Science and Public Policy, 44(4), 2017, 565–577

doi: 10.1093/scipol/scw086
Advance Access Publication Date: 10 January 2017
Article

A comparison of university technology transfer

offices’ commercialization strategies in the
Scandinavian countries
Lars Bengtsson*
Department of Industrial Management and Logistics, Faculty of Engineering LTH, Lund University, 221 00 Lund,
Sweden
*Corresponding author. Email: lars.bengtsson@iml.lth.se

Abstract
Many European countries have followed the American example by changing the intellectual property
laws governing university technology transfer from university inventorship to university ownership.
The Scandinavian countries have chosen different paths as Denmark and Norway changed their laws
in favor of university ownership, while Sweden retained its university inventor laws. This longitudinal
study shows increasing technology transfer organization (TTO) capacity in all three countries regard-
less of change in intellectual property rights (IPR) framework or not. Danish and Norwegian TTOs
increased their use of the license commercialization strategy, with variations at the TTO level, while
the Swedish universities TTOs have maintained their use of the spin-off commercialization strategy.
The relative use of the two commercialization strategies, licensing and spin-offs, is indirectly influ-
enced by the IPR framework, and more directly by the designs of the policy intent of the university
technology transfer system, the government funding system, the TTOs access to business develop-
ment resources and competence, and monitoring of the university TTOs.
Key words: technology transfer, licensing, spin-off, governance, academic entrepreneurship

1. Introduction include an increase in the number of lower quality patents (Czarnitzki

In order to strengthen the flow of university related technolog ical
knowledge into the development of commercialized products, many
European countries have followed the American example by changing
from laws that favors university inventor intellectual property rights
(IPR) to laws favoring university ownership IPR (Geuna and Rossi
2011). University inventor IPR (sometimes referred to as professor’s
privilege) means that publically-funded research developments or results
are owned by the researcher(s) and not by the institution where the re-
search is carried out, while university ownership IPR means that the in-
stitution employing the researcher(s) own(s) the research results (Geuna
and Rossi 2011). While there is widespread agreement that the univer-
sity is crucial to the national innovation system, there is still consider-
able debate regarding the consequences and effects of different
university technology transfer IPR regulations (Kenney and Patton
2009, 2011; Grimaldi et al. 2011; Doganova 2013). Previous research
has shown that introduction of university ownership IPR regulation
generates investments in university-owned support systems, such as
technology transfer organizations (TTOs)1 and other similar units
(Geuna and Rossi 2011), including an increase in university initiated pa-
tent applications and university-owned patents (Siegel et al. 2007;
Valentin and Jensen 2007; Lissoni et al. 2009). Unintended effects
et al. 2008), TTOs relying too much on transactions-focused
approaches (Weckowska 2015) and indications of TTOs being sur-
passed by individual academics (Fini et al. 2010). To date, little research
has been done on the effects of different university technology transfer
IPR regulations on the two major commercialization strategies: spin-
offs (Kenney and Patton 2011) and licensing (Markman et al. 2005).
While the overall trend in Europe has been to adopt university own-
ership IPR regulations of technology transfer, there are considerable dif-
ferences between the governance systems of European universities,
including exemptions or dual systems in their country laws (Geuna and
Rossi 2011). There are also differences in terms of relevant university
capabilities, such as the competencies and practices of TTO personnel
(Resende et al. 2013), academic inventors experience of patenting (Von
Proff et al. 2012) and business development resources, such as incuba-
tors and science parks (Markman et al. 2005). Consequently, the effects
of different university technology transfer IPR regulations may vary de-
pending on the particularities of the whole university technology trans-
fer regime.
The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden)
provide a quasi-experimental opportunity to compare the effects of
changing from one IPR framework to another and the development
over time. These countries are, in many ways, institutionally similar

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V 565
566
with comparable languages, cultures, legal systems, and welfare
structures. Moreover, in all three countries, the higher education
system is almost entirely funded and operated by the state.
Nevertheless, in the field of university technology transfer IPR regu-
lations, they have chosen different paths. Denmark (since 2000) and
Norway (since 2003) have chosen to change their country laws to
support university ownership technology transfer IPR, whereas
Sweden has retained university inventor IPR. Moreover, Denmark
chose to start an entirely new TTO system, while Norway restruc-
tured their existing TTO system. In Sweden, the TTO system origi-
nating from the mid-1990s has been restructured several times.
In order to analyze the effects of the introduction of the university
ownership technology transfer IPR and other related changes in policy,
government support, TTO capabilities and monitoring this article com-
pare the development of the university TTO capacity and the two major
university technology transfer commercialization strategies—licensing
and spin-off strategies—in the three countries. The study shows increas-
ing TTO capacity in all three countries regardless of change in IPR
framework or not. Danish and Norwegian TTOs increased their use of
the license commercialization strategy but with variation between indi-
vidual university TTOs. The Swedish universities’ TTOs have main-
tained their use of the spin-off commercialization strategy in the studied
time period. The relative use of the two commercialization strategies,
licensing and spin-offs, is only indirectly influenced by the IPR frame-
work, and more directly by the designs of the policy intent of the univer-
sity technology transfer system, the government funding system, the
TTOs access to business development resources and competence, and
the monitoring of the university TTOs. All these factors form a coun-
try’s university technology transfer regime that influences the size and
strategic behavior of the university TTOs.
The propositions developed in the article are based on previous
empirical studies and data on university technology transfer systems.
A collection of secondary data has been performed of six out of
eight university TTOs in Denmark and Sweden and all university
TTOs in Norway during the time period of 2004–13. Thus, it is a
total population study of Norwegian university TTOs and a near
total population of Danish and Swedish TTOs. Thus, no statistical
significance tests are necessary in order to confirm or refute the
propositions. The empirical data is limited to the three countries’
university technology transfer systems and cannot be readily gener-
alizable to all European university technology transfer systems. On
the contrary, given the variation of the European university technol-
ogy transfer IPR regulations (Geuna and Rossi 2011) the aim is in-
stead to further develop the middle range theory of university
technology transfer and better guide future empirical inquiries.
The rest of the article is structured in the following way. First, I
provide a brief review of previous research and develop propos-
itions. Second, I describe the theoretical framework and empirical
context of this study. Third, I explain the method used to collect
data from the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish university TTOs.
Fourth, I present the descriptive statistics and results. The article
ends with a discussion of research contributions and implications
for policy and further research.
2. Previous research and proposition
development
The Bayh–Dole Act introduced in 1980 has been heralded as the pri-
mary reason for the development of a more entrepreneurial and
innovation-oriented university (Shane 2004; Drucker and Goldstein
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
2007). Others, however, have observed a more complex pattern
characterized by decreased government funding to universities,
increased external funding, scientific breakthroughs in biomedicine
and computer sciences (Grimaldi et al. 2011), and the rise of the
entrepreneurial scientist (Etzkowitz 1983, 2003). The university
ownership regime, made possible by the Bayh–Dole Act, has been
seen as the best governance mechanism with which to commercialize
research (e.g. OECD 2003). Most European countries have now
changed their laws from university inventor IPR to university own-
ership IPR, albeit with exceptions and in some cases with dual coun-
try laws (Geuna and Rossi 2011).
