G.R. No.

172778               November 26, 2012

SABINIANO DUMAYAG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172778, November 26, 2012

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the November
26, 2004 Decision and the May 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 26513, which
1  2 

affirmed the June 24, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City (RTC). The RTC decision
3 

upheld with modification the Decision of the Municipal Trial Courjt of San Fernando, Cebu City (MTC), finding
4 

accused Sabiniano Dumayag (petitioner) guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

The Facts:

On July 6, 1995, at around 11:30 o’clock in the morning, along the national highway in Magtalisay, Sangat, San
Fernando, Cebu, a passenger bus of Petrus Bus Liner (passenger bus), driven by petitioner, collided with a tricycle
driven by Elsie Genayas (Genayas), resulting in the death of four (4) persons and causing physical injuries to five
(5) others, who were all passengers of the tricycle. The passenger bus was bound for Dalaguete, Cebu, while the
5 

tricycle came from the opposite direction, going towards Cebu City. At the time of the mishap, the tricycle was
overtaking a Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with a passenger bus coming from the opposite direction. 6

Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide for the deaths of
Genayas, Orlando Alfanta (Alfanta), Grace Israel (Israel), and Julius Amante (Amante); and with reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by Crispin Cañeda, Jannette Bacalso, Carmela Lariosa,
Fediliza Basco (Basco), and Nelfe Agad (Agad) and damage to property. 7

During the trial, one of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Rogelio Cagakit (Cagakit), a driver of
Badian Island Resort. He testified that on July 6, 1995, at around 11:30 o’clock in the morning, he was driving a
Mitsubishi Pajero with tourist passengers bound for Cebu City; that along the national highway somewhere in
Barangay Magtalisay, Balud, San Fernando, Cebu, he was trailing a tricycle bearing a total of 8 passengers; that
upon reaching the first blind curve of the road, he noticed the tricycle following a Mitsubishi pick-up; that when the
Mitsubishi pick-up slowed down upon reaching the second blind curve, the tricycle tried to overtake the pick up and,
while overtaking, a fast moving vehicle from the opposite direction hit the tricycle which was thrown towards his
direction; and that two passengers of the tricycle died on the spot.
8

Senior Police Officer 3 Gregorio Patalinghug (SPO3 Patalinghug) was also presented as a witness and he narrated
that on the said date and time he and Senior Police Officer 2 Felipe Yap (SPO2 Yap) responded to a report about a
traffic accident somewhere in Magtalisay, Balud, San Fernando, Cebu. When they arrived at the place, SPO2 Yap
immediately boarded the injured victims in a vehicle and brought them to the hospital. He noticed two lifeless bodies
lying on the road, later identified as those of Alfanta and Genayas. He then inspected the place of the incident;
measured the relative positions of the tricycle, the Mitsubishi Pajero and passenger bus; and drew a sketch. From
the sketch, he identified the point of impact, which was one (1) foot away from the centerline of the road, crossing
the lane occupied by the passenger bus. He also pointed to the skid mark, about sixty (60) feet in length, produced
by the bus when its driver stepped on the brake pedal. Based on his observation from the point of impact and on the
information he gathered from several persons present at the time of the accident, he was of the opinion that the
driver of the tricycle was at fault.
9

The prosecution also presented Cañeda, Agad and Basco, who related the collision they witnessed. The parents of
the victims and the owner of the tricycle, meanwhile, both testified on their respective claims for damages; while Dr.
Rolando Anzano, reported his findings on the injuries sustained by the victims.

In his defense, petitioner testified that he was a professional driver for 26 years and worked for five (5) different
employers, the fifth of which was the Petrus Bus Liner; that his everyday route was from Dalaguete, Cebu to Cebu
City and back, with two (2) round trips a day; that he was familiar with the road since he had been traversing it for
around 20 years; that the road where the accident happened had two (2) blind curves and upon approaching the
first blind curve, he slowed down by stepping on the brakes; that while negotiating the second blind curve, he
noticed that his lane was clear and so he stepped on the accelerator in order to gain momentum; that it was at this
moment that the tricycle while in the process of overtaking a vehicle ahead of it, suddenly occupied his lane; that he
tried to avoid hitting the tricycle but to no avail; that he could not swerve the bus to the left because there was
another vehicle occupying the same; and he could not also swerve the bus to the road shoulder on the right side of
the lane because it was sloping down and there was a canal. He posited that the accident would not have taken
place at all if the tricycle driver had not attempted to overtake another vehicle and occupied his lane.
10

On March 18, 1999, the MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide. It explained:
11 

Taking into account the circumstances and condition of the road there being two (2) blind curves involved, the
length of the skidmark produced at sixty (60) feet in length clearly speaks for itself that the accused drove and
operated the passenger bus negligently without taking the necessary precautions and without due regard to the
road condition.

Simply stated, if in the exercise of reasonable care as contended by the accused, the speed of the passenger bus at
that time was commensurate and corresponds with the demands of the circumstances and conditions of the road
where as is obtaining, the conditions are such as to increase the danger of accident, no matter how sudden the
tricycle appeared at the bus’ front, indisputably, the skid mark produced would not have reached that much or the
accident may have been avoided and if not, the damage or injuries caused could only be slight and manageable. 12

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Sabiniano Dumayag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years
and one (1) day minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days maximum and to pay the following
civil liabilities:

1. To the surviving heirs of deceased Orlando Alfanta:

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and

c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the surviving
heirs;

2. To the surviving heirs of deceased Julius Amante;

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and

c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the surviving
heirs;

3. To the surviving heirs of deceased Grace Israel:

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and

c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the surviving
heirs;
 plus P50,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 13

On appeal, the RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the MTC. The modified judgment reads:
14 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but modified as
follows:

1. For the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide of Alfante, Israel and
Amante, accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS (of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period), as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS (of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods), as the maximum
thereof, with all the accessory penalties thereto.

