Russia and East Asia: Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva

Introduction
Russia and East Asia

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Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva
Introduction
Russia, geographically spanning the entire Eurasian continent, has generally
been neglected in the academic and policy discourse on regional integration
in East Asia. The collection of analyses in this volume is an attempt to fill this
gap, with particular attention to the role of Eastern Siberia and the Russian
Far East in the deepening regional integration in East Asia.
Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia
has undergone sweeping and tumultuous transformations, and its relations
with the neighboring countries of East Asia have also changed dramatically,
mostly in positive directions. Today, as second-time President Putin and Prime
Minister Medvedev look to stabilize Russia’s national politics and modernize
its economy, they are paying increasing attention to the potentially significant
role that their nation’s eastern territories can play as a “bridge to Asia” and
bring substantial benefits, mostly economic gains but also political benefits
by implication, to the nation. Moscow invested tens of billions of dollars
in large-scale infrastructure development in the Far East in preparation for
the hosting of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in
Vladivostok in September 2012. Russia’s growing engagement with Asia was
also evident in its participation for the first time, along with the United States,
in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Indonesia in November 2011.1 Many obsta-
cles remain, however, to Russia’s constructive and effective participation in
the deepening regional integration in East Asia.
The collection of chapters in this volume examine the increasingly diverse
foreign policy interests of Russia related to emerging economic and politi-
cal realities of the world and Russia’s informal and gradual integration with
the countries of East Asia. The chapters reflect the perspectives of Russian
and Asian/US scholars regarding Russia’s engagement with East Asia. In this
Copyright 2014. Routledge.
introduction, Akaha and Vassilieva introduce the rationale, purpose, frame-

work, and outline of the book. It stresses the timeliness of this study, outlines
evidence of Russia’s growing interest in developing its eastern territories and
expanding its role in East Asia, and raises questions regarding the challenges
the nation faces in becoming part of the regional integration process in East
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2 T. Akaha and A. Vassilieva
Asia. Part I takes a close look at the evolution of Russia’s policy toward East
Asia. More specifically, in Chapter 1, Kozyrev describes the Putin–Medvedev
government’s global strategic vision and its security policy in Asia, reveal-
ing Moscow’s interests behind its growing commitment to the development
of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East and Russia’s evolving relations
with the neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan, highlighting
the linkage between domestic and international developments. Chapter 2 by
Hyodo examines, from a Japanese perspective, the factors behind Russia’s
increasingly assertive diplomacy vis-à-vis the West in general and the growing
hard-line orientation in its security policy in East Asia since 2008 in partic-
ular. The chapter also analyzes Russia’s complicated security relations with
Japan, Russia’s first multilateral engagement in Asia through the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and the limitations of Russia’s strategic partner-
ship with China. In Chapter 3, Minakir reviews the evolution of Moscow’s
view regarding the role of its Far Eastern territories in the nation’s economic
development policy since the 1980s. It then examines the specific policies
Russia has undertaken in developing its Far Eastern region and its changing
economic ties with China, Japan, North and South Korea, and Mongolia.
Part II is devoted to the examination of Russia’s bilateral relations with
China, Japan, and Korea. Kuhrt’s Chapter 4 reviews Russia–China relations
in political, strategic, and economic dimensions, highlighting both changes
and continuities. It then discusses the implications of the evolving bilateral
relations for Russia’s role in regional integration in East Asia. Chapter 5, by
Takahashi, describes the evolution of Russia’s bilateral economic ties with
Japan, with a particular emphasis on the role of the Russian Far East. It
provides useful data on the level and structure of bilateral trade, as well as
Japanese investment in the Russian Far East, and notes the major obstacles
to further expansion of trade and economic relations between Russia and
Japan. In Chapter 6, Shin reviews Russia’s approach to the Korean Peninsula,
including relations with both North and South Korea in political, strategic,
and economic dimensions as well as the Six-Party Talks, since the 1990s. The
chapter examines whether and how Russia’s policy toward the peninsula has
affected the nation’s interests in East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia, as
well as how it may affect Russia’s interests in the region in the future.
The three chapters in Part III present an analysis of Russia’s relations with
East Asian countries in the energy sector and the changing demographic dynam-
ics and immigration trends in Russia and implications for regional relations. In
Chapter 7, Horiuchi provides an overview of the energy supply–demand situ-
ation in East Asia, the present-day energy-focused frameworks in the region,
and Russia’s behavior therein, and discusses the possibility of future regional
cooperation in the energy sector and Russia’s role. In Chapter 8, Saneev and
Sokolov examine Russia’s regional energy policy in Eastern Siberia and the
Far East, including relations with East Asian countries in the energy sector,
development of concepts and forecasts of energy production and consump-
tion in eastern Russia and potential export to East Asian countries. Chapter 9,
Introduction 3
by Zaionchkovskaya, Mkrtchian, and Tyuryukanova, offers a comprehensive
analysis of the trends in emigration, immigration, including Chinese immigra-
tion, and internal migration in Russia since the 1990s. It also describes Russia’s
immigration policy and public attitudes toward foreign migrants, highlighting
contradictions and inconsistencies therein. The analysis emphasizes Russia’s

