1|Page

Xintao Lu

Plan B Draft

The Applications and Functions of Confucianism in Contemporary

China

Motives, Applications, Concerns, and the Future

Introduction

Confucianism’s rapid restoration to cultural relevance stands in stark contrast to its near
extinction during the Cultural Revolution. Nowadays, Confucianism is hailed as the sine qua non
of Chinese identity, and its founder, Confucius, is widely celebrated both as the architect of
Chinese traditional culture and for his capacity as a great thinker, teacher, statesman,
philosopher, and historian (Reconstructing the Confucian Ideal, 86).

This reemergence of Confucianism has occurred in conjunction with the unraveling of

certain aspects of Chinese identity, both cultural and political. The cause of this deterioration can
be traced back to the cataclysmic events of the late 1970s, when China voluntarily opened its
markets to the rest of the world after centuries of isolationist policies. While the reforms greatly
bolstered China’s economic situation, many scholars agree that this exacerbated the pre-existing
social insecurities that the Party still struggles with today: namely, the fragility of the nation’s
cultural identity, and by extension, the Party’s regime legitimacy.

This spurred a multidimensional effort to progressively elevate Confucianism back to

cultural prominence, resulting in a decades-long popularization process that ultimately saw
Confucianism’s contemporary enshrinement as the cultural backbone of an emerging Chinese
cultural nationalism. The most recent phases in this process include the “Harmonious Society”
project first brought into existence by President Hu Jintao, a project which has since been fully
endorsed by the Party under the rule of President Xi Jinping. Both men have praised
Confucianism as a keystone of the Party’s harmonious development policies, a point that has
been reflected in both rhetoric and policies alike.
2|Page

This begs the question: Is the CCP’s endorsement of Confucianism merely an ideological
sop aimed at bolstering regime legitimacy, or does it have real potential to engender social
change? Based on my readings and analysis, I have come to the conclusion that the movement
began as an ideological indoctrination campaign aimed at filling the ideological void left behind
by the degradation of Marxist-Leninist and Socialist ideology. This approach had both intrinsic
and extrinsic flaws that ultimately prevented its success. The CCP’s more recent iteration of
Confucian revival has focused more on using Confucianism to solve problems of social stability,
such as social decadence and corruption, and to create meaningful connections between the
present and the past of the Chinese nation. By doing so, the Confucian revival implicitly
strengthens the CCP regime’s resilience by creating social cohesion.

But bolstering regime legitimacy is not the only purpose or outcome of the Confucian
revival. More than just an ideology, Confucianism has become an ideational resource, meaning
contemporary Confucianism has value not only as a reinvented tradition for political
indoctrination, but can also act as a potent resource for those seeking social change. This is
possible largely due to the malleability of Confucianism, and its ability to serve as a political
instrument while retaining the capacity to foster a newly emerging sense of its own centrality to
China’s cultural and national identity. Cooperation between state and civic spheres in the
promotion of Confucianism has contributed to the shared objective of achieving a harmonious
society.

The English-language literature on this subject is still limited. The existing literature
primarily focuses on discussions of intellectual genealogy and philosophical arguments. Such are
the works of Rosker and Bell, with the former focusing more on the interpretation of
contemporary Chinese social ideologies, such as the concept of “harmonious society,” in a
Confucian context, and the latter focusing more on an exploration of Confucianism’s
applicability in contemporary China as an ideational resource for its political identity. Bell most
famously suggested, in his 2008 book, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in
a Changing Society, that “It is not entirely fanciful to surmise that the CCP will be relabeled the
Chinese Confucian Party in the next couple of decades”. There are also the works of Makeham,
whose research explores the validity of “New Confucianism” as a distinctly new intellectual
3|Page

movement. But he ultimately concludes that contemporary Confucianism remains a scholastic

exercise rather than a potent social and political force.

My contribution to the study of contemporary Confucianism is to provide the evidence to

suggest that Confucianism is in fact capable of developing into a popular and successful social
force in contemporary China. In fact, the CCP has encouraged this development, and there are
ample signs that the Chinese populace supports it. As mentioned previously, existing Western
literature tends to either focus exclusively on the theoretical, or to misrepresent the contemporary
Confucian movement as an inauthentic authoritarian mechanism for creating consensus and
obedience. While I don’t disagree that Confucianism does play that function in Chinese society
today, I also believe that it can also be a powerful ideational resource for the Chinese people as
they continue to seek ways to maintain a unique cultural and national identity in the rapidly
changing contemporary world—one that is increasingly challenging, if not hostile, to China.

The research methodologies I use for this study are a mixture of literature review and
comparative analysis. By examining and comparing a variety of official statements, programs,
and policies with outside developments such as appearances of Confucian ideals in mass media, I
hope to answer one fundamental question: what is the nature of the Confucian revival in
contemporary China? Is it simply a mechanism for authoritarian control, or can it be a window
through which we can improve our understanding of the intersections of politics, ideology,
society, and culture in contemporary China?

Defining Modern Confucianism

Modern Confucianism can be defined as a school of thought that acts as a set of

guidelines for the improvement and cultivation of human personality and interpersonal relations,
which then in turn enhances both state and societal function from both an ideological and
practical standpoint. Areas of Modern Confucianism concerning the daily lives of individuals
generally display egalitarian and democratic characteristics, the principles of which stem from
the “four sprouts” found in Mencius’ teachings. A foundational Confucian scholar often hailed as
the Sage second only to Confucius himself, Mencius argued that “virtuous actions are well
within human capacity, in order to encourage everyone…to act virtuously” (Tan, 488). It is a
4|Page

concept of human nature not too dissimilar from the Western philosophical theory of the Tabula
rasa, or “clean slate,” a theory that influential Enlightenment thinker John Locke revolutionized
in the late 17th century to conceptualize of the human mind’s initial state as a piece of “white
paper, void of all character” (Locke, 1689). This emphasis on human dignity, equality and
respect originated from Mencius’ teachings on Humanness (ren), one of the four sprouts, which
is a general embodiment of values such as benevolence, virtue, humanity, or in more specific
terms, “love of one’s fellow man” (Analects, 12:22) according to ancient Confucian Analects. In
the contemporary context, these principles of Humanness serve as a guide for individuals to act
in counter-balance to “the mechanistic laws of the free and otherwise ethnically unbounded
liberal market economy” (Rosker, 11).

Another concept that often works in tandem with the abovementioned four sprouts is the
notion of the Mean (zhong), or balance. The mean could be defined as a psychological state of
balance without inclinations to either side—the “sides,” in the contemporary context, could be a
references to a variety of temptations or forces that may divide an individual’s focus when
balancing the relationship between his/her work, family, and social/private life (i.e., balancing
his filial duties and responsibilities as a company man, in addition to his marriage and other
personal desires). Adhering to the principle of the Mean (zhong) enables the individual to
experience a state harmonious balance that keeps the mind in continuous concentration, allowing
the individual to always be able to act in accordance with his or her individual
position/capabilities within the natural world (Rosker, 203). In other words, the individual is
capable of striking a balance between individual desires and ambitions, and between duties to
their family, community, and state. This also applies in a broader sense to the overall governing
strategy of the Party, which aims to create a society in which individuals are not mere tools of
the state and society they live in, but at the same time do not simply use state and society to
further their own selfish interests.