2. For reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries accused is sentenced to PUBLIC CENSURE
for the injuries sustained by each of the private complainants, to wit, Canieda, Bacalso, Lariosa, Bascon and
Agad. In other words, accused is sentenced to said penalty for as many private complainants as were
injured.

3. For his civil liabilities, accused is directed –

3.1 To pay the surviving heirs of each of the deceased tricycle passengers, namely, Alfante, Amante
and Israel the following:

3.1.1 Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the death each of the defendant;

3.1.2 Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the wake, funeral, burial and other related
expenses in connection with the said death;

3.1.3 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for moral damages

3.1.4 Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for exemplary damages;

3.1.5 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as attorney’s fees.

3.2 To pay Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the damaged tricycle, EIGHTY

THOUSANDS PESOS (P80,000.00) as compensatory damage representing the value of the said
property after deducting therefrom its salvage value and allowance for depreciation; and

3.3 The costs.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It found the petitioner and the tricycle driver equally guilty of
negligence, the former for failing to observe the precautionary measure when approaching a blind curve and the
latter for unsuccessfully overtaking a vehicle. The CA stated that the petitioner should have been more careful
considering that the area had blind curves and there could be oncoming vehicles from the other side. The fact that
petitioner was driving on the right side of the road did not relieve him of the obligation of exercising due and ordinary
care to prevent collision and avoid injury to persons or property, including others who may be on the wrong side of
the road.16

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution, dated May 10, 2006.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT NEGLIGENCE, IMPRUDENCE AND RECKLESSNESS WAS CORRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO

PETITIONER BY THE COURTS BELOW WHEN THE VEHICULAR MISHAP COMPLAINED OF IN THIS
PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST 6 JULY 1995;

IF INDEED PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS AND IMPRUDENT WHEN THE MISHAP LITIGATED IN
THIS PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST 6 JULY 1995, WHETHER OR NOT SAID NEGLIGENCE,
RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE, WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SAME;

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION, AS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS

VIOLATIVE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AT BAR. 17

Petitioner argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, claiming that the vehicular mishap was
purely an accident. He insists that he was not negligent, reckless and imprudent in the operation of the motor
vehicle at the time of the accident and that he was driving the bus on the lane properly belonging to him at a
moderate speed.

He asserts that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent, reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle
driver, who suddenly overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. He stresses that had the tricycle
driver not attempted to suddenly overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, the accident would not
have taken place.

Petitioner further avers that, at the time of the accident, the tricycle was overloaded with eight passengers, in
addition to the driver; that the driver of the tricycle was operating along the national highway, a route specifically
prohibited under the franchise; and that the tricycle driver also violated Section 41 (a) and (b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the Philippines when he
18 

tried to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve of the highway. Therefore, due to serious
violations committed by the tricycle driver, the resulting deaths and injuries arising from the

vehicular accident should be his sole responsibility. 19

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. The Court, however, recognizes several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
20 

inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Several exceptions obtain in this case;
21 

hence, a departure from the general rule is warranted.

The MTC, the RTC and the CA found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and physical injuries and damage to property. They all concluded that petitioner was guilty because he
was driving fast at the time of the collision. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
and ordered to pay the victims civil indemnity.

Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. In order to establish a
22 

motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless
23 

driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful
and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. 24

After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and conclusion reached
by the courts below. The totality of the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless
negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of
traffic laws.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 25

The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising along its rightful lane
when the tricycle coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The accident
would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed on his lane and did not recklessly try to overtake
another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists
to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made
only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the
highway, where the driver’s view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking
26 

another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon
him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side
of the road upon which they have the right to pass. 27

The MTC opined that the accident could have been avoided or damage or injuries could only be slight and
manageable, if the speed of the passenger bus was commensurate with the demands of the circumstances and the
condition of the road. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the conclusion that petitioner was driving fast and
without regard to the condition of the road at the time of the collision.

The testimony of Cagakit that the passenger bus was running fast at the time of the collision lacks probative value.
The actual speed of the bus was not established because he merely stated that when the tricycle was trying to
overtake the Mitsubishi pick-up, a fast moving vehicle hit it. Also, it was not indubitably shown that petitioner was
driving at a speed beyond the rate allowed by law. In a similar case, Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, the Court, in
28  29 

adopting the conclusion of the RTC, wrote:

Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the
reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if
Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin
Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and
caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances.
Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while
approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.

x x x.

Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a total of eight (8) passengers (excluding the
driver), which is a clear violation of traffic rules and regulation. It was likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle,
Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver violated the conditions specified in the tricycle franchise which
prohibited all tricycles to travel along the national highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the alternate
driver of his son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company driver because he was a
neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason, the award of damages to Bernabe by the courts below has no
justifiable basis.
The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, petitioner should be
acquitted. Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict."30

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner.  It is to be noted that
1âwphi1

there were two blind curves along the national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was
aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the passenger bus as it approached them.
In the situation at hand, he did not exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed to
have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear. According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid
marks produced by the passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake brought about
by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him. Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal
negligence as he was driving along his rightful lane.

Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that negligence on the part of
petitioner was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed on the latter.
The determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The
31 

Court allowed the reduction of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v.
32 

IAC and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA,  and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA  and Philippine Bank of
33  34  35 

Commerce v. CA. 36

In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed equitable considering that the negligence of the
tricycle driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory. Moreover,
under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The
award of attorney's fees is not warranted either.