Changing to university ownership IPR strengthens the university
support structures (Geuna and Rossi 2011; Siegel et al. 2007), espe-
cially through the founding or expansion of a university TTO. The
TTO specializes in handling disclosed inventions, protecting the IPR
of the invention, applying for patents, licensing intellectual property,
and assisting in spin-off processes. Most research has indicated that
university ownership has resulted in an increase in the output of pa-
tent applications, university-owned patents, and license deals for
European universities (Geuna and Rossi 2011; Lissoni et al. 2009;
Siegel et al. 2007; Valentin and Jensen 2007) and a corresponding
increase in the number of personnel (Lawton Smith and Ho 2006).
In countries where they have retained the university inventor IPR,
academic researchers are free to choose their own technology trans-
fer mechanisms. In such countries, as in Sweden, most technology is
transferred to industry via direct deals between the researcher and
an established company or is spun off by the researcher without in-
volvement from the university (Jacobsson et al. 2013) despite the
fact that the researcher has the opportunity to use the services of a
university TTO. Under university inventor IPR there should be weak
incentives for the university to expand its TTO or similar support
structures. Consequently, the pattern of academic researchers trans-
ferring directly to industry or starting a firm (cf. Damsgaard and
Thursby 2013) by themselves would remain more or less the same
while staying with the university inventor IPR. Hence, based on pre-
vious research the first proposition states:
Proposition 1. University TTOs in countries, here Denmark and
Norway, changing from university inventor IPR to university owner-
ship IPR will expand their capacity more than university TTOs in
countries retaining the university inventor IPR, here Sweden.
The TTOs in the USA that operate under university ownership
IPR have primarily focused on licensing, as it is believed to bring
quicker returns and to carry less risk than spin-offs (Markman et al.
2005; Litan et al. 2008). The annual survey by the Association of
University Technology Managers (AUTM 2013) of American TTOs
has also verified this pattern, showing that the number of active li-
censes (43,295) was about ten times the number of active spin-offs
(4,206) in 2013.
Kenney and Patton (2011) found that North America’s only uni-
versity with university inventor IPR (Canada’s University of
Waterloo) outperformed five similar US universities in creating spin-
offs over the same period (1957–2009), despite it being ranked
lower in world rankings, having less R&D expenditure, and having
fewer faculty.
A similar pattern is observable in the TTOs from five European
countries surveyed by Piccaluga et al. (2012). Danish, Irish, Spanish,
and UK universities all operate under the university ownership IPR,
whereas Italian universities operate under the university inventor
IPR. In Piccaluga et al.’s study (2012), Italian TTOs reported the
lowest number of licenses, both in terms of actual numbers and rela-
tive to its number of TTOs, and the highest number of spin-offs per
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
TTO compared to the other four countries. Italy was the only coun-
try to report more spin-offs than licensing deals (almost three times
as many). The other four countries reported significantly more
licensing deals than spin-offs. In Denmark and the UK, the number
of spin-offs was less than 10% compared to the licensing deals.
Under a legal framework of university ownership, Baldini (2010)
finds that a greater share of royalties given to the inventor researcher
and the university department is associated with a higher patent ac-
tivity for the university. Under a legal framework of university
inventorship individual academic researchers can trade research
knowledge directly to companies for money, research grants, access
to equipment and facilities, or any other form of compensation they
find attractive (Jacobsson et al. 2013). In this way, the academic re-
searcher can negotiate more flexible types of compensation than a
university TTO could under university ownership IPR. If the aca-
demic researcher is more entrepreneurial, he or she may consider the
spin-off option to be more attractive. In such a case, turning to a
TTO might be appropriate, especially if the TTO has the requisite
capabilities to assist in the start-up process with little or no upfront
cost to the researcher.
Perkmann and Walsh (2007) classifies licensing as having a low
extent of relational involvement, that is, being predominantly trans-
actional, and academic entrepreneurship as having a medium rela-
tional involvement. This classification is verified by an empirical
study of TTO personnel in the UK and France and their rating of
work related to licensing and spin-offs in terms of transactional and
relational governance (Alexander and Martin 2013). Weckowska
(2015) finds in her study it difficult for TTOs with transaction-
focused practices to learn relational-focused practices and thus to
effectively assist in more relational activities such as supporting
spin-offs.
Based on previous research, university TTOs in countries chang-
ing from university inventor IPR to university ownership IPR are ex-
pected to focus more on licensing deals and less on spin-offs than
those in countries retaining university inventor IPR. Hence, the se-
cond and third propositions state:
Proposition 2. University TTOs in countries, here Demark and
Norway, changing from university inventor IPR to university owner-
ship IPR will increase the level of licensing compared to university
TTOs in countries retaining the university inventor IPR, here
Sweden.
Proposition 3. University TTOs in countries, here Denmark and
Norway, changing from university inventor IPR to university owner-
ship IPR will reduce the level of spin-offs compared to university
TTOs in countries retaining the university inventor IPR, here
Sweden.
The effects of university technology transfer IPR on the choice of
spin-off or licensing strategy could be affected by the TTO’s access
to internal and complementary capabilities for business develop-
ment, such as incubators, science parks, and seed funds (Markman
et al. 2005). The licensing strategy primarily requires access to com-
petencies and training in business law and patent practices (Lawson
and Sterzi 2014), as well as science and technology, integrated into
transactions-focused commercialization practices (Weckowska
2015). The spin-off strategy, on the other hand, requires competen-
cies in business development and support capabilities for the start-
up and early growth phases, such as incubators, science parks, and
seed funding, integrated into relational-focused commercialization
practices (Weckowska 2015). Thus, the fourth proposition states:
Proposition 4. University TTOs in countries, here Denmark and
Norway, changing from university inventor IPR to university
567
ownership IPR with access to internal business development compe-
tencies and complementary business development support capabil-
ities will use the spin-off strategy more predominantly than
university TTOs without access to such business development
capabilities.
3. The university technology transfer regime—
the legal framework government policies and
TTO structures in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden
The regulations regarding the IPR ownership of research knowledge
are important while studying the strategic behavior of university
TTOs. However, several researchers in the field (e.g. Geuna and
Muscio 2009; von Ledebur 2009) have emphasized that university
IPR regulations is only one part of a wider university technology
transfer regime. The regime also includes the traditions of university
involvement in IP issues, university bylaws and how strongly the
IPR regulations are enforced (Geuna and Rossi 2011), the existence
of university TTOs prior to change in university IPR ownership (von
Ledebur 2009), the public investment in new university TTO struc-
tures (von Ledebur 2009), the collaboration and co-localization
with complementary technology transfer infrastructures such as sci-
ence parks, incubators and seed funds (Jacob et al. 2003), govern-
ance practices of the university TTOs (Baldini 2009), and
competence profile of the TTO employees (Weckowska 2015).
Thus, while studying the university technology transfer systems in
detail in different countries they all have unique characteristics and
dynamics (cf. Geuna and Rossi 2011).This is also the case for the
three Scandinavian countries.
