Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

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Research Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/respol

Performance of Spanish universities in technology transfer: An empirical analysis

Aida Caldera a,∗ , Olivier Debande b
a
ECARES - Université Libre de Bruxelles, Av. F.D. Roosevelt 50, CP 114, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
b
European Investment Bank, Rue de la Loi 227, 1040 Brussels, Belgium

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper investigates the performance of universities in the transfer of technology using a unique
Received 29 June 2009 university-level dataset for Spain. The results suggest that universities with established policies and
Received in revised form 26 April 2010 procedures for the management of technology transfer perform better. Universities with large and expe-
Accepted 29 May 2010
rienced technology transfer offices (TTOs) generate higher volumes of contract research, but the TTO
Available online 21 July 2010
characteristics appear to matter less for university performance in terms of licensing and creation of
spin-offs. Furthermore, universities with a science park perform better than those without, which sug-
JEL classification:
gests that the agglomeration of knowledge close to universities has a positive effect on universities’
O31
O32
technology transfer performance.
O33 © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
L3

Keywords:
Industry–science relations
Technology transfer
Universities

1. Introduction acteristics including university ownership (public versus private),

Improving university technology transfer performance in
Europe attracts a lot of attention among policymakers, as evidenced
by the large amount of policy initiatives in this field (see for instance
the European Commission, 2004, 2008). However, there has been
very limited analysis on the efficiency of university technology
transfer systems. The commercialisation of university research has
important economic and policy implications. University–industry
research collaborations, licensing agreements and university-
based firms can result in additional revenue for the university and
employment opportunities for academic researchers and students.
In addition, technological spillovers may stimulate additional R&D
investment and job creation at local level.
The effectiveness of university research commercialisation is
affected by a number of factors. Several papers have shown that
technology transfer performance is influenced by university char-
∗ Corresponding author. Present address: O.E.C.D., Economics Department, 2 Rue
André Pascal, 75775 Paris CEDEX 16, France. Tel.: +33 1 45 24 15 67;
fax: +33 1 44 30 63 83.
E-mail addresses: aida.calderasanchez@oecd.org (A. Caldera),
o.debande@eib.org (O. Debande).
academic quality, local high-tech demand conditions, license con-
tract design and the characteristics of the university technology
transfer office (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002;
Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003; Di Gregorio and
Shane, 2003). Most of these studies analyse the performance of US
universities and explore a variety of different outcome measures,
including the number of patents and licenses, license income, and
the formation of spin-off companies.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the under-
standing of university technology transfer by investigating the
role of policies on performance. Spain makes an interesting case
because public spending on R&D has tripled during the last
decade and technology transfer initiatives have flourished within
Spanish universities (COTEC, 2003). To investigate university tech-
nology transfer performance we compile a unique dataset based
on confidential survey data for Spain and investigate the deter-
minants of university performance in three main activities: R&D
university–industry contracts, licensing of technologies and the
creation of spin-offs. For that purpose we estimate a number of
performance equations where university technology transfer out-
comes are expressed as a function of three main determinants:
university technology transfer policies, technology intermediaries,
such as technology transfer offices and science parks, and univer-

