Or HaChaim on Leviticus

Or HaChaim on Leviticus
1:1

‫ וידבר‬,‫ויקרא אל משה‬, He called out to Moses and spoke, etc. According to Torat Kohanim on
this verse G'd always called to Moses before He addressed him from the Tent of Testimony.
We have to explore why the Torah records such a call on three separate occasions instead of
allowing us to conclude that if it was stated once it would form the basis of a Mah Matzinu
type of exegesis, i.e. that just as G'd called to Moses on the occasion mentioned here, or
elsewhere, so He did on every other occasion He spoke to him from the Tent of Testimony.
The author of Torat Kohanim proceeds to explain why such an exegesis could not be applied:
"There are only two other occasions when this "call" is recorded as having preceded the ‫דבור‬,
the speech. The first time it occurred when Moses had the vision at the burning bush; the
second time was at Mount Sinai, and the third time is here. We cannot establish a common
denominator between these three occurrences as at the burning bush Moses had never
previously been addressed by G'd and there was a need to prepare him mentally for such an
address. At Mount Sinai (Exodus 19,3) G'd wanted Moses to convey His message to the entire
Jewish nation. Neither of these two instances could serve as a valid precedent for G'd
addressing Moses out of the Tabernacle on earth after having issued a "call." The reason that
even this latter occasion does not serve as a precedent for the other two occasions is that in
both other instances G'd had manifested Himself out of fire as opposed to the present
occasion.

According to Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, the source for the Torat Kohanim saying that the call at
Mount Sinai came out of the fire is either Exodus 24,16: "G'd called to Moses on the seventh
day," or Exodus 19,20 where the Torah writes: "G'd called Moses to (come up to) the top of
the Mountain." It cannot be Exodus 19,3 where the Torah writes: "G'd called to him from the
Mountain, etc." This follows the explanation of Rabbenu Hillel according to whom this latter
verse was not addressed to Moses out of the fire and the Torat Kohanim has stated that the
reason the three occasions cannot serve as precedent for one another is that at Sinai and at the
burning bush G'd called out of the fire. Thus far Rabbi Mizrachi. With all due respect to
Rabbi Mizrachi, the Rabbi was not quite exact in his observation. The premise of the Torat
Kohanim was that inasmuch as the word ‫ ויקרא‬is followed by the word ‫דבור‬, we should have
been able to deduce that what happened at the burning bush also happened at the Tabernacle
seeing that we have a gezeyrah shaveh, the use by the Torah of similar wording. When we
follow this principle the word ‫ ויקרא‬should have been dispensed with in at least one of the
three situations. I believe the proof is precisely from Exodus 19,3. The verse in Exodus 24,16
does not contain a single superfluous word as it serves as G'd's call for Moses to come up to
the Mountain and to spend there the next forty days. The word ‫ ויקרא‬in that verse is used
instead of the word ‫ דבור‬not in addition to it. The only verses which were of interest to Torat
Kohanim are the verses in which the word ‫ קריאה‬is used as a prelude to the word ‫דבור‬. Even
the verse in Exodus 24,16 does not really meet the criteria established by the author of Torat
Kohanim as G'd had to issue a call to Moses to ascend the Mountain seeing he was down
below. The word ‫ ויקרא‬is certainly not superfluous then. That particular ‫קריאה‬, call, could only
have served as a prelude to G'd speaking to Moses on the Mountain. Had it been omitted, we
would have assumed that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was at the base of the Mountain,
something impossible as the Torah itself testifies that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was
on top of the Mountain.

As far as Rabbi Mizrachi finding support for his theory in Exodus 24,16 where G'd called out
to Moses on the seventh day out of the cloud before addressing him in the subsequent verses
in 25,1-2 is concerned, the venerable Rabbi has forgotten that the verses 24,17-18 which do
not involve G'd's addressing Moses make it impossible to consider 25,1-2 as a continuation of
His call to Moses in 24,16. There is absolutely no evidence that what G'd said to Moses in
25,1-2 occurred prior to Moses' ascending the Mountain. G'd may have given Moses all the
instructions concerning the donations for the Tabernacle after the latter had already been on
the Mountain for a number of days.

Rabbi Mizrachi rejected the opinion of Rabbenu Hillel that seeing the call at the Tabernacle in
our verse was in lieu of G'd manifesting Himself out of the "fire" (seeing the divine fire had
not yet descended on the altar). Accordingly, the Torah had to record G'd's call here. We
cannot accept this argument either. Rabbi Mizrachi apparently thought that Torat Kohanim
presumed that the "call" at the burning bush and at Mount Sinai was accompanied by
Heavenly fire. This is not true. The author of Torat Kohanim only meant that the particular
appearances by G'd to Moses were also followed or preceded by G'd manifesting Himself
through fire, something that most certainly was not the case when G'd called to Moses here at
the Tabernacle. G'd manifesting Himself through fire is an additional dimension to the degree
of His manifestation and did not take the place of His "call" alerting the recipient of such a
vision that he would shortly be addressed by G'd. Seeing that no such fiery manifestation took
place in the encounter between G'd and Moses at the Tabernacle, it was important to record
that G'd drew Moses' attention to an impending message by means of this "call."

The author proceeds to insist that the principal proof that G'd always let the "call" precede His
speaking to Moses is from Exodus 24,16. [I have abbreviated the polemics somewhat in the
interests of brevity. Ed.]

‫ ב' מיהא‬,‫ ולו יהיה שלא נחשוב פסוק ויקרא אליו ה' מן ההר‬,‫ועוד למה הוצרך לומר ג' קראי בסיני שקדמה קריאה‬
‫ והלא כל טרחת התנא הוא על יתור ויקרא האמורה באהל מועד שלא היה‬,‫ישנם שקדמה קריאה לדיבור לסברת הרב‬
‫ ולדברינו אינו‬,‫ אלא ודאי שדברי הרב כאן שלא בדקדוק‬,‫צריך לאומרה ויגדל הקושיא בזכרונה ב' פעמים בסיני‬
‫מקום לקושיא אחת מכל אלו והקודמים ומעתה נמצינו אומרים עיקר לימוד שקדמה קריאה לדבור בסיני הוא פסוק‬
‫ויקרא אליו ה' מן ההר וגו' כה תאמר ועיקר‬:

I find it difficult to understand the comment in Torat Kohanim that seeing that when G'd
spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai this was something public, addressed to the whole nation, and
that this is why He needed to introduce His address by a "call. After all, every commandment
G'd revealed to Moses by speaking to him was intended for the whole nation. The author of
Korban Aharon claims that when G'd addressed the whole of Israel He had to reduce the
intensity of His voice seeing the people were not attuned to Him to the same degree as Moses.
Accordingly, if the Torah uses the the word ‫ ויקרא‬here it is to tell us that G'd did not reduce
the intensity of voice He used when He addressed the people at large instead of only Moses. If
we follow this approach we would have to understand the author of Torat Kohanim as saying
that when he speaks about ‫ לכל ישראל‬he did not consider this as a compliment to Israel. This is
quite difficult to accept. I believe that the ‫מעלה‬, compliment, expressed by the word ‫ ויקרא‬in
Exodus 24,16 consisted in the fact that G'd included the whole of the people in what He was
about to say instead of using Moses as His intermediary. The author of Torat Kohanim took
the example of Exodus 24,16 as his cue to tell us that just as G'd employed the "call" as a
compliment to the people at that time„ He continued to use this "call" forthwith as a
compliment to Moses, even though He addressed Himself to the ears of Moses alone.

The Torat Kohanim we have quoted above concludes by saying that this call not only
preceded addresses by G'd to Moses which were followed by the relatively harsh ‫דבור‬, but
included every time G'd spoke to Moses from the Tabernacle even when employing the softer
‫אמירה‬, or the word ‫צו‬, "command." The proof lies in the repetition of the word ‫ וידבר‬in verse
one, followed immediately by the word ‫ דבר‬at the beginning of verse two although no
message had been delivered yet as a result of either the words ‫ ויקרא‬or the word ‫וידבר‬. Seeing
no such apparently superfluous verbiage occurred either during the Torah's report of the
vision of the burning bush or when G'd communicated with Moses at Mount Sinai, all we
could have deduced from those occasions is that a "call" always preceded a ‫דבור‬. We needed
this verse and its unusual construction to teach us that such a "call" preceded every
communication Moses received from G'd at the Tabernacle. In the other two instances G'd's
appearances in that location were restricted to a single communication such as at the burning
bush or to a communication extending over a few days such as immediately before the
revelation at Mount Sinai. "Calls" reported on those occasions could not have served as
precedents for G'd "calling" Moses every time He spoke to him from the Tabernacle,
something that became a frequent occurrence during the next 38 years. The first such occasion
therefore had to be introduced by the words "from the Tent of Testimony," in order to
demonstrate that this form of communication set a pattern for future communications by G'd
to Moses which emanated from the Tabernacle. In this instance the previously mentioned
method of exegesis ‫מה מצינו‬, could be employed as there would not be new and different
factors governing G'd's speaking to Moses in the future. The Torat Kohanim needed to
address the problem of the nature of G'd's addresses, i.e. the various terms the Torah employs
when reporting that G'd spoke to Moses. The author wanted to establish proof that when G'd
commenced speaking to Moses and the Torah describes this as ‫ויאמר השם‬, or ‫ויצו‬, that such
communications were also preceded by a "call" to Moses. Torat Kohanim repeats once more
that in view of the repeated use of the word ‫ דבר‬or the very fact that the term ‫ דבר‬reflects a
"stronger" speech, I would have thought that only that type of speech was preceded by a
"call." Therefore, to ensure that we do not misread the Torah, the Torah wrote ‫דבר ידבר‬, to
include all kinds of addresses by G'd as having been preceded by a ‫קריאה‬, a "call."

I have seen that Rabbi Abraham ben David, (‫ )ראב"ד‬quotes a version of the Torat Kohanim
according to which the proof is contained in the words "‫ לאמור‬,‫ וידבר‬,‫ "דבר‬occurring
consecutively in our verse. This version makes much more sense than the one I am quoting
from which does not strictly conform to the text in the Torah. According to that version,
Torat Kohanim used the word ‫ לאמור‬which was unnecessary seeing that the word ‫ דבר‬followed
immediately. Actually, the word ‫ לאמור‬would not have been extraneous at all; the Torah is full
of constructions such as ‫וידבר…לאמור‬. What is extraneous is the repetition of the words
‫וידבר…דבר‬. We must consider the text of the Torat Kohanim at the disposal of the ‫ ראב"ד‬as the
authentic one.

I must add that as far as the Torat Kohanim proving that the word ‫ ויקרא‬in our verse is
indispensable is concerned as we could not have assumed that such a call preceded G'd's
communications to Moses from other instances such as the burning bush, etc., the fact is that
the word is absolutely necessary regardless of the arguments advanced. How else would I
have known that G'd's "call" preceded all other communications to Moses from the Tent of
Testimony barring the first one were it not for that word?
We must, however, pay closer attention to the text of the Torat Kohanim. Why did that author
not question the word ‫ ויקרא‬as being superfluous in either the appearance of G'd at the burning
bush or at Mount Sinai in conjunction with a "call," so that we could have deduced that such a
call had taken place by deducing this from what happened when G'd spoke to Moses from the
Tabernacle? The problem that the Torat Kohanim posed by saying that a combination of the
use by the Torah of the word ‫ ויקרא‬either at the burning bush and at Sinai, or at the Tent of
Testimony and at Sinai would not have served as a precedent to teach us concerning the third
ocurrence would then not have to be raised at all. Furthermore, seeing that Torat Kohanim
used the extraneous words ‫ מאהל מועד‬to prove that all subsequent communications from the
Tabernacle were preceded by "calls," what is to stop him from applying that ‫ למוד‬also to what
happened at Sinai and at the burning bush, so that the word ‫ ויקרא‬in both of those instances
would be superfluous?

I have read the commentary of Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi who was very aware of all these
problems, but I must confess that I do not feel that his answers put my mind at rest. The
venerable Rabbi argues that the reason that G'd had to record the call as preceding His
speaking to Moses at the Tent was that Moses was afraid to enter unless invited. (The Torah
had described the Tent as filled with G'd's cloud of glory and Moses being unable to enter in
Exodus 40,35.) In other words, the reason for the call there was that it could not serve as
precedent for G'd's need to "call" either at the burning bush or at Sinai. Why would the author
of Torat Kohanim have been afraid to point out something as simple as that? I believe that had
the Torah omitted mention of the word ‫ קריאה‬either at the burning bush or at Sinai, I simply
would have considered the ‫ קריאה‬here as something new which had not occurred previously
instead of assuming it had occurred without the Torah having mentioned it. [At this point the
author continues in his polemic against the conclusions offered by Rabbi Mizrachi. The
interested reader is referred to the original for further study. Ed.]

)‫ וכמו שגילה דעתו שדרש (שמות ג ד‬,‫ומה שיישב שאחר האמת דעת התנא הוא דלמדינן סנה מסיני ואוהל סועד‬
‫ ואם לא היה סובר שאין‬,‫ויאמר משה משה שאין תלמוד לומר ויאמר אלא ללמד על כל הקריאות שהיו משה משה‬
‫צורך ללמד בה שקדמה הקריאה לצד דיליף מסיני ואוהל מועד הרי אצטריכא לגופא להשמיענו שקדמה לה הקדיאה‬
‫ בושני מדברים אלו כי מה שאנו לומדים שהקריאה קדמה להדיבור אינו על דבור שהיה בקריאה עצמה אלא על‬.‫ע''כ‬
‫ כי הדבור שבקריאה עצמה לא מצינו אותו ולא היה בשום אחת מג' קריאות זולת בסנה‬,‫הדבור הנאמר בסמוך לה‬
‫ ולא על דבור זה אנו אומרים שקדמה קריאה לדבור אלא על הדבור‬,‫פירש הכתוב אופן הקריאה שהיתה משה משה‬
‫ והנה לפניך המקומות שאנו אומרים בהם שקדמה הקריאה בהם בסיני לא נאמר אלא ויקרא‬,‫הנאמר לו אחר הקריאה‬
‫ולא אמר הדבור שהיה בקריאה עצמה ואנו אומרים בו שקדמה הקריאה לדבור ובהכרח שהוא דבור הנאמר בסמוך‬
‫ וא''כ כמו כן תהיה‬,‫לקריאה וכמו כן באוהל מועד אנו אומרים שקדמה הקריאה לדבור הגם שלא נאמר ויאמר משה‬
‫קריאת הסנה הגם שלא היה אומר הכתוב ויאמר אלא ויקרא משה משה וגו' ויאמר של נעליך וגו' אמרי' שקדמה‬
‫ ותמהני עליו שהוא פירש שקריאה שקדמה לדבור בסיני‬.‫ ואייתר ליה ויאמר לדרוש מה שדרש התנא‬,‫קריאה לדבור‬
,‫הוא פסוק ויקרא ביום השביעי והדבור שאחריו הוא ויקחו לי תרומה שיש הרבה ריחוק מקום בין הקריאה לדבור‬
‫ ואם הרב חשב שהקריאה לחוד ואמירת משה משה‬.‫ובקריאת סנה העלים עיניו מראות הדבורים הנאמרים בסמוך‬
‫ ויש עוד להקשות‬,‫ ותמהני איך יצאו מפי קדוש דברים אלו‬,‫ והדברים ברורים לעין כל בן דעת‬,‫ זה שגגה הוא‬,‫לחוד‬
‫אלא שאין צורך לדחות דברים כאלה‬:

‫ ואמר‬,‫ומה שיישב למה לא ילמוד סיני וסנה מכל הדבורים והאמירות שנתרבו בפסוק זה שקדמה בהם הקריאה‬
‫שאין כוונת התנא אלא לאותם דברים ואמירות שנאמרו באוהל מועד בלבד ואין ללמוד ממנו לשאר דבדות שנאמרו‬
‫ ואוהל מועד לצד ששכן עליו הענן‬,‫ כי סנה אין בו קדימת קריאה‬,‫ לפי מה שהעלה שסתרנוהו בסמוך‬,‫בשאר מקומות‬
‫ ודחק עצמו לפרש גם בדברי רש''י שאמר סתם לכל הדברות ואמירות וכו' קדמה קריאה וכו' שאינו‬,‫ולא יכול לבוא‬
‫ כי ממה שריבה הכתוב כל הדברות והאמירות‬,‫ דבריו ז''ל אין שכלי הולמם‬.‫אלא אותם שנאמרו באהל מועד ע''כ‬
‫שהיו באוהל מועד שקדמה בהם הקריאה עין רואה ולב שומע כי לא לצד ששכן הענן ולא יכול לבא היתה הקריאה‬
‫ ואם להודיע שבכל דבור‬,‫אלא להקדים הקריאה לדבור מודיע הכתוב שאם מחמת היראה קריאה אחת תספיק לכל‬
‫שהיה ה' מדבר היה משה ירא ליכנס והיה צריך לקרא לו‪ ,‬אין דברים אלו כדאים ליאמר‪ ,‬כי בהכרח לומר שלא היה‬
‫הדבר כן בתמידות‪ ,‬שהרי הכהנים נכנסים ומשמשים ומשה לא ירא ולא יפחד ליכנם עמהם‪ ,‬ומן הסתם שידבר ה'‬
‫עמו בתמידות‪ ,‬אם לא שתאמר שבכל עת שהיה רוצה ה' לדבר עמו היה הענן שכן והיו יוצאים הכהנים חוץ לאהל‬
‫‪:‬מועד‪ ,‬וזה הבל גמור‬

‫ועוד תמצא שהעלה רא''ם בד''ה מאוהל מועד כי תנא דתורת כהנים סובר כאותה ברייתא דקתני (ריש ת''כ) כתוב‬
‫אחד אומר (שמות מ לה) ולא יכול משה לבא וכתוב אחד אומר (במדבר ז פט) ובבא משה בא הכתוב השלישי‬
‫והכריע ביניהם (שמות מ לה) כי שכן עליו הענן‪ ,‬אמור מעתה כל זמן שהיה הענן על המשכן לא יכול‪ ,‬נסתלק וכו'‬
‫ובבוא וגו' ע''כ‪ .‬הנה פשט דרשה זו היא שמעולם לא נכנס משה אלא אחר שנסתלק הענן‪ ,‬ואף על פי כן ריבה הכתוב‬
‫לכל הדברות שנאמרו לו באוהל מועד שקדמה להם הקריאה‪ ,‬ואם תאמר שלא דרש תנא כן אלא אחר שנאמר קריאה‬
‫בסיני אבל זולת זה היה מחזר אחר דרשת ר' תנחומא (ריש פ' זו) שדרש שהקריאה היתה לצד שהיה מתיירא לבא‪,‬‬
‫הרי לך דרשת ר' תנחומא ז''ל‪ ,‬היה ירא משה ליכנס דכתיב ולא יכול משה אמר הקב''ה אינו דין ודרך כבוד שמשה‬
‫שנצטער במשכן יהיה עומד בחוץ ואני בפנים אלא הריני קורא אותו שיכנס לכך נאמר ויקרא‪ ,‬לסברא זו לא היה‬
‫הדיבור אלא בפעם ראשונה אבל משם ואילך הרשות נתונה לו מאת המלך ליכנס ואין פחד ואף על פי כן אמר‬
‫‪:‬הכתוב שהיה מקדים קריאה לדבור ומעתה למה לא למדינן כל הדברות ואין צריך לומר סיני וסנה מאוהל מועד‬

‫והנכון לומר הוא כי אם לא אמר הכתוב קדימת קריאה לדבור בסיני וסנה הגם שהיה אומר באהל מועד היינו‬
‫אומרים כי מאהל מועד מיעט סיני וסנה שלא קדמה הקריאה בו‪ ,‬שהסברא נותנת ללמוד מאוהל מועד כשם שקדמה‬
‫בו קריאה לדבור כמו כן בסנה וסיני תלמוד לומר מאוהל מועד‪ ,‬ויש טעם למיעוט‪ ,‬כי אולי לצד שקבע ה' שכינתו עם‬
‫ישראל הוסיף מעלה זו בתחלת שכינתו שקרא לו קודם הדבור‪ ,‬ורבוי לאמר היינו דורשים דרש אחרת‪ .‬ותדע שאין‬
‫לך פרשה שאין בה יתור לאמר ואנו דורשים באופן אחר ותהיה זאת כאחת מהנה‪ .‬ואחר שאמר הכתוב קריאה בסנה‬
‫וסיני נתחייבנו לומר כי מאוהל מועד בא לרבות שאר דיבורים‪ ,‬ואחר שמצינו שריבה הכתוב הדבורים דרשינן ג''כ‬
‫לאמר למה שלפנינו שהם האמירות ששקול אני בהם אם יהיו בכלל הדברות‪ ,‬כי יותר יש לנו לדרוש יתור התיבה‬
‫למה שאנו צריכין לה במקומה מלבקש דרשות‪ ,‬ואחר שהודיענו הכתוב כל הדברות והאמירות שנאמרו באוהל מועד‬
‫שקדמה להם הקריאה הוא הדין לכל הדברות והאמירות שנאמרו בתורה‪ ,‬והטעם כי בג' מקומות מצינו שהקדים‬
‫הכתוב קריאה לאמירה סיני וסנה ואהל מועד‪ ,‬ואין אני יודע אם לא היה דבר זה אלא בפעם ראשונה או בכל פעם‬
‫ופעם כשביאר הכתוב באחד מהם שהוא באוהל מועד שהיה בו בכל דבור ואמירה הרי נתגלה הסתום שה''ה בכל‬
‫הדבורים שהיו בכל המקומות‪ .‬או נאמר עז''ה שאחר שביאר הכתוב דבורים ואמירות שהיו באוהל מועד אנו חוזרים‬
‫ולומדים מסיני וסנה ואוהל מועד לכל הדבורים על זה הדרך‪ ,‬מה סיני וכו' קדמה קריאה אף כל וכו'‪ ,‬מה לסיני וסנה‬
‫שהיה תחלת דבור במקום ההוא תאמר בשאר דבורים שלא היו תחלת דבור במקום ההוא‪ ,‬אוהל מועד יוכיח שקדמה‬
‫הקריאה לכל דבור ודבור שהיה שם‪ ,‬ולכשנאמר מה לאוהל מועד שכן היה מקום ששכן בו ה' בקביעות ונעשה‬
‫אלהים שכן בתוכנו‪ ,‬סיני וסנה יוכיחו וכו' שקדמה הקריאה בפעם ראשונה וכו' וחזר הדין וכו' הצד השוה שבהם‬
‫‪:‬שהיה דיבור מפי קדוש למשה אף אני אביא כל דיבור מפי קדוש למשה שקדמה בו הקריאה בכל מקום שדבר עמו‬

‫‪. He called to Moses. Why did the Torah not identify the caller? While it is true‬ויקרא אל משה‬
‫‪that the Torah identifies the caller as being G'd when it goes on to say: "G'd spoke to him‬‬
‫‪from the Tent of Testimony," the omission of G'd as the subject at the beginning of this verse‬‬
‫‪is most remarkable.‬‬

‫‪Perhaps the Torah wanted to let us know the essence of G'd's "voice" which is such that even‬‬
‫‪if it called extremely loudly it would be audible only to someone attuned to it and waiting to‬‬
‫‪, must mean that although G'd called out generally, only Moses‬ויקרא אל משה ‪hear it. The words‬‬
‫‪heard it and not any other person standing in front of him [i.e. closer to the source of the‬‬
‫‪voice. Ed.] Had the Torah written: "G'd called to Moses, etc.," I would have understood that‬‬
‫‪G'd called out in a powerful voice but that by the time the sound-waves reached the ear of‬‬
‫‪Moses they were considerably weaker than at their source. Moses would then have had to‬‬
‫‪gauge by the volume of sound he heard from where that sound had emanated. He would also‬‬
‫‪not have been surprised that people standing behind him had not heard that voice at all seeing‬‬
‫‪those people were even further removed from the origin of that sound than he himself. At any‬‬
‫‪rate, there would not have been any miraculous element in this call by G'd to Moses out of the‬‬
Tabernacle. By writing ‫ויקרא אל משה‬, the Torah draws our attention to the fact that Moses
indeed heard a very powerful voice and that the super-natural element in this call was that he
was the only one who heard it.

Another reason why the name of G'd was not recorded in the Torah as associated with this
"call" was that G'd was more interested in having His name associated with the
commandments He was about to give to Moses than merely to record that it was His voice
which invited Moses to receive a communication from Him, or as a sign of G'd showing him
respect, if we want to adopt the approach of Vayikra Rabbah 1,8. According to that Midrash,
Aaron, his sons and the elders had been wondering who was most beloved in G'd's eyes; They
decided amongst themselves that they would find out by observing to whom G'd would turn
first after the Tabernacle [Aaron's domain Ed.] was erected. When G'd called to Moses they
realised that G'd liked Moses best of all. There was no cause for the Torah to mention Moses
by name as the test was the call itself.

By following the approach of the Midrash we can also understand why the Torah had to add
the word ‫ אל משה‬instead of merely saying: ‫אליו‬, "to him," seeing that Moses' name had
appeared at the end of the last portion (Exodus 40,35). The Torah could have done the same
as in Genesis 18,1 where we are told: "G'd appeared to him" (Abraham), without mentioning
Abraham's name seeing he had been the subject of the last paragraph in Parshat Lech Lecha.
In our situation G'd had to convince the sons of Aaron and the elders of His fondness for
Moses.

‫וידבר ה׳ אליו מאהל מועד‬. G'd spoke to him out of the Tent of Testimony. The reason that the
Torah had to emphasise that G'd spoke only to Moses, i.e. that only Moses heard His voice,
was to prevent misunderstandings. While it was understandable that the ordinary people did
not hear G'd's voice, we could have thought that any priest inside the Tabernacle who had
business there at the time G'd wished to address Moses would be privy to hearing G'd's voice.
The Torah therefore emphasised that only Moses was privy to this voice by writing ‫אליו‬, "to
him exclusively."

‫מאהל מועד‬, from the Tent of Testimony, etc. Why didn't the Torah first mention the site from
which G'd's voice emanated before telling us who did the talking? Here the Torah reverses the
norm completely by first telling us to whom the voice spoke, then telling us who did the
speaking and only at the very end telling us from where G'd's voice emanated. When we
consider the comments of Torat Kohanim which we quoted earlier, i.e. that all of G'd's
communications from the Tent of Testimony were preceded by a call to Moses, it does make
sense that this information was reserved for the end of the verse. Matters which will occur at a
later stage deserve to be mentioned later than those which occur in the immediate future.

Torat Kohanim also deduces from the wording of this verse that G'd's voice was "cut off, and
did not travel beyond the confines of the Tabernacle." How could this be deduced from our
verse seeing Torat Kohanim had already deduced the nature of the "call" from the same
wording? Furthermore, if indeed the voice of G'd did not travel beyond the confines of the
Tabernacle, why did the Torah have to word things in such a way that we learn that the
Israelites could not hear this voice? Of course they could not hear a voice which was confined
to the Tabernacle! I have seen that Rabbi Mizrachi answers this problem saying that the
exegesis is based on the Torah not writing: ‫ויקרא אל משה מאהל מועד‬, but writing instead: ‫אליו‬
‫מאהל מועד‬. The meaning is that the voice travelled in a straight line from the Tabernacle to
Moses and stopped there. Our second question is answered by the ‫ ראב"ד‬who says that the
Torah had to tell us that the voice of G'd being audible only to Moses was something new;
previously it was either audible to the people who were assembled at Mount Sinai, or in the
case of the burning bush, it would have been audible had there been anyone else present
beside Moses. It was only after G'd took up residence in the Tabernacle that His voice reached
only Moses.

I must confess that I am not happy with either one of these two answers. As to the argument
of Rabbi Mizrachi that the mention of the words ‫ מאהל מועד‬at the end of the verse after ‫אליו‬
indicates that the voice came directly to Moses and not to the people, how do we know where
exactly Moses stood at that time? If Moses had stood in a spot adjoining the Tent of
Testimony, the fact that no one else heard the voice does not prove they would not have heard
it if he had stood some distance away. If Rabbi Mizrachi is correct, the voice should have
been mentioned first followed by its objective, i.e. ‫מאהל מועד אליו‬. The fact that the Torah
writes the word ‫ אליו‬first makes it plain that it was not the Torah's intention to convey to us
the exclusivity of G'd's voice by means of this wording. Why would the Torah reverse the
normal syntax by telling us the end before the beginning? It is much easier to accept that the
Torah imparts the information about G'd's voice being ‫נפסק‬, cut off, from the sequence " ‫מאהל‬
‫מועד לאמור‬," instead of the sequence "‫וידבר ה׳ מאהל מועד אליו לאמור‬." If the Torah had not
intended for us to deduce the various ‫למודים‬, the rules of syntax would have required the
Torah to first identify the place the speaker spoke from, followed by the identification of
whom it spoke to. Now that the Torah did not do so, we have "room," i.e. a sufficient number
of departures from the norm to allow for all the deductions we have been taught by Torat
Kohanim. The additional words ‫ מאהל מועד‬teach that from that time onwards a "call" preceded
every communication by G'd to Moses. The word ‫ לאמור‬may be used to include not only those
communications by G'd which used the word ‫דבר‬. The fact that the Torah did not write ‫ויקרא‬
‫ מאהל מועד‬attests to the nature of G'd's voice, i.e. that only Moses was attuned to it. The
sequence ‫ מאהל מועד לאמור‬teaches that the voice emanated from the Tabernacle, i.e. ‫וידבר‬, and
travelled only as as far as Moses and was not heard outside.

As to the ‫'ראב"ד‬s answer to our second question that the Torah had to exclude previous calls
which emanated from G'd as not having been exclusively for Moses' ears, and that this is why
the Torah had to write the words ‫ מאהל מועד‬where it did, his words are nothing short of
astounding. Surely the Torah had provided us with the words ‫ אהל מועד‬both in Exodus 25,22
and in Numbers 7,89. In both these instances G'd's voice is reported as emanating from the
Tabernacle or a certain spot within it. Why would the ‫ ראב"ד‬need the words ‫ מאהל מועד‬in our
verse to teach us such an exclusion? It is therefore much more plausible to believe that what
Torat Kohanim focused on was not that the voice was cut off inside the Tabernacle but that
the communication, i.e. the speech, the ‫ דבור‬was audible only inside the Tabernacle. When
G'd called, i.e. invited Moses, His voice was audible outside the Sanctuary. When He spoke to
Moses (after the latter had entered the Sanctuary), His voice was audible only to Moses, i.e. it
was ‫נפסק‬.

Rabbi Mizrachi opines that the author of Torat Kohanim clearly holds that Moses was inside
the Tabernacle at that time and that this was only possible because the cloud had withdrawn at
that time. [It is assumed that the readers are familiar with a Tannaitic disagreement as to
whether Moses was inside the Tabernacle when G'd spoke with him at this point or not.
Please refer to Exodus 40,35 where the Torah told us that Moses could not enter the
Tabernacle due to the cloud containing the glory of G'd filling the Tabernacle. Some opinions
(Yuma 4) hold that G'd took hold of Moses and placed him inside the Tent. On the other hand
we have Numbers 7,89 from which it is evident that G'd spoke to Moses while he was inside
the Tabernacle. Rabbi Mizrachi, based on Rashi, holds that the solution to the apparent
contradiction in the verses we quoted is in the words "because G'd's cloud rested upon it"
(Exodus 40,35); once the cloud moved Moses was able to enter. Ed.] We also find that Moses
was able to "enter the cloud" in Exodus 24,18. The same may be presumed to have occurred
in connection with this "call" in our verse here. As far as I am concerned the matter is very
simple as it is not reasonable to assume that Moses had to wait until the cloud removed itself
fom the Tabernacle and that Moses heard the call only then. Upon examination you will find
that Rabbi Mizrachi quoted the text of the first part of Torat Kohanim 1,9 (The Midrash refers
to Exodus 25,22 where G'd told Moses He would henceforth communicate with him inside
the Tent of Meeting, G'd's voice emanating from between the cherubs which were situated on
the lid of the Holy Ark): "When G'd said: 'I will communicate with you there,' He meant to
exclude the Israelites who had not been deemed fit to ascend Mount Sinai; He also meant to
exclude everybody else including Aaron, barring the ministering angels. Moses could not
enter the Tabernacle until he had been summoned. This proves that at the time G'd called to
him (in our verse) Moses was standing outside. The Torah writes that the voice came ‫אליו‬, to
him, i.e. from the inside of the Tabernacle and was cut off." Thus far the quote from Torat
Kohanim. It is clear that the author of that Midrash was convinced that Moses stood outside
the Tabernacle at the time G'd's voice called him. You may ask "how did the author of that
Midrash know that the call preceded the communication (i.e. the substance of what G'd
wanted to say)?" Seeing that the "call" was needed to invite Moses into the Tabernacle as he
was afraid to enter unless summoned, how can we derive any additional ‫למוד‬, exegetical
content, from this word? The answer is that if G'd had wanted to He could have removed
Moses' fear and he would have entered the Tabernacle without a special "call." Seeing G'd did
not do this, this is proof that the "call" was something that had to precede the communication
proper as we have outlined previously, and that Moses remained afraid to enter without
invitation. He stationed himself close to the Tabernacle so as to be mentally prepared as soon
as he would receive G'd's "call" at which time he would enter the Tent. The sound of the call
to Moses "left" (was audible beyond) the Tabernacle, whereas the sound of G'd's
communication to Moses never left the confines of the Tabernacle and thus was not heard by
anybody else. Not even an echo of it was audible [as had been during the last eight
commandments at Mount Sinai. Ed.].

A moral-ethical approach to our verse sees in it a message to Moses to relate to the Israelites
everything G'd would command him while he was still in the Tabernacle. This is the deeper
reason why the text wrote the words ‫מאהל מועד לאמור‬, "from the Tent of Testimony to say,"
in that order. There is a sound psychological reason for this. If the Israelites would hear G'd's
commandments as emanating from the Tabernacle, it would inspire them to relate to them
with far more reverence than if Moses were merely to tell them these commandments while
assembling the people inside the camp. They would accept these commandments knowing
that Moses would not have dared to add or omit a single word while he was communicating
G'd's word at a place where the ‫ שכינה‬was present.

There is yet another message contained in the words ‫אליו מאהל מועד‬. Moses merited being
called by G'd and addressed by Him as a sign that G'd had forgiven the sin of the golden calf
and had taken up residence within the Tabernacle to signify this forgiveness. G'd wanted
Moses to communicate this message to Israel. This is why the Torah wrote: "from the Tent of
Meeting to say." When you find that Torat Kohanim interprets the substance of the message
hinted at in the word ‫ לאמור‬as being ‫דברי כבושים בשבילכם‬, "words of rebuke for your sake G'd
communicates to me, etc.," this refers to Deuteronomy 2,16 where Moses told the people that
G'd had resumed speaking with him using the friendly term ‫ אמירה‬only after all the people
who were 20 years and over when the spies returned from their ill-fated misssion had died.
This was 38 years after the moment described in our portion. This comment is in line with
what I have said. The only difference is that Torat Kohanim derives the entire exegesis from
the word ‫לאמור‬, without dissecting the verse as carefully as we have done. ‫מ‬Torat Kohanim
states there that in the event we thought that G'd communicated with Moses because of His
own concerns we should know ‫לאמור‬, that it was only on account of the Israelites. The
Midrash means that the word ‫ לאמור‬is to be understood as a ‫מעוט‬, an exclusion. G'd made it
clear that He would not have spoken to Moses on that occasion were it not for the fact that He
did so for the benefit of the people, i.e. He wanted to speak to them. This teaches that the
whole purpose of G'd speaking to Moses from the Tabernacle was in order for Moses to
communicate sections of the Torah to the people. When we are told in Avot 1,1 that Moses
received the Torah at Sinai and he delivered it to Joshua, etc., this means that Moses handed
over the entire tradition; he neither omitted any part nor added something of his own. Every
secret G'd had entrusted to Moses, Moses in turn faithfully communicated to the leader of the
next generation. Israel are compared to Moses when it came to Torah knowledge, the only
difference being that Moses had received the Torah directly from G'd.

1:2

‫דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת‬, "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, etc." The first
difficulty is the repetitive: "‫דבר ואמרת‬," speak and say!" Besides, why did G'd not say ‫אמור‬
‫ואמרת‬, but changed the instructions in mid-stream from ‫דבר‬, harsh-sounding instruction, to
‫ואמרת‬, i.e. a softer approach? The answer is that in this communication G'd issued legislation
concerning two different kinds of sacrificial offerings. The first kind of offering mentioned
here is one which is prompted by man's goodwill towards G'd, his desire to donate a free-will
offering, the ‫עולה‬, the burnt-offering. The second legislation deals with a sin-offering, a
mandatory offering, the result of the owner having committed an inadvertent sin which
requires him to obtain atonement. The word ‫דבר‬, the relatively harsh form of communication
applied to the legislation about the sin-offering, whereas the word ‫ ואמרת‬was used when
telling the people the rules about the burnt-offering. Alternatively, we can recognise in this
differential two separate aspects of the sin-offering legislation. The sin-offering is referred to
by the word ‫ אמירה‬seeing G'd has declared Himself ready to accept a sheep, or in the worst
case, an ox, as atonement for man's sin; on the other hand, the harsher ‫ דבר‬is justified
inasmuch as man should not have committed such a sin, even inadvertently. The basic penalty
for the sin in question is the death of the sinner. It is a sobering thought that an animal had to
die to atone for man's mistake.

The Torah addresses ‫בני ישראל‬. According to Torat Kohanim this expression is to exclude the
practice of ‫סמיכה‬, the owner of the sacrificial animal placing his weight on the animal before it
is slaughtered, when such an animal is offered by a non-Jewish owner (something which will
be mentioned shortly in this legislation). The word ‫בני‬, is to exclude ‫בנות‬, females, from this
requirement. The word ‫ ואמרת‬is supposed to restrict the procedure of ‫ סמיכה‬to peace-offerings.
This is difficult to understand seeing the expression ‫ אמירה‬is perceived as something
additional to ‫דבר‬, i.e. as inclusive, not exclusive. Although the author of Korban Aharon
claims that the word ‫ לאמור‬would have taught us the lesson it did even if the word ‫ דבר‬had not
occurred at the beginning of this verse, I beg to differ. Without the words ‫ דבר אל בני ישראל‬at
the beginning of this verse I could not have deduced what I did from the word ‫ לאמור‬in the
previous verse. There would have been no exegetical value to the word ‫ דבר‬seeing it was
needed for the basic message the Torah is trying to convey.
Perhaps the author of Torat Kohanim felt that seeing it is not clear which of the two words ‫דבר‬
‫ ואמרת‬was to be used exegetically and which was needed for the basic message, it was in order
to use either word exegetically. Alternatively, Torat Kohanim did not mean to focus on the
word ‫ דבד‬at all but on the words ‫בני ישראל‬. Seeing that the Torah could have written ‫דבר אליהם‬
instead of ‫דבר אל בני ישראל‬, the extra words are available for exegetical purposes. It was quite
obvious that Moses was to address the Israelites and not anyone else. By saying ‫בני‬, the Torah
excluded females as the Torah should have written ‫ דבר אל בית ישראל‬if it intended to include
women in the requirement to perform ‫סמיכה‬. The word ‫ ישראל‬excluded the ‫ סמיכה‬requirement
from Gentiles offering sacrifices to G'd. Nonetheless, the alternative we offered earlier is
more likely to be the correct one, seeing that somewhere in the commentary by Torat
Kohanim it is argued that the words ‫ בני ישראל‬refer to the nation who had a Covenantal
relationship with G'd, something which is related to its interpretation of the line ‫אדם כי יקריב‬
‫מכם‬, i.e. that the word ‫ אדם‬includes Gentiles.

‫אדם כי יקריב מכם‬, "when any man of you brings an offering, etc." Why did the Torah have
to use the term ‫ ?אדם‬Whereas Torat Kohanim here claims that the word includes offerings
brought by proselytes as being acceptable, the author of Korban Aaharon asks what need
there was for the Torah to specifically include proselytes seeing we have a ruling in
Menachot 73 that even sacrifices from Gentiles are acceptable. This ruling is based on either
exegesis or logic derived from Leviticus 22,18. The author of Korban Aharon suggests as an
answer that we could have assumed that once the proselyte had converted he would become
subject to the same restriction that the Israelites themselves are subject to as a result of the
Torah writing ‫כי יקריב מכם‬.…‫בני ישראל‬, i.e. that not all the Israelites are entitled to offer such
sacrifices. The word ‫ אדם‬then would confirm that sacrifices are accepted from all proselytes. I
do not find this answer as grammatically tenable. Had the Torah not written the word ‫ אדם‬in
our verse which included proselytes, the Talmud would not have been able to include Gentiles
based on the wording ‫ איש איש‬in Leviticus 22,18, but would have included only proselytes as
allowed to offer vows and gift-offerings. This is why the author of Torat Kohanim chose our
verse as the basis for the ruling that offerings from proselytes are acceptable. This is the only
reason that the formulation ‫ איש איש‬in Leviticus 22,18 may be interpreted as a directive to
include Gentiles. Once we are clear about this there is no need to come up with forced
explanations to justify the Torat Kohanim as does the author of Korban Aharon.

One cannot object that seeing that according to Baba Metzia 114 only Israelites are called ‫אדם‬
and not Gentiles, that therefore the words ‫ איש איש‬in 22,18 must refer to proselytes seeing the
beginning of that verse specifically addressed Israelites and that it would not have occurred to
anyone to include Gentiles so that they needed to be excluded specifically. Once we use the
verse to expand the group of people from whom sacrificial offerings are acceptable we do not
include every category of person but we include the group of people most closely resembling
natural-born Israelites, i.e. the proselytes. Only if we find another word in the text which
suggests that some other group of people is to be included in this legislation do we use it to
include Gentiles. As a result, the law is that the proselyte may bring any kind of sacrificial
offering whereas the Torah permits the Gentile only certain types of offerings. Rabbi Akiva
holds that the Gentile may only bring a burnt-offering, ‫עולה‬, whereas Rabbi Yossi Haglili
holds that Gentiles may also offer a gift-offering, ‫( מנחה‬Menachot 73).

Midrash Tanchuma item 8 on our portion asks why the Torah used the expression ‫ אדם‬in our
verse in preference to the customary ‫ ?איש‬The answer given is that the Torah wishes to
establish a parallel with the first human being who had sinned, i.e. ‫אדם‬. We may understand
the verse as follows: ‫" ;כי יחטא אדם כמו אדם הראשון שהתחיל לחטא יקריב קרבן‬If someone sins as did
Adam who was the first human being who sinned, he shall offer a sacrifice." It appears from
the wording of the author of the Tanchuma that Adam's sin was inadvertent seeing sin-
offerings are acceptable only for sins committed inadvertently. The Midrash corresponds to
what I have written on Genesis 3,12 on the words: "she gave to me." The entire ‫ פרשה‬here
teaches us that G'd applied a different yardstick to man after Adam had sinned initially.
Whereas the penalty for Adam's sin had been death, i.e. mortality, and the fact that he offered
a sin-offering did not absolve him of his guilt, such offerings will help the Israelites to atone
for the sins they commit inadvertently. The Tanchuma supplied the reason why G'd did not
accept Adam's sacrifice as sufficient atonement, i.e. he had been the first human to sin; the
evil urge had not been an integral part of him so that it would have been difficult to resist the
lure of that urge. All subsequent human beings have been afflicted in that evil has become
part of their life-force, ‫נפש‬. The ‫אות הברית‬, the sign of the covenant between us and G'd, i.e.
the need to remove the foreskin through the act of circumcision, is the proof of the cardinal
difference between us and Adam who had been created minus the foreskin.

I believe that this consideration helps to explain a verse in Job 33,29 according to which G'd
gives man two or three chances before decreeing something final resulting in his death. Why
was Adam not measured by that yardstick? In fact, when it comes to sins committed by a
community of people, we know on the authority of Amos 2,1, that G'd will forgive Israel's
sins three times and only on the fourth occasion will He no longer forgive. There is, however,
a good reason why G'd did not apply the yardsticks mentioned in either Job or Amos to ‫אדם‬
‫הראשון‬, the first man. On the day G'd created Adam He made him of totally good components,
so that no part of him was either mentally or physically worthless which would cause him to
go astray. Once he sinned he became the prototype of a sinner and the evil his life-force, ‫נפש‬
had absorbed became a part of every subsequent Israelite's body and soul. Even man's body
absorbed that vestige of sin and the reminder of that contamination is the foreskin with which
males are born. Keeping in mind that we all suffer from a handicap Adam had not suffered
from, G'd decided to allow man up to three repetitions of mortal sins before making a decree
final. It is man's heritage from the moment he emerges from his mother's womb to be infected
with this evil pollutant. This pollutant endeavours to make man sin intentionally. It also
endeavours to make him sin through mere thoughtlessness. In this latter case, the sin-offering
helps to secure penitent Man atonement for such thoughtlessness. Although it is true that
Adam's sin was also due to thoughtlessness, G'd dealt fairly with him by not allowing him a
second chance seeing he did not have to overcome a spiritual or physical pollutant which
urged him to disobey his Maker.

‫כי יקריב מכם‬, "when one of you brings an offering, etc." We need to analyse why the Torah
had to write the word ‫מכם‬, "from you." Besides, why is that word written after the Torah had
already written the predicate of the verse, i.e. "who offers a sacrifice." Normally, the subject,
i.e. the person who performs the act is mentioned before the act he performs. Our sages in
Chulin 5 state that the word ‫ מכם‬is intended to exclude Jewish heretics whose offerings are not
acceptable. They arrive at this conclusion by viewing the word ‫מן הבהמה‬, as suggesting that
sacrifices by a heretic are aceptable. How was such an exegesis arrived at? The word ‫מכם‬
excluded only a Jew who either practices idolatry, (seeing this sin is equivalent to violation of
all the Torah's commandments), or the kind of heretic who rejects all of the Torah's
commandments. The wording ‫מן הבהמה‬, on the other hand, suggests another group of animal-
like human beings, i.e. heretics who reject only one or several of the commandments. The
Torah says that these sinners do qualify for offering of sacrifices. The translation of the verse
would be: "a certain animal-like person amongst you who offers a sacrifice, etc." The
exegesis offered in Chulin helps to explain why the word ‫ מכם‬in our verse appears after the
predicate instead of before. If the Torah had written: ‫אדם מכם‬, in that sequence, the word
would have appeared to exclude something instead of including something, or vice-versa. The
intention of the verse, however, was that inclusions should apply only to proselytes, whereas
exclusions should apply only to certain members of the Jewish community. The Torah
achieved this aim by positioning the words ‫ כי יקריב‬between the words ‫אדם מכם‬. We may also
justify the position of the word ‫ מכם‬through reference to a different exegetical approach on the
same folio of the Talmud. There the Talmud quotes a Baraitha which understands the word
‫ מכם‬as excluding offerings by heretics, and another Baraitha which uses the words ‫מעם הארץ‬,
(Leviticus 4,27)i.e. "from certain types of ‫ עם הארץ‬not from all of them," as the basis for not
accepting sacrifices from such individuals. Rabbi Shimon disagrees saying that the words ‫אשר‬
‫ לא תעשינה ואשם‬at the end of that verse make it clear that only an unrepentant heretic is not
allowed to offer sacrifices. [Seeing that it seems strange that according to the first view even a
repentant heretic should be forbidden to offer a sacrifice, Ed.], the Talmud defines the
difference between the two views as applying only when someone who remains guilty of
eating forbidden fat has repented for eating blood, and offers a sin-offering to achieve
atonement for that sin. According to the first view, such an offering would be acceptable,
whereas according to the second view it would not as the sinner continues to practice his
heresy by eating forbidden fat. The Talmud there adds that one of the verses (1,2) speaks of
the acceptance of a burnt-offering from a heretic, whereas the other verse (in Leviticus 4,27)
speaks of the acceptance of a sin-offering from a heretic and that we need the exegetically
usable words or letters of both verses. Thus far the T almud.

Our sages have said in Torat Kohanim that the words ‫ כי יקריב‬refer only to voluntary
offerings. This makes sense in view of the word ‫ מכם‬appearing after the words ‫כי יקריב‬. The
offerings which are excluded are voluntary offerings such as fulfilments of vows, i.e. ‫עולה‬.
This is what the Talmud in Chulin 5 meant when it said one verse speaks of the burnt-
offering. Logic might have persuaded us that the Torah is willing to accept a free-will
offering from a sinner who has not repented a specific sin, whereas a sin-offering from such a
sinner would be rejected. The Torah therefore had to tell us that no offering is acceptable until
the sinner has repented all of his sins. At the same time we also need the exclusion implied in
the words ‫ מעם הארץ‬in 4,27 where the Torah speaks of a need to bring a sin-offering. The
exclusion in that chapter is quite different from that in chapter one in that the only person
from whom we do not accept a burnt-offering is the heretic who rejects the whole Torah. In
4,27, however, the Torah excludes sin-offerings even from a Jew who habitually only violates
a single one of the 613 commandments when such a Jew wishes to offer a sin-offering for a
different commandment which he violated unintentionally. Maimonides rules similarly in
chapter three of his treatise on Maaseh Hakorbanot.

If we wish to see a moral-ethical dimension in this verse we may pursue the following path.
Seeing that the Jewish people had observed that G'd had brought Moses close to him, and
called out only to him from amongst all the Israelites, the Torah goes on record to say that
such distinctions are not restricted to Moses, but ‫אדם כי יקריב‬, "anyone who wishes to come
close to G'd, can do so provided ‫מכם‬, is a member of the Jewish people." In fact, as we have
already pointed out, G'd's call to Moses was only for the sake of the Israelites, for their
benefit. Consider the fact that during 38 years of wandering in the desert when the Israelites
were sullen [due to the decree that they would perish in the desert after adopting the majority
report of the spies Ed.], and G'd kept His distance from them, G'd had not spoken even with
Moses. This was clear evidence that when G'd had spoken to Moses out of the Tabernacle it
had been for the benefit of the people and not for either G'd's or Moses' benefit.
The Torah also wanted to give a hint to the elite amongst the people to influence the hearts of
the Israelites so that they would worship G'd willingly. The reason that the offering or
sacrifice is called ‫קרבן‬, i.e. from the root ‫קרב‬, "to come near," is that it is sin which separates
man from his Father in Heaven. We know from Deuteronomy, 4,4 that "you who have
cleaved to the Lord are all alive this day." The Israelites instead had become separated and
distant from the presence of G'd, the ‫שכינה‬, due to their support for the spies' report and their
attempt to return to Egypt. G'd, on the other hand, is anxious to establish a close bond with
Israel and commanded the elite to rebuke the sinner in order to bring his heart closer to the
Lord his G'd. At the same time G'd punished those who ignored their duty in this regard. A
proof that G'd indeed expects those who are the elite to take a leading role in influencing the
hearts of the people, is found in the statement by our sages in Avot 5,21: "He who leads the
multitude in righteousness shall have no sin come into his hand," seeing G'd will protect him
against committing errors. These then are the messages contained in our verse.

The word ‫ אדם‬used by the Torah here refers to the spiritually most advanced members of
society, the elite. Zohar Tazria interprets the sequence of the words ‫כי יקריב מכם‬, as "whom
does one try and bring close to G'd, the ‫מכם‬, the ones who have not been close in the first
place, i.e. the spiritually lower level of society who have sinned and asked G'd not to bother
them with His demands so that they could withdraw from the close bond with G'd." These are
the people for the elite to focus on, to try and bring them back closer to G'd. This is why the
Torah adds the words ‫קרבן לשם‬, to be close to G'd, so that they will become what G'd called in
the words of Isaiah 60,21: "the shoot that I planned, My handiwork in which I glory." A
person of that calibre, involved in bringing others closer to G'd does not have to bring either
free-will offerings or sin-offerings. Having finished with describing the task of the elite of the
Jewish people, the Torah continues: ‫מן הבהמה תקריבו את קרבנכם‬, i.e. the ordinary people are to
offer their various kinds of sacrifices; after all, not everyone is on the spiritual level of those
described as ‫אדם‬, i.e. able to restore harmonious relations between sinners and G'd.

1:3

‫אם עולה קרבנו‬, if his offering consists of a burnt-offering, etc. Why is the wording of the
Torah different here from the verses in which the burnt-offerings consisting of either sheep or
fowl are described? In both those instances the Torah writes: ‫ואם מן הצאן קרבנו‬, or ‫ואם מן העוף‬
‫קרבנו‬, whereas here the Torah writes: ‫ ?אם עולה קרבנו‬If the Torah wanted to be consistent it
should have written: ‫אם מן הבקר עולה‬. We may understand this in conjunction with an idea
mentioned in Torat Kohanim (3,20) in connection with the word ‫ את קרבנכם‬at the end of the
last verse. We are told there that the Torah speaks of communal burnt-offerings. This would
account for the plural ending in the word ‫קרבנכם‬. In the other two instances we have
mentioned the Torah uses the singular ending, i.e. ‫קרבנו‬, making it plain that the Torah speaks
of sacrifices offered by individuals. Moreover, the Torah uses the conditional ‫אם‬, if, when
introducing the burnt-offering to tell us that the only kind of communal burnt-offering
acceptable is the one which consists of ‫בקר‬, a male member of the cattle category. Peace-
offerings may not be offered as communal offerings. [Peace-offerings are offerings which are
eaten in the main by the owners, whereas the burnt-offering is completely consumed by the
altar except for the skin and the hair. Ed.] Furthermore, the sequence ‫ קרבנכם אם עולה‬suggests
that only burnt-offerings are acceptable as communal offerings and not peace-offerings as
stated in Torat Kohanim.

Furthermore, if the Torah had been consistent and written: ‫אם מן הבקר עולה‬, we would have
concluded that only animals which belong to the category of ‫בקר‬, cattle, are acceptable as
burnt-offerings and that sheep, etc., would be unacceptable as burnt-offerings. As a result of
such considerations the Torah wrote the words ‫ אם עולה‬in that order to make it plain that there
are other alternatives. Both cattle and sheep are acceptable as burnt-offerings, albeit
communal burnt-offerings have to be of the ‫ בקר‬variety. Individual burnt-offerings on the
other hand, may consist of either cattle or sheep. In order that we should not err concerning
the acceptability of burnt-offerings consisting of certain kinds of fowl, the Torah added the
word ‫ קרבנו‬once more (1,14) although this was not strictly necessary as pointed out in Torat
Kohanim which understands the word as precluding communal burnt-offerings consisting of
birds even when these communal offerings are in the nature of ‫נדבה‬, voluntary offerings.

The wording of the Torat Kohanim (3,21) is: "Why did the Torah have to repeat the word
‫עולה‬, burnt-offering, once more?" Answer: "I could have concluded that all the exclusions we
have learned from the previous verses apply only to burnt-offerings which are voluntary
offerings but that in the case of mandatory offerings they do not apply; hence the Torah
repeats the word ‫ אם עולה‬to teach that the restrictions which we have learned about do not
distinguish between voluntary and mandatory burnt-offerings." This concludes our quote from
Torat Kohanim. It appears that the author of the Torat Kohanim thought that the Torah should
have written: ‫אם קרבנו עולה‬, "if his sacrifice is a burnt-offering." They answered that if the
Torah had written the words in that sequence we would have assumed that the Torah spoke of
a voluntary offering, an ‫עולת נדבה‬, seeing that the words ‫כי יקריב‬, definitely imply that the
owner of that animal has a choice in the matter. The words ‫ אם עולה‬then mean any kind of
‫עולה‬, any kind of burnt-offering be it a mandatory one or a voluntary one. The ‫ ראב"ד‬argues
that the word ‫ עולה‬here was superfluous as the Torah could have relied on the next appearance
of that word in the next verse. I consider this very forced.