Regardless of changes in university IPR regulations, all three
Scandinavian countries, along with other Western European coun-
tries, have implemented support policies for university technology
transfer and generally embraced the ideas of ‘third mission’ activities
and the entrepreneurial university model since the mid-1990s
(Geuna and Rossi 2011). With this common background the three
Scandinavian countries have constructed university technology
transfer regimes with their own unique characteristics and dy-
namics. Geuna and Rossi (2011) have categorized the Danish and
Norwegian system as belonging to a group of European countries,
along with Germany, Finland, and Austria, with weak traditions on
university IP management that has changed from inventor owner-
ship to university ownership. In their (Geuna and Rossi 2011) cat-
egorization, Sweden has a unique position as having a weak
tradition on university IP management and retained the inventor
ownership system. While the Danish and Norwegian university tech-
nology transfer system share the weak tradition and the change of
the legal framework they differ in many other ways regarding their
university technology transfer system as will be discussed below.
Moreover, there are also some commonalities between the
Norwegian and Swedish transfer system even though their legal
framework is quite different. In the following, the characteristics of
the three Scandinavian countries’ university technology transfer sys-
tems will be presented in Sections 3.1–3.4. This will form the theor-
etical framework used in the analyzing and interpretation of the
results when the empirical material is confronted with the
propositions.
568
3.1 IPR and policy intent
Prior to changing the legal framework in Denmark and Norway, the
three Scandinavian countries had exemptions in their patent laws re-
garding employee inventions. The act regarding the property right to
employee inventions and its university employee exemption became
law in Sweden in 1949, in Denmark in 1955, and in Norway in
1970. While all three countries share the same general objective, to
maximize the dissemination and commercialization of research from
the university sector (Stenvik 2009), they now differ when it comes
to the legal frameworks governing university technology transfer.
In Denmark, a new law regarding university commercialization,
‘Forskerpatentloven’, was issued in 1999 and came into effect in
2000. The main policy intent was to strengthen the relations be-
tween the universities and industry. The new law clearly regulates
the IPR of universities and other higher education organizations
(Stenvik 2009). Under the law, the academic researcher is obligated
to disclose a patentable invention immediately. The university then
has 2 months to declare to the researcher whether it intends to take
over the IPR or allows the researcher to retain the rights. If it takes
over the IPR, the university must work actively for the invention to
come to fruition. The university assumes all of the costs for patent
applications and other types of protection. The researcher has the
right to receive compensation as determined by the individual uni-
versity. The most common compensation system is allocating
one-third of the income to each of the parties: the inventor, the de-
partment, and the university.
In Norway, the law related to inventions was changed in 2003.
Although similar to the Danish system, the Norwegian system dif-
fers on a couple of points (Stenvik 2009). Norwegian universities
have a longer response time—4 months instead of two. Importantly,
in Norway, the academic researcher has the final say in publishing
the research, making it available in the public domain, or protecting
the research for commercial purposes. In effect, a Norwegian univer-
sity researcher can say no to patent protection and publish the re-
sults, unless there are contractual limits involving a third party. The
main policy intent in Norway was formulated in 2001 ‘to increase
the value creation through commercialising knowledge-based
business ideas with a high value creation potential’ (Borlaug et al.
2009: 22).
Sweden has retained its university inventor system, even though
it has been the subject of debate for over a decade. In 2008, the gov-
ernment decided not to make any changes to the patent law
(Swedish Government 2008), despite the fact that the majority of
Swedish universities had expressed their wish to abolish it and to
transfer the IPR to the universities. Today, Swedish university em-
ployees retain the exclusive rights to all patentable inventions and
any other tangible results from their research and educational activ-
ities, such as software, books, templates, etc. (Stenvik 2009). Thus,
Swedish university researchers can choose whether to publish their
research, to patent it, to commercialize it through selling the rights,
licenses, or services, or to just give it away. If a Swedish university
researcher has commercial intentions, the university TTO can offer
assistance with intellectual protection, business advice, and starting
a company, among other services, normally at little to no upfront
cost for the researcher. Usually, if the business verification and de-
velopment process is very costly, such as costs for patent applica-
tions, the Swedish TTO will demand payment in the form of shares
in the new venture. The researcher, however, is free to choose com-
mercialization services offered by any organization or company.
Accordingly the main policy intent formulated in a state
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
investigation in 2001 was ‘to encourage teachers and researchers to
exploit their research results’ (Nygårds and Blomgren 2006: 7).
3.2 Government financing and local innovation system
In Denmark, the TTO system was built from scratch. Previously,
there had been publically funded commercialization units located at
six regional science parks, but these were independent of the univer-
sities and operated according to a mission of regional high-tech sec-
tor development. Assisting in the transfer of university research
knowledge was not the priority. The new Danish TTO system was
designed without any links to the preexisting regional science park
system. In fact, the Danish universities were forbidden to start busi-
nesses or foundations for technology transfer as well as co-own sci-
ence parks unless they got special approval from the Parliament
(OECD 2003). The new law specified the TTO to be an internal uni-
versity unit. The Technical University of Denmark (DTU) is the only
Danish university that has received special approval to co-own a sci-
ence park (Scion DTU) and some specialized commercialization ser-
vice companies (Bioneer A/S, Preseed A/S). For the first 7 years of
the new system (2000–06), the government allocated a total of 58
million DKK (around 8 million USD) to establishing and developing
TTOs at the eight universities. Apart from a special government pro-
gram, running from 2006 to 2012, which enabled the TTOs to apply
also for smaller proof-of-concept allowances, the Danish TTOs have
received no other financial or other support from the government.
The cumulative results for the 7-year period (2007–13) show a def-
icit for the university TTOs (Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation
2014), but the system is not expected to fully cover its costs. Rather,
the main aim of the new law is to increase the flow of research
knowledge from the universities to existing companies. The TTOs
running with deficits are financed by the universities’ own budgets
(Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation 2014).
The Norwegian university technology transfer system started in
1995, financed by a government program called FORNY2
(Rasmussen et al. 2013). At that time, transfer activities were the do-
main of commercialization actors who offered business develop-
ment, incubator, and science park services. These actors were
organizations located close to the major university centers in
Norway and often co-owned by the university, regional public agen-
cies, and private firms. In 2000, the FORNY program changed its
funding structure to stimulate closer collaboration between the uni-
versities and the TTOs. The funding was split in two types of
funding: one type of funding for infrastructure and one for further
commercial development of projects. The law change in 2003 fur-
ther strengthened university incentives, which resulted in an increase
in the number of university TTOs to fourteen in 2008 (Borlaug et al.
2009). In effect, when the Norwegian university TTO system began
in 2003, it was integrated into the existing regional science park sys-
tem. After a subsequent evaluation of the TTOs in 2009 (Rasmussen
et al. 2013), the number of TTOs eligible for government financing
was cut; presently, there are only six university-connected TTOs,
with each TTO serving two or more universities or higher education
institutes in the region.3 Five of the university TTOs originate from
the 1990s and retain business development capabilities, such as busi-
ness development and incubator services and investment funds, ei-
ther in-house or through closely-collaborating organizations. The
sixth university TTO (INVEN2), which serves the University of
Oslo and the Oslo University Hospital, had a later start in 2009
when two previous university TTOs in the region merged. INVEN2,
however, did not retain the business development capabilities.
