Georgi Zhukov and the Resurrection of “Deep Battle”

William C. Jandrew
American Military University
November 25, 2012
MILH 560 – World War II in Context
Dr. Anne Venzon
Summer 2012

1
 Modern Russian military doctrine grew out of the destruction of the Great War’s

positional warfare and the social upheaval of the Russian Revolution; the Soviet government’s

unique party-military structure and post-medieval peasantry’s social structure, combined with the

Marxist-Leninist ‘eternal class struggle’ ideology produced a dichotomous system in which

military thought reflected not only the internal struggles of Soviet Russia but also changes in the

outside world. Soviet military thought and industrial capacity grew through Russian cooperation

with Germany, its ideological nemesis; further modernization under Josef Stalin’s forced

industrialization plans gave Soviet military minds the machinery needed to realize their cutting-

edge theories. Russian combined-arms precepts, particularly Mikhail Tuchachevsky’s “Deep

Battle” doctrine, was based on offensive maneuver and called for close coordination of armor,

artillery, infantry, and air attacks supported by strong reserves and a solid rear echelon, in many

ways surpassing those of her contemporaries. Josef Stalin’s purges eliminated most of his

regime’s forward-thinking officers just as they’d turned their work to the creation of defensive

doctrines, and in an atmosphere of paranoia and fear, creativity and innovation gave way to

caution; those who were left, for the most part, embraced the static territorial thought of the last

war and the Red Army experienced a chaotic reversal of theory. When Georgi Zhukov was

selected to quell a growing situation in Mongolia in the summer of 1939, he fearlessly applied

the forbidden doctrines to great effect against the Japanese.

Attaining numerical superiority and pairing it with deep logistical networks and large-

scale deceptive measures, Zhukov’s near-perfect execution of massive and well-coordinated all-

arms operations was the embodiment of “Deep Battle”. Having acquired a reputation as

“Stalin’s Fireman”, Zhukov the purge survivor was sent to various trouble spots after the

German invasion, and organized defenses and countermeasures in the same fashion; his effective

2
application of the forbidden doctrines became the template for subsequent Soviet campaigns for

the remainder of the Second World War. Massed armor formations, preceded by overwhelming

artillery bombardments and followed by seemingly endless reserves became the Soviet calling-

card as they repulsed the Germans and steamrolled into Berlin.

The roots of Russian military thought lie in the ashes of the Great War, and the chaos of

the Russian Revolution. The stalemate of positional warfare and the Bolshevik seizure of the

government in 1917 combined to create a unique military idealism. Vladimir Lenin believed in

the Clausewitzean inseparability of politics and warfare, and recognized that war may be

inevitable in the attempt to create a society free of class struggle; the conflict was inherent in the

desire itself to entirely eliminate the divisions between social classes, as there may always be

resistance to such an idea.1 Along with the stated aim of bringing 20th-century communism to the

rest of the world, creating a utopian society without the class barriers, was the realization of such

resistance on a global scale and the never-ending warfare of between the proletariat in the

motherland and the rest of the bourgeois world. The two simply could not coexist, and would be

forever engaged in a do-or-die struggle, a war of annihilation.2 Created out of the chaos that

resulted from Russia’s exit from World War I and the measures necessary to protect the new

state from its enemies was a forced cooperation between the Bolsheviks leading the new state

and the remnants of the professional Tsarist officer corps. Lacking a large volunteer army, the

new Red Army relied upon the forced mobilizations and impressments of the Napoleonic era; the

goal of an army of motivated workers was at that point unattainable. With that in mind, the

commissar system, a cadre of “morale” officers, was emplaced to ensure that the imperfect army

1
Vladimir I. Lenin, “War and Revolution”, in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast
Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 25.
2
Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936”, in Historical Perspectives of the Operational
Art, eds. Michael D. Krause and Cody Phillips (Washington: Center of Military History, 2005), 229.
3
was at least motivated enough to perform its function for the state.3 Thus was created the dual

nature of the Soviet system, the socio-political and the military-technical facets of the armed

forces. The socio-political aspect is established by political leaders, and ruled by the relationship

of the military action to the goals of the party; the military-technical aspect, usually subordinate

to the former, is expected to execute war plans and achieve the stated goals within the framework

established by the party leaders;4 it is the actual conduct of military action. This dual command

system produced inevitable conflict, as military decisions had to be approved by the commissars

– separating the military commanders from their commands and objectives, as well as subjecting

the ratification of military actions to men who often had no military experience or qualifications

that enabled them to make such decisions.5 However, with the backward, often reluctant, and

mostly unprofessional Red Army of the post-Great War world, the commissariat was a necessary

evil and remained a part of the army’s command structure.

In keeping with the embrace of the ‘constant conflict’ theory, some of the Red Army’s

first leaders recognized the need to address two immediate issues; first was the establishment of

a better sort of army, given the fact that it will always be needed, and second, to analyze the

character of future wars, given their inevitability. The two issues, addressed together, would

help planners create the Red Army needed to fight such wars. Mikhail Frunze, a Civil War hero

and Red Army Chief of Staff, sought a unified doctrine for army’s next phase, establishing set

methods of training, equipping, and managing such a body, the goals which it was to meet, and

the means to achieve them.6 Frunze desired a semi-professional army a step away from the

3
Condoleeza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 650-1.
4
William Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine”, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988-1989):117.
5
Robert Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 189.
6
Mikhail V. Frunze, “A Unified Military Doctrine for the Red Army”, in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy,
and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 29.
4
unreliable peasant militia but not quite the professional, class-based military systems of Western

Europe.7

Throughout the early 1920’s, debate raged over the selection of procedures and doctrines

to guide the army in its growth; the Great War’s carnage had caused a worldwide shift in military

thinking to terms of the offensive. Airplanes grew in capability, research into chemical weaponry

advanced beyond its Great War limits, and the increasing mechanization and motorization of the

modern world expanded the its possibilities.8 The tank, though in its infancy, had opened the

door to maneuver, and exposed the burning Soviet need to modernize their industries toward the

production of machinery capable of the next age of warfare. Toward that end, the Soviets signed

the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922 with Germany, ostensibly an economic agreement pledging

friendly industrial and trade relations; in reality, it opened years of technological and military

exchange. Officers were exchanged and educated in German and Russian schools, German

munitions factories operated in Russia, and the two signatories co-developed munitions and their

accompanying doctrines. The Germans operated in secret, skirting the conditions of the Treaty

of Versailles, and the Russians developed their industries.9

Serious debate over the changing nature of warfare characterized the 1920’s in Soviet

Russia. The Great War had shown the world that Clausewitz’s one great “battle of annihilation”

had given way to larger battles, now capable of encompassing thousands of miles, and that

current military systems were incapable of adapting to these changes. The works of foreign

theorists, particularly those of J.C.F. Fuller, were translated into Russian for further study,10 and

7
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 655.
8
Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine”, 120.
9
James S. Corum, “Devil’s Bargain”, World War II (February/March 2009):52-4.
10
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 647.
5
the aerial doctrines of Guilio Douhet were preferred11 over those of Billy Mitchell. In their

search for a practical way to restore maneuver to the ever-expanding field of battle, Soviet

theorists added a link between strategy and tactics, that of the operational art.12 The operational

art encompassed the study of different operational forms, the study and planning of operations,

the maintenance of logistics and rear areas, and knowledge of the enemy.13 General Mikhail

Tuchachevsky, a leading proponent of offensive maneuver warfare, recognized the links between

expanded campaigns, larger and more mechanized armies, the economic forces of a nation, and

these emerging military arts. Tuchachevsky also recognized that the Soviet Union was still

relatively “backward” in comparison to other world powers, he called for a study of these linked

relationships and the advances in military theory made possible by continuing industrial

development in his 1926 article, “War”.14

Joining Tuchachevsky in his call for increased attention to economic was Boris

Shaposhnikov, an advocate of total economic involvement in the prosecution of military action.