0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.05.016
 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
sity characteristics in terms of size, research quality, ownership and
technological orientation. The empirical results are controlled for
regional and general macro-economic effects and for the poten-
tial endogeneity of university policies and performance using the
pre-sample scaling approach developed by Blundell et al. (1999,
2002).
Our paper expands on the existing literature in various respects.
To begin with, we investigate the role of university policies on
technology transfer performance. The theoretical literature on
university technology transfer underscores the importance of well-
defined university intellectual property policies to motivate the
participation of researchers in technology transfer activities (e.g.
Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Lach and Schankerman, 2008). How-
ever, except for a few studies, notably Lach and Schankerman
(2004, 2008), there is little empirical evidence on the effect of uni-
versity policies on technology transfer performance. The richness
of our dataset allows us to investigate the effects of university
rewarding systems, the procedures for disclosure of inventions, and
university spin-off policies on performance. Secondly, rather than
focusing on one single outcome, we examine multiple measures
of university performance. Previous research has studied univer-
sity performance in licensing or the creation of spin-offs (e.g. Lach
and Schankerman, 2008; Chukumba and Jensen, 2005), but there is
far less evidence on university–industry R&D contracts, despite the
importance of this source of revenue for European universities. Sur-
vey evidence presented by Conti and Gaulé (2008) shows that these
contracts are at least as important as license agreements to a large
number of European universities. Thirdly, we are the first to inves-
tigate the performance of Spanish universities in the transfer of
technology. There are very few studies analysing the performance
of European universities (e.g. Chapple et al., 2005; Conti and Gaulé,
2008, 2009; Sapsalis et al., 2006) and this study contributes to fill
this gap. Finally, we go one step further than the existing litera-
ture and not only investigate the role of technology transfer offices
(TTOs) on performance, but also of university science parks. By tak-
ing into account the role of science parks the analysis is enlarged
and considers the potential geographical spillovers from science
parks on university performance.
Our results suggest that university policies are important deter-
minants of university technology transfer performance. First, we
find that universities with internal rules regulating the participa-
tion of researchers in the transfer of technology perform better than
universities without such internal rules. The results show that uni-
versities with a rule on the potential conflict of interest between
researchers’ academic and external activities perform better. These
results suggest that well-defined university rules improve perfor-
mance by giving researchers incentives to participate in the transfer
of technology, confirming the insights from the theoretical litera-
ture analysing the management structure and incentive schemes
within universities (e.g. Aghion et al., 2005; Macho-Stadler et al.,
1996, 2007; Lach and Schankerman, 2008). Second, we find that
universities allocating a larger proportion of royalties to the inven-
tor generate more licensing income, in line with evidence by Lach
and Schankerman (2008) for the US. Finally, universities granting
researchers leave of absence for setting-up a spin-off company are
more successful in creating spin-offs. And so are universities with
a stake in a risk capital fund confirming the importance of uni-
versities’ venture capital funds in bridging the financing gap for
university-based spin-offs.
The results further show that universities with a science park
perform better than universities without a science park suggesting
possible spillovers from science parks on university performance.
Moreover, universities with larger and more experienced TTOs
generate more and larger revenue from R&D contracts. By con-
trast, contrary to previous evidence on American universities (e.g.
Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Lach and
1161
Schankerman, 2008), we find mixed evidence regarding the effect
of TTO characteristics on licensing and the creation of spin-offs.
The characteristics of the TTO do not influence university licens-
ing activities and only the size of the TTO, but not its experience,
positively affects the rate of creation of spin-offs.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next sec-
tion identifies the determinants of university technology transfer
performance, paying special attention to the particularities of the
Spanish case. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the
empirical framework that underlies the empirical work and Section
5 describes the baseline econometric results and Section 6 a robust-
ness check with respect to the potential endogeneity of university
policies. The concluding remarks in Section 7 summarise the main
findings and give indications for future research.
2. Determinants of university technology transfer
performance
This section describes the main determinants of university per-
formance based on previous literature. To facilitate the discussion
we classify the determinants into three categories: (1) university
technology transfer policies, (2) technology transfer intermedi-
aries, and (3) the institutional characteristics of the university.
2.1. University technology transfer policies
Previous studies have underlined the importance of universi-
ties’ policies and in particular their institutional strategic approach
towards the valorisation of their research (Siegel et al., 2007). In
most countries, universities aim at facilitating the transfer of their
know-how in a fast and efficient way into commercial activities
(European Commission, 2008). Debackere and Veugelers (2005)
argue that to achieve this objective universities need to set up a
clear strategy, notably a set of guidelines to manage the transfer of
technology, without hampering the other, fundamental, university
missions of teaching and research.
An important barrier in the commercialisation of university
research is the failure of academics to disclose their inventions
to the university TTO (Siegel et al., 2003, 2007). Recent evidence
suggests that adequate university policies may contribute to solv-
ing this problem. Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Macho-Stadler
et al. (1996) show that well-defined licensing contracts can act as
an incentive mechanism to stimulate inventors to disclose their
inventions and to participate in the commercialisation process.
Additional evidence by Lach and Schankerman (2008) shows that
American universities giving a higher share of royalties to the
inventor generate more inventions and higher licensing income.
This incentive effect appears to work both by inducing the sorting
of scientists across universities and by increasing scientists’ efforts.
2.2. Technology transfer intermediaries
To manage the transfer of technology between the suppliers of
innovations (university scientists) and those who can potentially
commercialise them universities establish specialised intermedi-
ary structures. University TTOs are typically the most important
intermediaries in the commercialisation of university research.
However, university science parks may also play a role on university
performance to the extent that science parks are created with the
purpose to generate knowledge clusters and improving the transfer
of technology between universities and industries.
2.2.1. Technology transfer offices
In Spain TTOs are the main institutions responsible for the trans-
fer of university research (RedOTRI, 2006). University researchers
are required by the university charter to disclose their inventions to
1162 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
the university TTO. Almost every Spanish university has a TTO pro-
viding a number of services including: (i) evaluation of the quality
of inventions disclosed by researchers, (ii) support for patent appli-
cation, (iii) negotiation of licensing contracts, (iv) contact point for
collaborative and contract research, and (v) support for researchers
in the creation of university-based spin-offs.
Previous research on TTOs identifies a number of key factors
impacting TTO productivity (e.g. Belenzon and Schankerman, 2009;
Chukumba and Jensen, 2005; Coupé, 2003; Siegel et al., 2003;
Thursby and Kemp, 2002). This research shows that successful tech-
nology transfer not only depends on the quality of the research
and the involvement of the inventor, but crucially also on the size
and the experience of the TTO. Among others, Siegel et al. (2003)
find that larger TTOs generate more technology transfer outcomes.
Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman (2004)
find that older TTOs execute more licenses, suggesting that effi-
ciency gains arise as TTOs gain experience in the management of
university technology transfer. Friedman and Silberman (2003) fur-
ther suggest that TTO’s age matters since successful TTOs need to
build a qualitative portfolio of inventions, which is time intensive.
2.2.2. University science parks
About half of all Spanish universities have a science park. Based
on the definition by the national organisation of science parks, uni-
versity science parks aim at facilitating the interaction between
universities and firms located in the park and the creation and
growth of firms resulting from university research (APTE, 2006).
Although the literature on university technology transfer has
not investigated the role of science parks in the process, previ-
ous research suggests the importance of geographic proximity for
successful university–industry relations (Agrawal and Cockburn,
2003). For instance Mansfield (1998), who explores the relationship
between academic and industrial R&D suggests that universities
are more likely to license technology to firms located nearby as
the further development of the technology often requires ongoing
collaborative efforts. We distinguish two main channels through
which sciences park may influence university technology transfer
performance. First, geographical proximity facilitates information
flows, reducing searching and monitoring costs and increasing
the probability of successful university–industry relations. Sec-
ond, science parks provide support infrastructure for the further
development of inventions. Given that the majority of university
inventions are in an embryonic stage at the moment of disclosure,
these incubation services can facilitate the development and test-
ing of the new technology and the sharing of development costs
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Siegel et al., 2003).
2.3. University characteristics
The last determinant of university technology transfer perfor-
mance the literature suggests is the institutional characteristics of
the university. A number of recent empirical studies have found
that the size of the university is positively related to the amount
of technology transfer (e.g. Belenzon and Schankerman, 2009).
Besides size, previous research finds that the research quality of
the university also matters. Universities producing higher qual-
ity research generate more licenses and higher licensing income
as shown by Chukumba and Jensen (2005). Thursby and Kemp
(2002) further suggest that the portfolio of disciplines offered by
the university can also play a distinctive role as some fields of study
are more likely to produce research more attractive for industries.
Recent empirical studies support this hypothesis and show that the
presence of biomedical and engineering faculties appear to be asso-
ciated with higher levels of patenting and licensing activity (e.g.
Lach and Schankerman, 2008).
Moreover, a number of studies have shown that private univer-
sities achieve better performance in terms of scientific publications
and technology transfer activity (Adams and Griliches, 1998; Siegel
et al., 2003). Lach and Schankerman (2008) suggest that a poten-
tial reason for that is that scientists at private institutions are more
responsive to royalty incentives. They also show that TTOs are also
more effective in private universities, suggesting that such institu-
tions are more commercially orientated.
3. Data description
The key source of our data is the RedOTRI technology transfer
survey, which is conducted annually by the network of Spanish
university technology transfer offices (RedOTRI). This unique sur-
vey provides us with confidential data on universities’ technology
transfer activities for 52 universities out of 71 universities in Spain
over 2001–2005. The dataset is representative of the Spanish pop-
ulation of universities. On average it covers over 70% of Spanish
universities, which account for the great majority of academic
scientists (97%), students (78%) and research production (91%) mea-
sured in terms of completed doctoral thesis.
The survey gives annual information for each university on three
types of technology transfer outcomes: the number and income
from university–industry R&D contracts, the number and income
from licensing contracts and the number of spin-offs created with
the support of the university TTO. In addition, the survey provides
information on university technology transfer policies, the charac-
teristics of the TTO and whether or not the university has a science
park. On university technology transfer policies, the survey asks
universities whether or not they have internal rules regulating the
following aspects: (i) the procedure for disclosure of an invention
to the TTO; (ii) the ownership and distribution of the copyrights
from commercialisation of inventions; (iii) academic scientist con-
flict of interests between teaching and other external activities;
(iv) the participation of university academic scientists/researchers
in R&D contracts; and (v) the participation of university academic
scientists/researchers in the creation of a spin-off.
In addition the survey provides annual information on two
university policies to support the creation of spin-offs. First, on
whether or not the university has a programme to help researchers
to create spin-offs. And second, on whether the university has a
stake in a risk capital fund to finance the early stages of spin-offs.
To conclude the survey gives annual information on the character-
istics of the TTO including the number and fields of specialisation of
the personnel working at the TTO, the year the TTO was created, on
university ownership (private/public), and whether the university
has a science park and a medical school or not.
To complement the survey information, we compile data on the
university size, research quality and royalty sharing arrangements
from public sources. We compile yearly information on the number
of academic staff working in each university from the annual survey
on university education by the Spanish national statistical institute.
To measure university research quality, we use three indicators.
First, we construct a quality index for each university as the ratio of
the number of publications in top scientific journals per researcher
based on the study of Moya-Anegón et al. (2007) that covers publi-
cations in the Science Citation Index, the Social Citation Index and
the Arts & Humanities Index. We construct a second indicator using
information on the number of invention disclosures to the TTO
available from the RedOTRI Survey for the years 2003 and 2005.
And third, we use information on the percentage of professors that
obtained a research leave and on the average number of research
leaves per faculty from the Foundation CYD survey. Research leaves
are granted to university academic scientists by a National Commit-
tee based on the number of international publications and therefore
are expected to be correlated with research performance. To con-
 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173 1163

Table 1
Summary statistics, 2001–2005.