Causes
For us to better understand the CCP’s objectives in initiating this ongoing Confucian
revival, we should first briefly revisit the events that elicited such a complete 180-degree shift in
the official attitude towards Confucianism. This will provide with a basic understanding of the
circumstances under which Confucian values were brought back to contemporary relevance.
5|Page

The questions I aim to answer in the following sections are as follows: how is
contemporary Confucianism being presented by the CCP? How has this presentation changed
over the years?

Changing Social Reality

The early years of the Deng era was a time of rapid transformations necessitated by a
variety of uncertainties stemming from the modernization process. Previous traditions rendered
obsolete by rapid modernization were abandoned as China moved quickly to adopt the model of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” under Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. As the hold
of Marxism-Leninism loosened, it became unquestionably clear to both the CCP’s leadership as
well as the Chinese people that the country could no longer be supported, ideologically, with
slogans of class struggle and revolution. The rapid changes brought about various social,
political, and cultural issues that were overlooked or purposefully ignored in favor of economic
development. These include the degradation of social morality and responsibility, and an aging
and derivative political identity that no longer fit China’s contemporary realities. These issues
eventually became too bothersome to ignore, and due to various factors, that will be discussed
later, Confucianism was revived in order to address and potentially resolve these problems.

Domestic cohesion was a difficult mission to accomplish following the massive influx of
information that came as the result of China’s reform and opening in the 1980s, regardless of the
Tiananmen Square Crackdown. People from all walks of life expressed the concern that China
had lost its moral grounding, a conclusion not difficult to arrive at given the high levels of
corruption at that time. With the economic boom came an onslaught of market-oriented values
that the socialist society was ill-prepared for. Corruption and profiteering, as well as a
skyrocketing inflation rate, were but a few of the most visible issues that prompted the Chinese
public to scrutinize the country’s economic strategies. Additionally, those who fell victim to the
economic hardships of this period demanded accountability from the officials they viewed as
corrupt and privileged. These criticisms drew widespread public support, as many during this
time, mostly students and young adults, felt the impact of the growing income gap and the lack
of job opportunities due a combination of rising education rates and market saturation. Such
immense pressure ultimately devolved the protests into what is widely known today as the
Tiananmen Square Crackdown.
6|Page

However, it would be remiss to attribute the cause of the protests to economic factors
alone. In fact, there were a multitude of social, political, and cultural factors at play during this
turbulent period. Issues such as social decadence, coupled with the deterioration of Marxist-
Leninist ideology and increased demand for freedom and democracy, raised serious questions
about China’s cultural and political identity. Deng’s slogan of “capitalism with socialist
characteristics” appeared to be no longer sustainable during an era of rapid marketization.

Over time, however, the Chinese populace, particularly the youth gradually came to
accept the terms and conditions of a market economy. By the late 1990s, they began to regard
issues such as income inequality and inflation as acceptable byproducts of a market economy.
Researchers (Social Change, 19) have attributed this change in attitude to the fact that people in
had greater access to financial resources and freedom; as people become, in relative terms,
richer, they gain greater access to goods which will in turn satisfy their more immediate needs
and wants, giving them less incentive to resort to dissent.

Nonetheless, this issues still remained. The growing wealth gap and the increasingly
saturated job market were but a few causes for concern for the Chinese youth. This resulted in
damage to the education system insofar as attendance rate and general interests are concerned.
Fewer and fewer students felt compelled to continue their education, as popular opinion shifted
towards a culture of entrepreneurship. Surveys conducted during the late 1980s showed a clear
and conscious effort on the part of Chinese youth to differentiate between professional
improvement and the socialist morality (Jiazhide Congtu, 1998, p.29). Most prioritized
professional improvement and economic freedoms over socialist morality and political pursuits.
Some explicitly stated that their reason for joining the CCP was to better their career prospects,
rather than for ideological motivations.

Predictably, this change in popular mentality regarding education visibly affected the
attendance rate at schools and universities. In the early 1990s, enrollments in graduate schools
experienced a noticeable decrease (Social Change, 82). Data collected by Zhongguo Jiaoyu Bao
in 1993 showed that only 81.8% of primary school graduates continued on to junior secondary
school; the overall rate of junior secondary enrollment, including those who did not graduate
from primary school, dropped even lower, to just 73%. Moreover, studies done by the Hebei
7|Page

Education Commission during the same time period revealed a total dropout rate of 20 percent
over the three years of junior secondary schooling.

The underlying issue here was China’s manifold contradictions as both Deng and the
Chinese people sought to straddle the fine line between an economically-interdependent,
information-age world and a regime that, at the time, hinged its legitimacy upon ideology and
rigid authoritarian control mechanisms. This led to issues such as rampant corruption. As many
have discovered, to prosper in a period in which China’s legal and economic infrastructure was
severely lacking in comparison with the rest of the capitalist world meant that it was necessary to
take the “moral low-ground,” so to speak.

However, one contradiction that is less talked about, but is no less important and
impactful as another contributor to the Tiananmen Square protests, was that between
“Chineseness” and the Other. Deng’s reforms took place during a phase in which China was still
recovering from the tensions and socio-cultural disorientations caused by the Maoist era. The
campaign to destroy the Four Olds left irreversible marks on the treasured traditions of Chinese
culture. While some traditions were protected and even progressed significantly during this time
period, such as Chinese medicine and Peking opera, others, such as traditional Chinese
architecture, literature, and paintings were less fortunate, with some Red Guards going so far as
to desecrate the remains of past emperors and nobles (Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural
Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication). And it was in this
precarious cultural context that Deng plunged the Chinese populace into a stream of rapid
socioeconomic challenges. Unsurprisingly, this led to some issues concerning China’s cultural
identity, as forces such as capitalism and marketization were perceived as “spiritual pollution”
that threatened to undermine the principles of “Chineseness.”

These issues brought to the forefront a number of concerns for the CCP in regards to
China’s national security, as they threatened not only economic development and social stability,
but most importantly, the resilience and longevity of the CCP regime itself. Amid such scrutiny,
the Party needed something to strengthen, and perhaps reassure both itself and as well as the
naysayers, of its own resilience (Authoritarian Resilience, 2003).

The principles for strengthening Party resilience were threefold. Firstly, issues
concerning China’s social stability needed to be addressed: i.e., corruption, abuses of power, and
8|Page

the decline of social morality. Secondly, the Chinese national identity needed to be strengthened:
i.e. negotiation of Chinese culture vis a vis Western culture and other “conflicting” ideologies,
such as capitalism. And last but not least, the connection between the “updated” Chinese identity
and the CCP needed to be strengthened, thereby consolidating the Party’s legitimacy and
resilience. These principles, taken together, were the primary motives for the revival of
Confucianism insofar as the CCP was concerned.

Reasons to Choose Confucianism

Previously, China operated on a model of state dependency, meaning the state dictated
the social life of its people, and the people relied on the state for their necessities (Social Change,
17). This had the adverse effects of artificially generating a remarkably large social schism
between the rural and the urban population, as well as a general lack of investment in social
development and social amenities due to the overemphasis on accumulation and growth targets
(Social Change, 16). Understandably so as a top-down policy making model would be
susceptible to poor planning and attention to social dynamics. But the system succeeded despite
these flaws because the state was able to provide its citizens with a system of health, education,
and cultural facilities that protected the social, mental, and physical wellbeing of the Chinese
populace1 “from cradle to grave” (Social Change, 16). The state took care and control of its
people while the people gave the state their total loyalty and submission, which in turn
consolidated the CCP’s legitimacy.

