DEL CASTILLO V. PEOPLE
Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search
Warrants; Requisites for the Issuance of a Search Warrant.—The requisites
for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized in order for it to be valid.—The warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order
for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In
the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates
or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items,
having been found in a place other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG
argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible
as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod
who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities.
The contention is devoid of merit.
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; While it is
not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or
possession.—While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or
seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellant’s control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence
to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established
that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of
electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
PEOPLE V. GREY
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Preliminary Investigation; Distinction
between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released.—It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged—is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Judge mandatorily required to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses.—In Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988), the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and
her witnesses.
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; What the law requires as personal determination on
the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor.—What the law requires as personal determination
on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only
the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused
and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
Same; Same; Same; Personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.—The Court has also
ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an
utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support
thereof.
PEOPLE V. SALANGUIT
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; In issuing a search warrant, judges
must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure—no presumption of regularity can be invoked in
aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.—Rule
126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things
to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a search
warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of
regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant
unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
Same; Same; The fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void—this would be material only if
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police.—The fact that there was
no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure
of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence.
Same; Same; It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was
issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized
on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. —It
would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable
cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof,
is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for
other items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the
first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant’s
house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Since the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Act.—Indeed, in People v. Dichoso the
search warrant was also for “Violation of R.A. 6425,” without specifying what
provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure
of “dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sets of paraphernalias (sic).” This Court, however, upheld the validity of the
warrant: Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in question was
issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant
is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this
theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for
illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated”
drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1)
search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Same; Same; Where the location of the accused’s house was made
determinate by reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant, and made
part of the record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the
place to be searched with sufficient particularity.—The rule is that a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
to be searched. For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement
and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an
Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused “Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant
Street, Malboro, Mass.” In this case, the location of accused-appellant’s
house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Requisites; Under the “plain view
doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in evidence.—Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful
objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b)
inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality
of the evidence before the police. The question is whether these requisites
were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found—the doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.—Because the location of the shabu
was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first.
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain
view doctrine” can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. As has been explained: What the ‘plain view’ cases have
in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused—and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.
Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control.—The only other possible justification for an intrusion by
the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellant’s lawful
arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent
the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach
for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
Same; Plain View Doctrine; Where the marijuana bricks were wrapped in
newsprint, there is no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.—The
marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People v. Musa in which
we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents
because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents.
Same; No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of
the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights
secured by the Constitution.—No presumption of regularity may be invoked
by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the
form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent
container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these
items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove
that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
accordance with the “plain view doctrine,” we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Same; The circumstances that the occupants of the house refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door
several times fancy and the agents saw suspicious movements of the
people inside the house, justified the searching party’s forcible entry into
the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their
mission would be frustrated unless they do so.—In contrast, Aguilar and
Duano’s claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot
be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant,
refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked
on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the
searching party’s forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless
they do so.
VALEROSO V. CA
Searches and Seizures; As a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is
required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers, or effects of any individual.—The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
which states: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,
as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of
any individual.
Same; Warrantless Searches; In the exceptional instances where a warrant
is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.—The above
proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. [Seizure] of
evidence in “plain view.” The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must
be immediately apparent; and d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.
Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] 9. Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. In the
exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
Same; Same; Arrests; Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest; Words and
Phrases; When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape, and, in addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction; A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control; The phrase “within the area of his immediate control”
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.—We would like to stress that the scope of the
warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri (252 SCRA
213 [1996]), People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (360 SCRA 690 [2001]), and People v.
Estella (395 SCRA 553 [2003]), we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his
immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
Same; Same; Same; A cabinet which is locked could no longer be
considered as an area within the arrestee’s immediate control because
there is no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that
could be used against him.—We can readily conclude that the arresting
officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso.
They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the
bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the
cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an “area within his immediate control” because there was no
way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him. The arresting officers would have been justified in
searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of
him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But
under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to
search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself. It is worthy to note that the purpose of
the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us,
search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been
within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds
of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; The “plain view doctrine” may not be
used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend
a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s
guilt.—Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
“plain view doctrine.” The “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
Same; Same; Same; The plain view doctrine does not apply where the
police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition but actually searched for the evidence.—The police officers
were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they were
supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other
words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be
used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually
searched for evidence against Valeroso. Clearly, the search made was illegal,
a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government; Because a
warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers
who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions.—Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty. Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in
the performance of official functions.
Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Constitutional Law; The Bill of Rights is the
bedrock of constitutional government.—The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as
human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III
of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law
way above the articles on governmental power.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; It would be better to set
free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to
convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.—Without the
illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict him. All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty
for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained.
Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.
LUZ V. PEOPLE
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a
Warrantless Search is Allowed.—The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”; (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk”
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.—Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that
the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In
this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police
station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a
limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.—Neither does the
search qualify under the “stop and frisk” rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a
limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct
a full search of the car.—In Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme Court held
that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly
issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not
authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer
does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or
doing a patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.—The Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented
without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government.
VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests;
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down
the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person.—Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant.  Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private
person, as follows: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Same; Illegal Searches and Seizures; A waiver of an illegal
arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search.—A waiver of an illegal arrest,
however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have established that
both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is
not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the
search. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless
search can be conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a moving
vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented
search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Searches
pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The
security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are
akin to routine security procedures in airports.—With port security
personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991), is inapplicable in
the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures
are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and
inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in
airports.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Searches and Seizures;
The Supreme Court (SC) lays down the exceptions where warrantless
searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (2) seizure in “plain view”; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.—The Constitution safeguards a
person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrant-
less search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in “plain view”; (3) search
of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Customs
Searches; Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid
search warrant, are allowed when “persons exercising police authority
under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement
of customs laws.”—The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is
different from a customs search. Customs searches, as exception to the
requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when “persons exercising
police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in
the enforcement of customs laws.” The Tariff and Customs Code provides the
authority for such warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et al. v.
Mago, et al., 22 SCRA 857 (1968): The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person onboard, or
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant
in said cases.
in this case — which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long
as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in
a way least intrusive to motorists.
Same; Same; When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.—It is well to clarify,
however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche
discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search — as
opposed to a mere routine inspection — such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.

Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a Valid Customs Searches.—Hence, to

be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting
the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the
search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is
not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part
of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of
the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs
searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the
search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.

PEOPLE V. MANAGO

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
unreasonable within the meaning of the said constitutional provision.—
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search
and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Searches and Seizures; One of

the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.—One of the recognized
exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed.

Same; Same; Three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected.—There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Same; Same; Police checkpoints are not illegal per se for as long as its
necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists.—A variant of searching moving vehicles
without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police checkpoints — as