Variable Mean Median SD Min Max

Income R&D contracts (thousands of Euros) 4,614 2,898 5,695 0 57,900

Number R&D contracts 180 132 167 0 878
Income licenses (thousands of Euros) 31 4 97 0 483
Number of licensing agreements 2 1 4 0 35
Number of spin-offs 2 1 4 0 31

Regulation R&D contracts (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.82 1 0.39 0 1

Regulation spin-offs (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
Regulation conflicts of interest (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.06 0 0.23 0 1
Regulation copyrights (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.34 0 0.47 0 1
Regulation invention disclosures (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.81 1 0.39 0 1
Spin-off program (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.65 1 0.48 0 1
Access to financing (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.19 0 0.39 0 1
Share of licensing royalties for inventor (%) 53.04 50 12.44 20 90

TTO size (no. employees) 11 7 10 1 58

TTO age 12 13 4 1 20
Specialized employees in R&D contracts (%) 20 18 13 0 70
Specialized employees in licensing (%) 5 5 4 0 25
Specialized employees in spin-offs (%) 6 5 5 0 25
Science park (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.46 0 0.50 0 1

University size (no. faculty) 1,659 1,320 1,152 151 6,197

No. of publications per faculty 3.06 1.42 4.26 0.04 20.01
Percentage of faculty with research leave 53.10 52.50 11.68 28.00 80.00
Average no. of research leaves per faculty 1.08 1.01 0.38 0.50 2.16
No. invention disclosures to the TTO 10.51 6.00 11.31 0 42.00
University ownership (public = 1, private = 0) 0.86 1 0.35 0 1
Medical school (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.55 1 0.50 0 1
Polytechnic school (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.07 0 0.25 1 0

clude, we compile information on the share of the royalties from
licensing an invention that goes to the inventor, from the study on
Spanish universities patenting rules by González-Albo Manglano
and Zulueta Garca (2007).
Table 1 gives some basic descriptive statistics over 2001–2005.
We observe quite some variation in performance among univer-
sities. The median R&D contract is only about half the mean and
differences in performance among universities are even larger
in the number of spin-offs, and especially in terms of licensing
agreements signed and income generated. While not displayed in
Table 1, the distribution of outcomes over universities is particu-
larly skewed to the right for licensing and spin-offs, with almost
half of the universities generating zero licensing and spin-offs. In
what follows, we investigate formally the determinants of univer-
sity performance in R&D contracts, licensing and spin-off creation
using regression analysis.
4. Empirical model and estimation method
In order to investigate the determinants of university technol-
ogy transfer performance we estimate a series of performance
equations where technology transfer outcomes are expressed as
a function of the main determinants identified by the previous
literature and discussed in Section 2. The baseline specification
is a model similar to those specified by Lach and Schankerman
(2004, 2008) and Chukumba and Jensen (2005). A number of studies
use frontier analysis instead and construct a best practice fron-
tier using data on universities’ inputs and outputs (e.g. Chapple
et al., 2005; Thursby and Kemp, 2002). Two methods are typically
used to estimate the best practice frontier: data envelopment anal-
ysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier estimation (SFE). However, both
of these methods have well-known drawbacks (Van Biesebroeck,
2007).1 For this reason we prefer to use linear regression analysis,
1
DEA is deterministic, thus sensitive to measurement errors and outliers, which
can lead to upwardly biased estimates of the technical efficiency scores by attribut-
as previously employed in the literature. We estimate the following
baseline equation:
Yit = ˇ0 + ˇ1 Policiesi + ˇ2 ScParkit + ˇ3 TTOit + Zit B + ˛r + ˛t + εit
(1)
where Yit is the outcome variable for university i in year t cap-
turing the university performance. We consider five measures
of performance: the log of R&D contracts income, the number
of R&D contracts, the log of licensing income, the number of
licensing agreements and the number of spin-offs.2 The explana-
tory variables include university policies (Policiesi ) the technology
transfer intermediaries, science park (ScParkit ) and TTO (TTOit ), and
other university characteristics, Zit . Region fixed effects ˛r con-
trol for regional differences in economic conditions and annual
fixed effects, ˛t , take into account macro-economic shocks, such as
changes in national policies or revenue shocks affecting university
funding.
4.1. University technology transfer policies
The first set of determinants, covers university policies in three
areas: the management of the technology transfer process, royalty
sharing arrangements and support for spin-off creation. We mea-
sure each policy by dummy variables taking the value 1 whenever
the university has an internal rule and 0 otherwise. In general, we
expect universities with a given internal rule to perform better than
universities without one. As discussed in Section 2, survey evidence
ing all deviations from the frontier to technical inefficiency. SFE is very inflexible, as
it requires making strong assumptions about the functional form of the production
function and about the structure of the error term.
2
It should, however, be stressed that using the number of spin-offs as a perfor-
mance measure may not be a reliable indicator of good performance if spin-offs
survival depends on the financial support of the university. In that case, it would
be advisable to complement the information on the number of spin-offs with infor-
mation on spin-off growth and rate of survival. However this type of data is not
available for Spain.
1164 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
by Jensen et al. (2003) shows that university researchers often do
not disclose valuable inventions to the TTO. Such rules can help
to reduce information asymmetries by clarifying researchers’ role
and benefits from commercialising the technology and increase
researchers’ incentives to participate in technology transfer activ-
ities.
An additional policy variable that enters Eq. (1) is the percentage
of royalties from licensing an invention that goes to the inven-
tor. Lach and Schankerman (2004, 2008) show that royalty sharing
arrangements are key determinants of performance. They show
that American universities awarding a larger share of licensing
income to the inventor generate more income. Finally, the spin-
off equation includes a dummy variable measuring whether or
not the university has a spin-off programme and a dummy vari-
able measuring whether the university has a stake in a risk capital
fund. Anecdotal evidence from Spain suggests that university pro-
grammes to support the creation of spin-offs are key for university
success in creating spin-offs. Furthermore, given that university
spin-offs typically face major obstacles to access funding due to
information asymmetry and uncertainty, university-affiliated ven-
ture capital funds may boost spin-off creation by bridging the
financing gap.
4.2. Technology transfer intermediaries
The second set of determinants are technology transfer interme-
diaries: the university technology transfer office„ and the university
science parks,. The vector includes TTO characteristics covering
standard measures such as TTO size, proxied by the number of pro-
fessionals working at the TTO, and age, measured by the number
of years the TTO has been operational. In line with the existing
literature, we expect TTO size and age to positively affect uni-
versity performance. In larger TTOs staff may specialise in those
areas where they have a specific expertise. Older TTOs should be
more experienced in the management and valorisation of technol-
ogy transfer (e.g. Conti and Gaulé, 2009). Additionally, we include a
measure of TTO specialisation proxied by the share of TTO profes-
sionals specialised in each type of technology transfer outcome. As
described in Section 2, Spanish TTOs provide a broad range of ser-
vices, and we expect higher TTO specialisation in a given outcome to
lead to better university performance through economies of scale.
We measure the presence of a university science park by a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the university has a science park and
0 otherwise. We expect the presence of a university science park to
positively affect university technology transfer performance. Geo-
graphical proximity enhances science-industry relations (Agrawal
and Cockburn, 2003). In addition, university science parks usually
host technology incubators, which decrease development costs and
facilitate spin-off formation. Both of these factors can contribute to
increasing the transfer of technology.
4.3. University characteristics
The vector Zit controls for more general university characteris-
tics like size, research quality, ownership and technical orientation
identified by the literature as having an influence on university
technology transfer performance (e.g. Belenzon and Schankerman,
2009; Siegel et al., 2003; Thursby and Kemp, 2002). First, university
size measured by the number of academic scientists is expected
to positively affect performance as larger universities are likely
to generate more research. Second, university research quality,
measured by the number of publications in top scientific jour-
nals per researcher, is expected to positively affect performance as
universities generating higher quality research could more easily
commercialise it.3 Third, the effect of ownership on performance,
measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the university
is public and 0 if the university is private, is not obvious. On the one
hand, as suggested by Belenzon and Schankerman (2009), private
universities may be more flexible and have closer ties with firms
leading to better private universities’ performance. On the other
hand, public universities in Spain are generally older than private
ones, so more likely to have longer research experience and mar-
ket reputation, which may translate into better performance. To
conclude, we control for university research orientation with two
dummy variables: a medical school dummy taking the value 1 if the
university has a medical school and 0 otherwise, and a polytechnic
university dummy, takes the value 1 if the university is polytechnic
and 0 otherwise. The university’s technical orientation is expected
to influence performance, as universities specialised in fields like
biotechnology or technical sciences will be more likely to generate
valuable research output for the business sector than universities
specialised in social sciences.
4.4. Estimation method
We estimate Eq. (1) pooling the data over the sample period
and clustering the error terms at university level to control for
intra-university serial correlation. We do not use panel regression
techniques because a variance decomposition of the dependent
variables shows that most of the relevant variation in the data is
cross-sectional. The equations having as dependent variable the
logs of R&D contract income and licensing income are estimated
by OLS.4 The equations having as dependent variable the count of
the number of R&D contracts, licenses and spin-offs, are estimated
using a Negative Binomial model.
An alternative approach for modelling the count variables would
be to use the common Poisson formulation, but, as pointed out by
Hausman et al. (1984), the Poisson model is highly restrictive, since
it imposes a data distribution for which the mean is equal to its vari-
ance. As discussed in the data section the outcome variables show
a significant amount of over-dispersion with high standard devia-
tions and notable differences between the mean and median values
(see Table 1). Hence, the Negative Binomial specification, which is
a generalisation of the Poisson distribution, to take into account
over-dispersion may be more appropriate. We validate below the
choice of the Negative Binomial over the Poisson model conducting
a likelihood test of the over-dispersion parameter and showing that
it is significantly different from zero, which reinforces our choice
of the Negative Binomial model.
5. Baseline empirical results
5.1. R&D contracts
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for Eq. (1) with
two alternative dependent variables: R&D contracts income and
number of R&D contracts. All regressions take into account inter-
university correlations clustering the error terms at university
3
We also experimented with two other proxies for university research quality
(the number of invention disclosures and the percentage of academic scientists hav-
ing been granted a research leave), but the results on the variables of interest do not
change and they are not significant, so we did not report them. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
4
As suggested by one referee, the error terms in the specifications with log R&D
contracts and log licensing income might be correlated. Therefore as an alternative
we jointly estimated the equations using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The
Breusch Pagan test of independence indicates that the error terms in both equations
are not correlated, therefore individual OLS estimates are prefered. The results from
the SUR test are available upon request.
Table 2
Baseline regression results for R&D contracts.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number
income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D
contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts

TTO size 0.601 0.503 0.548 0.426 0.538 0.374 0.505 0.369 0.487 0.345 0.443 0.261 0.505 0.375 0.508 0.375
(0.134)*** (0.084)*** (0.136)*** (0.084)*** (0.138)*** (0.084)*** (0.136)*** (0.084)*** (0.136)*** (0.080)*** (0.136)*** (0.075)*** (0.136)*** (0.083)*** (0.137)*** (0.083)***
TTO age 0.038 0.043 0.041 0.057 0.042 0.057 0.050 0.072 0.027 0.030 0.041 0.055 0.040 0.052
(0.019)** (0.012)*** (0.020)** (0.013)*** (0.020)** (0.013)*** (0.021)** (0.012)*** (0.021) (0.011)*** (0.020)** (0.012)*** (0.021)* (0.013)***
TTO specialization in 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.014 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.012
R&D contracts
(0.005) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.003)* (0.005) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.003)***
Science park dummy 0.327 0.120 0.320 0.102 0.272 0.007 0.288 0.097 0.332 0.127
(0.119)*** (0.073)* (0.119)*** (0.069) (0.119)** (0.064) (0.123)** (0.073) (0.120)*** (0.073)*

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

Rule on R&D contract −0.377 −0.686
dummy
(0.239) (0.144)***
Rule on conflict of 1.017 1.471
interests dummy
(0.385)*** (0.202)***
Rule on copyrights −0.158 −0.146
dummy
(0.128) (0.082)*
Rule on invention 0.066 0.181
disclosures dummy
(0.177) (0.113)

Controls for university characteristics

University size 0.960 0.762 0.791 0.586 0.780 0.548 0.757 0.544 0.721 0.485 0.896 0.791 0.750 0.538 0.756 0.542
(0.118)*** (0.076)*** (0.145)*** (0.088)*** (0.147)*** (0.086)*** (0.145)*** (0.086)*** (0.146)*** (0.083)*** (0.152)*** (0.081)*** (0.145)*** (0.086)*** (0.145)*** (0.085)***
Number of 0.047 0.074 0.046 0.072 0.047 0.077 0.055 0.080 0.051 0.074 0.050 0.072 0.050 0.077 0.056 0.083
publications/faculty
(0.018)** (0.012)*** (0.018)** (0.012)*** (0.018)** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)*** (0.012)***
Public university 0.614 1.047 0.638 1.012 0.682 1.229 0.711 1.247 0.844 1.501 0.489 0.853 0.751 1.310 0.729 1.290
dummy
(0.270)** (0.174)*** (0.268)** (0.168)*** (0.285)** (0.175)*** (0.280)** (0.175)*** (0.291)*** (0.173)*** (0.288)* (0.163)*** (0.281)*** (0.176)*** (0.285)** (0.177)***
Medical school dummy 0.097 0.385 0.093 0.363 0.084 0.315 0.096 0.315 0.186 0.469 0.024 0.193 0.093 0.313 0.105 0.336
(0.143) (0.090)*** (0.142) (0.088)*** (0.144) (0.087)*** (0.141) (0.086)*** (0.152) (0.088)*** (0.141) (0.077)** (0.141) (0.086)*** (0.143) (0.087)***
Polytechnic university 0.543 −0.107 0.521 −0.110 0.536 −0.031 0.510 −0.039 0.541 0.025 0.607 0.155 0.532 −0.026 0.516 −0.018
dummy
(0.191)*** (0.120) (0.190)*** (0.118) (0.193)*** (0.117) (0.189)*** (0.117) (0.190)*** (0.109) (0.190)*** (0.103) (0.190)*** (0.117) (0.191)*** (0.117)

R-squared 0.74 – 0.74 – 0.74 – 0.75 – 0.76 – 0.76 – 0.75 – 0.75 –

Likelihood ratio test of – 5013.82 – 4274.12 – 3972.40 – 3950.70 – 3673.41 – 2445.13 – 3953.33 – 3596.78
alpha = 0 statistics
Probability – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206

Notes: Results from estimating Eq. (1) with log R&D contracts income and number of R&D contracts as dependent variables. Income refers to the income from R&D contracts. Number refers to the number of R&D contracts. The
income equations are estimated by OLS, while the number equations are estimated using a Negative Binomial model. Robust standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the university level. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies.