The Russian people as a whole would need to be involved in the next war, as would the entirety

of their economic resources15 – the singular focus of the Soviet social body would be support of

whatever war being fought, with whatever means available. As the mutually beneficial

relationship with Germany continued to bear industrial and doctrinal fruits, Tuchachevsky and

Shaposhnikov’s economic foci would become increasingly more relevant. In his work The

11
Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 57.
12
David M. Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, Parameters (Spring 1985): 4-6.
13
Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 31.
14
Mikhail N. Tuchachevsky, “Tactics and Strategy”, in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds.
Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 44.
15
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 662-3.
6
Brain of the Army, published in 1927, Shaposhnikov called for commanders to attain deeper

economic knowledge, having deemed it essential to any type of war planning.16

By the late 1920’s, the Soviet modernization efforts, coupled with the fruits of the

Rapallo agreement with Germany, gave breadth to military thought. No longer limited by

primitive industry to penetration and encirclement by traditional infantry and horse-drawn

artillery17, the Red Army and its planners turned their focus to mechanization and mobility in the

execution of their breakthroughs and pursuits. Chief of Staff Vladimir Triandifillov wrote of this

wider train of thought in the 1929 Field Service Regulations, emphasizing the benefits of

mechanization to the stagnating army. Retaining the massive traditional Russian armies was

necessary, as a smaller but more mobile force, though useful to other nations, could not properly

protect the ponderous Russian geography; such mechanization must be standardized, and spread

amongst the entire army. Mass motorization and mechanization, properly utilized, could provide

the breakthrough, deep penetration, and annihilation sought by Russian armies.18 Traditional

weapons, modernized and mobilized by vehicles, not horses, could be better (and more quickly)

utilized, having a force-multiplier effect; such materiel, of course, also required greater training,

planning, and coordination.19 By the end of the 1920’s, the Soviet reliance on Germany grew,

with the increased exchange of officers and test equipment20 – in particular, the newest and

possibly most important piece of equipment – the tank.

16
Boris M. Shaposhnikov, “Economics and War”, in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds.
Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 46-50..
17
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 6.
18
Amnon Sella, “Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second World War”, Soviet Studies (April 1975),
247.
19
Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936”, 233-4.
20
Corum, “Devil’s Bargain”, 55.
7
 Mikhail Tuchachevsky’s advanced work on the use of tanks dovetailed with the long-

accepted primacy of the offensive; various different types of mechanized armor could achieve

breakthrough and deep penetration and also prevent the enemy from regrouping, making the

annihilation more likely, and perhaps easier. Keeping up with the Western powers and their

variations on motorized armored cars and artillery, he also advocated the use of such vehicles in

localized Red Army training exercises;21 his thoughts on mechanization also branched into the

realm of the air, extending the theories of ‘depth’ to include bombers and paratroopers to achieve

surprise, capture targets, and prevent enemy escape.22 Tuchachevsky recognized the value of

mechanization to all arms of the Soviet military, while other stars of the Russian military elite

contributed from their particular specialties.

Aleksandr Lapchinskiy, one-time Chief of the Red Army Air forces, addressed basic air

principles and the use of paratroops for surgical-strike operations. Lapchinskiy also constructed

a practical working definition of the concept of “air superiority” – not the ability to fly at will,

but “the degree to which air forces permit friendly troops to capitalize..and hinders the same on

the part of enemy troops”.23 Colonel Artur Mednis specified the purpose of ground-attack

aviation as only for use against targets that cannot be reached or destroyed by other means, and

from large, centralized bases. Using aircraft for missions that can be accomplished by artillery

or infantry is a wasteful duplication of effort, especially when the long reach of aircraft is best

used for the destruction of enemy rear areas.24 When the entire body of cutting-edge theoretical

work was combined with Tuchachevsky’s burgeoning overall doctrine, the skeletal framework of

21
Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936”, 234-5.
22
Bernd Horn, “The Airborne Revolution”, MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History (Summer 2005), 66-7.
23
Aleksandr N. Lapchinskiy, “The Fundamentals of Air Forces Employment”, in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine,
Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 63.
24
Artur K. Mednis, “Fundamental of Operational-Tactical use of Ground-Attack Aviation”, in The Soviet Art of War:
Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 66-7.
8
what would eventually become “Deep Battle” was in place. What was lacking at the time was a

complete array of the necessary motorized and mechanized tools to flesh it out.

With the success of Stalin’s first 5-year plan, a second focusing on heavy industry began

in 1933, and with it, came the machinery the Red Army needed to fulfill its doctrinal potential.

Answering the debate raging around the world, as to whether tanks should be used independently

or to support infantry, Soviet industry, in cooperation with the military per Shaposhnikov’s

edicts, produced several types of tanks designed to fulfill different roles. Light and medium tank

types were produced to support infantry, heavy tanks for assaults on fortifications and fast

medium tanks for the exploitation of breaches.25 Artillery, always an integral part of modern

Soviet arms, was developed on similar lines, becoming self-propelled and armored, better able to

protect itself. With the latest technological developments at his disposal, Tuchachevsky had the

tools to finish his theoretical work.

By 1936, “Deep Battle” had taken shape and was institutionalized and the 1936 Field

Service Regulations outlined the changes since the 1929 regulations. Reflecting traditional

Russian thought, mass and offense were the basis of the changes, augmented by the

developments of the last few years26. Mechanized means assumed primacy, acting as assault

force and reserve; massed tanks, self-propelled artillery, and motorized infantry were to achieve

and exploit breakthroughs; similarly composed forces were to encircle and outflank the enemy

after preliminary deep aerial bombing attacks and artillery bombardments on the enemy’s

prepared positions. Ground-attack forces, independent of the bomber attacks, were to act in

close cooperation with these combined-arms forces.27 In its execution, it was to proceed like
25
Earl F. Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations”, Parameters (June 1983), 23.
26
Mikhail N. Tuchachevsky, “What Is New in the Development of Red Army Tactics”, in The Soviet Art of War:
Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 56-9.
27
Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936”, 237.
9
this: air assault/bombardment, artillery preparation, assault and breakthrough by combined-arms

fronts, exploitation by tank/infantry forces, and pursuit by massed reserves.28 Multiplied on

several fronts simultaneously and followed up by pursuit and encirclement, bolstered by mutual

all-arms support, it was theoretically unstoppable. The Red Army and its equipment, doctrines,

and fighting men was by this point recognized as equal to or better than (in many regards) its

contemporaries.29

With the primary function of aggressive attack firmly anchored in positive doctrine,

Tuchachevsky turned his attention to the concepts of defense and rear area; acknowledged as

necessary by the Soviets and reflective of their fear of encirclement, the military rear area was a

smaller version of their grand concept of homeland. Borne of the traditional Russian fear of

encirclement and a desire for stability30, the importance of the rear was translated into a military

need for logistical support and a base of order. Within that need was the requirement to protect

the rear, and in so doing, especially in times of war, to do so in a flexible and effective manner.