I am mentioning this now because Deng’s reforms completely altered people’s perception
of this previous system of dependence. No longer was common poverty an acceptable price to
pay in exchange for the benefits of a socialist state. People demanded better and freer lives as
their aspirations for material wealth rose in conjunction to China’s economic growth. The old
dependency model was relegated to the wayside as people began viewing it as an impediment to
the country’s economic growth and social progress. While the Party was fully aware of the
people’s demands (Social Change, 17), damages to the Party’s legitimacy as well as general
social and political infrastructure by the Cultural Revolution made the addressing these issues
difficult.

1
In particular the urban populace
9|Page

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was then pushed to the brink of extinction by a
wave of liberalization movements. Uncertainties clouded the nation’s political future as its
cultural, ideological, and political identities were called into serious question by not only the
domestic masses but also by those without. If the Party wished to remain in power, decisions
needed to be made and enforced, a reality that the Party was brutally reminded of during the
1989 Tiananmen Square Crackdown. The incident was a culmination of the anger, frustration,
confusion, disappointment, and desperation that had been plaguing the nation and its people
since China welcomed world culture with open arms without first consolidating its own cultural
and political identity.

China’s economic achievements were often blemished, and some might even argue
overshadowed, by the spread of corruption and abuse of power that ran seemingly rampant
during the early decades of the economic reform era. Moreover, an attitude of cynical
materialism also emerged in part as a response to the Tiananmen Square Crackdown where the
general populace was reminded of the sometimes-harsh realities of an authoritarian regime.

All of these factors contributed to the erosion of the CCP’s legitimacy. Socialism as an
ideology was clearly compromised and both the CCP and the Chinese populace needed a new
ideological approach in order to better understand and adapt to the rapidly changing world
around them. While it is anything but explicit, evidence strongly suggests that the Party
ultimately decided on Confucianism as its primary ideational resource in contemporary world
(Makeham, 8).

On the part of the CCP, its primary concern at this point in time was how to deal with
questions surrounding the reality that its “socialism with Chinese characteristics” model was
simply unsustainable. The model was neither socialist nor capitalist, and in combination with
Deng’s “don’t argue” policy, which emphasized economic reforms and sought to avoid
discussion of political ideology, the model lacked connectivity, continuity, and authenticity (Ai
2009: 691). The CCP has relied on the somewhat plausible explanation that the market economy
is only a temporary feature necessitated by the disruptions to the overall system caused by rapid
economic development; but such a justification will inevitably wear out its welcome as China
continues its development. And as one of the world’s leading theorists of ideology, Michael
Freeden, has stated, politics cannot exist without ideology. Given this context, it seemed that the
10 | P a g e

CCP was in need of an ideational resource from which the political system could draw
legitimacy, resiliency, and opportunities (China’s New Confucianism, 3).

In order to maintain domestic cohesion and Party legitimacy amidst pressure from foreign
influence and internal unrest, then, the CCP required the aid of an ideological framework that
was recognizable to the public yet malleable enough to fit a wide range of agendas (Hammond &
Richey 2015: 41). Confucianism fit this bill remarkably well, in a recognizable albeit specialized
form. While all ideologies are malleable to a certain extent, Confucianism has proven time and
again during its centuries-old history of reformulation that it has a particular aptitude in this
regard (The Sage Returns, 41). Under this framework, the Party became the pioneer of a
“harmonious society;” its actions legitimized as necessary steps to safeguard the society’s peace
and order.

Nonetheless, the introduction of Confucianism in a modern context was not simply a

claim for Party legitimacy; to many within the Party, Confucianism is the sine qua non of
Chinese modernity (Makeham, 86-87). They believe that the assessment and reevaluation, and
ultimately the repurposing, of Confucianism is necessary in order to ensure China’s geostrategic
success on the world stage. Equally important, if not higher priority according to some, is
Confucianism’s role in helping China retain its cultural and political identity at home.

The need to regulate anti-regime rhetoric also contributed to the decision to bring
Confucianism to the forefront of the Party’s ongoing struggle to maintain legitimacy. The
concept of a harmonious socialist society introduced a new set of objectives and goals that was
grounded in Conficianism and in China’s illustrious past, which not only created continuity but
also helped to foster a sense of pride, admiration, and unity within the Chinese people and for the
Chinese nation as a whole. Furthermore, the Party has explicitly stated that the goal of this
harmonious socialist society is to meet the demands of protecting China’s national security,
development and social stability. More specifically, it is to meet the practical needs of its
citizens, prospered as a nation, and be able to excel and assert itself on the global stage as a
powerful 21st century nation should. Given the uniquely Chinese undertone of a “harmonious
socialist society”, the connotation here then is that a Sinicized modernization process can
produce better results than its western counterparts due to its suitability with Chinese
sensibilities, identity, and traditions.
11 | P a g e

And due to Confucianism’s place as one of the keystones of Chinese culture, it has since
become synonyms with the concepts of harmony and development, which are pivotal parts
necessary for the sinicization of Western systems, and ultimately the preservation, strengthening
and propagation of a Chinese cultural identity. The relevance and popularity of the “harmonious
society” campaign largely rely on its ability to produce results such as higher living standards,
diminished income inequality, lower corruption rates, and improved environmental conditions.
The existence of passionate nationalistic voices calling for greater international recognition and
for China to play a larger role at the global level, has also help solidify the “harmonious socialist
society” as a legitimate development model for the CCP.

In short, for the multifaceted reasons discussed above, over the past 30 yearse the
Chinese Communist Party has come to consider Confucianism a powerful yet malleable cultural
asset that could be deployed to serve the needs of the Chinese nation and its people. Therefore,
Confucianism has been lifted out of the ideological dustbin the Cultural Revolution had left it in.

Confucianism Chosen: Applications and Reasoning

.The delegitimation of Marxist-Leninist ideology after the Cultural Revolution left an

ideological void that enabled the rehabilitation of a set of ideas and ideals more grounded in
Chinese culture, customs, and history, which in turn could serve as the wellspring of an adaptive,
communicable, and imaginative political philosophy. While there are no policies or programs
explicitly geared towards the propagation of an officially sanctioned Confucian national identity
(Makeham, 8), there nevertheless is evidence to suggest that the CCP has made a conscious
effort to initiate a Confucian revival movement. Furthermore, through careful analysis, it is
possible to deduce the motives behind such efforts. In this section, I examine a series of
decisions about, and applications of, Confucian ideology aimed at addressing the problems of
social stability and regime resiliency, with the goal of understanding the evolution of the CCP’s
political philosophy since 1978,

Experimental Stage

While the basic principle behind the Confucian revival has always remained the same
insofar as the CCP is concerned—it has always been promoted for the purpose of consolidating
regime resiliency and social stability—the ways in which it has been presented to the public, i.e.
12 | P a g e

t the depiction of Confucianism itself, the values chosen for promotion, and the approach to
inculcating these values, has not always been so consistent.

In fact, I argue that prior to the 2000s, the revival of Confucianism was very much
limited in scope and outdated in both methodology and relevance. Nevertheless, there was were
clear and observable attempts to return Confucianism to cultural prominence, with the goal of
consolidating the CCP’s resiliency and China’s social stability. And it will be through an
examination of these attempts to reinforce regime resiliency this section will aim to extrapolate a
more comprehensive understanding of the CCP’s motives for initiating the Confucian revival.

