanding of Inclusion by function adds flexibility to the concepts as applied
selection as an evolutionary concept is thorough, what he has to (primitive) societies, in which social institutions are not
systematically attempted to apply is not evolutionary theory, readily divisible along lines derived from more highly stratified
but isolated concepts. Initial exploration of the applicability societies. For example, Harris (1979:51-54) includes kinship
of this body of theory to cultural phenomena must be carried relations as a part of structure; for Godelier (1977:122-23),
in contrast, if kinship relations function as "relations of pro-
out in piecemeal fashion, but this process has distinct liabilities
(e.g., Hardesty 1980). Perhaps it is for this reason that Adams duction" they are included in infrastructure, whereas if they
seems to confuse empirical generalizations such as Lotka's function as "ideology" they are superstructural. The inherent
principle with theoretical laws. Lotka's generalization is no weakness of Godelier's position, which Adams evades, is the
more an explanation of change than White's generalizations degree of arbitrariness involved for the individual researcher
about complexity or Spencer's use of the notion of progress. in determining how things function and the ambiguity of
Rather, the important explanatory issue is why such gen- dividing phenomena from the same institution and allocating
eralizations characterize so much of the empirical record. them to multiple categories. That Godelier avoids problems in
There is also an unfortunate tendency, perhaps only termino- arguing that "the dominance of a particular structure [kin-
logical, to attribute causal significance to these propositions ship, political relations, religious relations, etc.] is determined
(e.g., "societies ... seek survival in conformance with Lotka's by the role [function] it plays in the productive process" re-
principle") much in the manner that some sociobiologists pre- mains an unsubstantiated, seemingly tautological assertion.
sume that individuals actively attempt to maximize their in- Adams's conclusion that Godelier escapes a definitional "trap,"
clusive fitness (e.g., van den Berghe and Barash 1978). which Harris falls into, is misleading. It would be more accurate
Adams's effort to unite evolutionary theory with mental con- to conclude that each is reconciled to traps perceived by others.
structs of traditional interest to anthropology is similarly weak Overlapping and ambiguity are part of all typologies, includ-
and not well justified by his more general arguments. His con- ing Godelier's, which attempt to divide social relations and
clusion that mental activities, although they consume little culture.
energy, are of great significance because they function as Adams claims, furthermore, that it is "often impossible" for
"gatekeepers" and "energy-flow triggers" is an innovative "independent investigators" to "allocate human events to the
effort. Its utility, however, is entirely dependent upon the correct category" of Harris's scheme. Perhaps, but what evi-
assumption that ideas do function as "gatekeepers" and dence is there that this is true or, by implication, that Godelier's
"energy-flow triggers." No one would deny that they may is any more manageable? Adams offers none. Harris has re-
function in this fashion or that they might be viewed as having cently attempted to codify his definitions, and it remains to
this function analytically, but it is by no means clear that be seen if they will prove "operational" or not. I encounter
ideas play a proximate causal role. Decoupling of mental con- little difficulty in applying them to my data on the Coaiquer
structs and behavior is an important part of Sahlins's (1976) Indians of Ecuador. I would suggest that investigators who
criticisms of sociobiology. Adams himself argues against this are a priori hostile to cultural materialism will find it difficult
relation earlier in the article. Very little is known about this to apply Harris's methods, while those who are not will have
kind of proximate causation in other species. Yet it has provedfar fewer problems. That Harris's categories may not permit
quite feasible to construct evolutionary explanations without neat, absolute lines to be drawn does not detract from their
reference to the neural activity that produces animal behavior.potential usefulness. Absolute lines for boxing "reality" are
The fact that an anthropologist has access to these kinds of rarely found in scientific terminology. The corpus of Harris's
data does not require that they be accorded a causative role. work and the cultural materialist strategy in general have
Until this is more generally recognized, systematic progress in attracted an enormous following among fieldworkers and
the scientific explanation of cultural change is not likely to be theorists who find them advantageous as an organizational
made (e.g., Coombs 1980, Dunnell 1980, Rindos 1980). In this framework for their work. It is self-indulgent for Adams to con-
regard, Adams has not carried his initial arguments about tend that other investigators will find Harris's categories or his
venerable anthropological concepts far enough. An evolutionary research strategy difficult to apply.
approach is not just a different way to explain the same old Any research strategy which rejects "ideological" or "men-
talistic" explanations of culture and evolution is by definitionAdams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CCULTURAL MATERIALISM"
committed to seek explanations elsewhere. The search for
causal explanations, or for theories generally, to some degreehowever, do not equal behavior. They are separate things, even
intrinsically involves ordering larger bodies of data with com- when they do overlap.
pact abstractions. It is debatable whether this alone con- Similar confusion arises in Adams's brief discussion of com-
stitutes substantiation of the interpretation that Harris's re- munication. Language is not, as is implied in his statement
search strategy eliminates, or even reduces, consideration of the
surrounding the expression that "all culture communicates,"
"complexities of the human social process." Cultural material- the same as all other culture. Tools used in gardening or hunt-
ism has often been criticized for being "mechanistic" or "re- ing may incorporate symbolic expression and meaning, but
ductionist" and for failing to acknowledge adequately human first and foremost they are part of technology and subsistence
input (i.e., for being simplistic). Harris's rejoinders have clari- -in Harris's terms, part of infrastructure. The passage Adams
fied that he intends neither to omit human input on any quotes from Harris concerning communication is not apropos
grounds, political or ideological, nor to minimize the important to all of culture in any meaningful way. Communication, in-
role that ideas, mental processes, or human actions play in cluding language, proxemics, and kinesics, is different from
evolution and culture. What he insists upon is that these all technology, ecosystems, mating patterns, contraception, divi-
have a context out of which they cannot be fully understood. sion of labor, sex roles, political organization, art, ritual, etc.
The parameters of what he calls "infrastructure" are, subject (to name but a few of Harris's categories). Understanding it
to verification, the predominant components of this context. as special in reference to infrastructure, structure, and super-
Despite the idiosyncratic nature and unpredictability of structure in no way compromises Harris's definitions. In this
human thought and action, infrastructure is seen to have a regard, it is curious for Adams on the one hand to complain
"determining" influence in a causal relationship to the rest of that Harris's strategy fails to consider complex social process
culture. Human actions and political and ideological struggles and on the other to chide him for treating language as a special
are shaped by the context of infrastructure in essentially the situation which overlaps infrastructure, structure, and super-
way Marx suggested, minus dialectics (cf. Marx and Engels structure.
1972[1848]; Harris 1979:141-64). Adams seems perturbed that Harris's determinism does in
Adams's attempt to discredit Harris's position by enumerat- fact consider human social complexity by its recognition that
ing "problems" presents serious problems itself. For example, structure and superstructure can act upon, inhibit, and control
it is hard to be sure what Adams has in mind when he discusses infrastructure. He questions "just what kind of determinism
Harris's statement that infrastructure is "the principal inter- this is." Certainly it is not what Adams would have us believe;
face between culture and nature." What Harris is saying, I it is not mechanistic, reductionist, or simplistic.
believe, is that in those situations in which culture and nature Adams is properly critical that natural selection has been
interact (they don't always), infrastructure is more likely to neglected "as a major component of our social theories,"
be closely involved than structure or superstructure. This is though there are anthropologists, notably Carneiro (n.d.), who
not much more controversial than to suggest that hunting- argue for the significant potential of this concept in cultural
and-gathering peoples generally have a more direct interplay evolution. That Harris chooses not to emphasize natural
with nature than do industrial peoples. The a:nswer to Adams's selection, believing it to be "a principle under whose auspices
question "If culture is not part of nature, where does it stand it is impossible to develop parsimonious and powerful theories
in the order of things?" seems equally straightforward. Culture about variations in human social life" (1979:121), cannot be
is quite separate from nature, which is what makes it culture, construed as a rejection of its general significance. It is equally
despite the obvious fact that the two are intertwined and con- dubious to suppose that natural selection is in any way op-
tinuously in relationship. Culture may have been produced posed to the cultural materialist strategy. Harris (1979:79,121)
out of nature, in the sense that humans, who are part of nature, accepts in principle the general premise that natural selection
create it, but it is not a part of nature in the sense of being acts as a mechanism of evolutionary process but not as a deter-
"natural." A baby may once be a direct part of its mother, minant (cf. Carneiro n.d.).
though upon birth it becomes a separate entity. The baby may Adams proposes natural selection as an "alternative" to
owe much to its mother (heritage) and may remain dependent Harris's infrastructure causality, while attempting to isolate it
on and affected by her (nurture), but to argue that they are from the cultural materialist strategy. But is it an alternative?