Tuchachevsky’s defensive doctrines, in their infancy, resembled the German “elastic defense”

and American “delaying action” concepts, but with one important distinction – the Soviet

“sustained defense” and “mobile defense” doctrines were temporary measures designed to

marshal resources for an immediate counterattack.31 However, as the military minds enjoyed the

intellectual and tangible fruits of rapid industrialization, the masses responsible for such

advances grew increasingly restless.

In response to such widespread unrest, Josef Stalin instituted a system of brutal,

repressive societal controls later named the “Great Purges”; those repressions grew from those of
28
Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations”, Parameters (June 1983), 26.
29
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 667.
30
Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 56.
31
Ibid, 75.
10
simple, outspoken peasants in the early 1930’s to military and political leaders by 1936 – the

political side of the Soviet system had finally reared its ugly head. Fearing fascist infiltration

and possible revolution, Josef Stalin had many of the officers who’d had contact with the

Germans during the Rapallo period (1922-33) imprisoned and/or executed – even possession of

German manuals was a capital offense.32 The secrecy of Stalin’s regime prevents an exact count,

but anywhere from 40-80,000 Red Army officers were executed, including three of the five

Marshals - Mikhail Tuchachevsky, Simyon Budyenny, and Vasily Blyucher.33 Branded enemies

of the Russian people, their collective theories and works were banned34 and it was expressly

“forbidden to even speak of operations in depth”,35 according to Petro Grigorenko, at that time a

student at the General Staff Academy. So decapitated, the Red Army plunged into a time of fear

and stagnation. Innovation was suppressed and often mistaken for ‘political deviation’, so many

of the remaining officers ignored the recent forbidden doctrines and reverted to past (safe)

ideologies as a matter of survival.36 The army was left to face the upcoming crises with a

successful working doctrine that they were forced to ignore and inexperienced leaders who were

equally as ineffective in teaching and leading their troops.37

In the resultant doctrinal backslide, the remaining Soviet leaders reverted to a mindset of

positional warfare and fortification38 reminiscent of the Great War; the high command was left

with a largely unprofessional officer class comprised of unmotivated men recruited and gathered

in a variety of unorthodox ways.39 The Red Army’s shift to the unsuccessful methods of the past
32
Corum, “Devil’s Bargain”, 57.
33
Otto Preston Chaney, Zhukov. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 39-40.
34
Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations”, 27.
35
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 669.
36
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 7.
37
Chaney, Zhukov, 43, 51.
38
Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy”, 669.
39
Roger R. Reese, “Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party”, The Journal of Military History (January
2002):101.
11
was chaotic and disorganized; the commissars and their political agendas were reinstated and

contributed to the army’s further stagnation.

When a border dispute in May 1939 with Imperial Japan in Outer Mongolia erupted into

small-scale skirmishes, purge survivor Georgi Zhukov was sent to the Trans-Baikal Military

District in June to assess the situation and report back to Moscow. Zhukov, a hard-driving

taskmaster with a reputation for discipline, had barely survived the purges himself; his early

working relationship with Tuchachevsky and his adherence to his theories of mechanized

warfare had made him a target of the paranoid anti-fascist witch hunt and had briefly derailed his

career.40 He was happy to be given a chance to redeem himself, and took to the task in the Far

East with great enthusiasm, determined to drive the Japanese from Russian-claimed territory.

Figure 1 - the disputed border region, the Khalkin Gol to Nomonhan

Source: Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 144.

40
Chaney, Zhukov, 54.
12
 Immediately on arrival, Zhukov met with General Nikolai Feklenko and his staff and

recognized that few there were familiar with the growing situation or the rapid Japanese buildup

in the disputed territory; he recommended the rearrangement of troops to perform a holding

action on the Khalkin Gol (Gol, Mongolian for river) until he could obtain reinforcements, which

he requested and received – a mechanized infantry division, three mechanized brigades, a tank

brigade, and experienced air wing a heavy artillery regiment, and one Mongolian cavalry

division. Further illustrating Moscow’s confidence in him, he was ordered to replace General

Feklenko and assume command of the newly-christened First Army Group.41 Zhukov would

take this opportunity to not only redeem the repressed “Deep Battle” doctrines but also

unwittingly provide the Red Army with the strategic and tactical means to survive the upcoming

world war.

The Battle of Khalkin Gol would exhibit the hallmarks of that which would become

known as the “Zhukov way of war”42 – buildup of numerical superiority, exhaustive logistical

preparation and elaborate deceptive measures preceded careful coordination of air, artillery,

infantry, and armor attacks and were followed by large formations of tanks and infantry. Georgi

Zhukov was thorough in the gathering and assessment of intelligence (often analyzing reports

himself), and methodical in the transport and marshaling of supplies and ammunition. Planned

attacks occurred only when massive numerical superiority had been achieved, and heavy

casualties were acceptable in the pursuit of victory.43 On the occasions when reinforcements

were not available, forces attacked aggressively or displaced for maximum effect until the

offensive could be resumed. Often (and mistakenly) compared to the later German concept of

41
Stuart Goldman, Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II. (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2012), 102.
42
Albert Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler. (London:Pearson, 2003), 46.
43
Roger Reese “Zhukov: What Made Him Great?”, Military History (September 2012): 66.
13
Blitzkrieg,44 “Deep Battle” was a more complete, effective, and more enduring form of warfare,

designed for the sustained attack and annihilation of the enemy forces45 but with a built-in

flexibility that Blitzkrieg, and its short-term goals, could not support.46

In the first real test, the Red Army was forced into action in the beginning of July by a

massive Japanese incursion westward across the Khalkin Gol, then southward along the river;

taken by surprise and with little time to prepare and in what would become a tactic borne of

improvisation, Zhukov sent a massive force of tanks and armored cars (estimates vary, between

200 and 450) to drive the Japanese from Bain Tsagan heights and back to their side of the river.

What made the event so risky was the fact that the armor was totally unsupported by infantry,

considered in that time as foolhardy and risky47 – though in this case, ultimately successful.

Once the Soviets controlled their side of the river and the Japanese were confined to theirs, both

sides dug in and prepared their defenses.

Intelligence, important to any commander, held special significance for Zhukov; without

knowing what he faced, he could not fully prepare an offensive strong enough to push the enemy

from the Nomonhan area and demanded regular reports, scolding officers who improvised or

exaggerated the strength of enemy forces;48 there is also anecdotal evidence of scouts dressing in

sheepskins and infiltrating flocks of sheep near Japanese formations.49 Aerial reconnaissance

was also valuable, as the largely featureless terrain of the steppes was also easily scouted from

the air, and daily dogfights resulted.