1165
1166 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
level. Each column of Table 2 reports alternative specifications of
Eq. (1) where the various explanatory variables enter subsequently.
The different specifications are controlled regional and year fixed
effects.
Considering the effect of TTO characteristics, columns (1)–(8)
show that larger TTO size is associated with better performance.
An increase in TTO size of one professional (about a 10% increase)
is associated with a rise in R&D contract income of about 44–60
percentage points. As shown in columns (2)–(8), the number and
income from R&D contracts are higher for older TTOs. An additional
year of TTO experience translates to an increase in R&D income
of between 4 and 5 percentage points, depending on the speci-
fications. Columns (3)–(8) show that TTO specialisation on R&D
contracts does not appear to significantly impact R&D contracts
income, however, TTO specialisation has a significant and positive
effect on the number of R&D contracts generated. This result might
indicate that TTO incentives are biased in favour of maximising the
number of contracts, irrespective of the flow of income generated
by such contracts.
Regarding the role of science parks, columns (4)–(8) show that
universities with a science park generate more R&D income than
universities without one. Universities with a science park generate
about 30% more income than universities without one. However,
the effect of science parks on the number of R&D contracts, although
positive, is only significant in two out of five specifications, and only
at the 10% level. This result may suggest that science parks are a
source of positive spillovers for universities leading to higher R&D
contracts income. Spillovers may materialise through researchers’
interaction with firms located in the science park and the exchange
of ideas which is facilitated by close proximity.
Columns (5)–(8) of Table 2 explore the effects of university tech-
nology transfer policies on R&D contract activity. These variables
enter one by one into the equation because they are alternative
proxies for the university technology transfer policies and institu-
tional regulatory framework. First, the university rule on conflicts
of interest has a positive effect on the amount and volume of R&D
contracts (column 6 of Table 2). This result indicates that a regu-
lation clarifying potential conflicts of interest between researchers
teaching and external activities can improve performance by reduc-
ing moral hazard problems and uncertainty in the appropriation of
revenues from external research activities.
Second, the university rule on the participation of researchers
in R&D contracts has a negative effect on the number of R&D con-
tracts, but no effect on income. The same result is obtained for the
rule on copyrights from inventions, which has a negative, although
only significant at the 10%, effect on the number of R&D contracts,
but no effect on income. Both results may have a similar inter-
pretation. These rules give the university the right to share with
the researcher the benefits from the commercialisation of the IPR
generated by an external research activity. This result therefore
suggests that such rules hurt university commercialisation activity
by decreasing researchers’ incentives to engage in external activ-
ities. Finally, the variable measuring whether the university has a
rule on the procedure to disclose inventions has no effect on R&D
activity.
Regarding the remaining variables that control for differences
in university characteristics reported at the bottom of Table 2, we
find, first, that university size, measured by the number of aca-
demic scientists working at the university, has a significant positive
effect on both R&D contract income and number of contracts. Sec-
ond, the amount and volume of R&D contracts are higher for better
research universities. This result suggests that universities with a
good track record in terms of scientific publication attract more
research contracts from firms than lesser performing universities.
Third, the estimated coefficient on the public university dummy
indicates that public universities generate more R&D contracts and
income than private universities. Finally, the presence of a medi-
cal school has no effect on R&D contract income, but has a positive
and highly significant effect on the number of R&D contracts. On
the other hand, the dummy for polytechnic universities has a posi-
tive effect on R&D contract income, but no effect on the number of
contracts.
5.2. Licenses
The results from estimating Eq. (1) with licensing income and
number of licenses as dependent variables are reported in Table 3.
A number of interesting findings emerge. First, TTO characteris-
tics affect university licensing performance less than in the case
of R&D contracts. Although TTO size has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on the number of licenses, it has no effect on licensing
income (columns 1–8 in Table 3). TTO age does not significantly
affect licensing activity, except for three out of fourteen specifica-
tions where size has a negative effect on licensing income. Finally,
TTO specialisation has no effect on licensing outcomes. One possi-
ble reason for the lack of impact of TTO characteristics might result
from the fact that Spanish TTO offices are primarily focused on the
management of R&D contracts, having very limited expertise on
licensing activities and the creation of spin-offs.
Second, we find that universities with a science park gener-
ate a higher licensing income, but science parks have no effect
on the number of licenses. Although the coefficient on the sci-
ence park dummy is only significant at 10% in four out of five
specifications, this result tends to suggest that the local concen-
tration of high-tech firms has a positive effect on the volume of
licensing operations. Technology-intensive firms located in science
parks generate demand for university research, notably via licens-
ing deals. According to the Spanish association of science parks
(APTE, 2006), biotech firms, firms in the semi-conductors industry,
and IT firms represent most of the companies located in univer-
sity science parks in Spain. These sectors are research intensive
and are expected to create a substantial demand for university
research.
Table 3 further shows that the university royalty sharing pol-
icy significantly affects licensing income, but has no effect on the
number of licenses. The estimated coefficient of the inventor roy-
alty share is positive and highly significant (column 5 of Table 3).
The size of the coefficient suggests that an increase of 10% points
in the inventor’s share should generate, on average, about an 80%
increase in license income, which would imply an increase from
EUR 46,000 to EUR 83,000 in average licensing income.
Regarding the impact of the university technology transfer rules,
only the variable indicating whether a university has a rule to deal
with conflicts of interest has an impact on licensing activities. The
rule on conflict of interests has a positive and significant effect
on licensing income and on the number of licenses (column 6 of
Table 3). The rules on copyrights and invention disclosures have no
effect on licensing activity.
With respect to the effect of the other university control vari-
ables, the results indicate that larger universities generate more
license income and more licenses, as shown in columns (1)–(8)
of Table 3. This finding supports the results of Belenzon and
Schankerman (2009), Chukumba and Jensen (2005) and Siegel et
al. (2003) for US universities. Technical universities produce a
higher licensing income and more licenses, as given by the posi-
tive and significant effect of the polytechnic dummy on licensing
income. This result, although not consistent across all specifica-
tions, reflects the fact that technical universities mainly produce
applied research with a higher commercialisation potential. The
other university variables are not significant except for the pub-
lic ownership dummy and quality of the university that have a
negative effect on the number of licenses. The negative effect
Table 3
Baseline regression results for licensing.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Dependent variable Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number
income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses

TTO size 0.078 0.946 0.350 0.920 0.425 0.899 0.434 0.913 0.981 −0.089 −0.212 0.245 0.417 0.912 0.498 0.925
(0.804) (0.334)*** (0.819) (0.346)*** (0.836) (0.350)** (0.828) (0.353)*** (1.112) (0.390) (0.813) (0.340) (0.831) (0.356)** (0.837) (0.350)***
TTO age −0.173 0.014 −0.190 0.018 −0.200 0.016 −0.065 0.012 −0.286 −0.048 −0.183 0.017 −0.214 0.006
(0.113) (0.049) (0.119) (0.051) (0.118)* (0.052) (0.193) (0.072) (0.115)** (0.052) (0.121) (0.054) (0.120)* (0.052)
TTO specialization in 0.042 −0.015 0.071 −0.014 0.098 −0.044 0.058 −0.051 0.059 −0.014 0.076 −0.017
licensing
(0.087) (0.037) (0.088) (0.037) (0.117) (0.039) (0.084) (0.036) (0.090) (0.038) (0.088) (0.037)
Science park dummy 1.232 −0.103 0.378 −0.518 0.812 −0.432 1.294 −0.103 1.284 −0.064

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

(0.677)* (0.273) (0.875) (0.366) (0.658) (0.257)* (0.687)* (0.274) (0.684)* (0.271)
Inventor royalty share 0.083 −0.005
(0.047)*** (0.022)
Rule on conflict of 7.476 3.722
interests dummy
(2.105)*** (0.660)***
Rule on copyrights 0.440 0.006
dummy
(0.769) (0.315)
Rule on invention 0.763 1.070
disclosures dummy
(1.274) (0.672)