WHEREFORE, the petition 1s PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner Sabiniano Dumayag is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. He is, however, civilly liable and,
accordingly, ORDERED to pay each of the surviving heirs of Orlando Alfanta, Grace Israel and Julius Amante the
following:

1 P25,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

2 Pl5,000.00 for funeral expenses.

The award of damages to Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the tricycle, is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., G.R. No. 147437
Petitioner,
 
Present:
 
CARPIO MORALES, J.*
Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
 
May 8, 2009
 
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
TINGA, J.:
The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in
relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal.[1] He is

 
 
bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are
equal to his own.[2] Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property, [3] it is
nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution
under the circumstances for the safety of others[4] as well as for his own.[5]
 
This Petition for Review[6] seeks the reversal of the Decision [7] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated 28 February 1995. The assailed decision affirmed the judgment
of conviction[8] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 in Criminal
Case No. 76653one for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to propertyagainst petitioner
Larry V. Caminos, Jr. but reduced the latters civil liability on account of the finding that the
negligence of Arnold Litonjua, the private offended party, had contributed to the vehicular
collision subject of the instant case.
 
 
  
 
The case is rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of 21 June 1988 at
the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street in MandaluyongCity, right in front of
Gate 6 of East Greenhills Subdivision. The vehicles involved were a Mitsubishi Super
Saloon[9] driven by petitioner and a Volkswagen Karmann Ghia [10] driven by Arnold Litonjua
(Arnold). The mishap occurred at approximately 7:45 in the evening.[11] That night, the road was
wet.[12] Arnold, who had earlier passed by Wack Wack Subdivision, was traversing Ortigas
Avenue toward the direction of Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn
as he reached the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had
maneuvered the turn through the break in the traffic island the Mitsubishi car driven by
petitioner suddenly came ramming into his car from his right-hand side. Petitioner, who was
also traversing Ortigas Avenue, was headed towards the direction of San Juan and he
approached the same intersection from the opposite direction.[13]

 
 
The force exerted by petitioners car heaved Arnolds car several feet away from the break
in the island, sent it turning 180 degrees until it finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas
Avenue.[14] It appears that it was the fender on the left-hand side of petitioners car that made
contact with Arnolds car, and that the impactwhich entered from the right-hand side of Arnolds
car to the leftwas established on the frontal center of the latter vehicle which thus caused the
left-hand side of its hood to curl upward.[15]
 
Arnold immediately summoned to the scene of the collision Patrolman Ernesto Santos
(Patrolman Santos),[16] a traffic investigator of the Mandaluyong Police Force who at the time
was manning the police outpost in front of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Building.[17] Patrolman Santos interrogated both petitioner and Arnold and made a sketch
depicting the relative positions of the two colliding vehicles after the impact. [18] The sketch,
signed by both petitioner and Arnold and countersigned by Patrolman Santos, shows petitioners
car which, it seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even upon impact
was stalled along Ortigas Avenue a few feet away from the intersection and facing the direction
of San Juan whereas Arnolds car had settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue with its rear
facing the meeting point of the median lines of the intersecting streets at a 45-degree angle.[19]
 
At the close of the investigation, a traffic accident investigation report (TAIR) [20] was forthwith
issued by P/Cpl. Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District. The report revealed that at the
time of the collision, Arnolds car, which had no right of way, [21] was turning left whereas
petitioners car was going straight and was exceeding lawful speed. [22] It also indicated that the
vision of the drivers was obstructed by the center island flower bed.[23]
 
 
Petitioner was subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City with
reckless imprudence resulting in damage property.[24] He entered a negative plea on
arraignment.[25]
 
At the ensuing trial, Patrolman Santos admitted having executed the sketch which depicts
the post-collision positions of the two vehicles.[26] Arnolds testimony established that his vehicle
was at a full stop at the intersection when the incident happened. [27] Told by the trial court to
demonstrate how the incident transpired, he executed a sketch which showed that his car had
not yet invaded the portion of the road beyond the median line of the island and that the path
taken by petitioners car, depicted by broken lines, came swerving from the outer lane of the
road to the left and rushing toward the island where Arnolds car was executing a turn. [28] On
cross-examination, he admitted the correctness of the entry in the TAIR to the effect that he was
turning left when hit by petitioners car,[29] but he claimed on re-direct examination that he had
stopped at the intersection in order to keep the traffic open to other vehicles and that it was then
that petitioner bumped his car. On re-cross examination, however, he stated that he had brought
his car to a full stop before turning left but that the front portion thereof was already two (2) feet
into the other lane of Ortigas Avenue and well beyond the median line of the traffic island.[30]
 
Antonio Litonjua (Antonio), the father of Arnold in whose name the Volkswagen car was
registered, testified that the estimation of the cost of repairs to be made on the car was initially
made by SKB Motors Philippines, Inc. The estimation report dated 30 June 1988 showed the
total cost of repairs to be P73,962.00. The necessary works on the car, according to Antonio,
had not been performed by SKB Motors because the needed materials had not been delivered.
[31]
 Meanwhile, SKB Motors allegedly ceased in its operation, so Antonio procured another
repair estimation this time from Fewkes Corporation.[32] The estimation report was dated 13
December 1991, and it bloated the total cost of repairs to P139,294.00.[33] Ricardo Abrencia,
resident manager of Fewkes Corporation, admitted that he personally made and signed the said
estimation report and that Antonio had already delivered a check representing the payment for
half of the total assessment.[34]
 
 
 
Petitioner, the lone defense witness, was a company driver in the employ of Fortune
Tobacco, Inc. assigned to drive for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who was with him
at the time of the incident. In an effort to exonerate himself from liability, he imputed
negligence to Arnold as the cause of the mishap, claiming that that he, moments before the
collision, was actually carefully traversing Ortigas Avenue on second gear. He lamented that it
was Arnolds car which bumped his car and not the other way around and that he had not seen
Arnolds car coming from the left side of the intersectionwhich seems to suggest that Arnolds
car was in fact in motion or in the process of making the turn when the collision occurred. His
speed at the time, according to his own estimate, was between 25 and 30 kph because he had
just passed by the stoplight located approximately 100 meters away at the junction of Ortigas
Avenue and EDSA, and that he even slowed down as he approached the intersection.[35]
 