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
The Norwegian system of university technology transfer after
2009 includes three types of government support: financial support
for evaluating the commercial potential of research knowledge, fi-
nancial support for the regional TTOs’ activities, and financial sup-
port for infrastructure and competency development of the
university technology transfer system. The six university TTOs all
depend on annual allowances from the government scheme, which
is presently called ‘FORNY2020’. These annual allowances have
grown from 92 million NOK (roughly 12 million USD) in 2003 to
128 million NOK (17 million USD) in 2014, and are allocated
mainly to the operations of the TTO and the business verification
program (FORNY 2014; Rasmussen et al. 2013). The income from
licensing and the selling of shares in spin-offs covers only a minor
part of the TTO’s cost. For example, in most years, the average in-
come from TTO licensing amounts to 5–10 million NOK, which is
less than 10% of the total cost (Rasmussen et al. 2013).
The Swedish efforts to commercialize research knowledge
started in the mid-1990s (for an overview of this period, see Jacob
et al. 2003). The first initiative related to university TTOs was the
founding of five university holding companies in 1995. This was
deemed necessary because, at the time, universities in Sweden were
prohibited from investing in companies. These university holding
companies became the foundation of the Swedish university TTOs.
Since the first TTOs were holding companies, it became natural to
focus on spin-offs and investing in these spin-offs. Even though the
holding companies could also hold patents and license them, the
mission of the university TTOs became to spin-off companies from
research (Deiaco et al. 2006).
At the end of 1990s, the system expanded to fourteen university
TTOs, some of them very small and with very limited funds (Deiaco
et al. 2006). From 2003 and onwards, the expansion of the system
was fuelled by additional government support targeted at starting or
expanding incubators connected to the university TTOs (Vinnova
2009). In 2008, the Swedish government proposed the reform of the
government financing of the TTO system, restricting funding to
eight TTOs, each with a regional mission to serve several univer-
sities and smaller university colleges in the region (Vinnova 2009).
Swedish university TTOs are usually a mix of a traditional TTO of-
fice, an incubator, and an investment company controlled by the
university. The university holding companies have limited invest-
ment funds, and so they often work with investors, including private
and other state investment companies. One important state-funded
investor is ‘Innovationsbron’, which has larger investment funds
that allow it to go beyond seed capital and the first rounds of invest-
ment. Since 2010 the government financially supports the eight
TTOs with annual grants in a similar fashion to the Norwegian sys-
tem: to validate commercial potential of research, financial support
for TTO infrastructure, and financial support for TTO activities and
competency development.
3.3 TTO structure
Denmark has eight universities and their TTOs are units under the
control of the university management. Almost all commercial activ-
ity is generated by the four largest universities and the technical uni-
versity: Aalborg University, Aarhus University, Copenhagen
University, Danish Technical University, and the University of
Southern Denmark. The smaller TTOs located at the more special-
ized universities, Copenhagen Business School, IT University of
Copenhagen, and Roskilde University, exhibit very limited technol-
ogy transfer activity. Danish TTOs tend to be average in size
569
compared to other European TTOs (Piccaluga et al. 2012) with an
average of nine employees. Most employees (40%) are trained in
law, some 30% have a science or technology background, and 15%
have a business or finance background (Styrelsen for Forskning og
Innovation 2014).
The largest of the six Norwegian TTOs are the ones serving the
University of Oslo (INVEN2), the Norwegian Technical University
in Trondheim (NTNU Technology Transfer), and the University of
Bergen (Bergen Teknologiöverföring). Norwegian TTOs tend to be
larger than their Danish counterparts, with an average of eighteen
employees, ranging from eight to twenty-seven employees. Roughly
50% of TTO employees have a science or technology background,
30% have a business or finance background, 15% have some other
background, and only 5% have training in law (Borlaug et al. 2009;
Rasmussen et al. 2013).
The eight university TTOs and holding companies in Sweden are
located at Chalmers Technical University, Gothenburg University,
Karolinska Institute (KI), Royal Institute of Technology (KTH),
Linköping University, Lund University, Umeå University, and
Uppsala University. In terms of the number of employees, the TTOs
tend to be somewhat smaller than their counterparts in Norway, but
larger than those in Denmark. Most of the employees at Swedish
TTOs work in the business development and finance domains.
3.4 TTO governance and monitoring
The Danish TTOs are owned and managed by the universities. They
are organized as units in the central university administration dir-
ectly under the vice-chancellor. Danish universities are not allowed
to start businesses or foundations for technology transfer, and co-
ownership with science parks requires special permissions by the
Danish Parliament (OECD 2003). The only Danish university that
has such co-ownership and also own some businesses linked to com-
mercialization is the DTU. The Danish TTOs are relatively small
units as presented above and beside assisting in commercialization
also have the responsibility to manage research collaboration con-
tracts between businesses and university researchers. The output
from the TTOs is very visible and public in the sense that each year
the output is reported publically in a report by Styrelsen for
Forskning og Innovation. The reporting is standardized and all
Danish TTOs report yearly figures for disclosures, applied patents,
approved patents, patent portfolio, license deals, spin-offs, number
of employees, income and costs, and some other data. The aware-
ness of the results from the university technology transfer system is
quite high at the state level, university level, and researcher level (cf.
Baldini 2009). The reporting has a narrow TTO focus and does not
try to estimate regional, industry, or national effects of the TTO
output.
The Norwegian TTOs are independent organizations with its
own management, in the form of limited companies, owned by the
higher education institutes in the region. Their boards are domi-
nated by representatives from the higher education institutes. Five of
the six Norwegian university TTOs have a background in the pre-
2003 TTO system that primarily were attached to regional science
parks and incubators and had a regional mission. The Norwegian
TTOs follow the reporting procedures for all limited companies
issuing annual reports but also report to the Norwegian statistical
agency (since 2007) and the FORNY government program. The
Norwegian government commissions ad hoc evaluations of the
TTOs by independent researchers (Borlaug et al. 2009; Rasmussen
et al. 2013; Spilling et al. 2014) that analyzes the operations and
570 Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4

Table 1. Summary of characteristics of university technology transfer regimes in the three countries.

Country Denmark Norway Sweden

Legal framework
Conditions for university
ownership
Policy intent
Government programs and
financial support
Local innovation system
TTO governance and monitoring
No. of university TTOs
Average no. of employees/TTO (2013)
Dominant employee competency (2013)
University ownership since 2000
If the TTO declares interest
within 2 months from
disclosure
Strengthen the relations between
industry and the universities
Government support in start-up
phase, since 2007 self-financed
þ university funded. Minor
proof-of-concept program
2006–12.
No in-house investment funds or
incubator. Proof-of-concept al-
lowances 2006–12.
University units under university
management, annual, standar-
dized and publically available
reporting
8 6
9 18
Law
University ownership since 2003
If the TTO declares interest
within 4 months from disclos-
ure, but researcher may always
decide to publish instead
To increase the value creation
through commercializing
knowledge-based business
ideas with a high value cre-
ation potential
Annual government support
since 2003 (FORNY pro-
gram). Support for both TTO
infrastructure and commercial
development. New support
program since 2009 until 2020
(FORNY 2020)
In-house investment funds, incu-
bators, and science parks at
five of the six TTOs
Independent organizations co-
owned with other universities,
and in partnerships with com-
plementary organizations.
Reporting ad hoc and mostly
on regional effects
Business development
University inventor since 1949
Only through voluntary agree-
ments with the researcher
To encourage researchers to com-
mercialize research knowledge
Special funding of university
holding companies and incu-
bators since 1995 and 2003,
respectively. Annual govern-
ment support for innovation
offices since 2010.