‫קרבנו‬, his offering. Torat Kohanim views this word as including the above-mentioned
restrictions as applicable also to peace-offerings. If not for the word ‫ קרבנו‬I would have
understood that the peace-offering is not subject to the same restrictions as the burnt-offering.
Therefore this word is meant to include peace-offerings in the restrictions applicable to the
burnt-offerings. There was never any reason to assume that peace-offerings should be subject
to such restrictions in the first place so that the Torah had to counter that impression. [The fact
that female animals are acceptable as peace-offerings as opposed to burnt-offerings which are
restricted to male animals, lends substance to that assumption. Ed.] The author of Torat
Kohanim did not use the pronoun ending ‫ קרבנו‬instead of ‫ קרבן‬as the basis for its exegetical
comment as he did so already in verse 10 when the Torah speaks about the burnt-offering
consisting of sheep or goats.

1:9

‫את הכל‬. all of it. Torat Kohanim claims that the word ‫ הכל‬specifically includes the hooves and
the horns of the animal. In view of this, we must ask why Abraham did not include the horns
of the ram he offered in lieu of Isaac (Genesis 22,14), leaving the horns to be used as shofarot
as described in Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer chapter 31. Perhaps we have to assume that Abraham
did indeed offer, i.e. put the entire ram on the altar, and that due to the heat the horns ‫פקעו מעל‬
‫המזבח‬, cracked and fell off the altar; we learned in Zevachim 86 that once parts of the burnt-
offering fell off the altar they do not need to be put back on.

Another possibility is that the horns were separated from the ram prior to sprinkling its blood
on the altar. Horns, etc., are not included as fit to be burned on the altar unless they are still
attached to the body of the animal in question. If they have been detached, they have to be
removed from the altar even if they had been placed on it already as we know from Deut.
12,27: ‫ועשית עלותיך הבשר והדם על מזבח השם‬. According to Rabbi Zeyrah who stated in
Zevachim 86 that the parts which had fallen off the altar are permitted for private use if they
had been detached from the body prior to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar, one may
fashion handles for knives from such horns.

Another way of solving our question is that seeing the Torah had not been given as yet during
Abraham's lifetime, the details recorded here did not obligate him. It is true that our sages in
Yuma 28 held that Abraham carried out all the minutiae of the commandments. This included
‫ערובי תבשילין‬, i.e. pre-cooking some food for the Sabbath following a festival on the eve of the
festival in order to make preparation of food on the festival for the Sabbath permissible. I
have already explained that Abraham did so voluntarily, in order to accumulate merits, not
because he was under any obligation to do so. The same reasoning [that the Torah had not yet
been given. Ed.] applied when Tamar married Yehudah her father-in-law, or when Jacob
married two sisters while both were alive. The fact that the ram was stuck in the thicket by its
horns was in itself a supernatural event; Abraham certainly did not have to burn up these very
horns, a commandment applicable only in the future.

1:10

‫ואם מן הצאן קרבנו‬, If his offering consists of the category of sheep or goats, etc. Torat
Kohanim remarks cryptically that the word ‫ואם‬, in this verse [actually I think it would be
better to say "the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ואם‬," Ed.] informs us of something additional to what we
have learned about the ‫עולה‬. What the author of Torat Kohanim means is that all the details
mentioned in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of cattle and not repeated in this
paragraph are nonetheless also applicable when the burnt-offering consists of ‫צאן‬. Examples
are the need to perform ‫סמיכה‬, etc. This word ‫ ואם‬is also used to deduce that rules which are
mentioned here for the first time, such as that the sheep used as burnt-offering is to be
slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, apply equally to burnt-offerings consisting of
cattle. The basic exegetical approach of Torat Kohanim is to use all those words which appear
to be repeated unnecessarily for a halachic ‫דרוש‬.

Torat Kohanim concludes: "why did the Torah then interrupt the previous paragrah and write
a new paragraph altogether [if we treat the letter ‫ ו‬as making a single paragraph out of the two
for exegetical purposes. Ed]? Answer: "in order to give Moses a breather during which time
he could assimilate all the information he had just been given." Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi
questions that apparently Torat Kohanim would not have queried the fact that verses 10-13
are a new paragraph if the Torah had not introduced it with the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ואם‬. How is
this possible, he asks, seeing that the same Torat Kohanim on verse 1 (3,1) which deals with
the meaning of the word ‫ ויקרא‬wrote as follows: "I might have thought that a "call" preceded
every communication to Moses even including the separate paragraphs, ‫ ?הפסקות‬Therefore the
Torah wrote ‫וידבר‬, to teach us that "calls" preceded ‫ דבור‬but not every paragraph which was a
brief interruption of the same communication. What were the reasons for these ‫הפסקות‬, brief
interruptions? To give Moses a chance to assimilate the information he had been taught in the
previous paragraph. Thus far the Torat Kohanim." This proves that such ‫הפסקות‬, short
intervals between different parts of the same communication, served to give Moses a breather
even when the Torah did not introduce them by an otherwise superfluous letter ‫ו‬. Rabbi
Mizrachi proceeds to answer the question he posed. His words do not appeal to me. [The
author refers to the question of Rabbi Mizrachi; he does not even relate to his answer to a
question he does not perceive to have any merit in the first place. Ed.]
I believe that when Torat Kohanim on verse 1 stated that unless the Torah had linked the
paragraphs by an otherwise superfluous letter ‫ ו‬in our paragraph, I would have concluded that
the reason for the ‫ הפסקה‬was not to enable Moses to assimilate the information G'd had given
him but to warn Moses not to arrive at ‫ הלכות‬by a merely exegetical approach. The fact that
the Torah introduced our paragraph with the word ‫ואם‬, teaches that identical rules apply to a
burnt-offering consisting of cattle and one consisting of sheep. What was mentioned in
paragraph one applies to paragraph two, and what was recorded for the first time in paragraph
two applies to what has not been recorded in paragraph one. Seeing that this is so, it is clear
that the purpose of the pause must have been to give Moses a chance to assimilate all this
information. [After Moses heard the second paragraph he had to apply the new information
contained in that paragraph as additional to what G'd had revealed to him in the first
paragraph. This obviously took some time. Ed.] The author of Torat Kohanim spoke about not
just this particular paragraph commencing in verse ten, but about paragraphs and their
purposes altogether.

1:13

‫והקריב הכהן את הכל והקטיר‬, "and the priest shall offer it all and burn it up, etc." We have
been told the very same thing already in the first paragraph dealing with the burnt-offering
consisting of cattle. Why then did the Torah have to write this line? We cannot say that
inasmuch as sheep are covered with wool the Torah wanted to include the wool in the part of
the animal to be burnt up and that we could not have deduced the wool on the head of the ram
and the hair of the beard of the billy-goat without a special verse, and that all these details
could not have been derived from the word ‫ הכל‬in verse nine. The fact is that Torat Kohanim
(4,57) derives the inclusion of these various kinds of animal hair in what is to be burned up
from the word ‫ הכל‬in verse nine! Therefore, according to what we have stated that any detail
applicable to burnt-offerings involving cattle applies also to burnt-offerings involving sheep,
there was no need for the Torah to write a special verse containing this information!
Furthermore, in our verse here the word ‫ הכל‬appears only next to the expression ‫הקרבה‬, not to
the ‫הקטרה‬, the burning up of all these parts on the altar; our sages here in Torat Kohanim
claim that the position of the word ‫ הכל‬teaches that only a priest may perform this service
(bringing the animal to be burnt onto the altar), something we could not have deduced from
what was written in verse 9. This makes the argument that the words from ‫והקטיר המזבחה‬
onwards in our verse are superfluous even stronger.

I believe we can best explain the reason for these words here by reference to what Torat
Kohanim wrote on the words ‫ והקטיר המזבחה‬in our verse. I quote: "he shall burn it up even
though it may have become disqualified, even though it may have left the precincts of the
Tabernacle (courtyard), even though the priest offering it may have had the wrong thoughts (
‫ )פגול‬already during the earlier stages of offering this sacrifice, and even if it had become
ritually defiled. As a result of all these inclusions I might have concluded that the burning up
ceremony should take place regardless of whether the disqualifying factors had occurred
before the animal was on the altar or while it was still below the altar; therefore the Torah
writes ‫והקטיר המזבחה‬, he is to burn it up only if it had already been on top of the altar."

It is difficult to know what is the source for the author of Torat Kohanim to derive the ruling
that even if the sacrifice was already disqualified the priest must still burn up its parts. The
author of Korban Aharon, aware of this problem, wrote that the fact that the Torah did not
write ‫והקטירם‬, "and he is to burn them up" [seeing the Torah had already written "all"
concerning the ‫ הקרבה‬Ed.] is the source of the ruling by Torat Kohanim. If this were correct
the author of Korban Aharon should have reacted similarly to the word ‫ והקריב‬instead of
‫והקריבם‬. According to Korban Aharon, Torat Kohanim should have ruled that the priest ought
to proceed with the offering in spite of the animal having suffered the kinds of
disqualifications which did not affect the need for its being burned up. Seeing he did not do
so, he cannot derive any ‫הלכות‬, religious rulings, from the missing letter ‫ ם‬in the word ‫והקריב‬
either. The correct answer is that the author of Torat Kohanim arrives at his conclusion based
on the unnecessary repetition of the word ‫ והקטיר‬first in verse 9 and then again in verse 13.
This brings us back to our original question why this whole line beginning with the word
‫ והקטיר‬in verse 13 had to be written at all. That line should have appeared either in verse 9 or
in verse 13 but not in both verses. The very fact that the line is superfluous entitles Torat
Kohanim to use it exegetically.

‫עולה הוא‬. it is a burnt-offering. Torat Kohanim interprets the extraneous word ‫ הוא‬as making
the slaughtering of animals to be offered as a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar
mandatory, i.e. unless the animal had been slaughtered on that side of the altar it could not be
offered as a total-offering. This is the reason the Torah wrote this extraneous word only in the
paragraph in which the northern side of the altar has already been mentioned, i.e. in verse 11.
Clearly, the exclusion implied in the word ‫ הוא‬is related only to what was stated in verse 11,
and there was no need to write the word ‫ הוא‬in the paragraph discussing a burnt-offering
consisting of cattle which also discussed the need for ‫סמיכה‬, the placing of the owner's weight
on the animal prior to it being slaughtered. Had the word ‫ הוא‬occurred in that paragraph, we
would have had to conclude that the act of ‫ סמיכה‬was mandatory and that failure to perform it
would have disqualified that animal from becoming a burnt-offering. Actually, we have used
the occurrence of the equally extraneous word ‫ עולה‬in verse 9 to establish that the act of ‫סמיכה‬,
i.e. the owner of the sacrifice placing his entire weight on the animal prior to its being
slaughtered is not mandatory. We noted that the text hinted at some of the exclusions and
inclusions respectively in the first paragraph, whereas other inclusions and exclusions
respectively are hinted at in the second paragraph. We had stipulated that they all apply
equally to both burnt-offerings consisting of cattle and of sheep, etc.; nonetheless there is
something different about this particular exclusion which invalidates the premise concerning
these two details of the burnt-offering regulations which we adhered to thus far. The two
words ‫עולה הוא‬, both of which are extraneous, refer to two separate commandments, i.e. the
need for ‫סמיכה‬, and the need to slaughter the burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar.
We are therefore faced with the dilemma which of the extraneous words should serve
exegetically for which of these two commandments. When we are faced with such a dilemma
it is no more than reasonable to apply the extraneous word which appears next to an exclusion
in its context, and the other extraneous word which appears next to an inclusion in its context.
The word ‫ הוא‬in verse 13 is used exegetically as defining the commandment of where the
animal is to be slaughtered since it appears in the text close to that commandment, whereas
the word ‫ עולה‬which first appears in the text close to the inclusion of the ‫ סמיכה‬requirement is
used exegetically as defining that requirement.

Torat Kohanim supplies an additional reason for using the word ‫ עולה‬which is inclusive as
applicable to the rules of ‫סמיכה‬, and the word ‫ הוא‬which is restrictive to the rules about where
the animal must be slaughtered. Seeing that the rule of ‫ סמיכה‬is not even an initial requirement
for all kinds of burnt-offerings, -burnt-offerings brought on behalf of the public not requiring
‫ סמיכה‬at all,- it is reasonable to assume that even when required initially, such a regulation
should not be so essential that its absence would invalidate the offering. The requirement to
slaughter a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar applies to all kinds of burnt-
offerings, however. It is possible that Torat Kohanim was unduly expansive in its exegetical
use of this detail; the reason we have stated was quite adequate already. Even though the two
paragraphs in question deal with one basic subject, the fact that there was room for some
doubt makes it justifiable to write something extraneous. You will find, for instance, that the
words ‫ עולה הוא‬occur again in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of a bird (1,17); in
that instance Torat Kohanim uses the word ‫ עולה‬inclusively; even if the blood had only been
squeezed out of the bird's body and not out of its head, it is still acceptable as a burnt-offering
in that condition. The word ‫ הוא‬is again interpreted as restrictive, i.e. if the blood of that bird
had been sqeezed out of its head and not out of its body, it is not acceptable as a burnt-
offering. Zevachim 66 asks on this interpretation ‫" ?מאי תלמודא‬what is the logic behind this
kind of exegesis?" The Talmud's answer is that seeing most of the blood is in the body and
not in the head, squeezing the blood out of the body is more important. We see from there that
the Talmud too fell back on logic in order to resolve something that had been in doubt, i.e.
where to apply the words ‫ עולה‬and ‫ הוא‬respectively as inclusive and where to apply them as
restrictive.

1:14

‫ואם מן העוף‬, and if it is from the category of birds, etc. The letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ ואם‬means
that the rules mentioned previously as applicable to burnt-offerings of four-legged animals
apply also to burnt-offerings consisting of birds unless they are specifically negated by what
is written in this paragraph. Amongst the differences are: 1) a bird cannot serve as any
offering other than a burnt-offering. We derive this from the word ‫ העוף עולה‬as distinct from
the descriptions used for burnt-offerings of four-legged animals in the previous two
paragraphs. Alternatively, the very word ‫ עולה‬is superfluous and comes to tell us that it is the
only kind of offering that can be offered using birds. 2) We also use the word ‫קרבנו‬
restrictively, i.e. that only an individual can offer a burnt-offering consisting of a bird, not a
community. 3) the rule that instead of slaughtering the bird it must have its head pinched off
is applicable only to a priest, whereas the parallel act of slaughtering the four-legged animal
designated as a burnt-offering may be performed also by a non-priest, an Israelite. In
instances where in the previous two paragraphs some details have been repeated needlessly,
this means that they applied only to the burnt-offering consisting of four-legged animals. The
other details, each of which appears in only one of the previous two paragraphs, apply equally
to burnt-offerings consisting of birds. Examples of exclusions which are derived from the
respective paragaphs are: animals which have been mated with other species, animals set
aside to serve as sacrifice for an idol; animals which had been used for idolatrous purposes,
animals which are ‫טרפה‬, have a terminal defect; diseased animals, over-age animals; stolen
animals. All of the aforesaid are unfit to serve as burnt-offerings, or as any other offering. All
of these examples are listed in the fourth chapter of Maimonides' treatise Issurey Hamizbeach.

‫קרבנו לשם‬, his offering to G'd. The reason the Torah adds these words here whereas they did
not appear in the previous two paragraphs is that the Torah included birds which have certain
physical defects as fit to serve as a sacrifice, something which is not the case with offerings
consisting of four-legged animals. The source of this halachah is Kidushin 24: ‫אין זכרות ותמות‬
‫" ;בעוף‬the requirement that sacrificial burnt-offerings be male and free from physical blemish
does not apply to burnt-offerings consisting of birds." In view of this relaxation of certain
rules when an offering consists of a bird, logic would have told us that any bird-offering is of
an inferior nature, why else would the Torah permit a blemished bird to serve as an offering?
The Torah therefore had to tell us that as far as G'd is concerned, ‫ קרבנו לשם‬the bird-offering is
equally esteemed in the eyes of the Lord.
We find support for our view from Isaiah 57,15 where the prophet describes G'd as especially
close to the "contrite and lowly in spirit," and our sages in Sotah 5 interpret this as either: ‫אני‬
‫את דכא‬, "I descend from Heaven in order to be close to the contrite," or as ‫אתי דכא‬, "I elevate
the contrite to My domain." It is due to such considerations that the name of G'd is written
next to the bird-offering and not next to the offerings consisting of four-legged animals.
Anyone who offers a burnt-offering consisting of a bird is presumed to be in low spirits
seeing he cannot afford to offer something of greater value to G'd. We find the same approach
in Menachot 104 where the Talmud explains the reason for the wording ,‫נפש כי תקריב מנחה לשם‬
)2,1( as a hint that a poor person who cannot afford to offer more than a meal-offering is
considered as offering his whole personality, ‫נפש‬, to G'd by means of such a low cost offering.

1:17

‫אשה ריח ניחוח לשם‬, a fire-offering whose fragrance is pleasing to G'd. Our sages in
Menachot 110 comment that the fact that the Torah used this expression when describing the
burnt-offering consisting of a four-legged animal, as well as when a bird-offering is being
offered, as proof that G'd does not judge a person's offering by its monetary value but by the
attitude it reflects. As long as the donor's motivation is G'd-oriented, both kinds of offerings
are equally welcome in His eyes. The problem the sages wanted to overcome was that if the
Torah had written the term ‫ אשה ריח ניחוח לשם‬only in connection with the bird-offering which
is worth a few coins, it is obvious that a burnt-offering consisting of a four-legged animal
should qualify for that description no less. Hence why did the Torah have to write the
expression in connection with the offering of a four-legged animal? This is why they were
careful to write: ‫אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט‬, that there is no difference between the person who
offers a valuable animal as a sacrifice and the one who offers something less valuable. We
should not imagine that the fact that the Torah mentioned ‫ ריח ניחוח‬in connection with the
bird-offering was just an act of graciousness on the part of G'd towards the poor, whereas the
four-legged animal offered by the wealthy is dearer to Him. The Torah made the point that the
bird-offering is not considered inferior for any reason at all by writing the otherwise
unnecessary words ‫ ריח ניחוח לשם‬also in connection with the burnt-offering consisting of four-
legged animals. This is why the Rabbi in the Talmud did not simply write ‫הממעיט כמרבה‬, as
this would not have conveyed his true meaning. It is a rule that when one says: "this is as
good as that," that the "this" is inferior to the "that" seeing it is a derivative of it. The "this" to
"that" relationship is akin to the student-teacher relationship. Even if the student has absorbed
all of the teacher's knowledge, the teacher remains superior by dint of having taught the
student what he knows. When the Rabbi phrased his comment: "one who does a lot is as one
who does a little," he made sure the reader would not consider either of the two as superior or
inferior to the second one. This consideration prompted the Torah to write the same wording
once more in connection with the meal-offering in 2,2.

2:1

‫ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה‬, And a person who offers a meal-offering, etc. Torat Kohanim
views the word ‫ ונפש‬as both inclusive and restrictive, the singular ‫ נפש‬being considered
restrictively in that a voluntary meal-offering is not acceptable from a community; on the
other hand, the letter ‫ ו‬which introduced this verse is interpreted inclusively, to teach that
whereas the ‫כהן משיח‬, the High Priest who offers mandatory meal-offerings daily and who is
not permitted to offer such a meal-offering as atonement in the event he had defiled himself
before entering the Temple or while inside, -something that an ordinary Israelite is permitted
to do,- is nonetheless allowed to bring a voluntary meal-offering in normal cirmcumstances.
Why did the Torah write a single word which is restrictive and inclusive at one and the same
time? Perhaps the reason is that seeing that the meal-offering by a group of people could be
excluded only by reference to the High Priest's inclusion, the Torah felt that both of these
halachot should be alluded to in the same word, even though these two ‫ הלכות‬themselves
appear contradictory. Had it not been for the fact that the letter ‫ ו‬enabled us to include the
High Priest in the category of individuals from whom ordinary (not intended for atonement)
meal-offerings are acceptable, there would have been no need to write a word which would
indicate that a group of people is denied such a privilege. Why would I even have imagined
that groups would be allowed to offer such meal-offerings [the cheapest offering there is. Ed.]
that I should have had to exclude them?

2:4

‫וכי תקריב‬, and if you will offer, etc. The letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫ כי‬is again an
indication that the laws mentioned in this paragraph are to be viewed in conjunction with
those of the previous paragraph. This means that the various details governing meal-offerings
also apply to the High Priest's meal-offerings. As to the exclusion of communal meal-
offerings, such rules apply also to the details of offering frankincense and the like.

2:10

‫והנותרת מן המנחה‬, As to what is left over from the meal-offering, etc. Why did the Torah
repeat this verse twice both here and in verse 3? Perhaps we can understand this by referring
to what we learned in Menachot 58. The Talmud states that all meal-offerings whose left-
overs are permitted to be eaten may be consumed together with honey; if the left-overs had
become leavened, however, a person eating same is guilty of Malkot 39 lashes with a strap.
Menachot 55 derives this halachah from Leviticus 6,10: ‫לא תאפה חמץ חלקם‬, "it (the meal-
offering) shall not be baked with leaven even partially." If I did not have the word ‫והנותרת‬, I
would have argued that the culpability for eating it when it had become leavened would apply
only if the meal-offering had already been baked with leaven, not if it had become leavened
after having been baked. The word ‫ כל המנחה‬in that verse makes it plain that even if only the
left-over of the meal-offering had become leavened, the same law of not consuming it applies
and he who does so is culpable. Even though our sages there derived their halachah from the
Torah writing the words ‫ לא תאפה חמץ‬immediately before the word ‫חלקם‬, that exegetical use of
the word would not have sufficed to make someone culpable for eating only the left-overs of a
meal-offering which has become leavened; culpability was established only for the person
who had actually baked such a meal-offering. Even eating from such left-over turned-leaven
meal-offering could not be culpable unless there was some additional indication in the text of
the Torah. Menachot 55 and Torat Kohanim stated that baking meal-offerings as chametz had
been part of a general prohibition applying to all kinds of meal-offerings so that there was no
need to mention this here specifically. If the Torah nonetheless wrote the prohibition here
specifically, it served notice that just as baking is something performed by an individual, so
any other activity connected with the meal-offering which is performed by an individual is
equally prohibited on pain of the penalty of malkot. I believe that even after having learned
this, the culpability would be limited to such activities as taking a Kometz, a partial fistful of
the ingredients of the meal-offering, etc. Eating from the left-overs should not have been
culpable. In order to make one culpable for eating left-over parts of a meal-offering which had
become leavened the Torah had to write the word ‫ והנותרת‬in our verse.
The ‫ ראב"ד‬writes that both the letter ‫ ו‬and the letter ‫ ה‬in the word ‫ והנותרת‬are unnecessary and
therefore available for exegetical purposes. This is why we were able to derive the requisite
laws for not eating from the left-over meal-offering which had become leavened. Torat
Kohanim derives additional inclusions from the word ‫והנותרת‬, such as that even though the
meal-offering did not contain salt (a requirement for any sacrifice), did not have all its
frankincense burnt up, or that its main component the kometz had not reached the altar at all,
the left-over parts may be consumed by the priests. The words ‫ מן המנחה‬in our verse are
restrictive, i.e. that if a basic ingredient was missing or none of the frankincense had been
burnt up, the remains, ‫נותרת‬, may not be consumed. To come back to the exegetical use the
‫ ראב"ד‬made of the extraneous letters ‫ ו‬and ‫ ה‬before the word ‫נותרת‬, I do not agree that these
letters may be used for the purpose suggested by the ‫ראב"ד‬. If we were to omit those two
letters, the word ‫ נותרת‬would not make any sense at all. The author of Korban Aharon felt that
only the letter ‫ ו‬in that word is superfluous and may therefore be used exegetically to include
something. I have my doubts even about this. Moreover, what is the source of the Torat
Kohanim including the absence of the above-mentioned three additional requirements of the
meal-offering as items considered non-essential? Whereas it is in the nature of a restrictive
clause that the items excluded are thereby categorised as being ‫מעכב‬, essential, it makes sense
that the author uses the word ‫ מן המנחה‬as excluding the right to eat from the left-over parts if
three items had been missing (any basic ingredient, none of the frankincense not having been
burned up, and no kometz having been separated). This kind of reasoning is inadmissible
when applied to inclusions, however. If at all, the extraneous word ‫ והנותרת‬could serve as
including only a single item as non-essential in the ‫ מנחה‬and its absence therefore not
prohibiting the priests from consuming the left-overs.

Perhaps the consideration which motivated the author of the Torat Kohanim in this instance
was the fact that the three ‫ מצות‬which he categorized as non-esential based on the extraneous
word ‫ והנותרת‬are scattered throughout the text. They appear in different paragraphs. The need
to burn up all the frankincense appears in connection with the ‫ מנחת סלת‬in 2,2. The need to
offer the meal-offering on the altar appears in the paragraph of 2,8 ,‫מנחת מרחשת‬. The need to
add salt to the meal-offering appears at the end of the meal-offering legislation in 2,13. It is
remarkable that the legislation about what may be done with the ‫נותרת‬, the left-over of the
meal-offering, is not recorded at the end of the meal-offering legislation but already at the end
of the first paragraph (2,3), even though the requirement for the meal-offering to be offered on
the altar had not yet been mentioned. Clearly, this implies that the offering of the meal-
offering on the altar is not something we have to consider as relevant to the rules applicable
for eating the left-overs. We pointed out earlier (page 945) that when a new paragraph
commences with the letter ‫ו‬, this establishes a connection to the laws recorded in the previous
paragraph and vice versa. Accordingly, the need to present the meal-offering on the altar
which is written in the following paragraph which commenced with the word ‫ ואם‬should also
govern the rules of the ‫ נותרת‬legislation. The fact that the legislation dealing with the left-
overs is written in the middle of the total meal-offering legislation instead of at the end makes
it clear that the requirement to present the meal-offering on the altar is only ‫לכתחילה‬, i.e. an
initial requirement, it is not so essential a requirement that its omission would invalidate the
right to eat of the left-overs. On the other hand, omission of the burning up of any of the
frankincense would invalidate the right of the priests to eat the left-overs of the meal-
offerings. We find also that the Torah repeats the line ‫ והנותרת‬once more at the end of the
paragraph dealing with the ‫( מנחת מרחשת‬verse 10). Anyone reading this verse can see
immediately that it is quite superfluous (except for exegetical purposes), as everything written
therein has already been written in 2,3. Clearly, the reason for writing this verse is to teach us
that compliance with the rules laid down in this paragraph (2,5-2,13) is enough to entitle
Aaron and his sons to partake of the left-overs of such meal-offerings. There is no mention in
that paragraph of frankincense altogether. The only major requirement written there is the
‫קמץ‬, the partial fistful of the mixture containing the meal and oil of which the Torah says in
verse 8 that "the priest shall take off from the meal-offering the memorial part thereof," i.e.
the ‫קמץ‬. Failure of the Torah to mention the ‫לבונה‬, frankincense, in that paragraph persuaded
the Torat Kohanim to deduce that even if not all of it had been burned up the priests could still
consume the left-overs. This is why the author said: "even if it had not been brought on the
altar, and even if not all its frankincense had been burned up, the right to eat the left-overs has
not been jeopardised. The author adds his comment about the salting of the offering seeing
that this requirement also appeared only at the end of the entire legislation, i.e. much later
than the permission given to Aaron and his sons to partake of the left-overs of the meal-
offering. [This "left-over" probably amounted to 90% of the mixture from which the ‫ קמץ‬was
placed on the altar. Ed.]

2:14

‫ואם תקריב מנחת בכורים‬, "And if you bring a meal-offering consisting of first-fruit, etc." The
word ‫ אם‬here means "when," and refers to the period when the first-fruit ripens. The offering
of the first-fruit is mandatory whenever it is being offered. The word ‫ תקריב‬means "you are to
offer it, it is a duty." The conditional word ‫ ואם‬refers only to the timing of the offering.

3:1

‫אם זכר אם נקבה‬, be it male or female; the repetition of the word ‫ אם‬between the words ‫ זכר‬and
‫ נקבה‬indicates that the Torah does not favour a male animal over a female animal when it
comes to the offering of such peace-offerings.

3:12

‫ואם עז קרבנו‬, If his offering consists of a she-goat, etc. According to Torat Kohanim, the
reason why the Torah interrupted the presentation of its subject with the legislation about the
goat-offering is to teach that the ‫אליה‬, fat of the tail, did not have to be included in the part to
be offered on the altar (compare 2,9). We must first understand what is meant by "interrupted
the subject?" Korban Aharon writes that whereas the Torah should have written here ‫ואם עז‬, it
wrote ‫אם עז‬. This is obviously erroneous, seeing the Torah does write ‫ואם עז‬.

The ‫( ריב"א‬Rabbi Yitzchak ben Asher Halevi), writes in a Tossaphot on Pessachim 96 that
although the procedure outlined by the Torah for the offering of a goat is identical to that of
the category ‫ כבש‬in the preceding paragraph except for the offering of the ‫אליה‬, the fact that it
was accorded a separate paragraph must be viewed as an "interruption." As far as I am
concerned what the author of Torat Kohanim had in mind is quite simple. When the Torah
dealt with the procedures involving the ‫עולה‬, the burnt-offering, the Torah wrote a paragraph
commencing with the words: "if the burnt offering consists of the flock, either sheep or goats,
etc. (1,10)," no separate paragraph is accorded to the goats serving as burnt-offering. If,
nonetheless, the Torah wrote a special paragraph when the goats serve as peace-offerings, this
must certainly be viewed as "an interruption." It indicates that this paragraph must contain a
new ‫הלכה‬.

The paragraph does not start with the word ‫ אם‬but with the word ‫ואם‬, to teach that all the laws
pertaining to the ‫זבח שלמים‬, peace-offering sacrifices, outlined previously in the first paragraph
of chapter three, apply to such offerings. The only reason that the Torah interrupted its outline
of the peace-offerings was to iindicate that the ‫ אליה‬of a goat did not need to be offered on the
altar. The reason we know this is that in the enumeration of the details of a peace-offering
consisting of a goat (after having listed the details of such offerings when they consisted of
sheep), the only detail not mentioned is the reference to the fat of its tail.

As to the absence of mention of an ‫ אליה‬when the Torah described the procedure of a peace-
offering consisting of cattle, there was no need to write anything to exclude this as cattle do
not possess a tail wich would fit the definition of ‫אליה‬. Seeing that no one would have
imagined that such a tail be offered on the altar even though it was mentioned in the
paragraph dealing with sheep, there was no need to write anything which would serve to
exclude the tail of the peace-offering consisting of cattle from being offered on the altar. The
author of Torat Kohanim was perfectly justified then in writing that the rule about ‫ אליה‬does
not apply to cattle, though there is no word in the Torah which excludes it. The rule we had
established earlier that when a paragraph starts with the letter ‫ו‬, the laws mentioned in the
former paragraph and those mentioned in the subsequent paragraph are interchangeable,
applies only when the anatomical facts enable us to apply these laws to animals mentioned in
either paragraph. When such application is impossible due to the animal mentioned in the
former paragraph not possessing the anatomical feature in question, we can ignore such
considerations. In the case of an offering consisting of a goat, however, the anatomical
conditions which apply to sheep also apply to goats. As a result the Torah needed to exclude
the ‫ אליה‬of a goat specifically. Had the Torah lumped sheep and goats together as it did in its
description of the rules applying to burnt-offerings, we would have assumed that the fat tail of
the goat qualified for burning up on the altar. The Torah therefore wrote a special paragraph
dealing with the peace-offerings consisting of goats.

3:17

‫חקת עולם‬, a perpetual statute, etc. This verse provides us with the ammunition necessary to
prove that not only the ‫חלב‬, certain fat parts of animals which are being offered on the altar,
are forbidden for consumption by Jews, but that those fat parts are equally forbidden when the
animal has been designated for consumption as ‫חולין‬, secular purposes. This is why the Torah
writes that this statute applies throughout the generations in all parts of the earth where Jews
reside. This part of the verse would not make sense unless the prohibition applied to animals
not slaughtered as sacrifices. Torat Kohanim (189) also explains the word ‫ חקת עולם‬as
applying ‫לבית העולמים‬, "when the permanent Temple would be built," whereas it explains the
word ‫ לדורותיכם‬as ‫לדירותיכם בכל מושבותיכם בארץ ובחוצה לארץ‬, "in all your dwellings both inside
and outside the Holy Land." Seeing the Torah already wrote that this was a perpetual statute,
what need was there for the additional words: "for all your generations in all your dwellings?"
Clearly, the words ‫ חוקת עולם‬have to be read as a continuation of )3,16( ,‫כל חלב לשם‬, that all
the fat parts are to be be offered on the altar, including the periods when the permanent
Temple would be built. The Torah continues that this warning (law) is also applicable for all
times and in all places, even in the diaspora. We might have thought that prohibition of these
fat parts was a reasonable prohibition while these parts were offered as something sacred on
the altar, but that at times when the entire sacrifice legislation was in abeyance due to the
absence of a Temple or Tabernacle, such a prohibition did not make sense; we might also
have argued that this legislation should apply only in locations where the Tabernacle or
Temple was situated but not in other locations; the Torah therefore had to write that it applies
unconditionally and universally. [The thought presented here by our author that there was a
case for arguing that this fat should be permitted, may be based on the fact that the Torah
permitted meat not offered on the altar (Deut. 12,20) after the Israelites settled in the Holy
Land, while in the desert no meat other than sacrificial meat was permitted for general
consumption. Ed.]

4:2

‫דבר אל בני ישראל‬, "speak to the children of Israel, etc." Torat Kohanim uses the expression
‫ בני ישראל‬as excluding Gentiles from offering sin-offerings in the event they violated any of
the seven Noachide laws. This appears very difficult. Why should the idea that they could
offer such sacrifices ever have arisen so that the Torah needed to refute it? If we would have
made a comparison with the Gentile's right to offer free-will offerings, there is no comparison
seeing that those offerings were not meant to achieve atonement as we know from Chulin 5
where the Talmud debated the source of denying the heretic the right to offer either total-
offerings or sin-offerings respectively. The Talmud there makes it plain that the two kinds of
offerings cannot be derived one from the other unless there was something in the text alluding
to such entitlement. One argument used there is that if someone were denied to offer a free-
will offering it does not follow automatically that he should be barred from offering a sin-
offering seeing the latter is designed to help him achieve atonement. The same argument can
be used here. As a result of such considerations, the Gentile would have been presumed as
entitled to offer sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to write ‫בני ישראל‬, to exclude him from
the privilege to offer such offerings. It appears to me that the need for this exclusion was
accentuated by the word ‫ נפש‬which the Torah used in the very same verse in which it
described who would be required (or entitled) to bring a sin-offering. The word ‫ נפש‬suggests
that any human being is included in the legislation about to be unveiled. By writing first ‫בני‬
‫ישראל‬, the Torah enabled us to use the inclusive term ‫ נפש‬as including proselytes.

The obvious question is why the Torah did not simply omit both the words ‫ בני ישראל‬and ‫נפש‬,
and I would have excluded the Gentiles and included the proselytes? What possible reason
could there have been to exclude the proselyte from the privilege to offer a sin-offering that
prompted the Torah to write a word designed to include him? This is no objection as we find
that the Torah had included proselytes already in 1,2 where the Torah used the term ‫אדם‬, and
this term included proselytes. We would naturally have assumed that proselytes were included
only in the right to offer burnt-offerings but not sin-offerings. The Torah therefore had to
write the word ‫ נפש‬in our verse to tell us that proselytes have the right to offer sin-offerings.
Unless the Torah had also excluded the Gentiles by the restrictive term ‫בני ישראל‬, one could
have argued that proselytes did not need to be specifically included as they had already been
included at the beginning of the portion with the word ‫אדם‬. I would then have concluded that
the absence of any further restrictive clause indicated that the Torah has no objection to
Gentiles offering sin-offerings. We have now learned that the word ‫ נפש‬here, though
inclusive, includes only the proselyte and that the inclusive term ‫ אדם‬at the beginning of our
portion was not sufficient seeing the privilege of offering a sin-offering is a far greater
privilege than that of offering a burnt-offering. The very fact that a separate paragraph was
needed to sanction the offering of sin-offerings altogether indicates that it is a great privilege
to be allowed to atone for a sin by offering a sin-offering (only). This privilege could not have
been derived merely by exegesis, but needed to be stated outright. Moreover, it appears that
the conclusion of Torat Kohanim that the words ‫ בני ישראל‬exclude Gentiles is not based on
these words being superfluous, but rather on their plain meaning, i.e. "Jews and not Gentiles."
The moment we accept this, the implication is that only natural-born Jews are subject to the
legislation in this paragraph as the expression "children of Israel" refers to direct descendants
of the patriarch Jacob. If the Torah wanted to include proselytes also, it had to write the word
‫ נפש‬in order for us to understand this beyond doubt. Having said this you will appreciate that
though the expression ‫ בני ישראל‬in the whole Torah is not understood as available for
exegetical purposes but as telling us to whom the respective legislation is addressed, it
excludes Gentiles automatically.

‫נפש‬, a person. Torat Kohanim views this word as including proselytes in the group of people
entitled to offer sin-offerings. If the Torah had intended to also include women, the Torah
should have written ‫ אדם כי יחטא‬as the term ‫ אדם‬includes males and females seeing the Torah
referred to both males and females by the collective term ‫ אדם‬in Genesis 5,2.

A moral-ethical meaning of the term ‫ נפש‬as used in this paragraph may be the following. The
soul of a human being becomes defective when its owner has sinned intentionally. This is
why sinners are referred to as "dead" even while they are still "alive," as we know from
Ezekiel 18,32: "for G'd does not desire the death of the dead, etc." The sinner is referred to
by the prophet as dead already seeing he no longer has a soul. Solomon refers to something
similar in Proverbs 23,2 "if you are someone possessed of a ‫נפש‬, soul." Our verse tells us that
even sins committed inadvertently result in damage to one's soul. While it is true that such
inadvertently committed sins do not destroy the soul completely, nonetheless the Torah
requires a sin-offering in order for the damage to that soul to be repaired. The offering of that
‫קרבן‬, the sacrifice whose purpose it is to re-establish the affinity of the soul with its origin,
enables the diseased soul to be infused with the spiritual values which will heal its wounds.
The same result cannot be achieved if someone who had sinned intentionally were to offer
such a sacrifice seeing he had already forfeited his soul. There is nothing left that can be
reconstituted until the sinner repented and experienced the beneficial effect of the Day of
Atonement, as pointed out by Ezekiel 18,32 ‫והשיבו וחיו‬, "when you return and cause others to
return so that you may live."

4:3

‫אם הכהן המשיח יחטא‬, If the anointed priest shall sin, etc. The Torah begins its list with the
sin of an individual, although the Torah writes ‫לאשמת העם‬, that this individual thereby brings
guilt on the entire people. This is to tell us that an inadvertent sin committed by the High
Priest is equivalent to an inadvertent sin by the whole community. If so, why did the Torah
not begin the list of people who have to bring sin-offerings with 4,13 where the sin of the
community is described, and wait with mentioning a sin by the High Priest until after verse 21
when inadvertent sins by individuals are listed? Perhaps the Torah meant to tell us that in the
event of the High Priest and the community having committed an inadvertent sin, the sin-
offering of the High Priest takes precedence over that of the community as a whole. The same
rule would apply if both the King and the people had committed a sin. The reason given in
Horiot 13 is that the High Priest is active in securing atonement whereas the community
achieves its atonement passively. I have found in Torat Kohanim on verse 13 (item 240) in
our chapter that when both a high Priest and the community have to offer bullocks as sin
offerings, the bullock of the High Priest has to be offered first. This ruling is based on the
word ‫ ואם‬in verse 13 meaning that what is listed here is only secondary to what has been listed
before, i.e. the bullock of the High Priest.

This raises the question why our sages could not have deduced this rule simply from the fact
that the Torah has written about the bullock to be offered by the High Priest before it wrote
about the bullock to be offered by the community in the event the latter committed an error?
Perhaps the sages reasoned that if there were no other hint that the High Priest's bullock takes
precedence except the fact that the paragraph about the High Priest sinning was mentioned
first, we would have misunderstood the words ‫ לאשמת העם‬as a reference to the error the people
had committed which is described in verse 13. That verse deals with the people having acted
on the basis of an erroneous decision of the High Court. I would have thought that the reason
the Torah described the High Priest's error as "the sin of the people" was because he had
concurrred with the erroneous decision of the High Court, or had even been part of the Court
which handed down the erroneous decision. Such an interpretation would be wrong. If the
High Priest had been part of the High Court which handed down an erroneous decision, his
atonement is part of the atonement of the whole people, i.e. he does not have to bring a
bullock as an individual sin-offering (Horiot 7). The Torah commenced the sin-offering
legislation with the High Priest in order that we should not arrive at an erroneous conclusion.
In view of this I would not have been able to use the fact that the first paragraph deals with
the sin-offering of the High Priest as proof that his sin-offering takes precedence even over
the communal sin-offering. We are still faced with the problem why two separate exegetical
comments were necessary to teach us this, a) the word ‫ ואם‬in verse 13, and b) the words ‫כאשר‬
‫שרף‬, in verse 21 (compare Torat Kohanim 255 on that verse). I believe that the reason there
are two such exegetical openings is simply that if I had only had one, I would have reasoned
that the High Priest's offering may be offered first, but does not have to be offered first.
Seeing that the Torah provided us with two exegetical openings it is clear that the Torah
considers the High Priest's offering taking precedence as mandatory. I have seen a comment
by Korban Aharon who claims that unless I had both these expressions available for
exegetical use I would have assumed that the High Priest's offering would take only partial
precedence but that before he completed his offering one would start with the offering of the
community. I do not see any merit in such reasoning. If the author of Korban Aharon were
correct the Torah should not have written ‫כאשר שרף את הפר הראשון‬, "the first bullock" in verse
21, but should have written ‫את הפר האחד‬, "the one bullock." This would have indicated that the
procedure of offering the bullock of the High Priest had not been completed as yet at that
stage.

‫לאשמת העם‬, so as to bring guilt on the people; we may understand this statement as parallel
to what we are taught in Avot 5,18: that if someone is engaged in conferring merits on others
he himself will not commit a sin. When the High Priest himself commits a sin, this is proof
that the people did not enjoy sufficient merits by reason of his activities that it should have
protected him against committing a sin himself. This is the meaning of ‫לאשמת העם‬.

Torat Kohanim interprets the words ‫ אשמת העם‬as providing us with a clue as to the nature of
the sin on account of which the High Priest has to atone with the bullock as a sin-offering.
The sin is described as ‫העלם דבר‬, lack of knowledge of the correct religious ruling which
resulted in the people violating a negative commandment involving an activity, as mentioned
in verse 13. If all the High Priest had been guilty of was an erroneous activity, some hold that
he would be required to bring the same kind of sin-offering as an ordinary individual, whereas
others hold that he would not be culpable at all. We learned in Horiot 11 that the words ‫מעם‬
‫ הארץ‬in verse 27 are proof that if the High Priest had been guilty of a personal sin consisting
of a sinful act that he would be free of the obligation to offer a sin-offering altogether.
According to Horiot 7 if the High Priest does not happen to be an outstanding scholar he is
not required to offer a sin-offering of either kind, not for having committed a sinful act
inadvertently nor for having handed down an erroneous ruling upon which the people acted.
We need to understand the reason for such an halachah. Perhaps the reason is that if an
erroneous ruling is handed down by a High Priest who also happens to be an outstanding
scholar and upon whom the people place a great deal of reliance, such an error makes a deep
impression on his soul, creating a distance between his soul and its holy roots so that the
merits of the Israelites which he has been instrumental in securing for them is insufficient to
protect him against harmful effects on his own soul. Such an effect would not occur when the
High Priest only erred in personally committing an inadvertent sinful act, or even if a High
Priest who was not presumed to be a scholar handed down an erroneous ruling. Such sins
would not create the kind of distance between his soul and its holy roots that he would need to
bring an additional sacrifice in order to re-establish the bonds with his soul's holy roots. The
merits a High Priest confers on the multitude by means of his daily activities are enough to
protect the soul of such a High Priest from major harm. G'd would not despise him on account
of the error he committed. Furthermore, seeing that the High Priest's error did not involve the
people, it does not leave such a deep impression on his soul.

4:7

‫ לפני ה׳ אשר באהל מועד‬before the Lord who is in the Tent of Meeting, etc. In answer to the
question why the Torah had to write the words "before the Lord" which had already been
written in verse 6, Rabbi Nechemyah in Torat Kohanim says that seeing that we find that
Aaron stood beyond the golden altar on the Day of Atonement when he sprinkled the blood
on the dividing curtain, we could have assumed that the same procedure was to be followed
here. The Torah therefore had to make clear that only the golden altar was "before the Lord,"
not Aaron. This suggests that except for the fact that the blood of the bullock on the Day of
Atonement was sprinkled towards the dividing curtain, the words "before the Lord" in our
verse would be superfluous. This is difficult. How would I have known where Aaron was to
have stood if the Torah had not written the words "before the Lord?" Seeing that in that event
the Torah had not designated a specific spot where Aaron had to stand to perform the
sprinkling ceremony, I would have concluded that he had the choice of standing either in front
of the golden altar or beyond it. The Torah therefore had to write the words: "in front of the
Lord," to tell us that Aaron was to stand in front of the altar. Why was all this necessary?
Because we find that there was another occasion when he was to stand beyond the golden
altar. Another difficulty is this: why would I assume that Aaron was to perform the ritual of
sprinkling the blood towards the dividing curtain while he was standing so far away that the
altar was between him and the dividing curtain? Perhaps the words are to tell us that he was to
sprinkle the blood on the altar while standing in front of it (facing the dividing curtain)?
Seeing that in Leviticus 17,18 the Torah describes Aaron as exiting the Holy of Holies in the
direction of the golden altar while putting some of the blood of the bullock on its corners,
maybe the Torah wanted to tell us that the same procedure should be followed here, i.e. that
when Aaron was to put the blood on the corners of the golden altar he was to do so while
having his back to the dividing curtain and facing outwards before pouring out the excess
blood at the base of the copper altar? As far as the sprinkling of blood towards the dividing
curtain was concerned, however, this should take place when Aaron stood between the golden
altar and the dividing curtain? If we had had no other detail than this to worry about, we could
have answered this problem.

However, I have seen that the same Rabbi Nechemyah speaking of the meaning of the words
"and Aaron shall exit towards the altar which is in front of the Lord" (Leviticus 16,18),
questions the meaning of these words. He answers that we find in connection with the bullock
which Aaron has to offer concerning all the other inadvertently committed sins that he had to
stand on the far side of the curtain with the altar between him and the dividing curtain. I might
have concluded that he was to follow the same procedure also with the bullock on the Day of
Atonement; therefore the Torah had to write the word ‫ויצא‬, etc. Where did Aaron stand on that
occasion? ‫לפני השם‬, in front of the Lord." Thus far Rabbi Nechemyah in Torat Kohanim item
45 on 16,18 (item 45). It is difficult to understand why Rabbi Nechemyah had to find
justification for the words of the Torah in that verse. Surely the Torah had to inform us (or the
High Priest) that the High Priest had to leave the place he stood on and not sprinkle the blood
on the altar while standing between it and the dividing curtain. Besides, the Torat Kohanim
claims that the only reason we know where the High Priest stood at the time was that the
Torah describes him as in the process of exiting towards the golden altar when he sprinkled
blood on the dividing curtain. Furthermore, according to what Rabbi Nechemyah said that the
words ‫ ויצא אל המזבח‬are not needed seeing that we now learned where Aaron was standing
from the words ‫ לפני השם‬in 16,18 instead of as he said in our verse from the words ‫ לפני השם‬in
4,7. Rabbi Nechemyah glibly assumed that the High Priest would have stood outside the altar
when sprinkling the blood of the bullock towards the dividing curtain when he performed this
procedure on occasions other than the Day of Atonement. Where is there an indication in the
text that this was indeed the case? If he were to use the words ‫ לפני השם‬to prove this theory,
perhaps those words referred to the need to sprinkle some of the blood onto the altar itself
which is the plain meaning of the verse! Besides, if the Torah had omitted both the words ‫ויצא‬
‫ אל המזבח‬and the words ‫לפני השם‬, how would I have known where Aaron was to have stood?
How could Rabbi Nechemyah therefore even ask what these words were supposed to teach
us?

Actually, the exegesis of Rabbi Nechemyah in both parts of Torat Kohanim is most
appropriate. Had the Torah not written the words ‫ ויצא‬and not the apparently superfluous
words ‫לפני השם‬, I would simply have concluded that Aaron was free to sprinkle both onto the
dividing curtain and onto the altar regardless of whether he stood between the altar and the
dividing curtain or between the entrance to the Sanctuary and the golden altar. The Torah
mentioned in connection with a wrong decision rendered by the High Court and acted upon by
the community that a bullock had to be offered by the High Priest and that the blood was to be
sprinkled as atonement on the golden altar (according to the plain meaning of the verse). The
Torah also mentioned the golden altar as recipient of the blood of the bullock offered by the
High Priest on the Day of Atonement as evident by the words ‫ויצא אל המזבח‬. These facts
established a halachic linkage between these two bullocks and the procedure to be followed
concerning them. Not only this, but in both instances the Torah also speaks of the blood
requiring to be sprinkled either upon or in the direction of the dividing curtain which is
beyond the golden altar. Logic would have told us that the procedure prescribed in chapter 16
must be similar to that prescribed in chapter 4, i.e. that the sprinkling of the blood towards the
dividing curtain was to be performed from a position beyond the golden altar, closer to the
dividing curtain. We would then have made a ‫ מה מצינו‬kind of exegesis from what was missing
in the information described in chapter 4, 13-21 by referring to chapter 16, 3-20. Rabbi
Nechemyah tells us in Torat Kohanim that the words ‫ לפני השם‬are intended to prevent us from
arriving at such a faulty conclusion. He asks rhetorically: Why were the apparently
superfluous words ‫ לפני השם‬written seeing we would have used the same words in 16,18 and
have applied them in our verse here? After all, we already know that the golden altar was used
for sprinkling of the blood of the bullock offered as a sin-offering by the Torah writing ‫ויצא אל‬
‫המזבח‬. The words ‫ לפני השם‬could most certainly not be used to teach us that the High Priest
was not to sprinkle the blood of the bullock on the copper altar seeing that altar was outside
the Sanctuary. We are therefore back to the question what precisely the words ‫ לפני השם‬have
been written for in our context seeing everything else could have been derived from the
legislation about the bullock on the day of Atonement. Rabbi Nechemyah answers all these
questions saying that the words ‫ לפני השם‬prove that the Torah did not want us to apply the ‫מה‬
‫ מצינו‬type of exegesis by comparing the procedure to be followed with the bullock in our
paragraph to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement. The essential
difference between these two procedures involving the bullock as a sin-offering on the Day of
Atonement and that in our chapter is, that there is no mention of the sprinkling of the blood on
the dividing curtain by the High Priest while the latter is standing between the altar and the
Holy of Holies in our verse. This is in contrast to the bullock to be offered on the Day of
Atonement, where there is specific mention of this. Had I derived the various procedures
applicable to the procedure followed with the bullock on the Day of Atonement, I would have
also had to apply the detail of where the blood was to be sprinkled from the procedure
outlined in chapter 16. The appearance of the word ‫ לפני השם‬in our verse teaches me not to
derive any ‫ למוד‬from the bullock used on the Day of Atonement, be it the sprinkling of the
blood on the dividing curtain or the sprinkling of the blood of that animal on the altar. Seeing
this is so we would not have had any source upon which to base an assumption as to where
the High Priest was to stand during the procedure of sprinkling the blood in the direction of
the dividing curtain involving the ‫פר העלם דבר‬, i.e. the bullock in our chapter. It seems clear
therefore, that the words ‫ לפני השם‬must refer to the golden altar and not to the place where the
High Priest was standing during all the sprinklings mentioned in our verse. Rabbi Nechemyah
explains the words ‫ ויצא אל המזבח‬in 16,18 as follows: "What do these words teach us, i.e. what
is the plain meaning of this verse?" Answer: "That the High Priest should not commence the
sprinkling of the remaining blood on the altar until he has passed the golden altar on his way
out of the Sanctuary." This teaches by inference that prior to that the High Priest had
performed the sprinkling of the blood on the dividing curtain while standing between the
golden altar and the dividing curtain.

[Although the author continues to dissect the exegetical comments by Rabbi Nechemyah still
further, I have decided to omit further details seeing we have shown how he solved the main
problem. Ed.]

‫ לפי ברייתא זאת שהכריחה עמידת פנים בהזאת הפרוכת ממה שלא למד פר יום כיפור‬,‫אלא שצריך לחקור זאת‬
‫ אם כן כשנחזור להבין ברייתא דלפני ה' למה נאמר וכו' קשה והלא צריך לדעת לפני ה' שזולתה לא‬,‫מפר העלם‬
‫ ומעתה נחזור למה שהיה עולה‬,‫הייתי יודע כי כוונת אומרו ויצא הוא להצריך עמידה בפנים בהזאת הפרוכת כנזכר‬
,‫ מה תאמר‬,‫על דעתינו לומר כי גם בפר העלם יעמוד בפנים בשעת הזאה על הפרוכת כסדר האמור בפר יום כיפור‬
‫ שזולת זה‬,‫ אצטריך כדי לגלות על פר יום כיפור שחובה לעמוד בפנים בהזאת הפרכת כאמור‬,‫למה הוצרך לומר‬
‫ ויש לומר כי סובר התנא שלא תבא לפני ה' לעשות ממנו פלפול זה לבד דהיינו להקשות ילמוד‬.‫הייתי אומר רשות‬
‫ שעל כל פנים תהיה צריכה ללמוד דבר‬,‫ כי אין זה דרך הכתוב‬,‫ממנו פר יום כיפור וממה שלא למד וכו' כנזכר‬
‫ שאם לא היה כוונת ה' אלא לגלות על ויצא כנזכר היה לו לפרש הדבר במקומו בפר יום כיפור‬,‫לגופה‬:

‫ למה תדחה דרשה זו‬,‫עוד נראה לומר כי כיון שדרשה זו צודקת כשנקדים להקשות למה נאמר לפני ה' וילמד מויצא‬
‫ הלכך למדינן תרווייהו‬,‫מאידך‬:

4:13

‫ואם כל עדת ישראל ישגו‬, And if the entire community of Israel shall err, etc. The word ‫עדת‬,
"community of" is taken by Torat Kohanim as referring to the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme
Court. The word ‫ עדה‬in this verse and the word ‫ עדה‬in Numbers 35,24-25 both are a reference
to the Sanhedrin of 71 sages. The word ‫ ישראל‬is presumed to mean the Court which is unique
to Israel, i.e. the Court comprising 71 judges. The word ‫ ישגו‬teaches that the legislation
introduced here applies only if the Court erred in its judgment and the people acted upon that
error in judgment. If the members of the Court themselves acted upon their faulty judgment
this is still no reason to apply the legislation stated in this paragraph seeing that the Torah
writes ‫הקהל ועשו‬, "and the community did accordingly." Thus far the Torat Kohanim.
A moral-ethical approach to this verse considers the word ‫ ישגו‬as referring to Israeli society
committing moral errors and departing from Jewish norms. As a result of such conduct it
would follow that the Jewish Supreme Court will also hand down faulty judgments as the
judges and their Torah knowledge reflect the level of the people whom they represent. They
are to blame for the people straying as they had not used their authority in controlling public
morals. It had been their duty to discipline the individuals who were responsible for a trend
away from traditional Jewish values. We have the example of Abbaye in Gittin 60, who erred
in a ruling as he had not first obtained permission from his teacher to issue a ruling. We have
been told this specifically in Sanhedrin 5.

4:22

‫אשר נשיא יחטא‬, When the prince (or king) commit an error, etc. This includes a situation
where the ruler acted on the basis of a decision handed down by a properly constituted court.
As long as the court is not guilty of a sin-offering on account of its decision, the ruler has to
bring a a male goat as a sin-offering (Maimonides Hilchot Shigegot 15,8).