In its 18 September 1992 Decision,[36] the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged.
The trial court relied principally on the sketch made by Patrolman Santos depicting the post-
collision positions of the two vehiclesthat piece of evidence which neither of the parties assailed
at the trialand found that of the two conflicting accounts of how the collision happened it was
Arnolds version that is consistent with the evidence. It pointed out that just because Arnold had
no right of way, as shown in the TAIR, does not account for fault on his part since it was in fact
petitioners car that came colliding with Arnolds car. It concluded that petitioner, by reason of
his own admission that he did not notice Arnolds car at the intersection, is solely to be blamed
for the incident especially absent any showing that there was any obstruction to his line of
sight.Petitioner, according to the trial court, would have in fact noticed on-coming vehicles
coming across his path had he employed proper precaution. Accordingly, the trial court ordered
petitioner to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P139,294.00 as well as a fine in the same
amount.
 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the factual findings of the trial court. In its Decision dated 28
February 1995, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court against petitioner. However, it mitigated the award of civil indemnity on its finding that
Arnold himself was likewise reckless in maneuvering a left turn inasmuch as he had neglected
to look out, before entering the other lane of the road, for vehicles that could likewise be
possibly entering the intersection from his right side.[37]
 
This notwithstanding, petitioner was still unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court.
Seeking an acquittal, he filed the present petition for review in which he maintains Arnolds own
negligence was the principal determining factor that caused the mishap and which should thus
defeat any claim for damages. In declaring him liable to the charge despite the existence of
negligence attributable to Arnold, petitioner believes that the Court of Appeals had misapplied
the principle of last clear chance in this case.
 
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment,[38] argues that petitioners negligence
is the proximate cause of the collision and that Arnold Litonjuas negligence was contributory to
the accident which, however, does not bar recovery of damages. Additionally, it recommends
the reduction of both the fine and the civil indemnity as the same are beyond what the
prosecution was able to prove at the trial.
 
The Court denies the petition.
 
Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.[39]
 
Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure
to take the necessary precaution once the danger or

 
peril becomes foreseen.[40] Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required.[41] Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety
of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious
choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to
others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable
person.[42]
 
Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether
or not one of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that
lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle, [43] and a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely, (a)
that the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is
without malice; (d) that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender.[44]
 
 
 
 
 
Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding
of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act
without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal
intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law.[45] This, because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct is all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused,
[46]
 that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered
likewise at fault.
 
Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular act or acts
causing damage to property may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all
criminal prosecutions, the inquiry as to whether the accused could be held liable for the offense
is a question that must be addressed by the facts and circumstances unique to a given
case. Thus, if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious
indifference to the consequences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the most
fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from petitioners contention that at the time the
collision took place, he was carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on
second gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which under
normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable as to enable him to bring the car
to a full stop when necessary.
 
Aside from the entry in the TAIR, however, which noted petitioners speed to be beyond
what is lawful, the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioners contention.
The photographs taken of Arnolds car clearly show that the extent of the damage to it could not
have been caused by petitioners car running on second gear at the speed of 25-30 kph. The fact
that the hood of Arnolds car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on impact the car
even turned around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction to the outer
lane of Ortigas Avenuewhen in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the
inner lane and into the opposite laneclearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been
created by a speed way beyond what petitioners estimation.
 
Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal
considerations in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,
[47]
 and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from
which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. [48] While an adverse inference
may be gathered with respect to reckless driving[49] from proof of excessive speed under the
circumstances[50]as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the
intersection in excess of lawful speedsuch proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving
which may be overcome by evidence,[51] or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as
to require the accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or
imprudent manner.[52]
 
We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as
the physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that
his speed at the time of the incident was well within what is controllable. Indeed, the facts of
this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the junction, was traveling at a
speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his testimony. Insofar as such facts are
consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.[53]
 
Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to
exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily
subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which
will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway.[54] This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No.
4136. It states:
 
 
 
 
SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle
on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater
nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and
no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead.
 
 
Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the
conditions encountered [55] which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and,
whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the
highway. [56]
 
It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the
motorist is approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor
vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when
driving elsewhere in a street or highway.[57] A driver approaching an intersection is generally
under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able to
stop at the shortest possible notice,[58] that is, he must look for vehicles that might be
approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.[59]
 
 Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has
exercised the level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that
he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the
roads meet. In other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an approaching
motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence
would dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection
or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision,[60] which means that he is bound is to
move with the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the
slowest speed possible[61] so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can
see ahead.[62]
 
On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioners case is his own admission that he
had not seen Arnolds car making a left turn at the intersection. Of course, there had been an
arduous debate at the trial as to whether Arnolds car was in motion or at a full stop at the
intersection moments before the collision; nevertheless, inasmuch as he (Arnold), as shown by
the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the intersection significantly ahead of
petitioner, it defies logic to accord even a semblance of truth to petitioners assertion that he had
not seen Arnolds car entering the intersection laterally from his left especially when the said car
admittedly had already taken two feet of the other lane of the roadthe lane on which petitioner
was proceeding to crossand well beyond the median line of the intersecting road on which
Arnold proceeded after making the turn. Indeed, not even the fact that the view at the
intersection was blocked by the flower bed on the traffic island could provide an excuse for
petitioner as it has likewise been established that he approached the intersection at such a speed
that could not, as in fact it did not, enable him to arrest his momentum and forestall the certainty
of the collision.
 
It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the
standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to
make an observation in the interest at least of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter
the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should have observed only had he exercised
the commensurate care required under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion
is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and
reasonable motorist.
 