44
Douglas Varner, To The Banks of the Halha: The Nomonhan Incident and the Northern Limits of the Japanese
Empire. (Pittsburgh: Rosedog Books, 2008), 165.
45
Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 149-151.
46
Chaney, Zhukov, 74.
47
Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler, 55-7.
48
Ibid, 54.
49
Philip Snow, “Nomonhan – The Unknown Victory”, History Today (July 1990): 24.
14
 In keeping with the Soviet concept of the rear and its importance to interior lines of both

communication and logistics (a la Jomini), the First Army Group established a secure base for

the marshaling of supplies; the “unity of front and rear”.50 Extensive defenses were constructed,

with connected belts of trenches and overlapping fields of fire; tanks held in reserve were

camouflaged, to be used as artillery or if needed, mobile reserves.51 As the main mode of

transport in the Soviet Union at the time was the railway and the nearest railhead was

approximately 400 miles from the fighting, a reliable system of transport was necessary;

commandeering nearly every mechanical device in the area capable of carrying cargo,52 Zhukov

and his subordinates amassed an estimated 18,000 tons of artillery shells, 6,500 tons of airplane

ammunition, 22,500 tons of fuels, 4,000 tons of food, and 4,000 tons of miscellaneous material

in preparation for a massive offensive to start near the end of August.

To mask such preparations, elaborate deceptive measures were undertaken – mufflers and

treads were taken from tanks to mask their movement, and airplane flyovers and artillery fire

masked other preparatory noise;53 loudspeakers also blared construction noise at odd hours.54

Knowing that the Japanese were eavesdropping on radio traffic and intercepting phone

transmissions, bogus broadcasts concerning defensive preparations filled the airwaves, and

Russian planes “accidentally” dropped misleading leaflets (ostensibly defensive manuals for

Russian soldiers) on Japanese positions.55 By creating a routine of no routine, the Russians

aimed for complete surprise once the assault, now set for August 20th, was to begin.

50
Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936”, 231.
51
Goldman, Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II, 135.
52
Ibid, 124.
53
Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler, 58.
54
John Colvin, Nomonhan. (London: Quartet, 1999), 134.
55
Stuart D. Goldman, “A Long Shadow”, World War II (May 2009), 34.
15
 The Red Army had amassed (exact estimates vary) up to 65,000 men,56 and advantages of

4:1 in armor, 2:1 in artillery and aircraft, 1.5:1 in infantry, and 1.7:1 in automatic weapons;57

roughly 542 field guns, 498 tanks, and 515 airplanes to Japan’s 38,000 men, 318 guns, 130 tanks,

and 225 planes.58 With numerical superiority achieved and his forces dispersed on a wide front,

Zhukov planned to enact a simple plan.

A modern Cannae, a double-envelopment anchored in the center with a fixing attack and

augmented by modern touches of bombing and artillery strikes was in the offing; the two wings

of the pincers would meet at the small town of Nomonhan, encircling the Japanese troops on the

east side of the Khalkin Gol, near its confluence with the Holsten River. The Central Force, two

rifle divisions and a machine-gun brigade, would attack and fix the center of Japanese

fortifications near the east banks of the Khalkin; the Northern Force, an armored brigade, a tank

brigade, and one each of a cavalry and infantry regiment, would east strike across the river at the

Fui Heights. The Southern Force, a rifle division, five tank battalions, and a cavalry brigade,

would strike northeast across the steppes to Nomonhan. The advances would be preceded by

fighter/bomber sorties and an as-yet-unsurpassed artillery barrage; the whole assault

encompassed a 40-mile front. In essence, the plan was two twin spearheads attempting a “Deep

Battle” breakthrough, using the Soviet concept of “economy of force”.59

56
James J. Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should. (Centennial, Military Writers
Press, 2009), 215.
57
Colvin, Nomonhan, 99.
58
Sherwood Cordier, “The Red Star vs. The Rising Sun”. World War II (July 2003): 35.
59
Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 133-5.
16
 Figure 2 - Soviet Offensives beginning August 20

Source: Stuart D. Goldman. “A Long Shadow”, World War II (May 2009), 35.

At approximately 6 a.m. local time, the skies opened up – 200 bombers and their fighter

escorts bombarded Japanese fortifications, largely unopposed, as the Russians had achieved

Lapchinskiy’s “sense” of local, temporary aerial supremacy; Soviet planes also made full use of

a new weapon, the aerial rocket.60 When they refueled and refitted between sorties, Soviet

artillery unleashed the heaviest salvo yet in this undeclared war, firing at the limits of its

capabilities,61 characterized by one Japanese survivor as “the gongs of hell”.62 The

overwhelming artillery bombardment, a future Russian characteristic, completely immobilized

the Japanese defenders for almost an hour-and-a-half63 and left them vulnerable to the massive

infantry attack at approximately 9 a.m.

The Central Force kept the Japanese center fixed and unable to reinforce the weakened

flanks and the Southern Force’s overwhelming mechanized strength “bent” the weaker
60
Amnon Sella, “Khalkin-Gol: The Forgotten War”. The Journal of Contemporary History (October 1983): 675.
61
Chaney, Zhukov, 71.
62
Goldman, “A Long Shadow”, 34.
63
Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 664.
17
Manchurian cavalry back about 8 miles, north toward Nomonhan. Over the next few days,

hundreds of Soviet bomber sorties dropped 200,000 pounds of bombs on Japanese positions

while every front advanced steadily toward its objective; held up temporarily by Japanese

resistance at Fui Heights, Russian armor simply bottled up the forces there and stormed by,

letting the air force eliminate them – a tactic that would become a staple of Zhukov’s later battle

plans.64 By August 23rd, the Southern Force had crossed the Holsten River and on the 24th, both

pincers met at Nomonhan , completing the encirclement. Literal cyclones of artillery wiped out

remaining Japanese resistance within the ever-tightening mechanized circle; when artillery was

plentiful, there was no point in wasting infantry.65

In the end, the Soviets had achieved a military victory when all the world’s expectations

pointed to a crushing defeat; Russian estimates were as high as 55,000 Japanese casualties

(25,000 dead), while the Kwantung Army admitted to only 18,000, while taking only an

estimated 9,000 to 16,000. Most sources agree on an inflicted casualty rate of between 2:1 and

3:1,66 and the true numbers will likely never really be known. The small-scale battle had a ripple

effect, bringing an end to Japanese ambitions in Siberia and eventually turning them south and

pointing their aggressions at the United States; the Soviets, with a secure eastern border, returned

their attentions to Europe. They’d also revived a solid military doctrine, refined in the test of

battle, with the actions of Georgi Zhukov.