Controls for university characteristics

University size 2.890 1.146 3.508 1.110 3.497 1.120 3.370 1.130 4.245 1.397 4.328 2.175 3.362 1.130 3.341 1.271
(0.694)*** (0.313)*** (0.800)*** (0.338)*** (0.802)*** (0.340)*** (0.798)*** (0.342)*** (1.298)*** (0.498)*** (0.809)*** (0.401)*** (0.800)*** (0.342)*** (0.802)*** (0.356)***
University quality 0.023 −0.166 0.051 −0.169 0.050 −0.165 0.083 −0.171 0.158 −0.242 0.059 −0.159 0.092 −0.171 0.092 −0.147
(0.116) (0.088)* (0.117) (0.089)* (0.117) (0.088)* (0.117) (0.089)* (0.175) (0.164) (0.112) (0.091)* (0.119) (0.090)* (0.119) (0.086)*
Public university dummy −0.026 −3.026 0.110 −3.071 0.141 −3.080 0.118 −3.105 −3.849 13.905 −1.282 −3.843 −0.042 −3.107 0.248 −2.986
(1.743) (0.878)*** (1.736) (0.893)*** (1.742) (0.889)*** (1.726) (0.890)*** (3.196) (686.210) (1.697) (0.890)*** (1.753) (0.895)*** (1.744) (0.868)***
Medical school dummy −0.534 0.139 −0.394 0.119 −0.283 0.086 −0.089 0.080 −2.707 0.042 −0.793 −0.646 −0.119 0.080 0.009 0.082
(0.830) (0.338) (0.831) (0.345) (0.864) (0.355) (0.863) (0.356) (1.335)** (0.515) (0.849) (0.360)* (0.867) (0.357) (0.880) (0.356)
Polytechnic university 3.024 0.625 3.399 0.606 3.428 0.603 3.245 0.613 1.816 1.944 4.440 1.543 3.153 0.612 3.222 0.527
dummy
(1.070)*** (0.378)* (1.092)*** (0.384) (1.097)*** (0.383) (1.092)*** (0.384) (1.556) (0.441)*** (1.097)*** (0.367)*** (1.107)*** (0.389) (1.095)*** (0.383)

R-squared 0.57 – 0.58 – 0.58 – 0.59 – 0.67 – 0.63 – 0.59 – 0.59 –

Likelihood ratio test of – 105.07 – 104.08 – 103.19 – 101.95 – 93.63 – 57.46 – 101.66 – 96.55
alpha = 0 statistics
Probability – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000
Observations 154 148 154 148 154 148 154 148 101 116 154 148 154 148 154 148

Notes: Results from estimating equation (1) with log licensing income and number of licensing agreements as dependent variables. Income refers to the income from licensing contracts. Number refers to the number of licensing
agreements. The income equations are estimated by OLS, while the number equations are estimated using a Negative Binomial model. Robust standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the university level. ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies

1167
 1168
Table 4
Baseline regression results for spin-offs.

Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (6) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
number of spin-offs

TTO size 1.238 1.244 1.270 1.205 1.090 1.286 1.265 1.284 1.011 0.953
(0.275)*** (0.277)*** (0.277)*** (0.277)*** (0.277)*** (0.307)*** (0.276)*** (0.273)*** (0.287)*** (0.277)**
TTO age −0.010 −0.030 −0.036 −0.069 −0.103 −0.020 −0.038 −0.033 0.056
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.053)* (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.062)
TTO specialization in 0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.024 −0.003 0.003 −0.010 0.008
spin-offs
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Science park dummy 0.706 0.513 0.389 0.638 0.651 0.588 0.557
(0.298)** (0.300)* (0.283) (0.299)** (0.293)** (0.303)* (0.302)*
Rule on participation in 0.927
spin-offs dummy

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

(0.344)***
Rule on conflict of 2.974
interests dummy
(0.678)***
Rule on copyrights 0.282
dummy
(0.323)
Rule on invention 0.784
disclosures dummy
(0.545)
Spin-off program dummy 0.794
(0.399)**
Risk capital dummy 0.849
(0.426)*

Controls for university characteristics

University size 0.550 0.584 0.597 0.614 0.433 1.112 0.445 0.522 0.441 0.275
(0.313)* (0.358) (0.358)* (0.351)* (0.343) (0.375)*** (0.346) (0.346) (0.361) (0.357)
University quality 0.057 0.056 0.055 0.068 0.019 0.051 0.025 0.047 0.071 0.033
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.063) (0.060) (0.057) (0.055)
Public university dummy 1.101 1.115 1.134 1.101 0.300 0.831 0.104 0.490 1.082 0.632
(0.621)* (0.625)* (0.652)* (0.654)* (0.704) (0.712) (0.719) (0.708) (0.661) (0.633)
Medical school dummy 0.082 0.094 0.143 0.141 0.677 −0.393 0.330 0.324 0.367 −0.083
(0.322) (0.327) (0.334) (0.325) (0.351)* (0.334) (0.325) (0.322) (0.339) (0.380)
Polytechnic university 0.579 0.597 0.613 0.626 1.269 1.021 0.680 0.721 0.949 0.570
dummy
(0.374) (0.384) (0.427) (0.417) (0.437)*** (0.406)** (0.404)* (0.401)* (0.432)** (0.411)

Log likelihood −284.56 −284.54 −275.69 −272.90 −261.16 −245.29 −264.08 −263.80 −263.93 −255.70
Likelihood ratio test of 146.16 145.92 138.02 133.91 113.53 63.42 115.36 110.54 127.34 115.50
alpha = 0 statistic
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158

Notes: Results from estimating Eq. (1) with number of spin-offs as dependent variable using a Negative Binomial model with robust standard errors, reported in brackets, clustered at the university level. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies.
Table 5
Robustness results for R&D contracts.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Dependent variable: R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number R&D Number
income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D income R&D
contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts contracts

TTO size 1.005 0.744 0.783 0.530 0.760 0.472 0.732 0.471 0.694 0.432 0.723 0.445 0.740 0.492 0.730 0.470
(0.135)*** (0.092)*** (0.137)*** (0.088)*** (0.139)*** (0.087)*** (0.138)*** (0.087)*** (0.137)*** (0.082)*** (0.138)*** (0.084)*** (0.138)*** (0.086)*** (0.138)*** (0.086)***
TTO age 0.081 0.088 0.087 0.102 0.089 0.103 0.095 0.113 0.086 0.093 0.089 0.101 0.080 0.093
(0.018)*** (0.013)*** (0.019)*** (0.013)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.020)*** (0.014)***
TTO specialization in 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.015
licensing
(0.006) (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.003)*** (0.006) (0.004)***

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

Science park dummy 0.331 0.137 0.315 0.116 0.314 0.074 0.314 0.117 0.340 0.140
(0.129)** (0.081)* (0.128)** (0.075) (0.131)** (0.079) (0.133)** (0.081) (0.129)*** (0.081)*
Rule on R&D contract −0.550 −0.824
dummy
(0.251)** (0.154)***
Rule on conflict of 0.306 0.837
interests dummy
(0.401) (0.231)***
Rule on copyrights −0.085 −0.176
dummy
(0.142) (0.093)*
Rule on invention 0.211 0.218
disclosures dummy
(0.200) (0.128)*

Controls for university characteristics

University quality 0.048 0.064 0.048 0.065 0.050 0.073 0.058 0.076 0.052 0.071 0.056 0.072 0.056 0.073 0.062 0.080
(0.020)** (0.014)*** (0.019)** (0.013)*** (0.019)** (0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.011)*** (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.020)*** (0.012)*** (0.020)*** (0.013)***
Dummy public university 0.942 1.099 0.907 1.050 0.997 1.348 1.029 1.368 1.194 1.671 0.977 1.205 1.057 1.455 1.073 1.407
(0.297)*** (0.200)*** (0.282)*** (0.180)*** (0.297)*** (0.188)*** (0.293)*** (0.187)*** (0.299)*** (0.182)*** (0.301)*** (0.186)*** (0.297)*** (0.190)*** (0.296)*** (0.189)***
Dummy medical school 0.373 0.739 0.254 0.573 0.220 0.479 0.242 0.481 0.342 0.622 0.225 0.427 0.244 0.482 0.250 0.494
(0.149)** (0.098)*** (0.144)* (0.094)*** (0.148) (0.093)*** (0.146)* (0.093)*** (0.152)** (0.090)*** (0.148) (0.090)*** (0.147)* (0.092)*** (0.146)* (0.092)***
Pre-sample patent stock 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005 −0.000 0.006 0.002
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)* (0.002) (0.003)** (0.002)

R-squared 0.67 – 0.70 – 0.70 – 0.71 – 0.72 – 0.71 – 0.71 – 0.71 –

Likelihood ratio test of – 5972.81 – 4384.83 – – 4067.16 – 3741.47 – 3506.56 – 3986.90 – 3905.31
alpha = 0
Probability – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206

Notes: Results from estimating equation (1) with log R&D contracts income and number of R&D contracts as dependent variables and adding the pre-sample patent stock to control for university unobserved heterogeneity.
University controls on size and polytechnic school are dropped because they are highly correlated with the patent stock. Income refers to the income from R&D contracts. Number refers to the number of R&D contracts. The
income equations are estimated by OLS, while the number equations are estimated using a Negative Binomial model. Robust standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the university level. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies.