In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in
exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the
surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the dangers which are to be
anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle. [63] In other
words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks
attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road [64]which are open to ordinary observation.
[65]
 The ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm
might result if commensurate care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist
actually foresee the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was
foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary prudent man, knowing what
he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that suffered was to
materialize.[66] The evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner had failed to
foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he entered the junction in
question especially considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the
structures on the road. In the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee
the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that he was
running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the physical facts of the
case.
 
Yet, petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal. In his petition, he theorizes that the
negligence of Arnold, which according to the Court of Appeals was incipient in character, was
actually the principal determining factor which caused the mishap and the fact that the TAIR
indicated that Arnold had no right of way, it is he himself who had the status of a favored
driver. The contention is utterly without merit.
 
 
 
In traffic law parlance, the term right of way is understood as the right of one vehicle to
proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such
circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless
one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other.[67] Although there is authority to the effect
that the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to express
statutory provision,[68] it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the
matter, that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it
becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the intersection to proceed with
sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger of collisions.[69]
 
In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
[70]
4136,  which materially provides:
 
Section 42. Right of Way.
 
(a)    When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately
the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of
way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided.
 The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any
right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b)   The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an
intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such
intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such
first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left
has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this
Act. x x x.
 
 
The provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the
same direction and one of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule
embodied in the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States, has also
been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from
directly opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and one of them
attempts to make a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his
right, the vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other.[71]
 
Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not
absolute in terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles
from the point of intersection.[72] Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as
sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates
a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such
distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is
likely to occur.[73] Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our
traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the
same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the junction substantially in advance of the
other.
 
Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not
necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined
by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are
considered.[74] It is said that two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the
same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of
the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on
their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle
approaching from the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his
right.[75]
 
Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the
driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left
to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the intersection with his vehicle
under control so that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his
right.[76] He is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before
proceeding to the intersection but only

 
until it is reasonably safe to proceed. [77] Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,[78] it was
established that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a
turn; but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on
the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, he is bound to give
way to the former.
 
Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the
person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accuseds
vehicle collided does not constitute a defense.[79] In fact, even where such driver is said to be
guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of the accused. [80] In
other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of
his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accuseds
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was
likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the
intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioners contention, will nevertheless not support
an acquittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules governing
situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper
assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party.
 
 
 
But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise
negligent in executing the left turn? The answer is in the negative. It is as much unsafe as it is
unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the TAIR so indicated that he at the time had no right
of way, that Arnold had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection in failing
to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioners bare and self-
serving assertion that Arnolds fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as
his allegation that it was actually Arnolds car that came colliding with his car, there is no
slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what the physical evidence in this
case has established. Clearly, it was petitioners negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, that
proximately caused the accident.
 
 Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to
present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained
by Arnolds car, the award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand.
 
All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorists duty is such
care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the
dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the
vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the
circumstances and conditions in the particular case, [81] the driver being under the duty to know
and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the
vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation.[82]
 
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14819 dated 28 February 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No. 76653 dated 18 September
1992 is REINSTATED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC.,   G.R. No. 175512
Petitioner,  
  Present:
   
  CORONA, C.J.,
  Chairperson,
  VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
  PERALTA,* and
  PEREZ, JJ.
   
   
  Promulgated:
JOCELYN CATUBIG,  
Respondent. May 30, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
 
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision [1] dated November 17,
2005 and the Resolution[2] dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66815, which modified the Decision[3] dated January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, in Civil Case No. 11360, an action for recovery of
damages based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, filed by
respondent Jocelyn Catubig against petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc. While the RTC dismissed
respondents claim for damages, the Court of Appeals granted the same.
 
The undisputed facts are as follows:
 
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres
Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a
regular bus driver of petitioner.
 
On January 27, 1994, respondents husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his
way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy
Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve
at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by
crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus
driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig
and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was
thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
 
On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental. After preliminary
investigation, the MCTC issued a Resolution on December 22, 1994, dismissing the criminal
charge against Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the deaths of
Catubig and Emperado, because there was no negligence, not even contributory, on Cabanillas
part.
 
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on July 19, 1995 a Complaint for Damages
against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the total amount
of P484,000.00, for the death of her husband, Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation to
Article 2176, of the Civil Code. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the
latters employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus which collided
with Catubigs motorcycle.
 
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the
vehicular collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole
negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed
the opposite lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the
dismissal of respondents complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of
action, as there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of
its employee driver.
 
In the Pre-Trial Order[4] dated June 10, 1997, the parties stipulated that the primary issue
for trial was whether or not petitioner should be held liable for Catubigs death. Trial then
ensued.
 
Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert B. Elnas (Elnas), [5] Emilio Espiritu (Espiritu),[6] Dr.
Norberto Baldado, Jr. (Dr. Baldado),[7] Peter Cadimas (Cadimas),[8] and respondent[9] herself
testified in support of respondents complaint.
 
PO2 Elnas conducted an investigation of the collision incident. According to PO2 Elnas,
the bus was running fast, at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, when it collided with the
motorcycle which was trying to overtake a truck. The collision occurred on the lane of the
bus. Catubig was flung 21 meters away, and Emperado, 11 meters away, from the point of
impact. The motorcycle was totaled; the chassis broke into three parts, and the front wheel and
the steering wheel with the shock absorbers were found 26 meters and 38 meters, respectively,
from the collision point. In contrast, only the front bumper of the bus suffered damage.
 
Cadimas personally witnessed the collision of the bus and the motorcycle. He recalled
that he was then waiting for a ride to Dumaguete City and saw the Ceres Bulilitbus making a
turn at a curve. Cadimas signaled the said bus to halt but it was running fast. Cadimas also
recollected that there was a cargo truck running slow in the opposite direction of the
bus. Cadimas next heard a thud and saw that the bus already collided with a motorcycle.
 
