World War and the Europe

They left behind.

BY
MARTINSON ADU
Europe in the early 20th century had known no great war, involving all the
Continent’s major Powers, since the fall of Napoleon. Although European
society had been transformed in the interim, the changes had made war more
difficult rather than impossible, and the underpinnings of the long 19th-century
peace had grown fragile.As we enter the centenary year of the outbreak of the
First World War, many uncomfortable parallels with our own time spring to
mind. In 1914 the superpower that dominated the world, controlling the seas
and ruling over a global empire of colonies, dominions and dependencies—
Britain—was being challenged by a rival that was overtaking it economically
and building up armaments on land and sea to assert its claim for a “place in
the sun”—Germany. All of this is alarmingly close to the situation today, when
America’s global supremacy is increasingly being challenged by the rise of
China.The ideological rivalries between the superpowers now and then look
strikingly similar, too, at first glance: on the one hand, Britain then and America
now, with their democratic political systems that make governments
responsible to legislatures and removable by popular elections; on the other,
Germany then and China now, with appointed and irremovable governments
responsible only to themselves. A free press and open public on the one hand
contrast with a controlled public sphere on the other, in which censorship and
the trappings of a police state in effect muzzle the government’s most
trenchant critics.And of course there was, and is, the baleful influence of
nationalism, with China’s sabre-rattling over disputed islands today yielding
little in rhetorical vehemence to the kaiser’s bombastic speeches asserting
German claims in Africa and the Middle East before 1914. The clash of
ideologies and religions was evident before 1914, just as it is today, and in
both cases concentrated on trouble spots in specific parts of the
world.Currently it is the conflicts in the Middle East we have to worry about,
with a vicious civil war in Syria between rival Islamic factions standing proxy for
the rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, while an additional
element of danger is provided by Israel, with its nuclear arsenal, and again
Iran, with its persistent attempts to build one. China and Russia are lining up
behind one side while NATO and the US line up behind the other.Before 1914
the critical trouble spot was the
Balkans,where nationalist passions were overlaid with religious conflicts
between Christian states, such as Greece and Bulgaria, and the Islamic
Ottoman empire. The Hapsburg monarchy, run by a Roman Catholic elite, was
being challenged by Orthodox Serbia. Just as there have been wars previously
in the Middle East (in 1948, 1967 and most recently in 1973), so too there had
been wars in the Balkans, between Russia and Turkey in 1877-78 and
between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1885. So 1914, sometimes known in the
region as the third Balkan war, was nothing new for these countries.
THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC LANDSCAPE
OF EUROPE BEFORE THE BREAK OF The War
Globalization

Characteristic of the pre-1914 decades was what we would now call

globalization. Trade may have risen from one thirtieth to one third of world
production between 1800 and 1913; between 1855 and 1914 investment
flows grew 20 times. Europe accounted for nearly two thirds of global trade
and even more of global investment, and from the 1890s Europe’s major
currencies were fixed in value in relation to each other under the international
gold standard. Hundreds of thousands of foreign-born labourers worked in the
heavy industries of French Lorraine and Germany’s Ruhr. The British writer
Norman Angel in his 1909 best-seller, Europe’s Optical Illusion, maintained
that war between advanced modern economies was now irrational.Yet British
naval planners saw economic interdependence as making Germany more
vulnerable, and the German General Staff considered war remained a viable
option, at least if victory came quickly.

Democratization

A second 19th-century characteristic was democratization. By 1914 all the

European Powers had elected lower houses of parliament, and a majority of
the adult male population was enfranchised. The press was relatively free,
and citizens could form parties and pressure groups. Nonetheless, in Austria-
Hungary, Germany, and Russia ministers answered to monarchs rather than
to a parliamentary majority, and the military chiefs were not subordinate to
civilian statesmen. Moreover, as international tension mounted, public opinion
polarized, more moderate and progressive tendencies being offset by
nationalism and militarism. Europe’s socialist parties opposed wars of
conquest and aggression but were willing to endorse a war fought for just
cause and in self-defence, which in 1914 all the governments would claim to
be fighting.

Military revolutions

The 19th century had also witnessed a succession of military revolutions. At

sea, steel had superseded wooden hulls and steam had superseded sail.
HMS Dreadnought, launched by Britain in 1906 with turbine engines and 10
12-inch guns, made all existing battleships obsolete. On land, Prussia’s
combination of universal liability to conscription, forward strategic planning by
a General Staff, and railway-borne mobilization helped win the wars of
German unification, and was widely emulated. Breech-loading cannon with
rifled steel barrels replaced smooth-bore muzzle-loaders, and infantry rifles
replaced muskets. Smokeless high explosive replaced powder in bullets and
shells, and the modern field gun fired up to 20 rounds per minute. Yet
although on balance these developments favoured defenders over attackers,
military planners concluded from the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War that
offensive tactics could still prevail, albeit at much higher cost than before.

International organization

War therefore remained possible, and the leading international political

institution, the Concert of Europe, was too weak to prevent it. The Concert
was not a permanent fixture but rather an understanding that at times of crisis
the Powers would try to resolve their differences peacefully through a
conference of ambassadors. It was a valuable face-saving device if
governments wished to use it, but in 1914 when Britain proposed a
conference, Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to refuse .

A balance of power?

Peace therefore depended on more traditional devices such as the balance of

power and deterrence. In the 1870s and 1880s the newly unified German
Second Empire under the Chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck was not only
the strongest Continental military power but also spun a web of alliances that
left France – resentful of its defeat in 1870 – isolated. The Austro-German
alliance of 1879 developed into the Triple Alliance (including Italy) in 1882,
and Russia too concluded agreements with the German-led bloc. But after
Wilhelm II became Emperor he allowed the connection with Russia to lapse,
facilitating the formation in 1891-94 of a Franco-Russian alliance. Even so, for
a time the two groupings balanced each other, and Russia and France were
in rivalry not only with Germany but also (in Central Asia and in Africa) with
Britain. So secure did Germany still feel that from 1898 it too challenged
Britain through a major programme of North Sea battleship building.

The beginning of the 20th century

After 1904-07, the line-up became more ominous. Russia was weakened for
several years after its defeat by Japan. Germany tried but failed to form a
German-Franco-Russian bloc excluding Britain. Instead the British
compromised over their extra-European disputes with the French in the
‘Entente cordiale’ of 1904 and over those with the Russians in 1907, and
began co-operating diplomatically with their former adversaries. In 1902 Italy
had reached a separate understanding with France. Germany’s leaders
protested that the Triple Entente ‘encircled’ them, while their one remaining
reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, was a multi-national empire that was hobbled
by inter-ethnic disputes and menaced by a growing confrontation with its
neighbour, Serbia, which with Russian encouragement fomented separatism
among Austria-Hungary’s South Slavs. After 1905 Europe experienced a
succession of diplomatic crises that heightened antagonism between the two
blocs. From 1912 the Anglo-German naval race lost impetus, as a land arms
race between the Austro-German and Franco-Russian alliances superseded
 it. In retrospect it is easy to discern the warning signs. But at the time they
were less evident, and as late as spring 1914 tensions seemed to be easing.
The French Socialist leader, Jean Jaurès, believed the peaceful resolution of
so many crises had bred a dangerous complacency. Nonetheless, a general
war was not inevitable until deliberate decisions created it.

RELATIONS.
Rival alliances, clashing interests, and secret treaties divided pre-war Europe,
and set the stage for a war that would quickly engulf most of the continent,
and much of the world.

The Triple Entente vs. the Central Powers

At the start of the war, the Triple Entente powers were:

 Great Britain
 France
 Russia

On the other side, were the Central Powers:

 Germany
 Austria-Hungary

The Ottoman Empire, often known as Turkey, was not part of the Central
Powers alliance in August 1914, but it had declared war on most of the
Entente Powers by the end of 1914. In October 1915, Bulgaria joined the
Central Powers.

Italy, a pre-war ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, entered the war in

1915 on the side of the Entente. By 1918, many other countries had
become involved, including the United States and Japan on the Entente’s
side.

Causes of Tension

Long-standing territorial grievances, colonial competition, and fear of

surprise attack plagued international relations in the run-up to war. Once
fighting seemed likely, no state wanted to mobilize last, lest its enemies
 use the opportunity to settle old scores. Mobilization schedules, martial
rhetoric, and secret obligations set most of Europe on the path to war.

National Interests

All of the Great Powers of Europe had national interests that they hoped
would be achieved by going to war.

Triple Entente

 France was desperate to avenge its defeat by Germany in the

Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 by regaining the lost provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine.
 Russia promised to support Serbia, a fellow Slavic nation, while also
ensuring that Austria-Hungary did not expand its influence in the Balkans.
 Great Britain supported Belgium and guaranteed its sovereignty, but
also desired to retain the balance of power in Europe by restraining
Germany.
 Italy, initially allied to the Central Powers, refused to be drawn into
what it viewed as their war of aggression, but in May 1915 joined the
Entente hoping to acquire territory from Austria-Hungary and new colonial
possessions, mainly in Africa.

Central Powers

 Austria-Hungary wanted to suppress Serbian nationalism and to

strengthen the unity of its empire, especially in the Balkans.
 Germany supported Austria-Hungary in its war on Serbia. It also
sought greater influence in Europe, primarily by reducing the strength of
France and Russia, and more colonial possessions.
 The Ottoman Empire (Turkey) wanted greater territorial control over
the Turkic peoples, many of whom lived in Russia, and to secure its
frontiers, mainly against Russia.

References
Norman Angell, Europe’s Optical Illusion (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton,
Kent, 1909)

Epps, Valerie. "Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral
Damage Rule." Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law vol. 41, no.
2, pp. 309-55,