1169
 1170
Table 6
Robustness results for licensing.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Dependent variable: Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number Licensing Number
income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses income licenses

TTO size 1.057 0.919 1.085 0.758 1.190 0.749 1.206 0.759 1.626 0.192 1.019 0.609 0.952 0.692 1.194 0.711
(0.776) (0.299)*** (0.832) (0.306)** (0.845) (0.309)** (0.838) (0.311)** (1.124) (0.389) (0.836) (0.302)** (0.843) (0.314)** (0.828) (0.304)**
TTOage −0.010 0.084 −0.042 0.086 −0.052 0.084 0.147 0.084 −0.071 0.079 −0.023 0.095 −0.138 0.061
(0.108) (0.045)* (0.115) (0.046)* (0.115) (0.046)* (0.184) (0.066) (0.114) (0.044)* (0.115) (0.047)** (0.121) (0.047)
TTO specialization in 0.070 −0.007 0.097 −0.006 0.121 −0.029 0.094 −0.017 0.063 −0.013 0.120 −0.005
licensing

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

(0.091) (0.035) (0.092) (0.035) (0.123) (0.040) (0.091) (0.034) (0.093) (0.036) (0.092) (0.035)
Science park dummy 1.255 −0.098 0.690 −0.546 1.046 −0.240 1.391 −0.073 1.359 −0.053
(0.712)* (0.272) (0.912) (0.382) (0.714) (0.264) (0.710)* (0.271) (0.706)* (0.267)
Inventor royalty share 0.154 −0.014
(0.050)*** (0.023)
Rule on conflict of interests 3.989 1.833
dummy
(2.138)* (0.619)***
Rule on copyrights dummy 1.444 0.319
(0.810)* (0.307)
Rule on invention 2.743 1.264
disclosures dummy
(1.378)** (0.636)**

Controls for university characteristics

University quality 0.007 −0.162 0.009 −0.171 0.007 −0.171 0.043 −0.176 0.036 −0.410 0.024 −0.190 0.071 −0.166 0.072 −0.154
(0.120) (0.074)** (0.122) (0.072)** (0.122) (0.072)** (0.123) (0.073)** (0.178) (0.172)** (0.122) (0.075)** (0.123) (0.073)** (0.122) (0.072)**
Public university dummy 1.041 −2.442 1.064 −2.752 1.097 −2.766 1.059 −2.783 0.110 15.461 0.453 −3.113 0.484 −2.923 1.410 −2.578
(1.764) (0.788)*** (1.787) (0.799)*** (1.791) (0.801)*** (1.776) (0.803)*** (3.047) (1,623.696) (1.788) (0.801)*** (1.790) (0.803)*** (1.764) (0.789)***
Medical school dummy −0.219 0.346 −0.202 0.197 −0.049 0.186 0.179 0.178 −0.641 0.169 −0.172 −0.114 0.030 0.191 0.375 0.249
(0.795) (0.291) (0.817) (0.300) (0.843) (0.305) (0.846) (0.306) (1.129) (0.438) (0.858) (0.304) (0.842) (0.305) (0.841) (0.302)
Pre-sample patent stock 0.047 0.016 0.048 0.012 0.049 0.012 0.045 0.013 0.025 0.019 0.051 0.017 0.051 0.013 0.053 0.016
(0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)*** (0.005)** (0.014)*** (0.005)** (0.014)*** (0.005)** (0.017) (0.005)*** (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)*** (0.005)***

R-squared 0.54 – 0.54 – 0.54 – 0.55 – 0.56 – 0.56 – 0.56 – 0.63 –

Likelihood ratio test of – 115.32 – 111.88 – 111.47 – 110.99 – 104.65 – 90.53 – 106.70 – 99.96
alpha = 0
Probability – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000 – 0.000
Observations 154 162 154 162 154 162 154 162 101 116 154 162 154 162 154 162

Notes: Results from estimating Eq. (1) with log licensing income and number of licensing agreements as dependent variables and adding the pre-sample patent stock to control for university unobserved heterogeneity. Income
refers to the income from licensing contracts. Number refers to the number of licensing agreements. University controls on size and polytechnic school are dropped because they are highly correlated with the patent stock. The
income equations are estimated by OLS, while the number equations are estimated using a Negative Binomial model. Robust standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the university level. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies.
Table 7
Robustness results for spin-offs.

Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (6) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
number of spin-offs

TTO size 1.253 1.261 1.287 1.246 0.976 1.585 1.303 1.295 1.006 0.932
(0.252)*** (0.259)*** (0.262)*** (0.263)*** (0.265)*** (0.291)*** (0.264)*** (0.259)*** (0.280)*** (0.264)*
TTO age −0.006 −0.027 −0.026 −0.132 −0.043 −0.017 −0.047 −0.031 0.055
(0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057)** (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.056)
TTO specialization in 0.012 0.013 0.019 −0.010 0.004 0.015 −0.002 0.020
spin-offs
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Science park dummy 0.600 0.298 0.369 0.566 0.549 0.452 0.470
(0.292)** (0.296) (0.282) (0.294)* (0.284)* (0.299) (0.296)

A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173

Rule on participation in 1.555
spin-offs dummy
(0.399)***
Rule on conflict of interests 1.883
dummy
(0.575)***
Rule on copyrights dummy 0.445
(0.310)
Rule on invention 1.251
disclosures dummy
(0.559)**
Spin-off program dummy 0.965
(0.390)**
Risk capital dummy 0.737
(0.407)

Controls for university characteristics

University quality 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.039 −0.004 0.020 0.013 0.037 0.041 0.011
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055)
Public university dummy 0.897 0.904 0.846 0.839 0.100 0.746 −0.070 0.406 0.799 0.359
(0.593) (0.595) (0.635) (0.640) (0.679) (0.688) (0.695) (0.668) (0.663) (0.633)
Medical school dummy −0.013 −0.003 0.023 0.031 0.321 −0.235 0.173 0.142 0.120 −0.325
(0.284) (0.292) (0.301) (0.294) (0.295) (0.293) (0.301) (0.287) (0.295) (0.343)
Pre-sample patent stock 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.028 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.012
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*

Likelihood ratio test of 131.99 131.83 129.19 126.01 63.65 105.28 96.11 122.52 108.93 95.17
alpha = 0
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154

Notes: Results from estimating Eq. (1) with number of spin-offs as dependent variable and adding the pre-sample patent stock to control for university unobserved heterogeneity. University controls on size and polytechnic school
are dropped because they are highly correlated with the patent stock. The regressions are estimated using a Negative Binomial model with robust standard errors, reported in brackets, clustered at the university level. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a complete set of region and year dummies.

