Department of Justice v. Liwag GR No. 149311
Respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and
February 11, 2005 Azcuna, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Jurisdiction of the Digest By: Bries
Ombudsman
SUMMARY: Ong alleges that she was a former undercover agent of the PAOCTF
and PNP Narcotics Group, and filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against PNP
Gen. Lacson, PNP Colonel Aquino, and other PNP officials imputing several
offenses to them, including kidnapping for ransom and murder. A panel of
prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et al., who sent a letter saying
the DOJ should dismiss the complaint because the Ombudsman has a similar
complaint with the same facts. DOJ denied dismissal. Lacson and Aquino filed in the
RTC a motion for prohibition, insisting the DOJ does not have jurisdiction. Judge
Liwag issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from conducting a
preliminary investigation. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with SC.
SC: DOJ does not have jurisdiction to conduct PI, because of pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
DOCTRINE: DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct PI of cases involving
violations of the RPC, but this cannot diminish the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers
and employees.
While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with
the same subject matter, the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. There is also the possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions.
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: Complaint-affidavit filed by Ong v. Lacson
et.al before the Ombudsman. Ong then executed sworn statements before the NBI,
whose Director recommended their investigation to the Sec. of Justice. DOJ sent
subpoena to respondents, who manifested in a letter that the DOJ should dismiss the
complaint before it. DOJ denied this. Lacson et al. filed petition for prohibition with
Manila RTC, which granted this. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by the DOJ and NBI
FACTS: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force and the PNP Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a
complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP Gen. Panfilo Lacson, PNP
Colonel Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private
individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different
offenses imputed to Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-
affidavit sufficient in form and substance and required the respondents to file their
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counter-affidavits on the charges.
prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI,
alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Ong in her complaint-affidavit
before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter addressed to then Sec. of
Justice Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP
officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang,
James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.
In the letter, Director Wycoco manifested that this recommendation was made after
taking the sworn statements of Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai,
Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses
were attached to the letter.
A panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the
other persons named in the sworn statements. The subpoena directed them to submit
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall.
However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter that the
DOJ panel should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the
same respondents. They claimed that according to Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases involving
public officials, including police and military officials.
DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and denied the dismissal of the cases
before it through an Order that stated:
 the letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
 respondents’ rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the
determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged do not involve violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, nor are they related to
discharge of official duties;
 par. 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DoJ No.
95-001 dated Oct. 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation
 to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and
prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule
thereon with finality;
On the same day that the DOJ issued the Order, the Sol. Gen. received a copy of a
petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Manila RTC. They
maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the complaints. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ
was violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of having the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
RTC Judge Liwag issued an Order prohibiting the DoJ from conducting the
preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued by the RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by the DOJ and NBI, seeking to challenge the Order and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: WON DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct PI despite pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances
HELD: NO. PETITION DISMISSED. First, the SC allowed this petition even
though the petitioners came to it without filing a motion before the RTC to
reconsider the Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the
sake of the speedy administration of justice, considering that this involves the high-
ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted
nationwide attention, to which the SC agreed.
Sec.15, RA 6640, (Ombudsman Act of 1989), provides: “The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;”
Vis-a-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to
investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
RA 6770. Sec.15 (1) gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a
case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the
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power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is
not co-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can
delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the RPC, but this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against
public officers and employees.
While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with
the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in
the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as
unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies. In the present case, it
is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the
authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG, no complaint was filed with the Ombudsman, and the
SC recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate ill-gotten wealth cases. The SC pointed out that in Sanchez v. Demetriou,
Aguinaldo v. Domagas, Natividad v. Felix and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the DOJ, the complaint was not filed ahead with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation, so there was no simultaneous exercise of
power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders.
In contrast with the present case, Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially
with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted on by the Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records,
she then refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more
investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause
undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his
position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or
defense. There is also the possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the
same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents. The second investigation would entail unnecessary expenditure of
public funds in a duplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.