Espiritu was the photographer who took photographs of the scene of the accident. He
identified the five photographs which he had taken of Catubig lying on the ground, bloodied;
broken parts of the motorcycle; and the truck which Catubig tried to overtake.
 
Dr. Baldado was the medico-legal doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of
Catubigs body. He reported that Catubig suffered from the following injuries: laceration and
fracture of the right leg; laceration and fracture of the left elbow; multiple abrasions in the
abdominal area, left anterior chest wall, posterior right arm, and at the back of the left scapular
area; and contusion-hematoma just above the neck. Dr. Baldado confirmed that Catubig was
already dead when the latter was brought to the hospital, and that the vehicular accident could
have caused Catubigs instantaneous death.
 
Respondent herself testified to substantiate the amount of damages she was trying to
recover from petitioner for Catubigs death, such as Catubigs earning capacity; expenses
incurred for the wake and burial of Catubig, as well as of Emperado; the cost of the motorcycle;
and the costs of the legal services and fees respondent had incurred.
 
Respondents documentary exhibits consisted of her and Catubigs Marriage Contract
dated August 21, 1982, their two childrens Certificate of Live Births, Catubigs College Diploma
dated March 24, 1983, the list and receipts of the expenses for Catubigs burial, the sketch of the
collision site prepared by PO2 Elnas, the excerpts from the police blotter, the photographs of
the collision,[10] and the Post Mortem Report[11] on Catubigs cadaver prepared by Dr. Baldado.
 
In an Order[12] dated October 6, 1998, the RTC admitted all of respondents
aforementioned evidence.
 
On the other hand, Rosie C. Amahit (Amahit) [13] and Nunally Maypa (Maypa)[14] took the
witness stand for petitioner.
 
 Amahit was a Court Stenographer at the MCTC who took the transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 against Cabanilla. Amahit verified that the
document being presented by the defense in the present case was a true and correct copy of the
TSN of the preliminary investigation held in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 on May 25, 1994, and
another document was a duplicate original of the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994
dismissing Criminal Case No. M-15-94.
 
Maypa is the Administrative and Personnel Manager at the Dumaguete branch of
petitioner. He started working for petitioner on September 22, 1990 as a clerk at the Human
Resources Development Department at the Central Office of petitioner
in Bacolod City. Sometime in November 1993, he became an Administrative Assistant at the
Dumaguete branch of petitioner; and in August 1995, he was promoted to his current position at
the same branch.
While he was still an Administrative Assistant, Maypa was responsible for the hiring of
personnel including drivers and conductors. Maypa explained that to be hired as a driver, an
applicant should be 35 to 45 years old, have at least five years experience in driving big trucks,
submit police, court, and medical clearances, and possess all the necessary requirements for
driving a motor vehicle of more than 4,500 kilograms in gross weight such as a professional
drivers license with a restriction code of 3. The applicant should also pass the initial interview,
the actual driving and maintenance skills tests, and a written psychological examination
involving defensive driving techniques. Upon passing these examinations, the applicant still had
to go through a 15-day familiarization of the bus and road conditions before being deployed for
work.Maypa, however, admitted that at the time of his appointment as Administrative Assistant
at the Dumaguete branch, Cabanilla was already an employee driver of petitioner.
 
Maypa further explained the investigation and grievance procedure followed by petitioner
in cases of vehicular accidents involving the latters employee drivers.Maypa related that
Cabanilla had been put on preventive suspension following the vehicular accident on January
27, 1994 involving the bus Cabanilla was driving and the motorcycle carrying Catubig and
Emperado. Following an internal investigation of said accident conducted by petitioner,
Cabanilla was declared not guilty of causing the same, for he had not been negligent.
 
Lastly, Maypa recounted the expenses petitioner incurred as a result of the present
litigation.
 
The documentary exhibits of petitioner consisted of the TSN of the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 held on May 25, 1994 before the MCTC of
Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental; Resolution dated December
22, 1994 of the MCTC in the same case; and the Minutes dated February 17, 1994 of the
Grievance Proceeding conducted by petitioner involving Cabanilla.[15]
  
The RTC, in its Order[16] dated November 12, 1999, admitted all the evidence presented
by petitioner.
 
On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision favoring petitioner. Based on the
sketch prepared by PO2 Elnas, which showed that the point of impact x x x occurred beyond the
center lane near a curve within the lane of the Ceres bus[;] [17] plus, the testimonies of PO2 Elnas
and Cadimas that the motorcycle recklessly tried to overtake a truck near a curve and
encroached the opposite lane of the road, the RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the
collision of the bus and motorcycle was the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle,
Catubig. The RTC, moreover, was convinced through the testimony of Maypa, the
Administrative and Personnel Manager of the Dumaguete branch of petitioner, that petitioner
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee drivers, including
Cabanilla.
 
After trial, the RTC concluded:
 
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the [herein
petitioner] that the [herein respondents] husband is the reckless and negligent driver
and not the driver of the [petitioner], the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
dismissed.
 
[Petitioners] counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit. [18]
 
 
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated November 17, 2005,
the appellate court held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving their
respective vehicles. Catubig, on one hand, failed to use reasonable care for his own safety and
ignored the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a curve.Cabanilla, on the other hand,
was running his vehicle at a high speed of 100 kilometers per hour. The Court of Appeals also
brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it exercised the degree of diligence exacted by law
in the conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a position to testify on the procedures followed
by petitioner in hiring Cabanilla as an employee driver considering that Cabanilla was hired a
year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner.
 
Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision of the trial court
is modified. We rule that [herein petitioner] is equally liable for the accident in
question which led to the deaths of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado and
 hereby award to the heirs of Quintin Catubig, Jr. the amount [of] P250,000.00 as full
compensation for the death of the latter. [19]
 
 
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution
dated November 16, 2006.
 