need for expanded immigration and liberalization of immigration policy to
reverse the crisis of demographic decline in the country.
Part IV offers two analyses on the potential and prospects of Russia’s inte-
gration with East Asian countries. In Chapter 10, Wirth explores the mean-
ing of integration and future prospects for stronger ties between Russia and
Northeast Asia. Wirth provides a comparison of recent developments in
Russia–China and Russia–Japan relations, the changing salience of issues of
geopolitics, military threat perceptions, territorial disputes, and regional con-
cerns. The co-editors, Akaha and Vassilieva, present the concluding chapter,
Chapter 11, which summarizes the conclusions of the substantive chapters
and identifies both the promising avenues for Russia’s place in regional inte-
gration in East Asia and the obstacles the nation needs to overcome if it is to
contribute to and benefit from the ongoing process of informal and gradual
regional integration.
Russia and East Asia

Geographically, Russia is very much a part of East Asia. In other respects,
however, Russia’s position in this region today is not as evident or definite.
Politically, Russia has more or less normal and non-hostile relations with all
East Asian countries, although the depth, the scope, and the nature of those
relations vary widely, ranging from a “strategic partnership” with China
to slowly improving yet far-from-normal relations with Japan. Russia’s
trade and economic relations with the regional countries also vary widely,
from somewhat significant and growing relations with China and Japan to
virtually negligible relations with most Southeast Asian countries. Russia’s
impact on the international relations of the region has long been based
largely on its ideological and military interests vis-à-vis the other major
contenders for influence in Northeast Asia, i.e. Japan in the first half of the
twentieth century and the United States and China during the second half
of the twentieth century. However, with the end of the Cold War, the demise
of the Soviet Union, and the precipitous weakening of Moscow’s political
influence in the region, came a new era of ideological and military rivalries
in the region, leaving old issues unresolved. Most importantly, post-Soviet
Russia virtually disappeared from US strategic calculations in East Asia,
with Moscow relying on a “strategic partnership” with the increasingly

powerful Beijing to counter the “sole superpower” status of the United
States. Today, none of the big players in the region considers Russia a major
security factor, positively or negatively, Moscow’s wishes to the contrary
notwithstanding.
One area where Russia plays an important and growing role is the energy
sector. The nation has the potential to translate its energy resources – namely
oil and natural gas – into economic power and political influence in the region,
particularly in its relations with the energy-hungry Northeast Asian countries,
including China and Japan. Energy is not simply an economic asset but also
an important strategic value for Russia as it calculates its political and even
security interests vis-à-vis its regional neighbors. With some of the world’s
largest oil and natural gas reserves within its territory, Russia has developed
an active energy diplomacy wooing foreign energy trade partners and foreign
investment in the exploration and exploitation of its rich reserves.2 Elsewhere
in the world Moscow has attempted to take advantage of foreign partners’
dependence on its energy supplies in its foreign policy.3 Today, one cannot
describe Russia’s role in international relations without reference to its energy
resources and their political and strategic significance.
Key indicators of Russia’s power

One of the indicators of a nation’s relative power is its population size. At
140,041,247 in 2009, Russia’s population was the second largest among
the East Asian countries, after China (1,338,612,968) and ahead of Japan
(127,078,679). Incidentally, the population of the United States was 307,212,123.
Demographic trends in Russia (along with Japan) indicate a declining vitality,
with the population growth in 2009 estimated at −0.47 percent, compared
with the rates of growth of 0.98 percent in the United States, 0.66 percent in
China and −0.19 percent in Japan (see Table I.1).
Russia’s GDP in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms in 2008 stood at $2.27
trillion, far smaller than that of the United States’ $14.26 trillion, China’s
$7.97 trillion, and Japan’s $4.33 trillion. Russia’s GDP per capita at $16,100
compared favorably with China’s $6,000 but lagged far behind the United
States’ $46,900, Japan’s $34,000, and South Korea’s $27,600 (Table I.1).
Russia’s weight in East Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia, has long rested
on its military might and its military presence in the region, and the nation
still remains a formidable military power. Its defense expenditures, at $50.0
billion in 2008, were much smaller than those of the United States ($623 bil-
lion in FY08) and somewhat smaller than those of China ($65.0 billion in
2004) and exceeded Japanese defense spending ($41.75 billion in 2007) and
South Korean military spending ($21.1 billion in 2003).4
Political relations with the najor regional powers