Tight connections with incuba-
tors, science parks, in-house
investment funds, and other
investors
Independent organization owned
by the university, and in part-
nerships with complementary
organizations. Reporting ad
hoc and mostly comparative
with other TTOs
8
16
Business development

output of the Norwegian TTOs and try to estimate their regional,
industry, and national long-term effects. The reports of the
Norwegian TTO output are generally less strict4 and visible com-
pared to the Danish monitoring of their TTOs.
The Swedish TTOs are a mix of university units and independent
organizations run by their own management in the form of limited
companies. The eight innovation offices (since 2010) sponsored dir-
ectly by the Swedish government and the state innovation agency
(Vinnova) are formally run under the university management. The
innovation office handles (voluntary) disclosures by academic teach-
ers and validates the ideas technical and commercial potential. The
commercialization part of the innovation process is normally
handled by the universities’ holding company that further develops
the ideas into commercial projects. The holding company is organ-
ized as a limited company and reports through annual reports and
boards are generally dominated by university management represen-
tatives and regional business people. The mix of a university unit,
wholly sponsored by the government, and a holding company trad-
itionally with close ties to regional science parks and business give
the Swedish TTOs a rather loose connection to the university it is
supposed to serve (Vinnova 2015). The output of the TTOs is re-
ported through the university annual report and the holding com-
pany’s annual report. The Swedish government commissions
infrequently ad hoc evaluations of the TTOs performed by the in-
novation agency (Vinnova 2002, 2009, 2015) and generally has a
long-term focus comparing the different TTOs strategic orienta-
tions. In general, the TTO output seems of less importance in these
ad hoc evaluations. The strictness and visibility of the Swedish TTO
reporting and results is the lowest of the three Scandinavian coun-
tries. Table 1 summarizes the discussion of the university technology
transfer regimes in the three countries.
4. Data collection and method
In the USA and Canada, empirical data regarding university com-
mercialization has been systematically collected and published annu-
ally since 1991 by the AUTM. These survey data have been used in
many research projects to date (e.g. Siegel et al. 2007). Such a sys-
tematic collection of empirical data has not been carried out in
Europe, but surveys have been conducted in five European countries
(Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the UK) from 2005 to 2011
(Piccaluga et al. 2012).
The availability of information-concerning university TTOs at
Scandinavian universities varies. Danish universities publish their in-
formation through ‘Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation’, provid-
ing yearly summaries of disclosures, patent applications, patents,
licenses, spin-offs, personnel, and so on. Data are available from
2004 to 2013. The same data for Danish TTOs are also found in
part in the PROTON survey (Piccaluga et al. 2012). In this survey, I
have chosen to include the six most active university TTOs and ex-
clude the TTOs at Roskilde University and Copenhagen Business
School both showing a very low activity. Norwegian TTOs have
undergone several independent public investigations throughout
their existence. The data reported here comes from the three latest
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
investigations in 2009, 2013, and 2014 (Borlaug et al. 2009;
Rasmussen et al. 2013; Spilling et al. 2014) and from annual reports
published by the FORNY program. Data are available from 2004 to
2013 except for number of employees that are available from 2006
to 2013 (Table 2). I have collected data from all the six university
TTOs in Norway.
In Sweden, there is no equivalent source of data concerning the
university TTOs. Since 2010, most Swedish universities have pub-
lished figures annually regarding disclosures, patents, licenses, and
spin-offs as required by their owner, the Swedish state. In order to
gather data before 2010, I have consulted the annual reports of the
university holding companies. For six of the most active holding
companies at Swedish universities, I have found data for their spin-
off and licensing activity, disclosures, and personnel. These six hold-
ing companies are located at and controlled by Gothenburg
University, KI, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Linköping
University, Lund University, and Uppsala University. Once the eight
regional TTOs began to operate in 2010, six of them were located at
these same six universities, working in close relation with the exist-
ing university holding companies. Of the eight Swedish university
TTOs supported by the government’s TTO program, these six uni-
versities represent the great majority of the total TTO activity in
Sweden.
Since the Swedish technology transfer system began in 1995 with
holding companies operated by the universities, I gathered statistics
from the annual reports of these holding companies (2004–13), as
well as from their websites. For the period of 2010–13, these data
have also been supplemented with information from the universities’
annual reports. From 2010, Swedish universities have been obligated
to report disclosures, patents, and spin-offs in their annual reports.
In the Danish statistics (Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation
2014), a licensing deal includes a commercial agreement to license
patented research knowledge (including software) to a firm or other
organization, whether it be an established commercial unit or a new
start-up. A university spin-off is a new venture that has an agree-
ment with the university to use research knowledge in the form of
intellectual property or other forms. The new venture can be wholly
or partly started by the inventor, the researcher, or a third party.
The compensation for transferring research knowledge to a spin-off
could come in the form of shares, royalties, and/or cash. Norwegian
statistics define licensing deals and spin-offs in the same way as the
Danish statistics (Rasmussen et al. 2013), whereas, in Sweden, a
licensing deal or a spin-off does not have to include an agreement
with the university, as the research knowledge is owned by the aca-
demic researcher. In this case, university spin-offs are only reported
when the university holding company invests in the new venture, re-
ceives shares as compensation for patenting support or other ser-
vices, or provides substantial business development support to assist
in the start-up process. The researcher normally holds the patents
and establishes, either wholly or partly, the new venture. Licensing
deals for which the university holding company is an owner are also
reported in the annual reports. Basic data for all the eighteen univer-
sities and the university TTOs are found in Supplementary Table 1,
and data regarding license deals and spin-offs are found in
Supplementary Table 2. It is important to note that this is total
population study of presently operating university TTOs in Norway
and near total population study of Danish and Swedish university
TTOs. In Norway there has existed and still exist smaller regional
university college TTOs, that is, not full universities with permanent
research capabilities, with very limited activity (Spilling et al. 2014).
In Sweden there has also existed smaller university college TTOs
571
Table 2. Number of TTO employees and increase in TTO capacity
between 2006 and 2013.
Percentage Percentage Number of TTO
of TTO increase employees in
employees of capacity relation
in 2006 between to total
and 2006 and university
2013 2013 employees
(2013)
Danish university TTOs 43 (75) 74 0.24%
Norwegian university TTOs 62 (108) 74 0.54%
Swedish university TTOs 80 (96) 20 0.32%
until 2008. Also they showed very limited activity (Deiaco et al.
2006) and later merged into the new system with eight regional uni-
versity TTOs in 2010. For all practical purposes this is a total popu-
lation study, thus significance tests are not needed in order to find
support or no not for the four propositions.
5. Descriptive statistics and results
Denmark changed to university ownership IPR at the beginning of
2000 and Norway at the beginning of 2003; Sweden has retained its
university inventor IPR. According to Proposition 1, we would ex-
pect a growth in TTO capacity (measured by number of employees)
in the Danish and Norwegian TTOs, but less-pronounced growth
(or no growth) in the Swedish TTOs.
Figure 1 shows that the number of employees has steadily
increased in the Danish and Norwegian TTOs. If we compare em-
ployee growth in the period from 2006 to 2013 (when there are data
for all three countries), the Danish and Norwegian TTOs exhibited
a 74% increase in the number of employees. Meanwhile, the
Swedish TTOs exhibited a more modest growth at 20%. However,
if we relate the number of TTO employees to the total number of
university employees, in each country (see exhibit 2), the level of
TTO employees is the highest in Norway, the second highest in
Sweden, and the lowest in Denmark. Danish TTOs have only about
half of the number of TTO employees in relation to their university
size compared to the Norwegian TTOs.