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
 
Petitioner asserts that respondents complaint for damages should be dismissed for the
latters failure to verify the same. The certification against forum shopping attached to the
complaint, signed by respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondents verification that she
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.[20] Petitioner cited jurisprudence in which the Court
ruled that a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned pleading, which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
 
Petitioner also denies any vicarious or imputed liability under Article 2180, in relation to
Article 2176, of the Civil Code. According to petitioner, respondent failed to prove the
culpability of Cabanilla, the employee driver of petitioner. There are already two trial court
decisions (i.e., the Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-
Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the Decision
dated January 26, 2000 of the RTC in the instant civil suit) explicitly ruling that the proximate
cause of the collision was Catubigs reckless and negligent act. Thus, without the fault or
negligence of its employee driver, no liability at all could be imputed upon petitioner.
Petitioner additionally argues, without conceding any fault or liability, that the award by
the Court of Appeals in respondents favor of the lump sum amount of P250,000.00 as total
death indemnity lacks factual and legal basis. Respondents evidence to prove actual or
compensatory damages are all self-serving, which are either inadmissible in evidence or devoid
of probative value. The award of moral and exemplary damages is likewise contrary to the
ruling of the appellate court that Catubig should be equally held liable for his own death.
 
Respondent maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged petitioner to be liable
for Catubigs death and that the appellate court had already duly passed upon all the issues raised
in the petition at bar.
 
The petition is meritorious.
 
At the outset, we find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright
dismissal of respondents complaint.
  
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the
1964 Rules of Court was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided:
 
SEC. 6. Verification.A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the
person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his
own knowledge.
 
Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," shall be deemed insufficient.
 
 
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The foregoing provision
was carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, viz:
 
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
 
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
 
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
 
 
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which became effective
on May 1, 2000. It now reads:
 
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
 
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records. 
 
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
 
 
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly
provides that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that [e]xcept when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit. No such law or rule specifically requires that respondents complaint
for damages should have been verified.
 
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate against forum
shopping, the two are different.
 
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[21] we already pointed out that:
 
A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from
the partys failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel
renders the petition defective.
 
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and
not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are
alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not
sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. [22]
 
 
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified,
unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require
verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure; (2) petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising
only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review
from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for
review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction
under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59,
Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition
for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions
under Rule 64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule
65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warrantounder Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for
expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71,
Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-
corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies;
(17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules
on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings
under the Family Code.
 
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be
accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that respondents complaint for damages was
accompanied by such a certificate.
 
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal,
not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.[23]
 
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that respondent was unable to prove imputable
negligence on the part of petitioner.
 
Prefatorily, we restate the time honored principle that in a petition for review under Rule
45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again
evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[24] 
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. The findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent,
or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[25] 
 
The issue of negligence is basically factual.[26] Evidently, in this case, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals have contradictory factual findings: the former found that Catubig alone was
negligent, while the latter adjudged that both Catubig and petitioner were negligent.
 
Respondent based her claim for damages on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of
the Civil Code, which read:
 
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.
 
xxxx
 
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 
xxxx
 
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
 
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of the Civil Code
imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its
employee does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver,
Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, has never been established by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the
evidence presented during trial shows that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and
motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
 
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.[27]
 
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubigs overtaking of a slow-
moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if the
Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the collision if
not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and
encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a
curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed
reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent
driver would have done under the circumstances. Recklessness on the part of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while approaching a
curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. Overtaking is
not allowed while approaching a curve in the highway (Section 41(b), Republic Act
[No.] 4136, as amended). Passing another vehicle proceeding on the same direction
should only be resorted to by a driver if the highway is free from incoming vehicle to
permit such overtaking to be made in safety (Section 41(a), Republic Act [No.]
4136). The collision happened because of the recklessness and carelessness of
[herein respondents] husband who was overtaking a cargo truck while
approaching a curve. Overtaking another vehicle while approaching a curve
constitute reckless driving penalized not only under Section 48 of Republic Act [No.]
4136 but also under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 
The Court commiserate with the [respondent] for the untimely death of her
husband. However, the Court as dispenser of justice has to apply the law based on the
facts of the case.Not having proved by preponderance of evidence that the proximate
cause of the collision is the negligence of the driver of the Ceres bus, this Court has no
other option but to dismiss this case.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
 
 
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was
driving the bus at a reckless speed when the collision occurred lack probative value.
 
 We are unable to establish the actual speed of the bus from Cadimass testimony for he
merely stated that the bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it was running very
fast.[29]
 
PO2 Elnas, on the other hand, made inconsistent statements as to the actual speed of the
bus at the time of the collision. During the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. M-
15-94 before the MCTC, PO2 Elnas refused to give testimony as to the speed of either the bus
or the motorcycle at the time of the collision and an opinion as to who was at fault. [30] But
during the trial of the present case before the RTC, PO2 Elnas claimed that he was told by
Cabanilla that the latter was driving the bus at the speed of around 100 kilometers per hour.[31]
 
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2 Elnas both pointed out that the motorcycle
encroached the lane of the bus when it tried to overtake, while nearing a curve, a truck ahead of
it, consistent with the fact that the point of impact actually happened within the lane traversed
by the bus. It would be more reasonable to assume then that it was Catubig who was driving his
motorcycle at high speed because to overtake the truck ahead of him, he necessarily had to
drive faster than the truck. Catubig should have also avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead of
him as the curvature on the road could have obstructed his vision of the oncoming vehicles from
the opposite lane.
The evidence shows that the driver of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along
the proper lane, while the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of
him as he was approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on
reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee, Emperado.
 