In the planning of the Khalkin Gol campaign, Zhukov had put into practice the theories of

Tuchachevsky’s “Deep Battle”, advancing and refining the large-scale combined-arms formulas

of this relatively new mechanized mode of warfare. The dual pincers of his encirclement,

64
Sella, “Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second World War”, 256.
65
Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 219.
66
Colvin, Nomonhan, 165-6, 173-5.
18
attacking simultaneously and across a wide front, overwhelmed the Japanese Army’s weaker

Manchukoan flanks and the fixing attack in the center prevented reinforcement from the center to

either weakened flank; the Japanese fortifications were suppressed by concentrated and

coordinated air and artillery attacks before being overrun by mechanized and traditional infantry

formations. The basic overall plan was pulled from the Tuchachevsky’s 1936 Field Service

Regulations: “Simultaneous assault on enemy defenses by aviation and artillery to the depth of

the defense…mutual support of all types of forces are organized in its interests”67 in successive

waves and supported by the operational art of organized logistics based in a secure rear area.

The mobility and flexibility of the tank were proven effective, and they were able, when

necessary, to function and survive alone, unsupported68 but devastating en masse. The tank was

also proven to exploit its inherent mobility and achieve fast, speedy operations when supported

by the other combat arms – in the interests of penetration, the tank forces could (and did) strike

out independently past enemy strong points, surrounding and isolating them to either ‘wither on

the vine’ or be dealt with by artillery and air forces.69

In his execution of the battle plan at Khalkin Gol, Georgi Zhukov had further fulfilled

specific requirements of Tuchachevsky’s “Deep Battle” doctrines, as set forth in the 1936 Field

Service Regulations, in particular articles 164 and 181, respectively : “the enemy should be

immobilized to the full depth of his position, surrounded and destroyed”70 and “groups of long-

range tanks have the mission of breaking through to the rear of the main forces of defense,

crushing reserves and headquarters, destroying the primary artillery grouping and cutting off the

routes of withdrawal for main enemy forces”.71 The Japanese 23rd Division was annihilated, the
67
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 6.
68
Sella, “Khalkin-Gol: The Forgotten War”, 679.
69
Chaney, Zhukov, 74.
70
Tuchachevsky, “Tactics and Strategy”, 58.
71
Ibid, 58.
19
destruction so utter and complete that the Kwantung Army withdrew its 7th Division reserves

when they were unable to break the encirclement72 to assist the 23rd, satisfying the “Deep Battle”

requirement of the “annihilation of the army of the enemy”.73

Christened a Hero of the Soviet Union, Zhukov returned to the west as the new

commander of the Kiev Military District; his methods had earned him the credibility needed to

reassert the forbidden doctrines and restore the framework needed to recover from the purges,

and the newer equipment used at Khalkin Gol had received its baptism of fire and subsequent

improvements needed to better function in future battles.74 The strategies and tactics he used so

successfully, however, were only acknowledged by a select few and far too late for the imminent

invasion of Finland, and were not discussed openly75 – the Soviet Union had not yet faced a

crisis dire enough for the widespread resurrection of its most successful military ideals.

Germany had invaded Poland on September 1, and what little attention the Battle of Khalkin Gol

received again turned west.

In keeping with his Baltic ambitions, Stalin longed to bring Finland back into the Soviet

Union and after half-hearted political maneuvering the invasion of Finland began on November

30, 1939. Planned by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov (a political opportunist, purge participant and

Tuchachevsky’s main political enemy),76 the invasion exhibited the hallmarks of the last war’s

strategic, tactical, and operational weaknesses. Voroshilov had underestimated Finnish

72
Goldman, “A Long Shadow”, 36.
73
Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 150.
74
Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 221-2.
75
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 8.
76
Kliment Ye Voroshilov, “The Base Traitors of the Base Motherland Are Unmasked and Crushed”, in The Soviet Art
of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press,
1982), 70-1.
20
capabilities and potential, and his poorly-trained conscript army, led by unmotivated and often

unqualified officers, steamrolled into Finland in parade-march order, expecting an easy victory.

Voroshilov’s old-fashioned, workmanlike strategy involved a heavy reliance on mass and

routine; marching in formation through forests and across frozen lakes and rivers and mounting

repeated frontal attacks77 resulted in casualties out of proportion with the opposing sides’

numbers. Ignoring the lessons of Khalkin Gol, tanks were sprinkled throughout infantry in

penny-packet fashion, without supporting artillery,78 and relied almost exclusively on seasonal

roads; traffic jams left tanks and artillery open to devastating Finnish guerilla attacks.79 When

mechanized forces left the roads, they either crashed through the ice of lakes and rivers or fell

victim to ingenious hidden mines and booby-traps.80 After a month of embarrassing defeats and

crushing casualties, the Russian advance stalled, not having met even one of its objectives.

Stalin ‘promoted’ Voroshilov out of Finland at the end of the year, and in his place

appointed Marshal Simon Timoshenko, a longtime associate of Georgi Zhukov and fellow

adherent of “Deep Battle”, to assume command of the campaign in Finland. The reorganization

of the army began almost immediately, with Timoshenko’s selection of Zhukov as his Chief of

Staff and a top-down reordering of forces to reflect the reality of arctic fighting81 and not the

idealized dreams of his predecessor. New units were now composed of various combat arms,

reorganized for the assault on the Mannerheim Line, the Finnish version of the Maginot Line.

The plan was to “chew” through the Mannerheim Line, with massive artillery bombardments

77
William R. Trotter, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40. (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1991),
36-7.
78
Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40, 119.
79
Robert B. Asprey, “The Winter War: Finland vs. Russia”. Marine Corps Gazette (August 1958): 44-5.
80
John Hughes-Wilson, “Snow and Slaughter at Suomossalmi”. Military History (January/February 2006): 49.
81
Trotter, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40, 204-6.
21
followed closely by armored spearheads to exploit breaches.82 While tightening supply lines and

consolidating command, Timoshenko created mobile defensive armor formations (armor

encircling artillery, with infantry support) to be set up between maneuvers and units were rotated

out of combat for theater-specific training.83 Political commissars were also reduced in role,

losing their decision-making ability in military matters. Reorganization in a similar fashion to

that seen at Khalkin Gol continued throughout January, in preparation for an offensive in early

February.