The Danish increase in TTO capacity has come from the found-
ing of new university TTOs as this funding did not exist before
2000. The government program offering initial TTO start-up financ-
ing gave incentives to universities to start their own TTOs. The dip
in employee growth around 2007 may have been caused by the end-
ing of government funding and the transition to funding from license
and spin-off incomes and universities’ own budgets. Nevertheless,
the Danish universities have continued to grow their TTOs even
though the system as whole generates financial losses (Styrelsen for
Forskning og Innovation 2014). The growth in later years among
Danish TTOs comes mainly from an expansion by the DTU that has
stepped up its TTO activities despite experiencing economic losses
(Styrelsen for Forskning og Innovation 2014). The Norwegian gov-
ernment funding is different from the Danish funding giving the
Norwegian TTOs annual allowances for both infrastructure and for
commercialization projects. Thus, they can maintain a higher level
of employees than the Danish TTOs. There is a dip in growth when
the FORNY government program ended in 2009, following a brief
period of uncertainty regarding future government financing,
572
Figure 1. Total number of university TTO employees in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden 2004–13 (2006–13 in Norway).
causing stagnation in TTO capacity. After 2009, a new government
program called FORNY 2020 was launched. The new program
increased the level of financial support to TTOs and promised to
continually increase the funding until the year 2020. Since then the
Norwegian TTOs have increased their capacity.
It is interesting to note the high level of Swedish TTO capacity in
the beginning of the studied period, compared to the Norwegian
and especially the Danish TTOs, as government programs targeting
university holding companies and incubators had been in operation
since the mid-1990s. However, a dip in capacity is visible in 2008–
09, when some government support for TTOs and incubators was
rescinded (Vinnova 2009). A new government program supporting
the establishment of regional university innovation offices com-
menced in 2010 and is still in operation.
The university holding companies in Sweden have quite limited
funds and none of the holding companies had any major financial
success during this period of time to help make them financially in-
dependent. Thus, the Swedish TTO capacity reflects the level of gov-
ernment support to the TTO system. In addition, the acting owners,
the Swedish universities, have been unwilling to invest more capital
in their holding companies from their research or education funds.
These findings in part confirm Proposition 1; under the new uni-
versity ownership IPR, Danish and Norwegian university TTOs
have expanded their capacity more than Swedish university TTOs,
which retained the university inventor regime. It is, however, im-
portant to keep in mind that it is not the change in legal framework
that directly causes the TTO expansion. The cause is the government
programs and financing of university technology transfer activities.
Here the structure of government financing is important. The
Danish government financing was only available in the initial
buildup phase and only to university TTO units. The Norwegian
government financing is in the form of annual allowances for both
infrastructure and project support and for university units as well as
supporting organizations.
Overall, comparing the sizes of the six universities in each coun-
try (see Figure 1) the Swedish TTO system still has a capacity that is
greater than that of the Danish TTO system even though it has not
grown so much in the past decade. In that respect, Proposition 1 is
not supported. Even if Sweden has retained the legal framework of
inventor ownership Swedish universities expand their TTOs as long
as their government financing is available to them.
The second proposition stated that university TTOs in countries
changing from university inventor IPR to university ownership IPR
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
Figure 2. Development of licensing deals in the three countries’ university
TTOs 2004–13.
will expand their licensing activity more than university TTOs in
countries retaining the university inventor regime.
Figure 2 shows the statistics for the development of licensing
deals from 2004 to 2013. As can be seen in the figure, the Danish
TTOs had a dramatic increase in the number of licensing deals only
4 years after the law change in 2000. Danish TTOs had license activ-
ity also before 2004 that is not shown in the graph. In 2000–03,
there were six, six, fourteen, and twenty-two license deals registered.
As data is lacking from Swedish and Norwegian TTOs from this
period, I have not shown these numbers in the graph. A steady
growth is also exhibited in the Norwegian case. As in the Danish
case, most of the growth occurs about 4–5 years after the law
change. The Swedish TTOs exhibit a pattern of very low licensing
activity and no growth trend.
Proposition 3 proposed the decreasing importance of spin-offs
under the university ownership IPR. In Fig. 3, the development of
the number of spin-offs is presented for the three countries. The fig-
ure shows that spin-offs are unusual among the Danish TTOs, and,
despite a slight increase over the last 2 years, spin-off activity has re-
mained steadily at a low level. Danish TTOs had spin-off activity
also before 2004 that is not shown in the graph; ranging from one
spin-off in 2000 to four spin-offs in 2003. This limited increase of
spin-offs for the Danish TTOs in recent years has in part been attrib-
uted to a temporary government program for proof-of-concept sup-
port enabling to further develop research knowledge (DEA 2013),
which was in place from 2006 to 2012.
The Norwegian TTOs had slightly more spin-offs than the
Danish TTOs, but again did not exhibit any real increase. The
Swedish TTOs normally use spin-offs as their preferred strategy.
The dip in spin-offs visible around 2007 was due to uncertainty over
government financing and the future of the legal framework. A gov-
ernment program financing university incubators stopped in 2007,
and, at the same time, there was a political debate regarding the uni-
versity inventor system with several calls to change the system
(Statens Offentliga Utredningar 2005).
The development of license deals and spin-offs could just be the
result of the increasing size of the TTOs as presented previously.
More employees can handle more license deals and spin-offs.
Figure 4 describes the development of license deals and spin-offs in
the three countries per TTO employee.
In Fig. 4, the initial growth of license deals in Denmark is very
visible, but since 2009 it has stabilized around 1.5 license deals/em-
ployee. The Swedish spin-offs and Norwegian license deals per
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
Figure 3. Spin-off activity in Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian university
TTOs 2004–13.
Figure 4. License deals and spin-offs per TTO employee in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden.
employee also show a growth. However, Danish and Norwegian
spin-offs, as well as Swedish license deals, show no growth at all if
the TTO expansion over time is taken into account. In comparison
it is noticeable that the Norwegian growth in license deals over time
is not nearly as strong as in Denmark. Thus, the growth of licensing
deals in Denmark and Norway, as well as spin-offs in Sweden, is not
only a question of expanding TTO size.
It is especially interesting to compare the three major
Scandinavian universities that are dominated by medical and bio-
technical research: the KI in Stockholm, the University of
Copenhagen, and the University of Oslo. The TTO at the University
of Copenhagen has access to a TTO office with fifteen employees,
most of them having science and business law competencies. As
mentioned above, the University of Oslo’s TTO, INVEN2, is the
only university TTO in Norway without access to business develop-
ment capabilities, and most of its employees’ competencies are in
science and business law. The KI has one of the most developed sys-
tems for commercializing research knowledge among all Swedish
TTOs. KI describes its innovation system as comprised of five actors
or organizational units (KI 2013):
1. The Unit for Bio-Entrepreneurship, which is responsible for edu-
cation and research in innovation and entrepreneurship.
573
2. The Innovation Office, which is responsible for scouting ideas
and commercially-interesting research knowledge in life science
and verifying their commercial potential.