Russia’s most important political partner in East Asia is China.5 However,

the relationship, defined as “strategic partnership,” has its limits.6 Moscow
and Beijing share a common interest in deflecting or denying US dominance,
not to mention monopoly, on the regional political agenda. Since 1991,
Russia and China have resolved their long-standing border dispute, enjoyed
Introduction 5
Table I.1 Key indicators for select Northeast Asian countries
Populationa Population GDP GDP per Military

growthb (PPP)c capita budget (in
(%) (in trillions (PPP)b billions of

of US$) (in US$) US$)
Russia 140,041,247 −0.47 2.27 16,100 50.0d

China 1,338,612,968 0.66 7.97 6,000 65.0e
Japan 127,078,679 −0.19 4.33 34,000 41.8f
North Korea 22,665,345 0.42 0.04 1,800 5.0g
South Korea 48,508,972 0.27 1.34 27,600 21.1h
United States 307,212,123 0.98 14.26 46,900 623.0i
Notes: a July 2009 estimate; b 2009 estimate; c 2008 estimate; d 2008, CIA, SIPRI provide no
estimates; e 2004; f 2007; g FY02; h 2003 estimate; i FY08 budget.
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2009 (online; accessed on September 16, 2009); military budget
figures are from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm (accessed on May 10, 2009).
frequent reciprocal visits by their leaders, and been united in opposition to

US attempts at dictating policies at the global level, such as with respect to the
US-led invasion of Iraq, global war on terror, and mostly Western campaigns
in regard to Iran, Libya, and Syria.7
The generally strong bilateral political ties between Russia and China have
their limits, however, due to a number of bilateral issues. One such issue is the
much slower pace of bilateral trade expansion than their leaders have hoped.
A related problem is Moscow’s ambiguous position on the issue of oil and gas
pipeline slowly being constructed to ship production sites in Eastern Siberia
to destinations in China and Japan.8 The presence of Chinese traders, work-
ers, and tourists in Russia’s Far Eastern territories has also complicated bilat-
eral policy coordination, exposing different interests and priorities between
the two countries’ central governments and their regional leaders.9 Although
earlier fears of China’s “creeping expansion” or “peaceful invasion” into the
Russian Far East have dissipated with the improvement of bilateral migration
management between Moscow and Beijing, such fears may be easily rekindled
if the two countries fail to develop a sustainable border regime that accurately
reflects the dramatically shifting balance of economic power between the two
countries in China’s favor.10
Russia has expanded bilateral trade and economic relations with Japan to
their highest level since the end of the Cold War, but they are far from reach-
ing their full potential.11 Although Russia’s political relations with Japan are
potentially as important as its relations with China in the context of changing

balance of power in East Asia, the long-standing sovereignty dispute over the
southern Kuriles/Northern Territories remains a formidable barrier to build-
ing a relationship of mutual trust between Moscow and Tokyo.12 Events in
recent years have elevated the salience of the dispute over the islands. The
Russian leadership has intensified its appeal to patriotism and used the islands
issue to this end. On July 7, 2010 the Russian Duma passed legislation estab-
lishing September 2 as the day to commemorate the end of the Great Patriotic
War, that date in 1945 being the day when Japan signed the instrument of
surrender. On September 28, President Medvedev and Chinese President Hu

Jintao issued a joint statement commemorating the sixty-fifth anniversary of
the war and pledging further deepening of the Sino-Russian strategic alli-
ance. This was followed by President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri
Island on November 1, 2010, as well as similar visits to the contested territo-
ries by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and other high-ranking officials.
Prime Minister Naoto Kan called Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri “an unfor-
givable outrange.” An ultra-nationalist group in Japan desecrated the Russian
national flag in its demonstration against Russian actions near the Russian
embassy in Tokyo.
Shortly before his re-election in March 2012, President Putin called for
hikiwake, a Japanese judo term meaning “a tie,” indicating his desire to set-
tle the territorial row in a manner that would be acceptable to both sides,13
although what he meant remains unclear. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – also
serving in this leadership position for the second time – has also indicated a
strong desire to break the territorial impasse. His envoy, former prime minis-
ter Yoshiro Mori, met with President Putin in Moscow in February 2013 to
facilitate the scheduling of a summit between the Russian and Japanese lead-
ers. In the meeting, Putin described the absence of a peace treaty between the
two countries as an “abnormal” situation, indicating his desire to overcome
the territorial dispute and forge friendly relations.14 However, with national-
ist sentiments remaining strong on both sides and the political leadership in
both countries having no incentive to quell such attitudes, it remains uncer-
tain whether the leaders can find a compromise position that will be accept-
able to both countries.
Ironically, Medvedev’s visit to the disputed island in 2010 demonstrated
Moscow’s interest to develop the Russian Far East, including the southern
Kuriles, and Russia sees Japan as an important economic partner. Japan also
sees mutual benefits in closer economic ties with Russia to diversify its energy
supplies. For example, Japan has indicated interest in cooperating with Russia
in building a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Vladivostok. The project
is designed to further diversify sources of LNG supplies to Japan and reduce
its current heavy reliance on Asian and Oceanic sources. In fiscal year 2009,
Russia accounted for 6.5 percent of Japan’s LNG import, but the planned
project will boost the level above 10 percent.15
Russia’s relations with the United States are important both on their own
merit and for the influence they exert on Moscow’s relations with both Beijing
and Tokyo. During the early years of the Cold War Russia and China were
ideological allies opposed to the United States but the political rift and border
disputes between the two socialist giants led to a split in the socialist camp
and paved the way for Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s. The end
Introduction 7
of the Cold War seemed to remove any ideological divides between Moscow,
Beijing, and Washington, but the emergence of the United States as the
sole superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union brought Moscow and
Beijing closer together. The resolution of Sino-Russian border disputes in the
1990s also helped cement closer bilateral ties.16 Russia’s ideological conflict
with the United States defined its political relations with Japan during the
Cold War, but the end of the superpower conflict slowly led to the devel-
opment of Russo-Japanese relations defined on their own merit. This raised
hopes for a territorial resolution but, ironically, it elevated the political sig-
nificance of the island dispute in Japan, preventing bilateral political nor-
malization even two decades after the end of the Cold War.17 The Korean
crisis, namely North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile development, has
brought Moscow, Beijing, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul closer. Until North
Korea’s repeated nuclear weapons tests and missile launches in 2009, Moscow
and Beijing rejected Washington and Tokyo’s call for sanctions against
Pyongyang. However, with North Korea’s repeated provocations, including its
third nuclear test in February 2013, Moscow and Beijing have come to accept
the need to use sanctions against Pyongyang. All said, however, Moscow’s
influence in the Six-Party Talks is very limited, especially in comparison with
that of the other participants in this multilateral process.18
Russia’s place in the East Asian economy