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1172 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
of public ownership suggests that public universities generate
less licenses, which may be explained by the fact that pub-
lic universities do not have close links with the private sector.
The negative effect of the quality of university on the number
of licenses may suggest that universities publishing in top sci-
entific journals produce more basic research less likely to be
licensed to firms. Despite potential synergies between upstream
and downstream research, academic-oriented universities may
face a trade-off between allocating resources to academic research
or applied research.
5.3. Spin-offs
The results from estimating Eq. (1) with number of spin-offs
as a dependent variable are reported in Table 4. Each column
of Table 4 shows different specifications of Eq. (1) exploring the
effects of the different explanatory variables on the number of
spin-offs.
Regarding TTO characteristics, columns (1)–(10) show that from
TTO characteristics only the size of the TTO significantly affects
spin-off activity. We find no evidence, however, that the age and
specialisation of the TTO affect spin-off activity. This result differs
from other studies (e.g. Chukumba and Jensen, 2005) who find that
experienced TTOs generate more spin-offs. Our finding may reflect
the level of maturity of the technology transfer market in Spain,
slowly diversifying from an initial focus on R&D contracts and pro-
tection of intellectual property rights to late support for the creation
of spin-offs.
From column (4) onwards, we include in addition to TTO char-
acteristics the science park dummy, and find that universities with
a science park have a higher rate of spin-off creation. This result
is robust across alternative specifications and suggests that sci-
ence parks stimulate universities spin-off creation. Our findings
may suggest that the “incubating role” of university science parks
increases the rate of creation of new firms through a reduction in
start-up costs.
Regarding the effects of university policies on the number of
spin-offs, we find that a university regulation on spin-offs has a
significant and positive effect on the number of spin-offs created
(column 5 of Table 4). Such regulations generally allow for academic
scientists’ leave to start a new firm. This result suggests that in the
Spanish case, universities that grant academic leaves to start a new
firm generate more spin-offs. The positive and significant effect
of the conflict of interest dummy in column 6 of Table 4 further
supports the important role of universities’ internal regulations on
the creation of spin-offs. Universities with a conflict of interest rule
generate more spin-offs than universities without such rules. This
suggests that appropriate internal rules regulating the participation
of researchers in external activities are important for university
performance in terms of spin-off creation.
Two further interesting results emerge regarding the effect
of university policies on spin-off activity. First, a university pro-
gramme for the creation of firms has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the number of spin-offs, as reported in column
9 of Table 4. The second finding is that universities that facilitate
researchers’ access to risk capital have a higher rate of creation of
spin-offs. The positive and significant coefficient on the risk cap-
ital dummy in column 10 of Table 4 confirms the importance of
universities venture capital funds to secure funding for the initial
development phase of spin-offs.
Finally, regarding the impact of the university characteristics
on the rate of creation of spin-offs, university size, ownership and
the technical orientation of the university have a significant pos-
itive effect on the number of spin-offs, but only in some of the
specifications.
6. Robustness check: endogeneity bias
Lach and Schankerman (2008) point out that university
unobserved characteristics, such as commercial orientation or
managerial ability, may drive both performance and university
policies leading to upward biased estimates of the effects of uni-
versity policies on performance. The standard solution to address
this endogeneity problem would be to use university fixed effects
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. But since we only have
information on university policies at one point in time, it is not
possible to use university fixed effects in our case.
As an alternative we follow Lach and Schankerman’s (2008)
example and adopt the pre-sample scaling approach developed
by Blundell et al. (1999, 2002). They show that when fixed effects
cannot be used, an alternative approach is to use the pre-sample
mean of the dependent variable as an additional regressor to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity. Due to the lack of pre-sample
data on the dependent variables, we use instead the stock of pre-
sample patents for each university. We construct the pre-sample
stock using information on the number of patent fillings by each
university over 1987–2000 compiled from the Spanish Office of
Patents and Marks. The pre-sample patent stock is significantly cor-
related with university technology transfer outcomes. The sample
correlation between the stock of patents and the various depen-
dent variables is respectively 0.62 for the log of R&D contracts,
0.44 for licensing income, 0.45 for the number of spin-offs, 0.58 for
the number of R&D contracts and 0.50 for the number of licensing
contracts.
Table 5 shows that the baseline results on R&D contracts are
overall robust after adding the stock of patents to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Adding the pre-sample stock to the
regressions does not change the size and significance of the results,
except for the conflict of interest dummy that is no longer signifi-
cant. The pre-sample patent stock is positive and significant in all
income equations, and positive and significant in one out of eight
specifications using the number of R&D contracts.
Table 6 shows that the baseline results are also robust when
controlling for university unobserved heterogeneity using the
pre-sample patent stock. The pre-sample patent stock is highly sig-
nificant and positive, as reported in the bottom of Table 6 and the
results are in line with the baseline results. To conclude, Table 7
reports the robustness checks for the spin-off equation. The base-
line results are robust when controlling for unobserved university
heterogeneity using pre-sample information on patent counts. The
pre-sample patent stock is highly significant and positive across
all specifications, suggesting that the pre-sample information cap-
tures some of the unobserved heterogeneity. Overall, the variables
of interest remain significant and with the expected signs, except
for the effect of science parks on spin-off creation, which is less
robust. The coefficient on the science park dummy is positive, but
only significant at 10% in some specifications in Table 7.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the understanding of the role of policy
measures on university technology transfer performance. Based on
university data for Spain it provides new evidence suggesting that
university internal technology transfer policies and the nature and
type of technology transfer intermediaries are important factors
influencing the performance of universities.
The results show that university rules on conflicts of interest
between academic teaching responsibilities and external activities
have a positive and significant impact on university performance
in R&D contracts, licenses or spin-off creation. The results fur-
ther show that universities’ royalty sharing policy strongly affects
 A. Caldera, O. Debande / Research Policy 39 (2010) 1160–1173
licensing income. Granting a higher share of licensing royalties
to the inventor stimulates licensing activities. Furthermore, uni-
versities allowing academic scientists to take leaves to create a
new firm generate more spin-offs. This suggests that creating more
certainty for the appropriation of research results matters for uni-
versity performance. Designing the right incentives and sharing
the risk optimally between parties involved in the valorisation of
research is a key component of an efficient technology transfer
strategy.
We find further evidence that the presence of a science park has
a positive effect on the commercialisation of university research.
This result suggests that the local concentration of high-tech firms
has a positive effect on university research valorisation. Science
parks play an incubating role reducing the costs associated with
converting scientific findings into marketable products or pro-
cesses. However, we find mixed evidence regarding the impact
of TTO characteristics on university performance. TTO size has
a positive effect on R&D contract activity and on the number
of licenses and spin-offs created, but it does not affect licensing
income. Furthermore, we find that TTO experience only affects
R&D contract activity and that TTO specialisation only appears to
influence the number of R&D contracts generated, but not other
outcomes.
Although in terms of public policy our analysis does not lead
to specific recommendations, the result on the relative contribu-
tion of TTO versus science park might question an approach based
on the ‘multiplication’ of TTO structures in most universities. The
potential complementarity between TTO and science parks should
be investigated since top performing universities in terms of tech-
nology transfer outcomes have both a large TTO structure and a
science park. A better understanding of the respective role of the
TTO and science parks needs to be developed in literature.
Acknowledgments
The paper benefited from very constructive and useful com-
ments and suggestions from two anonymous referees. We are
also grateful to Mark Schankerman for detailed comments and
suggestions on previous versions of the paper. We also thank
Jordi Cami, Andreu Mas-Colell, Jacques Mairesse, André Sapir, Ziga
Zarnic and participants at the Economics of Technology Policy
Conference at Monteverita, the 34th Conference of the European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and the
10th European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis
(EWEPA X) for useful comments and discussions. We also thank
the RedOTRI for the access to their data and in particular to Con-
stantino Martinez-Cavero, the manager of the RedOTRI network,
for his willingness to talk to us about his technology transfer expe-
rience. Aida Caldera thanks Fundación Ramón Areces for financial
support.
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