Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1
Principles
• GATT rules applicable to all trade and not only
to bound tariff lines
• Transformation of all QRs to Tariffs
(Tariffication, tariff equivalents in Agriculture)
in Uruguay Round
• Phasing out of QRs in textiles by 2005
• Tariff Quotas and QRs under special exemptions
(esp. Articles XIII, XX GATT)
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2
BoP QRs (Art. XII, XVIII:B)
• India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports
of Agriculture, Textile and Industrial
Products (AB-1999-3). ITR p. 165; 467/8
• Relation of DSU to BOP Committee
(Jurisdiction)
• Interpretation of para. 11 Article XVIII.B
• Impact of IMF Assessment (para. 121 ss)
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Administration of Quotas
• Quotas are operated for tariffs and for QRs
(if exceptionally allowed)
• What are the main problems?
– Scarcity and distributive justice among
suppliers, MFN tensions
– Corruption in licensing
– Rent seeking
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Principles of Administration
– Article XIII of the GATT 1994 regulates the
administration of tariff and QR quotas on a
non-discriminatory basis (para 1, 5) and:
“In applying import restrictions to any product,
contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of
trade in such product approaching as closely as
possible the shares which the various
contracting parties might be expected to obtain
in the absence of such restrictions…” (para.2)
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3
Methods of Allocation
• Traditional patterns of quota allocation
• first-come-first served
• lottery
• sale and/or auctioning
• Does Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures regulate methods of allocation
(cf. Article 3 lit. j, k, l): what are minimal
requirements?
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Types of VER’s
• A VER might be :
– A non government measure (private agreement,
OMA, orderly marketing agreement) and/or,
– A government measure (government-to-
government measure)
• Explicit or tacit arrangements (i.e. Japanese
restraints on automobiles – formally a
unilateral Japanese statement)
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4
Practical Benefits of using VER’s
• Why are VERs attractive?
– Informal arrangements (avoidance of national
implementing processes in order to restrict
trade)
– No determination of injury in the importing
country
– No restriction on a MFN basis (discriminatory)
– It confers more control over import restrictions
to the exporting country (they decide how much
to export below the maximum)
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5
Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT)
• Product and process requirements
(standards) for purposes of standardization
or safety of products
• TBT Agreements obliges to use
international standards where available and
to avoid excessive standards
(proportionality, Art. 2)
• Rules on assessing conformity and
transparency requirements (Art. 5)
•
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6
IPRs and Competition Issues
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7
Legal Ground for EU Customs Action
• Council Regulation No 1383/2003 (EC Regulation on
Custom Action)
– allows border authorities to detain goods in transit for inspection if
they are suspected of infringing an intellectual property rights
(Article 9).
– national law of the country which detained the goods is to apply
when deciding whether IP rights have been infringed (Article 10).
• ECJ decisions on goods in transit:
Polo/Lauren; Rioglass; Rolex; Commission vs France; Montex; Class
International
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TRIPs Perspective
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8
Anti-trust and Competition
• WTO disciplines may be undermined by private
cartels and abuse of dominant positions
• Lack of disciplines in WTO law except for
Telecom (Reference paper) and state supported
VERs
• Left to domestic jurisdiction (Art. 41 TRIPs)
• Need for multilateral disciplines in WTO or mere
coordination (Competition Network)?
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