3. KI Innovation, which is responsible for taking over commer-
cially-verified life science projects from the Innovation Office
and provides the projects with patent and legal advice, business
advice, and seed funding, to form a spin-off company.
4. The KI Science Park, which is responsible for providing incuba-
tor and science park facilities (office space, labs, equipment, etc.)
for promising life science spin-offs.
5. Karolinska Development, which is a life science investment com-
pany noted on the Stockholm-NASDAQ stock exchange, and
which has an agreement with KI Innovation to have first right to
invest in the most promising spin-offs. At the end of 2013, the
company had thirty-three spin-offs in its portfolio with seven-
teen in the clinical phase, and a portfolio valued at around 2 bil-
lion USD.
Figure 5 depicts the strategic behavior of the three university
TTOs in the period 2004–13 in terms of number of spin-offs and li-
censes per TTO employee. As the figure shows, Copenhagen
University stands out in its overwhelming use of the license strategy.
KI stands out in its predominant use of the spin-off strategy; with
forty-nine spin-offs coming (0.29 spin-off per TTO employee) out of
their TTO system compared to University of Copenhagen’s twelve
spin-offs (0.12 spin-off per TTO employee) and University of Oslo’s
twenty-four spin-offs (0.15 spin-off per TTO employee). The innov-
ation system at KI is also quite unique from a Swedish perspective,
especially in terms of the relatively large financial capability of the
investment company, which makes it possible to develop life science
projects from preclinical development to phase 2 clinical trials be-
fore exiting, that is, selling off the company or licensing its technol-
ogy. Neither the University of Copenhagen nor the University of
Oslo has such capabilities, which forces them to license their tech-
nologies much earlier in the development process.
In summary, the Danish case supports Propositions 2 and 3 in
the sense that a new legal framework in combination with limited
funding of the system, limited access to business development capa-
bilities, and no funds for commercial development give little options
to the TTO units to do anything else than to evaluate disclosures
from an IPR perspective, that is, to patent and to license. The close
monitoring of the Danish TTO units reinforces these incentives to
focus on activities that generate results in the form of applied and
granted patents as well as possibilities of licensing with little risk
and a faster process compared to assisting spin-offs. Moreover,
Danish universities are not allowed to invest in other supporting or-
ganizations or co-own science parks without special approval from
the Danish Parliament making it more costly for Danish TTOs to
transfer a commercial project to such organizations that can provide
further business development support. The Danish TTOs also have
the responsibility to assist in research collaborations between estab-
lished firms and researchers, that is, to draw up and/or evaluate con-
tracts. In this context, TTO employees with scientific and/or legal
competence have dual use, both in research collaborations and in
patenting/licensing while TTO employees with business develop-
ment competence only have one use, that is, in licensing. The excep-
tion in the Danish university technology transfer system is the DTU
that has received approval by the Danish Parliament to own and co-
own some supporting organizations such as seed funds, an incuba-
tor, and a science park and also allocated their own budgets for
proof-of-concept funds and internal business development
574
Figure 5. Yearly average of spin-offs and licenses per TTO employee based
on the time period 2004–13 (2006–13 for University of Oslo) at three major
medical and biotechnical Scandinavian universities.
competence. The TTO unit at the DTU has the competence and
some financing options to further develop interesting projects in the
form of spin-offs that other Danish TTO units lack.
The Norwegian case partly supports Propositions 2 and 3 as li-
cense activity has increased, but less than in the Danish case, and
spin-off activity has stagnated, at roughly the same low level (per
TTO employee) as the Danish case. The stepwise reformation of the
Norwegian TTO system from a regionally-oriented and science
park-connected system to a system with much closer ties to the uni-
versities and less connected to regional science parks has led to
greater focus on the license strategy and relatively less use of the
spin-off strategy. The TTO-serving University of Oslo, INVEN2, is
the best example of this as it was started as a new organization in
2009 without the connections to the old system. Compared to the
overall size of the universities the Norwegian TTOs use the spin-off
strategy more often than their Danish counterparts reflecting the
availability of funding for commercial development of projects in
Norway and the access to business development competence in the
Norwegian TTOs as well as complementary business development
support from regional incubators and science parks.
The Swedish case supports Propositions 2 and 3 as the spin-off
strategy is increasingly used while licensing strategy is almost not
used at all among Swedish TTOs. The government funding of uni-
versity holding companies and incubators with close ties to regional
science parks and other complementary business development assets
have created a system that is almost exclusively oriented toward
spin-offs. Researchers interested in patenting and licensing normally
bypass the Swedish TTOs and go directly to the companies to make
their own deals (Jacobsson et al. 2013).
Proposition 4 stated that, under university ownership regimes,
university TTOs with access to business development capabilities,
such as business development competencies, incubators, science
parks, and seed funds, will more predominantly use the spin-off
strategy. In our sample of TTOs, only the DTU of the Danish TTOs
had access to such capabilities and has produced 31% of all univer-
sity spin-offs in Denmark during the studied time period. The DTU’s
use of the license and spin-off strategy (per TTO employee) com-
pared to the average use in the five other Danish TTOs is shown in
Fig. 6.
The difference in absolute levels of use of the commercialization
strategies seems modest, but the relative mix of the commercializa-
tion strategies is quite different. About one out of six
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
Figure 6. Yearly average of spin-offs and licenses per TTO employee based
on the time period 2004–13 at the DTU TTO with business development capa-
bilities and at five Danish University TTOs with no business development
capabilities.
commercialization projects is a spin-off at the DTU while only about
one of ten is a spin-off at the rest of the Danish TTOs. One also has
to bear in mind that the DTU business development capabilities are
limited compared to the Swedish and Norwegian TTOs. Only a
handful of commercial projects can receive proof-of-concept and
seed funds at the DTU each year.
Among the Norwegian TTOs, five had access to business devel-
opment capabilities—all except the TTO connected to the
University of Oslo (INVEN2). During this period of time, the TTO
at the University of Oslo produced 52% of all licensing deals in the
Norwegian TTO system. By contrast, the other five university TTOs
produced 81% of all university spin-offs in Norway. The University
of Oslo’s research is dominated by its medical faculty, and, thus, its
research knowledge is especially suited to licensing. Nevertheless,
the difference between the only TTO without business development
capabilities and the other five with access is striking. Figure 7 shows
the number of licenses and spin-offs between 2004 and 2013 per em-
ployee of the TTOs at University of Oslo and the the five
Norwegian TTOs with access to business development capabilities.
As can be seen from the graph, University of Oslo uses predomin-
antly the license strategy while the other five TTOs have a mixed
strategy using both commercialization strategies.
Overall support is found for Proposition 4. University TTOs
with their own business development capabilities as well as access to
complementary business development competence in co-owned or
partner support organizations directly influence the use of the spin-
off strategy in such a way that it will be used more often, relative to
the license strategy, by the university TTO than by university TTOs
without such capabilities.
Summarizing the findings there was in part some support for the
four propositions stated in the beginning of the article. The expan-
sion of the TTO system in all three countries and variations in indi-
vidual TTOs strategic behavior, regardless of change in the legal
framework or not, point to the general conclusion that university
technology transfer regimes are more than their legal framework. As
has been presented in Section 3, the university technology transfer
regime also includes policy intent, structure of government funding
and access to business development competence and resources, TTO
governance and monitoring. The three country cases have showed
how these factors interplay to create a technology transfer regime
that influences the relative use of the two commercialization strat-
egies. As the country cases also have shown, the regimes still give
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
Figure 7. Yearly average of spin-offs and licenses per TTO employee based
on the time period 2004–13 at the University of Oslo TTO with no business de-
velopment capabilities and at the remaining five Norwegian University TTOs
with access to business development capabilities.
room for individual university TTOs to modify their strategic
behavior.