anything but separate is to miss the significance of the processMuch of Adams's promotion of natural selection rests on the
of birth. Mother and child are separate, even when in close misconceived assumption that it is something more than a
relationship. Likewise, culture stands in relation to, but dis- mechanism. A careful reading of The Origin of Species makes
tinct from, nature, by definition. clear that natural selection in the strictest sense does not deter-
Another problem results from Adams's treatment of the rela- mine or induce anything. It acts on variations, but it does not
tionship between behavior and thought (ideology). If Adams's cause them (Darwin 1958 [1859]: esp. chaps. 3 and 4). In
finger-wiggling example has a point, it is that behavior has Darwin's words (p. 100), "natural selection acts only by the
"mental concomitants." Harris agrees when he says "behavior preservation and accumulation of small inherited modifica-
is governed by thought" (1979:58). Can it be concluded that tions." In its exact meaning, natural selection provides a
the two are therefore incapable of being distinguished? Hardly. mechanism for retaining favorable traits in individuals and
There is a real and knowable distinction between mental species.
process and behavior, though they are indeed closely inter- If natural selection is not a determinant in Darwinism, what
woven. What one thinks affects what one does, and vice versa. is? The answer is to be found in the concept of "the struggle
What one thinks, however, is not necessarily what one actuallyfor existence," which sees species and individual members
does. The "thought" Adams argues is needed to move the within each species as competing for scarce resources for sur-
finger (he calls it nervous activity) must carefully be differenti- vival (Darwin 1958 [1859]:29):
ated from "idea" or "ideology." Such "thought" is not equiva-
lent to the "mental concomitants" at stake in the argument. This is the doctrine of Malthus, applied to the whole animal and
vegetable kingdoms. As many more individuals of each species are
Similarly, engagement in "mental activity" is behavior, but
born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a fre-
thoughts of that activity (planning, contemplating, emoting,
quently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being,
etc.) are not that behavior. If it were, "behavior" would be if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under
indistinguishable from "mental activity" and would be con- the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a
ceptually redundant, permitting its elimination. Thoughts, better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected.
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 615
Following Malthus, Darwin's stress is on the relation between evolution, we think that he has not really extricated himself
food and reproduction, on the material conditions for survival from a framework that includes cultural materialism, neo-
and change. With this in mind, much of Harris's argument and evolutionism, and historical materialism. It is gratifying to see
the cultural materialist position become clearer. The emphasis a focus upon an autonomous dynamic social process faced by
on infrastructure, which includes environmental, ecological, external constraints after the hopeless functionalist nonsense
and economic factors, is a logical derivative of the doctrine of of cultural materialism, but Adams's inconclusive attack on
Malthus which informed and guided Darwin. Harris and the rather muddy exercise in biological and bio-
Why, then, does Harris deemphasize natural selection in physical metaphors must leave him, unfortunately, an easy
sociocultural theory? Aside from the important issue of the target.
independence of culture from the influences of natural selection While the criticisms of Harris's concepts of infrastructure/
(Harris 1979:121-22) and aside from moral and political con- superstructure, mental/behavioral, and emic/etic are excellent,
siderations and judgments (see Carneiro n.d. for a discussion no conclusion is reached as to the validity of the approach. If
of Boasian opposition to natural selection in cultural evolu- Harris's distinctions and model of causality are invalid, then
tion), it is because he and Adams are asking different questions. the whole research strategy is useless (Friedman 1981). This
Darwin's concept of natural selection is a response to the ought to be clearly stated. It is, perhaps, because of this un-
"how" of evolution. The "why" is alluded to but never speci- clarity that Godelier and structural Marxism are summoned
fied by Darwin beyond the Malthusian doctrine of struggle for as reasonable substitutes for Harris's rigid definitions because
survival. It is in the work of Mendel and the neo-Darwinist anything can function as infrastructure. Adams seems to ignore
theorists that issues of variation are successfully raised. The that, just as in cultural materialism, it is assumed that material
cultural materialist position, paralleling the biological evolu- conditions or the state of the productive forces determine
tion of Darwinism, holds that natural selection is a mechanism which social form is to be infrastructural. While not identical,
for mediating adaptation and survival but not a determinant historical, cultural, and structural-Marxist materialisms all
or cause in cultural evolution. The central questions (though belong to the same mechanical family.
by no means the only ones) to which Harris's strategy is It is certainly true that Harris's evolutionism is best charac-
directed concern causality and origins-the "whys" of socio- terized as Lamarckian in that it reduces selection to a positive
cultural change and evolution. Adams's alternative, it appears adaptive process in which cultural elements are created as
to me, is a new functionalism, essentially concerned with the optimal responses to environmental conditions. Adams's al-
"hows" of change and evolution. ternative to infrastructural causality is natural selection, which
From this perspective, Harris's lack of emphasis on natural he defines as applicable to all situations that are so complex
selection becomes more comprehensible, as does the inap- that they cannot really be understood by any other means. He
propriateness of Adams's critique. His arguments fail not be- goes so far as to say that since the decline of Britain in the latter
cause of any adjudged shortcomings of the concept of natural part of the 19th century is too complicated ever to be under-
selection, but rather because he sets it against a research stood we must resort to a selection explanation. Now, this is
strategy which attempts to go beyond the kind of question to extremely weak as a substitute for any other form of explana-
which it reasonably can be expected to offer answers. Adams tion. Selection in biology does not explain the existence of
himself makes this apparent in his discussion of "selection ex- anything. It is part of a larger process in which the generation
planations" and the limits in using them. Despite his dis- of variation is crucial. It cannot be used alone. Secondly, its
claimer, it does "muddy the waters" to imply that the term importance has recently been questioned. It has even been
"selection explanation" is needed. It is not clear to me whether suggested that "the lack of natural selection may be a pre-
Adams means selection explanation to be another term for requisite to major evolutionary advance" (Ho and Saunders
"ultimate" or "proximate" explanation or intends to create a 1979:589). Instead of functionalist-style adaptationist argu-
third, distinct category. In fact, selection explanations fall ments, it might be suggested that morphogenetic processes
squarely into the "old" format: "proximate," "functional," plus external constraints that lead to particular developmental
"the how," "the mechanism," "immediate environmental fac- pathways are the stuff of evolution (Waddington 1974). In-
tor," and "ecological time scale (now time)." stead of applying the concept of natural selection as such, it is
Adams goes on to reveal explicitly that he believes human more profitable to employ the more abstract concepts of which
life too complex to be comprehended and is prepared to settle it is a subset. The notions of limits, limit conditions, limits of
for something considerably less than a "science of culture." compatibility, include the notion of selection at both epigenetic
As anthropologists trying to apply science whenever possible and population levels. They are better applicable to social
to the study of human beings and their life, we would be foolishsystems, in which there are no species populations as such and
to follow his lead. It points in the direction of limited theory and
in which we can surely speak of contradictory tendencies
knowledge by suggesting a futility in seeking answers to the in systems themselves, within and between societies. The
larger questions of evolution and culture. It is a shame that, decline of Britain and, perhaps, of the West today cannot be
in his effort to revitalize interest in the application of natural
understood in terms of a biological model of natural selection.
selection to sociocultural process and evolution, Adams has The decline of Britain was part of the same process as the rise
chosen to present his argument as an attack on Harris's cul- of Germany and the United States. It was a world-system
tural materialism. The case for natural selection is lost in thephenomenon in which the flow and accumulation of capital
polemics. were determinant (Ekholm 1977, Friedman 1978). Selection
cannot be applied, because the nation-state is not equivalent
to a species population. It is a politically bounded place in
which capital is either accumulated or not. Social systems do
by KAJSA EKHOLM and JONATHAN FRIEDMAN
not have the same properties as nature. Understanding them
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, University of Copen-
is more important for a social science than the fact that societies
hagen, Frederiksholms Kanal 4, 1220 Copenhagen, Denmark. expand or decline.
20 v 81 The use of Lotka's principle is a perfect example of the fact
While we are sympathetic with Adams's criticisms of Harris that the application of biology to social reality can be singu-
and his attempt to construct an alternative and with the use larly unenlightening. The principle simply states that organic
made of Prigogine (but not Lotka) and Darwin to express some systems expand to the limits of available matter and energy.
ideas about the dynamic and contradictory nature of social Now, we do know that social systems have tended to expand.
We also know that the universe has been and still is expansion- Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "<CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
ist. The mechanisms, however, are very different in the two