First and foremost is Confucianism’s emergence as a legitimate contender for the position
of ideational foundation years before the issues of legitimacy and stability had come to the fore
in Chinese public culture. Deng Xiaoping first began rehabilitating Confucianism as a legitimate
philosophical system crucial to the study of Chinese culture in conjunction with his economic
reforms in the late 1970s, thus beginning the process of building a strong academic foundation
upon which Confucian values could be reevaluated and defined according to the needs of the
CCP. It is unclear whether Deng foresaw the ideology’s usefulness in addressing the problems
China would inevitably confront in the future based on the nation’s political trajectory as early as
the 1970s. Nonetheless, this intellectual revival set the precedent for the CCP to invent, mold,
define, and disseminate selected “Confucian values” as a means to address the issues China
would eventually come to confront in the future.

The first significant event that occurred in the CCP’s investment in Confucian academics
took place in 1985, with the establishment of the Academy of Chinese Confucius Research
Institution (zhonghua kongzi yanjiusuo). Then in 1986, “Confucianism” was identified as a key
component of China’s overall success and an invaluable research topic, and subsequently
received funding as part of the Seventh Five Year Plan. Furthermore, the plan took note not only
of Confucianism’s value as a foundational Chinese tradition, but also of its potentially universal
application, which is a point that would be developed and refined later, as China became more
comfortable with its role as a global influencer and a regional leader. In 1987, Vice Prime
Minister Gu Mu publicly praised Confucianism as the “crystallization of Chinese national
culture,” while some scholars publicly hailed the ideology as “the true lifeblood and spirit
13 | P a g e

imbuing the vitality of Chinese culture” and link that could reconcile “the problems that exist
between tradition, modernization and westernization” (The Sage Returns, 54).

The abovementioned developments were supplemented by a school of Chinese scholars

who specialized in what some have dubbed “Marxist Confucianism” (Ai 2009:694). Marxist
Confucianists essentially served as political propagandists for the CCP. Their work focused
primarily on the study, reevaluation, invention, and definition of Confucianism in a way that
would be compatible with Marxist principles. Their orientation towards the Party is evidenced
firstly by their dedication to reinterpreting Confucianism in Marxist terms, which is something
that seems farfetched now but was certainly a point the Party attempted to emphasize during the
late 20th century (Ai 2009: 694). Secondly, for two consecutive five-year plans (7th and 8th, or
1986-1990 and 1991-1995), the state funded research projects on “New Confucianism” led by
the staunch orthodox Marxist, Fang Keli.

The Party’s foray into trying to establish a Marxist Confucianism was nothing if not
controversial. A number of liberal Confucianists, including Zhu Bokun, Wang Guoxian, Chen
Yajun, and Li Denggui, pointed out that there were clear and significant disconnects between the
ideologies of Confucianism and Marxism, not least because the Confucian emphasis on social
harmony simply was not compatible with the Marxist ideology of class struggle. Despite their
attempts to bring this critique to the forefront of Confucian discourse, the liberal Confucianists
hardly had the political clout to substantiate their open condemnation of a state-backed project
(Ai 2009: 695).

This initial attempt to revitalize Confucianism in Marxist terms was largely unsuccessful.
This was largely because [explain how - people were so thoroughly disillusioned by Marxism
that the attempt to link it to Confucianism backfired?/ the movement failed primarily due to its
dysconnectivity with China’s social reality, in that Marxism ideologies of class struggle simply
was no longer applicable in a market driven economy and society that relied on capitalism. ]
Nonetheless, it is significant for two reasons: first , because it suggests that almost right from the
beginning of the reform period, the CCP realized the need for a new ideational foundation to
supplement Maoism, and was considering Confucianism in that role; and second, it suggests that
under the right circumstances, the CCP has the means to carry out an effective ideological
indoctrination campaign—but only when the ideology in question is one that the majority of the
14 | P a g e

population finds relevant. In the 2st century, the CCP has adapted and reinvented Confucianism
in accordance with these two lessons, the details of which will be discussed in the following
section.

Modern Confucianism, late 1990s and early 2000s

After the lukewarm reception of Marxist Confucianism, the CCP’s subsequent actions
suggest that the leadership became aware of the need to renew and adapt Confucianism to meet
the conditions of the contemporary world. Rather than alienating significant portions of its
population by attempting to popularize a farfetched connection between Confucianism and
another ideology disconnected from China’s contemporary social reality, this time the CCP
aimed to reinvent Confucianism as an ideational resource that was specifically Chinese in social,
political, and moral terms (Modern Confucianism and Chinese Theories of Modernization, 1).

This effort to cast Confucianism in a supporting role in a wider effort to strengthen and
refine China’s traditional culture is first evidenced by the actions of senior party figures such as
Gu Mu and Jiang Zemin, both of whom made appearances at the annual celebration of the birth
of Confucius in 1994 (Ai 2009: 696). In the same period, the CCP released several policy
documents focused on reforms in education, development, and civic morality during the same
time period, such as Outline of Educational Reforms and Developments in the People’s Republic
of China,2 Resolution of the CCP Central Committee Concerning some Major Issues in Building
a Socialist Psycho-Spiritual Civilization,3 and Guidelines for Implementing the Enhancement of
Civic Morality (Makeham, 313). While these documents make no explicit references to
Confucian values or Confucianism, the timing of their release, and their focus on themes such as
education, civic morality, and Chinese tradition, strongly suggest a Confucian influence.

At the same time, the CCP undertook an effort to not simply popularize the philosophical
or ideological teachings of Confucianism, but to integrate Confucian values with Party policy
and programs. This practice first appeared during Hu Jintao’s administration during the mid-
2000s. Alongside his flagship ideology of “Scientific Development” Hu promoted the concepts
of “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui) and the “Moderately Well-Off Society,” (xiaokang
shehui), which both have apparent Confucian undertones, though they are still far removed from
2
People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Education, Department of Policy Regulations, Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xianxing jiaoyu fagui huibian, p. 33, item 28.
3
http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2004-11/29/ content_2273313.html
15 | P a g e

an official endorsement of the Five Classics of the Confucian canon (Ai 2009: 696). They instead
focused on the contemporary function and relevance of Confucian values, by “promoting
(traditional) Chinese culture and building a common spiritual home for the Chinese nation …
(and) keeping its essence and discarding its dross to enable it to adapt to today’s society” (Hu
Jintao, Shiqida baogao).

In 2006, Hu Jintao introduced the Eight Honors and Eight Shames (barong bachi) to
supplement his concept of the “harmonious socialist society.” Similar to Chiang Kai-shek’s li yi
lian chi (propriety, righteousness, distinction, and shame), these values were meant to act as a
society’s “moral yardstick”: you honor your country, family, heritage, and yourself by loving
your country, selflessly serving others, following science, being honest, acting with discipline
and diligence, living simply, and being willing to aid others in their time of need. Conversely,
you are put to shame when you harm the country or its people, act ignorantly, indulge in indolent
behavior, act lawlessly, act wastefully, take advantage of others, and act unethically for financial
gain (The Sage Returns, 55). It is, in essence, a set of guidelines built to incentivize patriotic and
moral behavior, and its effectiveness relies on the cultural clout and consistency of
Confucianism.

However, President Hu’s Eight Honors and Eight Shames is distinct in its explicitly
stated relationship to Communist Party officials: these guidelines aimed to not only discipline the
behavior of average Chinese citizen but also that of Communist Party members. In other words,
it is also a “moral yardstick to measure the work, conduct and attitude of Communist Party
officials” (The Sage Returns, 55). This marked a crucial turning point in the application of
Confucian values in contemporary Chinese history. Under Chiang Kai-shek, Confucianism had
been employed as the ideological centerpiece in a set of top-down paternalistic policies aimed at
influencing, molding and ultimately controlling the behavior of Chinese citizens whose actions
were deemed unbecoming of a modern country. President Hu instead saw in Confucianism an
opportunity to bolster the CCP’s domestic and international legitimacy during a time when
serious questions about the integrity of the Chinese government were being asked, i.e. how many
Party officials are corrupt and power abusing officials? Can CCP continue to provide for the
Chinese people both socially and economically?
16 | P a g e

The problem that required the most immediate response was the rampant corruption in
the Party and state, as it directly correlated to the stability of the populace and therefore to the
legitimacy and the longevity of the CCP regime. The Tiananmen Square Protests clearly
demonstrated this point. This issue was addressed by creating an explicit connection between
government officials and Confucianism. One could argue that given the special mention given to
Communist Party cadres, the Hu Jintao regime actively sought to use Confucianism to regulate
the behavior of CCP members.

This is important because it marked a conscious top-down effort by the Party to govern
the corrupt behavior of (some of) its own members. Meaning, the Party drew an important
distinction between corruption and inaptitude. By enforcing such moral guidelines the Party was
in essence announcing to the public that its members were guided by a set of moral values, that
the Party and its systems were intrinsically good and aimed to serve the country and its people to
the best of their abilities; those who were corrupt were violating the system’s guidelines and
should be considered outliers; and the system was actively seeking out, correcting, and/or
expelling these outliers. This created the image of an effective and legitimate government
actively trying to identifying and fix its problems—rather than a government hopelessly and
helplessly plagued by corruption and abuses of power—and to an extent addressed the issue of
domestic legitimacy insofar as corruption was concerned.

It was also around this same time period that an intellectual movement led by prominent
political Confucianists such as Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang garnered the attention of both
Chinese academia and the CCP itself. The movement aimed to replace the dying Marxist
ideology with Confucianism in both moral and ideological education. Ultimately the goal was to
Confucianize the CCP and various political concepts such as rightful governance and equality.
For instance, Jiang Qing rejected the western concept of liberal democracy, arguing that from a
Confucian point of view, people are naturally unequal; i.e. the rights an individual has access to
should be based on his or her contribution and value to society, as opposed to being naturally
given. Moreover, Jiang also believed that while a society and its people should be bound by the
rule of law, not all individuals should be bound by the same laws or obligations, given their
previously mentioned differences (Jiang Qing on Equality). This Politicized Confucianism
ideology also sought to provide an alternative means to justify the authoritarian rule of the CCP.
17 | P a g e

By utilizing three Confucian principles outlined in the “Commentary of Gongyang” (Gongyang

Zhuan)—the legitimacy of Heaven, i.e. a sense of sacred, transcendent, natural morality; Earth,
i.e. wisdom from history and culture; and Human, i.e. popular will—the political Confucianists
formulated an authentically Chinese way of justifying the authoritarian rule of the CCP regime in
China, called the Way of the Humane Authority (Bell, A Confucian Constitution for China).

However, despite the political Confucianists’ intentions to reinforce Party legitimacy,

their ideas were rejected and even openly criticized by the Education Bureau via public
announcement, stating that the “views are not in line with the ideological route of the Chinese
Communist Party, and with the fundamental guidelines of the party-state. It is not only politically
incorrect but also threatening to the legitimacy of the state.” A possible cause for this rejection
could be due to the political Confucianists’ condemnation of Marxist ideologies. While they are
not incorrect in their observations that Marxism was a dying ideology in even in the early 2000s,
it was still during an era where Marxist-Leninist ideology played a large role in the thinking of
elite Chinese bureaucrats. In this period, then, the Party did discontinue the intermixing of
Confucian and Marxist ideologies, but Marxism was still relevant if not the more popular
ideational resource for high ranking bureaucrats (Ai 2009: 700).

But this rejection did not mark the end of the Confucian revival in China. While the CCP
does not support attempts to eliminate Marxist ideology4 from political discourse, support for an
independent Confucian revival remains strong. In fact, senior party figures regularly make public
appearances at the annual celebration of Confucius’s birth in Qufu. For instance, Jiang Zemin
attended the 2,545th anniversary of Confucius’s birth in 1994, where the following statement was
made during the opening ceremony:

Today in coming together to commemorate Confucius and to study and discuss his thought and
the Confucianism he established, we must critically inherit, pass on, and promote this valuable
cultural legacy. We must select its essence so that under the new historical conditions and
according to the needs of the new times, we get rid of the old and bring forth the new, enabling
Confucianism to make a positive contribution to the construction of socialism with Chinese
characteristics. (Makeham, 65)

4
Perhaps it’s more appropriate to call it rhetoric at this point
18 | P a g e

And in more recent news, Xi Jinping paid homage to Confucius weeks following his
election as the President of China in 2013, by visiting Confucius’s family mansion in Qufu, and
later by attending the grand international symposium on the celebration of the 2565 th anniversary
of the Confucius’s birth in Beijing (Confucianism: The Question of Its Religiousness, 82).

These actions are indicative of the CCP’s vested interest in a Confucian revival, one that
is fitted to the needs of the contemporary world. But its rejection of a politicized Confucian
ideology also demonstrates the Party’s caution with a political ideology that so clearly
challenged the orthodoxy, i.e. Marxism, or more importantly, the Party’s alignment to the
ideology. In other words, at this point in time, the CCP was eager to explore how Confucianism
could be used to maintain domestic cohesion and reinvent a Chinese identity that better fit the
demands of the contemporary world. While the Party proved itself willing to explore the
possibilities inherent in the richness of Chinese history and even in ideologies that it had deemed
outdated and hopelessly traditionalist only a few decades ago, it remained uncompromising when
dealing with anything, even it is ideologies that may ultimately prove beneficial to the CCP, so
long as it threatened the legitimacy and resiliency of the regime, it was to be eliminated.

Public Ceremonies

Highlighting this reemergence of a depoliticized Confucianism are the World Confucian

Conferences. These conferences usually take place just before the Confucius festival in the
birthplace of Confucius himself, Qufu, Shandong Province. The events are jointly organized by
the Chinese Ministry of Culture, the Chinese National Academy of Arts, the Shandong
Provincial Government, Shandong University, the Jinan municipal government, and the
Confucius Institute. The conference is usually attended by hundreds of domestic and
international experts and scholars whose discussions center around topics such as the modern
adaptation of Confucianism, national cohesion, the preservation of traditional culture, and the
global diffusion of Chinese culture. More recent conferences have discussed issues such as the
relationship between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Confucianism, and the value of
Confucianism to rural development.
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/shandong/shandongculture/ConfucianConference.html). But
the World Confucian Conferne is only one act in a larger even known as the Confucius Cultural
19 | P a g e

Festival. With the closing of the World Confucian Conference each year comes the start of
celebrations. A large part of the Festival’s public appeal originates not from the assortment of
ceremonies, celebrations, programs, and festive activities that surround the conferences. The
ceremonies are often grandiose in size and form; the largest of them involve over one thousand
participants at once. These ceremonies are predominately oriented towards the practice of
ancestor worship, which often involves events such as ritual dancing, the reading of Confucian
classics, and ritual offerings. These lavish ceremonies can also be themed around the veneration
of Chinese culture, such as the “Lighting the Holy Fire of Chinese Culture” ceremony. The
attendees of these ceremonies range from elementary students to working adults, with
appearances by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers donning civilian uniforms, who
participate in the ceremonies often as presenters of offerings (Lijiao, 90).

The festivities are usually capped off by a grandiose celebratory stage performance. The
performance itself is representative of the miraculous union between tradition and contemporary
showmanship; the organizers typically choose some variation of “Chineseness” to be the central
theme around which the performance will be carried out. Ideas of unity, inclusion, cohesion, and
harmony are frequently chosen for their inspiring connotations. Various scenography
mechanisms symbolic of China’s historic excellence and contemporary eminence are
prominently featured throughout the festival, such as dragons, the Great Wall, and historic
characters such as Mencius. These symbols usually accompany some sort of contemporary
performance that the audience, which includes common citizens as well as government officials,
can relate to. For instance, in 2007, the act consisted of floating lamps labeled with the names of
famous Confucian sages and a live rock performance by South Korean singer Mina (Lijiao, 89).

The Confucian Festival exemplifies the CCP’s dedication to the popularization of a

depoliticized Confucianism. It builds upon previously mentioned academic agendas and political
programs, such as the Harmonious Society, by integrating the prominent themes, such as
harmony, cultural uniqueness, and historic prominence, into easily consumed staged
performances that combine popular entertainment with ideological indoctrination.

In this section I overviewed the various applications and manifestations of Confucianism

in both Party policies and programs, its development in academic discourse, as well as public
rituals, i.e. festivals and ceremonies. By identifying the causes for the abovementioned
20 | P a g e

applications and manifestation I was able to speculate about the cultural and political benefits of
a Confucian revival. Its millennia-long history in China imbues Confucianism a degree of
continuity and reliability that the CCP needed to strengthen its own resilience as well as China’s
social stability. However, history alone was not enough for Confucianism to succeed as an
ideological pillar for the Chinese people. The CCP needed to utilize Confucianism’s malleable
nature shed the specter of decay and prove the ideology’s compatibility with modern realities. By
emphasizing certain elements of tradition, such as harmony and stability, while relinquishing its
anti-commercialism and relatively low regard for technology, the Party successfully cast
Confucianism as a catalyst in helping to mend the rift between Chinese tradition and capitalism,
and ultimately harmonize the relationship between China’s national identity, the CCP’s political
identity, and the country’s social realities. This ideological indoctrination was then supplemented
by depoliticized celebrations and festivals that the populace could easily participate in. Lastly,
despite the presence of a strong anti-commercial streak, Confucianism never became the basis
for any organized resistance to economic modernization throughout Chinese history. Its
prevailing advocacy of respect for education and concern for future generations further cemented
Confucianism’s role as the cornerstone of China’s contemporary identity in an era of cultural and
political uncertainty.

Outside Developments

This previous section examined the course of the Confucian revival as it took place under
the guidance/observation of Party leadership. But Confucianism has also become a useful
ideational resource in realms outside of explicit or implicit Party control. As we have seen above,
Confucianism first began its readmission back into Chinese academia as a legitimate
philosophical system crucial to the study of traditional Chinese culture in the years following
Deng’s ascension to CCP leadership in 1979 (Adler, 9). But it was not until the intense
ideological cultural crisis that took place during the 1980s, or what was effectively a national
identity struggle, that Confucianism finally became a stable in China’s new social reality. In the
decades since the Party has begun experimenting with Confucian revivalism, modern
Confucianism has also taken root among the country’s growing middle class.
21 | P a g e

For instance, Modern Confucianism has gained popularity through vast networks of
interest spanning Confucian academia, China’s business sectors, and the state’s central
authorities (Lior, 9). This has been achieved primarily through the establishment of a network of
Confucian education institutions. These institutions found success by appealing to audiences
among China’s growing and energetic middle-class, rather than among wealthy elites as they had
done in the past. This means that even without explicit support from the central government or
wealthy elites, Modern Confucianism is capable of the nationwide propagation of traditionalistic
values, which the revivalists hope would serve to contain corrupt behaviors, and in due time help
eliminate the perception of a degraded social morality.

One way of gaining an audience is for Confucian institutions to maintain their civic and
private (ie non-state) identity. In the past, Confucian institutions typically would enjoy the
patronage of China’s wealthy elites and official government institutions (Bol, 2008, p.256). But
given widespread disgust with the corruption among business elites and government officials, an
overly elitist or conformist approach in the contemporary setting is unlikely to produce similarly
positive results. Thus, Modern Confucianism has aligned itself with nonconformist culture in
their attempt to integrate tradition and reform. In so doing, it has managed to generate significant
traction among China’s middle-classes by distancing itself from the culture of materialism and
political misconduct. At the same time, Modern Confucianism’s explicit support for the
rejuvenation of social morality and the building of a harmonious society has been able to steer
the advocates away from direct confrontations with the central government despite their
prevalent usage of nonconformist rhetoric, which is vital to the longevity of Modern
Confucianism.

While there are modern Confucian institutes that develop their curriculum around more
elitist ideologies (and clientele), it is far more common for such institutes to be oriented towards
“commoners”, and to provide courses that are less intellectualized in both appearance and
substance. These “Commoner Institutes” offer China’s expanding middle class a spiritual refuge
that often could not be found elsewhere. In an era defined by policies of mass urbanization,
economic and political reform, and social reconfiguration, individual identities can seem fragile
and unmoored. Among those who are the most affected are China’s emerging middle classes.
22 | P a g e

Alongside their newfound financial freedom and stability has come, for many people, a sense of
emptiness that could not be satisfied by monetary assets alone. The search for a more meaningful
way of life has resulted in a nationwide surge in religious participation and self-discovery among
the Chinese middle class.5 Their interests have ranged from Buddhism (including Tibetan, Pure
Land, and Chinese), Taoism, Christianity, as well as Confucianism. The Confucian education
institutes’ primary objective is to foster this interest and help individuals hone their ability to
self-cultivate via abstracted forms of traditional Confucianism, which are then substantiated by
invented or actual restored traditions that could be practiced on a daily basis. A Confucianism
repackaged to focus on “the development of the moral integrity and spiritual depth of the
individual” (Lior, 10) has found widespread appeal among the middle class. That Confucianism
has been restored to its spiritual and cultural relevance is, then, no miracle, but a pragmatic
solution to the complex social, economic, political, institutional, and ideological changes
occurring in China today.

There also exist some more ambiguous Confucian practices, or minjian (civil) practices.
These usual take the form of discreet Confucian events or ceremonies organized by civilian
practitioners. They focus solely on the promotion of the ritualistic aspects of Confucianism
through the practice of ritual ceremonies, which is rather standard in comparison to the larger
public ceremonies. But their practices stand in stark contrast to the extravagant performances and
lavish ceremonies that are held at official Confucian Festivals, primarily due to the difference in
both audience and participants (Billioud & Thoraval 2009: 87). To this end, there is always a
concerted effort by organizer of these events to arrange for the rituals to take place in Confucian
or Mencius temples whenever available. The associations typically consist of common citizens,
ranging from store clerks and craftsmen, to schoolteachers and college students. During these
unofficial events, it is vital for the participants to be dressed in the proper traditional garb. The
rituals themselves consist of a series of rather simple performances; first is the group march to
the temple itself; once they’ve arrived at the site, a select few of the participants performs the
bulk of the liturgy, while the rest reactively bow, kneel, or kowtow according to the stage of the
ritual. The liturgies typically begin with a series of ritual gestures, i.e. bowing and kowtowing,
proceed into the offering of wine, silk, and other goods, and conclude with another round of
bowing and kowtowing, all while maintaining a solemn atmosphere.
5
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/world/asia/04china.html
23 | P a g e

The pretense of these minjian Confucian ritual reenactments is that the revitalization of
Confucian values and moral principles depends upon the renaissance of Confucian rites. The
same sentiment could be seen during the founding ceremony of the “Holy City Society for the
Promotion of the Ritual Culture and Music” (shengcheng liyue wenhua cujinhui) in 2007. Taking
place after the Official Confucian Festivals, the event’s participants constituted a similar
demographic as the other unofficial events, but held a much different tone and context than the
latter.

After the obligatory ritual gestures, the meeting quickly settled into a reading of missions
and objectives, which consisted of the following: handing down the rites of Confucius and
Mencius; providing assistance to local schools, free lessons on the classics, calligraphy, and
moral education; organizing activities related to classical culture for children and events
promoting the Confucian six arts; disseminating information on classical culture and
Confucianism; encouraging the movement of rediscovery of classical dress, i.e. Hanfu; and
reviving traditional festivals (Lijiao, 93). The society’s methods mainly rely on civil society, i.e.
utilizing the societal position of its members to disseminate its vision of Confucianism, and due
its wide array of membership, the Holy City Society has the potential to influence culture,
tourism, education, the arts, and more.

Besides its apparent objective based discourse, the Holy City Society is also notable in its
expressed support for President Hu Jintao’s promotion of a harmonious socialist society. This is
interesting because firstly, it is entirely possible, if not likely, that this explicit statement is a
reflection of the leadership’s concerns about the Society’s political survival. The statement itself
suggests an important connection between Chinese Confucian “civil societies” and the Party, in
that there is a degree of mandatory conformity “civil societies” have to oblige by regardless of
their true alignment. Secondly, there still exist opportunities for these societies to express, and
perhaps even achieve their desires so long as they do not run direct opposition to Party
directives. For the Holy City Society, this meant the promotion of classical dress or Hanfu. This
combination of government control and unofficial development should theoretically promote
Confucianism’s popularity among the Chinese people. And because of the necessity of toeing the
Party line, these societies will continue to remain under the implicit control of the Party, despite
24 | P a g e

some observers’ suspicions that contemporary Confucianism is no more than the product of rigid
bureaucratic procedures aimed at manufacturing consensus (Lijiao, 94).

Media Attention

There also exists another dimension to the development of a broader discourse of

Confucian revival, one that the CCP has arguably the least control over despite its best efforts.
The dramatic increase in media outlets during the late 1980s resulted in extraordinary levels of
media freedom by Chinese standards, which the evidence suggests was fostered by a
combination of official policy and the impracticality of mass-scale micromanagement. Increased
media openness created a platform upon which ordinary citizens as well as popular figures could
voice their socioeconomic insecurities in seemingly apolitical ways, which can be particularly
attractive during times of political turmoil. This is not to paint a false picture of rampant
transgressive media behavior, which the state will relentlessly crackdown on, but to simply
suggest another reason for the modern Confucian revival. Individual media outlets often self-
consciously orient their content towards popular and consumer culture and actively seek to avoid
political topics. In fact, they have been criticized for fostering an apolitical populace, in
particular the middle class, which, according to critiques of contemporary Chinese mass media,
has developed a greater appetite for popular and consumer culture than for political topics
(Seeking Channels for Engagement, 52-53).

There are two reasons behind this tendency: first, sometimes there is simply more
revenue to be made by erring on the side of pop/consumer culture. And second, as a result of the
media coverage that ran afoul of state interests in the aftermath of the devastating 2008
Wenchuan Earthquake, which put the structural integrity of school facilities under heavy
scrutiny, the Party and its censorship agencies have elevated the degree of attentiveness to the
regulation of politically sensitive material released by the media.

Nonetheless, voices of dissent still exist within media networks. Among the issues
featured by these media outlets, the most popular topics typically center around a general sense
of displeasure with China’s current social reality, including anxiety about the future, perceived
selfishness of the people, corruption of the upper classes, national pride, and lastly, the desire for
international recognition and for China to play a larger role globally (The Sage Returns, 73).
Furthermore, there also exists a strong desire for self-actualization and improvement. The
25 | P a g e

popularity of such sentiments was highlighted by China’s pioneer rock star, Cui Jian, whose
music took the Chinese nation by storm in the late 1980s and early 1990s, prominently featuring
the aforementioned themes of personal realization, cultural pride, and social anxiety.

These factors, combined with the population’s growing cynicism towards the
incongruousness of outdated socialist rhetoric, paved the way for the reemergence of
Confucianism in popular and consumer media. The expansive definitions and values of
Confucianism allowed for a malleability that is rarely comparable. Confucian values’ favorable
applicability was further supplemented by its ease of access, i.e. how the text could be easily
understood by the masses. It was no surprise then that this combination of accessibility and wide
applicability garnered Confucianism a considerable following within China’s expanding middle
class population.

In addition to being the portion of society most likely to be troubled by the

abovementioned social anxieties, the middle class also has the most access to popular culture and
media.

Fortunately for Modern Confucianism, its values strongly resonated with China’s middle-
class population, as evidenced by the success of Yu Dan and her works on Modern
Confucianism. Yu Dan was, and still is a “celebrity” professor at Beijing Normal University
(Beijing Shifan Daxue). She published her book, Reflections on the Analects (Lunyu xinde) in
2006, which sold over three million copies within the first four months of its publication. Part of
her success could be attributed to her conscious effort in keeping to politically conservative
interpretations of the original text (China’s New Confucianism, Daniel Bell, 163-174). But
another reason for her popularity among the Chinese middle class is the way she was able to “de-
intellectualize” the original Analects and make the lessons more appealing to an evidently more
materialistic populous.

In keeping with this fact, the book itself was categorized under the so-called “Chicken
Soup for the Soul” genre, which focuses on providing apolitical and narrative-free content that’s
often hailed for its ability to bring the readers a sense of inner tranquility and peace. This is very
much emblematic of the appeal of Modern Confucianism; indeed, it resonates perfectly with one
of the key motives the CCP had for initiating the Confucian revival in the first place: providing
the public with a set of values and guidelines for maintaining social stability. A social
26 | P a g e

environment of harmony and balance created the basis for people to be able to focus on self-
cultivation, and by isolating the self from the chaos of society, individuals are able to better focus
on self-cultivation and subsequently make better sense of an increasingly differentiated and
unstable society. (Social Change, 11)

Needless to say, despite these various forms of grassroots appeal that Confucianism has
found in contemporary China, the Party remains the final arbiter of what is acceptable.
Nevertheless, the broad social appeal of Confucianism, which stems from the people’s desire for
more meaningful lives and for a more culturally and politically identifiable China, is significant.
It could give the CCP more cause to push the revival forward, and could garner it greater support
nationwide, as much of what the populace wants echoes the sentiments of the CCP leadership.
Yet the malleability of Confucianism also means it could be easily marketized or used for
reactionary and sometimes chauvinistic purposes, such as the Hanfu Movement, which due to its
members’ rather nationalistic interpretations of Confucianism have led some to categorize it as
extremist.6

Conclusion

Confucianism’s malleability is key to its resurgence in contemporary China. Its malleable

nature allowed it to serve not only as an ideational resource for the Party in maintaining social
and ideological cohesion, but also as a potent force for social change and cultural identity for the
Chinese people.

In the contemporary world, Confucianism has been reinvented by the CCP as a tool to
help eliminate “poisonous tumor(s),” e.g. corruption and the abuse of power, and to foster the
reevaluation and reinstitution of Chinese tradition (Zhuoji, 2007). CCP officials have taken
action to revive Confucian values, texts and rituals on the assumption that doing so would
provide China with a sustainable sense of political and social cohesion, which in turn should
ensure regime resiliency and consolidate its legitimacy. However, the Party’s initial attempts at
doing so, in the 1980s and early 1990s, were largely unsuccessful due to ideological conflicts
from both within and without. One of main conflicts stemmed from the challenge Confucianism
posed to the central position of Marxism-Leninism in Party ideology.

6
https://torguqin.wordpress.com/2009/01/27/kingsreturn-essay/
27 | P a g e

Where the CCP found success was by reinventing Confucianism in a form more oriented
towards addressing social and cultural issues in Chinese society. This iteration of Confucianism
focuses more on providing the Chinese with a stronger sense of cultural identity by forging
meaningful connections between the nation’s past and its present. It does so by serving as an
ideational resource for the creative adaptations of Chinese traditional culture into the
contemporary world. Furthermore, other aspects of Confucianism, such as the concept of
harmony, have also garnered renewed popularity from both the Party as well as civil
organizations. A a number of other Confucian concepts can also be observed to be gaining
popularity among the contemporary Chinese populace, such as filial piety and righteous
rebellion, with the latter sometimes coming into conflict with officials at both the local and
national level. However, none have escalated to outright challenges to regime legitimacy.

Presently, the Party has actively avoided officially endorsing Confucianism as a political
ideology, but has maintained its value as an ideational resource for the continued reevaluation of
Chinese traditional culture and social practices. Languages surrounding the revival Confucianism
as an ideational resource insofar as education and the society at large is concerned, are usually
explicit and forthcoming, the Party is much more careful when Confucian ideologies appears to
challenge the orthodox ideologies, e.g. Marxism.

This sentiment is largely echoed by the Chinese populace, despite minor occurrences of
“righteous rebellion” taking place mostly at the local level, which poses little to no threat to
Party legitimacy. On the whole, contemporary Confucianism at the civic level serves as an
ideational resource for the resolution of issues concerning social stability, cohesion, and cultural
and national identity. With the latter often addressed via a connection being made between
Confucian values and “Chineseness”, i.e. culturalism.

Given Confucianism’s grassroots popularity, in particular among the middle-class, it

could be interesting to see how the CCP would interact with some of the more outspoken groups
and sects of the contemporary Confucian revival movement, such as the more commercial and
frivolous use of Confucianism in popular culture. Or the chauvinistic attitude and practices that
Confucianism could foster at times, e.g. Hanfu Movement.
28 | P a g e

References

Ai, J. (2009). Two Sides of One Coin: The party’s attitude toward Confucianism in
contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary China, 18(61), 689–701.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560903033976

Billioud, S., & Thoraval, J. (2009). Lijiao: The Return of Ceremonies Honouring Confucius in
Mainland China. China Perspectives, 2009(2009/4).
https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.4927

Brown, M., & Singh, P. (2018). How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A
Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation. 48.

Dreyer, J. T. (2018). China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (10 edition).
Routledge.

French, H. W. (2007, March 4). Religious Surge in Once-Atheist China Surprises Leaders. The
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/world/asia/04china.html

Hammond, K. J., & Richey, J. L. (Eds.). (2015). Sage Returns, The: Confucian Revival in
Contemporary China (Reprint edition). State University of New York Press.

Herr, R. S. (n.d.). Confucianism’s Political Implications for the Contemporary World. Fordham
University Press. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from
https://fordham.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5422/fso/9780823233199.001.0001/ups
o-9780823233199-chapter-5

Huang, Y. (2007). Confucian Theology: Three Models. Religion Compass, 1(4), 455–478.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2007.00032.x

Huang, Y. (2012). Confucius: A Guide for the Perplexed. A&C Black.

Maags, C., & Svensson, M. (Eds.). (2018). Chinese Heritage in the Making: Experiences,
Negotiations and Contestations (1 edition). Amsterdam University Press.

Makeham ….
29 | P a g e

Rosker, J. (n.d.). Modern Confucianism as a Form of Social Knowledge and its Impact upon
East Asian Modernization. Retrieved March 25, 2020, from
https://www.academia.edu/21574066/Modern_Confucianism_as_a_Form_of_Social_Knowledge
_and_its_Impact_upon_East_Asian_Modernization

Rošker, J. (2014a). China’s modernisation: From daring reforms to a modern Confucian revival
of traditional values. Anthropological Notebooks, 20, 89–102.

Rošker, J. (2014b). The Philosophical Sinification of Modernity and the Modern Confucian
Paradigm of Immanent Transcendence ( 內 在 超 越 性 ). Asian Studies, 2, 67.
https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2014.2.1.67-81

Rošker, J. (2016). The Rebirth of the Moral Self: The Second Generation of Modern Confucians
and Their Modernization Discourses. University of Hawaii Press.

Rošker, J. (2017). Between Tradition and Modernity: Modern Confucianism as a Form of East
Asian Social Knowledge. Asian Studies, 5, 43. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2017.5.2.43-62

Rošker, J. S. (2015). Modern Confucianism and Chinese Theories of Modernization. Philosophy

Compass, 10(8), 510–522. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12241

Song, X. (2003). Reconstructing the Confucian Ideal in 1980s China: The “Culture Craze” and
New Confucianism. In J. Makeham (Ed.), New Confucianism: A Critical Examination (pp. 81–
104). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982414_4

The Eighth World Confucian Conference Qufu, Shandong Province. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25,
2020, from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/shandong/shandongculture/ConfucianConference.html

Wang, X. (2009). Seeking Channels for Engagement: Media Use and Political Communication
by China’s Rising Middle Class (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1399887). Social Science Research
Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1399887

Why Equality and Which Inequalities?: A Modern Confucian Approach to Democracy. (2017,
August 29). Singapore Research Nexus. https://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/srn/archives/56392
30 | P a g e

Wong, L., & MacPherson, S. (Eds.). (1995). Social Change and Social Policy in Contemporary
China. Avebury.

Worsman, R. (2012). Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival: An Introduction and
Literature Review of New Confucian Activism. History Honors Papers.
https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/histhp/14

Xu, K., & Wang, G. (2018). Confucianism: The question of its religiousness and its role in
constructing Chinese secular ideology. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 17, 79–
95. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952477.n51