4:23

‫או הודע אליו חטאתו‬, or he has become aware of his inadvertent sin, etc. The Torah here
writes "or" seeing in the previous verse it had written ‫ואשם‬, that he was definite about having
sinned. Torat Kohanim concludes that the ruler has to bring an ‫אשם תלוי‬, a conditional sin-
offering, if he is in doubt about having committed the sin in question. Our verse may discuss a
situation where after having first offered an ‫ אשם תלוי‬while he was in doubt, the ruler now has
to offer a definitive sin-offering as he is now certain that he committed the sin he had been in
doubt about.

4:27

‫ואם נפש אחת תחטא‬, And if anyone of the common people sin through error, etc. The letter ‫ו‬
at the beginning of the word ‫ ואם‬connects this paragraph to the rules established in the
previous paragraphs concerning the details of the procedures.

‫מעם הארץ‬, amongst the common people, etc. Horiot 11 teaches that this excludes the High
Priest if the latter erred without there having been an erroneous decision handed down by the
High Court. In such an event the High Priest does not even have to bring a female goat as a
sin-offering to atone for his error. Exegetes also use the letter ‫ ם‬in the word ‫ מעם‬to exclude
culpability of a ruler in the event he ate half (part) of the minimum amount of a forbidden
food whereas he had eaten the other half before becoming the ruler. The method of exegesis is
based on the words ‫ מעם הארץ‬being superfluous in the first instance; the words ‫נפש כי תחטא‬
would have been quite sufficient. The expression is therefore used to exclude prominent
individuals such as the High Priest. The additional letter ‫ ם‬is now also available for exegesis
"dividing" the concept of ‫עם הארץ‬. Hence the exegete applies it to a commoner who has
consumed part of a forbidden amount of blood, for instance, and was subsequently elevated to
the status of king or High Priest before he ate the second part of that blood which constituted
an amount for which one is culpable of bringing a sin-offering. The extraneous letter teaches
us that such a High Priest or King does not have to bring a sin-offering.

‫בעשותה‬, when she (the ‫ )נפש‬has performed it (the sin). This word is extraneous and Torat
Kohanim interprets it both restrictively and inclusively. It is used restrictively to teach that if
the person who committed the sin did so as a result of carrying out a ruling handed down by
the High Court, he is exonerated. He has to bring the sin-offering mentioned in our verse only
if he acted in accordance with his own opinion. The Torah had to state this separately because
I might have thought that when the Torah legislated the bullock as a sin offering in verse 14,
only people who committed that sin as a result of having heard of the High Court's decision
would be covered by it, but that if an individual had not heard of that ruling and had
nonetheless committed the same sin he would have to bring the she-goat as a sin-offering; the
Torah therefore wrote ‫ בעשותה‬that he is to bring the personal sin-offering only if he had acted
on his own and there was no faulty ruling by the High Court. The word ‫ בעשותה‬is interpreted
inclusively in the event that the individual complied with the High Court's faulty ruling
though he was well enough versed in Torah to know that the ruling was faulty. In such a case
he cannot shield himself behind the High Court's ruling but has to offer a personal sin-
offering of a she-goat for having acted against his better judgment. His sin-offering then is in
addition to the bullock prescribed in verse 14. Had the Torah written only ‫בעשות‬, I would have
interpreted it only as inclusive; seeing the Torah added the letter ‫ ה‬at the end, I can also use it
restrictively, i.e. only in such a case and not in any other case. When you reflect on this you
will understand the Torat Kohanim correctly.

4:32

‫ואם כבש יביא קרבנו‬, And if he bring a lamb for his offering, etc. Why did the Torah have to
make two separate paragraphs out of verses 27-31 and 32-35? Why did the Torah not simply
state in the previous paragraph that the individual inadvertent sinner who is the subject in both
paragraphs has the choice of bringing either a ewe or a she-goat to serve as his sin-offering?
This would have eliminated the need for the entire paragraph commencing with verse 32? I
believe that the reason why the Torah chose to write a separate paragraph is the same as why
the Torah saw fit to write the paragraph starting with 3,6-11 and a separate paragraph
commencing with 3,11-17 when the peace-offering consists of a she-goat. Torat Kohanim on
3,12 (item 185) explained all that. In our instance when the Torah speaks of sheep and goats
as sin-offerings rather than as peace-offerings as in chapter three, the Torah (4,31) speaks of
separating and burning up on the altar all of the fat of the she-goat sin-offering, comparing it
with 3,9 where the fat-tail of sheep is included in the parts to be burned up as a peace-
offering. In the case of a sin-offering consisting of a sheep, all of the fat parts are to be offered
on the altar (4,35) including the fat-tail. We could not have derived the legislation pertaining
to voluntary peace-offerings from legislation describing what is to be done with the same kind
of animal when it is offered as a mandatory sin-offering.

Concerning the words ‫וסמך את ידו‬, that the owner- sinner has to place his weight on the sin-
offering prior to its being slaughtered, something that I would have derived from the same
rule pertaining to the she-goat sin-offering, Torat Kohanim uses the superfluous words as
applying to sin-offerings by a Nazirite or a person struck with Tzora-at after he has been
declared healed. Both of these people have to bring a mandatory sin-offering at the end of the
term of Nazirism or when the affliction has disappeared (compare Numbers 6,14, and
Leviticus 14,11). In either instance the Torah did not mention the need for the person who
obtains atonement by means of that offering to perform the rite of placing his weight on the
animal. Therefore, the superfluous words ‫ וסמך ידו‬in our verse are used as applicable to those
sin-offerings. ‫ושחט אותה לחטאת‬, and he is to slaughter it to be a sin-offering. Zevachim 7
derives from these words that the act of slaughtering must be accompanied by the intent that
the animal in question become a sin-offering. This is another detail which could only have
been derived by the repetition of this sentence. In the previous paragraph these words were
needed for the plain meaning of the verse. You may learn from this verse that this rule applies
both to the sin-offering of a she-goat and that of a ewe. ‫במקום אשר ישחט את העולה‬, in the
place where he (the priest) is to slaughter the burnt-offering. Zevachim 48 asks: "whence
do I know that the sin-offering had to be slaughtered on the northern side of the altar?
Answer: Leviticus 4,33." The Talmud goes on to ask: "granted that this is true of the
slaughtering; whence do I know that this is not only an initial requirement but is mandatory?
Answer: "from the additional and otherwise superfluous words ‫במקום אשר ישחט את העולה‬."
Again we have proof that the verse had to be written in two separate paragraphs (29 and 33).
The Talmud there goes on to demonstrate that this requirement applies as a mandatory
requirement to all categories of sin-offerings. ‫מדם החטאת‬, from the blood of the sin-offering,
etc. Torat Kohanim derives from this superfluous repetition (compare verse 30) that the
receiving of the blood into the receptacle provided for this was mandatory. The same kind of
exegesis is used to derive halachot from every single repetition in these two paragraphs.

5:1

‫כי תחטא‬, if one sins, etc. Why did the Torah have to introduce this paragraph with the words
‫?ונפש כי תחטא ושמעה‬, It would have sufficed to write ‫ונפש כי תשמע‬. Perhaps the reason is that
the person who is the subject of this paragraph is one who had previously denied knowing of
testimony which could result in an accused's exoneration. When he does so a second time, he
proves that he had already incriminated himself previously. The Torah alludes to this state of
affairs by writing ‫נפש כי תחטא‬, someone who has already sinned, etc. The fact that the potential
witness had lied already previously is accounted as a sin. All of this is confirmed by the letter
‫ ו‬the beginning of the word ‫ונפש‬, at the start of this paragraph.

We may also explain the wording based on Shavuot 30 where we learn of the culpability of
someone who denied under oath that he knew testimony (concerning return of a loan being
claimed by the creditor) and was aware that he would be guilty of offering a sin-offering even
if he had denied testimony only inadvertently, but said person did not know that he had to
bring a sin-offering for his perjury. If he did not know that he was culpable for the denial
under oath of such testimony though he was aware that he lied, he is not guilty of such a sin-
offering. Rashi explains that the Talmud means that only if the accused was unaware that he
knew testimony that would help the creditor and was unaware of any penalty for withholding
such testimony would he be free from bringing a sin-offering. Maimonides writes in chapter 1
of his Hilchot Shavuot that the definition of an inadvertent sin involving an oath concerning
testimony is that the witness was unaware that refusal to testify to something one had
knowledge of results in such a witness having to bring a sin-offering, whereas that same
person is aware that his oath is sinful and that he perjures himself by swearing it. We note
therefore that in order to be guilty of bringing the sin-offering the person had to be aware that
his action was both forbidden and a lie. When the Torah writes: ‫ ונפש כי תחטא‬the meaning is
that regardless of whether the denial was intentional or unintentional the culprit is aware that
he commits a sin; the Torah thereby excludes a person who was unaware of the sin or had
forgotten that he had witnessed what he is accused of having witnessed is not obligated to
render the oath mentioned in our verse. The Zohar understands this verse as referring to the
warnings issued by G'd to the soul which descends into this deceitful world when entering
man's body.

‫ושמעה קול אלה‬, when he heard a public imprecation, this is explained by the following
statement in the Mishnah on folio 30 in tractate Shavuot: "Culpability for this kind of oath
exists both when the guilty party swore in the presence of the court or without the presence of
a court provided he volunteered the oath. If, however, he merely denied such knowledge
without swearing to his denial or saying "Amen," confirming what was put to him, he is not
culpable until he had specifically denied his knowing testimony in the presence of a court. So
far the view of Rabbi Meir. The other rabbis hold that there is no culpability for a false oath
be it in the presence of a court or otherwise unless the perjurer had specifically denied his
knowledge of testimony in the presence of a court in so many words, i.e. that he did not know
of any testimony which would help the accused. From the above we note that in the view of
Rabbi Meir culpability does not depend on what the accused actually said but on what he
heard. Hearing a request to testify by the court and failing to do so brings in its wake
culpability, i.e. ‫ושמעה קול אלה‬, as long as he has heard the request to render an oath.

The view of the other rabbis is explained by the ‫ ראב"ד‬and later authorities as follows: If the
perjurer heard the demand to testify regardless of whether this was in the presence of a court
or not, he is culpable if he denied knowledge even if he did not say "Amen," as long as his
denial occurred in the presence of a court even at a different time than that when the demand
to render an oath was made upon him. Again, the determining factor in his guilt is the fact that
he failed to respond to a request to testify which he had heard with his ears.

Although Maimonides rules in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the
rabbis that the denial must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer to
be culpable, he disagrees by saying that in order to be culpable in the absence of a court the
accused must have at least said "Amen." (compare his rulings in chapter 9 ruling 1 and in
chapter 10 ruling 17). This means that he holds that a denial in the absence of a court does not
result in culpability unless the potential witness had uttered the word "Amen" in response to a
statement suggesting that he had no knowledge of such testimony. ‫ ראב"ד‬disagrees with
Maimonides claiming that one cannot rule according to Rabbi Meir. Furthermore, it is not
clear why either according to Rabbi Meir or according to the other rabbis it should matter that
the court is present at the time the potential witness denies under oath that he has any such
knowledge as he is accused of having. Thus far the words of the ‫ראב"ד‬. The author of ‫כסף משנה‬
adds that he has no idea about Maimonides' source for distinguishing between a denial in the
presence of the court and a similar denial in the absence of a court.

I believe that Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagreed only in a situation in which the
potential witness volunteered his oath outside the confines of a court and did not deny any
knowledge in the presence of the court at all. According to Rabbi Meir he would be guilty of
perjury seeing Rabbi Meir derives this from a different kind of oath called ‫שבועת הפקדון‬. Just
as someone who denies having received money or objects on trust and he does so at his own
behest he is guilty of perjury even if such an oath did not take place in the presence of a court.
The other rabbis adhere to the principle known as ‫דון מינה ואוקי באתרא‬, that one may derive the
essential parts of one legislation and apply it to a different type of legislation without
applying all the details pertaining to the legislation which serves as the source of the exegesis.
[The principle is explained by Rashi in Shevuot 31. Ed.] In situations where the supposed
witness is challenged to testify by third parties but not in the presence of a court, and the
supposed witness declares that he does not know any such testimony, he does not have to
bring a sin-offering even if he subsequently admits before a court that he had lied. When such
a lie had occurred in front of a court and is subsequently retracted, the liar is guilty of the sin-
offering according to all the rabbis.

Maimonides holds that any oath which is not sworn to in the presence of a court needs to be
initiated by the person who swears it in order for him to be guilty of perjury and the sin-
offering which is required. He derives this rule from the following words in the Mishnah
quoted in Shevuot 31: "What is meant by the term ‫שבועת העדות‬, "an oath concerning
testimony?" If a party said to two others: "please testify on my behalf that you have been
witnesses to a certain occurrence;" if the two people in question reply: "we swear we have no
such knowledge," or if they simply say: "we do not know anything about the matter you want
us to testify to (without volunteering an oath)" and the first party challenges them to confirm
this on oath and they confirm it by saying "Amen," they are guilty of perjury. If the person
demanding such an oath repeated his request five times but never in the presence of a court,
and received a negative answer each time and both parties subsequently come to court where
the ones who had denied their knowledge five times now admit that they did have knowledge,
they are not guilty concerning their previous denials. If they deny their knowledge also in
front of the court and are subsequently found to have lied, they are guilty of a sin-offering for
every previous denial separately. Thus far the Mishnah. We note that according to the text of
the Mishnah the witnesses had said "Amen." Who is the author of that Mishnah? If it is Rabbi
Meir and there was no subsequent denial in the presence of a court we would have a
disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis in the previous Mishnah followed by
this Mishnah in which all rabbis are agreed. We are entitled to view this anonymous Mishnah
as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Meir, seeing he is not quoted as diagreeing. Seeing that
Maimonides demanded that the perjurer must have first denied his knowledge in front of a
court before becoming liable for the sin-offering even if his original denial had been at his
own initiative, it is clear that he interpreted the Mishnah according to the consensus of the
Rabbis. The Mishnah spoke of the perjurers having said "Amen." When did they do so? When
they were not in the presence of a court, for if they had denied their knowledge in front of the
court they would have been guilty of perjury according to all opinions even without having
uttered the word "Amen" as confirmation of an oath. It emerges that according to the view of
the majority of rabbis the word "Amen" is the minimum required for such potential witnesses
to become guilty of perjury when not in the presence of a court. [At any rate our author has
succeeded in demonstrating that Maimonides did not rule according to a minority view so that
the complaint of ‫ ראב"ד‬is not in place. Ed.]

Tossaphot, aware of an imprecision in the text of the Mishnah, state that this is due to the
Mishnah's attempt to be brief; this is true if we were to assume that the alternative would have
been for the perjurers to have said: "we do not know of any testimony we can offer on your
behalf." Maimonides does not agree with this but holds that any oath sworn outside a court
must be volunteered, i.e. the perjurer must have recited the substance of his oath with his own
words. His reason is that the Torah discusses an occurrence in front of a court as we know
from the words ‫אם לוא יגיד‬, "if he will not reveal it." Only in such a situation is it enough for
the perjurer to have merely heard the demand to testify, i.e. ‫ ושמעה קול‬for him to become
guilty without uttering the substance of what he denies.

Shevuot 32 asks: "whence do we know that the denial of the witnesses's knowledge must have
occurred in the presence of the court so that he would only then be guilty for such denial
(perjury)?" Abbaye answered there that we derive this from the words ‫ואם לוא יגיד‬, "if he
refuses to testify," and that these words only make sense in a setting in which one normally
testifies, i.e. a court. Rabbi Papa counters that if we were to accept the exegetical comment by
Abbaye we would come to the conclusion that even an oath freely volunteered but not within
the confines of a court would not be subject to the laws of perjury seeing that it was not sworn
at a place defined as one designated to hear testimony? This argument is rejected in light of a
Baraitha which interprets the word ‫לאחת‬, "one of" in 5,4 to mean that the party who has
become guilty of perjury is liable for each violation separately. If we were to assume that any
oath must be sworn only in front of a court in order for one to become guilty of perjury, why
would we have to be told that if the perjurer perjured himself five times in the presence of a
court (on the same subject) he needs to bring only a single sin-offering? It follows that an oath
may be sworn to also outside a court, whereas the denial must have taken place in front of a
court for the perjurer to be liable. All this teaches that the oath which is sworn in the presence
of the court is identical to the one sworn outside the court, and that one is certainly liable for
perjury if one had sworn falsely outside the court. Having accepted this, it makes no
difference if the party who is the subject in our verse was sworn by others in the presence of
the court or elsewhere.

This is important if we want to understand Maimonides' source for his ruling. The use of the
word ‫ לאחת‬which we quoted to mean that the perjurer is liable for every previous denial is
really problematical; after all, 5,4 speaks of ‫[ שבועת בטוי‬undertakings by a person on oath to
either do something or not do something. Ed.]. How can we apply the rules which pertain to
such an oath to the type of oath discussed in 5,1? The two types of oath are so dissimilar that
we would need an exegetical instrument to permit us to derive ‫ הלכות‬applicable to the one
kind of oath to the other! We are forced to conclude that the only situation in which the two
oaths are comparable is when the ‫שבועת העדות‬, the oath concerning testimony, has been
entered into voluntarily just as the ‫ שבועת בטוי‬discussed in 5,4. In the case where the potential
witness only responded to a challenge to deny his knowledge on oath there is no way we can
derive a ‫ הלכה‬applicable to ‫ שבועת בטוי‬as applicable also to ‫שבועת העדות‬. This is why
Maimonides derives culpability in the case of ‫ שבועת העדות‬only when such denial occurred in
the presence of the court. He saw no way of proving culpability of ‫ שבועת העדות‬which was
imposed by the creditor on the supposed witnesses by comparison to culpability of the person
who swore a ‫שבועת בטוי‬. Let us now return to Rabbi Papa's suggestion that if we were to use
Abbaye's interpretation of the words ‫לוא יגיד‬, we would have to conclude that every oath has
to be sworn in the presence of a court in order for someone to legally incriminate himself as
guilty of perjury! We do not find that Abbaye rejected Rabbi Papa's conclusion! He only
rejected Rabbi Papa's exegetical proof. This means that Abbaye agreed with Rabbi Papa that
culpability for ‫שבועת העדות‬, the denial of knowledge as a witness which is the result of the
creditor initiating the formula of the oath, must have occurred in the presence of a court in
order for the perjurer having to offer a sin-offering. Thus Abbaye's view is identical with the
ruling of Maimonides.

According to all the foregoing we may interpret the words ‫ ושמעה קול אלה‬as referring to the
perjurer having denied knowledge of what he had been invited to confirm even if he did not
say "Amen." This must have taken place in the presence of a court as we derived from the
words ‫אם לוא יגיד‬. In the event he denied his knowledge by uttering an oath, he would also be
liable for another aspect of this oath, the one that we derive from the ‫ גזרה שוה‬of the word
‫ תחטא‬occurring both here and in connection with the )5,21( ,‫ שבועת פקדון‬an oath in which one
swears not to have been guilty of carelessness or other trespass involving an object entrusted
to one to keep on behalf a third party, providing the denial occurred in court. As to the
conclusion of the Talmud on Shevuot 32 that oaths may be sworn outside the court and result
in the penalty for perjury, this refers to that kind of oath, i.e. someone denying that he had
dealt treacherously with his fellow man's property while in fact having done so. [The
unnecessary repetition of the word ‫ תחטא‬in those two paragraphs is the exegetical basis for
learning across from one kind of oath to another. Ed.].

We have now completely understood the way Maimonides interprets our verse. Our verse
speaks of a single scenario namely that the creditor beseeches the witness to testify on his
behalf in court and the (so-called) witness refuses to respond while in court. Both the two
requirements mentioned in our verse are mandatory in order for the witness to become guilty
of the sin-offering. 1) The attempt to make the witness deny on oath must occur in court,
whereas if the denial occurred outside the court it does not result in a sin-offering even if at a
different time the same witness had denied this in court. 2) The denial has to take place while
the party denying is in court. If that were not the case the liar would not even be guilty of the
sin-offering if he had volunteered a false oath outside the court as we derive from the
comparison with the ‫ שבועת פקדון‬and the words ‫ תחטא‬that he would not be guilty. In the event
that the denial occurred in the court whereas the oath had been sworn outside the court, we
derive from the comparison with ‫ שבועת בטוי‬that if the perjurer had uttered the words of the
oath himself that he is culpable for swearing a false oath. Anyone studying this carefully will
agree that Maimonides' ruling is most illuminating and is fully supported by the text of our
paragraph.

5:7

‫ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה‬, if he is unable to afford a lamb, etc. This means that the individual in
question can afford to present more than the two turtle-doves which are the next cheaper sin-
offering and burnt offering the Torah demands of him. As long as he is not able to afford a
lamb as his sin-offering, he is allowed to offer the bird-offerings designated for a needy
person.

The word ‫ ידו‬is interpreted by Torat Kohanim to mean that the individual in question does not
have to borrow money to enable him to purchase a lamb for his sin-offering. Neither do we
tell such a person to work harder in order to earn the money necessary to purchase the lamb.
The reason for this is the principle ‫חביבה מצוה לשעתה‬, it is important to perform a
commandment at the time it is due rather than to perform it somewhat later but in a more
perfect manner (based on Pessachim 68). Torat Kohanim describes the alternatives as follows:
"the meaning of the words "if his means do not suffice for a lamb" is that even if the
individual in question owned a lamb but he did not have the wherewithal for his elementary
needs, i.e. for clothing, food or shelter, he is considered as if he did not have a lamb to offer.
Torat Kohanim derives this from the expression ‫די שה‬, "sufficient to afford to offer a lamb."

I have seen a comment by Rabbeynu Hillel who defines "his needs" as referring to the lamb
for the offering which this individual does not possess. Halachah demands that the owner of
the lamb personally bring it to the courtyard of the Temple, etc. This explanation seems rather
forced seeing it does not take more effort or time to bring a lamb to the Temple than it takes
to take two turtle-doves to the Temple. If the Rabbi referred to the effort to bring a relatively
sizable lamb to the Temple, let him bring the money instead and purchase it from the Temple-
treasury. If Rabbeynu Hilel referred to the need to perform ‫ סמיכה‬on the lamb, something that
need not be performed on the birds, this too is no argument as the performance of ‫ סמיכה‬is an
initial requirement only; the requirement is not mandatory so that failure to perform it would
invalidate the offering. Why should such an individual rather not bring the offering required
of him and instead bring the offering designated for a needy person? We have learned at the
end of tractate Nega-im (14,12) that if a well-to-do person offered the sin-offering designated
for a poor person he has not fulfilled his obligation. The same applies to all the offerings
commonly known as ‫קרבן עולה ויורד‬, offerings which vary in value with the economic situation
that the person who has to offer a sin-offering finds himself in. Maimonides also rules this
way in Hilchot Shega-got chapter 10. The requirement of placing one's weight on the lamb is
only meant to enhance the commandment and does not in any way interfere with the
atonement value of the offering for the sinner in question as we know from Zevachim 6.

Torat Kohanim interprets the words "if she cannot afford a lamb" in Leviticus 12,8 where the
need for a woman who gave birth to bring a sin-offering is discussed, as follows: "If she owns
a lamb but does not have her basic needs, how do I know that she need only bring the offering
designated for a poor person?" Answer: "The Torah writes ‫די שה‬, sufficient for a lamb." The
reason Torat Kohanim had to use these words there in the same sense as in Leviticus 12,8 is
that one of the offerings of a mother who has given birth is a burnt-offering and such burnt-
offering requires to be accompanied by a drink-offering ‫נסכים‬. This drink-offering is
mandatory. Had the Torah not written ‫ די שה‬in that verse I could not have derived this
meaning from our verse where we discussed an offering that is purely a sin-offering. As a
result of such considerations, why did the Torah not merely write these words in Leviticus
12,8 and I would have applied them here also? There was no need to tell us that the sinner
may forego the need for ‫סמיכה‬, as we could have applied a ‫קל וחומד‬, an inference from minor
to major; if in the case of a sin-offering which does not involve a mandatory drink-offering, a
person who owns a lamb but does not have money for his basic needs is allowed to bring the
sin-offering applicable to a poor person in its place, then a mother who finds hereself in a
similar economic situation and who would have to find the means for an additional drink-
offering most certainly would be allowed to offer a poor person's offering instead, and I
would not need additional superfluous words for such exegesis. I believe therefore that I was
right. As long as the sinner has more than enough for two birds but not enough for a lamb, he
is entitled to bring the offering designated for a poor person. Korban Aharon supports my
interpretation.

5:10

‫מחטאתו אשר הטא‬, concerning the sin which he committed, etc. In connection with the
offering by a rich man the Torah writes: ‫מחטאתו‬, whereas when describing the parallel offering
by a poor man the Torah writes: ‫מחטאתו אשר חטא‬. Why the difference between these
descriptions? Torat Kohanim item 343, elaborating on verse 13 which deals with the sin-
offering to be brought by the poorest of the poor, claims that I might have thought that the
value of the various sin-offerings was determined by the relative severity of the sin it was to
atone for; in order to disabuse us of such thinking the Torah wrote ‫מאחת מאלה‬, that either kind
of sin-offering could atone for either kind of sin and that what determined the kind of sin-
offering was only the economic situation of the sinner. The reason for this comment is the fact
that this paragraph deals with three distinctly different kinds of sins for which sin-offerings
have to be brought. We have the sin of someone who is ritually impure introducing impurity
into the Temple precincts (5,2), a sin which carries the Karet penalty if committed
intentionally. This is the most severe sin for which a sin-offering is acceptable. We have the
sin (5,1) of perjury committed by someone who withholds relevant testimony on behalf of a
fellow Jew, a sin which is punishable by a sin-offering either if committed inadvertently or if
committed intentionally. This sin is less severe than the one which preceded it, though it is
more severe than the one involving ‫ שבועת בטוי‬an undertaking accompanied by an oath to do
or not to do something and the failure to honour one's undertaking. This sin is listed in the
Torah (5,5) after the ‫ שבועת העדות‬as it is relatively minor. Violation of ‫ שבועת בטוי‬is punishable
by a sin-offering only if it occurred inadvertently. As a result of these distinctions I could
have thought that different sins require sin-offerings of different value in relation to the
severity of the sin. Therefore the Torah tells us in verse 13 that the value of the sin-offering is
not related to the nature of the sin but to the ability of the sinner to afford the offering in
question.

The hypothesis that we could have misunderstood the intent of the Torah unless the Torah had
written the words ‫ מאחת מאלה‬in verse 13 is baffling. After all, the Torah had spoken
specifically of the sinner's inability to afford a certain kind of offering in our verse! This made
it abundantly clear that the kind of sin-offering to be brought was not determined by the kind
of sin but by the economic status of the sinner! Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests in his
commentary on verse 13, that the words ‫ מחטאתו אשר חטא‬were needed to prevent us from
misinterpreting the words ‫ ואם לא תגיע ידו‬to mean that if the sinner's "hand" had not "touched"
i.e. been guilty of committing a trespass involving the need to offer a sheep as a sin-offering,
but had been guilty only of a minor trespass, that such a sinner has to bring the sin-offering
consisting of two turtle-doves. If the sinner had not even been guilty of a sin severe enough to
require a sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves, then he has to bring only a sin-offering
consisting of a meal-offering." The words ‫ מחטאתו אשר חטא‬were written after the Torah
discussed a lesser of the three categories of sin mentioned in our paragraph i.e. ‫שבועת העדות‬, so
that we would not err and think that the sin-offering consisting of turtle-doves is applicable
only for atonement of the sin of ‫שבועת העדות‬, but not to any of the categories of sin dealt with
in this paragraph. Rabbi Mizrachi elaborates with further examples which we need not repeat
here. I believe that his approach is very forced, seeing it is hard to imagine someone
misinterpreting the words ‫ ואם לא תשיג ידו‬as referring to a greater sin.

Perhaps Torat Kohanim was prompted by the following consideration: If the Torah had not
written the words ‫מאחת מאלה‬, I would have thought that if someone committed the most severe
of the sins listed in this paragraph, the bringing of impurity into the precincts of the
Tabernacle, the only kind of sin-offering acceptable from such a sinner would be a four-
legged animal, a ewe. As to the line in verse 7: "if he cannot afford a lamb he should bring
two turtle-doves, etc," this alternative does not apply except in the case where he was guilty of
the lesser offence such as ‫ שבועת העדות‬which, because of the relatively milder nature of the
sin, requires less in the way of atonement. If someone were to argue that the Torah's
concession to the sinner extended even to a poor man guilty of bringing a sin-offering
consisting of a sheep for a more serious offence, let him prove his case! Similarly, when the
Torah wrote in verse 11 ‫ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים‬, that if the sinner cannot afford two turtle-
doves that he should bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering, I would have assumed that the
Torah made this concession in a case where the sinner was guilty of only the least severe of
the sins mentioned in this paragraph, the sin of ‫שבועת בטוי‬. I would not have assumed that such
a meal-offering could serve as a sin-offering for the sin of ‫ שבועת העדות‬which is more severe
than ‫שבועת בטוי‬. It would most certainly not suffice to achieve atonement for the severe sin of
bringing impurity into the confines of the Holy Tabernacle. I would have been confirmed in
this attitude by the fact that in all the sins listed by the Torah up to now where sin-offerings
are called for the Torah never offered the concession of a bird or meal-offering replacing a
sin-offering consisting of a four-legged animal. I would have reasoned "why should the Torah
deal so leniently with someone guilty of a sin which carries the Karet penalty?" I would have
assumed that the inexpensive sin-offering was certainly acceptable only for the lesser sins. I
would have reasoned as follows: The wealthy person has to bring a four-legged animal as his
sin-offering regardless of the relative severity or mildness of his sin. The Torah made a
concession to the poor if he happened to have been guilty of the sin of ‫שבועת העדות‬, in which
case he could bring the turtle-doves. If he had been guilty of the sin of bringing impurity into
the Tabernacle however, the Torah did not exempt him from the rule applicable to sin-
offerings in ‫נפש כי תחטא בשגגה‬, described in chapter four. If a person is destitute and
committed only the sin of ‫שבועת בטוי‬, the Torah relents and allows him to offer a sin-offering
consisting only of a meal-offering. If that same destitute person was guilty of the sin of ‫שבועת‬
‫העדות‬, which is more severe, he cannot absolve his guilt by offering only a meal-offering as
his sin-offering. This is the major error I could have made unless the Torah had written the
words ‫ מאחת מאלה‬in verse 13. By means of these two words the Torah placed all the sins in the
same category to teach us that the meal-offering as a sin-offering is acceptable to G'd
provided the sinner is so destitute that he cannot even afford to bring two turtle-doves. This is
what the author of Torat Kohanim had in mind when he wrote: "I could have thought, etc."
When he wrote that "we would have made a division in comparing the mild sins to the severe
sins," this is an error; the text there should have read: "the severe sins to the milder sins."

Another method of explaining the words of the Torat Kohanim is by remembering that the
paragraph deals with three separate sins and I notice that the Torah also describes three
different kinds of sin-offerings. I would assume that the Torah arranged the list of the sin-
offerings in keeping with the type of sins they are to atone for. The Torah therefore
commences with the sin-offering to be offered in respect of the most severe of these three sins
by saying that the sinner has to offer a female sheep. In the event that the sinner in question
could not afford that, he should bring the kind of offering that would be appropriate for the sin
mentioned by the Torah prior to this one, i.e. the sin of ‫שבועת העדות‬. The sin-offering should
consist of two birds regardless of the sinner's economic situation, whereas the sin-offering
consisting of such birds would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of bringing impurity
into the Temple only if the sinner was poor. The words ‫ואם לא תשיג ידו‬, "if he cannot afford
even a bird-offering" in verse 11 apply to the sin-offering if one was guilty of ‫שבועת העדות‬, for
which the regular sin-offering consists of two turtle-doves. If the sinner could not afford this,
he would be allowed to bring the sin-offering appropriate for the next milder sin, i.e. ‫שבועת‬
‫בטוי‬.

As a result of such reasoning the sin-offering appropriate to atone for ‫ שבועת בטוי‬would be the
least expensive one, a meal-offering, even if the offender were a wealthy individual.
Similarly, a wealthy individual would be allowed to bring only a bird-offering for the sin of
‫ שבועת העדות‬even if he were well to-do. If he were especially poor however, he would only
have to bring the meal-offering. If someone were guilty of bringing impurity into the
Tabernacle and he is well to-do, he will have to bring a sheep or goat; if he is poor he would
bring turtle-doves but not a meal-offering. This is what the author of Torat Kohanim meant
when he wrote that the serious ones would be atoned for by a sheep. He meant that only in
respect of the serious sins were sheep required as the sin-offering. No sheep as a sin-offering
would be called for in respect of minor sins such as the two types of oaths even if the people
who had committed these offences were wealthy individuals. Torat Kohanim did not worry
that you might misinterpret what the Torah wrote and think that only a sheep or goat would be
acceptable as atonement for the sin of impurity seeing that the Torah had written in the verse
following the requirement to offer a sheep: "if he is unable to afford a sheep, etc. (compare
verses 6 and 7)." However, the Torah had to tell us that whereas the less serious offences (the
oaths) did not require a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, they did require bird-offerings. The
bird-offerings themselves are required only for the sin of ‫שבועת העדות‬, whereas the sin of
‫ שבועת בטוי‬can be atoned for by a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering. Torat Kohanim
also did not worry that someone might think that it would not be acceptable under any
circumstances to try and atone for the sin of ‫ שביעת העדות‬with a meal-offering, seeing the
Torah wrote immediately following the requirement to offer the bird-offerings: "if he is
unable to afford this he may bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering" (compare verses 10 and
11).
As a result of all these considerations you would have concluded that 1) a sheep is only called
for if the most severe of the three sins mentioned in this paragraph had been committed; 2) a
bird-offering is called for in case the sin was relatively mild, but not in case it was the mildest
of the three; 3) the appropriate sin-offering for the mildest of the three offences is the meal-
offering. The most severe sin could not be atoned for by a mere meal-offering under any
circumstances.

[At this point the author devotes several pages to demonstrate why every line in the Torat
Kohanim is justified. The interested reader is referred to the original somewhat tedious
presentation. Ed.]

‫ כי‬,‫ שזה דוחק‬,‫ובזה אין אנו צריכין לדוחקו של רא''ם שאמר כי פסוק ראשון בא להשוותם לוידוי האמור שם‬
‫ כי‬,‫כשהשוה אותם הכתוב ואמר והתודה והביא את אשמו מנין תמצא לחלק ולומר שלא השוה אלא לסמוך ממש‬
‫במה חלק הכתוב למאמר והביא את אשמו אדרבה וא''ו סמכיה‬:

,‫ שלא תאמר שאין קרבן זה של עוף בא אלא על הקל‬,‫ומעתה נבוא לדייק אומרו מחטאתו אשר חטא על זה הדרך‬
,‫ תלמוד לומר אשר חטא לרבות חטא חמור‬,‫ אבל החמור שהוא טומאת מקדש וקדשיו לא‬,‫שהוא שבועות העדות‬
‫ ואפילו בטומאת מקדש‬,‫ מאומרו מאחת מאלה‬,‫וכשהזכיר פרשת דלי דלות ריבה גם כן עשירית האיפה בכולן‬
‫וקדשיו‬:

‫ נראה לומר כי לצד שבדלי דלות אמר‬,‫ואם תאמר ישמיענו בקרבן דלי דלות שישנו בחמור ומכל שכן קרבן דלות‬
‫ ודרשו בתורת כהנים‬,‫ ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה‬.‫ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים ולא אמר כאומרו בפרשת דלות‬
‫ ופירשנוהו למעלה‬,‫ הרי זה מביא קרבן עני‬,‫אפילו יש לו שה אם אין לו צרכיו‬:

‫ וכן פירש בעל‬,‫והנה דרשת התנא היה ממה שלא אמר כמו שאמר כאן ואם לא (תגיע) [תשיג] ידו לשתי תורים‬
‫ הדברים מוכיחים כי אם יש לו הרי זה חייב‬,‫ אם כן כאן שלא אמר הכתוב די שתי תורים‬,‫ ופשוט הוא‬,‫קרבן אהרן‬
‫ הגם‬,‫ ומעתה הוצרך הכתוב לרבות בעוף שיביא להחמור שהוא טומאת מקדש וקדשיו‬,‫ אפילו הוא צריך להם‬,‫להביא‬
‫ והבן‬,‫ אם הוא צריך לו‬,‫שהיה לו כבש‬:

‫ כי השמיענו שיפטר בזה גם לחמורות‬,‫ יוצדקו דברינו‬,‫ של שה קאמר‬,‫גם מה שפירש רבינו הלל ואין לו צרכיו‬
‫שהוא טומאת מקדש [וקדשיו] מה שלא היה נשמע זה מקרבן עשירית האיפה‬:

5:21

‫ ומעלה מעל בשם‬,‫נפש כי תחטא‬, If someone sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, etc.
Why did the Torah have to write the words ‫ כי תחטא‬here? It cannot mean that the sin referred
to is a denial of the sin by the sinner seeing that the Torah already wrote ‫וכחש בעמיתו‬, that the
sinner denied having committed the trespass, i.e. having exploited his labourer by failing to
pay him. Besides, why does the Torah in this instance describe the sinner as ‫מעל בשם‬, "having
committed a trespass against the Lord," words which have not appeared in any of the previous
examples of sins committed? Why did the Torah have to add the word ‫ בעמיתו‬when writing
‫ ?וכחש בעמיתו‬The meaning of the word is not clear.

Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of three distinct wrongs committed by the sinner in
question. 1) He appropriated to himself something which did not belong to him, i.e. an aspect
of the sin of robbery. 2) ‫ומעלה מעל בשם‬, the meaning of the words "against G'd" may imply
that by trying to re-arrange the allocation of wealth to people other than those decreed by G'd,
the sinner interfered with G'd's scheme of things. Hence the Torah describes him as having
committed a trespass against G'd. By doing so, the sinner creates the impression that he
denied G'd's justice and fairness in allocating wealth to different people at different times. It is
even possible that the reason that the Torah repeats the expression, i.e. ‫ ומעלה מעל‬instead of
merely saying ‫ ומעל‬includes the victim's impression of G'd's sense of justice and fairness. By
the sinner having done what he did, he produces a feeling in the heart of the victim that G'd
has allowed him to be victimised. This is an additional sin committed by the person described
as guilty of "trespass." 3) The meaning of the words ‫ וכחש בעמיתו‬is that the sinner, i.e. the
recipient of a loan who now denies to the lender that he had received it, accuses the righteous
of being wicked when he makes it appear as if the lender was the liar. The exact meaning of
the word ‫ בעמיתו‬is, that he puts his opposite number in the position of appearing to have stolen
from the dishonest accuser. He has the nerve to challenge the person who extended a loan to
him, and, instead of being grateful to him he makes him appear as a criminal. All of these
three sins occur either when 1) someone has either received some deposit on trust, ‫פקדון‬, or
‫בתשומת יד‬, when he had a loan extended to him, the depositor not wanting a third party to
know about it; or 2) when there is outright robbery, ‫;גזל‬, or 3) ‫עשק בעמיתו‬, when the sinner is
guilty of withholding wages from his labourer and the like. When someone has found some
object lost by a third party and denies it, the definition ‫ כחש בעמיתו‬does not apply, seeing he
does not know who has lost it. This is the reason that the Torah wrote a separate verse to
describe this example of wrongdoing.

On the moral-ethical level, our paragraph also describes three negative effects on the soul of
the sinner described here. 1) By accusing someone wrongly, the soul of the accuser loses
some of its spiritual light; the expression ‫ נפש כי תחטא‬reflects this loss sustained by the soul
itself. 2) the words ‫ ומעלה מעל בשם‬may be understood in kabbalistic terms. Every Jewish soul
depends on continuous input from celestial forces called ‫ שפע נשמתו‬in order to sustain itself
spiritually inside a body. The only soul which does not enjoy this continuous spiritual input is
one whose ‫נפש‬, the person it resides in, has become guilty of criminal sins which will result in
its being deprived of the celestial spiritual input. This is what the Torah meant when it
described the ‫ נפש‬being "cut off" in Genesis 17,14 as the consequence of a Jew ignoring the
commandment to circumcise himself or be circumcised. The celestial spiritual input into our
souls which we have described enters by means of two thin "threads" through a person's two
nostrils as this is the area where the ‫ נפש‬is joined ‫מקום דבקות‬, to its owner i.e. to G'd. This is
what Moses meant when he said in Deut. 4,4: "all of you who have cleaved unto the Lord
your G'd are alive as of this day."

If man commits the sins described in this paragraph his soul comes under the domination of
the forces of evil. If the spiritual input from celestial sources were to continue, it would
actually strengthen the forces of evil which have taken over in that person. When the Torah
speaks of ‫ומעלה מעל בשם‬, this describes such a process of strengthening him who trespassed
against G'd. This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 28,24: "Whoever robs his father and
mother and says: 'it is no sin,' is a companion of a destroyer." Solomon means that inasmuch
as this person makes common cause with evil, otherwise known as ‫איש משחית‬, a destroyer, he
has himself become a destroyer.

3) The denial of the truth by the individual in our paragraph impacts also on the community of
Israel seeing that all of Israel are branches of one soul. If any branch of that soul becomes
involved in evil this has repercussions on the entire people. This is the deeper meaning of the
words ‫וכחש בעמיתו‬, his denial extends to the members of his ‫עם‬, his people. His people become
‫כחש‬, "weak," through his sinful behaviour. This is exactly what Solomon referred to in the
verse from Proverbs we have just quoted. Berachot 35 describes the word ‫ אמו‬in that verse as
referring to the ‫כנסת ישראל‬, the spiritual concept of the Jewish people, "mother Israel." The
Jewish nation increases in spiritual power by means of its men of valour who contribute to it
peace and harmony and who thereby assure it of life itself.

‫חסלת פרשת ויקרא‬

6:2

‫צו את אהרון‬, "Command Aaron, etc." Torat Kohanim comments that the expression ‫ צו‬is
always one which denotes a sense of urgency covering both the present and future
generations. [I believe the meaning of "future generations" is that the commandment does not
merely involve a one-time contribution such as the materials for the Tabernacle. Ed.]. Rabbi
Shimon says that this expression is used especially when performance of the commandment
involves personal expense. According to the first opinion quoted, the reason the expression ‫צו‬
is justified here more than elsewhere is because the legislation involving the burnt or total-
offering involves also night-time activity, something which is not the case with any of the
other offerings. The priests therefore had to be impressed with a special sense of urgency. We
find a parallel passage in the Torah (Leviticus 24,2) where the expression ‫ צו‬is used in
connection with the oil for the candlestick which was used primarily at night. That
commandment also involved personal expense for the people contributing the oil. Aaron was
commanded with those words, and the Torah reports in Numbers 8,3 that Aaron carried out
the instructions to the letter. The word ‫ לדורות‬used by Torat Kohanim means that the rules laid
down here after the word ‫ צו‬are not subject to change in the future. We encounter the
following comment in Pessikta on our verse. "The need for the Torah to legislate with the
word ‫ צו‬was based on the Israelites having said: 'in the past while we were wandering through
the desert we used to offer daily communal burnt-offerings. Now that we have have stopped
wandering, we will also discontinue the practice of these offerings.'" We see from the above
that there was room for error as to the application of the daily ‫ תמידים‬offerings.

As far as the ‫חסרון כיס‬, the personal expense cited by Rabbi Shimon as the reason for the use
by the Torah of the word ‫ צו‬in this instance is concerned, there are many interpretations as to
what the Rabbi had in mind. Some say that Rabbi Shimon did not restrict his comment to
when a commandment involved personal expense, but that he also referred to any
commandment the fulfilment of which involved pain, discomfort, etc. to the person
performing it. Others say that he included commandments which robbed the performer of his
regular night's sleep or the work he would otherwise perform during that night. Others say
that all the Israelites considered themselves as losing money when they observed the
sacrificial animal being burned up and no one enjoying any part of it. Still others believe that
Rabbi Shimon referred to the financial loss to the priest who would have preferred to officiate
over a different offering, one from which he would have been able to eat at least a part. In the
case of the burnt-offering the priest's share was limited to the skin of the animal. I consider all
these interpretations of what Rabbi Shimon had in mind with his statement as missing the
mark by a wide margin.

He may have referred to the pile of firewood which had to burn around the clock on the ‫מזבח‬
‫העולה‬, the altar for the burnt-offerings, as we know from Yuma 45. We are told there that the
altar contained three separate piles of firewood, one of which was kept burning without any
offerings being burned up on it. This was done in order to keep the fire going all night long. It
seemed to the people that this was a waste of money. Hence the Torah used the word ‫צו‬. Use
of that word would preclude debate on that subject.
There is another element which makes one think in terms of financial loss when one
contemplates the procedures involving the burnt-offering. The Torah made a big fuss in
connection with that offering. We read in verse 5 (after being told that the fire on the altar
must not be allowed to go out): "and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning and lay
the burnt-offering on it." Torat Kohanim asks: "how do I know that no other offering could be
offered up before the daily burnt-offering?" Answer: The Torah says ‫עליה העולה‬, "the burnt-
offering on [in addition to] it." We are told in the Tossephta Pessachim 4,2 that if any
sacrifices were offered up prior to the daily burnt-offering of the morning they are
automatically disqualified. This teaches that but for the burnt-offering all that precedes it is
useless; this ruling has far-reaching consequences regarding the meaning of ‫חסרון כיס‬,
financial loss.

Supposing some individual had brought a one year old male sheep to the Temple to offer it
there as his burnt-offering. It happened to be early in the morning prior to the daily ‫תמיד‬
having been offered up. The individual is therefore told to wait for an hour until after the ‫תמיד‬
has been offered. We have a rule that when it comes to sacrificial offerings even hours make
a difference. We derive this both from Zevachim 25 and Bechorot 39. [The male sheep used
for the burnt-offering is not to be more than one year old. Normally, the day is considered a
single unit, so that as long it was born on that date a year earlier it does not matter which part
of the day. In this instance, if the sheep had been born on the same date the year before it had
been offered up, but at an earlier hour than the time it was offered up, the extra hour would
disqualify it as a potential burnt-offering. Ed.] The owner would suffer financial loss by not
now being able to offer up his animal which had already been designated for a specific type of
offering.

The same rule which results in financial loss to the owner of a private burnt-offering applies if
someone burned up the gift-offering prematurely. More importantly, during periods when
Jerusalem was under siege and there were not always any sheep at hand, the automatic result
would be that no other category of offering, be it cattle, sin-offerings consisting of goats or
birds, or even meal-offerings, could be offered up on the altar seeing the daily ‫ תמיד‬had not
been offered up. When you consider all this you will understand a report in Baba Kama 82
according to which the besieged Jews of Jerusalem lowered baskets full of golden coins to
their besiegers in order to secure one or two sheep for the daily burnt-offering. [during a civil
war about who should be king. Ed.] This was certainly an extreme example of the legislation
of the daily burnt-offering causing substantial financial sacrifice to the people. Had the rule
that the ‫ תמיד‬had to be the first offering on any day not existed, it is doubtful that the priests
would have gone to such extremes in order to secure a single sheep.

‫לאמור‬, to say. It is not clear to whom Aaron's sons were supposed to relay this legislation. If
they were meant to do this for the benefit of future generations, we have already heard about
this as being implied in the expression ‫צו‬. If they were meant to tell the other Israelites so that
these would prepare the animals for the offering as well as all the necessary tools to be used in
connection with this as well as the wood for kindling, this had already been included in the
words "G'd spoke to Moses ‫לאמור‬." Why would I need a second ‫?לאמור‬

Perhaps G'd had told Moses to tell Aaron various exegetical details alluded to in the text He
had dictated to Moses, seeing that the verse as it stands appears like a book sealed with seven
seals. If you do find that our sages have offered many ingenious interpretations of the words
in this verse, this was only because they already knew the actual ‫ הלכות‬and did not have to
arrive at them by studying the text.
Alternatively, seeing animals which ultimately could not be offered on the altar nonetheless
were not removed from the altar once they had been placed on it --as pointed out expressly by
Torat Kohanim,-- G'd had to inform Aaron that the priests must not allow animals unfit for
sacrifice to be placed on the altar. The priests would have thought that the fact that such
animals are not removed from the altar once they had been placed on it was proof that G'd did
not really mind their being placed on the altar as long as they were not offered as a sacrifice.
They would have reasoned that no special care had to be taken to prevent such animals from
being placed on the altar. Therefore G'd commanded that only ‫תורת עולה‬, an animal which
corresponded in all details to the requirements of the ‫ עולה‬legislation was to be placed on the
altar as such. This meant amongst other details that the animal could not have spent the
previous night in the holy precincts, nor could it have been taken out of these precincts and
been brought back there prior to slaughter.

‫זאת תורת העולה‬, This is the law of the burnt-offering; Rabbi Yehudah in Torat Kohanim
sees three separate restrictive clauses in this verse, i.e. the word ‫זאת‬, the word ‫ היא‬and the
letter ‫ ה‬in the word ‫ העולה‬the second time that word occurs. He reasons that the first restrictive
clause is to forbid a burnt-offering being slaughtered at night; the second restrictive clause
disqualifies a burnt-offering if its blood has been spilled to the ground and the extra letter ‫ה‬
which really limits the word ‫עולה‬, if the blood had escaped beyond the hangings of the
courtyard of the Tabernacle. If an animal which has been disqualified by one of the three
reasons just mentioned had nevertheless been placed on the altar it must be removed.

However, if the disqualification was merely due to the animal having spent the night within
the Tabernacle without having been offered as a sacrifice, it need not be removed from the
altar once it has been placed thereon. The same rule applies to sacrificial animals which had
either become impure or had left the precincts of the Tabernacle after having been brought
inside. Similarly, all other types of disqualifications do not result in the animal having to be
removed from the altar once it has been placed on it, seeing that the word ‫ תורת‬is an inclusive
one, it being unnecessary for the plain meaning of the text to be understood. The sequence ‫זאת‬
‫ תורת העולה היא העולה‬means that once the animal has already become an ‫עולה‬, i.e. placed on the
altar, ‫מוקדה‬, it is subject to the laws of the burnt-offering and cannot be disqualified unless the
disqualification had occurred before it was placed on the altar. The altar "purifies" all the
disqualified animals except for the three disqualifications mentioned at the beginning and
derived from the exclusions in the text we mentioned. Unless it had wanted to teach us these
additional ‫ הלכות‬we have pointed out, the Torah could have written merely ‫תורת העולה על‬
‫מוקדה‬.

On the words ‫היא העולה‬, Rashi comments that it excludes an animal which had sexual relations
with a human being because such an animal was already disqualified before it entered the
precincts of the Tabernacle. I do not know why Rashi preferred to explain the verse in
accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon rather than in accordance with the view of Rabbi
Yehudah (whom we quoted in Torat Kohanim). [The author had not quoted Rabbi Shimon's
view thus far though it appears in the same passage of Torat Kohanim as that of Rabbi
Yehudah. Ed.]

Furthermore, it would seem that Rashi did not pay careful attention to the words or letters
which constitute the exegetically restrictive material. He did not refer to the restrictions
deriving from the word ‫זאת‬, but assumed them to derive from the words ‫היא העולה‬. If Rashi
indeed followed the method of Rabbi Shimon he should have derived the exclusion from the
word ‫זאת‬. Unlike Rabbi Yehudah who needed to find three different restrictive expressions,
Rabbi Shimon does not have to look for a number of restrictive words or letters in our text
seeing that he argues that all these disqualified animals have to be removed from the altar
even if they have been on it already. If Rabbi Shimon did not learn that most or all the
disqualified animals have to be removed from the altar even when they had already been
placed on it, he would have to find many more restrictive expresssions than Rabbi Yehudah.
We must therefore conclude that he derives the law that the disqualified animals need to be
removed from the altar from a single restrictive expression. He holds that any animal whose
disqualification occurred before it was slaughtered is automatically rejected by the altar.
Seeing that he does not need more than a single restrictive clause, the Baraitha in Zevachim
84 says that he used the word ‫ זאת‬as his restrictive clause.

The question is therefore, whence does Rashi conclude that the exegetical source is the
expression ‫ ?היא העולה‬In Horiyot 2, the Talmud discusses the expression ‫ נפש אחת‬in 4,27,
concluding that such expressions are restrictive. [The subject is the culpability of an
individual who transgressed a law of the Torah that the High Court has declared permitted.
The individual in question had not been aware of the High Court's decision but had acted on
his own. Ed.] The Talmud assumes that the Baraitha quoted there reflects the view of Rabbi
Yehudah. The Talmud challenges this assumption by asking that perhaps the example quoted
in that Baraitha reflects the view of Rabbi Shimon? In answer to this question the Talmud is
adamant that only Rabbi Yehudah adopted the exegetical approach that our verse contains a
number of restrictive clauses such as ‫היא העולה‬. You will note therefore that we cannot accuse
Rashi of adopting Rabbi Shimon's approach.

‫על מוקדה על המזבח כל הלילה‬, where it is burned up on the altar all night long, etc. These
words are explained in Zevachim 85 as meaning that if these parts of a disqualified burnt-
offering had been placed on the altar they are not to be removed from it, whereas if they had
fallen off or been removed from it they are not to be placed upon the altar a second time. Ulla
claims that this rule applies only to pieces of the disqualified burnt-offering which had not yet
been "ruled" (thoroughly attacked) by the fire of the altar; if the pieces had been partially
burned they may be put back on the altar. Although there is an opinion in the Talmud which
holds that Ulla referred only to such items as bones, horns, and hooves which were still
attached to the main body of the animal having fallen off the altar, the concensus of the
Talmud is that Rabbi Chanina's dictum in the Mishnah which forms the background to Ulla's
statement represented a disagreement only with the latter half of the Mishnah. He did not
disagree with the opinion expressed in the earlier part of the Mishnah where it was stated that
animals disqualified before they were even slaughtered are to be removed from the altar even
if they had been placed on it by mistake and the fire had taken hold of them; [such animals
had never qualified as food for the altar. Ed.]

The Torah therefore wrote the words ‫ על מוקדה‬to inform us that once the fire had taken hold
the animal is considered as food for the altar and is not to be removed. The Torah goes on to
write the words ‫על המזבח‬, to teach that even animals which had not yet begun to be consumed
by the fire are also not to be removed if they fitted certain criteria. The Torah wrote what
appeared to be the same law twice, as it distinguished between different kinds of
disqualifications which a potential burnt-offering may undergo. ‫ על מוקדה‬means that once the
fire took hold of the animal parts it may be put back on the altar regardless. The additional
words ‫ על המזבח‬teach that the permission to leave such animals on the altar applies only
because they had already been on it;
this is why the Torah had to write the words ‫ על מוקדה‬first before the words ‫על המזבח‬, although
under normal circumstances the word "altar" should have been mentioned first seeing it is the
general location and ‫ מוקדה‬describes only the specific location on the altar. Instead, the Torah
decided to describe first the circumstances when something which had become unfit may be
placed on the altar a second time. It comprises parts which had already been suitable as food
for the altar in the first place. This is why they may be put back on even if they had been
taken off the altar. Afterwards the Torah describes a second category of disqualification
which applies because the disqualified animal is already on the altar though it was not
originally suitable as an offering; it need not be removed; however, if it was removed, it must
not be put back on the altar a second time.

We find a disagreement between Rabbi Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in Torat Kohanim as to
the implication of the words ‫על המזבח‬. Rabbi Gamliel holds that if a potential sacrifice, even a
drink-offering, had once been fit to be offered on the altar, it must not be removed from the
altar under any circumstances, regardless of the kind of disqualification which occurred.
Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the words ‫ על מוקדה‬teach that only such sacrifices as are intended
to be burned up cannot be removed from the altar. Seeing that drink-offerings by definition
are not burned up but poured out, the words ‫ על מוקדה‬do not refer to such offerings.

On a moral-ethical plane we may consider this whole paragraph as an allusion to our present
and final exile. The paragraph is designed to console us about the depressing conditions we
find ourselves in. Inasmuch as the soul of every Israelite refuses to be comforted seeing our
exile appears to be interminable, we are certainly in need of some comfort. At the time of this
writing the exile has already lasted far longer than our previous exiles combined, (Egypt=400
years, Babylonia=70 years, whereas already 1672 years have passed since the destruction of
the Temple). How much longer do we have to wait for redemption?! Besides, we do not only
suffer from mere exile but from persecution, seeing that every country which hosts Jews
discriminates against them and treats them as inferior. Whenever revolutions do occur
amongst the Gentile Kingdoms this does not bode the Jews any good as the gentile politicians
never speak to us with sincerity and their promises are only lies. The Torah, i.e. G'd, who has
foreseen all things used this paragraph to inform Moses to urge the Israelites, and foremost
amongst them the Torah scholars, notably the priests whose task it is to instruct the people in
morality and ethics, to inform the people for all future times of the message contained here.

‫זאת תורת העולה‬, the word ‫ זאת‬is an exclusion. The people are to be aware that there will not be
an ‫ עולה=עליה‬an ascent comparable to the one mentioned in this paragraph. The Torah repeats
who it is that will experience this ascent, i.e. ‫הוא העולה‬, a reference to Song of Songs 3,6: ‫מי‬
‫זאת עולה מן המדבר‬, "who is this that ascends from the desert?" ‫" על מוקדה על המזבח‬the ones who
were burned up on the site for burning, on the altar;" The Torah refers to two details here; 1)
that we are knowledgeable in Torah, i.e. ‫זאת תורת העולה‬, something that does not exist
amongst the Gentiles; 2) that we have endured many afflictions both by being in exile and by
being impoverished. The word ‫ מוקדה‬is a reference to Torah, seeing Torah is often compared
to fire; young Torah scholars are described in Taanit 4 as ‫דרתח אוריתא‬, "we have to make
allowances for the angry young Torah scholars as it is the fire of the Torah which causes their
anger." When the Torah continues ‫על המזבח‬, this is a reference to exile and all that is
connected with it. The afflictions the Jewish people suffer in exile achieve for us what the
sacrifices achieved on the altar, i.e. atonement for our sins. We find that the Talmud in
Berachot 5 uses similar language to describe the purpose of ‫יסורים‬, afflictions. The Torah
therefore informs us here that there are two elements which will ensure our ascent to untold
heights of good fortune, honour, etc.
The Torah also explains how long it will be until we will achieve this goal. We will achieve
our goal in two stages, 1) ‫כל הלילה‬, by means of enduring the whole night of exile; in Isaiah
21,11 the prophet already compared exile to night when he said: ‫שומר מה מלילה שומר מה מליל‬.
"Watchman what of the night, watchman what of the night?" as a reference to the duration of
the exile. They also interpret Ruth 3,13: "stay the night until morning" in a similar vein. When
"morning" arrives, G'd will pour over us His glory, etc. This time will arrive after the middle
of the sixth millenium as we know from G'd's own words that 1000 years are equivalent to a
"day" in His calendar (compare Bereshit Rabbah 8,2). Reason tells us that the first 500 years
of that "day" are part of the "night" so that the time of the redemption will occur during the
second five hundred years of that millenium. The words ‫ עד הבוקר‬in our verse make it plain
that we cannot expect the ascent until some time during the latter 500 years of the present
millenium. It was unclear from the time of the destruction of the Temple whether the
"morning" referred to was the second half of the fifth millenium or the second half of the sixth
millenium seeing that the Temple was destroyed in the latter half of the fourth millenium. G'd
therefore revealed His secret by means of His prophets when Isaiah in chapter 33,3 spoke of
"mornings." The verse reads: "Be their arm ‫לבקרים‬, on mornings, also our deliverance in times
of stress." Isaiah meant that if the deliverance does not occur on the first "morning," (i.e. the
second half of the fifth millenium) it will surely occur during the second half of the sixth
millenium. The word ‫ עד הבוקר‬is a reference to a "well known morning," i.e. the second one of
these possible "mornings." Perhaps Isaiah even hinted in chapter 21,12 when he spoke about
the morning having arrived and having been followed by another night, (without the
redemption) that if Israel had been worthy it would have been redeemed already on the first of
these two "mornings."

When our sages claimed that no more than one day of exile had been decreed on the Jewish
people, we may have to understand this in terms of Psalms 20,2: "The Lord will answer you
on the day of trouble;" the "day" the Psalmist refers to being the "day" In G'd's calendar, i.e.
1.000 years in our calendar. According to this calculation the most that we would have have
had to wait since the destruction of the Temple until redemption should have been 672 years,
i.e. 172 years which were left in the fourth millenium when the Temple was destroyed plus
the 500 years which represent the "night" of the fifth millenium. Upon the arrival of the
"morning" of that half of the millenium the ultimate redemption should have materialised.
Alas, due to the fact that our people have not rehabilitated themselves that "day" passed
without our being redeemed. This was Isaiah's lament when he said in Isaiah 33,2: "O Lord,
be gracious to us! It is to You we have looked." The word ‫קוינו‬, "we have looked," refers to
our hope to experience redemption on the first "morning" which has been disappointed. At
any rate, the prophet continues, ‫היה זרועם לבקרים‬, "be their arm on mornings," i.e. on the
second morning after two nights of exile have passed.

‫ואש המזבה תוקד בו‬, and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning thereby. The Torah
informs us that when the dawn of that morning (of redemption) finally looms, G'd's anger will
burn and consume all those who have tortured us during the many years of our exile and
especially the Western nations [the Christians and their inquisition who tortured Spanish
Jewry Ed.]. The words "and the fire of the altar" are an allusion to the many afflictions we
have endured at the hands of the merciless Gentiles who did not have pity on us seeing G'd
had already punished us for so many years. The word also recalls the self-sacrifice exhibited
by Isaac when he lay bound on the altar. The word "altar" always conjures up the attribute of
Justice in our minds. The mystical dimension of all these concepts is contained in the word
‫תוקד‬, [also related to ‫= עקד‬he bound. Ed.]
‫ולבש הכהן מדו בד‬, and the priest will wear a linen garment; the Torah switches to allude to
the attribute of Love and Mercy which has also been described by the word ‫כהן‬. The Torah
means that when that time arrives even such attributes as Love and Mercy will consent to G'd
avenging the wrong done to the Jewish people by the nations of the world. (Compare my
commentary on Exodus 6,2 on the words "He said to him: 'I am the eternal G'd.'") The words
‫ מדו בד‬may be understood in light of a comment by our sages that G'd makes a visible mark of
the blood of any Jew who was killed because he was Jewish on His "garment." On the day
when G'd goes out to exact retribution from our enemies He will wear that "garment" on His
heart. The word ‫מדו‬, recalls Bileam's statement that the Jewish nation ‫עם לבדד ישכון‬, is "a
nation which dwells in solitude" (Numbers 23,9); the root of that word is ‫בד‬, i.e. that the very
garments of the priest are a reminder of the Jewish people. The word is also a hint of the unity
which was displayed by all the martyrs who died for the sake of Judaism, i.e. who refused to
compromise G'd's unity by associating Him with any other religion.

The Torah goes on to speak of ‫ומכנסי בד‬, linen trousers, the word ‫ מכנסי‬from the root ‫כנס‬, to
enter, to join. This is a reference to the pagans who killed the leading Jews because they tried
to introduce the concept of belief in G'd and in His uniqueness into the hearts of their fellow
Jews. These are the very people who are most beloved by G'd; nothing separates them from
G'd at all. The word ‫ מכנסי בד‬means that "this is what grants entry to the domain of G'd's
uniqueness and unity." The additional word ‫" על בשרו‬next to his skin," is an allegorical
expression of the absolute affinity which exists between the martyrs for the Jewish faith we
have mentioned and G'd Himself. The Torah uses the word ‫ על בשרו‬in a sense similar to
Jeremiah 13,11: ‫" ;כי כאשר ידבק האזור אל מתני האיש כן הדבקתי אלי את כל בית ישראל‬for as the
loincloth clings close to the loins of a man, so I brought close to Me the whole House of
Israel, etc." The Torah employs anthropomorphical expressions to describe G'd in order to
train our ears to assimilate certain concepts which are familiar to us, not in order to create the
impression that G'd has a "body." In view of what these nations have done to these righteous
Jews, G'd has sealed the decree of destruction of these wicked nations.

The Torah alludes to this in the words ‫והרים את הדשן‬, "He will elevate the ashes." To the extent
that the Gentile nations have reduced us to "ashes" by means of torture and persecution, G'd in
turn will elevate these very ashes to unheard of heights. If you will examine the matter you
will find that the persecution we have suffered during this exile is much worse than what we
experienced during our slavery in Egypt. When the Jewish people were enslaved in Egypt, the
Egyptians fed and clothed them. You only need to study the comment of the Mechilta on
Numbers 11,5: "we remember the fish we used to eat in Egypt for nought, the cucumbers, the
melons, etc." Hail to the people who never had to experience exile under the (Arabs)
Muslims. Not only did they enslave us and torture us but they did not pay wages for labour
performed but they demanded that we hand over what little we owned. People would be
kidnapped to obtain their freedom by ransom. The Muslims would demand that people give
them what they did not even possess and persecuted them to the point of death. The Torah
alludes to this kind of persecution when it writes: ‫ ;והרים את הדשן אשר תאכל האש‬G'd will elevate
the ashes; when the nations of the universe experience troubles they are compared to fire by
our prophets. The Torah predicts that G'd will consume these nations as if by fire. Compare
Ezekiel 10,2 "fill your hands with fire from amongst the cherubs and throw them upon the
city." The word ‫ את העולה‬refers to the nation called ‫עולה‬.

The words ‫ על המזבח‬may be understood as follows (continuing this allegorical approach): We

find a disagreement between Maimonides and ‫ ראב׳ד‬in Hilchot Teshuvah chapter six about the
nature of G'd's retribution against the nations who have abused the Jewish people. ‫ ראב׳ד‬holds
that seeing these nations acted as free-willed human beings they will only be judged because
they committed excessive cruelty when acting as G'd's agents and fulfilling His decree of
exile for the Jewish people. Maimonides holds that they will also be judged for the fact that
they exiled us in the first place. I have already written in my commentary on Genesis 15,14
that there is ample reason to punish all our adversaries for every act of hostility they have
committed against us. What is written here only reinforces my argument. If the intention of
our oppressors had only been to carry out G'd's retribution against the Jewish people they
should have been exremely careful not to do anything over and beyond what G'd commanded.
The fact that they indulged in excessive cruelty only proves that they were never motivated by
acting as G'd's agents in the first place. When the Torah writes the unnecessary words ‫על‬
‫המזבח‬, it alludes to the unnecessary zeal and pleasure with which the Gentiles exploited their
position of physical superiority. Whereas a certain measure of afflictions was decreed by G'd
to serve as our atonement for sins committed, the decreed by G'd to serve as our atonement
for sins committed, the extra words ‫ על המזבח‬indicate that what the Gentiles did to us was far
more than was called for in order for us to achieve our atonement. ‫ושמו אצל המזבח‬, and he
will place it next to the altar. The altar is intended to serve as the instrument of atonement.
Everything "beside" the altar is evidence of our enemies' hateful attitude, not their desire to
help us achieve atonement for our sins. As a consequence of such an attitude amongst our
enemies they will be punished not only for their excesses but for the part they would not have
been culpable for had they perceived themselves as true agents of the Lord. An alternative
meaning may be that though the days of our exile are not yet complete, G'd will count what
has been done to us ‫אצל המזבח‬, over and beyond the punishment decreed, and thereby hasten
the final redemption. G'd will present the various afflictions the Jewish people have endured
to the attribute of Justice which considers the concept "altar" as the instrument by means of
which Israel receives its punishment and therefore atonement; By confronting the attribute of
Justice with all the excesses perpetrated against us by our enemies, G'd will enlist its support
for His plan to punish our enemies.

‫ופשט את בגדיו‬, and He will put off His garments, i.e. seeing G'd wore a certain set of
"garments" when He was engaged in disciplining our enemies, He will now put on different
"garments" in order to do good with us, to take us out of exile. He will not delay the arrival of
the redemption to occur on the date set for it originally until all the evildoers have perished,
but will gather us all in immediately and lead us to ‫מקום טהור‬. a pure place. This is a reference
to the Land of Israel which is always perceived of as a pure place compared to the lands
owned by the Gentiles. Our sages in Shabbat 15 have decreed that not only the soil of foreign
lands is treated as infected with ritual impurity but also the very air of lands outside ‫ארץ‬
‫ישראל‬. The expression ‫ מקום טהור‬is also a reference to G'd's domain, seeing He is called ‫טהור‬,
pure.

‫והאש על המזבח‬, and the fire on the altar, etc. Do not imagine that the only harm G'd will
inflict upon our enemies will be that which occurs when He takes us out from amongst their
midst. On the contrary; this "fire" of retribution ‫ לא תכבה‬will not go out. The priest (simile for
G'd) will continue to stoke that fire with additional wood, i.e. more and more of the nations of
the world who are perceived as dry wood ready for burning. ‫עצים‬, trees, serve as a simile for
man in Deut. 20,19 "for man is as the tree in the field;" in the introduction to Midrash Eychah
Rabbah we read: "the trees are hyperbole for the exiles (i.e. for the people who have been
exiled)."

‫בבקר בבקר‬, every morning; this is an allusion to the two "mornings," i.e. the two latter parts
of the fifth and sixth millenium we described as possible dates for the redemption. The Torah
tells us that actually the redemption should have occurred already on the first of these
"mornings" in the fifth millenium. It was delayed by a thousand years, i.e. another day in G'd's
calendar only on account of our sins. The Torah tells us that the nations of the world must not
assume that they will be the beneficiaries of the sins of the Jewish people and that they would
therefore escape their just punishment. When the time comes, the nations will receive the
punishment due to them for what they did to us in both of these millenia, i.e. ‫בבקר בבקר‬.

‫וערך עליה העולה‬, and He will arrange on it the burnt-offering, etc. We have to understand
this in the sense of what we learned in Baba Kama 83: ‫הכל לפי המביש והמתביש‬, "the amount of
compensation payable to someone who has suffered 'loss of face' is determined by the relative
social position of the party suffering the shame and the party who shamed him." One cannot
compare an insult received by a socially highly placed person heaped upon a person who is
also at the top end of the social ladder to someone at the bottom of the social ladder who
insulted someone at the top of that ladder. We certainly cannot compare those situations to
that of a slave insulting his master. When the Torah speaks of arranging the burnt-offering on
it (the altar), the "burnt-offering" is a simile for the whole of the Jewish nation. ‫והקטיר עליה‬
‫חלבי השלמים‬, and He will burn up on it the fat parts of the peace-offering. G'd will also
arrange on that altar the elite of this Jewish nation, ‫ חלבי השלמים‬whose lifestyle was equivalent
to burning up sweet-smelling fragrances for G'd (compare Genesis 27,27: "look! the fragrance
of my son is like the fragrance of the field which G'd has blessed"). Remember that we
perceive of anyone who has committed a sin as exuding an unpleasant odour. The story is told
that once the prophet Elijah passed by a wicked man and tried to avoid inhaling the evil smell
which that person exuded and which was more pungent than the smell exuded by a carcass.
On the other hand, the fragrance exuded by the righteous person is comparable to that which
emanates from a rose-garden. The Torah therefore chose to describe the belovedness of the
righteous before G'd in terms of a pleasant fragrance. The message of the verse is that G'd will
match the punishment in detail to what the Gentiles have done to His righteous, the people
who exuded fragrance such as the incense.

‫אש תמיד‬, a continuous and ongoing fire; even though G'd will inflict severe blows on the
nations who have abused us, the fire (of punishment) on the altar will not go out; this is
similar to the final message of the prophet Yoel (Yoel 4,21): "I will not treat their blood as
having been avenged;" this will not occur until the earth has been cleansed of the spirit of
impurity and "G'd rules as King over the whole earth" (Zachariah 14,9).

6:15

‫והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו‬, and one of his sons, the priest who will be anointed in his stead,
etc. The sages in Menachot 51 explain that this verse teaches that if a High Priest has died and
no successor has as yet been appointed, that one of his sons must offer the daily meal-offering
which is mandatory for the High Priest. They derive this ‫ הלכה‬from the words ‫מבניו תחתיו‬, "one
of his sons in his stead." The same sages use the letter ‫ ם‬in the word ‫ מבניו‬for a different
exegetical purpose. The Talmud on that folio quotes a Baraitha according to which the word
‫ בניו‬means that the High Priest's sons enjoy the status of ordinary priests; to the query that may
be the Torah intended them to have the status of High Priests (pl)? The sages point to the
words ‫ והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו‬as proof that only one of the sons may be anointed as High Priest
in place of their father. It seems clear that this conclusion is derived from the word ‫מבניו‬, i.e.
from amongst his sons, not all his sons.
On this subject the Talmud Horiot 11 adds that even a High Priest who is the son of a High
priest needs to undergo anointing with the oil of anointing. They derive this from the words:
‫ ;והכהן המשיח תחתיו מבניו‬if anointment of the son were not required all the Torah would have
had to write was ‫ והכהן מתחתיו מבניו‬the extraneous word ‫ המשיח‬teaches that even if the High
Priest's own son is his successor he has to be anointed. This seems difficult. The word ‫המשיח‬
is essential to teach us that the sons who up until then were only ordinary priests, as per We
could answer this query by saying that we did not need the word ‫ המשיח‬to enable us to allow
the sons to offer the meal-offering in the absence of a newly appointed High Priest, for why
else would the Torah write two verses dealing with the ordinary priest offering a meal-
offering. It is clear therefore that on the first occasion the Torah mentions the meal-offering
brought by an ordinary priest that the regular priest is meant, whereas on the second occasion
the Torah refers to an ordinary priest who happens to be the son of a High Priest. The word
‫ המשיח‬did not have to be mentioned unless the Torah wished us to derive an additional lesson
from that word. The Talmud concluded therefore that the word teaches that even if a High
Priest is succeeded by his son he needs to be anointed for his new office.

There remains the problem why the Torah had to write ‫תחתיו מבניו‬, an inverted way of saying
‫מבניו תחתיו‬, "from amongst his sons as his replacement." Perhaps the Torah was especially
interested in the word ‫ תחתיו‬appearing next to the person whom he replaced in order for the
Talmud in Menachot to be able to arrive at the conclusion that one of the High Priest's sons
must offer the meal-offering normally offered by the High Priest pending appointment of a
new High Priest. The whole verse may then be understood as follows: ‫והכהן המשיח תחתיו יעשה‬,
"and the priest who will be anointed in his place will carry out (the functions of that Office);"
however, if a replacement has not yet been appointed, ‫מבניו יעשה‬, "one of his sons may carry it
out." Had the Torah written ‫הכהן המשיח מבניו תחתיו‬, the meaning would have been that only if
the son had already been appointed in place of his father, i.e. had been appointed or was
considered fit to be appointed, would he be obligated to offer the meal-offering his father used
to offer; seeing that the Torah reversed the words ‫ מבניו תחתיו‬and wrote ‫תחתיו מבניו יעשה‬, we
derive the law that any of the High Priest's heirs may bring the meal-offering. Rabbi Shimon
disagrees and holds that as long as no replacement for the High Priest has been appointed the
meal-offering in question has to be paid for by the public purse (instead of by the High Priest
or his estate). The significance of the sequence of the words ‫ תחתיו מבניו‬then is that no one
other than the son of the deceased High Priest is entitled to replace him. After having given
this explanation I have found that Torat Kohanim already preceded me in explaining these
Baraithot in the same spirit.

7:5

‫אשם הוא‬, it is a guilt-offering. Rabbi Eliezer and the other rabbis disagree in Torat Kohanim
whether the extraneous word ‫ הוא‬is intended to teach that if this offering was not slaughtered
on the northern side of the altar that it is invalidated. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the word ‫הוא‬
means that if the guilt-offering was slaughtered while the priest entertained the wrong
thoughts i.e. assumed that the animal in question was a different kind of offering, it is invalid.
According to his reasoning, the words ‫ אשם הוא‬emphasise the need for the guilt-offering
mentioned in verse 1 of our chapter to have been slaughtered for that purpose in order to be
acceptable. We find in Zevachim 10 that Rabbi Yehoshua challenged Rabbi Eliezer's exegesis
and that thereupon Rabbi Eliezer retracted and derived his ruling that the ‫ אשם‬must be
slaughtered as such in order to be valid from the words ‫ כחטאת כאשם‬in verse 7 of our chapter.
Considering this, we must ask what Rabbi Eliezer learns from the extraneous word ‫?הוא‬
Perhaps if the word ‫ הוא‬had not been written here I would have made the comparison made in
Zevachim 11 between the guilt-offering and the sin-offering described in verse 7 as not
applying to the need to perform ‫ סמיכה‬on the guilt-offering just as on the sin-offering, but I
would have applied it to the need to slaughter either offering with the right intent in order for
it to be acceptable. In order to prevent us from making such an error, the Torah wrote the
word ‫ הוא‬next to the word ‫ אשם‬to inform us that this word tells us something about the ‫אשם‬
itself. The Torah wrote the words ‫ כחטאת כאשם‬in verse 7 in order to tell us that both these
offerings require ‫ סמיכה‬as something mandatory. The other rabbis, the ones who disagreed
with Rabbi Eliezer who used the word ‫ הוא‬to invalidate the guilt-offering unless it had been
slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, understand that word to refer back to verse 2
where the principle of slaughtering the guilt-offering in the same place as the burnt-offering
has first been mentioned. Repeating this by means of the word ‫ הוא‬indicates that the
requirement is mandatory. Although one could challenge these rabbis with similar queries as
the ones used by Rabbi Yehoshua to get Rabbi Eliezer to retract, the fact that they did not
arrive at a new ‫ הלכה‬by dint of a ‫סברה‬, a process of reasoning, but applied a rule applicable to
other sacrifices also to the guilt-offering by their methodology, it is absolutely acceptable that
the word ‫ הוא‬was intended by the Torah to make the site of the slaughtering mandatory. This
is all the more so since in the case of the burnt-offering the Torah had spelled this law out in
so many words. The contribution of those rabbis is that if we had only had verse 1 in our
chapter, I would have reasoned that while it is a desired requirement, failure to slaughter the
guilt-offering on the northern side of the altar would not have invalidated it.

7:9

‫וכל מנחה אשר תאפה בתנור‬, and every meal-offering which is baked in the oven, etc. The
Torah mentions five separate categories of meal-offerings to exclude five matters. 1) The sons
of Aaron do not divide the meal-offering according to the formula employed when animal
offerings are shared out, i.e. that portions of one offering may be traded off against portions of
another offering; rather every priest of the group performing service on that day receives his
share of each of the meal-offerings presented on that day. 2) Bird-offerings are not shared out
in the same way as the meal-offerings. One could have argued that the bird-offerings and the
meal-offerings were both offerings presented by the poor and the very poor respectively. This
factor does not have a bearing on the method employed in sharing out the meat of the bird-
offerings, however. 3) The distribution of the meat of bird-offerings did not parallel that of the
offerings consisting of four-legged animals, even though in both cases their blood is sprinkled
on the altar. 4) The criteria applicable to the distribution of the parts of one kind of meal-
offering are not identical to those of the sharing out of another kind of meal-offering, even
though they all consist of flour of some kind. 5) Meal-offerings consisting of baked goods
baked in one kind of pan or another kind are not shared out according to the same criteria as
other meal-offerings prepared in a similar manner when these meal-offerings served different
purposes.

Although these five exclusions all concern different kinds of meal-offerings, the exegesis
from which we derived these halachic differences is based on what is called ‫אם אינו ענין‬, i.e.
that if the Torah records certain information which is superfluous in its context, such
information may be applied to supplement information lacking in a different context. I have
seen that Maimonides in chapter 10, ruling 15 of his Ma-asseh Hakorbanot explains the
exclusions in our two verses along different lines (other than Torat Kohanim which is similar
to our author). He bases his exegesis on the fact that the Torah did not include the five kinds
of meal-offerings mentioned here in the section dealing with ‫ מנחת סלת‬in 6,7-11 but records it
in a different context. This is remarkable seeing that in the case of the meal-offerings which
are baked as well as in the meal-offering consisting of fine flour mixed with oil and
frankincense the Torah speaks of the offering belonging to the officiating priest. Maimonides
reasons that we could have made a case for sharing out the meal-offering consisting of fine
flour according to the same criteria as those applicable to some other meal-offering but we do
not do so. It is clear from Maimonides' reasoning that he employs the words ‫" לכל בני אהרון‬to
all the priests" in 7,10 as the basis for his exegesis. This is not what we learned in the
Baraitha (Torat Kohanim ).

Maimonides also stresses the fact that the laws of the meal-offering do not all appear in a
single paragraph. This teaches that unless the Torah had separated the laws of one kind of
meal-offering (the ‫ )מנחת סלת‬which was not baked from the five categories mentioned in our
chapter all of which are baked, we could not have used these verses exegetically and we
would not have arrived at the conclusions derived by Torat Kohanim. Perhaps Maimonides
thought that the fact that the Torah artificially separated the legislation pertaining to the
offering of the meal-offerings is proof that it did not want us to assume that the formula of
trading off by the priest of parts of one meal-offering against parts of another type of meal-
offering is acceptable. Having arrived at this principle, it is applied to all the meal-offerings.
You may find proof in the fact that in the case of ‫ מנחת מרחשת‬and ‫ מנחת מחבת‬the Torah does
not mention a word about all the priests sharing in it equally. All that is mentioned is that
priests not officiating on that day are not entitled to share in it. [the Torah phrases it
positively, saying: "it belongs to the priest who offers it which means to the group of priests
officiating on that day. Ed.] Whence does Maimonides know then that a meal-offering offered
in a pan may not be traded off against a meal-offering offered in a stewing-pan seeing not a
word is said about how these meal-offerings are to be shared out? Actually, the five
exclusions we cited earlier as the basis of our exegesis are only of the type known as ‫אסמכתא‬,
a "lean-to." This type of exegesis is not binding but serves as a reminder of halachot with
which we are already familiar. The principal exegetical tool is the fact that the Torah saw fit
not to record all six examples of meal-offerings in the same paragraph.

We are now left with the problem of why the Torah gave many details repeatedly when all it
had to write was that "every meal-offering belongs to the officiating priest, and is to be shared
by all the priests officiating on that day." Perhaps -in view of the fact that the Torah already
entered into details of different kinds of baked meal-offerings- the Torah was afraid that we
would apply totally different criteria to the ‫ מנחת סלת‬and others which were not baked. We
find, for instance, in Menachot 63 that the Talmud explains the words ‫וכל נעשה במרחשת ועל‬
‫ מחבת‬in 7,9 to mean that these meal-offerings and the rules pertaining to them are governed by
the type of container they are offered up in and not so much by their composition. The
practical significance of this becomes evident when a person vows to bring a meal-offering
and he merely identifies the kind of meal-offering he undertakes to bring by naming the vessel
it is to be brought in. For instance, he said: "I am obligated to a certain kind of baking pan"
[one of the ones which existed in the Temple. Ed]. According to the school of Hillel such a
vow is valid seeing the kind of pan he mentioned is a sacred vessel and can be used for the
meal-offering and the Torah wrote: "anything prepared in either of these kinds of pans, etc."
According to the school of Shammai it is doubtful what this person had in mind. His
"offering" would need to remain untouched until the coming of Elijah the prpohet who would
resolve our doubts about its validity. Rabbi Yossi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that all
these meal-offerings are separate categories. Therefore, one may not bring less than a minimal
quantity of a meal-offering ‫ על המחבת‬and add to it less than a minimal quantity of a meal-
offering ‫ במרחשת‬in order to combine these quantities into a single meal-offering of minimal
acceptable quantity. The words ‫אשר תאפה תנור‬, teach that one cannot combine part of a meal-
offering baked on a griddle with part of a meal-offering baked in an oven. The only
extraneous words which have not yet been explained exegetically are the ones in verse 10
seeing what is written there is also a duplication.

Perhaps Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Yehudah who holds that the words ‫ מאפה תנור‬mean two
types of meal-offerings derived his ruling from the fact that the Torah employed the word ‫כל‬
both in verse 9 and in verse 10. As a result we have a double duplication. First of all there was
no need for the extra verse; secondly, if you already had the extra verse, the word ‫ כל‬did not
need to appear in both verses. This is why Rabbi Yossi is careful to mention the source of his
ruling, i.e. ‫ ובל מנחה בלולה‬,‫…וכל נעשה במרחשת‬,‫וכל מנחה‬. He adds: "Just as the word ‫ וכל‬in verse
10 clearly refers to two separate meal-offerings, i.e. one containing a great deal of oil and one
a dry one, so the word ‫ וכל‬in the previous verse also refers to two different categories of meal-
offering. It follows from the above that if the Torah had only written the words ‫מנחה בלולה‬, or
‫כל מנחה חרבה‬, I would not have had an exegetical tool with which to derive the various
halachot we have derived from the repeated use by the Torah of the word ‫וכל‬. In fact, one
could have argued that if the Torah had written ‫ כל מנחה חרבה‬this would furnish proof that the
word ‫ כל‬applied to a single kind of meal-offering, [in spite of the Torah using the word ‫כל‬
meaning each or every. Ed.] and that when the Torah spoke about this kind of meal-offering
without using the word ‫ כל‬such as in Leviticus 2,4: ‫( מנחה מאפה תנור‬Leviticus 2,4), it also
referred to only a single category of offering. The Torah had to write all the verses which
appear to contain some duplication in order to teach us the various halachot we just described.

7:20

‫ונפש אשר תאכל בשר וטומאתו עליו‬, And a person who eats of sacrificial meat….while he is
ritually unclean, etc. Both this and the following verse are interpreted by Torat Kohanim as
speaking of personal ritual impurity [as opposed to the meat having become impure, as
suggested by the masculine pronoun ‫ עליו‬which does not fit the subject ‫ נפש‬which is feminine.
Ed.]. Zevachim 43 states that any verse which has not been interpreted by Rabbi Yitzchak son
of Avdimi in this fashion cannot be interpreted in this way. Rabbi Yitzchak son of Avdimi
had stated that only if a verse commences with a subject which is feminine and concludes
with a subject which is feminine and in between we encounter a masculine pronoun may we
interpret that the masculine pronoun refers to the original subject and not to the object which
is masculine. Rashi explains that seeing that the verse following displays the same pattern and
it is clear in that verse that the person who is the subject of the word ‫ואכל‬, "and he eats," is a
human being, verse 20 must be understood in the same sense. Rashi's words help us
understand why the word ‫" וטומאתו‬while he is impure," do not have to refer to the word ‫בשר‬,
which is the only masculine noun in that verse seeing that we thought that the laws about the
meat being impure had already been concluded as Rashi explained in his commentary in
Zevachim 43 where the verse is examined.

Torat Kohanim also cites a gezeyrah shavah comparing the word ‫טומאתו‬, mentioned here with
the word ‫ טומאתו‬mentioned in Numbers 19,13. However, I have decided to concentrate on the
reason the Torah saw fit to contravene the rules of grammar in our two verses. If the Torah
had simply written the word ‫ וטומאתה‬in verse 20 instead of writing ‫וטומאתו‬, we would not have
had to resort to the exegetical use of the gezeyrah shavah in Numbers 19,13 at all. Also, why
did the Torah not write verse 21 in a more straighforward manner?

I believe that when the Torah wrote ‫ וטומאתו עליו‬in verse 20, it wanted to teach us something
different altogether. The words refer to someone who had already undergone the purification
process of seven days for someone who has become impure through contact with the dead,
but had not yet experienced sunset on his seventh day; alternatively, it may refer to a person
impure through contact with some kind of four-legged creeping animal who has not yet
undergone ritual immersion. It is important to appreciate that such residual impurity as we
have just mentioned is not so serious that it affects the soul of the person concerned. It is more
like a veil of impurity which envelops only the outside of the body of a person. This is the
reason why ritual immersion is sufficient to remove the last vestiges of such impurity
although for the previous seven days such a ritual immersion would have been quite
ineffective seeing the impurity had penetrated also the inside of the body. When the Torah
wrote ‫והנפש אשר תאכל…וטומאתו עליו‬, it informed us that not only is someone guilty of the
Karet penalty when the impurity he is suffering from is ‫עליה‬, envelops his soul, but even if the
impurity has already been reduced to a state where it is only ‫ עליו‬on the outside of his body,
the same penalty still applies if he eats sacrificial meat before having become totally pure.
Similar considerations apply to someone who has not yet shed the relatively lighter impurity
absorbed through his having contacted a dead creeping animal.

Why then does the Torah use the masculine form ‫ ואכל‬in the middle of verse 21, when the
correct term would have been ‫ ואכלה‬seeing that I could not have mistaken its meaning and it
would have been so much simpler to have a uniform text in both of these verses? I believe
that the reason the Torah chose to write ‫נפש כי תגע‬, a feminine way of describing the contact
instead of writing ‫ איש כי יגע‬the parallel masculine form, is to inform us that such contact with
the source of impurity had to be intentional not merely accidental in order for the person to
become culpable of the penalty mentioned. The word ‫ נפש‬alludes to such an intentional act.
This is also the reason why the Torah chose the word ‫ נפש‬instead of ‫ איש‬in verse 20. The word
‫ איש‬would not have conveyed the fact that the act was committed intentionally. Keeping in
mind the thought that the word ‫ נפש‬alludes to the awareness of the sinner of what he is doing
will help us understand the recurrent use of the word ‫ נפש‬in chapter four and five which deals
with inadvertently committed sins. This word explains the need for the sinner to offer sin-
offerings or guilt-offerings in those situations. Had the sinner been totally unaware of
committing a wrong the Torah would not have required these offerings from him so that he
could atone for his mistakes. We may summarise that the word ‫ נפש‬indicates that the person
who committed the trespass cannot claim unawareness of doing something wrong. In our two
verses here the word ‫ נפש‬implies that the guilty party was aware of touching something he
should not have touched (verse21) or he was aware that he ate something he should not have
eaten (verse 20). We cannot therefore question why the Torah used a masculine term in the
middle of both verses as there was no need to depart from the norm in describing the
perpetrator of the sin as being a male. The reason the Torah wrote ‫ונכרתה הנפש ההיא‬, "this soul
will be exterminated," is to teach us that G'd will not only punish the body of the sinner by
premature death or something like it, but that He will also punish his soul by death.

In addition to the approach of our sages in the Talmud, we may find still another reason to
justify the repetition of our verses by referring to the Mishnah in Zevachim 106. We learn
there that a person who is ritually impure and eats sacrfificial meat is guilty regardless of
whether that meat had already been defiled or not. Rabbi Yossi Haglili disagrees saying that if
said meat had already been defiled, the person who ate it is not guilty. In discussing this
problem on folio 108, the Talmud concludes that if the person became defiled before the meat
became defiled there is a concensus that the person who ate from that meat is guilty. The
disagreement between the majority opinion and Rabbi Yossi Haglili concerns only a situation
when the meat became defiled before the person eating it became impure. This is why the
Torah had to write two verses The first verse i.e. ‫ והנפש אשר תאכל‬describes a situation in which
a person who is ritually unclean ate sacrificial meat of a peace-offering which was ritually
pure; the second verse which writes ‫ואכל מבשר זבח השלמים‬, speaks of a ritually impure person
who ate sacrificial meat which had already become defiled. Perhaps the reason the Torah
described the meat in the first verse as ‫תאכל בשר מזבח שלמים‬, meat of a peace-offering, is that
the meat in question had not yet become defiled; in the following verse the Torah changed
this description by writing ‫מבשר זבח שלמים‬, meaning the meat was of a category which
qualifies as a meat-offering, but it had been defiled in the meantime and does no longer
qualify for being eaten. It is no longer ‫בשר שלמים‬. The letter ‫ מ‬in the word ‫ מבשר‬indicates that
it is no longer wholly a meat-offering, ‫זבח שלמים‬. The letter ‫ מ‬is therefore not exegetically
available for some other ‫למוד‬, halachah, to be derived from it.

7:25

‫מן הבהמה‬, from the beast, etc. This apparently superfluous word is interpreted by Torat
Kohanim as including the fat of animals each one of which would have been suitable as a
sacrifice, and which have been crossbred, such as the product of a billy-goat mating with a
ewe or vice versa; the fat of animals which are the product of such crossbreeding is unfit to
eat on pain of the Karet penalty. The apparently extraneous word ‫ כל‬in the sequence ‫כל חלב‬
refers to an animal called ‫ כוי‬which is the product of a male goat mating with a gazelle. In my
book ‫ פרי תואר‬in which I have commented on the ‫ טור יורה דעה טז‬you will find more about this
subject.

‫כל אוכל חלב‬, anyone eating such fat, etc. The word ‫ כל‬is interpreted by Torat Kohanim as
including the fat of animals which are not intended to become sacrificial offerings. We should
not err and conclude from the words ‫ אשר יקריב ממנו אשה לה׳‬that only ‫ חלב‬of such sacrificial
animals is prohibited; therefore the Torah adds the word ‫כל אוכל חלב‬. Seeing this inclusive
word is not required to warn those who would eat it, it may be applied to the parts of the
animal subject to being eaten.

It seems rather difficult to understand why I would have made such an error and would have
thought that without the word ‫ כל‬the Torah's injunction would have applied only to ‫בשר קדשים‬,
sacrificial animals. After all, the Torah mentioned specifically that the fat of a ‫ נבלה‬an animal
which died by causes other than ritual slaughter may be used for the performance of all kinds
of work but may not be eaten (24)? Besides, since when are the remnants of sacrificial
animals permitted for use by non-priests? Does the Talmud not state specifically in
Pessachim 82 that if an animal intended as a sacrifice was found to be treyfah after it has been
slaughtered, such an animal has to be removed to a place called ‫בית השרפה‬, to be burned there?
We derive this from Leviticus 6,23 ‫בקדש באש תשרף‬. This teaches that all sacrificial animals
which have become unfit for the altar have to be destroyed. In view of this the words ‫וחלב נבלה‬
‫ וחלב טרפה‬in verse 24 must refer to animals not intended as sacrificial offerings. Why then did
the Torah have to write the words ‫ כל אוכל חלב‬to prevent me from making an error as to the
prohibition of ‫ חלב‬applying to ordinary animals? We believe the main point Torat Kohanim
wanted to make with its ‫ למוד‬from the words ‫ כל אוכל חלב‬is that the penalty of Karet applies
both to someone who partakes of fat from sacrificial animals and to someone who partakes
from the fat of ordinary animals. If not for the words ‫כל חלב‬, I would have assumed that the
prohibition is an ordinary negative commandment punishable by 39 ‫ מלקות‬lashes.

‫" כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו‬You shall not eat any fat of ox, sheep or goat. Torat
Kohanim on this verse comments that the list of these animals is intended to exclude the
prohibition of ‫ חלב‬from animals not suitable for consumption by Jews, ‫בהמות טמאות‬, as well as
free-roaming animals and fowl. In Chulin 116 Rabbi Mori is reported as having asked Rabbi
Zvid if the fat-tail ‫ אליה‬of the sheep was considered ‫ חלב‬and therefore prohibited. Rabbi Zvid
answered: "because of people who ask questions such as you have just asked the Torah wrote
the verse ‫כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו‬, to make clear that the term ‫ חלב‬applies only to the kind
of fat which these three categories of animals have in common." How could Rabbi Zvid give
such an answer seeing we have already used the animals mentioned in that verse for a
different ‫למוד‬, namely to exclude three other categories of animals? If the Torah had not
written verse 23 to exclude the three categories of animals mentioned by Torat Kohanim, we
would have learned a ‫קל וחומר‬, i.e. used logic to arrive at the opposite conclusion as explained
by Torat Kohanim on that verse. Perhaps we could have derived the exclusion of those three
categories of animals from the words ‫אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם‬. These words would already
have excluded both fowl (of which only two species may be used as an offering) and impure
animals which are totally unfit as offerings, as well as free-roaming animals which are not
suitable as offerings for different considerations although they may be consumed by Jews if
ritually slaughtered, etc. Alternatively, once the Torah had specifically excluded impure
animals and free-roaming beasts, the Torah made it plain that the ‫ קל וחומר‬which was based on
the comparison with the prohibition to eat blood which applies to all of the three categories of
animals alike although certain other disqualifications do not apply to it, is not to be applied
here. You will find that Rashi's commentary on the Mishnah in Chulin 117 follows a similar
path. It is important to take a good look at the next verse.

‫מן הבהמה‬, from the beasts; Torat Kohanim derives from this expression also that animals not
intended to serve as sacrifices due to a physical blemish are nevertheless included in the
legislation forbidding the consumption of their ‫חלב‬, the fat parts offered on the altar, if they
had been used as sacrifices. Although the Torah had already specifically prohibited the ‫ חלב‬of
animals which have not been slaughtered ritually or of animals which were found defective
after slaughtering (although these animals too were unfit for the altar and I could have used
that fact to apply the legislation to said ‫)חולין בעלי מומין‬, this would not have been conclusive.
According to Maimonides there is no biblical prohibition against a treyfah animal being
offered on the altar (Issurey Mizbeach chapter 2). This prohibition is based only on Maleachi
1,8 that "G'd would reject an offering which does not reflect our high regard for Him seeing
we would not dare offer something inferior to our governor." Accordingly, a special verse was
needed to include treyfah animals. It is true that Torat Kohanim on the same two words in
Leviticus 1,2 mentions the exclusion of treyfah animals; however, this is only an ‫ אסמכתא‬a
"lean to;" it is not the kind of exegesis which is binding as has been explained in that
connection by the author of Kesef Mishneh. At any rate, seeing that a ‫ נבלה‬is prohibited as an
offering by a biblical injunction because the Torah wrote the word ‫ושחט‬, "he must slaughter
the animal," in connection with every sacrifice, why was there a need to use the words ‫מן‬
‫ הבהמה‬to include the categories mentioned by Torat Kohanim? We have to answer again that
what Torat Kohanim had in mind was that the same penalty Karet which applies to someone
who partakes of the fat of the sacrificial animal also applies to someone eating the fat parts of
an ordinary animal which had become unfit as a sacrifice.

‫אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם‬, from which he will offer a sacrifice to the Lord; Torat Kohanim,
which zeroes in on the apparently extraneous words ‫אשר יקריב‬, concludes that the Torah refers
to the type of ‫ חלב‬which is suitable for burning up on the altar; it excludes the kind of ‫ חלב‬of
the walls of the animal's cavities and fat on the ribs which is not suitable for the altar.
According to this reasoning which uses the words ‫ כל חלב שור וכשב ועז‬to exclude application of
the prohibition to eat the fat of impure animals and the like, the words ‫ אשר יקריב‬were not
needed, and they were therefore available to exclude such fats as is on the ribs of the animal
from the application of the prohibition to eat ‫חלב‬.

From where does Rabbi Zvid who used the words ‫ שור וכשב ועז‬to permit eating of the fat on
the ‫אליה‬, the fat part of the tail of the sheep, derive permission to eat also from the fat on the
ribs, etc.? At the same time we may ask where the sage who derives permission to eat the fat
of the ‫ אליה‬from the words ‫שור וכשב ועז‬, finds a source for permitting consumption of such fat
as that on the ribs, etc.? We may have to conclude that Rabbi Zvid holds that the words ‫אשר‬
‫ יקריב‬exclude not only such animals as impure beasts, free-roaming animals and fowl from the
prohibition of ‫חלב‬, but also exempt fat on such parts of the animal as the ribs from the
application of this law. The reasoning is simply that not only any animal but any part of an
animal not burned up on the altar is excluded from this injunction. The author of Torat
Kohanim also arrives at the same exclusion using the words ‫ שור וכשב ועז‬as excluding also the
‫ אליה‬from this injunction. If the verse had wanted to exclude only impure animals, birds and
wild-roaming animals, it would have had to mention only ‫שור וכשב‬. As soon as we would
exempt even a single type of animal from the prohibition of eating ‫ חלב‬though the prohibition
of eating of its blood still applied to it, the whole basis for the ‫ קל וחומר‬which Torat Kohanim
wanted to refute by the Torah's use of the extraneous words ‫ מן הבהמה‬had already disappeared.
We would have excluded such animals as ‫ חיה ועוף‬automatically. If the Torah nonetheless
wrote extra words, such words may be used exegetically, i.e. to exclude the fat on the ribs.
The three words ‫ שור כשב‬and ‫ עז‬would between them have excluded only the fat of the ‫אליה‬
from the prohibition of eating ‫חלב‬.

Why then did Rabbi Zvid disagree with the author of Torat Kohanim who derived the
exclusion of the fat of impure animals, free-roaming animals, and birds from the words ‫שור‬
‫ ?וכשב ועז‬The author concludes that the principal exclusion of such animals as the impure, the
free-roaming ones, and the birds is derived from the words ‫שור וכשב ועז‬. He does not therefore
accept the view of Rashi on the Mishnah in Chulin 117 which he quoted earlier.

7:37

‫זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאח‬, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering
and of the sin-offering. It is not clear what this verse wants to tell us. In Torat Kohanim we
read that just as the details of the consecration rites of the Tabernacle which are discussed in
the next chapter have all been handed down at Mount Sinai, so the details of permanent
offerings have also been handed down at Mount Sinai. Seeing that the consecration rites
consisted of public offerings, how do we know that the legislation concerning private
offerings was also handed down from Sinai in all its details? Answer: This is why the Torah
included the guilt-offering in our verse, an offering which is always a private offering. I have
already said repeatedly such as at the beginning of Parshat Mishpatim what I have to
contribute on the subject (compare page 689). Torat Kohanim as well as Zevachim 97 also
derive from this verse that all the meat-offerings need to be slaughtered with a knife, same as
the burnt-offering. It also teaches that all public peace-offerings are to be consumed by the
male priests just like the meal-offerings. A more homiletical message contained in this verse
may be the thought expressed by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in Menachot 110 that anyone
studying the laws of the burnt-offering is as if he had actually offered such a sacrifice. I plan
to follow the same approach.

Let me first preface my remarks by recalling that numerous Kabbalists who have engaged in a
study of these matters have said that the principal purpose of Torah and its study is to
recapture sparks of sanctity which have "fallen" and as a result are being held captive. We are
dealing with two separate aspects of fallen sparks of sanctity here. One refers to the sparks of
sanctity which descended into the world of chaos for reasons which are well known. The term
"sparks" of sanctity is enough for these students of Kabbalah to know what we are talking
about. The second aspect of that term is that it refers to souls which are being oppressed by
cruel humans ever since the time Adam sinned in ‫גן עדן‬. At that time Adam provided the
negative elements in our world with a great deal of spiritual loot. The only way such souls can
be rescued from the clutches of the spiritually negative forces which hold them captive is the
study of Torah in such a way that Torah becomes the mainstay of our lives. Torah is the only
effective antidote to the forces of Samael (the evil urge) as we know from Kidushin 30: "If
Samael attacks you drag him to the hall of Torah study. If he had been as hard as stone before
you dragged him to the house of Torah study you will find that he melts; if he had been as
tough as iron he will explode."

In our verse the Torah has revealed the marvellous properties of our Torah. When the Torah
writes: "This is the Torah," this is an introduction to the description of its powers. The Torah
continues: ‫לעולה‬, to tell us that by means of Torah study the Jewish people can elevate
themselves to be the vehicle of G'd's Presence. The Torah goes on to say ‫למנחה‬. This word
may be translated in several ways all of which are correct. The word reflects the concept of
‫מנוחה‬, rest; it reflects the concept ‫נחת‬, calm, tranquillity; it also reflects the concept of ‫הנחה‬,
deposit, repose. This latter meaning is most likely the principal meaning of the word ‫מנחה‬. In
Chulin 91 the stones upon which Jacob placed his head when he went to sleep after having
been surprised by an early sunset, are described as having merged in order that the righteous
Jacob should be able to use all of them as his pillow, for his repose. In his commentary on
Genesis 2,2 Rashi writes ‫בא שבת בא מנוחה‬, "the arrival of the Sabbath brings with it a sense of
repose." This is because the righteous, the foundation of the world, uses the Sabbath as his
pillow (allegorically speaking). This is also the mystical dimension of Song of Songs 2,6:
‫שמאלו תחת לראשי וימינו תחבקני‬. "His left hand is under my head and His right arm embraces
me."

‫ולתטאת ולאשם‬, and for the sin-offering and the guilt-offering. These words clarify two
separate aspects of the descent of the sparks of sanctity into the nether regions which we
referred to earlier. The sparks of sanctity which descended at the time the world was still in
chaos, Tohu Vavohu [before the period which commenced with G'd creating light at the
beginning of the Torah's report in Genesis 1,3 Ed.], are here referred to as ‫לחטאת‬, i.e. "the
Torah of the sin-offering," whereas the sparks of sanctity which descended into the realm of
Satan after Adam sinned are referred to as ‫לאשם‬, i.e. "the Torah of the guilt-offering." The
Torah had to inform us of this division in order for us to appreciate that not only can it help us
locate and isolate i.e. identify these sparks of sanctity in an environment inherently hostile to
sanctity, but Torah can also be the instrument of rescuing these sparks of sanctity from their
exile. The Torah alludes to this when it writes: ‫ולמלואים‬, i.e. "to make them fill their original
places." The word ‫ למלואים‬refers to the original place assigned to the sparks of sanctity which
descended into chaos before G'd created order in the physical universe. The words ‫ולזבח‬
‫ השלמים‬refer to the sparks of sanctity which descended into the clutches of the spiritually
negative forces rampant in our world after Adam's sin. The expression ‫ זבח‬in this connection
reminds us of Psalms 50,23: ‫זובח תודה יכבדני אראנו בישע אלוקים‬, "he who offers a thank-offering
honours Me….and I will show him salvation." Sanhedrin 43 comments on this verse that the
person the Psalmist refers to sacrifices his evil urge. Slaughtering, ‫זובח‬, means vanquishing
that which one slaughters. By vanquishing one's evil urge one can again isolate the realm of
good which had been inextricably fused with the forces of evil while that soul had been in the
clutches of Satan, i.e. of the evil urge. This is a tremendous spiritual accomplishment as
commented upon by David in Psalms 109,22 who viewed himself as ‫לבי חלל בקרבי‬, "my heart
was slain inside of me." David refered to having killed the evil urge within him. This is a very
great spiritual accomplishment but it cannot be achieved except through Torah as we
mentioned when we quoted the Talmud in Kidushin 30. The Talmud there also quotes G'd as
saying: "whereas I have created the evil urge within you I have also given you a remedy to
overcome it, i.e. the Torah."

Another homiletical message is contained in the words ‫ ולזבח השלמים‬which tell us that the
whole purpose of identifying and isolating these lost sparks of sanctity is to do so by means of
the ‫זבח‬, the sacrifice; Isaiah 34,6 speaks of ‫כי זבח לה׳ בבצרה‬, "for the Lord holds a sacrifice in
Bozrah;" our sages comment on these words that in the future G'd will slaughter Satan. The
meaning of the word "slaughter" [when applied to a spiritual being such as Satan. Ed.] is that
G'd will deprive Satan of the component which enables it to live, i.e. the spark of sanctity.
This then will be the peace-offering ‫ שלמים‬alluded to in our verse which is a reference to the
"happy ending" of human history. Our verse tells us that even the slaughtering of Satan will
be accomplished by means of preoccupation with the Torah. Torah. It is the merit acquired by
the righteous through preoccupation with Torah which will bring all this about. Our sages in
Sukkah 52 alluded to this when they described the slaughter of Samael as being carried out
jointly by G'd and the righteous, each one holding the knife from one end. This is meant to
teach us that it is within the power of the righteous to contribute their share in the elimination
of Samael-Satan. We have already stated that the words ‫ זאת התורה‬are to remind the reader of
all the marvellous things which can be accomplished by means of the Torah. ‫;לעולה למנחה‬
these words allude to the elevation of the ‫ שכינה‬and its unification with the essence of G'd.
The words ‫ לחטאת ולאשם‬allude to the respective identification and isolation of the sparks of
sanctity which are the essential part of the living universe. The words ‫ולמלואים ולזבח השלמים‬
describe the unification of the sparks of sanctity which had gone astray with their erstwhile
source, and the slaughtering of the evil source which enabled such a going astray of sanctity
to have occurred in the first place. This will also deny that source the basis for any future
existence. The word ‫שלמים‬, perfection, completion, alludes to the fact that when that stage will
have been reached all the challenges life on earth presents will have been met successfully.
This is the time when G'd will be proclaimed king in this world for ever more and He and His
name will be One.

‫אשר צוה ה׳ את משה‬, which G'd commanded Moses, etc.; the Torah here reverts to the cause
for all this, i.e. the Torah, as had been mentioned by the words ‫וזאת התורה‬. It is as if the Torah
had written in verse 37: "This is the Torah which G'd commanded Moses, etc." ‫ביום צוותו את‬
‫בני ישראל‬, on the day He commanded the children of Israel, etc. This ordinance was
commanded to them at Mount Sinai seeing G'd said: "in the desert of Sinai." The Torah
added: ‫להקריב את קרבניהם‬, "to offer up their sacrifices." This is an allusion to what I have
written previously that all particles of sanctity which exist are an integral part of Israel and
that Israel will be able to reunite all these various "sparks" of sanctity by means of the Torah.

8:2

‫קח את אהרון‬, "take Aaron, etc." This paragraph was revealed to Moses before the Tabernacle
was erected, and the reason it was not recorded up until now is to tell us that all the laws
pertaining to the various sacrifices were revealed before the details of the consecration rites
were revealed. Aaron and his sons had to become priests in order to perform any of the other
services in the Tabernacle; this did not happen until Moses had taught him all the details
about the various sacrifices and he had undertaken to perform every rite in accordance with
what the Torah demanded. Only after he undertook to do this did G'd tell Moses to anoint him
and his sons as priests. If this had not been the case, some Israelite might have decided to
offer a sacrifice to G'd on the altar in front of the Tabernacle and he would not have known
how to proceed.

8:4

‫והקהל העדה‬, the community was assembled, etc. Perhaps when the people saw Moses taking
Aaron, his sons, and the priestly garments, they assembled spontaneously. It is also possible
that the verse tells us that G'd ordered the people to assemble around the entrance to the
Tabernacle as explained by Vayikra Rabbah 10,9 on the word ‫ הקהל‬in verse 3 and that our
verse reports that the people did so.

8:5

‫ויאמר משה …זה הדבר‬, Moses said:…"this is the word, etc." Moses informed the people of
what G'd had said so that they would not register a protest at a later date claiming he had
made all these appointments of his own accord. Seeing that the Torah reported here that
everything was done at the command of G'd, Korach had no basis for the claim that he had
acted inadvertently when he challenged Aaron's position seeing he had been present at this
time and had not challenged Moses when the latter presented these appointments as having
been made at the direct command of G'd.

It is also possible to explain this verse along the lines of Shemot Rabbah 2,6 and Zevachim
102 that Moses' position was equivalent to that of a king seeing the Torah wrote in Deut. 33,5:
"He was king in Yeshurun." We have learned in Ketuvot 17 that even if a king is willing to
waive the honour due him he is not allowed to do so. We observe that Moses did things
(waived his claim to honour) which even a Jewish servant is not allowed to perform for his
master, such as bathing him, etc. In our paragraph Moses is bidden to wash the entire body of
Aaron and his sons. There is no more demeaning task that anyone can be asked to perform.
This is why the Torah had to introduce this paragraph with the words: "G'd said to Moses to
say." Moses explained to the people that if he was seen to perform such a demeaning task it
was because G'd had told him to; it did not mean that by doing so he relinquished his claim to
the position of king. This was the only demeaning task ever performed by Moses as all others
were forbidden to him by his very status. Only G'd who was the One who had appointed
Moses as king was in a position to ask him to perform a service not in keeping with a king's
dignity.

Furthermore, we may understand what happened in terms of a comment by Torat Kohanim on

verse 6: "he washed them in water." They say that the High Priest (and the ordinary priests
when required) acquired the merit accompanied by ritual immersion and his washing his
hands and feet before each act of service in the Temple on the Day of Atonement. The words
‫זה הדבר אשר צוה ה׳ לעשות‬, "this is the thing which G'd has commanded to be done," means that
these rites were to be performed also in the future, seeing performance of this command
granted them the privilege of ritual immersion in the future. [According to ‫ ראב׳ד‬quoted by
Malbim the ritual immersion referred to is the the ritual baths the High Priest underwent
during the seven days he prepared himself for the Day of Atonement. Ed.]

8:10
‫וימשח את המשכן‬, He anointed the Tabernacle, etc. Why did the Torah interrupt the report of
clothing Aaron in the priestly garments and his being anointed with the report of the
Tabernacle being anointed? The reason is presumably that the Torah had reported that Moses
was commanded to anoint the Tabernacle before it reported that he had been commanded to
anoint Aaron (compare Exodus 40,9). You may argue that it would have been appropriate
then for the Torah to report the anointing of the Tabernacle before reporting the dressing of
the priests in their garments in order to conform with the order in which the Torah reported
the commands as being issued by G'd. The reason Moses did not do so may be found in a
detail in verse 2 where G'd had said to Moses: "take Aaron, his sons, the garments, and the oil
of anointing." If the anointing of the Tabernacle had been intended to precede the sons of
Aaron being dressed in their priestly garments, the Torah should have written as follows:
"take the oil of anointing, etc." seeing the Torah wanted the first command to be carried out
first. If the Torah had written verse 2 in that order we could not possibly have mistaken its
intention. Seeing the Torah first mentioned Aaron, it is clear he was to be anointed first before
he was to put on the priestly garments. It was not possible to misinterpret what G'd wanted
because the Torah had already said in Exodus 28,41: "dress your brother Aaron and his sons
in them and anoint them." It is clear therefore that the Torah intended to have the priests put
on the priestly garments prior to anointing the Tabernacle with the oil of anointing. Why is it
then that in ‫ פרשת פקודי‬the Torah reported the anointing of the Tabernacle before it reported
Aaron being dressed in his priestly garments? We may answer that seeing the Torah did not
want to interrupt between the act of Aaron's' getting dressed and being anointed, it wrote all
the laws pertaining to Aaron consecutively; this did not mean however, that the anointing of
the Tabernacle was to be preceded by anything but the anointment of Aaron himself. This is
the point we learn from the sequence of the Torah's report in our chapter.

8:28

‫על העולה‬, upon the burnt-offering. These words mean that nothing else intervened. Perhaps
the meaning is that Moses did not wait with accepting the meal-offering from the hands of the
priests until the burning up of the burnt-offering had been completed.

8:31

‫כאשר ציויתי‬, "as I commanded, etc." Moses referred to the site where the meat was to be
consumed, seeing he had already commanded the priests to consume the meat. If a priest
would be unwilling to eat these parts of the offering this would invalidate it (retroactively). If
he wanted to eat it in a place other than the one designated he would also invalidate it. The
Torah added the word ‫ לאמור‬to indicate that Moses did not initiate this halachah but that he
had received specific instructions concerning this from G'd.

‫חסלת פרשת צו‬

9:1

‫ויהי ביום השמיני‬, it was on the eighth day; We need to analyse why the Torah had to
introduce this chapter with the word ‫ויהי‬. We are told in Megillah 10 that Rabbi Levi claimed
there was an ancient tradition that every time the word ‫ ויהי‬appears it has a connotation of
something painful having occurred. This view was challenged by the questioner pointing to
the word ‫ ויהי‬in our portion which introduces the joyous event of Aaron performing the rites in
the Tabernacle; furthermore, we have a Baraitha according to which this day was as joyous
an occasion as the day on which G'd created Heaven and Earth, a day which is also introduced
in the Torah by the words ‫ויהי ערב ויהי בקר‬, "it was evening it was morning, etc." The Talmud
answers that the saddening event in our portion was the death of Nadav and Avihu. The
questioner in the Talmud continues, wanting to know why the word ‫ ויהי‬is used in Kings I 6,1
when the building of Solomon's Temple is reported. He also points to Genesis 29,10 where
Jacob's encounter with his bride-to-be Rachel is introduced by the word ‫ויהי‬. The questioner
mentions a further occurrence of that word every time G'd completed part of the creation of
the universe and the Torah describes the completion of that portion with the words ‫ויהי ערב ויהי‬
‫בקר‬. What were the negative elements on those occasions which prompted the Bible to draw
our attention to them by means of the word ‫ ?ויהי‬Rav Ashi answers that the word ‫ ויהי‬by itself
may have either positive or negative connotations. When the word ‫ ויהי‬is followed by the
word ‫בימי‬, "during the lifetime of, etc." it invariably has a negative connotation. The Talmud
added that there are five occasions when the expression ‫ ויהי בימי‬occurs in the Bible. Thus far
the discussion in Megillah 10.

Why did the questioner address his question to what is written in our verse, when the real
question is what is written in Genesis over and over again, i.e. ‫ויהי ערב ויהי בקר‬, which enabled
the query about our verse not having a negative connotation? I must assume that the
questioner obviously had all these verses in mind when he challenged Rabbi Levi's tradition.
The only reason he introduced our verse was to make his question even more powerful by
suggesting there are many such verses which clearly point to a joyous event. Alternatively,
the questioner wanted to draw the opposite conclusion of the one Rabbi Levi reported as
originating with the men of the great assembly. He wanted to argue that the word ‫ ויהי‬always
introduces something joyous. He reasoned that just as the Tanna had compared our verse to
the verse in Genesis in which the expression occurs for the first time and which certainly
spoke about a positive event, so every time that expression occurs it denotes something
positive, a joyous occasion. Using the verse ‫ ויהי ערב ויהי בקר‬in Genesis makes it much harder
to refute the questioner's argument seeing no specific event is mentioned in that verse the
nature of which could be disputed. Rabbi Levi's answer that our verse describes a day on
which Nadav and Avihu died is somewhat astounding. This answer is applicable to our verse,
but certainly not to the verses commencing with ‫ ויהי ערב‬in Genesis? It would not do to say
that Rabbi Levi felt that the words ‫ ויהי ערב‬in Genesis also referred to something negative
[after all they were preceded by G'd saying that He approved of how His instructions had been
carried out, ‫וירא אלוקים כי טוב‬, Ed.]. More to the point, why did not Rabbi Levi himself address
those verses which begin with the word ‫ ויהי‬and which clearly speak of joyful events? He
himself should have known the answer given by Rav Ashi!

I believe that Rabbi Levi did not mean to teach us anything other than Rav Ashi. The Talmud
alludes to this by not introducing Rav Ashi's words with the introductory: ‫אלא אמר רב אשי‬,
"however, Rav Ashi said, etc." Had the Talmud used that formula we would have been
justified in understanding him as refuting Rabbi Levi. What Rav Ashi said is compatible with
what Rabbi Levi said, i.e. that the word ‫ ויהי‬contains a negative connotation. There are indeed
many verses when that word alludes to something saddening. He only answered the person
who had challenged Rabbi Levi believing that Rabbi Levi had meant that the word ‫ויהי‬
without the addition ‫ בימי‬is employed by the Bible exclusively in a negative context. This is
why the questioner chose our verse out of the many other verses he could have chosen. He
wanted to show that the events described in our verse were exceptionally joyous. After all,
what conceptual difference is there between ‫ויהי ביום‬, and ‫ ?ויהי בימי‬The answer given was that
the reason the Torah wrote ‫ ויהי ביום‬instead of a formula which would have reflected the
purely joyous nature of the occasion was that the two sons of Aaron died on that very day.
[With all due respect to the author, if he had introduced the subject as it is introduced in the
Talmud namely: ‫ויהי בימי אחשורוש‬, followed by Rabbi Levi's statement that every place where
the expression ‫ ויהי‬occurs it carries a negative connotation, his remarks would have been
easier to follow. No doubt the author had his reasons and that is why I did not see fit to amend
his quotation above. Ed.]

Subsequently the question about the meaning of the word ‫ ויהי‬when it is not followed by either
the word ‫ בימי‬or ‫ ביום‬is dealt with. In that context Rav Ashi said that the word itself is neutral
and that its meaning is modified by what follows, such as the word ‫בימי‬, for instance. The
questioner who quoted a number of verses in which the word ‫ ויהי‬is not modified by either the
word ‫ ביום‬or ‫בימי‬, refers to very joyous events and gave Rav Ashi cause to say that this need
not lead us to the assumption that only the words ‫ בימי‬or ‫ ביום‬modify the meaning of the word
‫ ויהי‬to signal that something sad is being reported. There are other occasions when the word
by itself may also introduce something sad. When we have the words ‫בימי‬, however, what
follows invariably contains a negative element. Incidentally, the negative element in Exodus
19,16 where the Torah states ‫ ויהי ביום השלישי‬and introduces the happy event of ‫מתן תורה‬, was
that all the Israelites died for a brief space of time when they found themselves unable to
absorb G'd's revelation. According to Shabbat 88, G'd brought them back to life immediately.

Perhaps another element of pain asscociated with the words ‫ ויהי ביום השמיני‬is that Moses
realised on that day that it had become Aaron and his sons who were the "heirs" of his own
spiritual stature and not his own sons. The Talmud (Menachot 109) tells about the High Priest
Shimon Ha-tzaddik who had appointed one of his sons Chonov to be his successor, something
which aroused the jealousy of Chonov's brother Shimi. The results were terrible. At any rate,
we see from there that aspiring to something noble may cause the finest person anguish if
one's desire goes unfulfilled. At the time G'd had repeatedly urged Moses to accept the role of
leader of the Jewish people and Moses had repeatedly declined, G'd had become angry,
deciding to deny Moses the position of High Priest [a hereditary position provided the son
was suitable. Ed.] Up until now Moses had not felt saddened by not having been accorded the
rank of High Priest. Now when he saw that Aaron had been given this honour, he was
saddened by having forfeited the chance to be the High Priest. Although we know that Moses
was the most humble and fair person his heart was not made of stone, and he suffered some
emotional distress about this, especially as the position denied him involved being the
instrument of atonement for his people, etc. Perhaps the Torah alluded to Moses' feelings in
the matter in Numbers 7,1 where we read ‫ויהי ביום כלות משה להקים את המשכן‬, "it was on the day
Moses completed erecting the Tabernacle;" this was the same date as the day which is
described in our portion as "the eighth day," i. e. the first of Nissan. Our suggestion would
account for the fact that the Torah introduced both paragraphs with the words ‫ויהי ביום‬, seeing
that in our verse the sad event was the death of Nadav and Avihu whereas in Numbers the
sadness the Torah alluded to was Moses' distress at having forfeited the chance to be the High
Priest.

‫ביום …קרא משה לאהרון‬, on that day Moses called Aaron, etc. Any psychologist realises that
a person who is forced to give up a position of honour originally intended for himself to
someone else, even if that someone is his own brother, may be expected to display his distress
in three ways. 1) He is unlikely to carry out the command with dispatch; 2) he is unlikely to
perform the command in the most effective manner; 3) he will try to avoid fulfilling this
command publicly. The Torah here describes that Moses mastered all the inhibitions an
ordinary individual would have displayed in carrying out this command. 1) He carried out the
command on the first day it was possible, i.e. the eighth day. 2) He carried out the command
with all its attendant subsidiary commands, i.e. he appointed Aaron's sons at the same time
although there was no immediate need for Aaron's sons to substitute for their father and this
was perhaps the hardest part for him to fulfil. 3) He called in the elders of the people and
performed the command in public. Moses displayed an example of suppressing his personal
feelings in order to fulfil G'd's command.

9:2

‫קח לך עגל‬, "take for yourself a bull-calf, etc." Yuma 4 questions the need for the words "for
yourself," seeing that the Torah goes on to say that the he-goat in verse 3 was for the people;
obviously then the bull-calf was for Aaron personally. The Talmud answers that the words ‫קח‬
‫ לך‬meant that Aaron was to pay for that bull-calf out of his personal funds.

Perhaps we may add that the word ‫ לך‬was intended as a sign for all times that Aaron had not
made the golden calf with sinful intent nor had he been involved in its worship. This is why a
bull-calf could serve as atonement for Aaron. The same could not be said of the people at
large seeing their involvement in the sin of the golden calf had been ‫במזיד‬, i.e. they had been
aware of what they had been doing. Not only could a bull-calf not serve as atonement for their
sin, on the contrary, it would remind G'd of their sin and be an accuser. You will find in
Vayikra Rabbah 21,10 that the reason G'd did not want Aaron to enter the Holy of Holies on
the Day of Atonement dressed in his golden garments was because he had been the one who
made the golden calf and we have a principle of ‫אין קטיגור נעשה סניגר‬, "something which
served once as an accuser cannot reverse its role and serve as advocate for the defence." This
was a consideration which did not apply to the Israelites who had sinned knowingly in the
way they related to the golden calf so that a bull-calf could not serve as a sin-offering for
them.

In this connection we must explain why G'd commanded Aaron to take a bull-calf as a sin-
offering altogther. Is not a sin-offering intended as atonement and there is therefore no more
powerful advocate for the defence than such an offering? Apparently G'd judged matters very
fairly. On the one hand, Aaron's involvement in the construction of the golden calf was
peripheral; he had neither made its shape, nor believed in it when it emerged from the
crucible, and, as he explained to Moses: "the calf emerged by itself" (Exodus 32,24), i.e. as a
result of an action by the sorcerers Yeynuss and Yombrus amongst the mixed multitude as
reported by Tanchuma 19 on Parshat Ki Tissa. It follows therefore that there were steps in the
procedure which resulted in the golden calf materialising which Aaron did take knowingly.
He told the people to bring the gold; he accepted it from them; he etched the gold with an
etching tool. All of these details he performed in full awareness of what he was doing. Even
though the reason he did these things was fear of the Israelites killing him just as they had
killed his nephew Chur, and even though all he did was stall for time until Moses would
return, he did something improper. This is why G'd told him to bring a sin-offering to atone
for a sin which he had been instrumental in making possible. Concerning the gold which was
the crucial element in that sin, G'd told Aaron not to appear before Him in the Holy of Holies
dressed in gold seeing the accuser could not become an advocate for the defence. The same
consideration did not apply to the Israelites as they had been involved in that sin knowingly
and a bull-calf could not therefore be used as a sin-offering on their behalf. G'd therefore
commanded the Israelites to prepare a he-goat as their sin-offering.

We have to question how it is possible that in view of the principle (Rosh Hashana 26) that
the accuser cannot serve as an advocate for the defence that the Talmud Erchin 16 tells us that
the purpose of the four golden garments of the High Priest was to atone for four different
categories of sin. In view of this the accuser certainly did turn advocate for the defence! We
must answer therefore that one cannot compare the process of atonement which occurs as a
result of offerings presented on the copper altar outside the Tabernacle with the process of
atonement initiated by offerings presented on the golden altar inside the Sanctuary. The
function of the golden altar inside the Sanctuary is to cleanse the people from sin absolutely
so that not a trace of their former sins remain. The well-known symbol for this was the red
cord hung at the cliff from where the scapegoat was thrown off, which turned white as a result
of the atonement procedures performed by the High Priest inside the Sanctuary being
accepted by G'd (compare Yuma 67). The golden garments worn by the High Priest when he
performed duties outside the Sanctuary did not interfere with the atonement process because
that atonement process did not result in a complete removal of all vestiges of guilt. In order to
achieve such total atonement, the High Priest could not wear anything in the Sanctuary which
would remind G'd of his ever having been associated with the sin of the golden calf. The very
fact that Aaron was commanded to wear the golden garments when performimg his duties on
the copper altar was proof that his involvement with the golden calf had only been peripheral.
The Israelites, whose sin had been far greater, could not obtain their forgiveness through any
process performed only on the copper altar outside the Sanctuary.

9:3

‫תדבר לאמור‬, "you shall speak saying;" We need to explore the reason why Moses
commanded Aaron to speak in this instance instead of instructing the Israelites himself as was
his custom. Perhaps it was because at the time of the golden calf it had been Aaron who
invited the people to bring him their gold, Moses now wanted to give him an opportunity to
speak to the people and tell them to bring a male goat to be the sin-offering as atonement.
This would be in line with the principle ‫הפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר‬, "that the mouth which
uttered the prohibition must be the mouth which utters the permission." We have repeatedly
quoted our sages as saying that the sin which causes someone's reputation to become sullied
can best be repaired when the method of rehabilitation is as closely linked to the
circumstances of the sin it rehabilitates as is possible. This is why G'd ordered Aaron to
inform the people of this procedure. The words ‫ תדבר לאמור‬mean that inasmuch as on the
previous occasion Aaron had uttered words which resulted in the people becoming
unrestrained, demeaning themselves, he was now to utter words which would eventually
elevate the people and result in atonement for that sin.

Furthermore, seeing that Moses had observed how Aaron had been elevated by G'd to such a
high position, Moses told him to communicate soothing messages to the Jewish people. The
word ‫ לאמור‬implies a message couched in a very friendly manner. Aaron told the people that
G'd would appear to them (verse 4) to indicate that the whole procedure he was instructing
them about was for their good, not for his own. This recalls what we wrote in the name of
Torat Kohanim at the beginning of ‫פרשת ויקרא‬, that the fact G'd did not communicate with
Moses in the Tabernacle for 38 years was on account of the sin of the spies; when G'd is
reported as communicating with Moses out of the Tabernacle this was a compliment to Israel.

9:5

‫ויקתו את אשר צוה משה‬, They took what Moses had commanded, etc. When the Torah writes
"which Moses had commanded," the Torah means what Moses had commanded to Aaron, i.e.
that Aaron took the animals Moses had commanded him to take and sacrifice on behalf of the
people. Had the Torah only written that the people took the animals Aaron had commanded
them to take, I would not have known of Aaron's involvement, i.e. that Aaron carried out
Moses' instructions. Furthermore, perhaps the Torah wrote "which Moses commanded" as a
contrast to the usual "as G'd had commanded," that Moses' command sufficed for the people
to carry out these orders although they had not been assured that the command which they
were bidden to carry out had emanated from G'd.

9:6

‫זה הדבר אשר צוה ה׳ תעשו‬, "This is the thing G'd commanded you should do." What
precisely does the Torah refer to by the word ‫ ?הדבר‬Rashi explains that the reference is to
Aaron's offering. [our editions of Rashi on the Torah do not have a commentary by Rashi on
this verse. Ed.] This is not the plain meaning of the verse seeing that it addresses the
Israelites, i.e. ‫תעשו‬, (pl) and not Aaron. Perhaps Rashi referred to words in the previous verse:
‫ויקרבו כל העדה ויעמדו לפני השם‬, that "the whole congregation drew near and stood in the
presence of G'd." The Torah was careful there to write in the "presence of G'd," instead of "in
front of the Tent of Meeting." The words were altogether superfluous seeing the Torah
mentions that all this occured in front of the Tent of Meeting. We may therefore assume that
in verse 5 the Torah describes the spiritual preparations made by the people to appear in the
presence of the Lord. They achieved a spiritual niveau which made them fit to be in the
presence of G'd. When Moses observed this, he added of his own accord in verse 6: "this is
the thing which G'd commanded you should do;" Moses told the people that they should
always remain on such a spiritual plane that they would be fit to be in G'd's presence. David
spoke about this in Psalms 16,8: ‫שויתי ה׳ לנגדי תמיד‬, "I am ever mindful of the Lord's presence."
When doing this he could be assured of what is written in the second half of that verse: ‫כי‬
‫מימיני בל־אמוט‬, "so that He (i.e. Torah) is at my right hand and I (David) will never be shaken."
The reward for such a spiritual preparation is "the glory of the Lord may appear to you."
Another general meaning of the term ‫ לפני השם‬is that there should not be a curtain or barrier
between Israel and G'd; Isaiah perceives of the sins of the Jewish people as constituting such a
barrier (compare Isaiah 59,2). Accordingly, our verse reports that the Israelites were at peace
with their G'd at that time enabling them to appear in the presence of the Lord.

After I had written this I found a comment in Bamidbar Rabbah 12,8 on this verse which goes
as follows: "What is the meaning of ‫ ?זה הדבר‬It refers to circumcision. The same expression
occurs in Joshua 5,4 when it describes the fact that Joshua circumcised all the Jewish males
who had been born in the desert immediately after the people crossed the river Jordan." Thus
far the Midrash. Actually, what do the two events have in common? After all Moses did not
circumcise anyone on the day Aaron assumed the office of High Priest!

I believe we must distinguish between circumcising the foreskin of the body and removing the
"foreskin" of the heart, the ‫קליפה‬, the peel, which makes us unreceptive to G'd's commands.
Moses commanded the people to rid themselves of that foreskin in order to qualify for being
in the presence of the Lord. If they were to do this the glory of G'd would appear to them.

I have seen yet another Midrash quoted in Torat Kohanim on our verse which goes as
follows: The words ‫ זה הדבר‬refer to Moses urging the Jewish people to remove the evil urge
from their hearts so that all of them would be of a single purpose and share the same sense of
reverence for G'd as a result of which they would merit to serve in the presence of the Lord.
Moses promised the people that their service of the Lord would be something unique as it is
written "and you shall circumcise the foreskin of your hearts (Deut. 10,16), etc." Moses
added: "when you do this, the verse 'the glory of G'd will appear to you' will be fulfilled."

9:7

‫וכפר בעדך ובעד העם‬. "and make atonement for yourself and for the people." We learn from
this that Aaron's own atonement effected the atonement of the people. This is because Aaron's
sin was brought about through the Israelites. Had they not demanded from Aaron that he
make a deity for them, none of all this would have happened. As long as Aaron had not
obtained atonement for his part in that sin, both the sinner and the one who had been the
prime cause of that sin still remained guilty. As soon as Aaron obtained atonement, so did the
people. We derive all this from the linkage of the two atonements in this verse i.e. "on your
behalf and on behalf of the people."

9:8

‫ויקרב אהרון אל המזבח‬, Aaron approached the altar, etc. This verse alludes to a conversation
in the celestial spheres which is reported in the Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2,6: "They
enquired from 'prophecy': what shall be the punishment of a person who has sinned? Answer:
‫והנפש החוטאת היא תמות‬. 'The person (soul) who sins, she (the soul) will die (Ezekiel 18,4)'.
When they asked 'mercy' the same question the answer given by 'mercy' was: 'he shall bring a
sacrifice.'" The major factor determining the value of the animal sacrifice is the thoughts it
evokes in the person offering it. If that person will realise that everything which is being done
to the sacrificial animal is something that should really be done to him, the offering may
effect atonement for its owner. When the Torah writes that Aaron approached the altar this is
another way of saying that he readied himself to place his own soul on the altar as a guilt-
offering. He was aware that when he performed the act of slaughtering the animal instead, this
was an act of mercy by G'd who spared his life and allowed him to present the animal's life as
a substitute for his own.

In order to understand the system of crime and punishment and the apparent ease with which
atonement can be obtained by the offering of an animal, we must consider various statements
by our sages. Tanchuma Shoftim posits that G'd has sworn to hold the universe and the
creatures therein responsible for their deeds. If anyone were to declare that G'd is a ‫וותרון‬, an
indulgent and lenient G'd, he will experience that his bowels ‫יוותרו‬, will become loose.
(Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 5,1). If, as the prophet said in Ezekiel 18,4, the sinner ought to
die for his sin, how is it that he only has to offer a sacrifice in order to escape death? I believe
we can find a reason for this which is acceptable even in legal terms. At the time a person
commits a sin he does not do so as a human being in full command of his faculties. Rather, he
has temporarily taken leave of his senses or he would never have committed the sin in the first
place. Compare Sotah 3. We are told there that prior to committing a sin man's mind is
afflicted by some mental disturbance. Had the person committing the sin not descended to a
spiritual level such as that of a beast he would not have committed the sin. On the day such a
person becomes a penitent, his ‫רוח‬, spiritual level, has reasserted itself and he again assumes
the spiritual level of a human being. Would it be fair to kill such a human being because of
what he did while he was on the spiritual level of a beast? When such a person has to offer a
beast in expiation of his sin he will realise the anguish the beast suffers when it has to die and
he will appreciate that he himself had been in a situation similar to that of the beast which
now has to die. Man's sensitivity to the animal's anguish then is what really saves him from
the fate of the animal. This is what the Psalmist has in mind when he speaks of "man and
beast You deliver, O Lord" (Psalms 36,7). G'd has delivered the part of man which is similar
to the beast because man chose to allow his spiritual part to dominate him. His spiritual part
had not deserved to be punished as it had no part in his sin. When looked at from this point of
view the requirement to bring this sacrifice is part of justice as opposed to being in lieu of
justice. This is why the Psalmist introduced the verse we quoted by saying: ‫משפטיך תהום רבה‬,
"Your justice is like the great deep;"

9:15

‫ויקרב את קרבן העם‬. He presented the people's offering. This refers to the presentation of the
"lights" [a term denoting enlightenment in kabbalistic jargon. Ed.] which were planted in the
Israelites from the source of the original "light" which had been diffused due to Adam's sin
and which had prevented man from achieving the close relationship with G'd he should have
maintained. The change which took place in man's soul dictated that he keep a certain
distance from G'd as ever since the sin G'd and man are perceived of as two different species,
[a halachic term used when two categories of food, a forbidden one and a permissible one
become mixed and the question arises if one of them loses its former identity. Ed.] The Torah
tells us here that by means of the service performed by Aaron two species which had
previously been incompatible had again become compatible. The words "he brought close the
offering of the people" mean that he re-united what had become estranged. Actually, by
rights, this verse should have been written at the end of the whole procedure in verse 23. Why
did the Torah write this verse prior to describing the details of the procedure? The Torah
wanted to teach us the lesson that it is not the actual procedure which is crucial in achieving
the objective of the sacrifice. It is the intent with which such a procedure is initiated which
determines if the execution of the ritual will achieve its objective.

We have a mystical element in this verse also. I have mentioned on a previous occasion that
the burnt-offering, ‫עולה‬, represents the concept of ‫כנסת ישראל‬, [a concept known in kabbalistic
language as the ‫שכינה תחתונה‬, the lower manifestation of the ‫ שכינה‬in the emanation ‫מלכות‬. Ed.]
the ideological concept of the people of Israel. If the Israelites fail to behave as they should
they "lower" the concept of ‫כנסת ישראל‬. On the other hand, if they draw near to G'd as
expressed in the words ‫ויקרב את העולה‬, they will experience one spiritual ascent after another.
Not only will they not be tainted by sins but they will be able to face the most rigorous
standards of justice. This is what is implied in the words ‫ויעשיה כמשפט‬.

9:22

‫וישא אהרון אח ידיו‬, Aaron raised his hands, etc. Torat Kohanim claims that this verse is
truncated and the words: "he descended from offering the sin-offering, etc." should have been
written before the words "he raised his hands and blessed them." We therefore have to explore
why the Torah chose this unusual sequence. Perhaps when Aaron realised that the Presence of
G'd had not manifested itself (by consuming the fat and meat on the altar by means of
heavenly fire) he may have felt that both he and the people had not yet been completely
exonerated from their respective share in the sin of the golden calf. He therefore considered
himself as having brought a curse on the people. By raising his hands already at this time and
blessing the people, Aaron hoped to counteract that curse. Only after he had blessed the
people did he feel that he had really completed the ritual of the sin-offering. He was then able
to descend from the altar secure in the knowledge that he had done all he could. Perhaps the
Torah wanted the blessing of the Israelites to be included in the procedure of offering the sin-
offering because it also exonerated Aaron from his share in the guilt. The word ‫ וירד‬may also
refer to a spiritual descent; when Aaron saw that the ‫ שכינה‬had not yet descended, he felt
reduced in stature, i.e. ‫וירד‬. Torat Kohanim on our verse reports Aaron as having cried out to
Moses that the latter had commanded him to present these offerings on the altar only to now
shame him when G'd had not indicated that He had accepted these offerings. Moses then
entered the Tabernacle together with Aaron and after they asked G'd to show mercy the fire
from heaven materialised.

9:23

‫ויצאו ויברכו את העם‬, They emerged from the Tabernacle and blessed the people. Perhaps
they had been commanded to do so by a prophetic vision. It is also possible that the Torah
substitutes the word "blessing" here for the word "prayer." The prayer may have been that
G'd's Presence should continue to manifest itself in the camp. Even though the people had
already been blessed by Aaron, it was good to be blessed by both brothers each of whom
represented a different nuance of spirituality, one that is unique to the Levite and the other the
spirituality unique to the priesthood. In kabbalistic terms the two brothers Aaron and Moses
represented the emanations ‫ חסד וגבורה‬respectively.

10:1

It seems to teach that the place of their error was for two reasons. The first was that in
becoming priests, they erred in their service, and this ( is implied in the text) beginning by
saying they were 'sons of Aaron'; the two of them (thought) they were great in deeds and
should be weighted like Moses and Aaron [Torat Kohanim Achrei Mot 53]. And as the Zohar
teaches, they were on a high spiritual level in the realm of deeds, hence they were called
('sons of Aaron') Nadav and Abihu, and this trait is not so for Elazar and Itamar (the Torah
does not refer to them as 'sons of Aaron'); they too are 'sons of Aaron', but are not at the
spiritual level themselves that Nadav and Abihu were. So too we find this explanation where
(the Torah) says

‫וישימו עליה קטורת‬, they placed incense on it (the censer). The Torah does not write that they
placed the incense "on them," as it had described the act of placing fire on the censer in the
plural, i.e. ‫ ויתנו בהן‬lumping the censers together. The reason the Torah distinguishes in its
description is to emphasise that the crucial part of their error was the fire which did not
originate on the altar.

‫ אשר לא צוה אותם‬,‫זדה‬, strange fire, which He had not commanded them. The words "which
He had not commanded them" define the nature of the strangeness of the fire. It is possible
that if these two sons of Aaron had taken the fire for their incense from the altar G'd would
not have minded so much; it is also possible that G'd would have minded for a different
reason; at any rate, the sin consisted in their doing something on their own initiative which
G'd had not commanded them.

10:2

‫וימותו לפני השם‬. They died in the presence of the Lord. The words: "in the presence of the
Lord" may be intended to inspire fear and reverence for the Tabernacle in the people who
witnessed that even people who entered in order to offer the offering dearest to G'd, incense,
had died as a result of doing something unauthorised. There is also an allusion here that their
death was due to something they had done previously and which involved the presence of G'd.
I refer to Exodus 24,10 where these two sons were reported as having beheld G'd (compare
Vayikra Rabbah 20,10 and G'd was reported there as not punishing the "nobles of Israel" at
that time). These "nobles" were Nadav and Avihu.

10:3

‫הוא אשר דבר השם‬, this is what G'd has said: etc. The word ‫ הוא‬needs further analysis.
Another word which seems peculiar is the word ‫לאמור‬. This word gives the impression that
Moses had already been commanded to communicate this idea that G'd is most exacting with
those near and dear to Him. If Moses had been instructed to communicate this concept, why
had he not done so before? Perhaps this error of Moses was similar to the one we described in
connection with Moses' failure to communicate to the people all the details about the manna
on the Sabbath, as mentioned in Exodus 16,23 where we also find the expression ‫הוא אשר דבר‬
‫השם‬. We had supplied sufficient reasons why Moses at the time did not communicate the laws
about the Sabbath to the Israelites in advance, basing ourselves on the absence of the word
‫ לאמור‬in that context. In this instance then, why had Moses not told Aaron of this concept
sooner?

Our sages in Torat Kohanim on our verse describe Aaron as in despair accusing both himself
and his sons as having sinned and having been punished for it. When Moses heard this, he
entered Aaron's tent and tried to put his mind at ease by telling him that G'd had told him
when he was on Mount Sinai that in the future He, G'd, would sanctify the Tabernacle by
means of persons of great stature. At the time, Moses said, he had thought that G'd referred
either to himself or to Aaron. Now, in view of what had just occurred, it had become clear to
him that both Nadav and Avihu were of greater stature than either he or Aaron seeing G'd had
selected those two to sanctify His Tabernacle. Thus far Torat Kohanim. Another approach
may be this: while it is true that Moses had been told about this concept at Sinai, he had not
understood in which context this lesson would assume practical significance. Only now, when
Nadav and Avihu had died under peculiar circumstances did he, Moses, realise what G'd had
meant to tell him at that time when He said to him: ‫בקרובי אקדש‬, "I will be sanctified by means
of those who are close to Me." Moses told Aaron: "the only reason your sons had to die was
to glorify the name of the Lord." This is how he suddenly understood the words in Exodus
29,43: ‫ונועדתי שמה לבני ישראל ונקדש בכבודי‬, "there I will meet with the children of Israel and
there My glory shall be sanctified." As soon as Aaron heard that the two sons of his who had
died were ‫ידועי השם‬, based on Exodus 29,43, he remained silent and did not utter a lament.

According to the first approach the word ‫ הוא‬has to be understood thus: Seeing Aaron was
saddened by his interpretation of the reason his sons had died, Moses corrected him by saying
‫" הוא‬this is the reason your sons died," i.e. because they were too close to G'd not because they
had become estranged from G'd. Accordingly, the word ‫ הוא‬refers to the cause. According to
the second approach to our verse we have to understand the word ‫ הוא‬as a reference to the
comment G'd had made to Moses without specifying His meaning. Moses said that now he
understood ‫הוא‬, i.e. "it," the "it" being what G'd had told him about being sanctified by men of
stature. As to the meaning of the word ‫לאמור‬, Moses now understood that when G'd had told
him that He would be sanctified ‫ונקדש בכבודי‬, you may understand this as ‫לאמור‬, "to say,"
‫בקרובי אקדש‬. This takes care of the various problems in the text we have raised. There remains
the difficulty why Moses had failed to communicate the concept of ‫ בקרובי אקדש‬sooner. We
also need to understand the deeper meaning of why-according to Torat Kohanim -Moses did
not practice his customary humility when saying to Aaron: "I thought G'd referred either to
me or to you." We would have expected Moses to have said: "I thought G'd referred to either
you or me." Why did he mention himself first?

We have to remember that we are dealing with an event which contained two vastly different
elements. 1) The lesson that Nadav and Avihu were men of great stature. 2) The fact that they
died while in the process of committing a sin. When Moses told Aaron that he had understood
what G'd had meant when He spoke about being sanctified by men of great stature, men close
to Him, he did not necessarily refer to the first element. If Moses had only related to G'd
having spoken about people of great stature being the ones by means of whom He would be
sanctified, the fact that he mentioned himself first would indeed have to be interpreted as
somewhat presumptuous. However, seeing that Moses added that he had now become aware
that G'd had considered Nadav and Avihu as greater than himself or even Aaron, it became
clear that Moses had not meant to be presumptuous at all. Also, if the major aspect of Moses'
new understanding had been who was supposed to be the victim in terms of giving up his life
so that G'd would be glorified, it would hardly have been appropriate for Moses to volunteer
this honour for Aaron. This is why he mentioned himself first. On the contrary, when one
speaks of a possible tragedy befalling either oneself or the person with whom one discusses
such an eventuality, good manners require that one mentions oneself as a possible victim first.
Moses phrased the whole matter as something concerning which he had previously
entertained some doubt.

There remains the difficulty that according to what Moses told Aaron only one person had to
die in order to demonstrate to the people that G'd is sanctified by someone close to Him. Why
did both sons die? After all, according to Moses' own words he had only been in doubt which
one would be the victim. He never considered that there could be two or more victims to
demonstrate the point G'd wanted to make. Besides, whence did Moses know that Nadav and
Avihu were of greater stature than either Aaron or himself? Seeing that G'd had mentioned
one person as dying, it is plausible that that one person was of greater stature than either
Moses or Aaron. Why would I assume that both were greater? In fact it seems strange that
two had to take the place of one, i.e. either Moses or Aaron? If so they were not greater than
Moses or Aaron individually. One can certainly not argue that in this case Solomon's rule
(Kohelet 4,9) applies that ‫טובים השנים מן האחד‬, "that two are better than one?"

I believe what Torat Kohanim had in mind is that when G'd said to Moses ‫ ונקדש בכבודי‬that the
Tabernacle would be sanctified by a person who is considered as of great stature by Me (G'd),
Moses realised that one of the ‫צדיקים‬, righteous persons, would die. However, he assumed that
according to the plain meaning of the words that G'd referred to an outstandingly righteous
person (singular). This was the reason he was not sure whether the victim would be either
himself or Aaron. Now that he saw that two men had died he re-evaluated the meaning of
what G'd had told him. He now realised that when G'd had spoken about ‫ונקדש בכבודי‬, the
meaning was not that it required a single person whose death would confer glory on G'd and
the Taberncale, but that G'd had referred to something of a more comprehenive nature. This is
why Moses re-phrased what G'd had told him and he said to Aaron ‫בקרובי אקדש‬, "by means of
those who are close to Me (plural) I will be sanctified." He added that G'd had said: ‫ועל פני כל‬
‫" ;העם אקדש‬and I will be seen to have been glorified in front of all the nation." This meant that
when G'd had previously spoken of ‫כבודי‬, My Glory, the meaning was "on account of My
Glory." If we accept this interpretation G'd never applied the singular as applying to the
‫צדיקים‬. The word ‫ ונקדש‬is a collective term referring to whatever righteous will be the
instrument by which G'd's Glory is sanctified. The proof that this had indeed been G'd's
meaning was the fact that two people died. Moses said "this is what He had said" in order to
console Aaron. The word ‫ לאמור‬means that Moses now understood that he had to
communicate, i.e. explain G'd's meaning as being: "I will be sanctified by those who are close
to Me." The principal reason for the word ‫ לאמור‬was to forestall any other erroneous
interpretation of what G'd had in mind in Exodus 29,43.

It is also possible that Moses had already understood G'd correctly originally; he had realised
that there were actually three possibilities. Either several people would die, or he himself or
Aaron would die and thereby demonstrate G'd's principle of ‫ונקדש בכבודי‬, i.e. the same as
‫בקרובי אקדש‬. When Torat Kohanim quotes Moses as having said to Aaron that he had thought
that either he or Aaron would be chosen to demonstrate the principle in question, Moses
meant that originally he had entertained three doubts about who would be the people chosen
for this kind of martyrdom. He had now learned which of the three possibilities was the
correct one.

There still remains one difficulty. How could Moses have been certain that he had interpreted
G'd's words correctly? Perhaps the combined merits of Nadav and Avihu equalled that of
either Moses or Aaron and that is why both of them had to die to demonstrate the principle of
‫ ?בקרובי אקדש‬This latter supposition is quite untenable. The whole purpose of G'd allowing
those who were close to Him to become the victims of the principle ‫ בקרובי אקדש‬was to inspire
sufficient reverence in the people not to treat the sanctity of the Tabernacle lightly. Once the
people had observed that G'd had taken up residence in the Tabernacle, as it were, they would
begin to take His presence for granted and not relate to it with the necessary degree of
reverence. The more highly placed the individual Israelite, the more likely that he would feel
so familiar with his G'd that he would become guilty of a trespass. The people most likely to
make such an error were the spiritual elite of the people, among them Nadav and Avihu. As a
result these people would enter the Sanctuary at will whereas the lesser individuals would
keep their distance as required. The result of such considerations would be that the spiritual
leaders would be less respectul towards the sanctity of the Tabernacle than their counterparts
the ordinary Israelite. In order to prevent such a situation from developing, G'd had to
demonstrate by what happened to Nadav and Avihu that He was especially mindful of His
honour when it came to the elite in order for the common people not to ever lack in reverence
for the Tabernacle. If we were to accept that Moses or Aaron individually were more
outstanding than either Nadav or Avihu, G'd would have failed to demonstrate His principle
seeing He had excluded both Moses and Aaron from the restriction the principle of ‫ונקדש‬
‫ בכבודי‬was to teach the people. G'd demonstrated the principle of ‫ בקרובי אקדש‬by literally
applying it to the people who represented the elite of the elite. The death of Nadav and Avihu
demonstrated that nobody, Aaron and Moses included, could treat the Tabernacle as such
familiar ground that they were allowed to enter it at will. The suggestion that only Nadav and
Avihu combined represented greater stature than either Aaron or Moses is rejected by the
author who explains that if you have a single diamond of ten carats, such a diamond does not
become relatively inferior because someone else has two diamonds the combined weight of
which is eleven carats.

10:6

‫" ;ראשיכם אל תפרעו‬do not let the hair of your head grow wild." The Torah warns that if the
people at large were to do the same as the priests, i.e. trim their hair while in mourning for a
close relative, G'd would become angry. There are differences in the manner ordinary
Israelites mourn their dead and in the manner in which priests charged with serving the Lord
do this. Whereas the priests are not allowed to let their hair grow wild, they are obligated to
rend their garments when hearing of the death of a close relative. Perhaps, in this instance, the
rules applied were those we apply when the president of the Supreme Court dies; at such a
time all of Israel are commanded to rend their garments as a sign of mourning (Moed Katan
22). In view of the opinion that Nadav and Avihu were of greater stature than even Moses and
Aaron, it was certainly appropriate for the whole nation to mourn their deaths.

‫ואחיכם כל בית ישראל יבכו‬, "and your brethren the whole house of Israel will weep, etc."
This is a ‫מצוה‬, a desirable act; failure to do so will not arouse G'd's anger. The Torah is
particular to write ‫אשר שרף השם‬. This may best be understood in accordance with a statement
in Shabbat 105 that anyone who weeps and mourns another person' death has his own sins
forgiven and will not have cause to weep [for a tragedy in his immediate family. Ed.]. This
thought is alluded to in the words ‫אשר שרף‬, "He had burned." If the Israelites were to weep for
the death of Nadav and Avihu now, there would be no future burning to be wept for. The
words ‫" ולא תמותו ועל כל העדה יקצוף‬so that you will not die and G'd will be angry at the whole
congregation" mean, that when the righteous die G'd's anger is unleashed against the whole of
Israel. The reason is that the righteous by their very existence had kept G'd's anger against
Israel in check while they were alive. The death of priests is especially apt to result in G'd's
anger becoming manifest as it was the task of the priest to assuage G'd's anger by means of
the Temple service he performed while alive.

10:16

‫ ;דרוש דרש משה‬Moses kept asking for, etc. Personally, I think that Moses had not yet
decided to permit consumption of the meat of that sin-offering. Proof of this is the fact that he
had not told the priests exactly what to do as he had done in the case of the meal-offering
concerning which he had said (verse 12) "take what is left over of the meal-offering and eat
it!" If it had been clear to Moses that the priests (i.e. the bereaved family of Nadav and Avihu)
were to eat the meat in their present emotional state of being ‫ אוננים‬he himself would have told
them to do so. Should you argue that Moses had assumed as a matter of fact that by telling
Aaron and his remaining sons to eat the left-over parts of the meal-offering, that they would
do the same with the sin-offering, then why did he enquire about the meat of the sin-offering?
Why would it even have occurred to him that maybe Aaron and his sons had not eaten that
meat? Therefore we must assume that Moses had left the matter of the meat of the sin-
offering in abeyance, seeing he himself was not certain as to the correct procedure to be
followed. It had been clear to Moses that the law applicable to the meal-offering which was a
one-time affair and concerning which he had received clear instructions from G'd (verse 12)
was similar to that of the male-goat offered by Nachshon (the first of the offerings by the
princes which occurred on that day) which was also a one-time offering. He was not at all
sure whether he could make an inference from the laws applicable to those offerings to the
sin-offerings offered on the New Moon seeing that was a regular offering to be presented
every New Moon for all future generations. We may therefore understand the words ‫דרוש דרש‬
that Moses was still busy researching the applicable ‫הלכה‬. The repetition of the words is a hint
that it could have either of two ‫הלכות‬, rulings. The reason Moses was angry was not because
Aaron and his sons had done wrong but because they had taken it upon themselves to decide
the issue without asking him. It did not matter that at that time Moses would not yet have
known what to answer them if they enquired. Even though Moses eventually (verse 18) told
Aaron and his sons to eat that meat in accordance with his previous instructions, this only
meant that Moses told them to apply the same ruling as G'd had told him to apply to the eating
of the meal-offering. Torat Kohanim understands the repetition of the words ‫ דרוש דרש‬to mean
that Moses enquired 1) why this meat should be burned, 2) why it should be eaten. This seems
a far-fetched way of understanding the verse. What would have been the point in enquiring
why the meat should be burned seeing it had been burned already instead of having been
eaten? One needs to find a suitable answer to this comment of the Torat Kohanim.

‫ יתבאר על דרך אומרם ז''ל (ויק''ר פי''ג) הנותרים אמר ר' פנחם ולואי שלא‬,‫ אומרו לאמר‬.‫הנותרים לאמר‬
‫ ובתורת כהנים‬,‫ והוא דברי ר' פנחם‬,‫ והוא אומרו הנותרים לאמר פירוש הנותרים לאמר ענין אחר‬.‫נשארתם ע''כ‬
‫אמרו לאמר אמר להם השיבוני על דברי פירוש הרשם להשיבו שלא ימנעו לצד ראותו בקצף עליהם עוד ירצה על‬
‫ והוא אומרו הנותרים לאמר כאילו אמר‬,‫דרך אומרם ז''ל (ב''ר פע''ג) בפסוק צאן לבן הנותרות שהוא לשון פחיתות‬
‫לאמר הנותרים פירוש קראם במאמרו נותרים לשון פחיתות‬:

10:19

‫וידבר אהרון אל משה‬. Aaron spoke (harshly) to Moses. Torat Kohanim reminds us that the
word ‫ דבר‬invariably signals harsh talk. Why was Aaron justified in adopting this tone of voice
when speaking to Moses? Moses had not even addressed him, much less criticised him!
Perhaps Aaron had felt slighted by Moses' angry reproof in verse 16-17 to his sons why they
had not eaten the meat of the sin-offering. Moses' accusation did not sound unlike a curse.
Aaron felt that at a time when he was still in shock from the death of his two older sons and
Satan had a relatively free hand that such an accusation would endanger the lives of his
surviving sons. Aaron's outburst may therefore be interpreted as the complaint of a father
whose feelings of mercy towards his children have been aroused.

‫הן היום‬, "behold, this very day, etc." Our sages in Zevachim 101 understand this expression
as follows: "did Eleazar and Ittamar offer the sin-offerings this day, a day when they are
prohibited of performing the service seeing their brothers have not yet been interred and this
is why you acuse them of have burned the meat? It was I who have offered the sacrifice and in
my capacity as High Priest I am entitled to perform this sacrifice even while in mourning for
my sons who have not yet been interred!" The implication is "why did you accuse my sons of
something they have not been guilty of at all?"

The plain meaning of the verse is this: ‫הן היום הקריבו‬, Nadav and Avihu offered their burnt-
offerings and their sin-offerings in the presence of the Lord this very day. Aaron reminded
Moses that he was an ‫אונן‬, a mourner who had not yet commenced the mourning rites as his
sons had not yet been buried ‫ואכלתי חטאת היום‬, He went on: "If I had eaten the regular sin-
offering this day?" i.e. the sin-offering which is offered on every New Moon. This was
Aaron's way of hinting that there is a difference between eating of the meal-offering which
was a one-time offering and eating of the sin-offering which was part of a cycle of regular
public offerings. He questioned: "would it have been pleasing in the eyes of the Lord if I had
eaten this offering?"

Perhaps we can prove from here under what circumstances a disciple is permitted to give a
halachic ruling in the presence of his teacher instead of referring the problem to the teacher
first. I have seen a comment by the ‫ רא"ש‬on Eyruvin 63 that in the situation quoted of Ravina
examining the knife of a ritual slaughterer in a location some distance removed from his
teacher Rav Ashi, that in such a situation the teacher may be presumed not to feel that his
dignity has been offended. [The subject matter discussed in the Talmud there is the
permissibility of students giving halachic rulings in the area presided over by their teacher.
The standard opinion is that even a relatively simple query such as if one may use a fully
formed egg found inside a hen after one has slaughtered it together with milk, the query must
be submitted to the local Rabbi. Ed.] At any rate, it seems that Aaron had taken it upon
himself to give a ruling and thereby offended the honour of Moses his teacher. Perhaps we
can answer this by saying that Aaron's decision was not really what we call a halachic ruling.
Aaron had simply used logic. We know from Deut. 26,14 that the farmer had to declare that
he had not eaten of the second tithes or the like while in a state of ‫אנינות‬, pre-mourning. Seeing
that the level of sanctity of such tithes was on a far lower level than that of the sin-offering,
Aaron simply reasoned that he would most certainly be forbidden to partake of the meat of
that offering (compare Rashi on Yuma 5 and Zevachim 101). He himself had been taught the
law about the tithes by Moses. All he had done therefore was apply what Moses had taught
him to a different situation. He had therefore thought that Moses himself had instructed him to
burn the meat seeing there was no one authorised to eat it. This is much less than the example
given in the Talmud about the egg found within the chicken we mentioned earlier. It is
worthwile to study what Tossaphot have to say on that subject in Eyruvin 62.

10:20

‫וישמע משה וייב בעיניו‬. Moses heard this and it was pleasing in his eyes. Why had Moses
either forgotten or been unaware of such a simple halachah as that one has to distinguish
between the degrees of sanctity of one-time offerings and that of regular offerings? If Moses
was aware of an argument why such a differentiation should not be made, why did he accept
Aaron's reasoning instead of trying to convince him that his own argument was correct?
Moses had no right to command Aaron to either eat or burn sacrificial meat unless he was
convinced that the halachah demanded this. His anger against Aaron and his sons was not
caused by his conviction that they had committed an halachic error, but merely because he
did not think they had adequate reason to burn up that meat. Alternatively, as suggested by
Zevachim 101, he may have thought that all three of them had become ritually impure
preventing them from consuming the meat of the sin-offering. According to the Talmud,
Moses had enquired if something had gone wrong during the sprinkling of the blood or
whether for some reason the animal had left the precincts of the Tabernacle. All of these
events would have been due to some degree of negligence on the part of the priests and would
have given Moses reason to be angry. Once Aaron had countered by citing the logic which
had prompted him to make the decision to burn the meat Moses was put at ease. He realised
that Aaron had not burned the meat until he had correctly judged the circumstances which
demanded such action. If Aaron had not had logic going for his decision, it would indeed have
been difficult to decide whose considerations were weightier; as it was, Moses was entitled to
accept the ‫ קל וחומר‬Aaron had learned. When the Torah said ‫וייטב בעיניו‬, this means that Moses
approved of the meat having been burned. It is also possible that the words refer to Moses
now approving of Aaron having made the decision without consulting him.

Another approach would focus on the first words in the verse, i.e. "Moses heard." This may
mean that Moses had heard from G'd about the difference between the degree of sanctity of
one-time offerings and those of regular offerings. As a result he approved of what Aaron had
done, i.e. ‫וייטב בעיניו‬. You may counter by saying that if Moses had heard the ‫ הלכה‬from G'd
why had he been angry at Aaron? Perhaps he was angry because he himself had not yet told
Aaron about this and he thought that Aaron had done what he did without adequate reason. It
is also possible that Moses who was able to receive prophetic revelations at any time (as we
know from Numbers 9,8: "stand still and I will hear what G'd will command") now received
word from G'd as to the correct procedure; as a result he was pleased to have G'd confirm that
Aaron had acted correctly.
Torat Kohanim on our verse writes as follows: "Rav Yehudah said that as long as Rabbi
Chananiah son of Yehudah was alive he used to explain that anger is a terrible affliction as it
caused Moses to err. Seeing that Rabbi Chananiah is dead already, I feel I must respond to
what he said. Anger did not cause Moses to err but his error caused Moses to become angry."
Why did Rav Yehudah say that "Rabbi Chananiah said as long as he was alive etc.?" Why did
he interpret events differently from Rav Yehudah whose opinion seems psychologically more
sound and seems better supported by the text? We must also analyse why Rav Yehudah
waited until after Rabbi Chananiah's death before he took issue with his explanation. It seems
that both Rav Yehudah and Rabbi Chananiah ben Yehudah intended to be complimentary to
Moses by their statements. The fact is that what happened can be explained by two different
approaches. 1) Forgetting what G'd had said to Moses; it does not reflect credit on someone of
Moses' stature if we were to accuse him of having forgotten some instruction G'd had taught
him. 2) Moses became angry at the surviving sons of Aaron and spoke harshly with them as
reported in our verse. In fact he was also angry at Aaron but he expressed this by speaking to
Aaron's sons; he did not criticise Aaron to his face. Rabbi Chananiah chose to attribute Moses'
having forgotten a ‫ הלכה‬as due to his anger, an inadvertent sin, as he did not want to accuse
Moses of simply having forgotten something G'd had told him. We find a similar approach in
Sifri Mattot 31,21 where Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah quoted three occasions when Moses was
reported as becoming angry and we find in each case that he committed an error. Numbers
31,14 describes Moses as angry at Eleazar the High Priest. The anger is not reported as caused
by an error on his part. We therefore have to find a different reason to explain Moses
becoming angry at the sons of Aaron. The reason had to be the failure of the sons of Aaron
and Aaron himself to request a ruling from Moses before deciding to burn the meat. Moses'
anger caused him to rule incorrectly and to tell them to eat the meat. Moses was convinced at
the time that he had ruled correctly and that the sacrificial meat was fit for consumption by
priests in their condition. (The author adds: "Rabbi Chananiah's reasoning is not compatible
with the explanation I gave earlier that Moses simply told Aaron that he had good reason to
rule differently from him and was in doubt about the issue").

Rav Yehudah did not want to contradict Rabbi Chananiah outright and to reject his
explanation as wrong. All he wanted to do was to come to the defence of Moses by pointing
out that error need not necessarily be the result of anger. He did so because one can argue that
anger is more of a negative virtue than forgetting something one has been told by G'd. It may
therefore be preferable to explain what happened in terms of Moses simply having forgotten a
relevant ‫הלכה‬. When he realised he had forgotten the ‫הלכה‬, Moses became angry once he had
the feeling that Aaron and his sons had not acted in accordance with G'd's will. His anger had
nothing whatsoever to do with his own honour or dignity. Rav Yehudah did not feel that this
explanation was the only possible one; rather he felt that it was no less likely than that
offfered by Rabbi Chananiah. After all, one could explain Moses' anger without implicating
him in something unbecoming and one could explain his forgetting without Moses' image
suffering much in our eyes as a result. This is why Rav Yehudah did not voice his dissent
until after Rabbi Chananiah had died. Rabbi Chananiah had not shared Rav Yehudah's view
that one could allow for both considerations but insisted that Moses' error could only be
explained in terms of his having first become angry. The text of the Sifri states: ‫הרני כמשיב על‬
‫ דבריו‬meaning that Rav Yehudah appeared to dissent. [Our text of the Sifri does not have the
letter ‫ כ‬mentioned by the author. Ed.] This version of the text is compatible with the view we
have expressed. One may also understand Rav Yehudah as having most definitely held the
view that Moses only became angry because he had erred and presumed that Aaron and his
sons had sinned by burning the meat. One may err by simply not concentrating on a problem,
i.e. by ‫הסח הדעת‬, being absent-minded. This is something quite inadvertent. One cannot,
however, become angry and be absent-minded at the same time. Anger, by definition, implies
that one has one's mind on the subject of one's anger. Whereas a sin associated with anger is
one that is considered ‫מזיד‬, the result of an action one is aware of, the same is not the case
when the sin is the result of one's having forgotten something. Furthermore, if we say that
Moses erred, i.e. forgot something, the result of his forgetting did not result in a sin occurring
at all. If we perceive Moses as having been irritated by the actions of Aaron and his sons his
anger was caused by this and this anger was an outright sin. Rav Yehudah chose to portray
Moses' anger as having been caused by an error not by his irritation. In this way he helped us
maintain a better image of Moses. If he said that he disagreed with Rabbi Chananiah after the
latter's death, this did not mean that he had not voiced his disagreement during his lifetime,
but that even after Rabbi Chananiah's death he still felt that he had to go on record as
disagreeing with Rabbi Chananiah. Alternatively, Rav Yehudah may have not voiced his
dissent until after Rabbi Chananiah died because he was afraid that Rabbi Chananiah would
offer proof that he was right, something he could no longer do after he had died.

11:1

‫אל משה ואל אהרון‬, to Moses and to Aaron, etc. Perhaps the extra word ‫ ואל‬in ‫ ואל אהרון‬is
intended to put Aaron on the same footing as Moses in their duty to communicate the laws of
forbidden foods to the Israelites. G'd also addressed them as equals when He said: ‫( דברו‬pl) ‫אל‬
‫בני ישראל‬. We find something similar in Exodus 12,1 where G'd used the same wording to
introduce the legislation of the Passover. This interpretation is possible seeing that from an
exegetical point of view we have other verses which teach us that Moses was to teach Aaron
the law before the latter was able to communicate it to the Israelites.

‫לאמור אליהם‬, to say to them. Torat Kohanim on our verse explains the word ‫אליהם‬, "to them,"
as a reference to Eleazar and Ittamar. The idea is that these two sons of Aaron were to be
acquainted with this legislation before it was to be taught to the entire people. This is based on
Eyruvin 54. Perhaps the Torah had in mind to emphasize a point made by the prophet in
Maleachi 2,6 that the lips of the priests are to preserve knowledge and that people seek to
obtain knowledge of Torah from the priests. The words ‫ לאמור אליהם‬may also reflect what I
have explained in connection with Exodus 20,1 that the reason for the word ‫ לאמור‬is that the
word emanates from the Supreme G'd and that G'd made an angel out of it and that it was that
angel who spoke to Moses. [The concept is that the "word" is something in between a totally
abstract concept and something which has at least a semblance of something physical about it.
The absolute abstract, i.e. the Essence of G'd, cannot communicate with a human being who is
part body by means of something entirely abstract. G'd therefore created an intermediary
called an "angel" to accomplish communication by word of "mouth." Ed.] The word ‫לאמור‬
refers to that angel who would communicate with Moses and Aaron. This explanation is not at
variance with what our sages said in Torat Kohanim at the beginning of the Book of Leviticus
that G'd communicated verbally from the inside of the Tabernacle only with Moses, not with
Aaron. What it means is simply that the angel who addressed Moses used the plural form
‫ !דברו‬when addressing him instead of saying to him ‫( !דבר‬singular). Moses relayed the words
to Aaron before he spoke to anyone else.

11:2

‫אל בני ישראל לאמור‬. to the children of Israel saying. The word ‫ לאמור‬here indicates that the
legislation following conferred a distinction upon the Israelites who were to keep their
distance from matters considered impure. Vayikra Rabbah 13,2 quotes Rabbi Shimon bar
Yochai commenting on Chabakuk 3,6: "When He stands He measures the earth;" Rabbi
Shimon interprets that G'd measured all the nations and found not one of them deserving to
receive the Torah except the generation travelling through the desert. G'd measured all the
mountains and the only one fit to hand down the Torah from was Mount Sinai. The word
‫ לאמור‬in this context must be understood along the lines of Isaiah 3,10: ‫אמרו צדיק כי טוב כי פרי‬
‫מעלליהם יאכלו‬. "Hail the just man, for he shall fare well; he shall eat the fruit of his works."
The sequence of ‫ לאמור זאת‬means that Moses and Aaron are to take every kind of creature into
their hands and display them saying: "this you may eat and this you may not eat." It was not
enough to instruct the Israelites only orally.

‫" ;זאת החיה אשר תאכלו‬these are the living things which you may eat;" I have already
explained elsewhere why the term ‫ חיה‬is applied here to domesticated animals ‫בהמה‬. The term
‫ חיה‬implies that nothing evil adheres to these creatures. This term is used in contradistinction
to other domesticated beasts which are not associated with the concept of sanctity at all.

11:3

‫כל מפרסת פרסה‬, Whatsoever parts the hoof; Chulin 59 explains that any beast which has cleft
hooves also ruminates except for the pig. If the Torah nonetheless says "every animal with
cleft hooves…is chewing the cud," and subsequently mentions the pig as being the exception
to this rule, there is a deeper reason. Rabbeynu Bachyah, quoting a Midrash Tanchuma, states
that even the pig will conform to the pattern of chewing the cud in the idyllic future
foreshadowed by our prophets. The very word ‫ חזיר‬from the root ‫חזר‬, to return, i.e. to reverse
oneself, alludes to that future in an ideal world when even the pig will revert to being a pure
animal fit for consumption by Jews. When viewed in this light, the fact that the Torah
commences with the words ‫ כל מפרסת פרסה‬is quite appropriate as it does not exclude anything
in the long run.

11:4

‫ממעלי הגרה זממפריסי הפרסה‬, of those which chew the cud or only part the hoof, etc.
According to Bechorot 6 the apparent duplication in these words is to teach that if an unborn
animal which has parted hooves and chews the cud is found inside a mother-animal which
belongs to a forbidden category, such an unborn animal may not be eaten. However, the plain
meaning of the verse is as follows: the words "of the ones which chew the cud" i.e. the camel,
or of "the ones which part the hoof," i.e the pig. The letter ‫ ו‬is not a conjunctive letter but has
the same meaning as ‫או‬, "or."

11:6

‫ואת הארנבת‬, and the rock-badger. The reason the Torah chooses to describe the whole
species by its female gender is because when one deals with concepts of impurity one finds on
occasion that the female is on top of the male making the male subordinate to the female.
Mention of the female of the species first then is for the very same reason that the male is
mentioned first most of the time, i.e. to describe the dominant part of the species. There is an
interesting comment in the Zohar on ‫ פרשת פנחס‬page 231 according to which the mystical
aspect of the ‫( יותרת הכבד‬Leviticus 3,4 et al) is that the female input results in the male
achieving whatever excess it possesses. [Seeing the word ‫כבד‬, liver, is masculine, one would
have expected the Torah to describe the lobe, ‫ יותרת‬as something masculine rather than
something feminine. Ed.] We have already pointed out that all the forbidden species originate
or have become part of the ‫קליפה‬, the domain described in Kabbalah as part of the negative
side of the emanations, that which is not destined for eternal life.

11:7

‫והוא גדה לא יגר‬, but it does not chew the cud, etc. The Torah uses these words as a condition,
i.e. as long as the pig has not reverted to chewing the cud it may not be eaten. In the future,
when it undergoes evolutionary changes so that it will become a ruminant, it will again be fit
to be eaten by Jews. It is not the Torah which will adapt to "realities," but "reality" which will
adapt to Torah; the laws of the Torah are immutable, the nature of the pig is not.

11:10

‫שקץ הם לכם‬, they are a detestable thing unto you. The letter in ‫ ו‬verse 11, beginning with
the words ‫ושקץ יהיו לכם‬, is to be understood as the rationale; "because the Torah has
determined in verse 10 that certain kinds of fish and other animals which populate the sea and
the rivers are detestable, they must be regarded as detestable by Jews." We are taught in
Chulin 5 that G'd protects the animals of the righteous so that they will not consume the kind
of food forbidden to their owners. If G'd is so concerned about the food eaten by the property
of the righteous, how mcuh more concerned must He be that the righteous themselves do not
consume such food? Tossaphot comment there that we observe that a famous scholar
committed judicial murder by executing a certain witness believing him to be an ‫עד זומם‬, the
type of false witness for whom the Torah legislated this penalty. How do we square this with
the statement just quoted? Tossaphot answer that the rule applies only to food-intake, not to
the commission of other sins. It would be demeaning for the ‫ צדיק‬to eat something the Torah
characterised as ‫ שקץ‬even if he did so inadvertently. It is this idea the Torah refers to by
writing ‫ושקץ יהיו לכם‬, i.e. to include even people who eat these creatures inadvertently. The
negative effect on the Jewish soul is not determined by whether such foods have been eaten
deliberately or unintentionally. The words ‫ יהיו לכם‬tell us of the permanent effect consumption
of such fish or crustaceans has on our personality, ‫נפש‬.

11:14

‫ואת האיה למינה‬, and the falcon after its kind. The falcon mentioned here includes many
different kinds of birds all of which are sub-categories of the falcon family. Our sages in
Chulin 63 state that at the time they were familiar with 120 different species of birds all of
which belonged to that family. There may be even more than that number. The same applies
to the many varieties of ravens, though the Torah mentions only the word "the raven" as if
there were only one such bird.

11:21

‫אשר לו כרעים‬. which have jointed legs above their feet, etc. In my treatise on Tur Yore
Deyah 85 I have explained in detail that Rashi is correct that these winged creatures have to
have legs which are attached close to their throats. People who permit these creatures to be
eaten because there are no species which conform to this description are in error. The fact is
that of the four, respectively eight categories of winged creatures listed in verses 22 as
permitted to eat, only one category is found in our parts of the world. The eight kinds of
forbidden swarming things listed in verses 29 and 30 also do not have their habitat in parts of
the globe inhabited by Jews. Most of the winged things that do abound in our part of the globe
do not have the kind of jointed legs that would make them edible according to the Torah's
criteria. Most of these details are discussed in Chulin 63-65. The important thing is that the
fact that we do not find the species mentioned in the Torah in our parts of the globe is no
proof that they do not exist and that our sages have misinterpreted the Torah. Any G'd-fearing
Jew will abstain therefore from eating any of these things and will protest when he sees other
Jews eating them. For the last 12 years after I have published these words and people stopped
eating these kinds of "grasshoppers," our land has not been afflicted by the plague of locusts.
This is proof that observance of Torah and the commission of good deeds protects us against
natural disasters.

11:23

‫אשד לו ארבע דגלים‬, which have four legs. Torat Kohanim explains that the reason the Torah
appears to repeat something here that has been written in verse 20 is to tell us that if such a
creature has five legs it is permitted to be eaten. It would appear that the same holds true if
such creatures have six or more legs. We need to examine why the Torah saw fit to write this
legislation in an indirect way requiring us to arrive at the ruling that 5-legged winged
swarming things are permitted by exegesis instead of writing outright that if such creatures
have five legs we may eat them. Alternatively, the Torah could have written that any such
creatures moving on more than 4 legs are permissible. Perhaps the Torah also had to inform
us about the permissibility of brine in which forbidden locusts had been stored. Torat
Kohanim had interpreted the repetition of the word ‫ שקץ הוא‬to be an exclusion, i.e. only the
actual body of the winged swarming thing is prohibited. The Torah therefore had to write this
verse in order to get this point across.

11:24

‫ולאלה תטמאו‬. And by these you will become unclean; According to Torat Kohanim the word
‫ ולאלה‬refers to the future, i.e. the animals mentioned in the paragraph commencing now. If this
were so, I do not understand the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ואלה‬. There was no need for that letter if
all the Torah wanted to introduce here was the list of animals which confer impurity if one
touches their carcass.

Perhaps Torat Kohanim meant that the animals listed in the paragraph commencing here have
the same ‫ הלכה‬concerning impurity as the ones already mentioned in the previous paragraph.
In other words, every species of domestic animal and free-roaming animals whether of the
pure or the impure categories which do not chew the cud or have parted hooves and are not
listed by name are all included in the expression ‫כל הבהמה‬. This would justify the extra letter ‫ו‬
before the word ‫ולאלה‬. The letter ‫ ו‬then includes all the unnamed animals. This same rule
applies also to all the animals listed in the paragraph detailing which identifying features
make an animal suitable for consumption by Jews. Hence the Torah wrote the letter ‫ו‬. In order
that we should not make a mistake and include everything which had been mentioned earlier
in this regulation, the Torah had to spell out that this legislation applies only to ‫בהמה וחיה‬, to
mammals.

Another possibility is that the Torah was very interested in writing the regulations about
impurity immediately adjoining the regulations about what may and what may not be eaten.
The lesson is then that just as culpability for eating something forbidden commences when
one has consumed a minimum amount of meat the size of an olive, so one does not become
defiled unless one had contact with some dead animal or part of an animal not smaller than
the size of an olive.

Torat Kohanim posits that the verse deals with ‫אבר מן החי‬, the law that one may not eat living
tissue, i.e. tissue of an animal still alive regardless of whether the animal is of the permitted or
the forbidden category. The author of Torat Kohanim derives the rule about the minimum size
of an animal which confers impurity through contact with its carcass from verse 40 where the
Torah writes that ‫האוכל מנבלתם טמא עד הערב‬, that someone eating of the carcass of such dead
animals remains impure until the evening of that day (after immersion). The exact wording in
Torat Kohanim is that "the words ‫ ולאלה תטמאו‬were only written in order to provide us with
the minimum quantity that someone in contact with dead animals has to either consume or
carry in order to become impure by such contact or eating." Perhaps one may say that an
additional allusion found in these words is that if the animal gave birth to a category of animal
such as the ones listed it is subject to the same ruling.

I have seen that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra wrote that he believed that the word ‫ אלה‬referred
back to all the animals mentioned earlier including the winged swarming creatures. I think he
would have done well not to write such a comment and to quarrel with the ancient
commentators seeing that what he wrote cannot be supported at all. Who is going to take him
seriously especially when he teaches something which contradicts our accepted tradition?
Even a junior scholar can determine that this could not be the plain meaning of the verse. [The
author continues to lambast Ibn Ezra in this vein. Ed.]

11:29

‫וזה לכם הטמא‬. This is what is impure for you among the swarming things which swarm on
the earth; considering that Torat Kohanim on the previous paragraph explained the word ‫ואלה‬
as teaching that eating living tissue of an animal causes impurity, the word ‫ וזה‬may be
interpreted as comparing present legislation to previously announced legislation. Accordingly,
this word teaches that our paragraph also speaks about ‫אבר מן החי‬, teaching us that it is the
limb size and not the size of the meat on it which determines when one becomes culpable
regardless of whether we speak of mammals or swarming creatures.

Furthermore, the letter ‫ ו‬before the word ‫ זה‬does not have to mean that we are to make the
legislation in this paragraph interchangeable with that in the previous paragraph (as is the
usual function of this letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of a new pragaraph), but to give us warning that
an additional type of impurity is conferred upon the person contacting the dead ‫שרץ‬, namely
having contacted merely its blood. Touching or otherwise being in contact with the blood of a
dead mammal does not confer ritual impurity on a person (compare Torat Kohanim on our
verse).

The word ‫לכם‬, "unto you," is explained by Torat Kohanim as excluding blood from such
creatures making plants susceptible to impurity as opposed to water and certain other liquids.
The word also means that impurity is conferred by such creatures only on Jews, not on
Gentiles.

We need to examine why the Torah did not include the snake, the original cause of all ritual
impurity, in the list of creatures whose carcass causes impurity on contact? Perhaps the reason
is that the impurity caused by the serpent was of a spiritual rather than a physical nature.
When the serpent dies, its body remains devoid of any vestige of spirituality so that impurity
has nothing to attach itself to. We find a similar reasoning in Baba Metzia 114 where we are
told that the reason the corpse of a pagan does not confer ritual impurity when one finds
oneself under the same canopy with such a body is for this very reason. [The Talmud reports
the prophet Elijah explaining that the term ‫ אדם‬is not applicable to pagans; hence their dead
bodies cannot confer impurity by one being under the same canopy with such bodies. Ed.]
Whereas the bodies of Israelites confer impurity when one is under the same canopy with
them, this is because there is a residue of spirituality adhering to such bodies. [in kabbalistic
terms there has not yet been a clean break between the fusion of soul (source of spirituality)
and body which existed when the person was alive. Ed.] ‫ שרצים‬confer impurity by their bodies
rather than by their spirits and this is why they confer such impurity only after they are dead.
The impurity of the serpent by contrast is far more intense than that of the ‫שרצים‬.

‫למינהו‬, according to its kind. The meaning of the word is that there are numerous categories
of turtles and lizards. Even if there were only one category of lizards the Torah would still use
the word ‫למינהו‬. In Chulin 122 we find the following Baraitha: "when the Torah speaks of
‫הטמאים‬, the impure ones (an unnecessary letter ‫) ה‬, this includes the skin of the soft skinned
‫ שרצים‬being considered as part of their flesh [when the skin is attached to the flesh. Ed.]; I
might think that this rule applies to all of the animals listed; to inform me that this is not so
the Torah writes ‫ אלה‬in the following verse (30). To the question that the word ‫ אלה‬is a
collective term including all the previously mentioned animals, Rav answered that the word
‫ למינהו‬separates between what was described in the previous verses and what follows from
here on in." Whence does Rav know that the word ‫ למינהו‬is intended to serve as an
interruption of what was listed before instead of telling us that there are several varieties of
turtles and lizards? We must assume that Rav did not mean to invalidate the plain meaning of
the verse, i.e. that there are different varieties of lizards. He considered the fact that on the one
hand the word ‫ הטמאים‬is used inclusively to extend the ritual impurity to the skins of these
animals. On the other hand, the verse immediately adds an exclusion by writing the word ‫אלה‬.
If the word ‫ למינהו‬had not been written in between I would not have known how to apply the
inclusive ‫ ה‬in the word ‫ הטמאים‬and the exclusive message contained in the word ‫אלה‬. Now,
-even though the word ‫ למינהו‬- is required in its own right, it also serves to separate between
what was written in the previous verse and what is written in verse 30. This also answers the
question raised by Tossaphot on that folio that if the word ‫ למינהו‬acts as separating the
previous verse from the following one, why did the Torah have to write the word ‫?אלה‬
(Tossaphot remain with the question). When you adopt our approach there is no problem even
according to the opinion that the word ‫ הטמאים‬includes the legislation that the skin of these
animals also confers impurity. If we follow the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, the determining
factor of whether the skin is treated like the flesh of the animal depends on the feel of the skin
relative to the flesh. It does not depend on the verse these animals are mentioned in relative to
other verses. [it appears that the main disagreement concerns the skin of the lizard which
according to Rabbi Yehudah (Shabbat 107) would certainly not be considered as integral to
the rest of the body. Ed.] At any rate, the word ‫ למינהו‬is certainly needed in its own right.

11:31

‫הטמאים‬. the impure ones. How does the Rabbi who did not derive the impurity for the skins
of these animals from the word ‫ הטמאים‬explain this word? According to Torat Kohanim on
this verse that Rabbi derives from this word that the eggs of such ‫ שרצים‬are impure if they
have developed to a stage where they clearly contained an embryo. Me-ilah 17 also teaches
that the blood of one category of ‫ שרץ‬and another category of ‫ שרץ‬combine to form the
minimal quantity which confers impurity on those contacting same.
We have to know what the word ‫ אלה‬is to exclude according to the exegetical approach
adopted by that Rabbi. Perhaps we must understand that Rabbi in terms of what Maimonides
wrote in the fourth chapter of his treatise Avot Hatumah, namely that the blood of a ‫שרץ‬
conforms to the same rules as the ‫ שרץ‬itself as long as it is part of the animal. The word ‫אלה‬
teaches that when the blood of such a ‫ שרץ‬is no longer part of it, it does not combine with the
animal it was taken from to form the minimal quantity which would confer impurity on
someone who comes in contact with it.

11:40

‫והאכל מנבלתה‬, anyone eating of its carcass, etc. According to Torat Kohanim the only reason
this verse was written is to inform us that the size of an animal which confers ritual impurity
on someone carrying or touching its carcass is the same as that of someone eating of it, i.e. the
size of an olive. The verse does not intend to convey the meaning that a reader who did not
read any of the aforegoing would have derived from it, namely the prohibition of eating from
such a carcass and that swallowing it confers impurity. The reason that we cannot understand
the verse in that way is that we already have a clear verse in Leviticus 22,8: "he must not eat it
on pain of becoming impure through it." The word ‫ בה‬in that verse is an exclusion and means
that only the carcass of a pure bird which died of natural causes confers such impurity as soon
as one swallows it but not the swallowing of parts of a mammal which dies of natural causes
rather than ritual slaughter. Dead birds do not confer impurity through contact; therefore the
Torah had to tell us that if the bird was a pure bird it does confer impurity as soon as it
reaches one's esophagus and if a priest ate from that bird he is disqualified from performing
his duties unless he purifies himself. Why did the Torah not spell out such a regulation but
depended on our deriving it through exegesis? Perhaps the Torah intended to teach us
numerous halachot from a single verse, something that would have been difficult if the verse
had only stated that the carrion of a clean bird is capable of conferring impurity by one's
swallowing it. We are taught in Chulin 71, for instance, that if the meat of a dead swarming
thing has deteriorated to the extent that a dog would reject it as unfit to eat, it no longer
confers impurity. This halachah is derived by Tossaphot in Bechorot 23. We have a verse in
Kings II 9,10 where Izzevel, wife of king Achav, is described as being eaten by the dogs, not
being buried. We note that consumption of meat by dogs is described by the term ‫ אוכל‬the
same term used for humans consuming food. Seeing that it is the intention of our verse to
establish a linkage between eating and impurity, it is only logical that other halachot of that
nature may be derived from this verse.

11:43

‫אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם‬, "Do not make something detestable out of your persons, etc." Why
did the Torah repeat this commandment? Torat Kohanim writes that this includes separate
culpability for someone who after having contacted the dead part, let it go, and then touched it
again. Granted that what is stated in Torat Kohanim is true and that one is indeed culpable for
repeated contact with carrion, why did the Torah have to write this? Who would have
imagined that the second time one contacted the carrion one would not be culpable? Perhaps
the verse wants to inform us that if someone eats these swarming things his soul will become
something detestable and the Torah warns us in clear terms not to cause our souls to become
something detestable. The Torah hints at the same time how much or how little of such
carrion will have such an effect on our souls. Look at what we have written on Genesis 1,26
on the words ‫וירדו בדגת הים‬, "and they are to have dominion over the fish of the sea, etc." You
will find there that our sages in Pessachim 49 referred to ‫עמי הארץ‬, unlearned and therefore not
truly observant Jews, as ‫ שקץ‬and that they compared the daughters of such people to ‫ שרץ‬also.
All such statemnents of our sages are inspired by the Holy Spirit. These words are identical to
what we have written here.

The Torah says here ‫ולא תטמאו בהם‬, "do not make yourselves unclean with them." We need
to be very circumspect concerning anything which may possibly infringe on this warning.
Whenever we are in doubt about contacting something which may or may not fall under the
category of things that would confer impurity on our souls we must avoid such things at all
costs. There is no vegetable or other produce which is not infested with some of the things
which are detestable; we must therefore be most careful in examining all such produce before
consuming it.

11:44

‫כי אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, "for I am the Lord your G'd." The major difference between Israel and
any other nation is that G'd has not described Himself as the "Lord G'd" of any other nation.
This obligates us to keep our distance from anything which contaminates us.

‫והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים‬, "sanctify yourselves and be holy." The meaning of this statement
is that if we do our share in trying to deserve the appellation "holy," G'd on His part will
bestow such a title upon us by not allowing such contaminating elements to enter our bodies.
We have already quoted the Talmud Chulin 4 in which G'd is described as insuring that even
the beasts of the righteous do not eat matters unfit for the owner to eat. G'd would certainly
protect the ‫ צדיק‬himself against erroneously consuming such matters.

Another meaning of the word ‫ והתקדשתם‬is "sanctify yourselves by means of erecting

protective legal fences," i.e. rabbinic ordinances designed to reduce the likelihood of
contacting and absorbing impure material. G'd tells us that if you do this: "I in turn will help
you become holy." The Torah then spells out in what respect you are going to be holy. ‫כי קדוש‬
‫אני‬, "for I am holy;" G'd made His presence amongst us dependent on our keeping ourselves
apart from contaminating influences. This is why such people are entitled to the same
appellation "holy" as is applied to G'd Himself. ‫" ולא תטמאו‬and you will not become defiled,
etc." This is a promise by G'd that if we make every effort not to become contaminated by the
‫ שרצים ושקצים‬swarming detestable things mentioned in this chapter, G'd's appreciation will
become manifest in that we will not become the passive victims of other kinds of impurity.
Pagans are included in the terminology ‫שרצים ושקצים‬. G'd promises that if we make every
effort not to become contaminated by the swarming or creeping things mentioned in this
chapter, He will make sure that we will not be under the dominion of pagans.

11:45

‫כי אני ה׳ המעלה אתכם מארץ מצרים‬, "For I am the Lord who has brought you out of the land
of Egypt, etc." The Torah provides proof that G'd will protect the Jewish people from
becoming enmeshed in the sin of contamination by impuriy. He took the Israelites out of such
a contaminated environment in which their souls were completely submerged. We have
mentioned this concept on previous occasions. If the Israelites will now take active steps to
preserve their isolation from such contamination, G'd will certainly do His share to see that it
does not occur again. If, on the other hand, the Israelites were to absorb any of these
forbidden ‫ שקצים ורמשים‬as nutrients, they would revert to the environment dominated by the
spiritually negative forces of the world, the ‫קליפות‬. In such a case G'd could not be their
companion as He does not associate His name with such forces. This was the reason He never
associated His name with the Israelites until after the people had left Egypt.

11:46

‫זאת תודת הבהמה והעוף‬, "This is the law of the beast and of the fowl, etc." The entire verse
appears superfluous. Chulin 27 explains that the reason for the verse is to teach us that birds
too require ritual slaughter; we learn this from the fact that the word ‫ עוף‬appears between the
word ‫ בהמה‬and the word ‫חיה הרומשת‬, the fish. Placing the bird where it did, the Torah indicated
it was part ‫ חיה‬and part ‫דג‬, fish. This is why when you slaughter a bird you need to sever only
either the gullet or the windpipe not both, as in the case of mammals. We now understand
why the Torah (Moses) in Numbers 11,22 does not use the expression ‫ ישחט‬when describing
the fish of the sea. We never would have expected that fish would require ritual slaughter;
why did the Torah have to exclude it by writing ‫ יאסף‬in that verse? Answer: seeing that the
Torah in our verse listed mammals, birds, and fish in one sequence, I might have thought that
the common denominator is that all of them require ritual slaughter. The word ‫ יאסף‬in
conjunction with the words: "the fish of the sea" in Numbers 11,22 ensures that we do not
arrive at the conclusion that fish need to be slaughtered in the regular way. Once we know
that mammals need to have two vital pipes severed by slaughter and fish none, it is easy to
arrive at the conclusion that birds need to have only one vital pipe severed by slaughter.

You may ask that if this is so why did the Torah bother to also mention ‫נפש השורצת על הארץ‬
"every creature that swarms on earth" i.e. the grasshoppers or locusts in our verse? Answer:
The Torah was concerned that since these creatures were not mentioned as exempt from ritual
slaughter by the word ‫ יאסף‬in connection with fish in Numbers 11,22 that I might conclude
locusts have to be slaughtered. By mentioning them in our verse after the fish which do not
require slaughter the Torah precludes us from making such an error.

‫חסלת פרשת שמיני‬

12:2

‫דבר …לאמור‬. "Speak…to say." Why does the word ‫ לאמור‬have to be repeated here, seeing
verse 1 ended with the word ‫לאמור‬, "to say?" Perhaps the reason is that this commandment is
addressed primarily to women. The word ‫ לאמור‬after "the children of Israel," is a warning to
the women to pay special attention to this legislation. We may also explain this extra word
‫ לאמור‬in accordance with Torat Kohanim on this verse which explains the words ‫ בני ישראל‬as
excluding Gentiles. The word ‫ לאמור‬stresses that it is a privilege for Jewish women to be
given this legislation. Had they not been on a spiritually higher level than their non-Jewish
counterparts they would not have been considered as having suffered impurity through such a
natural process as giving birth. [seeing that their spiritual level had been temporarily eclipsed
by the need to focus on purely bodily functions, the mothers need to purify their bodies to
make it fit again for their spiritual functions. Ed.]

‫אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר‬, a woman who brings forth seed by giving birth to a male child, etc.
Why did the Torah not simply write: ‫אשה כי תלד זכר‬, "when a woman gives birth to a male
child, etc.?" The words ‫ כי תזריע‬appear superfluous. Our sages disagree about the reason.
Torat Kohanim on our verse writes that these words tell us that contrary to expectations a
woman who was already pregnant before this legislation was revealed to the people is also
subject to it, whereas she does not contract impurity if she gave birth just before this
legislation was revealed. Anonymous sages state that when the baby is delivered by caesarean
incision the mother does not contract impurity. The fetus has to exit from the same place
where the seed entered. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if an indeterminate mass is delivered,
i.e. some fetus clearly unable to live, the mother does contract impurity and has to bring the
required offerings. He does not accept the view that if a woman gives "birth" by caesarean
incision that she is not subject to the legislation in our chapter. Why did the Torah use the
future tense in the words ‫כי תזריע‬, and switch to the past tense writing ‫ וילדה‬instead of ‫?ותלד‬
We find that the Torah does use the word ‫ ותלד‬when describing the birth of a female child in
verse 5! Although there are numerous instances when a form of the past tense of the verb is
used by the Torah to describe something in the future, the Torah does not switch tenses
unnecessarily without trying to draw our attention to some additional meaning. Furthermore,
why does the Torah write ‫וילדה‬, "she gave birth," instead of ‫אם ילדה זכר‬, "if she gave birth to a
male child as a result," seeing there is no certainty that she will indeed give birth to a male
child rather than to a girl? One could answer the last question by saying that the word ‫ כי‬in ‫כי‬
‫ תזריע‬is equivalent to the word ‫אם‬, "if," and that this word belongs to the latter half of the
verse. This is a forced explanation, however.

Our sages in Niddah 31 as well as in Berachot 60 are of the opinion that if the woman
achieves orgasm first during marital intercourse the baby born from such a union will be
male, and that the Torah here informs us of this biological fact. This is why the Torah wrote
‫ וילדה זכר‬as something that is definite. While it is true that Rabbi Tzadok arrived at this
conclusion exegetically from Genesis 46,15 ‫ואת דינה בתו‬, the fact is that the Torah made the
birth of a male child dependent on an experience of the mother, and the birth of a female child
on the experience of the father during their union. The verse in Genesis does not provide a
reason for this linkage to the respective experience of father and mother during their union.
[The author of Torah Temimah comments on that verse that the scientific aspect of the matter
was an established fact for our sages; they knew that when two factors have to combine to
create something it is the last factor which determines the nature of the product. Hence, if the
male has spent his reproductive effort before the woman, the result will be a female child
corresponding to the reproductive power of the woman. We do not "learn" this from that
verse; the verse only alludes to something already known. Ed.] In our verse the Torah
explains the reason for this fact of life, namely that the crucial factor is who spends his
reproductive power first. The Torah did not need to add the word "first" in our verse for even
if the mother were not to expend her reproductive power first she does have to spend it in
order to produce a child of either gender. This is why the Torah also had to write the verse in
Genesis 46,15 so that from the two verses combined we would know what factors determine
the sex of a baby. [The word ‫ואת‬, "and in addition," in that verse in Genesis indicates that
Leah was last in spending her reproductive power during the union that led to the birth of
Dinah. Hence the child was a female. Ed.].

The Torah managed to include still more information in these few words. In Psalms 139,5
David says: "you have created me both last and first." This line is explained by Bereshit
Rabbah 8,1 as referring to two separate creations of man. His body was created at the very
end of the six days of creation whereas his spirit had been created already in the first verse of
the Torah prior to the creation of the light, when the Torah described the spirit of the Lord as
hovering over the deep. We are told by the Zohar Kedoshim page 80 that the nature of the
soul or personality of a baby is determined by the thoughts of the father and mother during
marital union. If the parents entertain unworthy thoughts during such a union the personality
of the baby will tend to be attracted to spiritually negative forces, whereas if the thoughts of
the parents during their physical union are worthy this will be reflected in the children of such
unions. Consider carefully what we are told in Berachot 10 and the Jerusalem Talmud
Sanhedrin 10,2 about what happened to the children of the pious king Chizkiyah who had
married the daughter of the prophet Isaiah. [the regular text of the Talmud does not have this;
parts are found in Eyn Yaakov Ed.) According to the Talmud there the reason that Menashe
and Ravshoke, the sons of that union, became such heretics was some unworthy thoughts
entertained by Chiskiyah's wife at the time the child was conceived. (supposedly she
fantasized about the servants of Merodach Baladon king of Babylon) If we accept this, the
most important part of the "birth," i.e. the fusion of soul and body takes place already at the
time of conception. Not only that, but the thought which precedes ejaculation of the semen
has a determining influence on the tendency of the baby's character development. This would
be the mystical aspect of the words ‫כי תזריע וילדה‬, the nature of what will be born is
determined at the time of conception. After that period it is already too late to reverse what
occurred at the time of the union between father and mother. The term ‫לידה‬, birth, is therefore
applicable to a process which is a long way from becoming visible. Once we have appreciated
this we will have a better understanding of Genesis 12,5 where the Torah speaks of
personalities ‫ נפש‬which Abram and Sarai made in Charan, i.e. due to their union as man and
wife. Although Sarai had not given birth to a physical child in those years, the thoughts that
she and her husband entertained while they tried to conceive children produced the kinds of
souls which became G'd fearing individuals in other bodies. This does not contradict the truth
of the statement that the sex of the child is determined at the time of conception. The Torah
wrote the word ‫זכר‬, male, as a hint that already during the moments when the bodies of the
parents join in marital union they have it within their power to determine the sex of the child
which will be the result of such a union by dint of the thoughts which they entertain at that
time. These will enable them to draw down from heaven a male soul. (or "a soul from the part
of heaven inhabited by male souls").

The verse contains an allusion to other psychological factors which are part of the process of
conception, i.e. the physical union between man and wife. A woman is neither obligated to
have children, nor does she as a rule volunteer to beconme pregnant, an experience she finds
often painful, fraught with many discomforts and danger to her health culminating in the
excruciatingly painful experience of giving birth. In fact, there are women who avoid getting
married in order to avoid the experience of pregnancy and birth. If the woman does get
married, the feelings she entertains during marital intercourse are frequently limited to
gratifying her physical pleasure during such intercourse. According to Gittin 49 a woman's
desire in this respect is greater than that of her husband. [according to the author this is the
meaning of the statement in the Talmud that "her urge to get married is greater than that of her
husband." Ed.] In our verse the Torah hints that if a woman enters marriage although she is
not commanded to do so, this will be accounted for her as a meritorious deed, as if she were a
male and had fulfilled the commandment to procreate incumbent upon the male. The Torah
writes: ‫אשה כי תזריע‬, that when a woman is active in joining in an activity which will result in
the birth of a baby, i.e. she engages in intercourse in order to have children, and not in order to
satisfy her biological urge, she may have a son. If the Torah had merely written ‫אשה כי תלד‬
‫זכר‬," when a woman gives birth to a male child, etc," we would have understood that the
process described above occurs as a result of any mating between husband and wife
irrespective of their thoughts at the time. As it is, the Torah teaches how a woman can acquire
the stature of a ‫זכר‬, male. The reason the Torah has to add the word ‫ וילדה‬is to tell us that she
attains that level only if the thoughts she entertained during intercourse also result in the
actual birth of a child. Perhaps this is also part of the meaning of the word ‫ לאמור‬in verse 2,
the need for which we had questioned earlier. The sequence of ‫לאמור אשה‬, suggests that Moses
was to tell the women how a woman may attain a spiritually superior niveau; she will do so
by volunteering to have children and by entertaining lofty thoughts during the process of
conception. Perhaps this is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 10,1; ‫" ;בן כסיל תוגת אמו‬a
foolish son is his mother's sorrow." A son who is not up to the expectations of his mother may
well be the outcome of the kind of thoughts the mother did not entertain when she conceived
him.

The verse also contains an allusion to the ‫כנסת ישראל‬, the Jewish people as a conceptual entity.
We find that this term is applied to women in such verses as Isaiah 54,5: ‫כי בעליך עושיך‬, "for
He who has made you will espouse you;" the prophet also continues: ‫ואשת נעורים‬, "and the
wife of your youth;" the prophet Hoseah describes the relationship of G'd and ‫ כנסת ישראל‬in
Hoseah 2,21: ‫וארשתיך לי לעולם‬, (G'd speaking to His bride) "I will betroth Myself to you
forever, etc." Isaiah 50,1: "where is the bill of divorce I have given you?" There are more such
verses to be found scattered throughout the Books of the Prophets. ‫וילדה זכר‬, "and she gives
birth to a male child, etc." when viewed from a moral-ethical vantage-point, the Torah
reveals that when the ‫ מזריע‬the initiative for the husband-wife relationship with G'd originates
with the Jewish people, the ‫כנסת ישראל‬, then the product of such an initiative will be a male
child, ‫זכר‬, the entire nation will attain the highest spiritual level. The word ‫זכר‬, male, is
hyperbole for the highest moral-ethical achievenment. In Sanhedrin 98 and Shemot Rabbah
15 the superiority of the ultimate redemption to the redemption at the time of the Exodus from
Egypt is described. The ultimate redemption is perceived there as the corollary of Israel
distinguishing itself by the performance of good deeds, etc. The prophet described the Exodus
in terms of Israel being "naked and nude" (Ezekiel 16,7). Clothing is perceived as a layer of
‫ מצות‬and good deeds covering our bodies. The inadequacy of the Jewish people at the time of
the Exodus is underlined in Deut. 4,34 where G'd describes the Exodus as wrenching one
people from the midst of the same people, something that made it legally difficult for G'd to
justify taking the Israelites out of Egypt when He did. That redemption has been described
only in female terms and that is why it did not endure in the end and the Temple was
destroyed. Not so the redemption of the future which will occur as a direct result of Israel's
merits. First and foremost among those merits is Israel's preoccupation with Torah as
described in Deut. 31,21 something that will never be forgotten even during a protracted
period of exile. The Torah continues: ‫וטמאה‬, the mother contracts ritual impurity as a result of
giving birth. Here the Torah alludes to the way G'd initiates a process which culminates in the
rehabilitation of Israel so that it will attain a spiritual level that qualifies for the description
‫זכר‬. The "days" mentioned here are to be understood as seven years similar to Genesis 24,55
where Laban and his mother wanted Rebeccah to delay her departure by ‫ימים‬, i.e. a year. The
years which are viewed as the ‫חבלי משיח‬, the birth-pangs of the Messiah, last for seven years
during which Israel will be refined spiritually in preparation of his arrival. He will make his
appearance during the eighth year. On the eighth day, at the beginning of the eighth day
(year), the baby is to have its foreskin removed, i.e. the concept of a foreskin which acts as a
barrier between man and G'd will be removed from the universe. We read in Zachariah 13,2
that G'd will destroy the spirit of impurity from the earth. This will occur during the eighth
year. It is well known that conceptually the foreskin is identical with the forces of the ‫קליפה‬,
the spiritually negative emanations. When the Torah wrote the word ‫וטמאה‬, describing the
state of the mother, this is a simile for the afflictions experienced during the birth-pangs of the
Messiah.

12:3

‫וביום השמיני‬, and on the eighth day, etc. Why did the Torah have to instruct us to circumcise
a male baby on the eighth day, something that has been legislated already in Genesis 17,12
prior to the birth of Isaac, even? If all the Torah wanted was to tell us that the rite of
circumcision must be performed by day and not by night, or that the importance of
circumcising the baby on the eighth day is so important that the Sabbath may be violated in
order to fulfil this commandment on time (compare Shabbat 132), why did G'd not include
this information in Genesis?

Perhaps the reason G'd did not mention all this to Abraham at the time was so that people
should not think that only the patriarchs were allowed to violate the Sabbath in order to
circumcise the baby on the eighth day, seeing they had not yet been commanded to observe
the Sabbath as a day of rest and that therefore the observance of the Sabbath was not so
important. However, the Israelites, who were warned in Exodus 31,14 not to violate the
Sabbath on pain of execution, were not expected to circumcise their babies on the Sabbath.
The Torah repeated the legislation here in order to include the detail that the Sabbath was not
to take precedence over circumcision on the eighth day. While it is true that the Talmud in
Chulin 101 states that the legislation about ‫ גיד הנשה‬was legislated at Mount Sinai, the Torah
decided to record it in Genesis 32,33 to inform us of the reason for this legislation. Similar
considerations may have motivated the Torah in recording the legislation about circumcision
already in Genesis 17,12 though it was commanded to the Jewish people collectively at
Mount Sinai. All of this still enables those who want to, to argue that there is reason to be
more lenient about the date of the circumcision prior to the revelation at Mount Sinai than
afterwards.

Furthermore, we may assume that what the legislation revealed to Abraham in Genesis 17,12
means is that it is as binding as if it had been revealed at Mount Sinai and that therefore the
Torah did not need to add any details to that legislation when the Israelites stood at Mount
Sinai. G'd did not need to write a special verse to tell Abraham to perform circumcision even
on the Sabbath as he would have understood this on his own just as he understood many other
‫ מצות‬which were never spelled out to him. The reason he would have considered the
circumcision legislation as overriding the Sabbath legislation is that G'd had not bothered to
command him specifically to observe the Sabbath, but He had commanded him specifically
concerning the circumcision. In fact, if G'd had spelled out to Abraham that the circumcision
on the eighth day overrides the Sabbath legislation, every exegete would have written reams
of paper wanting to know why G'd had bothered to do this, seeing that Abraham could have
arrived at this by simple logic. Seeing G'd did not tell Abraham, He had to tell the Israelites
who, after all, had been commanded to observe the Sabbath and who could not have arrived at
these details by using logic as could Abraham at the time.

Let us now turn to why the Torah wrote this piece of legislation immediately after the law
about the mother who gave birth contracting a kind of ritual impurity lasting for seven days
similar to the menstrual impurity. The Torah simply wanted to explain why the circumcision
of the baby has to be delayed for seven days (compare Shabbat 135). This is the reason that
the Torah wrote ‫וביום השמיני‬, the letter ‫ ו‬indicating that the timing was related to what has been
described previously. The Talmud in Niddah 31 elaborates further, suggesting that the "whole
world should not be rejoicing when the baby is introduced to Judaism while its mother is
depressed being ritually impure." Devarim Rabbah 6,1 writes as follows: "why does the baby
have to be circumcised on the eighth day after its birth? G'd exercised His mercy on the baby
waiting until it was strong enough to endure this operation. Just as G'd exercises His mercy on
human beings He did so on animals and this is why a new born animal may not be offered as
a sacrifice until the eighth day after it has been born (compare Leviticus 22,27).
How do we know that the baby attains a certain amount of physical strength by the eighth day
after its birth? It appears that we have to rely on the Zohar both in our Parshah as well as in
Parshat Emor where it is explained that the experience of a single Sabbath in its life confers
such additional physical strength upon both the baby and the new-born animal. The Sabbath
experience provides what is called ‫כח חיוני‬, a life-sustaining force. You will also find the
comment of Bereshit Rabbah 10 that prior to the first Sabbath the universe was in a very
unstable condition. It was only the Sabbath which helped stabilise the entire universe. This is
what the sages meant when they said that the experience of a Sabbath helps stabilise the vital
signs of new-born babies and animals. The letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ וביום‬also links the impurity of
the mother to the circumcision experience of the baby, i.e. if the baby's mother is meticulous
in her observance of the laws pertaining to menstruating women, her baby's chances of living
long enough to experience circumcision and not being harmed by it are improved.

Our verse may also be explained in terms of Tanchuma Tazria 5 where we have the following
statement: "The Roman Governor Turnus Rufus asked Rabbi Akiva whose actions were more
pleasing, G'd's or man's? Rabbi Akiva answered that man's actions were more pleasing.
Turnus Rufus asked why the Israelites circumcised themselves? Rabbi Akiva said he had
known that Turnus Rufus would ask him this and this is why he had said immediately that
man's actions were more pleasing. Rabbi Akiva brought both ears of corns and white flour
proclaiming: "the former are representative of G'd's works, the latter are representative of
man's works. Are not the latter nicer than the former?" Thereupon Turnus Rufus wanted to
know why G'd commanded circumcision instead of creating man without a foreskin? Rabbi
Akiva replied that the whole reason for Torah legislation is in order to refine human beings as
we know from Psalms 18,31 'the word of the Lord is refining;' Rabbi Akiva did not content
himself with the example of the ears of corn versus the finished product, the scone or roll,
seeing that the improvement necessary in order to convert ears of corn into flour is intended to
add to man's enjoyment and man therefore is motivated to convert ears of corn into flour. This
cannot be said of his body. Man does not feel that the foreskin is a hindrance to his physical
perfection. There was a reason therefore for G'd Himself to create man without a foreskin if
that was His will. Why did He leave this to man instead of doing it Himself? Rabbi Akiva
therefore answered Turnus Rufus that G'd's laws are designed to refine man. This appears to
be a very enigmatic answer for someone like Turnus Rufus. A pagan of the type of Turnus
Rufus does not understand the concept that man has to attain his relative perfection by means
of carrying out G'd's commandments. He therefore accepted the answer at face value. We
Israelites, G'd's favourites, have to examine the matter on a different level. One of the
remarkable things is the fact that whereas in nature we observe that nature's products
reproduce themselves true to existing features, i.e. the farmer having achieved a certain strain
of wheat, for instance, will find that if he sows seed of that strain they will reproduce
themselves identically, the same is not true of circumcised Jews producing children without a
foreskin. All our evolutionary studies ought to dictate that after thousands of years of male
Jews living their lives without foreskins, their children should be born without foreskins!
Even if we were to argue that once one has been born with a foreskin the laws of mutation
will ignore such a fact and he will reproduce children with a foreskin, why did someone such
as Moses who was born without a foreskin (compare Sotah 12) not produce children without
foreskins?

Let me enlighten you in matters of G'd's instructions to us. We have learned that the foreskin
symbolises evil, its very presence drawing attention to hidden characteristics. Man's entire
body is a sheath for the personality it hides within. The sheath reveals information concerning
what is inside it. G'd told the Jewish people that by removing the visible evidence of evil
within them, i.e. the foreskin, they would be able to diminish the power of evil hidden inside
their bodies also. If the Gentiles were to do the same, the effect would not be the same as their
entire personalities are the outgrowths of spiritually negative forces, as represented by their
foreskins. When the prophet Jeremiah 9,25 refers to all Gentiles summing them up as
"foreskins," this is very significant. It is a well-known fact that Adam possessed perfect
health, that his body created by G'd Himself lacked any particle of impurity; as a result he had
no foreskin which could symbolise any hidden impurity. When the Talmud Sanhedrin 38
describes Adam as "pulling" on his foreskin after he committed the sin of eating from the tree
of knowledge, this is a way of saying that he had developed a foreskin. After Eve had eaten
from the tree of knowledge, she too developed signs of physical impurity reflecting the fact
that her personality had absorbed input by the forces of impurity. In her case the external sign
of such impurity which corresponded to the foreskin in Adam was the menstrual blood. The
Talmud Eyruvin 100 describes no less than ten curses Eve suffered as a result of her eating
from that tree. Man's sin impacted on nature as a whole. Starting after the sin, the earth began
to produce fruit covered with many peels, the husks of an ear of grain being one example of
such ‫קליפות‬, "peels.

Proof of all this is that man cannot enjoy bread until he has first removed these peels from the
kernel of grain. He can convert it into flour only after having removed the outer husk. In fact,
the grain has to undergo no less than 10 stages of refinement before we can serve it up as
bread (compare Shabbat 73). These ten stages correspond to the ten curses we mentioned
earlier (compare Zohar Pinchas page 243). This is why when the time comes which is
envisaged by the prophet Zachariah 13,2 the earth will once again give forth rolls or scones,
ready to eat. This is what Rabbi Akiva had in mind when he contrasted the rolls with the ears
of corn. The reason that nature (G'd) does not produce perfection nowadays is not G'd's
inability to do so but man's interference in the mechanism G'd had provided for nature. As a
result, when man procreates at a time when he is already minus the foreskin, the forces
represented by the foreskin have not thereby been vanquished; they are still as active as ever
in our universe and man is nourished daily by products which have been influenced by all the
spiritually negative forces which are rampant in nature. As a result, the seed which ultimately
develops into a baby, has been inhibited by all these negative forces in our world preventing it
from developing into a human being minus the foreskin. As to Turnus Rufus' second question
that if G'd does indeed want man to be circumcised why had He not created him so, this
question was based on his ignorance of the relationship between spiritual inadequacy and the
resultant inadequacies in nature.

Alternatively, Turnus Rufus was aware that man's external appearance, i.e. that tangible
aspects of man reflect some of his intangible parts inside of him; he thought that such stains
on man's character as were reflected by his exterior had been given to him by G'd at birth. He
believed that when G'd ordered for man to remove his foreskin, the character stains which his
foreskin reflected would be removed from him by G'd. Rabbi Akiva gave him a general
answer concerning the purpose of the positive and negative commandments. Having a
foreskin is not indicative of a single stain on one's character or even a single inadequacy
which has become part of human nature. Rather, it is a reminder of basic inadequacies which
man is troubled by ever since Adam ate from the tree of knowledge. Inasmuch as man caused
these inadequacies, he must labour to overcome them. G'd does not do it for him. Rabbi Akiva
explained that all the positive commandments combined are designed to refine man, i.e. to
gradually remove the stains which are part of his being a creature born of woman.
Performance of each positive commandment restores some of the spiritual light which has
become encapsuled in a "peel" as a result of eating from that tree. The negative
commandments on the other hand, are the agents which remove the sickness which adheres to
man's soul ever since first man allowed such diseases to become part of him. The whole
process of rehabilitation is best described in Proverbs 6,23 ‫כי נר מצוה ותורה אור‬, "performance
of a single commandment is equivalent to providing the kind of light given by a single candle,
whereas the performance of all of the Torah's commandments (not given to a single individual
to perform) provides "Light", i.e. will restore the light which existed when Adam was in ‫גן‬
‫עדן‬." It is not G'd who does all this; G'd gave man the commandments as tools in order to
enable him to find his way back to "paradise lost." Seeing Adam had contaminated all future
souls, it is up to each human being to rehabilitate himself individually. I have dealt with the
subject in my commentary on Genesis 4,7.

Furthermore, if we were to allow G'd to remove all these impediments man faces nowadays,
the whole concept of reward and punishment which is the philosophical basis of Judaism
would be negated. How can one expect to be rewarded for gifts given to us by G'd? To sum
up: the fact that we are born with a foreskin is the result of spiritual damage caused to man's
soul as a by-product of his sin. This spiritual damage is reflected in an outgrowth of his body,
i.e. the foreskin. G'd ordered every male Israelite to excise the visible part of this evil from his
body. Having done this his soul will also be on the road to recovery. This is why the Torah
stresses ‫" וביום‬and on that day," etc. There was already the need for the mother to purify
herself from the impurity contracted through giving birth. Now there is the added
commandment to remove the foreskin from the baby. G'd commands concerning both these
rehabilitative steps simultaneously. This is the meaning of ‫וביום השמיני‬, "and on the eighth
day, etc." Seeing that the sin of Eve had been greater than that of Adam, man is able to
remove the physical reminder of his impurity with one stroke i.e. the foreskin does not grow
back [as distinct from normal skin Ed.], whereas woman experiences menstrual bleeding at
regular intervals.

Perhaps another reason why G'd commanded that circumcision should be performed on the
eighth day, not sooner and not later, was because on that day G'd judges the mother who has
to count seven days of impurity from the moment the baby left her womb. The baby is
perceived as having left a grave [simile for the mother's womb. Ed.] hence the baby itself has
become contaminated by contact with the impurity suffered by its mother. Seeing that
circumcision is equivalent to G'd revealing His name to man as I have hinted in my
commentary in Parshat Vayera where G'd visited Abraham after he had circumcised himself,
He wanted to wait until the seven days during which cleansing from that impurity occurs have
passed. On the eighth day the baby is fit to be circumcised.

‫ימול בשר ערלתו‬. "the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised." We understand this in
terms of what we have already mentioned, namely that the foreskin is a tangible symbol of the
‫קליפה‬, the spiritually negative part of the emanations. The Torah hints here that the ritual of
circumcision consists of three stages. They are called: 1 ;‫ מציצה‬,‫ פריעה‬,‫ )מילה‬the removal of the
foreskin itself; 2) the splitting of the membrane and pulling it down; 3) the sucking of some
blood from the place where the foreskin has been cut. The word ‫ ימול‬refers to the cutting of
the foreskin. The ‫ פריעה‬does not involve cutting that membrane and is alluded to in the text by
the word ‫בשר‬. This rite insures that the foreskin will not grow back. The word ‫ בשר‬suggests
"dead meat." The ‫ מציצה‬consists of removing blood which had been contaminated by the two
parts of the foreskin which have been removed. This blood was considered as part of the
foreskin and has to be removed alongside with the foreskin. This ritual is alluded to in the text
by the word ‫ערלתו‬, his foreskin.
There is an interesting analysis of the concept of ‫קליפות‬, peels, in an appendix to the first
volume of the Zohar page 262. The "peels" surrounding the kernel "sanctity" are compared to
the four peels surrounding the walnut. The comparison is based on Solomon speaking of the
‫גנת אגוז‬, in Song of Songs 6,11. 1) There is an outer shell which is bitter in taste, eventually
dries out and falls of its own accord. 2) There is the hard shell. 3) There is the flexible type of
shell which separates different edible parts of the nut from one another. 4) There is the thin
peel which adheres to the fruit itself and is edible when attached to the fruit. This inner peel is
not considered so despicable unless it is separated from the edible part of the nut. When we
contemplate the ritual of circumcision, we think in terms of three peels. The foreskin itself is
somewhat like the outer shell of the walnut. The membrane we fold back during what is called
‫ פריעה‬corresponds to the hard shell of the nut which is broken before one can get at the edible
part. Finally, the act of ‫מציצה‬, the sucking away of contaminated blood, corresponds to the
inner peel of the nut which separates edible parts from one another. It too has to be removed
in order to enable us to eat the nut without hindrance. Man still remains with the last "peel"
the one that we described as not totally despicable while it is attached to the edible part.
Zohar part one, page 78, refers to this part as the peel which is attached to a boy until he
reaches the age of 13. Until that time he is still considered as possessing some kind of ‫ערלה‬,
foreskin in the allegorical sense, seeing he does not yet have an antidote to the evil urge he
has been born with. To carry the simile a little further. Just as every fruit-bearing tree is
considered by the Torah as ‫ ערלה‬during its first three years of existence, so man, who is
compared elsewhere by the Torah to the tree in the field, is considered as still possessing
some ‫ ערלה‬until his ‫בר מצוה‬. Once he enters the fourteenth year of his life he is ‫קדש הילולים‬, all
his products (deeds) may become holy unto G'd.

Another way of looking at our verse may be parallel to what is written in the ‫ תקוני הזהר‬section
24, folio 69. The commandment of circumcision consists of three levels. The highest level of
this commandment is the circumcision of the children of the righteous, the children of the
living G'd. Their circumcision is an experience comparable to revelation of G'd's very name to
them. They will consider the experience as if G'd's holy name had been engraved on their very
flesh which had thus become sanctified. The next lower level of the circumcision experience
is that experienced by the average person. For such people the experience of circumcision is
equivalent to their having become a sacrificial offering to G'd. The third level of circumcision
is when children of forbidden unions are circumcised, people who are evil and hated by G'd.
When people like that perform the ritual of circumcision it is as if they donated part of
themselves to the original serpent, as if giving it dust which is its bread, i.e. these people feed
the forces of evil (compare Tikkuney Hazohar folio 10). These three levels of the circumcision
experience are alluded to in the Torah by the words ‫ימול־בשר־ערלתו‬. The first word ‫ ימול‬may be
understood as ‫יו׳ד מול‬, G'd (‫ )יו׳ד‬is perceived as present by the person being circumcised. The
word ‫ בשר‬is a simile for the meat-offerings, i.e. the person being circumcised conceives of
himself as being sacrificial meat. The word ‫ ערלתו‬is a simile for the people whom G'd hates
being circumcised. The word "his foreskin" is a reference to the unworthy part of man which
in reality is part of Satan. Unworthy people are perceived as donating those parts to Satan
when they undergo circumcision. As a result of these considerations we find that G'd
commanded all three levels of our people to undergo the ritual of circumision so that a Jewish
court would not be able to say that there is no point in performing circumcision on the body of
a ‫ממזר‬, a "bastard" (the product of a union between partners who are forbidden to be joined in
marriage on pain of the Karet penalty). The reason the Torah wants the foreskin of such a
bastard removed is to weaken the Satanic forces active within such a person. This is so even
though such a male is not allowed to marry a Jewish girl even after he has been circumcised.
Once his foreskin has been removed this (innocent) victim of the sins of his parents has a
chance to perfect his personality and to strengthen all the positive elements within him. This
is why our sages in Horiot 13 are on record that a ‫ ממזר‬who is a Torah scholar takes
precedence in matters of personal honour over a High Priest who has not studied Torah.

12:5

‫ואם נקבה תלד‬, and if she gives birth to a female child, etc. Why does the Torah not describe
the birth with the word ‫ וילדה‬as it did in the case of a male child? Torat Kohanim write: "how
would I have known that the legislation of impurity due to giving birth applies not only in the
case of a female child being born but also if a child of undetermined sex or a bisexual child
had been born? The Torah writes ‫אם נקבה תלד וטמאה‬, "if she gives birth to a female she is
ritually impure" to teach us that the basic ritual impurity depends on the birth process not on
the sex of the baby being born." I most certainly do not want to dispute what Torat Kohanim
has written, but I do want to add something to that comment. Perhaps the author of this
comment arrives at his conclusion by the failure of the Torah to write simply ‫וכי תלד נקבה‬, "if
she gives birth to a female," with the verb at the beginning of the sentence instead of at its
end. This latter sequence of the words would have indicated that what the woman gave birth
to would result in her becoming ritually impure only if the baby was definitely female. As it
is, the wording allows also for babies of indeterminate sex.

Alternatively, the fact that the position of the word ‫ תלד‬is interpreted by Torat Kohanim as
including ‫אנדרוגינוס‬, bisexual children, may reflect the fact that the author of Torat Kohanim
holds a view similar to that expressed in Bikkurim 4,5 that such a creature is considered as in a
category by itself. [The author proceeds to analyse this problem; the interested reader is
referred to the original. Ed.]

‫ וסובר כמאן דאמר‬,‫ואולי כי תנא דתורת כהנים כן סובר שמרבה טומטום מתיבת ואם ואנדרוגינוס מריבוי תלד‬
‫ ולזה אמר תלמוד לומר ואם נקבה תלד ולא הספיק לומר תלמוד לומר תלד‬,‫בריה בפני עצמה‬.

‫ ואולי שגם למאן דאמר ספק לא‬.‫אלא שצריך ליישב הכתוב למאן דאמר אנדרוגינוס ספק למה הוצרך לומר תלד‬
,‫יספיק לימוד אחד לשניהם מטעם כי ספיקו של טומטום הוא ספק שאפשר שיתברר וימצא נקבה ולזה יש לחוש לו‬
‫ ולמה שאמרו בריש פרק‬.‫ ולזה הוצרכו ב' רבויים‬,‫מה שאין כן ספיקו של אנדרוגינוס שהוא עומד כמו כן לעולם‬
‫ אם כן טומטום תתחייב לומר‬.‫) כי לא אתי קרא לספק משום דקמי שמיא גליא אם זכר אם נקבה‬.‫בתרא דיומא (עד‬
‫ ומעתה גם אנדרונגינוס אינו אלא מדבריהם ממה שהשוה אותם התנא יחד‬,‫שאין טומאתו כנקבה אלא מדבריהם‬
‫ ולחומרא נלכו בו ולא לקולא כמו‬,‫כשם שטומטום אינו אלא אסמכתא גם אנדרוגינוס אינו אלא מדבריהם ואסמכוה‬
‫ פירוש ימי‬.‫) אהא דתנן המפלת טומטום ואנדרוגינום תשב לזכר ולנקבה ע''כ‬.‫שאמרו בפרק יש נוחלין (ב''ב קכז‬
‫ וכפי זה אומרו ואם נקבה תלד שאנו מרבים‬.‫טוהר דזכר וימי טומאה דנקבה לחומרא שבשניהם יעויין שם דבריהם‬
‫הספיקות אינו אלא להסמוך לה שהוא וטמאה שבועיים אבל ימי טוהד אין לה אלא כימי זכר שאם ראתה מיום‬
‫ארבעים ללידתה אין לה משפט דם טוהר‬:

12:7

‫ ;והקריבו לפני ה׳ וכפר עליה‬and he shall offer it before G'd and make atonement for her.
Concerning the offering of the sheep as a burnt-offering the Torah said ‫והקריבו‬, whereas
concerning the turtle-dove as the sin-offering the Torah writes ‫וכפר עליה‬, "and he will make
atonement for her." Torat Kohanim write that the two sacrifices are not both dependent on
each other in order to fulfil their respective tasks but that only one depends on the other. I do
not know therefore which of the two sacrifices is indispensable, and this is why the Torah said
‫והקריבו‬, he will offer it up. Had, the Torah only written these words I still would not have
known which one of these two sacrifices was indispensable; therefore the Torah adds the
words ‫ וכפר עליה‬to tell us that the sin-offering is indispensable. Perhaps the exegesis is derived
from the fact that the Torah could have simply written ‫והקריבם‬, "and he is to offer them up."
The fact that the Torah spent all these extra words teaches that the two sacrifices are not of
equally indispensable nature.

13:2

‫אדם כי יהיה בעור בשרו שאת או ספחת‬, when a person shall have in the skin of his flesh a
rising or a scab, etc. We have to explain this verse in a similar vein to the statement in Baba
Metzia 114 on Numbers 19,14: "you are called ‫אדם‬, whereas the title ‫ אדם‬is never applied to
Gentiles, for the Gentiles are not susceptible to the impurity resulting from the various skin-
diseases enumerated in our Parshah." This statement, attributed to the prophet Elijah, is proof
that the clothing of Gentiles afflicted with these ‫נגעים‬, stains mentioned in our chapter, does
not confer impurity on Jews in contact with them as we have learned at the beginning of the
eleventh chapter of the tractate ‫נגעים‬.

‫כי יהיה בעור בשרו‬, which he will have on the skin of his flesh, etc; the Torah informs us here
that only the skin of Israelites afflicted with this disease is affected. The disease does not
penetrate below the skin. This is a principal difference between Israelites and Gentiles; the
latter are perceived as afflicted with this disease through and through. Their entire being is
perceived as being part of the ‫ צרעת‬syndrome. If an Israelite has committed a sin which results
in ‫נגע צרעת‬, the skin afflictions mentioned in this chapter, it is visible only on his exterior not
on his flesh and certainly not his soul, personality.

Our sages in Erchin 3 explain the word ‫ אדם‬as meaning that even a baby can be afflicted with
the disease related here as babies too qualified for the term ‫אדם‬. Women too are included as
the Torah refers to man and woman combined as ‫ אדם‬in Genesis 5,8.

Torat Kohanim adds that the reason the Torah chose the expression ‫בעור בשרו‬, the skin of his
flesh, instead of merely ‫בעורו‬, on his skin, is to include the skin on which hair does not grow.
We are not to think that only skin with follicles, i.e. capable of producing hair, is included
here. [the Torah features the colour of hair surrounding these skin blemishes, and it was
therefore reasonable to assume that only those patches of hair are subject to this legislation.
Ed.] As it is, if a white hair grew in an area normally devoid of hair, the legislation in this
chapter applies. Nonetheless the white spot on the skin has to precede the appearance of the
hair before this legislation can apply. If an old man or an albino who normally has white hair,
first develops the symptoms on the skin described here and a white hair makes its appearance
subsequently, it is doubtful if such a person is considered afflicted seeing the hair did not turn
white as a result of the condition of the skin surrounding it. On the other hand, the progression
of the symptoms conforms to what is written in the Torah. We are unable to determine with
certainty that the hair grew white from the source as at the time the person appears before the
priest we only see the ultimate result and do not know whether the hair grew black and
immediately turned white. Tossaphot in Niddah 19 feel that the bright spot on the skin, ‫בהרת‬,
is presumed to have caused the hair to turn white. At any rate, such a situation is one which is
known in ‫ הלכה‬as ‫ספק טומאה‬, a state of doubtful impurity.

‫שאת או ספחת‬, a rising or a scab; we are taught in Nega-im 1,1 that the meaning of the word
‫ ספחת‬is a kind of ‫שאת‬, a whiteness which is a shade darker than that of ‫בהרת‬, as the colour of
‫ שאת‬is similar to clean wool and similar in whiteness to the whitewash used in the Temple.
Even though the expression ‫ ספחת‬occurs in the Torah only in our verse, the same rule is true
for a lower degree of whiteness of ‫ בהרת‬which is the whitest of whites, similar to snow in
colour. The verse ought to be understood as if the Torah had written: ‫ או בהרת‬,‫שאת או ספחת‬
‫וספחתה‬.

We need to understand why the Torah mentioned ‫ שאת‬before it mentioned ‫בהרת‬, seeing the
latter is whiter than ‫שאת‬, in fact unmatched by anything else in whiteness? Why did the Torah
not give us a list of degrees of white in a descending order? We believe that if the Torah had
commenced by describing the whitest possible kind of skin-affliction, i.e. ‫ בהרת‬first, and had
mentioned the word ‫ ספחת‬later, I could not have derived that ‫ שאת‬also may occur in shades of
a secondary degree of whiteness which is part of its category and is called ‫ספחת דשאת‬. Even if
the Torah had written: ‫בהרת או ספחת או שאת‬, I would have concluded that there are only three
categories of the colour white which form a ‫ נגע צרעת‬instead of there being four such
categories (2 of them being sub-categories). Even if the Torah had written: ‫בהרת או שאת או‬
‫ספחת‬, I would not have known that there is an additional category called ‫ספחת הבהרת‬, seeing
the word appeared only at the end of the sequence. As it is, it is impossible to overlook the
fact that the Torah wanted us to know that ‫ ספחת‬is both a sub-category of ‫ שאת‬as well as a
sub-category of ‫בהרת‬.

Erchin 15 explains that these afflictions are a penalty for people who have spoken ill of their
fellow man. Maimonides explains this in greater detail in the seventh chapter of his Hilchot
Deyot. This is what he writes: "A person is guilty of the sin of ‫לשון הרע‬, a wicked tongue,
when he tells something detrimental to the image of this fellow man even though he speaks
the truth. If he tells lies about his fellow man he is guilty of the sin of ‫מוציא שם רע‬, bad-
mouthing another human being." We see therefore that one is called ‫בעל לשון הרע‬, even if one
tells the truth about someone, whereas one is called ‫ מוציא שם רע‬when the evil gossip one
spreads has no basis in fact. The Torah therefore describes two different categories of skin
afflictions, one to be applied to people guilty of ‫לשון הרע‬, i.e. ‫בהרת‬, the other to be applied to
people guilty of ‫מוציא שם רע‬, described by the Torah as ‫שאת‬.The reason the Torah chose the
term ‫ שאת‬as an allusion to people guilty of ‫ מוציא שם רע‬is because the Torah said in Exodus
23,1: "do not utter a falsehood." The word ‫ בהרת‬aptly describes someone who engages in ‫לשון‬
‫הרע‬, as the word describes something which is the brightest of bright, i.e. true. Although such
a person speaks the truth, what he has done is despicable. The sub-categories of which the
Torah speaks may be regarded as alluding to the verbiage which surrounds the basic
detrimental information which the respective guilty party tries to convey conversationally.

‫והיה לנגע… צרעת‬, and it will turn into a skin-afliction. Inasmuch as the most important
factor determining the impurity resulting from what is and what is not a ‫ נגע צרעת‬is revealed
by the colour of certain hairs and not by the colour of the skin alone, the Torah uses the
expression ‫ צרעת‬independent of mention of any hair. The word ‫והיה‬, "it will be," alludes to the
fact that what determines if we are dealing with a ‫ נגע צרעת‬has yet to occur.

13:3

‫ומראה הנגע‬, and the appearance of the affliction, etc. Here we come face to face with the
mystical dimension of Psalms 39,7: "man walks about as a mere shadow;" the Psalmist refers
to the appearance of raw flesh. When the forces of evil assert themselves in man this makes a
visible impression on his flesh. The healthy appearance of his skin disappears. It appears that
there is something physically missing, i.e. the skin appears as "deep," as having lost its normal
surface. It is remarkable that according to ‫הלכה‬, one is not ritually impure if this condition
covers the entire body, i.e. if this "deepness" leaves no visible mark seeing we cannot detect a
contrast with other skin or flesh (compare Shevuot 7).

‫וראהו הכהן וטמא אותו‬, and when the priest takes a look at him he will declare him ritually
impure. The Torah made the impurity conditional on the priest declaring him so. This
reminds us of a statement in Shabbat 119 that two angels accompany a person on his way
home from the synagogue on Friday nights and they examine if this person had made the
preparations for the Sabbath prior to going to the synagogue. If he did, one angel commends
him (the 'good' angel) exclaiming "may you continue to do so," whereas the second angel
[who represents man's negative actions Ed.] says "Amen." The reverse happens when the
person in question had not made preparations for the Sabbath before the onset of the Sabbath.
At any rate, the Talmud suggests that once a positive or negative momentum has been built it
feeds upon itself unless something contrary happens. Seeing that it is the priest's duty to
obtain atonement for Israel from their impurities, diseases, etc., G'd has commanded him to
concur with the judgment of impurity the afflicted person has been subjected to. This state of
impurity will continue until the afflicted person turns into a penitent when G'd will remove
the symptoms of impurity from him.

13:6

‫והנה כהה הנגע‬, and the affliction has dimmed, etc. Rashi explains this to mean that if the
appearance of the affliction remains either stationary or has spread, the person suffering from
it is impure. Maimonides writes in chapter one of his treatise Hilchot Tum-at Tzora-at that the
word ‫ כהה‬means that if the appearance is less white than any of the four degrees of whiteness
the Torah had described, the person afflicted by it is now ‫טהור‬, "clean." Similarly, if it neither
spread nor dimmed nor sprouted a white hair in the area of the affliction, the person who
suffered these symptoms is "clean" also. Thus far Maimonides.

According to Rashi the expression ‫ כהה‬in the Torah describes a comparison to a previous
condition which definitely was one of the other three symptoms qualifying for the description
‫נגע צרעת‬, whereas the present appearance is not one which does not qualify for any of the four
degrees of whiteness which would constitute the presence of a ‫נגע צרעת‬. Had the Torah
wanted to exclude the presence at this stage of all the four possible symptoms which
constitute the presence of a ‫נגע צרעת‬, the Torah should have written that there was no
appearance of anything which looked like ‫נגע צרעת‬. We must conclude therefore that our verse
discusses someone who had previously displayed at least one of the three other kinds of white
areas which would signify ‫ נגע צרעת‬such as the ‫ בהרת‬described in verse 2 which had a
subcategory ‫ספחת‬. If, however, the appearance had already been at the lowest end of the scale
of white, i.e. the skin covering an egg, it could not have dimmed any further [and still be of
concern to us halachically at all. Ed.] Alternatively, we would have to assume that there is a
lower degree of whiteness in any of the four categories ‫ נגע צרעת‬the Torah has discussed thus
far, and it is this relatively dimmer appearance the Torah describes here as ‫כהה הנגע‬. The ‫נגע‬
described as ‫ בהרת‬itself would consist of either of two degrees of whiteness, both being close
in appearance to snow-white. One of these degrees existed prior to the stage described in the
Torah as ‫כהה‬, the other after that stage had been reached. We find the following statement in
Nega-im 1,4: Rabbi Chanina says there are altogether 16 shades of a colour which could
qualify as ‫נגע צרעת‬. Rabbi Dotha claims that there are 36 such shades. Akavyah ben Mahallel
says that there are no fewer than 72 such shades which have to be examined. We may assume
that these Rabbis do not disagree as to which shades constitute an affliction resulting in the
victm becoming declared ritually impure, etc; they disagree only as to the number of shades
there are that a priest must be familiar with in order to render the proper ruling. [these shades
include also other kinds of skin afflictions such as ‫ מכרה‬and ‫ נתקים‬,‫שחין‬, etc.. Ed.] Maimonides
in his commentary on the Mishnah also writes that the disagreements do not concern basic
categories which would qualify as ‫נגע צרעת‬. Only a few of these shades actually qualify as ‫נגע‬
‫צרעת‬. There are two basic methods which may bring about a change in the legal status of the
afflicted person, seeing that the "dimming" is what determines the process of the afflicted
person becoming "clean." Either there has to be a dimming from one basic category to a lower
basic category of whiteness, or there only needs to occur a dimming from the higher level of a
category to a lower level of whiteness within the same basic category. One may make a case
for either of these approaches except that the first method appears somewhat forced. Rashi is
true to his method of interpretation of the Torah and adopts the approach that the word ‫כהה‬
‫ הנגע‬is followed in the Torah by the word ‫ הנגע‬indicating that the affliction has not been totally
uprooted though it has improved. It has only improved in appearance. Therefore he arrives at
the conclusion that if the appearance even dimmed only relatively, within the major category
it belonged to previously, this is sufficient to have this person declared "clean."

According to Maimonides, when the Torah speaks of the ‫ נגע‬having dimmed, this means that
it has become dimmer than any of the four basic categories of whiteness which cause the
priest to pronounce the person so afflicted as impure. The present state of colour is dimmer
than any of the four degrees of whiteness described in the Torah. In this respect Maimonides
agrees with Rashi that if the whiteness had dimmed to a degree of whiteness less bright than
the four categories listed, the person concerned is declared "clean." If, however, we were to
understand that the words ‫כהה הנגע‬, are a dimming which is darker than the original white but
still within the four shades of white which constitute ‫נגע צרעת‬, what news does the Torah
reveal by saying that such a person remains impure? We have to explain the words of
Maimonides as referring to the need for the afflicted person to wash his clothing [complete
ritual immersion. Ed.] even if the present appearance of the formerly white spot is dimmer
than any of the four categories of whiteness which result in the priest declaring such a person
as afflicted with ‫נגע צרעת‬.

If we accept Rashi's opinion, why did the Torah not make the dimming of the afflicted spot
conditional on it reverting to its original colour just as the Torah made the declaration by the
priest that the person is definitely afflicted dependent on the area of the whiteness spreading?
According to Maimonides, when the Torah speaks of the afflicted area as not "having spread,"
the meaning is that it has not dimmed in colour either. According to Rashi we do not know
what the legal status of the person under observation at the end of the second week would be
in such a situation.

As mentioned previously, we can approach the problem in two ways. According to method
one, both expressions i.e. ‫ כהה‬and ‫ לא פשה הנגע‬describe conditions which result in the formerly
afflicted person being considered "clean." Seeing that we do not need both expressions in
order to teach us the same ‫ הלכה‬in the same setting, one of these expressions is used
exegetically as applicable to a situation other than the one described in our verse. [something
which in the thirteen exegetical rules of Rabbi Yishmael is called ‫לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא על‬
‫ ;הכלל כולו יצא‬Ed.] In our case one example, i.e. that the whiteness has dimmed, teaches that if
it resumes its former brightness the person previously under suspicion of being a ‫ צרוע‬will this
time be considered as definitely afflicted. This will be so even though the white spot he
suffers from now is no brighter than the whiteness of the spot he suffered from previously
while he was only under observation. This is only true however, if previously the white spot
had never dimmed enough to be less white than any of the basic four categories of whiteness
which potentially make him impure, afflicted. Seeing he had previously not been declared
impure, his again having a spot of that degree of whiteness on his skin would not make him
worse off than before, i.e. under observation by the priest only. Do not ask concerning the
example of ‫פשיון‬, spreading, which the Torah describes as one following the afflicted person
having come under the priest's scrutiny and isolation and having been declared ritually pure.
The person in question is one who is again ritually pure. Nonetheless the Torah ordered that if
such a spread occurred again, the person afflicted is considered impure and the Torah does
not allow for a situation where the area concerned either contracted or remained stationary.
Why does the Torah not allow for a situation there where the afflicted person reverts to the
status prior to the white area having spread, i.e. his status would be one of suspended ritual
purity pending further developments? This is not a valid question because in a situation of
‫פשיון‬, a horizontal spreading of the affected area, the priest declares such a person as definitely
‫ צרוע‬already at the end of the first seven days of quarantine, unlike the situation described in
verses 4-6 where the shade of white is the determining factor. Perhaps Rashi thought that the
second approach to our problem is based on reasoning and does not require a specific verse to
confirm it. This is an essential weakness in Rashi's approach.

Personally, I prefer to explain our verse in the following manner: ‫" ;והנה כהה הנגע‬and behold,
the affliction has dimmed;" it has become dimmer than its original appearance but it still is
white enough to qualify under one of the basic four categories as a ‫נגע צרעת‬, (just as Rashi had
said). However, the intention of our verse is that even if the appearance of the white spots had
dimmed, the individual in question is to be declared "clean" only if there had not been a
horizontal expansion of the afflicted area on the skin during the week in question. If the white
area on the skin has expanded horizontally, the person retains the same status as he had at the
previous inspection by the priest a week earlier. My only difficulty is to know on what basis
our verse arrives at this conclusion.

Meanwhile I have seen the following statement of our sages in Torat Kohanim. "You might
have thought that the words ‫ והנה כהה הנגע‬mean that the appearance of the white spot is
dimmer than any of the four basic categories of white which would qualify as ‫;נגע צרעת‬
therefore the Torah adds the word ‫הנגע‬, to tell you that the Torah speaks of one of these four
categories. If the Torah had only written the word ‫ הנגע‬you would have thought that it could
have remained looking the same as on the last inspection. Therefore the Torah had to write
‫והנה כהה‬, it had definitively dimmed when measured against its previous appearance but not
sufficiently to be dimmer than any of the four categories of white which qualify as a ‫נגע צרעת‬.
The words ‫ והנה כהה‬also mean that if its whiteness intensified during that week and dimmed
subsequently it is as if it had not intensified; the word ‫ הנגע‬means that if it had first dimmed
during that week only to intensify again, it is as if it had never dimmed at all." Thus far Torat
Kohanim. Clearly, the author of Torat Kohanim feels that the dimming was not sufficient to
result in such a dim appearance that it no longer would have qualified as a ‫ נגע צרעת‬at all,
unlike the comment of Rashi. However, from the statement that if the afflicted area had
intensified in whiteness at some time during that week or dimmed and intensified again, we
disregard all dimming or intensification respectively as if they had not occurred, it is clear that
this conforms to our own interpretation. It is the intention of our verse that if a certain degree
of whiteness was not visible originally, then even if it had become much whiter in the interval
as long as it had dimmed by the time the priest inspected it again it would be declared healed,
provided it had not spread horizontally. Having established this, the author of this Baraitha
clearly disagrees with both Rashi ad Maimonides. Nonetheless, as mentioned we still have no
source for the opinion offered by the author of Torat Kohanim. Perhaps it is simply a
condition that there has to be a dimming of some kind before the quarantined person may
qualify for the description "clean."

I have found another comment in Torat Kohanim on our portion which is as follows: "the
meaning of the word ‫ מספחת‬in our verse is that though it did not change its appearance." This
means that even if it did not become weaker in appearance the person under observation is
declared "clean" on the second inspection by the priest. If so, we can once more revert to
explain that the reason is that the word ‫ כהה‬means that the priest does not initially examine if
the whiteness has dimmed; neither does he immediately consider if it had intensified. Both the
words of Rashi and Maimonides need further examination and seem very difficult to reconcile
with Torat Kohanim.

‫מספחת הוא‬, it is a scab. This means that it is not a ‫צרעת‬, similar to the word ‫ בהק הוא‬in
Leviticus 13,39: "it is a brightness." Nonetheless the Torah commands people afflicted with
such symptoms to wash their clothing, i.e. an indication that they have contracted a minor
form of impurity. If we look for a homiletical meaning for this law it may be that it indicates
that the victim was guilty of something called ‫אבק לשון הרע‬, a peripheral form of loose talk
about a third party. We find an example for this in Erchin 15 where a person who described a
fire in a neighbour's house is described as guilty of ‫אבק לשון הרע‬.

Another meaning of the expression ‫ מספחת היא‬is simply that this is a form of affliction which
requires the person so afflicted to "wash the clothing he wore when this affliction was
diagnosed by the priest." [actually it means ritual immersion. Ed.] We derive this from the
sequence of the words ‫מספחת היא וכבס בגדיו‬. From the words ‫ וטהרו הכהן‬just prior to this
sequence it seems clear that the priest first has to say to the afflicted person "you are clean"
before he is back to normal. This appears to be difficult to understand. It makes sense that the
person quarantined because of certain symptoms would not be considered ‫טמא‬, impure, unless
so declared by the examining priest; but why should a person who has not so far been
declared as impure require to be declared pure by the priest before returning to society?
Granted that Rashi says somewhere that this is because the person had already been
quarantined, this is not a sufficient reason. When you accept our approach to the whole verse
there is an adequate reason for the priest having to declare such a person as "clean." We had
characterised this symptom as a form of skin-affliction. If so, it is reasonable that the victim
cannot be purified from it without the formal declaration by the priest that he is "clean"
henceforth.

13:8

‫צרעת הוא‬. it is a form of leprosy. The meaning of these words is that even if the priest had
previously declared the person afflicted as "clean," this judgment is reversesd retroactively in
light of the afflicted area having spread. The reason is that a scab which does not indicate
ritual impurity is not in the habit of spreading. The Torah indicates that the spreading needs
only to be minimal in order for the afflicted person to be declared as ritually impure. It is the
scab which is the affliction, not its size.

13:10

‫והיא הפכה שער לבן ומחית בשר חי‬, and it has turned the hair white, and there be healthy
flesh, etc. The plain meaning of the verse is that two conditions must be present in order for
the afflicted person to be ritually impure, 1) healthy flesh, 2) white hair; our sages in Torat
Kohanim write as follows: "I might have thought that the person remains "clean" until he
develops white hair plus an area of healthy flesh; to teach me that this is not so the Torah
wrote: 'it is an old ‫צרעת‬,' i.e. it is impure and no other symptom is needed. If so, why does our
verse speak about white hair and healthy flesh? this teaches that impurity is not decreed unless
the area of skin is large enough to accomodate both white hair and healthy flesh." Apparently
the inference from the text that healthy flesh alone (when inside the white area) is sufficient
cause to declare the person ritually impure was based on the word ‫ ;נושנת‬this poses a problem,
however; granted that the presence of healthy flesh inside the white area does not need an
additional symptom in order for the afflicted person to be declared ritually unclean -as distinct
from the presence of white hair alone,- whence do we know that the presence of such healthy
flesh by itself results in ritual impurity? Perhaps the word ‫ היא‬in our verse refers back to
either one of two symptoms appearing; 1) the hair turning white in which case there is no
need for a further symptom; 2) healthy flesh appearing, and not as Korban Aharon explains it
as referring only to the appearance of healthy flesh. It is also possible that the rule that an area
of healthy flesh within the white area is sufficient by itself to declare the afflicted person
ritually impure is derived from the additional words ‫ בשר חי‬at the end of the verse. The words
‫ טמא הוא‬in verse 11 make it plain that no other symptoms were needed. Ignoring the words of
Torat Kohanim for the moment, I believe that the absence of the words ‫ או מחית בשר חי‬tells us
that if both symptoms exist and the white area covers the entire surface of the skin this
indicates that the person is ritually pure, something I could not have inferred if the Torah had
written the word ‫או‬. How would I then have known that the person could be declared "clean"
while suffering simultaneously from two symptoms each of which is basically a symptom
signifying ritual impurity?

13:19

‫שאת לבנה או בהרת לבנה‬, "a white rising or a very bright spot, etc." According to Torat
Kohanim the reason the Torah writes ‫לבנה‬, white, is to exclude ‫אדמדמת‬, a ‫ שאת‬of a reddish
appearance; the words ‫ בהרת לבנה אדמדמת‬refer to a ‫ בהרת‬mixed with a reddish appearance. [I
did not find this in my edition of Torat Kohanim on this verse. Ed.] How do I know that the
rules stated in our verse apply to a ‫שאת אדמדמת‬, and to ‫ בהרת לבנה‬that instead of the ‫ שחין‬there
is now a completely white spot of the intensity called ‫ ?בהרת‬This is why the Torah added the
words ‫נגע צרעת‬, "it is a form of leprosy," in verse 20. At first glance it seems that these extra
words should have been necessary only in respect of ‫שאת‬, the rising on the skin which was of
a mixed colouring (white and reddish); seeing that the basic colour was not an intense white I
might have presumed that it did not qualify anymore as a symptom conferring ritual impurity.
We never would have assumed this of an area which contained the kind of bright whiteness
known as ‫בהרת‬. We never find that ‫ שאת‬is more susceptible to impurity than ‫בהרת‬.

The true explanation of the verse then is this: "a white rising on the skin of the kind called
‫ שאת לבנה‬or an intensely white spot called ‫ בהרת‬which contains also some reddish appearance
is still a symptom of ritual impurity because the colour of ‫ בהרת‬contains some rising, ‫שאת‬, and
will not result in purification seeing a leprosy like appearance grew in it." The words ‫נגע צרעת‬
are not necessary except to tell us that the ‫ שאת‬underwent a dimming of its white colour.
While it is true that the author of Torat Kohanim speaks of two divisions, the second one is
mentioned as incidental not because we needed the words ‫ נגע צרעת‬to convey this information.

13:29
‫ואיש או אשה‬, and a man or a woman, etc. The Torah had to spell out "or a woman," instead
of using the collective term ‫ אדם‬for both man and woman because women do not usually grow
beards. The reader who sees the word ‫ אדם‬would conclude that the legislation only applies to
people who normally grow beards, i.e. men, and I would have assumed that either minors or
Gentiles are included in this legislation whereas any plagues on the beard of a woman would
not be subject to the legislation introduced here. The Torah therefore wrote ‫איש או אשה‬, to tell
us that if a woman grows hair in a part of her face where a man grows a beard, the legislation
applies to her also.

13:30

‫שער צהב דק‬, thin blond or yellowish hair; according to Torat Kohanim the word "yellowish"
is intended to exclude hair which is of a greenish, reddish or black colour. The use of the
word "yellowish," serves to exclude all colour except white. The colour white did not need
exclusion. We might have arrived at this through simple logic. Just as the colour yellow is not
a colour mentioned in connection with other afflictions of the skin considered as leading to
ritual impurity, so the colour white, which is the prime colour for skin-afflictions resulting in
ritual impurity would most certainly also qualify for such impurity if it occurred in the area of
the beard. The Torah therefore mentions "yellowish" to tell us that white would not qualify as
a colour resulting in ritual impurity in this legislation dealing with hair discolouring in the
area where the beard grows. I find it difficult to follow this ‫קל וחומר‬, inference from minor to
major. Maybe the word ‫צהב‬, yellowish, is needed to teach us the basic law that this colour if
present in a ‫נתק‬, scall, confers ritual impurity on the person concerned even though the colour
has no negative implications in other skin-discolourations. If so, white would cause ritual
impurity in the case of a scall just as it does in other skin afflictions which the Torah has
legislated previously. This reasoning is reinforced by the mere fact that the author of Torat
Kohanim did not spell out a ‫ קל וחומר‬saying: "if yellowish, which does not normally confer
ritual impurity etc.," until after he had established that yellowish does confer ritual impurity in
a scall. From the sequence of the reasoning in Torat Kohanim you may infer that the Torah
did not exclude your right to make the ‫ קל וחומר‬we have just mentioned. If so, how does the
word ‫צהב‬, yellowish, demolish the validity of the ‫?קל וחומר‬

I must assume therefore that the exegetical approach of Torat Kohanim goes along these lines:
"The Torah writes about the afflicted person who has already been mentioned ‫וטמא אותו הכהן‬,
instead of the shorter ‫וטמאו‬, which the Torah used already on several occasions (verses
8,11,15,20). The extra word ‫ אותו‬is used to exclude a white scall from causing the afflicted
person to become ritually impure. We would translate the verse as follows: ‫וטמא אותו‬, i.e. "the
yellowish colour confers impurity;" it is as if the author of Torat Kohanim had said: "the word
'yellowish' teaches that only it and no other colour including white results in ritual purity in
this instance." If you will examine what the author of Torat Kohanim has written every other
time the Torah wrote ‫ וטמא אותו‬instead of ‫וטמאו‬, you will find an approach consistent with
what he wrote in this instance. Why did he not bother to tell us that he used the word ‫ אותו‬to
arrive at his conclusion? The reason may be that he still wanted to use the word ‫ דק‬which
preceded the word ‫ אותו‬for an additional exegetical message. A careful scholar does not jump
from the right to the left and rely on his reader to read his mind so as not to arrive at a faulty
conclusion about his true intentions. You will find that after explaining the exclusion
contained in the word ‫אותו‬, our author of Torat Kohanim explains the exclusion contained in
the sequence of the words ‫ וטמא אותו הכהן נתק הוא‬using only the word ‫ הוא‬in that sequence as
an exclusion. The reason he did so is because he had already used the word ‫ אותו‬in the sense
we explained.
You may reason that if all this is correct, why do we not use a ‫ קל וחומר‬type of reasoning to
prove that just as the colour yellow results in the afflicted person becoming ritually impure
when he contracted a ‫נתק‬, the same should hold true for yellowish hair in other situations
where hair is a factor in the afflicted person contracting ritual impurity in connection with
skin turned white? The logic is simple. If a white hair which which does not confer ritual
impurity when present in a ‫נתק‬, nevertheless confers ritual impurity when present with other
skin afflictions, then a yellow hair which even confers ritual impurity when present only in a
‫נתק‬, certainly confers ritual impurity when it appears in conjunction with other skin
afflictions. Perhaps the very fact that the Torah needed to exclude white as a colour resulting
in ritual impurity in the case of a scall was equivalent to telling us that we should not engage
in learning the ‫ קל וחומר‬in reverse as applying to situations such as ‫בהרת או שאת‬. You may wish
to read what we have written on Leviticus 14,7 in connection with the Baraitha which
explains why the person afflicted with ‫ צרעת‬has to experience seven sprinklings of ‫ מים חיים‬in
his purification process as opposed to the person who contacted ritual impurity through
contact with a dead body, and who has to undergo only two such sprinklings one each on the
third and on the seventh day of his purification rites. This is so in spite of the fact that I could
have arrived at the opposite conclusion by using the ‫ קל וחומר‬type of reasoning.

In that instance, the author falls back on the explanation of the word ‫ צהב‬he has given on our
verse here. Why is the colour ‫ צהב‬the only one which confers impurity in the case of a scall?
Torat Kohanim explains that this colour symbolises gold. Maimonides explains in his
commentary on tractate Nega-im 6,1 that ‫ צהב‬is a colour which is a mixture of red and green. I
have seen that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra explains it as follows: "The word means something
close to egg-white in Arabic." It appears therefore that Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra understood
the word ‫ צהב‬as ivory coloured. We, who live under Mohammedan rule, know that the Arabic
word tzahov means some kind of dim white. This would all contradict the opinion expressed
by the Tannaim in the Mishnah. I do not see what purpose would be served to explain words
in the Torah in terms of the Arabic language; this would lead to making our Torah into a book
of lies, G'd forbid. What is so objectionable in our traditional sources explaining the word ‫צהב‬
as yellowish-gold? I am afraid that Rabbi Ibn Ezra lent his hand to those who make a mockery
of our holy Torah. Anyone who toys with commentaries of this nature would do better to
suppress them and not to publish them.

13:37

‫טהור הוא וטהרו הכהן‬, "he is 'clean;' and the priest shall declare him "clean" (ritually
pure)." This apparent repetition is explained in the Torat Kohanim as follows: We would
have thought that it suffices if the priest simply allows the afflicted person whose ‫ נתק‬has
remained unchanged in appearance except that black hair grew on it, to go back to the camp;
to teach me that this is not sufficient, the Torah tells us that the priest must first declare such a
person as "clean." I would also have thought that if the priest erred and erroneously declared a
ritually impure person "clean," that he would henceforth be considered "clean;" this is why
the Torah had to write ‫טהור‬, he is objectively "clean;" the priest merely confirms it. This is an
exegesis which Hillel taught when he came from Babylonia as the scholars in Israel at the
time had been unable to furnish proof for this halachah from the text of the Torah (compare
Jerusalem Talmud Pessachim 6,1). We need to understand why the scholars who had
disagreed with Hillel at that time did so.

It seems clear that the meaning of the line is as explained by Torat Kohanim. If the word ‫טהור‬
had not appeared, I would naturally have assumed that the priest, who is after all the expert in
all these laws, would decide the status of the person in question. As a result, if the priest is
aware that there is a ‫בהק‬, a dull white spot, he will release the person from his quarantine so
that he can go home to his family. The Torah therefore writes both ‫ טהור וטהרו‬to inform us that
there is a formality to be observed. This exegesis could not be confirmed until Hillel returned
to the land of Israel and quoted it in the name of his teachers Shmayahu and Avtalyon. Let us
now return to the statement that this ruling of Hillel (resp. his teachers) is good only if the
priest did not err and declare someone as "clean" whose skin had not undergone the necessary
changes. Do not ask that perhaps what the Torah meant with the word ‫ טהור‬was that even if
the afflicted person was himself aware that he was "clean" by then, the priest's declaration
was still essential for him to resume his normal life. Such reasoning is very forced and if one
had to choose between both possible approaches Hillel's exegesis is far superior. Seeing that
the reasoning we apply is the basis of a religious ruling, it is preferable to accept the approach
of Torat Kohanim rather than getting involved in forced explanations.

I have seen a statement in Vayikra Rabbah 22,1 that there is nothing in the way of Torah
exegesis which had not been taught to Moses while he was on Mount Sinai, including what
renowned scholars thought they revealed for the first time in the distant future. At the same
time we have a statement in Bamidbar Rabbah 19,6 that Rabbi Akiva expounded exegetically
matters which even Moses did not know. The Midrash is based on a verse in Isaiah 42,16:
"these things (such as making the blind see, etc.) I have done (G'd speaking)." It does not say
there that G'd will do these things in the future, but that He has already done them. When did
He do them? When He revealed to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues Torah insights He had not
even revealed to Moses." Thus far the Midrash. We appear to be faced with a contradiction
between the two Midrashim we have quoted. Many statements in a similar vein abound in our
Midrashic literature.

I think we have to understand these statements in the following manner: It is true that
everything which is of a Biblical nature was revealed to Moses and no one since has become
privy to something Moses did not already know at that time. The difference between Moses
and subsequent generations of scholars is that Moses had been given both the written and the
oral Torah from G'd directly. G'd, in His wisdom, had recorded all the parts of the oral Torah
He had revealed to Moses in the written Torah also. He had not, however, revealed to Moses
where all the parts of the oral Torah He had taught him were to be found in the written Torah.
The labour of discovering all these allusions to the oral Torah in the written Torah was left for
all the Torah scholars after Moses. It is their task to find proof in the written Torah for all the
halachot G'd had taught Moses orally. The reason the scholars of the Mishnaic period
compiled commentaries such as Torat Kohanim was to provide us with the key that enables us
to find where the oral law is anchored in the written law. This labour is an ongoing process
and it remains our task to establish this linkage between the oral and the written law. The
labour is generally called ‫ארץ החיים‬. Moses was not informed about all this and this is why the
sages could state that Rabbi Akiva had become privy to insights not even revealed to Moses.
The proof of how this works is found in Hillel's reconstructing from the written text a ‫הלכה‬
which had been revealed to Moses at the time but whose "anchor" in the written Torah had
been unknown until that time.

13:44

‫צרוע הוא טמא הוא‬, he is "leprous," he is ritually impure. It appears best to approach these
words in the same way Hillel approached the words ‫ טהור הוא וטהרו הכהן‬in verse 37. Here the
force of the exegesis is even more convincing as the word ‫ צרוע‬refers to the body of the
afflicted person whereas we still require that the priest declare him to be ritually impure. This
means that legally speaking, his symptoms notwithstanding, the afflicted person would not be
considered subject to the laws of impurity until the priest had declared him to be impure.

The reason the Torah repeated ‫ טמא הוא‬is to make it clear that if the priest had erred and had
declared a person as ritually impure although his symptoms did not justify this, the priest's
declaration is invalid. The reason the Torah also repeated ‫ טמא יטמאנו‬is explained in Torat
Kohanim as including all other categories of ritual impurity. A person never becomes legally
impure due to symptoms on his skin unless the priest has declared him to be so.

‫צרוע הוא‬, he is "leprous." Why does the Torah not use the expression ‫ צרעת הוא‬in order to
describe the affliction as it has done repeatedly? Perhaps the Torah wanted to indicate G'd's
extreme displeasure with a person whom He has afflicted with this disease in such exposed
areas of the skin of the head and beard. Most other afflictions listed in our portion occur in
more private parts of the body. Generally speaking, G'd displays great concern for the
sensitivities of a person even when He punishes him. The person described here as ‫ צרוע‬has
forfeited the consideration G'd normally shows even to sinners; this is why he is described as
a "leper" throughout. The words ‫ בראשו נגעו‬that his affliction is already in his head, is the
justification for calling him a ‫צרוע‬.

13:46

‫כל ימי אשר הנגע בו‬, all the days that the plague is within him, etc. This means that as long as
his sin is still part of him he remains in the state of ritual impurity. The emphasis expressed by
the words ‫ טמא הוא‬after the word ‫ יטמא‬is a reminder of Jeremiah 2,19 where the prophet
exclaims: ‫תיסרך רעתך‬, "your discipline has been the result of your wickedness." In other words
it was not G'd who inflicted these misfortunes on the sinner but the sins he committed.
Jeremiah expresses a similar thought in Lamentations 3,39: "Of what shall a living man
complain?! Each one of his own sins." Yalkut Shimoni item 1040 on this verse is worth
studying. You may want to read what I have written on Genesis 4,4 ‫אם תיטיב שאת‬.

13:47

‫והבגד כי יהיה בו נגע צרעת‬, And the garment which is afflicted by the plague of "leprosy,"
etc. The conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of this paragraph is explained in Torat Kohanim
by Rabbi Yossi Haglili by reading together the last three words of the previous verse with this
verse, i.e. ‫מחוץ למחנה מושבו והבגד‬, "his dwelling is outside the camp together with the garment."
This teaches that the garments also need to be removed outside the three camps. Torat
Kohanim added that the wording reflects that the rule applies not only to garments made out
of wool or linen each but even to garments made of a mixture of those materials but not to
garments made of cotton, silk, and other fabrics. This seems difficult as it is possible that what
we have perceived to be a conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬is only intended to draw attention to the
proximity of the legislation to remove garments made of linen or wool outside the three
camps or to include garments made of a mixture of linen and wool. Perhaps Rabbi Yossi
Haglili's inference is based on the letter ‫ ו‬whereas the inference regarding inclusion of
garments made of a mixture of linen and wool is based on the letter ‫ ה‬in the word ‫והבגד‬.

‫ בבגד צמר או בבגד פשתים‬in a garment made of wool or in a garment made of linen. We
have to analyse why the Torah wrote the word ‫ או‬instead of simply writing ‫בבגד צמר ובבגד‬
‫פשתים‬. This is particularly difficult when we consider the words of the author of Korban
Aharon who argues that the reason a mixture of wool and linen had to be included in this
legislation was because the Torah used the word ‫ או‬which amounted to dividing the word
"wool" from the word "linen." The problem becomes even more complex when we consider
that Torat Kohanim writes that we might have assumed that these garments contract impurity
regardless of whether the fabrics which these garments have been made of have been dyed or
not. The words ‫ בבגד צמר‬are to teach us therefore that just as linen garments are usually made
of undyed fabric so the legislation is applicable to woollen garments only when these fabrics
have not been dyed. This comment is also problematical; on the contrary, it is directly
opposed to the statement that the word ‫ או‬is divisive and one could therefore not derive any
rule applying to linen garments as also applying to woollen garments.

We believe that the reason our verse had to write the word ‫ או‬was so that we should not think
that unless the garment was made of a mixture of wool and linen it would not contract
impurity. If so, the word ‫ או‬is needed in its own right and cannot be used exegetically
anymore. Once this is so it does not represent a contradiction to what is implied by the words
‫ צמר‬and ‫ פשתים‬appearing next to each other. We have to understand our verse thus: ‫בבגד צמר‬
means that not only if the garment is made of wool, but the same legislation applies if it is
made of linen; both materials are treated equally in ‫הלכה‬. This is why Torat Kohanim wrote
that just as linen garments are made of undyed fabric so the woollen garments the Torah has
in mind here are the ones whose wool retains its original colour. The reason that the Torah
had to include garments made of a mixture of linen and wool is not because we would make
the mistake by misreading the meaning of the word ‫ או‬as Korban Aharon would have us
believe, but that seeing the Torah mentioned only these two fabrics how would I have arrived
at a valid assumption about a mixture of wool and linen? If, on the other hand, we were to
accept the argument of Korban Aharon that the word ‫ או‬is divisive, thoroughly separating the
words ‫ צמר‬and ‫ פשתים‬from each other, then how could one argue that just as linen garments
are of undyed material so the woollen garments the Torah describes are also only those whose
fabrics have not been dyed? We would therefore need the letter ‫ ו‬before the word ‫ הבגד‬to re-
establish some linkage between these two kinds of garments.

13:50

‫ ודאה הכהן…והסגיד‬and the priest will observe and quarantine it, etc. We need to
understand why the Torah changed its legal approach when speaking of the afflicted garment
as compared to the legal approach used in connection with afflictions of the skin. The reason
may be that an affliction of the skin may exist without quarantine, i.e. the priest will declare
the afflicted person impure without a waiting period upon his first inspection (13,3). In the
case of a parallel affliction appearing on the clothing of the afflicted person, the priest will
first decree quarantine of seven days even though the symptoms are quite clear that we are
dealing with ‫צרעת‬, a form of "leprosy." The Torah therefore wished to distinguish between a
person himself and his clothing. On the other hand, once the garment has been declared as
definitely "leprous" it has to be utterly destroyed; unlike a person who may be cured of his
"leprosy" if certain symptoms disappear, this is not true of his garments. If the Torah had
legislated that the garments have to be declared as irrevocably impure at the first inspection
by the priest, the impression would have been created that the wearer of those clothes cannot
rehabilitate himself by means of repentance. We know from other parts of our commentaries
that G'd does not desire the loss or destruction of man's money. Torat Kohanim as well as
Nega-im 15,5 explained Leviticus 14,36: "and the priest shall command that they empty the
house before the priest will go in to see the plague" that the declaration that the afflicted
house is to be demolished is delayed until as much as possible of the owner's possessions have
been "saved" by having first been removed from it. G'd therefore is on record that He is
mindful of the possessions of even the lowest of the sinners. This then is the reason that the
garments of the afflicted person are not declared as irrevocably impure during the first
inspection by the priest. Seeing that man is given the opportunity to repent even after he has
been ostracised and declared impure, no harm is done if he is declared impure, suffering from
"leprosy" even at the first inspection by the priest.

‫חסלת פרשת תזריע‬

14:2

‫זאת תהיה תורת המצורע‬, "This shall be the law of the "leper," etc. The entire verse seems
superfluous. All the Torah had to tell us was that the afflicted person shall purify himself and
be brought to the priest. Torat Kohanim explains the word ‫ זאת‬as excluding the purification
ritual on an altar other than the one in the Temple. The word ‫ תהיה‬is explained as including
people in our own times who suffer from the symptoms described in the Torah. Torat
Kohanim on verse 4 relates that Rabbi Tarphon had a staff with which he used to purify
"lepers" in his day [he was a survivor of the period during which the Temple was destroyed
by the Romans. Ed.]. The word ‫ תורת‬is explained as teaching us that even though the different
symptoms produce different kinds of ‫צרעת‬, and different regulations regarding quarantine etc.,
they are all terminated by the offering of the same kind of offering as outlined in this chapter.
The word ‫ ביום‬means that the process of purification described here must take place by day.
One might think that the slaughtering of the birds for the offering and the afflicted person's
shaving himself would be permissible at night; to prevent us from thinking this the Torah
wrote ‫זאת‬. Thus far Torat Kohanim.

You note that the author of Torat Kohanim used the word ‫ זאת‬exegetically both to exclude
temporary altars or altars outside the Temple, as well as to forbid the afflicted person shaving
himself at night, etc. The basis for these multiple inferences from the same word is that the
Torah wrote two restrictive clauses (‫ ביום‬,‫ )זאת‬before mentioning the word ‫טהרה‬,
"purification." If the Torah had wanted to make only a single exclusion, the main subject of
the verse, i.e. the purification, should have appeared next to either one of these ‫מעוטים‬,
restrictive expressions. For example, the Torah could have written: ‫ זאת תהיה ביום‬,‫תורת המצורע‬,
"the law of the leper; this shall occur by day." We would then have understood that only the
word ‫ ביום‬was to serve as a restrictive clause. The purification rites would then have been
permissible on whatever altar was in use by the Jewish people at that time. The Torah could
also have written the following sequence: ‫ביום טהרת המצורע זאת תהיה תורתו‬, "on the day the
'leper' is purified, this shall be the law of his purification rites." The restrictive clause would
then have applied only to the offerings, not to the time of day when the offering had to be
brought. This latter version would not have contained a single additional letter except that the
words would have been rearranged.

Vayikra Rabbah 16,2 derives the idea that the person afflicted had been guilty of slander from
the unnecessary words ‫זאת תהיה‬. We need to understand why the Torah chose to allude to this
fact at this point just when the afflicted person undergoes the rites of purification. I believe
that the fact that his first offerings have to be the birds which are characterised by their
constant twittering is the key to this. These birds are a reminder of the afflicted person's loose
tongue, the sin of ‫לשון הרע‬. The Torah first wrote these unnecessary words to allude to the
reason why the first offerings in his rehabilitation process must be the birds.
We may also understand these verses as follows: the affliction of "leprosy" develops due to
pollutants in the body and gradually these negative influences within the body gain in strength
until their presence becomes noticeable on the skin. Such physical symptoms also are
accompanied by psychological symptoms developing. The afflicted person becomes morose,
miserly, and his mind becomes depressed. The natural antidote are activities which help to
cheer up a person, cause him to laugh and to enjoy himself. Now that the person under
discussion has become afflicted with ‫צרעת‬, it was natural for him to think that his disease was
a natural occurrence. If someone were to tell him that it was his loose tongue which had
resulted in this affliction he would not believe such a person, nor would he admit that he had
been guilty of a loose tongue. This is why G'd in His wisdom decided to decree isolation for
such a person, for his garments, (13,45) etc. While quarantined, such a person is apt to take
stock of himself and to regret his former conduct. He will then observe that he has not been
able to use his tongue against other people and that during this period his symptoms recede or
vanish although by natural law he would have expected the symptoms to increase; he will find
that the very affliction opened his eyes and he will realise why he had been afflicted. He will
repent, confess his sin, and purify his tongue and realise that he was not the victim of a chance
disease. When the Torah writes ‫זאת תורת המצורע‬, this is an allusion to the new insights the
afflicted person has discovered and which will lead to his purification. His new insights will
prove all this to him ‫ביום טהרתו‬, on the day of his purification; i.e. that although his isolation
deprived him of what would naturally have served to cheer him up, he was healed despite the
fact that he should have been morose and depressed while in solitary confinement. This will
convince him that it was the wrong use he had made of his tongue which had resulted in his
affliction and he will henceforth guard his tongue carefully. When the Torah concludes verse
3 with the words ‫והנה נרפא נגע הצרעת מן הצרוע‬, and behold, the "plague of leprosy has been
healed 'from the leper,'" the extra words ‫ מן הצרוע‬tell us that the cure was due to the disease
itself.

‫והובא אל הכהן‬, and he is brought to the priest. Seeing the Torah had previously spoken of
‫ביום טהרתו‬, on the day of his purification, the formerly afflicted person could have thought that
his purification was complete already seeing his symptoms had disappeared; the Torah
therefore explains that until he has been declared "clean" by the priest this is not so. Our sages
in Torat Kohanim also observe that the words "he will be brought to the priest" imply that
there is to be no delay. The reason that the Torah uses a passive form "he will be brought,"
instead of the usual "he shall come to the priest," indicates that the court will obligate him to
go to the priest, or that the priest will take hold of him forcing him to leave his present
residence. The same may apply when the symptoms had first shown up; he is obligated to go
to the priest and to have the priest examine him.

14:4

‫וצוה הכהן ולקח למטהר‬, and the priest will command to take for the person to be purified,
etc. According to Torat Kohanim the priest issues the instruction but anybody is authorised to
take the birds. In the following verse Torat Kohanim again understands that according to the
view of Rabbi Yehudah son of Rabbi Yossi the priest issues the instructions but that any non-
priest is qualified to slaughter these birds. Rabbi disagrees, insisting that also the slaughtering
of the birds must be performed by a priest. Why did Rabbi Yehudah son of Rabbi Yossi and
Rabbi not disagree concerning what is written in verse 4?If we were to assume that in verse 4
the word ‫ וצוה‬applied only to another verb, i.e. ‫ ולקח‬instead of to an object, this is not an
adequate reason as even in verse 5 the word ‫ וצוה‬refers to another verb, namely ‫ושחט‬, and we
do not know that it refers to any other object. In fact, in verse 4 we are entitled to assume that
the word ‫ וצוה‬implies that the birds be brought to the priest and he would receive them
personally from those who bring them to him so that he would perform two commandments,
something that is not so in verse 5 if we read it to mean that the words ‫ וצוה ושחט‬apply to one
and the same person, i.e. the priest.

I have seen a comment by Korban Aharon according to which the commandment is that the
priest command that two birds be brought to him so that he could choose one of them as the
offering and one to be released later (verse 7). The reason that Rabbi did not disagree with
Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi Yossi in verse 4 insisting that only the priest is to take the birds is,
that he could not tie the word ‫ וצוה‬to the commandment, i.e. he could not prove that the priest
had to make this selection. Thus far Korban Aharon. I do not agree with the author of Korban
Aharon as there is no indication from the words that the commandment to select the birds had
to be performed by the priest and that it could be derived from the word ‫וצוה‬. On the contrary,
we may infer that the word ‫ וצוה‬as positioned in this verse indicates that the selection of the
bird may be performed either by the priest or by someone else, whereas the slaughtering of
the bird selected had to be performed by the priest, and Rabbi could explain verse 4 along the
same lines as he did verse 5 saying that the selection of the birds could be performed only by
the priest. It would then have appeared that Rabbi disagrees with Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi
Yossi and thought that the slaughtering of the birds also could be performed only by priests.

The reason, however, would not be because of something specific in our verse, but because it
corresponds to the nature in which the subject matter is described by the Torah. G'd had
commanded that the slaughtering take place in a vessel made of earthenware over water
running from a well. This is not an act which is only "slaughtering," seeing a second action
must accompany it immediately afterwards. This latter act is the principal ingredient of the
purification ritual. Seeing that this is so it is reasonable to assume that it can be performed
only by the priest. This kind of reasoning cannot be applied in verse 4 in which no action is
demanded that is part of the purification process. There was therefore no reason to assume
that the Torah demanded it to be performed by the priest exclusively unless the Torah had so
indicated by some extra word or letter. The Torah preferred to leave the matter to be decided
by the scholars.