The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows
from the negligence of their employees.[32] Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision resulting in Catubigs death was his own negligence, and there was no
fault or negligence on Cabanillas part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part
of petitioner, as Cabanillas employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to
delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 17, 2005 and Resolution dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 are SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 26, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, dismissing Civil Case No. 11360
is REINSTATED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

 RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING R. A. 7924,

THE LAW CREATING THE

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 7924, declaring the Metropolitan Manila
as a special development and administrative region comprising of cities and municipalities in the area under the direct
supervision of the President of the Philippines, and creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority to replace
the Metropolitan Manila Authority which was constituted under and by virtue of Executive Order No. 392, dated
January 9, 1990; 

WHEREAS, RA 7924 invests the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority with responsibilities for the
effective delivery of metro-wide services in Metropolitan Manila; and 

WHEREAS, there is a need not only to effect the orderly transfer of powers and functions, officials and
employees, assets and liabilities, including changes in organizational structure, expanded jurisdiction, policy directions
and programs, but also to clarify or explain said provisions in order to achieve harmony or congruity with other
existing laws and rules and regulations. 

NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, pursuant to Section 6 of RA 7924, that the Metro
Manila Council hereby adopts and endorses to the President of the Republic of the Philippines for approval the
following rules and regulations:  

  RULE I 

GENERAL PROVISIONS            

Section 1.  Title - These rules shall be known, cited and referred to as the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7924, Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. 

Sec. 2  Purpose - These rules and promulgated to prescribe the guidelines and procedures for the
implementation of RA 7924 which took effect on March 23, 1995, in order to facilitate compliance therewith and
achieve the herein State policy and objectives.  

Sec. 3  Declaration of Policy and Objective - It is the policy of the State to treat Metropolitan Manila as a
special development and administrative region, and to delineate and consider certain basic services affecting or
involving Metro Manila as metro-wide services, the delivery of which the Authority shall plan, supervise, regulate,
monitor, coordinate, or implement, where appropriate, in conformity with national government policies without
prejudice to the autonomy of the local governments affected. 

Sec. 4  Scope of Application - These Rules and Regulations shall apply to all local governments comprising
the special development and administrative region of Metropolitan Manila and agencies of the national government
operating in Metropolitan Manila. 

RULE II 

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Sec. 5  Creation -  The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Authority,
shall replace the Metropolitan Manila Authority constituted under Executive Order No. 392 dated January 9, 1990.  

The Authority shall be attached to the Office of the President for policy and program coordination. 
 The affairs of Metropolitan Manila, which is composed of the cities of Caloocan, Makati, Mandaluyong, Manila,
Muntinlupa, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon and the municipalities of Las Pi–as, Malabon, Marikina, Navotas, Para–aque,
Pateros, San Juan, Tagig, and Valenzuela, shall be administered by the Authority.  

x The scope of services of the Authority shall cover those which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan Manila.  These services shall include:

a.   Development planning which includes the preparation of medium and long-term development plans;  the
development, evaluation and packaging of projects; investments programming; and coordination and monitoring of
plans, program and project implementation. 

b.   Transport and traffic management which includes the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies, standards,
programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of
a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila. 

c.   Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation, and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal.  It shall likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary landfill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. 

d.   Flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system. 

e.   Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter                  services which include the formulation,
adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and projects to rationalize and
optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development of
slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing facilities and the provision of necessary social
services thereof. 

f.   Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control which include the formulation and implementation of
policies, rules and regulations, standards, programs and projects for the promotion and safeguarding of the health
and sanitation of the region and for the enhancement of ecological balance and the prevention, control and abatement
of environmental pollution. 

g.   Public safety which includes the formulation and implementation of programs and policies and procedures to achieve
public safety, especially preparedness for preventive or rescue operations during times of calamities and disasters
such as conflagrations, earthquake, flood and tidal waves; and coordination and mobilization of resources and the
implementation for rehabilitation and relief operations in coordination with national agencies concerned. 

Sec. 7  Powers and Functions - The Authority shall perform planning, monitoring, coordinating and
implementing functions where appropriate, and in the process, exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila area, and in conformity with the national government policies
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government concerning purely local matters.  Such powers and
functions shall include the following:  

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery
of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national
development objectives and priorities; 

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the
packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions; 

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council.  For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project
management offices; 
 (d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila;  identify
bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementations; 

(e) Set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs
and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon
request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all
other government agencies and offices concerned; 

(f)  Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke driverÕs
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136, and PD 1605 to the
contrary notwithstanding.   

        For this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, thru its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose. 

(g) Perform functions of a Regional Development Council [RDC] for the National Capital Region, inviting other
agencies/offices/sectors as special non-voting participants, when necessary; and 

(h) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery
of basic services to the local government units when deemed necessary, subject to prior coordination with and
consent of the local government unit concerned. 

RULE III 

THE METRO MANILA COUNCIL 

The Metro Manila Council shall be the governing board and policy-making body of the Authority. 

Sec. 8  Composition -  The Council, which shall be headed by the Chairman, is composed of voting and non-
voting members. 

8.1 Voting members - The voting members are the Mayors or local chief executives of the cities of Caloocan, Makati,
Mandaluyong, Manila, Muntinlupa, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon and the municipalities of Las Pi–as, Malabon, Marikina,
Navotas, Para–aque, Pateros, San Juan, Tagig, and Valenzuela, the President of the Metro Manila Vice Mayors League
and the President of the Metro Manila Councilors League. 

8.2 Non-voting members -  The non-voting members of the Council are heads of the following agencies or their duly
authorized representatives. 

a.   Department of Budget and Management [DBM]; 

b.   Department of Tourism [DOT]; 

c.   Department of Transportation and Communications [DOTC]; 

d.   Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH]; 

e.   Housing Urban and Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC);