1. Crisostomo vs. Atty. Philip Nazareno, A.C. No.

6677, June 10, 2014

FACTS:
Complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) because of several inadequacies and construction defects in
the housing units they bought from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex).
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex. Sometime in August 2003, Rudex
filed (3) three petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications
against forum shopping, Rudex, through its legal counsel, Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not
commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues
pending before any court, tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under
the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on against the Sps.
Sioting, before the MTC Cavite.

Atty. Nazareno filed (1) one more complaint on January 29, 2004 and (6) six more on April 1,
2004. All of which were for the rescission of contracts to sell against Sps. Sitiong and the other
complainants. All certifications against forum shopping in the complaints declared that it has not
commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the same issues pending
before any court, tribunal or agency.18 The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno
himself.

Complainants jointly filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno
claiming that the latter made false declarations in the certification that no similar actions or
proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court,
tribunal or agency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended
for a period of one (1) month

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the
submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct
contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions.

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as
follows:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 xxxx

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held
administratively liable.

Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions for
review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment case it
filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission cases.
Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for
rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as
well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on
April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the
other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping
the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.

Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even
bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to
be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.

2. Alpajora vs. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018

FACTS: An intra-corporate case was filed before the RTC presided by Judge Adolfo Encomienda,
but was later on re-raffled to Judge Virgilio Alpajora (Judge Alpajora).

Atty. Ronaldo Calayan (Atty. Calayan) was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
Calayan Educational Foundation, Inc. (CEFI). He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel
pro se" for himself. Thereafter, Judge Alpajora issued an Omnibus Order for the creation of a
management committee and the appointment of its members.

That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the Judge Alpajora – order was
not acceptable to Atty. Calayan because he knew in effect, he, together with his wife and
daughter, would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary, respectively, and
as members of the Board of Trustees of the CEFI.
Judge Alpajora asserted that respondent committed the following:

(1) serious and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself;
(2) violated his oath as lawyer for: [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts
(Section 20 (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining
actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the judge by
false statements (Section 20 (d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of procedures
governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same to defeat the ends of justice;
and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same
cause of action.

Atty. Calayan, on the other hand, maintained that complainant committed the following:
(1) grossly unethical and immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;
(2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the CPR;
(3) malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial, in violation of the Interim
Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the case; and
(4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts. The Investigating Commissioner
concluded that Atty. Calayan violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rules 8.01,
10.01 to 10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR.

Investigating Commissioner finally noted that as a party directly involved in the subject
intracorporate controversy, it is duly noted that Respondent was emotionally affected by the
ongoing case. His direct interest in the proceedings apparently clouded his judgment, on
account of which he failed to act with circumspect in his choice of words and legal remedies.
Such facts and circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Calayan violated the aforementioned Canons of the CPR.

HELD: YES

When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the
rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice,
appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand,
suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.

In this case, Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of a worthy lawyer. Atty. Calayan
respondent did not deny filing several cases against opposing parties and their counsels. He
explained that the placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a
management committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by
virtue of the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions. It was in his
desperation and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of
the courts. The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost
zeal. However, professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications.

The filing of cases by Atty. Calayan against the adverse parties and their counsels manifests his
malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's
interest. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Atty. Calayan has consistently
attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his pleadings. He also accused
the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the adverse
counsels; and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse counsels. However, these bare
allegations are unsupported by any piece of evidence.

Thus, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to complainant in
violation of Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.

It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the
courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation. Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent
argues that he should have been cited in contempt.

He found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan, to wit: The alleged offensive and contemptuous
language contained in the letter complaint was not directed to the respondent court. As
observed by the Court Administrator, "what respondent should have done in this particular case
is that he should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the complaint
and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which
obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a court's honor.

A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his impartiality
even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt is
inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due
administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers
for correction and preservation not for retaliation or vindication. As correctly pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely cautions a judge against citing a
party in contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of respondent. He
misrepresented the text of a decision, in violation of the CPR. Ironically, Atty. Calayan's
indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and even administrative
 cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs
counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It
degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.

3. In Re Atty Vicente Raul Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970

Facts:

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the
required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself,
who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals.

Almacen then filed before the SC a petition to surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title as he
asserts "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity."

His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that
"the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated."

Nonetheless the SC decided to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word
came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-
27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September
28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his
 offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act." Almacen then asked that he may
be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is
“the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

Held:
Yes.

The Supreme Court ruled that Almacen’s satements were uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions
of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But, it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct
by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same
should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it
is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law,
there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best
shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or
how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he
may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known
that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place
of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

4. In Re Letter of the UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

FACTS:
 Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the
"Malaya Lolas"// Atty Harry Roque and Atty Bagares), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision. Subsequently, they filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No.
162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. They assert that it was improper for the courts to
plagarize 3 sources. An article published from YALE Journal, a book published by Cambridge
University and made it appear that said materials formed part of the judgment of the court.
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."

37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a
statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its
dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of
allegations of plagiarism in his work.

HELD
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
 or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis,
Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark
R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35
respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his
duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school
he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

5. Avida Land vs. Argosino, A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016
FACTS:

Avida Land Corporation (AVIDA) entered into a Contract to Sell (CTS) with Rodman Construction
& Development Corporation (RODMAN) which was to acquire a subdivision house and lot located in
Santo Rosa, Laguna through bank financing.
 In the event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay contract price
of P4,412,254.00 less the downpayment of 1,323,676.20 within 15 days from its receipt of the loan
disapproval.
 After downpayment, Rodman took possession of the subject property.
 In 3 separate letters, Avida demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of P3, 088,577.80.
 Both parties agreed that the amount be payed on deferred basis within 18 months.
 On March 1999, Rodman made a partial payment of P404,782.56.
 Consequently, Avida rescinded the CTS by notarial act and demanded Rodman to vacate the
property.
 However, Rodman remained in possession of the property which prompted Avida to file an unlawful
detainer case against Rodman before the MTC of Makati.
 Subsequently, Rodman filed a complaint before House and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
seeking the nullification of the rescission of the CTS. Also, they prayed for the accounting of
payments and the fixing of the period upon which the balance of purchase price should be paid.
 MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 HLURB, through Atty. Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman’s complaint and ordered it to pay
damages and attorney’s fees.
 HLURB Board modified the arbiter’s ruling which ordered Rodman to immediately pay its
outstanding balance which Avida shall have the right to rescind the CTS subject to a refund all the
sums paid less deduction as stipulated in the contract.
 Avida filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the HLURB Board’s decision wherein they questions the
order to refund the sums paid.
 Neither parties appealed therefor the judgment became final and executory.
 On January 17, 2007, HLURB Board issued an Order denying Rodman’s Motion for Reconsideration.
 It held that the computation of interest and penalties shall be dealt with in the executing
proceedings before the Regional Office.
 Instead of complying with the order, Atty Argosino filed a Motion:
o To Quash the Writ of Execution
o For Clarification
o To Set the Case for Conference
 The said motion created new issues and claims in the order.
 Also, Atty. Argosino filed a petition to cite Avida in contempt for issuing a demand letter to Rodman
despite the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
 Atty. Argosino then moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for setting of
a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant Contempt.
 On February 21, 2007, Steven Dy, vice president for project development, filed a complaint against
Atty. Argosino for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.:
o Rule 1.03- a laywer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
o Canon 10- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
o Rule 10.03- a layer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
die ends of justice.
 o Canon 12- a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
o Rule 12.04- a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
 However, Atty. Argosino claimed that what caused the delays in the HLURB case were the legal
blunders of Avida’s counsel:
o It took them a period of 6 months to file a Motion for Writ of Execution of the HLURB
Board’s decision.
o The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB board, which as an appellate
body had not jurisdiction.
o Also, Atty. Argosino raised the issue that Avida’s counsel acts of notarial rescission and filling
before th trial court which contributed to the delay of the case.
 Also, he argued that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his client with
utmost dedication, diligence and good faith.
 The court referred the case to the IBP for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Argosino is guilty of gross professional misconduct?

HELD/ RATIO: Yes.

 Despite the simple issue before the HLURB, Atty. Argosino deliberately attempted to delay the
actual execution of the judgment therein.
 He continued to file pleadings over issues already passed upon and made unfounded accusation of
bias or procedural defects.
 These acts are considered a disregard to authority of a tribunal and abuse of court processes and
detrimental of the administration of justice.
 As a lawyer, Atty. Argosino indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve
with competence and diligence.
 However, professional rules impose limits on the lawyer’s zeal with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.
 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
 The code also obliges the lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
 He made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and caused unjust delays in the
administration of justice.
 These acts violated:
o Rule 10.3- a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice
o Rule 12.04- a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or
misuse court processes.
o Lawyer’s Oath by disobeying his sworn duty to “delay no man for money or malice”
 IBP guidelines similarly provide that “suspension is appropriate when lawyer knows that he is
violating a court order or rule and there is injury or potential injury to a client or party with legal
proceedings.

SC DECISION:
SC held that Atty. Argosino is found guilty of violating Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath for which he is suspended from the practice
of law for 1 year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is sternly warned that a
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.