With the new KV-1 heavy assault tank and improved (direct, via phone lines)

communication between assault groups and supporting artillery,84 Timoshenko’s unofficially

“Deep Battle”-styled arctic army was ready for another try in Finland; logistically secure, with a

secure rear and plentiful armor and infantry reserves. In what was, for Zhukov, a similar pattern -

the February 1 attack on the Mannerheim line began with six hours of artillery barrage and a

500-plane aerial attack on the Mannerheim’s rear areas, followed by a combined armor-infantry

assault; later artillery barrages averaged 15-2000,00 shells per mile85 and successive armor

assaults normally involved 100 vehicles or more.86 By March 13 the reformed Soviet steamroller

had forced an uneasy peace on the Finns, and an armistice was signed. Timoshenko’s

reorganization of the faltering Red Army in the “Deep Battle” style was a great personal and

professional risk, but in the end had achieved not only Stalin’s goal of destroying Finnish

military capabilities but also further restored the credibility of Tuchachevsky’s work.87

Timoshenko’s success would catapult him to the position of Defense Commissar that May, and

82
Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40, 236, 241.
83
Asprey, “The Winter War: Finland vs. Russia”, 45-6.
84
Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40, 236, 246.
85
Asprey, “The Winter War: Finland vs. Russia”, 47.
86
Trotter, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40, 214-5.
87
Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40, 240-1.
22
new defense regulations, in particular Order No. 160, reflected new policies as a result of the

initial failures in Finland.88

With Timoshenko’s new post, such policies received wider attention and tacit acceptance;

at the Red Army High Command Conference in December 1940, Georgi Zhukov, in his

presentation “The Character of Modern Offensive Operations”, spoke on his belief in the swift

offensive, followed by massive flanking attacks. He also called for further study of active

defense, and the need to switch quickly from the defense to the offense in order to best defeat the

enemy. This presentation was well-received, and widely acknowledged to be “an outright

recognition of Tuchachevsky’s and Yegorov’s ideas concerning operations in depth”.89 In the

war games held soon after the conference, Zhukov’s forces were victorious in both trials and

he’d cemented his reputation as “Stalin’s fireman”, the premier Russian military problem-solver.

On February 1, 1941, Georgi Zhukov was appointed Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

In what would be its baptism of fire, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June

1941 showed that the Red Army was caught between its old doctrine and the new; one never

very effective, the other not yet emplaced. In the resulting confusion, approximately one-quarter

of valuable armor was lost to the German onslaught while Russian commanders and soldiers

alike wallowed in chaos and indecision. Throughout the invasion, “Stalin’s fireman” was called

in to assess unfavorable situations, coordinate their recovery, and often plan counterattacks

before being sent to another desperate situation; as often as not, when he was called away, others

who recognized the effectiveness of his methods carried on the same work in his stead.

88
Sella, “Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second World War”, 259.
89
Chaney, Zhukov, 87-8.

23
 As one of the few to stand up to Stalin and survive, Zhukov was demoted from Chief of

the General Staff to commander of the Reserve Front in July 1941, after denouncing Stalin’s

plans for the retention of Kiev; but by September 10, Stalin needed his fireman to relieve the

hapless Voroshilov in Leningrad, which was surrounded and in danger of being overrun by the

Germans’ Northern Force. Replacing those on the present staff with favorite (and competent)

officers and in keeping with his seemingly harsh treatment of unmotivated subordinates, he

immediately issued Order No. 0064, mandating the summary execution of anyone abandoning

their post. Without available reinforcements, Zhukov reorganized the existing defenses, focusing

artillery on choke points and roads needed by the besieging Germans, and deceptive measures

similar to those used at Khalkin Gol. Finding out that the Leningrad citizenry had constructed

dummy tanks from wood and cloth in a local theater and that the Germans had wasted

ammunition by bombing the dummies repeatedly, he ordered more built and deployed. Miles of

trenches were dug and communications wires lain, overlapping fields of fire coordinated,

extensive and layered anti-tank emplacements constructed, and urban combat training was

undertaken by the civilian populace. Sailors and other military personnel were retrained and

redeployed within the city.90 Zhukov unified and streamlined the command structure, and

ensured that the city’s industries continued to churn out the necessary implements of war;

thousands of tanks, armored cars, artillery pieces, and tons of ammunition were produced during

the German siege.91 Though called away by Stalin to Moscow in October, the defensive

networks he set up held firm under his deputies, and Leningrad was never taken.

Assuming control of Moscow’s Western Front on October 10, Zhukov inherited a

government in retreat and a battered, weak defensive line. Hundreds of factories had been

90
Ibid, 147-8, 156-7.
91
Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler, 97.
24
transplanted to distant, secure areas in the Urals and in Siberia, maintaining the “secure rear” and

preserving the logistical flow of supplies; several hundred other factories had been removed to

the eastern side of the Volga and maintained within the Moscow Military District.92 Three

reserve armies were also secretly moved up and maintained in the rear until needed for the

upcoming offensive.

Following the same pattern of shifting reserves and shoring up defenses, he summoned

over three-quarters of the Soviets’ available aircraft to the Moscow theater93 and transferred forty

Siberian divisions with experience at Khalkin Gol to his Western Front.94 While the Western,

Kalinin, and Southwestern fronts fortified and held, Zhukov oversaw the military training of

100,000 civilians, the raising of 25 companies (mostly boys and older men) and the medical

training of 17,000 women and girls as nurses and assistants;95 by the time of the planned

counteroffensive on December 5, the Red Army had amassed over 1 million men, almost 8,000

guns and mortars, almost 800 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft, plus over 400 Katyusha rocket-

launchers.96 Fielding eighty-eight divisions against sixty-seven German divisions and attacking

under cover of a blizzard, Zhukov’s Western Front held the center while the Kalinin Front

attacked south across the Volga and the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts attacked west across

the Don River, in a large breakthrough and encirclement maneuver stretching over 500 miles

from north to south.97

92
Ibid, 85.
93
Chaney, Zhukov, 191.
94
Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 222.
95
Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, ed. Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: Harper and Row,
2002), 59.
96
Nikolai Poroskov, “The Battle for Moscow”. Russian Life (November/December 2001): 54.
97
Martin Gilbert, The Second World War. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 243.
25
 Figure 3 - Soviet Counteroffensive at Moscow

Source: Albert Axell. Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler. (London: Pearson, 2003), 86.

It was a move reminiscent of the Battle of Khalkin Gol in both planning and execution;

numerical superiority in men and machines, amassed and unleashed at the enemy’s weak points

at the most opportune moment, with a close coordination of combined arms and aimed at

encirclement and annihilation. Though the Soviets fell short of encircling the German Army

Group Centre, various German pockets were destroyed and the Wehrmacht was forced to beat a

hasty retreat westward;98 it was also the first major offensive victory of the war for the Soviet

Union and had the added morale-boosting effect of saving the Russian capital. These “Deep

Battle” concepts were effective enough that Josef Stalin overlooked their origins in his nation’s

time of need.
98
William Terdoslavich, “The Battle of Moscow: September 1941-January 1942”, in How to Lose WWII: Bad
Mistakes of the Good War, ed. Bill Fawcett (New York: Harper, 2010), 104.
26
 In the lull that occupied the summer of 1942, both armies licked their wounds and

improved their defensive positions until the Wehrmacht launched attacks in the Caucasus, with

Army Group B’s main forces directed at Stalingrad. By the end of July, the citizens of

Stalingrad prepared their defenses, digging the now-familiar trench networks and emplacements

that had become the hallmark of Russian civilian defense while the Germans bore down on them.

Under a stage of siege by mid-August and encircled by General Paulus and his 6th Army, the city

had been hammered by merciless Luftwaffe attacks and its defenders driven to the Volga. On

August 27, 1942, Stalin appointed Zhukov the Deputy Supreme Commander (the only man to

have ever held the title) and sent him to handle the situation at Stalingrad; Stalin’s fireman was

to orchestrate his greatest victory there.