6. Concluding remarks
This present study focused on the three Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) and included data from almost all
university TTOs in these countries over a 10-year period (2004–13).
This study complements and develops our understanding of univer-
sity technology transfer regimes and commercialization strategies.
First, this study verifies Geuna and Rossi’s (2011) study on changes
in European university technology transfer IPR regulations; a change
from university inventor to university ownership IPR results in fur-
ther investment and expansion of the university TTO system.
However, the Swedish case shows that retaining the university in-
ventor ownership IPR has also resulted in further public investment
and expansion of the university TTO system. Apparently the gener-
ally-embraced ideas of the university ‘third mission’ and the entre-
preneurial university are strong regardless of university technology
transfer IPR. Second, this study also complements Geuna and
Rossi’s (2011) study by noting the importance of differences in
European university ownership regimes. While the laws governing
the university IP might be very similar, as in the Danish and
Norwegian case, other factors that more directly influence the use of
the two different commercialization strategies are:
- Policy intent: the TTO system as a way to strengthen support
for and relations with existing industry or as a way to stimulate uni-
versity researchers to start up new firms and industries regionally
and nationally.
- Government financial support system: one time initial allow-
ance from the state budget vs annual allowances from the state
budget.
- TTO business development capabilities: no or very limited ac-
cess to business development capabilities vs access to business devel-
opment capabilities through specific government support of further
commercial development in the TTO and/or its partnered organiza-
tions such as funds for proof of concept, market research, product
development, seed funding.
- TTO performance monitoring: strict monitoring with an em-
phasis on patents and licenses or ad hoc monitoring with an em-
phasis on regional growth and development.
575
These four factors give different incentives to the universities and
their TTOs to choose more or less of the two different commercial-
ization strategies. Third, this study also verifies and complements
Kenney and Patton’s (2011) study on the question of whether uni-
versity inventor IPR encourage academic entrepreneurship. Kenney
and Patton based their study on data from seven universities (the
University of Waterloo in Canada and six major US universities) in
North America over a 50-year period (1957–2009). In line with
Kenney and Patton’s (2011) result, this study supports the finding
that university inventor IPR tend to encourage academic entrepre-
neurship (cf. Damsgaard and Thursby 2013) with the qualification
that the policy intent, government financial support system, and
TTOs’ access to business development capabilities and monitoring
also have to support academic entrepreneurship. Moreover, the
TTOs at the Norwegian University of Technology and DTU show
that internal and partnered access to business development compe-
tence and resources give the TTOs some room for strategic maneu-
vering and to use a more mixed commercialization strategy.
The findings of this study contribute to the policy debate regard-
ing the efficiency of university ownership and university inventor
technology transfer regimes. This study shows that the choice of
legal framework of IPR might not be as important as the design of
the whole university technology transfer regime. The results of this
study suggest that the development and outcome of each country’s
system has to be examined from a wider university technology trans-
fer perspective at least in a government-financed context such as the
European one. For example, the policy decision to start a completely
new system with no relations to previous regional system with access
to business development capabilities, as in the Danish case, or to re-
structure the existing one, as in the Norwegian case, clearly affected
the commercialization strategies. Moreover, the design of the gov-
ernment funding system for TTOs with or without funds for further
commercial development is another factor with influences the use of
commercialization strategies.
For policymaking this study’s results imply that the IPR legal
framework is only one of several policy tools to use for policy makers
in order to influence the use of the two commercialization strategies.
The different policy tools should also be seen in a systemic perspec-
tive, that is, in relation to each other and how they interplay. If a
country wishes to stimulate academic entrepreneurship, regional de-
velopment (Markman et al. 2005) and further development activities
of research knowledge or provide better technology transfer support
for research knowledge in especially computer science, electrical en-
gineering, and physical sciences (Kenney and Patton 2011) the in-
ventor ownership IPR in combination with continuous government
support of business development competence and resources, as well as
a monitoring system emphasizing long-term regional effects might be
the better choice. Countries that already have introduced the univer-
sity ownership regime might contemplate generally more inventor-
centric support activities measures such as support to business devel-
opment capabilities and development of relational-based commercial-
ization practices (Weckowska 2015) at university TTOs in order to
make the spin-off strategy and specifically the exploration model of
university spin-offs (Doganova 2013) more realistic.
There are several limitations to this study. I have depended on a
few secondary sources of data. Although these data have been vali-
dated by government authorities (in the Danish case), by independent
researchers and statistical authorities (in the Norwegian case), and by
certified accountants (in the Swedish case), the definitions of univer-
sity licensing and spin-offs may vary between sources. In the Swedish
case, I was not able to retrieve data for two university TTOs.
576
Moreover, as the three countries and their higher education systems
share many commonalities they also differ in several regards, such as
the rankings of the universities and their level and quality of research
output, thus comparisons across-countries should be made with care.
However, by adjusting the levels of spin-offs and licenses for the size
of the TTO unit, that is, number of TTO employees, I think it is rea-
sonable to compare levels both at certain points in time and over time
across countries. While prior research has indicated that a spin-off
strategy is more beneficial for commercialization from certain techno-
logical fields (Kenney and Patton 2011) and for regional development
(Markman et al. 2005), I have not been able to establish this due to
lack of availability of data. Thus, the effectiveness of the systems can-
not be determined by this study. Moreover, in a relative perspective
some university TTOs seem more ambidextrous, that is, use both
commercialization strategies relatively frequent rather than only one
of them. This is especially the case of the technical universities in the
Scandinavian countries; Danish Technical University, Norwegian
University of Technology and Science, and the KTH Royal Institute of
Technology in Sweden. Perhaps the technical universities’ TTOs are
especially prone to develop both transaction- and relational-based
commercialization practices (Weckowska 2015) due to the
development-oriented engineering disciplines dominating the technical
universities. A more fine-grained and qualitative study on TTOs’ prac-
tices and processes could give more precise answers on how these dif-
fer between university TTOs in different regimes and in different
types of universities. I recommend these questions for further
research.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data is available at Science and Public Policy online.
Notes
1. TTOs are outside organizations and/or university units
involved in the transfer of technological and other research
knowledge from universities that are entrusted by one or
several universities with substantial activity in the transfer
of knowledge from the universities, including intellectual
property management, licensing, creation of spin-offs and
partnering with industry (Piccaluga et al. 2012).
2. The word FORNY in Norwegian means renewal.
3. There is a seventh TTO-serving Norwegian government
labs (SINTEF), which has been excluded from this study.
4. One sign of less strictness in reporting is the difference in
the reported licenses and spin-offs from each TTO in the
FORNY program and the statistics issued by the Statistics
Norway. While the differences are minor they still do dif-
fer in certain years. I have relied on the data from
Statistics Norway (from 2007) that also is the data source
used by the latest university technology transfer evaluation
done by independent researchers (Spilling et al. 2014).
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ) for a research
grant supporting the research reported in this article (Grant number P10-
0869:1). The author also wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4
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