How important is Russia as a trading partner in East Asia? In 2005, Russia’s
trade with the other countries of the region amounted to barely 2 percent of
the entire trade within Northeast Asia. In contrast, China (excluding Hong
Kong), Japan, the United States, and South Korea represented 33 percent,
26 percent, 12 percent, and 12 percent, respectively, of the total intraregional
trade.19 This picture does not change at all even if we look at exports and
imports separately, with Russia’s exports and imports vis-à-vis other Northeast
Asian countries, including the United States, amounting to only 2 percent of
the region’s total.20
Trade in Northeast Asia is significantly more important to Russia than
Russia’s trade is to the other countries within the region. In 2005, Russia’s
trade with its Northeast Asian neighbors, including the United States, consti-
tuted around 12 percent of its worldwide trade. Clearly, Russia finds most of
its trade partners elsewhere in the world. By contrast, China’s trade within the
region represented around 60 percent of its global trade and Japan’s intrare-
gional trade amounted to about 62 percent of its total international trade.
South Korea conducted over 55 percent of its global trade with the other
Northeast Asian countries (see Table I.2).21

Among the Northeast Asian countries, Russia’s most important trading
partners in 2005 were China, with 44 percent of Russian exports in the region
going to China and 33 percent of Russian imports from within this region
coming from China. Russia’s second most important trading partner was the
Table I.2 Northeast Asian countries’ intraregional
trade as percentage of their global trade, 2005
China 57.52
Taiwan 60.50
Japan 61.98
South Korea 55.47
North Korea 70.80
Mongolia 44.16
Russia 11.96
United States 18.44
Source: calculated from data in International Monetary

Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
Table I.3 Russia’s trade in Northeast Asia, 2005 (in millions of US$)
Exports to: Imports from: Total
United States 7,475 4,571 12,046

Japan 3,768 5,841 9,609
China 13,049 7,239 20,288
Hong Kong 349 19 368
South Korea 2,365 3,997 6,362
Taiwan 1,446 490 1,936
North Korea 228 7 235
Mongolia 443 22 465
Total 29,123 22,186 51,309
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics

Yearbook, 2006.
United States (accounting for 26 percent of Russia’s exports and 21 percent

of Russia’s imports), followed by Japan (13 percent and 26 percent, respec-
tively) (see also Table I.3).22
In short, Russia is the least integrated East Asian economy vis-à-vis the
other economies of the region. Even among the Northeast Asian countries,
Russia is still a small, if not an insignificant, trading partner.
However, Russia’s potential role in regional trade is substantial, particu-
larly in the energy sector. Russia holds huge reserves of oil and natural gas. In
2006, Russia was in eighth place among the countries with the greatest proved
oil reserves. Russia (with 60.0 billion barrels (bb)) followed Saudi Arabia (264.3
bb), Canada (178.8 bb), Iran (132.5 bb), Iraq (115.0 bb), Kuwait (101.5 bb),
United Arab Emirates (97.8 bb), and Venezuela (79.7 bb). Its proved natural gas
reserves (1,680 trillion cubic feet (tcf)) ranked Russia in first place on the list of
Introduction 9
the countries with the largest natural gas reserves, ahead of Iran (971 tcf), Qatar
(911 tcf), Saudi Arabia (241 tcf), United Arab Emirates (214 tcf), the United
States (193 tcf), Nigeria (185 tcf), Algeria (161tcf), and Venezuela (151 tcf).23
If successfully developed, these resources can boost Russia’s economic pro-
file to unprecedented levels. This has several implications. First, to the extent
that Moscow relies on its ability to develop and export its energy resources
for pursuing some of its foreign policy goals, the global energy price will have
a major impact on Russia’s ability to leverage those resources. Second, the
development of the resources requires sustained investment in infrastructure
development, including pipelines and other transportation facilities as well
as refineries and petro-chemical production facilities. This, in turn, calls for
investment from foreign partners. Third, the nation’s energy reserves may also
be exploited to fuel political rivalry between their potential importers, such
as China and Japan.24 Indeed, there is already much written on this aspect of
Russia’s international behavior. Fourth, while Russia enjoys unprecedented
energy export revenues, the nation also needs to diversify its economy, gradu-
ally reducing its dependence on that very lucrative sector. Is Moscow ready to
allocate a growing portion of its revenue to non-energy sectors?
Finally, does Russia want to define itself as mainly a natural resource
exporter, a typical profile of developing countries? In contrast to the modern
and postmodern economic structures of its East Asian neighbors, does Russia
want to remain largely an exporter of primary commodities and importer of
high-value-added products? President Medvedev answered this question in
the negative when he stated in his speech “Go Russia” in September 2009:
The global economic crisis has shown that our affairs are far from being
in the best state. Twenty years of tumultuous change has not spared
our country from its humiliating dependence on raw materials. Our cur-
rent economy still reflects the major flaw of the Soviet system: it largely
ignores individual needs. With a few exceptions domestic business does
not invent nor create the necessary things and technology that people
need. We sell things that we have not produced, raw materials or imported
goods. Finished products produced in Russia are largely plagued by their
extremely low competitiveness. (Emphases added)25
Medvedev went on to point out that contemporary Russia was plagued by

three “social ills” and that the nation needed to overcome and move beyond
them if it was to regain its great power status in the increasingly competitive
world. One of the “social ills,” as he put it, was “[c]enturies of economic
backwardness and the habit of relying on the export of raw materials, actually
exchanging them for finished products” (emphasis added).26 A good part of

the Russian population agrees that their country is a backward country with
a primitive raw material-based economy. According to a 2009 public opinion
poll by Levada Center, 36 percent of the respondents fully shared this view,
with 60 percent disagreeing.27
The military dimension
As noted above, Russia’s weight in East Asia, particularly in Northeast
Asia, has long rested on its military might and its military presence in the
region. The nation remains a formidable military power today. However,

military capabilities have limited utility, if at all, as an integrative factor
in East Asia because military security policy divides some countries of
the region while it unites others. Moreover, although Russia’s defense
cooperation with China has been steadily growing since the 1980s, it is
highly unlikely that the two countries’ militaries will reach the level of
integration seen among the NATO allies, or even the level of defense
cooperation and coordination that exits between the United States and its
allies in the region, namely Japan and South Korea. Given the strong – if
not trouble-free – security ties among the latter three countries, Russia’s
ability to affect the overall alliance pattern in the region is limited. It will
remain limited unless Russia and China formulate an overarching joint
strategy directed against the US-led alliances in the region, which is not a
likely prospect in the foreseeable future.
Also, a resolution of the North Korean problem is unlikely to require the
use of Russia’s military capability. On the contrary, it will be in Russia’s inter-
est to cooperate with the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea in
removing or containing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Failure
to cooperate on this issue may trigger a destabilizing arms race in the region,
including nuclear proliferation in Japan and South Korea.
The role of the Russian Far East

If Russia is to be integrated with East Asian countries, bilaterally or
multilaterally, the nation’s Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern territories will be
an essential link.28 Russia’s eastern territories represent both an opportunity
and a burden for Moscow. They offer an opportunity as the territories’
geographical proximity to Russia’s neighboring countries favors closer trade
and economic ties with them. The eastern territories of Russia also serve as an
entry point for capital, technology, services, and labor from the dynamic East
Asian economies. During the Soviet period, however, Moscow failed to develop
the necessary infrastructure in these territories and modernize industries there
to take advantage of these complementarities with the neighboring countries.
Although post-Soviet Russia appears eager to engage China, Japan, Korea,
and the United States in economic transactions based on market principles,
its behavior has been characterized by unpredictability and ambiguity. The
“stop-and-go” offshore energy development projects off Sakhalin are the
most visible example. The numerous pipeline projects in Eastern Siberia and
the Far East have also suffered from a lack of consistency and stability in
Moscow’s strategy vis-à-vis the potential partners in development, namely
China, Japan, and South Korea.
Introduction 11
The following list summarizes the real and potential opportunities as well
as liabilities that Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East represent for
Russia:29
1 Advantages
a Abundant natural resources: the rich natural resources in the region
are an important part of the complementary relations between east-
ern Russia and East Asian economies.
b Proximity to East Asian markets: the geographical proximity of east-
ern Russia offers Russian exporters an advantage in accessing Asian
markets. Modernization of industries in the territories could boost
their export of value-added products to East Asian markets.
c Proximity to East Asian investment capital: East Asian countries’
high savings and capital accumulation might be exploited if the
investment climate in eastern Russia were improved.
d Proximity to Asian technology: as with investment capital, the rich
technological base of East Asian economies offers substantial prom-
ises for industrial modernization in eastern Russia.
e Proximity to Chinese labor: the problem of labor shortage in some
sectors of eastern Russia, namely agriculture, construction, and ser-
vices, can be ameliorated by the importation of cheap and abundant
Chinese labor if Moscow and Beijing can develop a sustainable bilat-
eral migration regime that does not pose a threat to the social, eco-
nomic, and political future of the regions of eastern Russia.
2 Disadvantages
a Small and declining population: the small and declining population of
eastern Russia limits its potential growth. After peaking at around eight
million in the late 1980s, the population of eastern Russia has been
declining due to emigration to western Russia and natural population
losses due to economic dislocation and social problems in the region.30
b “A raw materials appendix”? The abundance of natural resources in
the region is also a source of its weakness to the extent that Moscow
defines the Far East’s role as a source of raw materials, for domestic
use or for export, and the infrastructure development in the region
is limited to that which relates directly to the exploration and devel-
opment of those resources to the neglect of modern industrial and
social infrastructure needs.
c Environmental and public health problems: a related problem is the
harms the development of natural resources has done and continues
to do to the region’s natural environment and the health of the local

populations.31
d Huge infrastructure needs: the transportation, communication,
and other basic infrastructure of eastern Russia needs substantial
improvement if it is to support the level of economic activity and popu-
lation growth required to sustain the region’s viable future in the context
of regional integration with the neighboring territories of East Asia.
e Little local investment capital: the seriously strained economic devel-
opment in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East means there is
very little indigenous investment capital. Therefore, the region con-
tinues to depend on the “subsidies” from Moscow and investment
from foreign sources.
f Distance from Russia’s center: given the continuing dependence of
eastern Russia on financial injections from Moscow, it is crucial that
Russia improve the efficiency of transportation and communication
between the eastern and western parts of the country. However, the
sheer geographical distance and the long neglect of eastern Russia’s
infrastructure needs will keep the transportation costs quite high.
g Disparate Center-region priorities: the strategic partnership between
Moscow and Beijing has not been translated into a stable relation-
ship between the Russian Far East and its neighboring Chinese prov-
inces. On the contrary, the continuing migration pressure in northeast
China has been a source of serious concern and even xenophobic
reaction in the Russian Far East.32
The balance of advantages and disadvantages has resulted in a steady but

suboptimal growth in trade between the Russian Far East and the major East
Asian economies. As shown in Table I.4, South Korea, Japan, and China were
the three most important destinations of exports from the Russian Far East
in the 2000–2007 period. On the other hand, China, Japan, and South Korea
were the leading sources of imports.
Does Russia have the political will and commitment to invest the necessary
financial resources to advance the advantages and reduce the disadvantages of
its Far Eastern territories? What is required is a transformative reorientation
of Russia’s priorities toward its Far Eastern territories. Will Moscow translate
the investments it has made for the development of modern infrastructure
and facilities in the region in anticipation of the 2012 APEC summit into
a sustained development program long after the photo opportunities at the
international meeting are over? It was reported the event might attract $100
billion in investment to the Russian Far East and that spending on summit-
related activities boosted the region’s economy.33 On the other hand, will the
neighboring countries, namely China, Japan, and Korea, commit their public
funds to the infrastructure development required even to realize the existing
pipeline projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East? For this to happen,
Moscow must be unequivocal and fully committed to developing and deliver-

ing the promised oil and natural gas supplies to its East Asian neighbors.
What are the domestic, bilateral, regional, and international factors that
might affect Moscow’s approach to these imperatives? The following analyses
will attempt to answer these questions.
Table I.4 Russian Far Eastern federal district’s trade with select countries of East Asia (in millions of US$)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Trade Exports to: Total 3,788.4 5,842.1 3,917.1 4,122.1 4,625.5 6,581.6 9,065.8 13,533.4
Japan 722.2 652.0 782.1 849.2 1,202.0 1,558.2 1,534.7 4,070.1
China 978.1 1,696.8 1,046.9 1,517.2 1,491.8 2,162.9 2,573.1 1,981.1
South Korea 382.7 801.2 690.4 722.8 811.2 1,277.8 1,185.4 4,552.5
United States 377.4 333.3 251.5 182.0 185.5 206.0 300.5 354.8
Other 1,328.0 2,358.8 1,146.2 850.9 935.0 1,376.7 3,472.1 2,574.9
Imports from: Total 934.2 1,216.8 1,518.6 1,764.5 3,015.0 5,813.0 6,983.3 7,747.6
Japan 131.3 189.3 186.0 441.8 1,204.2 1,941.0 1,710.7 2,034.2
China 141.1 173.4 424.1 487.6 655.3 1,187.4 1,701.8 2,540.8
South Korea 184.3 244.0 302.9 299.2 352.7 905.7 1,603.3 1,292.4
United States 177.5 183.0 241.5 155.4 208.1 488.6 426.8 501.1
Other 300.0 427.1 364.1 380.5 594.7 1,290.3 1,540.7 1,379.1
Total trade 4,722.6 7,058.9 5,435.7 5,886.6 7,640.5 12,394.6 16,049.1 21,281.0
Balance of trade 2,854.2 4,625.3 2,398.5 2,357.6 1,610.5 768.6 2,082.5 5,785.8
Source: Russia Statistical Yearbook, 2006 and 2007 editions.
Notes
1 Even though geographically the United States is not an East Asian or Asian coun-
try, we refer to the United States in the context of discussing countries in East Asia
and Asia for ease of expression and where appropriate to indicate the importance
of the United States within the region.

2 www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0872964.html (accessed on May 15, 2009).
3 For Western analyses of Russia’s energy diplomacy, see A. Jaffe and R. Manning,
”Russia, Energy, and the West,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2001), pp. 133–152; E. Morse
and J. Richard, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No.
2 (2002), pp. 16–31; L. Goldstein and V. Kozyrev, “China, Japan, and the Scramble
for Siberia,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2006), pp. 163–178. See also S. Itoh, “Russia’s
Energy Diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific: Is Moscow’s Ambition Dashed?” in
Energy and Environment in Slavic Eurasia: Toward the Establishment of the Network
of Environmental Studies in the Pan-Okhotsk Region, Sapporo: Slavic Research
Center, Hokkaido University, 2008, pp. 33–65; S. Itoh, “Chu-Ro enerugi kyoryoku
kankei” [Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation], in H. Kimura and S. Hakamada, eds.,
Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia [Russia Moving Closer to Asia], Sapporo: Slavic Research
Center, Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007, pp. 98–117; T. Sugimoto, “Roshia no
enerugi shigen to gaiko” [Russia’s Energy Resources and Diplomacy], in S. Yokote,
ed., Higashi Ajia no Roshia [Russia in East Asia], Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2004, pp. 225–253; H. Chun, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy toward
Europe and Northeast Asia: A Comparative Study,” Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 7,
No. 2 (2009), pp. 327–343.
4 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm (accessed on May 10, 2009).
5 For recent analyses of Russia’s relations with China, see “Russia-China Relations
Lose Momentum,” Oxford Analytica, April 23, 2009, www.oxan.com/display.
aspx?ItemID=DB150651 (accessed on November 6, 2009); R. Weitz, China-Russia
Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion? Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008.
6 Weitz, China-Russia Security Relations.
7 For a balanced analysis of Sino-Russian relations in the early twenty-first century,
see A. Iwashita, “9.11 jiken igo no Chu-Ro kankei” [Sino-Russian Relations since
the 9/11 Incidents], in H. Matsui, ed., 9.11 jiken igo no Roshia gaiko no shin tenkai
[New Post-9/11 Evolution of Russian Diplomacy], Tokyo: Nihon Kokusaimondai
Kenkyujo, 2003, pp. 207–230.
8 Itoh, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific.” See also P. Rutland,
“Roshia no Ajia ni okeru yakuwari” [Russia’s Role in Asia], in Kimura and
Hakamada, Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia, pp. 31–48.
9 E. Wishnick, “Migration and Economic Security: Chinese Labor Migration in the
Russian Far East,” in T. Akaha and A. Vassilieva, eds., Crossing National Borders:
Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia, Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2005, pp. 68–92.
10 See K. Iskyan, “Selling off Siberia: Why China Should Purchase the Russian Far
East,” posted July 28, 2003, www.slate.com/id/2086157/ (accessed on November
13, 2009).
11 V. Kistanov, “Higashi Ajia shokoku to Roshia no keizai kankei” [Economic
Relations between East Asian Countries and Russia], in Yokote, Higashi Ajia no
Roshia, pp. 203–224, particularly pp. 209–214.

12 For recent analyses of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute, see A. Iwashita,
Hoppo ryodo: 4 demo 0 demo, 2 demo naku [The Northern Territories Problem:
Neither 4 Nor 0, or 2], Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2005; A. Iwashita, Kokkyo:
Dare ga kono sen wo hiitanoka [National Borders: Who Drew Them?], Sapporo:
Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006; H. Kimura, “Hoppo ryodo henkan ni
Introduction 15
ojinu Roshia” [Russia Refusing to Return the Northern Territories], in H. Kimura,
Gendai roshia kokkaron: Puchin gata gaiko towa nanika [The Contemporary
Russian State: What is a Putinesque Diplomacy?], Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha,
2009, pp. 263–293.
13 “Putin Proposes Starting Over in Negotiations Over Northern Territories,” Asahi

Shimbun, online, March 2, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/poli-
tics/AJ201203020054 (accessed on April 10, 2013).
14 “Editorial: Progress in Territorial Talks Vital for Japan-Russia Economic
Cooperation,” Asahi Shimbun, online, February 23, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/views/AJ201302230028 (accessed on April 10, 2013).
15 Yomiuri Online, December 14, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/
T101213003043.htm (accessed on December 15, 2010).
16 Iwashita, Hoppo ryodo.
17 Among the numerous studies of the post-Cold War Soviet/Russian–Japanese rela-
tions, the following are the most comprehensive treatises: H. Kimura, Japanese-
Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000;
T. Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations,
2 volumes, Berkeley: University of California, 1998; J. Goodby, V. Ivanov, and
N. Shimotomai, eds., “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese,
and American Perspectives, Westport: Praeger, 1995; V. Ivanov and K. Smith,
eds., Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia: Partners in the 21st Century, Westport:
Praeger, 1999.
18 H. Kimura, “Roshia no Chosen hanto seisaku” [Russia’s Policy in the Korean
Peninsula], in Kimura and Hakamada, Ajia ni sekkinsuru Roshia, pp. 212–244.
19 Hong Kong’s intraregional trade represented 15 percent of the region’s total trade
in 2005.
20 These statistics are calculated from data in International Monetary Fund, Direction
of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
21 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
22 These statistics are calculated from data in International Monetary Fund, Direction
of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006.
23 www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0872964.html (accessed on May 10, 2009).
24 See, for example, Goldstein and Kozyrev, “China, Japan, and the Scramble for
Siberia”; S. Itoh, “Russia’s Energy Policy Towards Asia: Opportunities and
Uncertainties,” in C. Len and A. Chew, eds., Energy and Security Cooperation in
Asia: Challenges and Prospects, Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development
Policy, 2009, pp. 143–165.
25 D. Medvedev, “Go, Russia,” President of Russia Web Site, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml (accessed on November 13,
2009).
26 Ibid.
27 www.levada.ru/press/2009092402.print.html (accessed on April 10, 2013).
28 For an earlier exploration of this topic, see T. Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics
in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge,
1997. See also T. Akaha, ed., “Proceedings: Workshop on US-Japan Cooperation
in the Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East,” Center for East Asian
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, June
12–13, 1992.
29 For a fuller examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the Russian Far
East, see T. Akaha, “The Russian Far East as a Factor in Northeast Asia,” Peace
Forum (Kyung Hee University, Korea), No. 25 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 91–108. See
also P. Minakir, K. Okada, and T. Akaha, “Economic Challenge in the Russian Far
East,” in T. Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing
Ties with Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 49–69.
30 For example, the population of the Far East was estimated at over eight million
in the late 1990s and around seven million in 2007, with further declines expected
beyond 2010. Vladivostok News online, Issue No. 560, Special Reports, March 15,
2007, http://vn.vladnews.ru/issue560/Special_reports/Russias_Far_East_popula-
tion_continues_to_dwindle (accessed on November 6, 2009).

31 For a comprehensive survey of the natural resource base of the region and its envi-
ronmental and developmental implications, see J. Newell, The Russian Far East:
A Reference Guide for Conservation and Development, 2nd edition, McKinleyville:
Daniel & Daniel, 2004.
32 See V. Larin, “Chinese in the Russian Far East,” and E. Wishnick, “Migration
and Economic Security,” in Akaha and Vassilieva, Crossing National Borders,
pp. 47–67 and pp. 68–92, respectively.
33 “Russia’s Far East Seizes the Moment Ahead of APEC,” Russia Today online,
http://russiatoday.com/Business/2009–10–12/russias-far-east-apec.html (accessed
on November 6, 2009).

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Introduction

Russia and East Asia

Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva

introduction, Akaha and Vassilieva introduce the rationale, purpose, frame-

contradictions and inconsistencies therein. The analysis emphasizes Russia’s

Russia and East Asia

with Moscow relying on a “strategic partnership” with the increasingly

Key indicators of Russia’s power

Political relations with the najor regional powers

Russia’s most important political partner in East Asia is China.5 However,

Populationa Population GDP GDP per Military

(%) (in trillions (PPP)b billions of

Russia 140,041,247 −0.47 2.27 16,100 50.0d

frequent reciprocal visits by their leaders, and been united in opposition to

potentially as important as its relations with China in the context of changing

surrender. On September 28, President Medvedev and Chinese President Hu

Russia’s place in the East Asian economy

Northeast Asian countries (see Table I.2).21

Source: calculated from data in International Monetary

Exports to: Imports from: Total

United States 7,475 4,571 12,046

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics

United States (accounting for 26 percent of Russia’s exports and 21 percent

Medvedev went on to point out that contemporary Russia was plagued by

exchanging them for finished products” (emphasis added).26 A good part of

region. The nation remains a formidable military power today. However,

The role of the Russian Far East

to do to the region’s natural environment and the health of the local

The balance of advantages and disadvantages has resulted in a steady but

Moscow must be unequivocal and fully committed to developing and deliver-

Source: Russia Statistical Yearbook, 2006 and 2007 editions.

of the United States within the region.

Roshia, pp. 203–224, particularly pp. 209–214.

13 “Putin Proposes Starting Over in Negotiations Over Northern Territories,” Asahi

tion_continues_to_dwindle (accessed on November 6, 2009).

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