Zhukov planned an extended phase of “active defense” similar to that used earlier in

Leningrad99 to wear down the Germans and marshal men and materiel, and then unleash a

massive counteroffensive to encircle and destroy the German 6th Army, codenamed Operation

Uranus.100 Mechanization, coordination, and mass were the hallmarks of this restructured force,

patterned after the one so successful under Zhukov’s command in the Far East at Khalkin Gol.101

While General Vasili Chuikov’s 62nd Army locked the Germans in the city, engaging in brutal

hand-to-hand, house-to-house combat (“hugging the enemy” and negating his artillery, for fear

of striking their own men) Zhukov had amassed almost one million men, 1,000 modern tanks,

1,400 aircraft and 14,000 artillery pieces102 for the onslaught. Planned in secrecy, only a few

knew the particulars of the offensive and preparations were once again (a la Khalkin Gol)

99
John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 1990), 228.
100
Nikolai Poroskov, “Stalingrad”. Russian Life (November/December 2002): 36.
101
Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 221-2.
102
Dennis Showalter, “Stalingrad”. World War II (January 2003), 36.
27
orchestrated to appear defensive in nature.103 Logistics, weather, and German counterattacks all

contributed to periodic postponements of the attack.

Figure 4 - Operation Uranus

Source: Hans W. Henzel. “The Stalingrad Offensive: Part II”, Marine Corps Gazette (September 1951), 55.

On November 19, after a massive preparatory artillery barrage, General Nikolai Vatutin’s

Kletskaya Front (four tank and two cavalry corps) moved south across the Don River against the

inferior 8th Italian and Romanian 3rd armies guarding the Germans’ northern flank; General

Andrei Yeremenko’s Stalingrad Front (one tank and three infantry armies) moved northwest,

crushing the Romanian 4th army and driving off the 4th panzer Corps en route to its meeting with

the Kletskaya Front at the town of Kalach. General Rokossovski’s Don Front moved west

across the Volga and held the trapped 6th Army in place. Now simultaneously on the offensive,

closing the encirclement, and on the defensive, repelling German attempts to break through and

103
Chaney, Zhukov, 223.
28
rescue the 6th Army. In early January Zhukov’s men tightened the circle and began to isolate and

destroy German pockets.

Surrounded and over 100 miles from the nearest German assistance, Paulus repeatedly

refused Russian surrender overtures until January 8th; on the 10th, the Red Army unleashed the

largest artillery bombardment in history, approximately 7,000 field guns,104 pounding the

Stalingrad pocket and the thousands of men trapped inside. By February 1st, Paulus’ 6th Army

had been annihilated, and the remaining 90,000 soldiers, of the 330,000 that began the attacks on

Stalingrad,105 surrendered. It was the greatest defeat in German history, and once again

reaffirmed the effectiveness of the “Deep Battle” doctrines, by now fully in use and widely

acknowledged to be successful – but without the “Deep Battle” label applied by Tuchachevsky,

or any pointed recorded references to that fact.106

Widespread acceptance of the aggressive offensive tactics used by the Soviets in the

rebound phase of the war (“Deep Battle” or “the Zhukov way of war”) were married to the active

defense tactics successful in Leningrad and Stalingrad, and the two dovetailed perfectly at the

Battle of Kursk. In response to Hitler’s plan to reduce the Kursk salient and squeeze the “bulge”

with pincers of his own, Zhukov began planning for the assault there as early as March 1943.

Expecting a massive tank battle, he directed the construction of over 6,000 km (approximately

3,700 miles) of defensive trenches,107 composed of six belts of fortified bunkers and foxholes

manned by infantry, covered by overlapping fields of fire, fronted by masses of land mines and

104
Keegan, The Second World War, 236.
105
Hans Henzel, “The Stalingrad Offensive: Part II”. The Marine Corps Gazette (September 1951), 56.
106
Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 8.
107
Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler, 113-5.
29
backed by antitank guns.108 The defensive belts were covered by an estimated 20,000 artillery

pieces that outnumbered the infantry by a ratio of 2 to 1.109

The defensive network was as deep as 110 miles in some places, and backed by the

Steppe Front, the mobile reserve force needed to plug gaps and react to German

breakthroughs.110 In keeping with the ‘overwhelming force’ requirements of the established

doctrines, almost half of the Red Army’s manpower, three-fourths of its armor, and almost three

thousand aircraft were devoted to the counterattack phase111 which, if properly executed, would

encircle the German pincers and either drive off or destroy them; over one and a half million

men and thousands of tanks, field guns, mortars, and Katyusha rocket-launchers were to take

place in one of the largest battles in human history. The defensive measures of the Red Army at

Kursk, undertaken willingly for the first time in the war, had taken a coherent form and had

come to reflect the procedures outlined in the 1936 Field Regulations, designed to slow the

enemy advance and make it very costly.

The first phase of the operation started with an artillery barrage an hour before the

German advance in order to interfere with the formation of German attack groups112, followed by

days of pitched battle in which forty German divisions exhausted themselves against the Russian

version of the Maginot Line. Despite local successes, the offensive was blunted and eventually

stopped, followed up by the planned Soviet counteroffensives in several sectors. The Bryansk

Front in the north, striking southwest to the rear of the 9th Panzer Army and directly at German

108
William Terdoslavich, “The Battle of Kursk: Russia, July 1943”, in How to Lose WWII: Bad Mistakes of the Good
War, ed. Bill Fawcett (New York: Harper, 2010), 137.
109
Thomas J. Weiss II, “Fire Support at the Battle of Kursk”. Field Artillery (July/August 2000), 10.
110
Max Hastings, The Second World War: A World in Flames. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 328.
111
Richard Overy, Why The Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 90.
112
William Terdoslavich, “The Battle of Kursk: Russia, July 1943”, in How to Lose WWII: Bad Mistakes of the Good
War, 138.
30
Army Group Center; the Central Front, striking due west, and the Southwest Front, moving west

behind the 4th Panzer Army at striking at the German Army Group South, counterattacked the

second week of July.

Figure 5 - Battle of Kursk

Source: Richard Overy. Why The Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 93.

By the end of the first week of August, both German army groups were forced to retreat to avoid

encirclement and all Russian fronts advanced hundreds of miles, recapturing territory lost two

years earlier;113 the Russian counteroffensive at Kursk resembled the recent offensives at

Moscow and Stalingrad in form and execution, with massive encirclements encompassing fronts

113
Louis L. Snyder, The War: A Concise History: 1939-1945. (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1960), 311..
31
hundreds of miles wide. This battle marked the last large German offensive on the Eastern Front

and its army’s transition to a fighting retreat toward Berlin.

The “Deep Battle”-styled “Zhukov way of war” had become a regularity in the Red

Army, and reached its pinnacle during the invasion of Manchuria in August 1945,114 in which

Georgi Zhukov had no role aside from his resurrection of the “Deep Battle” concepts that

supported and drove the largest Russian operation in the Far East. Using the logistical format

originated at Khalkin Gol, a numerically superior force of over one and a half million men

(eighty divisions) was assembled and equipped with almost thirty thousand field guns and self-

propelled artillery, almost four thousand tanks, and just under six thousand aircraft – the very

embodiment of overkill and overwhelming firepower – and would advance on three massive

fronts.115

Figure 6 - Soviet Invasion of Manchuria

Source: Douglas C. MacCaskill. “The Soviet Union’s Second Front: Manchuria”, Marine Corps Gazette
(January 1975), 20.