cases. Political and economic growth in human social by RONNsystems
PARKER
is the result not of Lotka's principle, but of the structure 78-40 164thand
St.,Apt. 1K, Queens, N.Y. 11365, U.S.A. 14 VI 81
dynamic properties of social accumulation. It is socially deter-of Harris's "fuzzy" methods for predicting
Adams's critique
mined. Even demographic growth has been shown to be the outcome of cultural processes is basically sound. Harris's
largely determined by social relations, i.e., the goals of the models are as yet too broadly drawn and difficult to handle
family or other immediately concerned parties (the nonparents experimentally. At best, we can apply computer systems
of today's underreproducing Western world) in given social terminology to enhance the usefulness of his structural para-
conditions. The parallel of growth is not enough. If Adams digms. The idea of infrastructure may be viewed as a "high-
wants to show that social expansion can be reduced to bio- level," or informative but very general, notion as opposed to
logical expansion, he must show how socially determined ex- a more predictive and detailed "low-level" one. For instance,
pansion is a translation of Lotka's principle. The world, of one might expand the concept of infrastructure beyond Harris's
course, is full of examples of societies that are more or less generalities and Adams's dissection, understanding it as the
stable. While this may be a function of their marginal posi- results of humankind's activity within the structure of the
tions, it demonstrates the social possibility of stability. In universe. These results are definitive of culture in all its aspects.
order to understand the nature of human social expansionism If we accept humanity's penchant for action as intrinsic to the
we must understand its social determinants.
species, then culture is a naturally generated entity.
Prigogine's work is more useful in that it says something Culture, the total diversity of human accomplishment, un-
about the necessary nature of all living systems without assum- derstood as a dynamic process, is a function of ecology, the
ing any particular mechanisms. Social systems are dissipativeinterrelationship between humans and environmental spaces,
structures. The development of more complex structures is an measured in terms of energy transformations. Given life's
unstable phenomenon dependent on the continuity of energy origins in the molecular structures of amino acids, it is sub-
flows from outside. It thus tends to contradict itself where
entities of ecology that have generated the organisms (humans)
energy sources are finite. World history demonstrates increasing that bring culture into being. A cornucopia of subfunctions
size and complexity of social systems in the long run, increas- may, of course, be derived from the general relationship.
ing energy flow and increasing depletion. However, dissipative The idea of subfunctions brings to mind questions raised by
structures can reproduce themselves in relatively stable fashion Adams's natural-selection approach, based in the laws of
if their reproduction draws less free energy than their source thermodynamic transformations. For example, Adams's notion
produces. Secondly, there is a lot more to world history, to that an idea, or mental energy, is significant only in its effects on
rises and falls, expansion and contraction, than dissipative larger energy flows seems restricted. The concept does not
structure.
appear to account for the teachings of the Buddha and their
In order to come to grips with social "evolution" it is neces- consequences in contrast to the ideas which stimulated the
sary to build theories about social processes themselves. A Industrial Revolution or our own multinational information-
focus on total processes of social reproduction takes into con-energy-complex. As for Adams's concept that the behavior
sideration all of the energy flows discussed by Adams, but it favored by natural selection is that which takes part in large
accounts for these flows in terms of socially determined rela-energy outflows, how would it explain the behavior of genera-
tions. It does not restrict itself to single societies, as is the tions of Eastern mystics? Does the existence of the yogi within
tendency in biologically inspired approaches, but considers a sealed glass box lead to greater or lesser amounts of energy
total or global systems of relations. Explanation in this ap- expenditure? Is the yogi's behavior more or less conducive to
proach is historical or, more properly, transformational. It survival than that of the Western corporate executive?
accounts for that which exists by accounting for its genesis- We have learned that the interface between humans and
invariably the transformation of former structures. This is nature can be described in terms of energy transformations.
opposed to any form of functionalist explanation, materialist Ecological parameters define the quantity and quality of
or other. Social transformational processes are not simply the natural human resources. Since organic matter on the surface
result of contradiction to or selection by external nature or of the earth is self-proliferating, it will remain relatively stable
"infrastructure." They are more often the result of the dynamic quantitatively, but the quality of the organization of matter
and contradictions of the system itself, including that part of may change radically over long stretches of time. It is in the
nature that is subsumed by the system. It can easily be argued realm of explaining qualitative change that Adams's presenta-
that since the rise of the great commercial civilizations of the tion falters.
Middle East, the collapse of individual states and empires and "Low-level" rigor is needed in Adams's as well as in Harris's
even the general crises of the entire area including the Mediter- model.
ranean have been economic in nature and much like the one
we are experiencing today, not simply a question of running
out of energy sources (Ekholm and Friedman 1979, 1980). by J. IAIN PRATTIS
There have, of course, been serious contradictions between Department of Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa,
social expansion and its energy sources. This is an integral Ont., Canada KIS 5B6. 10 vi 81
property of the system and has played an important role in Adams's statement that he is not qualified to discuss what
history. But most social transformations, crises, collapses, etc.,Marx meant by "infrastructure" and "superstructure" renders
in history are not the result of the reaching of absolute naturalhis discourse somewhat suspect, particularly as it is evident
limits, even if breakdowns often have occurred at high levelsthat Harris suffers from the same lack of depth. This is not "a
of productive intensity. The salinization that destroyed the problem properly left to intellectual historians," but one that
soils of southern Mesopotamia could have been prevented is fundamental to a discussion of the events that Harris and
Adams seek to explain. Harris and Adams share a tradition in
technically, but it was socially too costly in that period of in-
cultural ecology; what each does with it is quite different.
tensive production and trade. Europe could run out of wood
Harris attempts to reformulate mainstream cultural ecology
and switch to coal in a period of economic growth, but we may
by adding on bits and pieces of neo-Marxist theory, while
not make it to the next resource base in our present economic
Adams reverts to an anthropological Darwinism with his
decline.
preference for natural selection, Lotka, and Prigogine.
Vol. 22 N No. 6 * December 1981 617

Harris's strategy is unsatisfactory, and Adams's is uncon- though it is not a ball he has chosen to run with, and it appeals
vincing. While there are definite convergences theoretically be- more to my biases and concerns than the variants of cultural
tween cultural ecology and neo-Marxist theory, their different ecology on offer.
conceptual properties make the Harris hybrid difficult to sus-
tain. There is, as Adams points out, a vital epistemological
issue here. Harris should either concern himself with a refine- by JIM WEIL
ment of cultural ecology or clear the decks and start over with Department of Anthropology ,State University of New York at
a better understanding of neo-Marxist theory. The Harris Stony Brook, Stony Brook, N.Y. 11794, U.S.A. 15 vi 81
hybrid, based as it is on such a shaky synthesis, is not a vigorous
Wolf (1980) has recently publicized his concern about the
one. Furthermore, Adams's confessed lack of qualification leads future of anthropology, given the fractiousness of its practi-
him continually to question the meaning of determinism in tioners. He points to a "spurious unity" among materialists of
Harris's work. Harris and Godelier (when they are not being varying persuasions in battle against a coalition of diverse
mutually antagonistic) are talking in different ways about mentalists. Indeed, the most vigorous debate seems to occur
"determination in the last instance." This concept has been between representatives of related theoretical approaches vying
explicated by Althusser and Balibar (1977) and applied in for the same anthropological territory. Perhaps Harris has
different ways by members of the French school of economic received so much attention in the pages of this journal because
anthropology (Meillassoux, Rey, Dupre, Godelier, and Terray).' of his efforts to occupy a coveted niche. Others likewise would
This is why Godelier (1978c) can refer to supposed superstruc- claim to provide definitive, systematic explanations for the
tural items such as kinship, exchange, and religion as function- appearance of cross-cultural similarities and differences. By
ing under certain conditions as relations of production as well writing clearly and arriving at unambiguous conclusions,
as in the superstructure. Adams seems to have misunderstood Harris stimulates his readers to decide whether to agree or dis-
this. Also, Godelier's concern with the functioning in this man-
agree. The same cannot be said for the theoretical and factual
ner of the idgel component of mental, ideological factors under- alternatives of all of his opponents.
cuts much of Adams's concern for the place of the meiitalist Adams begins by stating that his purpose is to criticize the
dimension in behavior. cultural materialist strategy formulated by Harris. After con-
Adams's epistemological critique of Harris is a telling one, testing several logical/empirical issues, he devotes the remain-
though I think he is incorrect to take Harris to task over the ing two-thirds of the discussion to what he calls "a more
notion of energy gates' requiring "exotic idea systems, complex effective strategy for seeking the reasons some human be-
and expensive ritual performances," etc. Although I did not haviors ultimately prevail over others." This indicates a com-
use Harris's terminology, my discussion of Leach's Highland mon ground of shared goals and assumptions that Adams might
Burma material used the notion of situational logic to identify have delineated before launching into his critique. As it stands,
the conditions under which Kachin gumsa chiefs (duwa) at- the impression of divergence from the approach taken by
tempted to become Shan princes (saopha), through their con- Harris is misleading. Both Adams and Harris grapple with
trol of an increased material base (read energy flow) (Prattis evolutionary problems by focusing primarily on the inter-
1976a, b). The analysis was directed at the results of the chang-actions of humans with their biophysical environment. Further-
ing material base under the control of particular political func- more, Adams relegates ideational factors to a subordinate
tionaries-no exotica here, just an examination of roles, causal position when he writes: "Models of processes that
material base, and power. I believe that this is what Harris is accord with the trajectory of nature are more likely to be use-
getting at in his discussion of energy gatekeepers, and Adams's ful than those in the meaning/symbol systems that stand
critique here is not well founded. apart from the other processes of nature." This assertion
Adams's discussion of laws of energy under the aegis of a would dissociate Adams completely from numerous anthro-
more thoroughgoing Darwinian anthropology is illuminating pologists (Marshall Sahlins, say) but not from Harris.
and interesting but for me unconvincing. It offers an alterna- Adams discusses his alternatives under two headings,
tive, but to state that one must "understand the energetic "Natural Selection" and "Laws of Energy," which do not
world in energetic terms" is not really to critique Harris's signal an inevitable conflict with the cultural materialist pro-
strategy. Harris may be more usefully criticised in that, despitegram. As I read Adams, the argument is not that Harris
surface appearances, he is more concerned with cultural ecology denies natural selection, but that he fails to employ it as a
than with a refinement of historical materialism. The latter thoroughgoing explanatory principle: "The process that Harris
requires that anthropologists not pass the buck to intellectual is trying to capture is really evolution-an essentially Dar-
historians, as these concerns are properly part of the toolkit winian evolution-or it is nothing." Fine, ultimately; but such
of contemporary anthropology. outcomes depend on quantum shifts in gene pools resulting
Adams makes a very good point in saying that the thought/ from reproductive differentials among populations. It should
behavior dichotomy is more often a folk category of Western not be necessary to repeat the caution against indiscriminate
culture than a useful analytic distinction. This telling criticism application of biological concepts in the interpretation of
could have been developed into an expose of the overriding differences in the transmission of cultural traits. Yet Adams
ideological component in Western social science. It is all too claims that "mutation, replication, variation, and natural
easy to overlook the fact that anthropology itself "is a product selection are as important to sociocultural as to biological
of a particular intellectual tradition that was, and is still, theory." Harris does anticipate a causal priority in demo-
largely determined by the nature of the society in which it hasgraphic, nutritional, and combative/defensive factors, but he
developed" (Copans and Seddon 1973:3). Much analysis re- has attempted to avoid biological reductionism by accommo-
flects the ideology of the anthropologist; indeed, the anthro- dating the influence of other cultural variables, including
pologist's ideology tends to frame the objects under scrutiny human volition.
It is difficult to know whether Adams considers this ex-
so that anthropologists become artists merely painting them-
planatory scheme too loose or too rigid. In one place he writes:
selves. This line of thought follows from Adams's critique,
"the argument that the infrastructure determines the structure
and the superstructure but can also be acted upon, inhibited,
1 The designation "school" may not appeal to the scholars and cited,
controlled by them raises the question of just what kind
as there are claims of fundamental differences in strategy and
epistemology amongst them. This form of fratricidal strife is, how- of determinism this is." Probabilistic determinism, I would
ever, normal amongst neo-Marxist scholars. venture to respond, just as in other sciences. Would Adams
contend that control of energy is the only factor in cultural Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
evolution (and accept the "vulgar materialist" epithet)? He

seems, rather, to favor indeterminacy, rejecting what he views taking Harris's Cultural Materialism as a statement widely ac-
as linear cause-and-effect processes in the scheme of Harris: cepted by anthropologists. While I would claim to inherit much
"nonlinear processes operate in convoluted ways that make of the same intellectual tradition as Harris, I do not share his
mincemeat of such explanations." Specifically, Adams attrib- categorical discarding of approaches that throw light as well as
utes to the Nobel laureate Prigogine the notion that, out of a shadow; rather, I see them as areas to be combed for utility.
chaotic interplay of events, novel life forms emerge on the More important, however, I consider the intellectual equip-
basis of autocatalytic mechanisms of energy capture (compare ment he is selling cumbersome, ambiguous, and misleading. I
this with Maruyama's [1978] millenarian appraisal). I do not do not, however, agree with Ekholm and Friedman that his
mean to disregard what Adams proposes when I restrict my "distinctions and model of causality are invalid" and the whole
response to doubting its relevance to a critique of the cultural research strategy is useless. "Validity" is not a criterion of
materialist research strategy. He implies that outcomes of cul- method, but one of theory. I do not regard Harris's approach
tural evolution are in the last analysis unpredictable, while as totally misguided; it is (to borrow Cohen's expression)
Harris claims to reveal a degree of predictability in social life."closer to the real world" than, for example, some of the
This brings us back to the issue of form and substance in literature that comes out under the label of structuralism. For
anthropological debate. Adams criticizes logical and opera- me the problem with it is that its theory is unworkable-its
tional aspects of the research procedures formulated by Harris concepts are so loosely defined that one is rapidly lost in at-
(e.g., whether "infrastructure" is an exclusive and exhaustive tempting to use it and, more seriously, it has no explicit
category to which to assign cultural phenomena), but he does dynamics. On the other side of the ledger, Harris is looking in
not offer equivalent counterproposals for comparative evalua- the right direction. Perhaps one of the differences between us
tion. He might have sketched guidelines for carrying out in- is that I see theory as something to be developed and discarded
vestigations in a different way or provided alternative interpre-when a better one comes along-but, whether constructing it
tations of specific findings. Since he refers to the "heat and or discarding it, it has to be there.
light" produced by exchanges in anthropological journals, it It is clear that I erred by introducing alternatives. The error
is appropriate to mention his presidential address to the was not in the intent, but in the execution. It was poor judg-
American Anthropological Association (Adams 1978). There ment to draw elements from what is a fairly broad theoretical
he used the same play on words to decry the internecine strife construction applying the idea of energetic processes to social
among anthropologists (much as Wolf did), while presenting analysis. The framework in which these elements operate is
his prospectus for an anthropological holism based on ener- quite as important as the ideas, and introducing the ideas with-
getics. That effort, in my opinion, was more articulate and out the framework led some readers to advance criticisms that
coherent than the present one. In sum, Adams fans the flames are not applicable to the theory I am using. A draft monograph
without illuminating a new path, and I wonder what we have (Adams n.d.b.) develops that framework.
gained. For better or worse, this reply will consist of two parts. The
first is a series of disconnected comments on specific points
brought up by some of the readers, aimed merely at clarifying
my position. The second outlines my theoretical position on the
Reply use of the idea of energy in social science research. It will not
be sufficient, and it will omit entirely the sociological com-
by RICHARD N. ADAMS
ponents, which would probably be of more interest to some
Austin, Tex., U.S.A. 8 vii 81 readers than the energetic background. This part is intended
Most commentators note that my paper has two parts, the for those who find existing approaches sufficiently defective to
first concerned with what I regard as inadequacies in the con- be willing to explore new ideas.
ceptual equipment of cultural materialism and the second sug- Finally, I must draw attention to one area where I feel that
gesting some alternative ways of looking at things. Concerning I was seriously at fault in attaching a private meaning to a
the first, so far as I can tell no one takes exception to my con- term that has a much too conventional public meaning.
cerns with emic/etic issues, one or two are uncomfortable with "Natural selection" first refers, of course, to the purely bio-
the thought/behavior issue, but quite a number react nega- logical Darwinian usage. My own usage is much broader and
tively to my treatment of the tripartite structural model. Con- will be set forth below.
cerning the second, there is considerable discomfort with my
I
treatment of natural selection, with my use of energy laws and
principles, and with the selection explanation. In sum, I was Cohen defends the tripartite structural model but confesses
better at destroying than at constructing. That certainly is that it is all but impossible to use. This is all right; lots of leaky
not what I wanted. boats don't sink for a long time. However, we have to get
I recognize that I have nothing to offer critics such as about building better ones. If the designs are very different
Ehrenreich, who finds no trouble with cultural materialism and they are going to be harder to accept, but sometimes very
for whom anyone who does is necessarily "hostile" to it and different designs are necessary to avoid the reasons that the
"self-indulgent." Similarly, for those like Prattis, who finds me older ones leak. Whether one prefers to sail in leaky vessels or
suspect because I doubt that we will ever really know what to construct new ones is a matter of taste. Cohen concludes that
Marx may have meant by "infrastructure," there is little "of the two paradigms, energetics and cultural materialism, the
worthwhile response. For the most part, however, my critics latter is clearly closer to the real world, and because it is we
and I simply do not understand each other, and I direct these will over time either accept . .. or reject it. If we accept it, ...
observations to them in the hope that, through repeated efforts conventions will emerge about which variables are to go in
to explain, better understanding may eventually emerge. I am which of the three divisions." Perhaps. It has been lying
surprised at the degree of difference that seems to separate me around for over a century now, and no such conventional
from some of them; Cohen's assertion that cultural materialism wisdom has emerged, nor has any consistent rejection or
is "closer to the real world" than energetics leaves me dumb. acceptance.
I seldom take the time to prepare a critique, but I did so Some of Curtin's comments misread my statements, one is
this time because I found that some nonanthropologists were factually wrong, and some are questions of interpretation. I
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 619
nowhere proposed, nor would I presume to attempt, "to use energy that is therefore conserved. Quite the contrary. Until
natural (Darwinian) selection as an exact model of cultural 1975, energy was openly widely used to achieve conservatism
processes." Natural selection is a vastly variegated class of and progressivism. That "selection favors the homeostatic
processes and cuts into the cultural sphere as do other natural optimum of efficiency . . . and conservation" seems to me to
processes. I certainly do not "equate mutation and invention," be rarely the case. I have not, so far as I can recall, ever held
but regard them as terms that come from different scientific that "materialisms do not ordinarily assume biological and
traditions and refer to a common property, namely, the appear- physical reduction or that they contradict biological or physical
ance of wholly new, novel forms. My statement "in contrast principles." It is a mark of the failure of my paper that a
to mutative processes, selective factors operate in the relative statement so close to its central thesis should be taken by
light of day" says that selection processes are far more open to Davis to have somehow been denied.
observation than mutative processes, both in biology and in De Ruijter's observations are not far from my own positions.
culture. We can, after the fact, find out something about how While I also believe that Godelier's redefinition of them was
selection has worked; it is very difficult to find out how a made to save the Marxist paradigm, I find relations of produc-
specific mutation or invention occurred. I was not saying that tion to be a very central focus of organization of any society.
selection is more predictable than mutation; both are probably I cannot take exception to de Ruijter's objection that the
equally difficult and usually impossible to predict. three laws I suggest are not adequate to many questions; I
Curtin asserts that "no biologist would contrast 'functional' would deny that any of them implies a final cause and cannot
and 'evolutionary' in the same sense as 'proximate' and 'ulti- see why this occurs to him. Nor am I pretending to "completely
mate.' Wrong. The zoologist Pianka (1978:15) writes: "Mayr explain" culture by these laws.
(1961) has termed these the 'how?' and 'why?' approaches to Diener's concern with information, hierarchical process, and
biology. They have also been called the 'functional' and natural selection are taken up in the second part of this reply,
'evolutionary' explanations and the 'proximate' and 'ultimate' as are Dunnell's concerns with natural selection and mental
factors influencing an event (Baker 1938)"; John Randel constructs.
Baker is listed in World Who's Who in Science as "zoologist," Parker's question about how Buddha's teachings and the
and Ernst Mayr is regarded as a "biologist." acts of Eastern mystics effect things surely needs to be answered,
It is quite possible that "where ... the analogy between cul- but it has to be done by cases, not by vast generalizations. I am
tural and biological evolution is carried too far, it will lead to not competent in those data.
the creation of arbitrary. categories"; I would, however, reject Weil (joining Cohen) is concerned that time is being wasted
the implication that I am guilty of carrying it too far. Finally, in efforts such as these. I have generally in recent years avoided
that "the notion that energy transformation is the essence of controversies for the same reason, but there are times when the
biological success ... is certainly a dangerous idea to live by in only way to shape up ideas is to put them out for natural
the modern world" is an interesting speculation, but the selection.
question is whether it is a good model of what is happening. Ekholm and Friedman's main objection to my approach is
I do not hold Darwin responsible for Social Darwinism or E. that explanations in social evolution have to be "social." I dis-
0. Wilson for racist misuses of sociobiology. By the same agree. The world is more complex than that. In a complex,
token, I will not be frightened by allegedly "dangerous ideas." nonlinear process, to pick one class of events as determinant
The first of Davis's comments seem, like Cohen's, simply to of all others can only be ultimately misleading. It is not that
favor less critical interpretations of Harris's work. I maintain population grows because of social factors, but that there is a
that the thought/behavior distinction is a fundamental part circularity between biological-demographic processes and
of our folk concepts and that nervous-system activities that social-decision-making factors. As I understand them, following
do not affect manifest overt behavior are by definition not Ekholm and Friedman's recommendations we would dispense
relevant to social processes; on both these points and others with the circularity and provide less than half the picture. I
we disagree. certainly do not exclude social factors from my concern, but
In his "Alternatives to Harris: Natural selection" there is in order to use them I require a model that sees them in terms
some ground for discussion. Following Davis's numbers: (1) of an ongoing energetic system. Such a model is touched upon
The vagueness of the definition of infrastructure is at issue not in a recent paper (Adams 1980) and is developed more fully in
with respect to an alternative of genetics, but with respect to a forthcoming one (Adams n.d.b). For me, all factors of any
an alternative of superstructure. I have assumed that in the consequence have to be energetic or they can do no work in
tripartite structural model the component "structures" are the system. In human society, social factors are both causes
defined with respect to each other as sociocultural matters, not and consequences of other processes as well as social ones.
with respect to the genetic structure. (2) I think this criticism Assigning dynamics exclusively to "social" factors can only be
is warranted, as is the similar objection of Ekholm and Fried- sustained empirically in specific cases. Therefore, I would not
man. When I asserted that the emphasis on selection should be categorically disagree about the importance of social factors
"essentially Darwinian," I was referring to the role selection but want to see their energetic operation in specific cases. My
plays in the larger Darwinian picture (i.e., as a part of the preference for the energetic is simply that it provides a basis
paradigm of reproduction, variation, mutation, selection) and by which these various social, biological, and other factors
not to the specific biological genetic processes. Since Darwin can be handled within a single framework.
was concerned with biological evolution, it is quite reasonable Incidental to this, I would agree with Ekholm and Fried-
to take my comment as referring to that, even though that man's characterizations of the 19th-century British situation,
was not what I had in mind. I will clarify this below. (5) and as they will see in my forthcoming monograph on the problem
(6) I advocated "selection explanations" not because they (1980). I am sorry that I was not familiar with their references
were more precise than proximate explanations, but because on the subject.
they are the only kind of explanations we can have in many I do not think that Ekholm and Friedman understand
instances. They recognize our degree of ignorance and make it Lotka's principle. To say that it "simply states that organic
clear that proximate detailing of one history may provide little systems expand to the limits of available matter and energy"
basis for understanding the next. is wrong. It does not, in fact, predict that any particular thing
Under "Alternatives to Harris: iLaws of energy," Davis will expand; it says that if something expands the operation of
argues that "adaptation is a notoriously conservative process." selection upon it will follow the stated rule and that nothing
I believe he is misreading the process by saying that it is can expand beyond the limits of available energy and matter.
II Adams: SELECTION, ENERGETICS, "CULTURAL MATERIALISM"
The following points are derived from a monographic treatment

on the one hand, and neural and energetic, on the other, is
(Adams n.d. b) of my general approach to the study of society.
extremely important. A mental model can have no effect unless
Here I discuss, without references to specific commentaries, a
it is converted as information into an energy form such as
number of the points they raise.
speech sounds, a sculpture, an automobile, or a toothpick. Thus
1. Everything with which science can deal can be included
it is impossible to avow unambiguously that an "idea" has
in the category of energy form. An energy form is any process
any effects. We can hypothesize that neural activities trigger
which, no matter what else it does, follows the two laws of
muscular-behavioral activities that may trigger extrahuman
thermodynamics. In our folk usages, it would include all
energetic processes that may result in natural selection, but we
energy processes, commercial and otherwise; all material or
only "picture" these in mental models. It is never the mental
mass forms and processes; all things which "carry information";
model itself that "does" any work. It is the neural biochemical
all human behavior, both overt and covert, and biological
activity that engenders our mental images, on the one hand,
processes, neurological as well as muscular; and the organiza-
and that triggers behavioral activities, on the other. Thus, the
tional, informational, and formal aspects of all these processes.
neural activities are as much a part of the energetic world as
This explicitly is not saying that explanations for process can
is agricultural production or a munitions factory. Mental
be derived only from energy theory. Rather, it holds that all
models are human devices fraught with the difficulties implicit
theory we may subsequently construct must minimally take
in the "conscious" and "unconscious," complexities made
energy processes into account.
possible by the human neural system.
2. Our understanding of energy forms derives from experi-
6. Energy processes can be conceived of as comprising two
ence primarily with two of their aspects: that they do sub-
major phases: a potential flow and the releasing of flow. This
stantive work and that they have a form. The substantive work
is equivalent to saying that some energy forms can inhibit the
comprises the process of the energy form's seeking equilibrium,
seeking of equilibrium by others. Equilibrium here is thermo-
(i.e., building entropy), during which it dissipates energy,
dynamic equilibrium, not the dissipative structure's steady
whether it takes on additional energy or not. The form may be
state (which it may or may not seek) or the fuzzy equilibrium
that of a dissipative structure or of a structure that cannot
of sociologists. Thus, any flow may act as a trigger to some other
take on (input) additional energy; this second type we call'an
flow, inhibiting or releasing it. This may be a simple, one-link
equilibrium structure in that it either rests at or is in the process
process, such as the uncorking of an inverted bottle of liquid,
of approaching equilibrium. The form may be regarded as
or it may be an extensive and complex system of parallel and
either a structure or a flow, the convenience of one or the other
serial links, such as the combined processes of human beings
being determined, usually, by the relation of the rate of changes
communicating, computers deciding, orders being given and
under way to the analyst's definition of the problem. It can be
carried out and the further energy flows resulting from these
changed by "contact" or interaction with another form, and
orders. Whether a particular energy form acts as a trigger or
it can change other forms.
as a flow is determined by the context. While work is done in
3. Forms can receive information from other forms. That is,
releasing, and sometimes in inhibiting, other flows, in specific,
one form can affect another in such a way that the latter will
concrete structure/flow systems usually some forms specialize
manifest an imprint, a perturbation which reflects both some
in triggering and others in substantive work.
aspect of the formal properties of the impinging form and its
7. Whereas triggers can only release flows to seek equilibrium,
own inherent properties. Information is uniquely and un-
substantive work can act both as a trigger and as a constructor.
ambiguously a property of the receiver, not of the sender.
Energy form reflects the sender; the receiver receives an im- A constructor is an energy form that is capable of constructing
pression or dislocation, an imprint or perturbation, that is other energy forms out of preexisting elements. Constructing
unique to the receiver and can only and at best be a reflection energy forms includes the novel production of forms and the
of limited aspects of the impinging form. reproduction of already existing forms. Constructing occurs
4. Another formal property of energy forms is organization. through the conjunction of relevant energy forms in an or-
An energy form simultaneously has organizational properties ganization that is autocatalytic for self-organization and self-
and the properties manifested in substantive work. An observer production. The processes involved are complex but may be
is an energy form that receives the imprints of other energy seen in the light of experiments at construction, either inten-
forms and thus creates in itself information. Since the formal tional or random, as in the fluctuations of dissipative structures
properties of energy forms cannot be "known" directly, our under stress. All organisms are self-constructors, autopoietic,
knowledge is comprised of logical models constructed out of the in that they are organized constantly to reproduce their own
information in our nervous systems or in extensions of our organization, their own relations of production. Similarly,
nervous systems such as computers. Scientists are observers human societies are autopoietic in that they are constantly
who try to come up with models, based on information, in the using human energy in the substantive work of recreating the
hope that those models will prove to be satisfactory replicas relations of production of the society. They differ from organ-
of some of the energy forms with which they can be compared. isms, however, in that they are also neopoietic; they not only
5. We differentiate in usage between neural and mental in constantly recreate themselves, but also constantly tend to
that the former refers to biochemical (energy) processes that create new relations, to experiment with new forms. The com-
go on in nervous systems and are hard to analyze for their parable process in organisms is mutation, but it occurs only at
"content" (see Adams 1975:97-109). Mental forms are the the genetic cellular level, whereas in societies novelty can occur
"imeanings," "images," "ideas," "values,") "cognitive maps," in the context or in the form of any behavior.
etc., that the human nervous system provides for the organism 8. Natural selection is the process whereby energy flows im-
to use as its version of information. As human beings we are pose themselves as triggers from time to time on other flows
restricted to dealing with our mental processes; we have no and structures. While it can be the product of design, for the
other alternative and at best can supplement or extend them most part it is the product of random actions. It is not limited
by constructing energy forms such as computers. Mental forms to specific genetic processes, but can inhibit or constrict equi-
are not energy forms, but the neural processes that constitute librium structures and dissipative structures indiscriminately.
them are. The distinction between the mental and mentalistic, It works through the inherent properties of the particular
Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 621
forms involved in specific encounters. A concrete dam can stop ner superior to the other. Where there is a choice, the selection
water flow but not neural flow or speech-sound flow; a toxic will be made in terms of the purpose at hand-whether the
substance may cause a dissipative structure to die but may not observer is interested in the idiographic or the nomothetic.
stop the flow of a river.
9. Energy forms can be extremely complex. Living organ-
isms, and the human organism specifically, are among these.
Social organizations and social structures are also very com-
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book Ngprajzi KiIzlem6nyek was produced. A conference was