114
David M. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Art Since 1936”, in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, eds.
Michael D. Krause and Cody Phillips (Washington: Center of Military History, 2005), 267.
115
Douglas C. MacCaskill, “The Soviet Union’s Second Front:Manchuria”. Marine Corps Gazette (January 1975), 20.
32
 Mechanized mobile forces of tanks and artillery spearheaded each giant front’s advance,

preceded by fast reconnaissance units that bypassed and isolated strong points; air superiority

enabled paratroop drops deep behind enemy lines and long-distance resupply of the fast-moving

ground forces. The operation took half as much time as predicted, driving elements of the

Kwantung Army as far south as Korea by the end of August 1945; it has been hailed as the

model of combined-arms activity, with armor, infantry, artillery, and aviation linked by extensive

communications and coordination to achieve the perfect “devastating synergistic effect”116 on the

Japanese enemy. Neither Tuchachevsky nor Zhukov were present for this campaign, but the

former’s doctrinal framework, enacted by the latter first at Khalkin Gol years earlier and then

throughout the Second World War, had laid the foundation for what would become the resurgent

Red Army that drove the Germans from Russia and the template for future armies.

In his stunning victory at Khalkin Gol in 1939, Georgi Zhukov not only reintroduced and

resurrected the “Deep Battle” methodologies, but illustrated their effectiveness in practice. With

an emphasis on the offensive and widely dispersed aggressive attack with mixed mechanized

forces and supported by heavy artillery and aviation arms,117 Zhukov successfully bridged the

gap between the strategic and the tactical arts with Tuchachevsky’s operational art. Pairing his

sound logistical systems with crushing numerical superiority and a preference for the massive,

multi-front encirclement,118 he was able to maintain and support large, linked operations. That

formula of materiel and order of battle remained constant throughout subsequent operations.119

In each offensive, starting with those at Khalkin Gol, air assaults (ground attack as well

as rear-area bombing runs) and artillery bombardments preceded the main mechanized/infantry
116
R.J. Biggs, “The Origin of Current Soviet Military Doctrine”. Marine Corps Gazette (August 1985), 65.
117
Colvin, Nomonhan, 131.
118
Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations”, 28.
119
Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler, 62.
33
assault on enemy lines or fortifications. Once the breakthrough was achieved, reserves secured

the breach and continued the pursuit of enemy forces in retreat.

Figure 7 - The Breakthrough

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 71.

Each wing or pincer of the double-envelopment maneuvers at Khalkin Gol, Moscow, Stalingrad,

Kursk, and Manchuria, viewed as its own front, performed as shown in Figure 7. A front could

be as small as Khalkin Gol, 40 miles, or as large as those at Kursk, encompassing hundreds of

miles.

34
 Figure 8 - Breakthrough and Encirclement

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 135.

Linked together in concurrent operations with the same objective, several coordinated

fronts achieved encirclement (Figure 8) such as those at the battles of Khalkin Gol and

Stalingrad, resulting in the destruction of the forces trapped in the pocket, one of the “Deep

Battle” theory’s ultimate goals. In the battle of Moscow, Russian forces failed in their attempt at

encirclement but did cause the retreat of Army Group Center in its attempt to avoid entrapment –

enemy retreat being another goal of “Deep Battle”, absent the opportunity for annihilation. In

Stalingrad, the center’s holding action in the city itself deprived the Germans of maneuver and

made the Russians’ flanking efforts easier and more efficient. The flanking maneuvers and

encirclements at Khalkin Gol and Stalingrad are perhaps the best examples of the Soviet use of

“Deep Battle” offensive doctrines.

35
 By summer 1943, Soviet defensive doctrine had reached maturity and manifested itself at

the battle of Kursk. Combining the experience of defensive tactics learned during the siege of

Leningrad and the defense of Moscow and Stalingrad with the “defense in depth” work

Tuchachevsky had started before his untimely death, the Red Army ground down the Wehrmacht

before going on the offensive. Once the German panzer armies had been stopped, the Red Army

broke out and opened up a multi-front counteroffensive (Figure5), again resembling Figures 7

and 8; the central forces broke through and two independent pincers attempted encirclement

from the north and south of the fortified area.

Figure 9 - Soviet Active Defense

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 71.

36
The deep penetration of armor into German rear areas again forced the German army groups to

retreat in order to avoid encirclement on two separate fronts, not only dividing their forces but

driving them in separate directions. German losses were irreplaceable, and the successful

marriage of Soviet offensive and defensive doctrine turned the Wehrmacht to the defensive on

the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war. The battles at Kursk were the culmination of a

linked chain of campaigns dating back to 1941, and demonstrated the flexibility of “Deep Battle”

in its largest sense as the Red Army transitioned from the defensive to the offense.

Soviet doctrine grew from the uniqueness of its political structure and reflected the needs

of the Soviet state. Mikhail Tuchachevsky’s work reflected the Soviet Union’s growing

industrial might and the doctrinal advancements a modernized military offered. His “Deep

Battle” theories grew to encompass not only the newer concepts of aviation, the mechanization

of forces, and active defense, but also their close coordination with traditional infantry and

artillery. Binding the four cornerstones of modern warfare (airpower, artillery, armor, and

infantry) with an offensive mindset and backing them with effective communication, solid

logistics, and extensive intelligence and deceptive operations, the mechanized offense assumed

supremacy. By the mid-1930’s, the Red Army’s “Deep Battle” doctrine was acknowledged to be

amongst the world’s most advanced competing military foundations when the purges eliminated

its leading proponents and sent the Red Army into a chaotic tailspin; the Russian military

suffered a doctrinal backslide, reverting to the antiquated thinking of the Great War.

Georgi Zhukov’s resurrection and successful application of Tuchachevsky’s forbidden

doctrines reflected not only their effectiveness on the battlefield, but also the validity of their

companion force structures. With his success at Khalkin Gol, Zhukov cemented his reputation as

a supremely competent commander and was subsequently used by Josef Stalin as a military

37
troubleshooter, sent from one military crisis to another. Repeatedly using the same “Deep

Battle” formulae of reliable logistical networks, thorough intelligence-gathering, and extensive

deceptive measures in combination with massive numerical superiority and closely-coordinated

mechanized combined-arms campaigns, Zhukov won increasingly more important battles in the

effort to drive the Wehrmacht from the Soviet Union. With the defensive refinements of the

Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad campaigns added to the offensive power of “Deep Battle”,

Soviet doctrine reached a pinnacle at the all-important Battle of Kursk, forcing the German army

to assume a defensive role it was never to shed for the remainder of the war. In his resurrection

of “Deep Battle” at Khalkin Gol and its effective use of massed armor formations and close

coordination of all arms, Georgi Zhukov provided the Red Army with a template for the later

Russian campaigns in the Second World War and the Soviet state with the military body it

desperately needed to survive.

38
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