Institutions
held in Nyiregyhaza on regional and open-air museums. Mem-
bers of the curatorial staff did fieldwork in various Hungarian
* The Ethnographical Museum of Budapest, founded in 1872,
villages and worked as a team for two weeks in the northern
has recently completed a move to its new permanent residence.
Hungarian village of MezZk6vesd; an exhibit on the birth of
At the end of 1980 it had a staff of 156-39 scientific fellows,
folk arts was prepared on the basis of this latter work. Ethno-
12 restorers, and administrative and technical staff. That year's
graphic lectures and presentations were made to school children
accomplishments included an increased rate of inventorying the
and to the general public, and the museum's scholars presented
museum's collections; complete documentation is now available
papers at conferences abroad. Visitors to the museum in 1980
for 145,395 of the 159,574 ethnographic objects in its care. The
numbered 98,524.
year also saw the opening of the museum's first permanent
For further information, write: Tamas Hoffmann, Director,
exhibit, "From Ancient Societies to Civilizations," presenting
Ethnographical Museum, Kossuth Lajos ter 12, H-1055 Buda-
the development of culture from Australian Aboriginal society
pest, Hungary.
to the Central American civilizations. Plans for a second per-
manent exhibit, "Hungarian Peasant Culture," are well ad-
vanced. Temporary exhibits dealt with such topics as peasant d The International Network for Social Network Analysis, the
costume, folk arts and architecture, childhood in the old Hun- University of Florida, and the University of South Florida are
garian village, the peasant kitchen, and the ethnography of the jointly sponsoring a Sun Belt Social Network Conference
forest. Traveling exhibits were received from the Museum of February 12-15, 1982. Some sessions will be theoretical and
the National Bank of Bogota and from the Museum of Py6ng- methodological: Networks and Attitudes, Collecting and Pro-
yang; an exhibit entitled "Room from Fadd" was sent to the cessing Network Data, Combinatorial and Algebraic Models.
National Museum in Helsinki. Others will be substantive and applied: Bridging Theory and
Seminars on the research of the museum's fellows have cov- Other Applications, Health and Mental Health, Communica-
ered such subjects as the history of Hungarian instrumental tions, and Family, Kinship, and Demography. For information,
music, peasant agriculture, traditional fishing on the Drava, write: Alvin W. Wolfe, Department of Anthropology, Univer-
peasant weddings, traditional glazed tiles, emigration, and pop- sity of South Florida, Tampa, Fla. 33620, or H. Russell Bernard,
ulation trends. Some 32 scientific and semipopular papers were Department of Anthropology, University of Florida, Gaines-
published by staff members, and another volume of the year- ville, Fla. 32601, U.S.A.

Adams Et Al 1981 Natural Selection Energetics and Cultural Materialism

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Natural Selection, Energetics, and "Cultural Materialism" [and Comments and Reply]

Author(s): Richard N. Adams, Donald T. Campbell, Ronald Cohen, Richard A. Curtin,

The University of Chicago Press, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological

Natural Selection, Energetics, and

Vol. 22 * No. 6 * December 1981 603

604 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

win's own relevance to the social sciences goes unrecorded.

Vol. 22 * No. 6 E December 1981 605

606 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

alternative to Harris's approach with a discussion of three:

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move rapidly toward internal uniformity in social transmission.

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ist. The mechanisms, however, are very different in the two

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evolution (and accept the "vulgar materialist" epithet)? He

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The following points are derived from a monographic treatment

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book Ngprajzi KiIzlem6nyek was produced. A conference was

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