Furthermore, we may assume that the plain meaning of verse 4 in which the Torah mentions
the taking of the birds is that the Torah addresses the priest. The reason for this is that there
was no need to mention the word "the priest" in the verse in connection with each separate
activity. The Torah had repeated the word "the priest" already several times in verses 2-3. In
the absence of a further repetition of that word at the beginning of verse 4 we would have
reasoned that the commandment is not restricted to the priest as the Torah did not again
mention the word "the priest" until the end in verse 5. These considerations are invalid seeing
the Torah did write the word "the priest" at the beginning of verse 4. This indicates that just as
everything which had been mentioned in verses 2 and 3 had to be performed by the priest the
same is true of what is said in verse 4. Seeing that the Torah bothered to write the words ‫וצוה‬
‫ הכהן‬once more in verse 5, the meaning must be that at least something of what is described in
verse 4 need not only be performed by the priest. The word ‫ ולקח‬therefore does not refer to the
priest. If everything in verse 4 could only be performed by a priest, why did the Torah have to
write the words "the priest" again in verse 5? All the Torah had to write in verse 5 was ‫וצוה‬
‫ושחט‬, and I would have known that it is the priest who is the subject of these instructions.
Clearly then the instructions in the Torah have to be split up differently. When the Torah
writes the word ‫ ולקח‬in verse 4 for the first time, this refers to anybody, not only to the priest.
The same interpretation cannot be applied to the word ‫ ולקח‬in verse 5 as we have no indication
from Rabbi that he holds that the ‫ הלכה‬is based on the plain meaning of the verse. This is
especially so as both the word ‫ וצוה‬and the word ‫ ושחט‬are positioned next to the word ‫ הכהן‬on
either side of it.

Rabbi Yehudah ben Rabbi Yossi, however, feels that seeing we found in verse 4 that the word
‫ ולקח‬does not need to refer to the word ‫ הכהן‬although it is written adjoining to the word ‫הכהן‬
we may interpret what is written in verse 5 in a similar manner.

All this would be fine except for a statement in Torat Kohanim at the beginning of our
portion. This is what is written there: The law about purifying the "leper" is entrusted to the
priest. I would have thought that the priest's function is only to declare the "leper" either
impure or healed, i.e "clean." How do I know that the priest also has to offer the birds and
perform the sprinklings of the blood as well as shave the "leper?" This is why the Torah says:
‫תורת המצורע בכהן‬. Seeing this is so, I would have thought that also the taking of the birds and
the sending away of the live bird and the washing of the "leper" and his clothing are to be
performed only by the priest? To teach me that this is not so the Torah wrote ‫זאת‬. Thus far
Torat Kohanim. From the plain text of the Baraitha it seems clear that only three parts of the
purification process of the "leper" have to be performed by the priest. In view of this there
was no need for the Torah to command the priest about taking the birds or slaughtering them.
From the combined text of the two Baraithot it emerges clearly that both Rabbi and Rabbi
Yehudah ben Yossi hold that the priest must issue directives concerning two procedures.
There appears to be a clear contradiction then between these two Baraithot.

Perhaps the reason why the author of the Baraitha did not mention the two clear directives to
the priest contained in verses 4 and 5 is that he considered only things which involve the body
of the "leper" as part of his purification ritual; he had already excluded numerous things as a
result of the restrictive word ‫זאת‬. If the Torah had not specifically demanded in verses 4 and 5
that the priest perform the act of selecting the birds and slaughtering them, I would have
concluded that the word ‫ זאת‬in verse 2 had already relieved the priest from these two duties.
The author of the Baraitha therefore only mentioned matters included in the definition ‫תורת‬
‫המצורע‬. He was well aware that he would make separate comments on verses 4 and 5; hence
he ignored these aspects in his earlier comments.

However, I have seen in chapter 11,5 of Hilchot Tum-at Tzora-at by Maimonides that only the
slaughtering of the birds and the shaving of the body-hair of the "leper," as well as the
sprinkling of the blood of the bird have to be performed by the priest. No mention is made of
the priest having to select the birds. In fact, Maimonides mentions specifically that all the
rituals he has not mentioned may be performed by ordinary Israelites as well as by priests.
Although we have a Tossephta in chapter eight of tractate ‫ נגעים‬according to which only three
things have to be performed by the priest, -just as Maimonides has written,- the matter of the
directives the Torah issued to the priest in verses 4 and 5 is not mentioned at all. Ordinarily,
we would not need to consider the fact that the Tossephta does not conform to the views
expressed in Torat Kohanim as unduly disturbing. We could even argue that the author of the
Tossephta presumably dealt with verses 4 and 5 in a different context, something that we
cannot say about Maimonides who is under an obligation to deal with those verses in his
treatise on the subject.

We cannot argue that what the Torah has written in verses 4 and 5 is not clear enough to
require Maimonides to refer to it in his treatise on the afflictions suffered by a "leper." After
all, the authors of the Baraithot did consider it necessary to derive these ‫ הלכות‬from a biblical
source. Neither can we argue that Maimonides thought that the plain meaning of the
Tossephta which said: "and the other matters may be performed by any person" include even
the ones concerning which the Torah issued directives to the priest, and that he would
therefore ignore the views of both Rabbi and Rabbi Yehudah ben Yossi. If we were to assume
this there is an additional difficulty, namely that a Tossephta which ignores both the views of
Rabbi and of Rabbi Yehudah ben Yossi need not be considered authentic at all. What has
been recorded in the Sifra de bey Rav is a carefully edited text, much more reliable than the
collection of Tossephtot at our disposal.

Perhaps we may resolve the contradictions resulting from Maimonides' text by assuming that
Maimonides relied on the first Baraitha in Torat Kohanim in which the items the priest has to
perform in connection with the purification of the "leper" under the heading ‫ תורת המצורע‬are
discussed. Maimonides understood those rites to be so mandatory that any deviation would
cancel the whole procedure. The directives given in verses 4 and 5, however, Maimonides
understood as something that would be performed preferably by the priest. Anything which is
commanded by the priest is imbued with additional importance. We know this principle from
Genesis 41,40 where Pharaoh issued a directive to his subjects that all of Joseph's directives
were to be considered as binding on the Egyptians. In our instance, the Torah issued a
directive that the steps of the purification rites mentioned in verses 4 and 5 should be initiated
by a command from the priest but that they may be carried out by non-priests. If, for some
reason, these instructions were not carried out at his initiative but someone else issued the
instructions this would not invalidate the procedures. There is also a ‫ קל וחומר‬which can be
applied to reinforce this logic. If the Torah had made it plain that the releasing of the live bird
is not mandatory, then the instructions of how and by whom they have to be selected and
slaughtered is certainly not mandatory. If Rabbi holds that even the slaughtering of the bird
must be performed by the priest, he did not base this on the words in verse 5 but on his
understanding that it is part of the procedures called ‫ תורת המצורע‬seeing it is similar to the
sprinkling of the blood and the need to have the hair of his body shaved off. This corresponds
to the view held by the first Rabbi quoted in the Baraitha according to whom the slaughtering
is included in the three procedures which have to take place by day.

14:7

‫והזה על המטהר מן הצרעת‬, and he shall sprinkle on him that is to be purified, etc. Why did
the Torah have to write the words ‫ ?מן הצרעת‬Is it not obvious that we speak about someone
who had suffered from "leprosy?" Perhaps the fact that this sprinkling of the blood mixed
with ‫ מים חיים‬of the slaughtered bird still did not complete the purification process and the
former "leper" still has to remain outside his home for another seven days shows he is
comparable to a woman who had suffered from vaginal secretions, ‫זבה‬. During these seven
days before the former "leper" brings his final offerings and undergoes the procedure outlined
in verses 9-20 he is still a primary source of ritual impurity, ‫אב הטומאה‬. The Torah therefore
emphasised by the words ‫ המטהר מן הצרעת‬that the person is being cleansed only of the actual
plague called ‫ ;צרעת‬he is not yet "clean." If we learn in verse 9 that this person must wash his
garments on the seventh day this proves that his body conferred impurity on his clothing
during the preceding seven days. This proves in turn that he was a primary source of ritual
impurity as secondary sources of impurity do not confer ‫ טומאה‬on clothing. The words ‫מן‬
‫ הצרעת‬are amply justified then.

Torat Kohanim offers a different explanation, saying that the words ‫ מן הצרעת‬are intended to
teach that if someone's ritual impurity is due to contact with a dead body he does not have to
undergo seven sprinklings of ‫מים חיים‬. Had the Torah not written the words ‫מן הצרעת‬, I would
have concluded through a ‫ קל וחומר‬that if a "leper" who does not require sprinklings of water
from a well (mixed with the ash of the red heifer) on the third and seventh day of his
purification process nonetheless requires seven sprinklings of blood, then a person whose
impurity is due to contact with a dead body would certainly need these seven sprinklings of
‫ מים חיים‬spring water mixed with the blood.. Hence the Torah wrote the words ‫ מן הצרעת‬in
order to teach me that such a ‫ קל וחומר‬is not admissible. At the end of that Baraitha it is stated
that the word ‫ וטהרו‬in verse 7 is restrictive and teaches that the "leper" does not have to
undergo sprinklings of well water mixed with the ash of the red heifer on the third and
seventh day of his purification rites as does the person who purifies himself from ritual
impurity due to contact with a dead body. Had the Torah not written the word ‫וטהרו‬, I would
have learned a ‫ קל וחומר‬that if such a ‫ טמא מת‬who does not require the seven sprinklings of ‫מים‬
‫ חיים‬plus blood, nonetheless requires sprinkling of well water mixed with the ash of the red
heifer on the third and seventh day of his purification rites, the "leper" who even requires the
seven sprinklings of blood mixed with ‫ מים חיים‬certainly would also require the sprinkling
with well water (containing ash from the red heifer) on the third and seventh day of his own
waiting period. The word ‫ וטהרו‬therefore means that the ritual described previously is
sufficient.

I do not understand this. Seeing we have already used the words ‫ מן הצרעת‬to teach us that a
comparison between a ‫ טמא מת‬and a ‫צרוע‬, leper, is inadmissible, why did I need the word ‫וטהרו‬
to teach me the same thing?

We may explain this as follows; In the case of the ‫ טמא מת‬the Torah legislated sprinklings of
‫ מי פרה‬on the third and seventh day respectively (Numbers 19, 18-19) without mentioning how
many of these sprinklings there had to be. On the other hand, the Torah did mention the
number of sprinklings to be administered to someone whose ritual impurity was due to the
plague, but it did not mention on which days these sprinklings had to be administered. It
would have been quite reasonable to argue that a purification procedure requiring seven
sprinklings is a more comprehensive procedure than one which occurs only on the third and
seventh day respectively because it takes place only twice. The Torah therefore had to write
the word ‫ וטהרו‬to teach that such reasoning is invalid. On the other hand, one could have
argued with equal force that if the Torah legislated sprinklings to occur on two days in the
case of a ‫טמא מת‬, whereas the ‫ צרוע‬requires sprinkling only on one day of the seven days he is
waiting, this is proof that the purification procedure of the ‫ טמא מת‬is of greater force than the
one involving the "leper." Different scholars each adopt one of these two arguments in their
approach to our problem. Accordingly, one scholar would have learned the ‫ קל וחומר‬using as
his point of departure the case of the ‫טמא מת‬, whereas the other scholar would have used the ‫קל‬
‫ וחומר‬using as his point of departure the case of the "leper." As a result the Torah had to write
two restrictive expressions, i.e. ‫ מן הצרעת‬as well as ‫ וטהרו‬in order to invalidate either ‫קל וחומר‬.

Seeing that the logic of at least one of the two scholars arguing in opposite directions must be
faulty, you may ask why the Torah should have to bother to invalidate faulty reasoning by
writing an extra word! The answer is that we find that the Talmud Berachot 47 on the words
‫עליך אמר קרא‬, explains that there are numerous instances in Tannaitic exegesis when a verse is
used to refute a statement whose logic was faulty in the first place.

I have seen a comment by the outstanding scholar Rabbi Yehudah Rosenish, author of
Mishneh Lamelech (commentary on the ‫ יד החזקה‬by Maimonides) on Hilchot Chametz
Umatzah 6,2, where he quotes a Baraitha similar to the one we have quoted before whose text
is as follows ( Torat Kohanim chapter 11 on Leviticus 23,6): the words ‫הזה חג המצות‬, mean
that on this day matzot are mandatory; on Sukkot, however, matzot are not mandatory. We
could have learned a ‫ קל וחומר‬reasoning that if a festival (Passover) which does not require
that we move into a Sukkah still requires us to eat matzot, then surely a festival on which we
have to move into a Sukkah requires us to eat matzot. The Torah therefore wrote ‫הזה חג המצות‬
to make it clear that matzot are mandatory only on Passover. In chapter 14 of the same Torat
Kohanim on Leviticus 23,34 on the sequence of the words ‫הזה חג הסוכות‬, the following
Baraitha is quoted: These words mean that only the festival of Sukkot requires us to move out
into huts whereas the festival of Passover does not include such a requirement. I could have
learned a ‫ קל וחומר‬saying that if this festival which does not require us to eat matzot
nonetheless requires us to move into huts, then a festival, i.e. Passover, which does require us
to eat Matzot most certainly also requires us to move into huts. The Torah therefore writes ‫הזה‬
to teach us that only on the festival of Sukkot are we required to move into huts. The author of
Lechem Mishneh there raises the same questions we have raised in connection with the
Baraitha concerning the words ‫ מן הצרעת‬and ‫ וטהרו‬in our portion. It will be worth your while
to see what Rabbi Rosenish answers there although I consider his words slightly forced. There
are a number of authorities who do not consider it worth their while to examine Maimonides'
rulings critically when what is at issue is a lenient ruling concerning a matter whose biblical
origin is doubtful at best. [This is relevant because Maimonides' ruling concerns whether it is
adequate to swallow the bitter herbs without tasting them. Ed.]

I believe that the solution to why both of these Baraithot are quoted by Torat Kohanim is
quite self-explanatory as we explained earlier. The whole point of our moving into the Sukkah
is to remind ourselves of the miracles G'd performed for us after the Exodus as we know from
Leviticus 23,43. This move into the Sukkah is an additional dimension of our recalling the
Exodus. It was quite natural therefore to suppose that we should also eat matzot on that
festival to symbolise our remembrance of that miracle seeing the Torah commanded us to sit
in the Sukkah, something we do not have to do on Passover. The Torah had to write the word
‫ הזה‬to teach us that there is no need to do this. On the other hand, the festival of Passover also
reflects a dimension of that miracle which is not present in the festival of Sukkot in that we
celebrate it on the anniversary of its occurrence, on the 15th of Nissan. One could have
supposed therefore that it would be in order to observe it while sitting in Sukkot, seeing that
we have to sit in the Sukkah even when we observe this remembrance without it being on the
anniversary of the event it commemorates. It was reasonable then for the author of the
Baraitha to assume that but for the extra words ‫ הזה‬on both occasions such a ‫ קל וחומר‬would
have been in order. The author tries to demolish the explanation by Lechem Mishneh arguing
that if the whole ‫ קל וחומר‬was only based on a possible ‫ הלכה‬as opposed to a definite one, it
could not have been called ‫ קל וחומר‬at all. [I have left out some of the details of this reasoning.
Ed.]

14:8

‫וכבס המטהר את בגדיו‬, and the person to be "cleansed" is to wash his garments, etc. Why
does the Torah decree this washing of the garments seeing that during the ensuing seven days
the ‫ מטהר‬keeps on conferring impurity on garments by contact with them? I have explained on
verse 7 that the words ‫ מן הצרעת‬refer to the impurity his body had suffered from up until now
and which he is rid of, and this requires that at some stage he washes his garments in order to
purify them, why do it now when they will likely become defiled again immediately by a
different level of ritual impurity? I have found the following answer to this in Torat Kohanim.
"What does the word ‫ וכבס‬teach us? If it is to tell us that the "leper" conferred ritual impurity
on these garments through touching them, I did not need a verse to tell us this as I could have
arrived at this by a ‫ קל וחומר‬based on the status of the afflicted person while he awaits the
priest's final decision. During those days he does not confer impurity on people by reason of
his entering the camp (based on Leviticus 13,3) although his garments become impure on
contact. During the purification days when he would confer impurity on entering the camp,
surely his garments also absorb impurity from him during those days? The verse therefore
informs us about the additional ways the ‫ מטהר‬confers impurity, i.e. through someone sitting
on those garments or lying on them even without touching them. Thus far Torat Kohanim.
According to this, the word ‫ וכבס‬would indicate that after this washing the garments of the
person undergoing purification rites will no longer confer impurity by someone lying on them
or sitting on them. The main thrust of the Torat Kohanim's comment on the word ‫ וכבס‬is
based on our very question that the procedure seems useless seeing the clothing will become
impure again immediately. There was no need to question the plain meaning of the word ‫וכבס‬,
seeing washing will result in purification of the garments. There would have been nothing
unusual in the Torah requiring someone to remove impurity at the first possible opportunity;
we would not have had to look for any explanation beyond this were it not for the question of
what function such washing of the clothing would serve at that stage. The Torah did issue
similar directives when it comes to the shaving of the hair of the ‫ מטהר‬which also is something
that has to occur both on the first day of the purification rites as well as on the seventh day.

I have seen that Rabbenu Hillel actually writes that the conclusion of Torat Kohanim that as
of the time of this washing the clothing of the ‫ מטהר‬no longer confers impurity by sitting on
them or lying on them should be stricken from the text. The reason he advances for this is a
statement in Pessachim 67 that the ritual impurity of a person suffering an involuntary
seminal emission, ‫זב‬, is more severe than that of a person afflicted with ‫ צרעת‬seeing that a ‫זב‬
confers impurity on anything he sits or sleeps on and also is a cause of impurity by entering
areas forbidden to him. If Rabbenu Hillel were correct we would have to emend the text of a
number of Baraithot in which it is expressly stated that the "leper" causes impurity to things
he sits on or lies on. The author of Korban Aharon has already refuted the arguments voiced
by Rabbenu Hillel. It is argued there that the claim that a ‫ זב‬is indeed afflicted with a deeper
degree of impurity is true during the days he counts towards his purification when he causes
impurity to what he sits on and lies on whereas the ‫ מטהר‬does not. The ‫ מצורע‬on the other
hand, does not cause this kind of impurity during the days he counts towards final
purification. This is precisely what we learned from the words ‫ וכבס המטהר‬occurring both in
verse 8 and in verse 9. Maimonides and all the other authorities are unanimous in this ruling.
Rabbenu Hillel was not correct in this instance.

‫ורחץ במים וטהר‬, and he will bathe himself and be "clean." Torat Kohanim write that the
additional word ‫ במים‬means that even immersion in a ‫מקוה‬, a ritual bath, is acceptable. If not
for that word, we could have learned the following ‫קל וחומר‬. If a ‫ זב‬who does not require to be
sprinkled with running water from a well, nonetheless has to immerse himself in running
water from a well, i.e. ‫מים חיים‬, the ‫ מצורע‬who does require to be sprinkled with such running
water would most certainly also have to immerse himself in such running water from a well;
the Torah therefore writes: ‫ ורחץ במים‬to teach us that the water of a ritual bath suffices for this
washing. The author of Korban Aharon explains the extra word ‫ במים‬in the same vein. The
difficulty with this exegetical comment is that according to the author of Torat Kohanim the
Torah had already informed us in 15,13 on the words ‫ ורחץ בשרו במים חיים‬that only the ‫זב‬
requires immersion in running water from a well and not a ‫מצורע‬. The reasoning presented
there is identical to that presented here. The only difference is that in 15,13 the word ‫ בשרו‬is
the one considered extraneous whereas in our verse it appears to be the word ‫במים‬. The author
of Korban Aharon also concurs. If all this is correct, why did the Torah write the word ‫ במים‬in
our verse? Perhaps one may answer that the author of Torat Kohanim considers the word ‫במים‬
in our verse as crucial to his inference that the words "in water" are a suitable expression if
the subject is a ritual bath, ‫מקוה‬. The word ‫בשרו‬, his flesh, is really needed primarily to
exclude the need to wash his clothing in running water from a well but that it may be washed
in any kind of water. Torat Kohanim on 15,13 explains this also. The author overcomes the
accusation that he wanted to use the word ‫ בשרו‬for two exegetical comments by mentioning
the word ‫ במים‬in our verse for this combined exegesis. Korban Aharon, on the other hand,
bases himself on the Torah not writing ‫ורחץ הזב‬, but merely ‫ורחץ בשרו‬. If you adopt our
approach you do not need all this.

Concerning another comment by Torat Kohanim on Leviticus 6,21 ‫ומרק ושוטף במים‬, "it shall
be scoured and rinsed in water," where the Torah speaks of the vessel wherein the sin-offering
has been cooked, we find another definition of the Torah's use of the word ‫ במים‬when not
defined further. Here is the text of Torat Kohanim there. "If the Torah had only written ‫ושטף‬, I
would have concluded that it is required to be immersed in at least 40 Sa-ah of water, i.e. a
ritual bath. The additional word ‫ במים‬teaches that a minimal amount of water is sufficient. The
word ‫ במים‬also excludes wine as the liquid in which such an earthenware vessel may be
scoured." We cannot compare the superfluous word ‫ במים‬the Torah wrote in connection with
the sin-offering with the superfluous word ‫ במים‬in our verse. If the Torah had not written the
word ‫ במים‬in Leviticus 6,21 I would not have required more than 40 Sa-ah of the waters of a
ritual bath. We would not have jumped to the conclusion that the vessels in question had to be
scoured in ‫מים חיים‬, running water from a well, and that the extra word ‫ במים‬precluded this
requirement. I would simply have concluded that the word was necessary to tell us that what
is required is 40 Sa-ah of "mikveh-water" rather than any quantity of any kind of water. This
is not so in our context. If not for the restrictive word ‫במים‬, I would have had cause to assume
that what is required is running water from a well. The extra word ‫ במים‬therefore teaches us
that no ‫מים חיים‬, running water from a well, is required. If Torat Kohanim on Leviticus 6,21
added that the word ‫ במים‬means that the vessel must not be scoured in wine, this is not derived
from the word ‫ במים‬being extraneous but from the plain meaning of the word, i.e. "water, yes,
wine , no."

14:9

‫ ורחץ את בשרו במים וטהר‬and he will bathe his flesh in water and be "clean." Why did the
Torah have to write the word ‫בשרו‬, his flesh? We have stated that the word ‫ בשרו‬in 15,13 in
connection with the ‫ זב‬meant that only the ‫ זב‬and not the ‫ מצורע‬requires immersion in ‫מים חיים‬,
and that the word excludes washing of the clothing in ‫ מים חיים‬from the requirement. It is not
possible to justify both these exegetical comments from the use of a single word ‫בשרו‬. Now
that this word appears here also and is not needed in its own right, the comment of Korban
Aharon on 15,13 is acceptable. We can also ask why the word ‫ במים‬had to be written in this
verse again. The explanation we offered for that word being written in verse 8 does not apply
here. In that verse we could have erred by thinking that but for that word the ‫ מטהר‬would have
had to immerse himself in ‫מים חיים‬, seeing he had already had to undergo sprinkling with ‫מים‬
‫חיים‬. There was no reason to make such a ‫ קל וחומר‬the second time. If you were to argue that
the whole procedure of purifying the ‫ מצורע‬is a single procedure and that therefore any
possible misunderstanding and the subsequent ‫ קל וחומר‬would apply equally to both washings,
we have already eliminated the need for bathing in ‫מים חיים‬, even in an instance when
sprinkling with ‫ מים חיים‬had been necessary. There could not have been room for error then to
make the word ‫ במים‬necessary a second time.
We would have to answer that the scholar arguing that without the word ‫ במים‬a second time,
the only thing which the first word ‫ במים‬eliminated was the need for ‫ מים חיים‬for his first
bathing, something that anyway did not confer complete purity on him. On the other hand, we
could have argued that the final bathing, which results in the absolute purity of the ‫מטהר‬,
would require ‫ מים חיים‬unless specifically excluded by the word ‫ במים‬again in our verse. We
must not forget that the ‫ זב‬is purified completely by a single bathing (15,14). The two
situations are therefore not comparable. Even though the second purification process of the
‫ מצורע‬is not accompanied by sprinkling of ‫מים חיים‬, I could have argued that it should not
involve a procedure inferior to that of the ‫זב‬. If the Torah wrote the word ‫ במים‬also in our
verse, this teaches that no ‫ מים חיים‬is required in the final bathing of the ‫מצורע‬.

The Torah was particular to write the word ‫ בשרו‬which is the very word which caused us to
argue in the case of the ‫ זב‬that he needed to bathe himself in running water from a well. Had
the word ‫ בשרו‬not been mentioned in our verse also, I would have concluded that the only
thing which the word ‫ במים‬excluded was the need to wash the clothing, etc., of the ‫ מצורע‬in ‫מים‬
‫חיים‬, but that he would have to bathe at least his body in running water from a well based on
the ‫ קל וחומר‬from the situation the Torah describes when telling us about the purification rites
of the ‫זב‬.

You may be tempted to ask why the Torah did not merely write ‫ ורחץ בשרו במים‬in verse 9 and
the word ‫ במים‬would have been totally unnecessary in verse 8. The reason this does not work
is that I would then have argued that the need for ‫ מים חיים‬was eliminated only for the second
bathing which did not have to be preceded by sprinkling the ‫ מצורע‬with ‫מים חיים‬. This
argument, however, is not true for the first bathing by the ‫ מטהר‬which was preceded by his
being sprinkled with ‫מים חיים‬. I would then still have learned the ‫ קל וחומר‬from the ‫ זב‬so that I
would have needed the word ‫ במים‬to counter that ‫קל וחומר‬. [The author continues examining
other alternatives for another page or so. I have decided to omit those in the interest of
brevity. Ed.]

A moral-ethical approach to this whole paragraph sees it as describing Israel's exile.

According to the Zohar the Gentiles are viewed as a ‫ צרעת‬infesting Israel, and dominating
them by means of this plague. The plague of ‫ צרעת‬is viewed a "surrounding or encircling" the
Israelites bodies. You will also find statements by our sages that even in Egypt Israel's
redemption was only possible because they did not indulge in ‫לשון הרע‬, bad-mouthing each
other. This compliment is based on Exodus 3,22 where the Israelites are told that they should
ask their neighbours to lend them silver and golden trinkets something they did not do until 12
months later in Exodus 11,2. They were able to contain themselves during all this time
without taunting their Egyptian neighbours during this entire period. No single sin results in
as much alienation between man and his Maker as the sin of ‫לשון הרע‬, careless and even
defamatory use of one's tongue. This is why the Torah wrote: ‫זאת תהיה תורת המצורע‬, referring
to the Jewish people which had become victimised by this affliction. The words ‫ביום טהרתו‬
imply that Israel is to purify itself by refraining from the sin of ‫ לשון הרע‬and all that it
involves. The word ‫ הכהן‬in the sentence ‫ והובא אל הכהן‬refers to G'd. Having previously been
alienated from its G'd, the repentance of the Jewish people will once again bring it close to
Him (compare Zohar based on the verse in Isaiah 57,19: ‫שלום שלום לרחוק ולקרוב‬, "Peace, peace
to the far and subsequently near.") Following this reconciliation, G'd is described in Zachariah
14,3 as "going out to fight the nations of the world." This is alluded to here by the words ‫ויצא‬
‫הכהן אל מחוץ למחנה‬, that G'd had left the camp of the ‫שכינה‬, i.e. the land of Israel, to a place of
impurity to which the Israelites were exiled due to their sins. ‫ וראה הכהן והנה נרפא הנגע‬and as
soon as G'd sees that the sin which was the cause of the plague (the exile under the dominion
of the Gentiles) has been healed,

‫וצוה הכהן‬, G'd will issue directives for two birds to be taken, etc. These two birds represent the
two Messiahs, the Mashiach ben Yoseph and the Mashiach ben David. The reason the
Messiah is called a bird is that this is a description for souls in the higher regions. The Zohar
on ‫ פרשת בלק‬Numbers 24,17 quotes another example of the Messiah being called a "bird." We
quote: "From this cave there emerges a very great bird which will rule over the world and the
kingdom will be handed over to him." All these expressions are euphemisms for celestial
forces as any student of the Kabbalah is aware of. We have found that the first Messiah will
be from the tribe of Ephrayim who will nevertheless die while revealing himself; he will be
followed by the Messiah descended from David. When the Torah speaks of G'd taking "two
birds which are pure," these words are similes for the two kinds of Messiah.

The words ‫ועץ ארז ושני חולעת ואזב‬, "and the cedar-wood and the scarlet and the hyssop," are
allusions to the merits of the three patriarchs. Abraham is represented by the word ‫ ;עץ ארז‬He
was a man of gigantic spiritual stature. Jacob is represented by the words ‫ושני תולעת‬, seeing he
is called by that "nickname" in Isaiah 41,14 i.e. ‫אל תירא תולעז יעקב‬, "do not be afraid O worm
Jacob;" Isaac is represented by the word ‫אזוב‬, seeing Isaac symbolises the attribute of ‫גבורה‬,
strength, heroism. The Messiah will have to combine all those attributes within himself.

The word ‫ ושחט‬in this context is an allusion to the death of the first Messiah as G'd said ‫אל כלי‬
‫חרש על מים חיים‬. He will die as atonement for the sins of the people. The Torah speaks of ‫כלי‬
‫חרש‬, "a vessel made of earthenware," because original man was made of "dust from the earth"
(Genesis 2,7); the entire human race was perceived as a ‫כלי חרש‬, subject to irrevocable
fragmentation, because man had not yet been given the Torah. Torah is compared to running
water from a well, i.e. ‫מים חיים‬. When there is no Torah in Israel it is no better than a ‫כלי חרש‬,
subject to total annihilation. This is why one of the two "birds" had to be slaughtered, i.e.
would die. The death of that bird at the hands of the Gentiles, i.e. the death of the Messiah
from the tribe of Ephrayim would give G'd a legal excuse to don His garments of revenge and
to reverse His customary practice of wearing His "suit of mercy" by donning His "suit of
retribution." As a result, He would dispose of all the wicked nations. Having been told what
would happen if Israel would not practice Torah you can extrapolate that if they would
observe Torah none of the afflictions alluded to in our portion as a national disease would
have to occur, and the righteous (the first Messiah) would not have to die. The Ari Zal wrote
that whenever we pray our regular prayers we must include the request that the Mashiach ben
Yoseph should not die. Every prayer adds to the merit of that Messiah so that the collective
prayers of the Jewish people may be sufficient to cancel the decree that he would die at the
hands of the Gentiles.

The Torah goes on to speak about the ‫צפור החיה‬, the surviving bird, i.e. the Mashiach ben
David whom G'd will take and to whom He will attach the merits of the Patriarchs plus the
right to avenge the murder of the Mashiach ben Yoseph; this is why the Torah writes: "He
will take it together with the cedar-wood, etc., and dip it in the blood of the bird which has
been slaughtered." This means that the combined power of the attribute of Mercy will
outweigh the power of the attribute of Justice so that all the impurities of the Jewish people
will be atoned for. When the Torah speaks here about the seven sprinklings to be performed
on the ‫מטהר‬, this is an allusion to the seven levels of impurity. Israel will be cleansed of one
level of impurity by each of the seven sprinklings. Once this has been accomplished the "bird"
will emerge from the cave mentioned in the Zohar, etc. The words ‫על פני השדה‬, refer to this
present world, and the message is that the Messiah will then rule over the whole world. After
that, ‫וכבס את המטהר‬, He will bathe Israel and its clothes, i.e. the sins which have formed its
dirty garments and have stained its soul. The removal of the "dirty clothing" may be
compared to the vision of the prophet Zecharyah 3 where the angel is described as removing
the sin-stained clothing from the High Priest Yoshua in a similar simile describing the
redemption from the exile in Babylon. ‫וגלח את כל שערו‬, "and he will shave the hairs off his
entire body;" these words are hyperbole for the removal of unworthy mental outgrowths. The
words ‫ ורחץ במים‬are hyperbole for Israel immersing itself in Torah. This latter procedure will
purify Israel's thought processes also. ‫ואחר יבא אל המחנה‬, "After that he can enter the camp;"
this is a reference to the camp of the ‫שכינה‬, i.e. Jersualem on earth which will descend to earth
having been built in Heaven.

The Torah goes on to say: ‫וישב מחוץ לאהלו‬, he will still have to sit outside his own residence
seeing that he cannot unite with the ‫ שכינה‬until the seven days of purification have passed
which are necessary in order that one receive an important guest with due honour. On the
seventh day then the Israelites are ready to welcome the holy guest. You will find a similar
concept alluded to in Ezekiel 43,26: "for seven days let them purify the altar, cleanse it, etc."
You will note that Ezekiel speaks of two purifications. The first purification achieves the
removal of negative influences, The second purification accomplishes the repentant sinner's
approach to the sacred, to that which is holy.

14:11

‫והעמיד הכהן המטהר‬, and the priest administering the purification rites will place, etc. this
is best explained in light of a comment in Keylim 1,8 that someone whose atonement is not
complete is not allowed to enter the courtyard of the Temple intended for the Israelite public.
Here the Torah commands that the person undergoing the purification rites stand outside at
the entrance to the Nikanor gate as stated in Sotah 7, based on the Torah writing the words
‫לפני השם‬, "in the presence of the Lord." The Torah charges the administering priest with
ensuring that the former "leper," the ‫מטהר‬, not cross the threshold into the courtyard. He must
not even stretch his hand inside and perform ‫ סמיכה‬on the sin-offering. According to Torat
Kohanim the Torah permitted him only to place his head inside that area so that the priest
could place the oil on his right earlobe and on his respective right thumbs. The principal
reason the priest was charged with this task was to prevent the ‫ מטהר‬accidentally crossing the
borderline with a substantial part of his body.

‫הכהן המטהר‬, the priest who performs the purification rites; the reason both these words are
necessary is this. If the Torah had only written ‫הכהן‬, I would not have known that this
particular part of the commandment could not be performed by any priest but had to be
performed by the priest who administered all the rites. If, on the other hand, the Torah had
written only the word ‫המטהר‬, I would not have been sure that this chore had to be supervised
by a priest at all; there are, after all, functions in the total purification procedure which may be
performed by a non-priest. Hence the Torah had to write ‫הכהן המטהר‬.

‫האיש המטהר ואותם‬, the man who must be purified and these things; the Torah had to write
both the word ‫ האיש‬and the word ‫המטהר‬, so that we would not conclude that the word ‫האיש‬
excludes a minor as not being included in this part of the legislation although he is liable to be
afflicted by ‫ צרעת‬and such affliction makes him ritually impure. Hence the Torah had to add
the word ‫המטהר‬. On the other hand, this word would not have sufficed without the additional
word ‫ האיש‬as I might have reasoned that the need for the priest to supervise where the former
"leper" had to stand applied only to a minor who had been afflicted and who might not take
care where he stood. I would have assumed that an adult could be trusted to watch where he
stands at the entrance to the courtyard. The Torah indicates that we do not trust an adult
without supervision either. This is why the additional word ‫ איש‬is in place.

Torat Kohanim explains the reason that the Torah added the word ‫ האיש‬as excluding the sin-
offering and the burnt-offering from the need to undergo the ‫תנופה‬, the waving, which the
Torah demands for the guilt-offering in verse 12. The Torah then writes another exclusion by
means of the word ‫ אותו‬in verse 12 excluding also the man himself, meaning that only the
guilt-offering and the log of oil need to be waved. Should you ask that if the word ‫אותו‬
excludes the ‫ איש המטהר‬from the need to undergo the "waving," how could it serve to exclude
others from a procedure which does not even apply to itself? This is no problem. We can
always use the exclusion by falling back on the exegetical tool ‫אם אינו ענין‬, that if a word is
superfluous in one situation, it may be applied to another situation where it is felt to be
appropriate. This is the reason the author of Torat Kohanim chose his words very carefully in
this instance. We quote: "The Torah wrote ‫ לא חטאת ולא עולה‬,‫האיש‬. You note that the word
‫ תנופה‬is not even mentioned here." Torat Kohanim meant to say therefore that the word ‫האיש‬
excludes ‫ חטאת ועולה‬by using the same reason although the ‫ הלכה‬whose application is being
excluded did not apply to the ‫ איש‬in the first place. Our sages were authorised to know where
to apply this exclusion seeing the word is evidently unnecessary in its own context. This
makes the language of Torat Kohinim on our verse easily intelligible. The alternative
explanation given by Korban Aharon seems very forced to me.

14:21

‫ואם דל הוא ואין ידו משגת‬, And if he is poor and he cannot afford (3 sheep as the respective
offerings). Why did the Torah have to repeat, i.e. tell us that the meaning of "he is poor" is
that "he cannot afford," etc.? Perhaps the Mishnah in Kritut 27 may clarify this for us. We are
told there that "if someone set aside a sheep or nanny-goat as the offering he had to bring, and
said animal becomes disqualified for the altar by developing a blemish, and the owner also
became poor during the interval, he may sell the animal in question and offer a bird -offering
with the proceeds of the sale." The Talmud derives this ruling from the word ‫ מחטאתו‬written in
the Torah in connection with the sin-offering reserved for the very poor people. There would
be good reason to argue that seeing that in the case of a ‫ מצורע‬the Torah had not made
provision for a meal-offering by the very poor people to take the place of either the sheep or
the birds as the case may be, it is not in order to use words exegetically which were written in
a situation that is quite different. [The sin-offering dealt with there is one brought by a person
who committed the kind of sin which carries the ‫ כרת‬penalty or worse, if it had been
committed knowingly, something that certainly is not the case with the ‫ מצורע‬who brings a
guilt-offering. Ed.] It would have been reasonable to suppose that just as the Torah did not
allow a very poor ‫ מצורע‬to offer a meal-offering as his guilt-offering, so it would also not
allow him to make the kind of substitution discussed in connection with the sin-offering in the
Talmud in Kritut. The Torah therefore writes the extra words ‫ואין ידו משגת‬, to tell us that the
substitution for two turtle doves would be in order also in the case of the ‫מצורע‬.

Alternatively, we could explain the apparently unnecessary words ‫ ואין ידו משגת‬by referring to
the reverse situation described on the same folio in Kritut. A very poor person had set aside
the meal-offering required for his sin-offering; it became unfit for the altar. Before this person
could arrange a substitute his economic situation improved but not sufficiently to enable him
to offer a sheep. He therefore prepared birds. When the same story repeated itself with the
birds becoming unfit as an offering, the owner became still better off so that he could afford
to bring the sheep as a sin-offering that normally well-situated people have to bring to obtain
their atonement. This person has to bring the expensive offering though at the time he became
liable for the offering he had indeed been very poor. The extra words ‫ ואין ידו משגת‬may
therefore be used to teach that the Torah describes a temporary state of affairs and that the
words may work to the advantage or the disadvantage of the person described in Kritut.

Torat Kohanim writes as follows: "The words 'he is poor,' might be understood to mean that
he used to have 100 dollars and now only has 50 dollars. The Torah tells you that it does not
speak about such a subjective 'poverty' but about someone who does not have enough money
left to afford to buy a sheep. Alternatively, you may read this backwards. He started out being
unable to afford…etc. Or, he was able to afford but could not find a sheep to purchase; then
the Torah considers him as 'poor' and he brings two birds." We have to understand what is
meant by the words 'he could not find.' It may mean that there simply were no sheep to be
had, such as happened during the siege of Jerusalem. It is obvious that in such a situation the
Torah would not obligate such a person to wait indefinitely with bringing his guilt-offering,
but would agree that he bring two birds as do people who cannot afford more. After all, at a
time like this the money which normally defines a person as being rich has lost its value to the
owner and he now is poor. We would not need Torat Kohanim to tell us that such a person fits
the definition of 'poor.' It is more likely that the author of Torat Kohanim meant that sheep
were not available at the regular price and could be bought only at exorbitant prices.

We may assume that the obligation to bring a sheep or goat as his guilt-offering is conditional
on the owner not depriving himself of the necessities of life. Even if his poverty is only
relative to his former wealth he may bring the guilt-offering designated for an objectively
poor person and use the balance of his funds to defray his regular expenses. This explanation
of our sages does not contradict what we have written. You should know that if the Torah had
not wanted to tell us more than what our sages have already explained it would have sufficed
for the Torah to write ‫ והביא‬,‫ ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה וכבשה‬as the Torah wrote in Leviticus 5,7 in
connection with another guilt-offering. Clearly then the Torah intended to convey the
additional message we have pointed out by changing its syntax in this instance.

Torat Kohanim (verses 30-31) also comments on the three unnecessary expressions the Torah
uses in connection with the terms describing a person's ability or lack of ability to afford
certain expenses. They are: 1) ‫) את אשר תשיג ידו‬3 ,‫) מאשד תשיג ידו‬2 ,‫אשר תשיג ידו‬. Here is their
comment: The expression ‫ אשר תשיג ידו‬refers to someone who started out being wealthy but
had become impoverished by the time he was required to bring the guilt-offering. The Torah
therefore tells us that such a person brings the offering appropriate for a poor person. The
words ‫ ומאשר תשיג ידו‬speak about a person who had been well off and set out to bring the
guilt-offering appropriate to a wealthy person but whose offering became disqualified before
it reached the altar. The owner of that offering had meanwhile become impoverished. He too
is required to bring only the offering appropriate for a poor person. Finally, the words ‫ואת אשר‬
‫ תשיג ידו‬refer to someone who was poor and had prepared to offer the guilt-offering
appropriate to his economic status. He had become wealthy before completing this offering.
The Torah tells us that such a person has to bring the offering appropriate for a wealthy
person. If, however, he had already offered the sin-offering while in a state of poverty he does
not have to bring the rich man's burnt-offering which he is still obligated to offer to complete
the process of atonement. This conclusion is derived from the words ‫אחד לחטאת ואחד לעולה‬,
meaning that both the sin-offering and the burnt-offering must be of the same category, i.e.
either both have to be rich man's offerings or both have to be poor man's offerings. All of
these exegetical derivations do not include what we have mentioned earlier as based on the
repeated expression ‫דל הוא ואין ידו משגת‬. Even after we have all the commentaries of Torat
Kohanim our sages have offered us, my own comments were still necessary to explain the
extra verbiage in our verse.

14:32

‫זאת תורת אשר בו נגע צרעת‬, This is the law concerning someone afflicted with "leprosy,"
etc. The entire verse seems superfluous. Our sages in Torat Kohanim explain that the
extraneous words ‫ זאת תורת‬refer to the situation when a poor person insisted on bringing the
guilt-offering appropriate for a rich person. His offering is acceptable. You may well ask why
the Torah had to tell us this. Why should it not be simple logic seeing the Torah's verses
dealing with the poor man were designed only to lighten his burden. If such a person is
willing to extend himself beyond what he is obligated to do more power to him! He will
surely be blessed! It appears that seeing that the Torah used the word ‫ זאת‬to exclude a wealthy
man who brought the offering appropriate for a poor man, the Torah was afraid that the reader
might feel that a poor man would also not be allowed to deviate from the rules laid down
previously. The word ‫ תורת‬therefore teaches that the poor is free to do better than the Torah
demanded of him.

This still leaves the words ‫ אשר לא תשיג ידו‬in our verse unaccounted for. Perhaps the Torah
was afraid that some scholar would attempt to draw a comparison between what has been
written about relative poverty of people who have to bring guilt-offerings because of failing to
testify, or contracting impurity and entering the Temple in such a state, etc. in Leviticus 5,7.
In those cases the Torah had provided for the minimal meal-offering to be brought by the
lowest category of the poor. Such people are required to bring only two tenths Eypha of fine
flour etc. instead of two birds. The scholar may have wanted to extrapolate that if the "leper"
is too poor, he too may discharge his obligation by such a meal-offering. The Torah therefore
had to write ‫אשר לא תשיג ידו בטהרתו‬, that such a person cannot attain his purification unless he
brings two turtle doves, etc.; the Torah therefore wrote ‫ זאת תורת אשר…לא תשיג ידו בטהרתו‬to tell
us that although he cannot afford it at the time he is being purified and he is wallowing in
misery he still must bring two birds, no less.

A moral-ethical approach to this verse may be based on the Zohar (Tikkunim 22) according to
which the state of poverty is called ‫ צרעת‬which accounts for the fact that both people afflicted
with poverty and those afflicted with "leprosy" are described as "dead" in Nedarim 64. This is
what the Torah alludes to when it wrote ‫אשר בו נגע צרעת‬, meaning the fact that the person who
has to bring the offering is still poor is evidence that he is still afflicted with the plague of
"leprosy." The Torah explains this by adding: "that he cannot afford it during his purification
rites."

14:34

‫כי תבאו…ונתתי נגע צרעת‬, When you come to the land…and I will give a plague of
"leprosy," etc. How can one describe the plague of "leprosy" breaking out on one's house as
good news so that the Torah describes it as a gift from G'd? Why did the Torah not merely
write: "when the walls of your houses develop certain stains, etc." in the same way as the
Torah described such a skin disease in 13,9? Vayikra Rabbah 17,6 was conscious of this and
explained that the Canaanites who heard that the Israelites were approaching hid their
valuables inside the walls of their houses. When the walls would display signs of "leprosy,"
the Jewish owner would investigate and discover the hidden treasure. This is homiletics, of
course. Rabbi Levy explains in that same Midrash that when G'd wishes to reprove us He
does not immediately inflict pain on our bodies, but He first afflicts our houses, and in the
event this does not help He afflicts our clothing. Only if we fail to respond to these two
warnings does G'd inflict the plague on our bodies, i.e. our skin. When viewed in this light the
affliction on the house is indeed a "gift" i.e. a demonstration of G'd's loving concern for us.

Why then did the Torah list the respective plagues on man, his clothing, and his house, in the
reverse order of what Rabbi Levy would have us believe? I have explained this previously. At
the time the legislation was revealed the Israelites had not yet entered the Holy Land and
therefore G'd could not warn the guilty individual by smiting his house first. The reason the
Torah introduced this paragraph with the words: "when you come to the land, etc." is to tell us
that as of that time the order of afflictions would be reversed and G'd would first strike the
house of the guilty person whom He wanted to warn to mend his social behaviour. You may
still ask why the Torah does not list the "leprosy" on one's clothing before the "leprosy" on
one's skin, seeing that everyone wore clothing at the time this legislation was revealed? G'd
could have demonstrated His loving concern for the guilty by first smiting his clothing and the
Torah describing this as the first example of such a ‫ ?נגע צרעת‬It appears that the reason the
Torah chose to position the legislation of "leprosy" on one's clothing in between the
legislation of skin disorders and "leprous-like stains" on the walls of one's house, is because
there are some common denominators between the stains on the house and on the clothing on
one side, and between the stains on the clothing and on the skin on the other side. The
minimum size of a ‫ נגע צרעת‬on one's skin and the size of such a ‫ נגע צרעת‬on one's clothing is
identical, whereas the minimum size of that plague on a house to be considered as ‫ טמא‬is
twice that of people or clothing. On the other hand, the plague on both clothing and houses is
characterised by a greenish colour, whereas the skin disorder which afflicts man is of some
kind of whitish shade.

Furthermore, we need to understand why the Torah did not complete the laws pertaining to
the plague on people before introducing the legislation about a plague afflicting one's
clothing. The reason cannot be that the Torah wanted to group together all the laws of ritual
impurity resulting from such stains before describing the procedures leading to their
purification. If that had been the Torah's intention why did it not also describe the impurity
arising from a plague on houses before commencing with the laws of purification? I think it is
quite obvious that the unusual positioning of the law of the plague on one's clothing right in
the middle of the legislation concerning "leprous" skin, is proof that the Torah wanted to
teach that G'd first afflicts man's garments before afflicting man himself. The Torah made
plain by the positioning of the ‫ נגע בגדים‬that it too was caused by man's sinful conduct. When
the Torah describes the purification rites after having spelled out the law about the respective
ritual impurity the garments conferred on the sinful man who wears them, it is clear that had
man responded to the call to repentance of the plague on his garments, he would not now also
need to purify himself from the effects of the ‫ נגע צרעת‬on his skin.

Another reason the Torah did not first mention the affliction on man's garments is that had it
done so we would have assumed that a plague on one's garments indicates guilt of a minor
nature, whereas a plague on one's skin is indicative of a sin of a more serious nature, rather
than that both plagues are a punishment for the same sin, the skin-disease being a punishment
for lack of sensitivity to the message G'd sent to the wearer by afflicting his clothing.

14:35
‫והגיד לכהן לאמור‬, and he shall tell the priest, saying, etc. The word ‫ לאמור‬appears to be
superfluous. Torat Kohanim explains that the word means that the priest is to tell the afflicted
person words of admonition, explaining to him why he had been so afflicted. This is pure
homiletics, seeing that the Torah speaks of the owner of the house doing the talking, not the
priest. Our sages simply used the principle of ‫אם אינו ענין לדברי בעל הבית תנהו ענין לדברי כהן‬, "if
we could not find a reason for the owner to say something other than what the Torah recorded
here, we may apply the words exegetically to what the priest says instead." The author of
Korban Aharon explains the sequence as follows: ‫והגיד לכהן‬, the reason the owner of the
affected house is forced to tell the priest about his problem is ‫לאמוד‬, so that the priest can
sermonize to him and explain why he was made to suffer this plague. If this explanation were
correct the Torah should have written the word ‫ לאמור‬after the words ‫כנגע נראה לי בבית‬, "it
seems to me that the house has developed a plague." No doubt the approach of Torat
Kohanim is quite correct.

However, the question remains why the Torah did not simply write that "the priest spoke,
etc.," and I would not have had to search for the meaning of the verse? Clearly, the Torah
wanted to leave something for us to exploit exegetically. Our sages have articulated this very
principle themselves in Torat Kohanim. This is what is written there: "why did the Torah not
write that the owner said ‫נגע‬, but describes him as saying ‫כנגע‬, "something like the plague?"
They answer that the letter ‫ כ‬teaches that even if the owner is very learned and he has no
doubt that the symptoms he has found are those of a ‫נגע‬, he must not take it upon himself to
pronounce judgment but he must leave it to the priest. What forced the author of Torat
Kohanim to explain the extra letter ‫ כ‬in this manner? Perhaps the Torah was afraid that if it
wrote simply ‫ נגע‬the owner would feel that unless he was certain that the symptoms were
really those of the ‫ נגע צרעת‬there was no need to call in the priest. The Torah therefore made it
plain by the additional letter ‫ כ‬that the priest has to be called in regardless of whether it is
doubtful if the symptoms were truly the ones resulting in the house having to be torn down.
What the author of Torat Kohanim meant was that all the Torah had to write were the words
‫והגיד לכהן‬. The words "I think that something like a ‫ נגע‬appears on my house," were quite
unnecessary. It was clear from the context of the paragraph that the owner referred to this.
Considering these extra words, Torat Kohanim concluded that the reason was to teach us that
the priest has to be called in regardless of whether there is doubt or not. This explanation is
based on the scholar who holds that on occasion the Torah wrote things in order to encourage
us to engage in exegesis.

Torat Kohanim continues to exploit practically every word here in a similar fashion. The
words ‫נראה לי‬, are explained as "appeared to me and not to my light," i.e. I could see it with
my own eyes unassisted by artificial light. This is the basis for the rule that one need not open
the windows of a house in order to start searching for symptoms of a ‫נגע‬. The word ‫בבית‬, "in
the house," is taken to mean that even if the stain occurred in the upper floor, the whole house
is afflicted. Many other halachot are all derived from these basically superfluous words of our
verse. Even though our sages often use the above mentioned method of exegesis, it is
preferable to derive a rule from a direct sequence of words such as ‫ לאמור כנגע‬in this verse. It
means that regardless of how definite the appearance of that stain, the owner has to report it as
being only "like a ‫נגע‬." We are not bound by the exegetical method used by our sages in
deriving certain rulings from the presence of or absence of certain words or letters provided
we follow accepted norms of exegesis. The major restriction we are bound by is that our
exegesis must not result in ‫ הלכות‬directly opposed to those arrived at by the classical
commentators.
14:36

‫בטרם יבא הכהן‬, before the priest arrives. The reason the Torah had to write the word ‫הכהן‬
"the priest" again is, that otherwise I could have thought that the priest can issue directives
before he arrives at the scene. According to that, the priest would not have had to delay
himself until the people had cleared the house in question of all its contents. By writing the
word ‫הכהן‬, the Torah made it plain that the word ‫ בטרם‬is not linked to the mention of the priest
as the one who issues the directive but is connected with the words ‫" ופנו‬and they shall clear
out."

‫כל אשר בבית‬, everything that is within the house. The meaning is that none of the items that
have been removed prior to the arrival of the priest will be affected by the declaration that the
house and all its contents have become ritually impure. The reason is that G'd is concerned
with the belongings of even the person for whom He expressed some disdain. We must ask
ourselves that seeing this is so why did all these items have to be removed prior to the priest's
arrival when the impurity decreed on these items does not become effective until after the
priest's departure (compare verse 38)? The Torah wrote ‫ולא יטמא כל אשר בבית‬, "in order that all
that is in the house not become defiled," to teach us that once the priest has observed the
symptoms on the walls of the house as being those of a ‫נגע‬, he may not delay pronouncing the
house and its contents as ritually unclean any longer. If the people in the house had waited
until the last possible moment with removing all mobile objects they would most likely have
forgotten some in their haste. It is better therefore that they should do so as soon as they
became aware that the priest was on his way.

We are taught in Keylim 12,5 that G'd's concern is only for earthenware vessels seeing all the
other vessels are subject to purification rites except earthenware jars, etc. According to our
explanation G'd is concerned even about very small and inexpensive earthenware vessels.

14:37

‫וראה…בקירות הבית‬, and he sees…on the walls of the house, etc.This paragraph alludes to the
actions of G'd and how He deals with the wicked who chose to be defiled by associating
themselves with the evil urge which is known by our sages as ‫נגעי בני אדם‬, the plague which
afflicts human beings. According to the Zohar volume 1 page 187 G'd equips the body with a
soul. If the partnership is successful, all well and good. If not, G'd yanks the soul from that
body and places it in a different body. This is hinted at here in the Torah's description of what
happens to the afflicted house. The house symbolises man's body. The priest represents G'd as
we have pointed out previously in our analysis on page 1106. The Torah describes that G'd
examines the walls of the house to determine how far the evil urge has penetrated the body of
the person concerned. The word ‫ שקערורת‬may be understood as a composite of the two words
‫ שקע רורות‬with the letter (vowel) patach being swallowed up as part of the pronunciation. The
missing letter is perceived as being an ‫א‬. The meaning of the two words would be "the cursed
one (‫ )ארור‬has penetrated deeply (‫)שקע‬. Inasmuch as wickedness is multi-faceted, the Torah
uses the plural ending when describing the evil urge. The Torah goes on to speak of ‫ירקרקת‬,
an allusion to sin we are familiar with from Shabbat 33, where ‫הדרוקן‬, dropsy, is described as
a symbol of the wickedness of the person afflicted by it. The word ‫אדמדמות‬, refers to the sin of
bloodshed. When the Torah speaks of the priest ordering the house to be shut up, this means
that the person represented by the house will cease to receive outpourings of G'd's generosity.
This is the mystical dimension of the banishing of certain wicked people from society. They
are banished in order to prevent them from receiving the outpourings of heavenly bounty. If
the person so afflicted becomes aware of what is happening to him and why, well and good; if
not, the priest i.e. G'd, will subject this person to sufferings. If that does not help either, He
will eventually order the destruction of the house, i.e. the body which the soul in question
inhabits. This is the meaning of ‫ונתץ הבית את אבניו‬, "he shall break down the house, its stones,
etc."

15:2

‫דברו אל בני ישראל ואמרתם‬, "speak to the children of Israel and say to them, etc." This
entire verse appears redundant in view of verse 1 before it. Perhaps we may understand it in
light of Torat Kohanim which explained that whereas the Israelites confer ritual impurity
when they suffer from the involuntary seminal emissions called ‫זיבה‬, the Gentiles do not
confer such ritual impurity if they come into contact with Jews or touch their belongings, etc.
The Torah therefore employed the expression ‫ דברו‬to indicate the relative severity of this
legislation. Expressions such as ‫ דבר‬always indicate some degree of harshness when compared
to the expression ‫אמור‬. A Jew suffering from this disease transmits ritual impurity to anything
he sits on or lies on, even. The Torah continued with the softer ‫ ואמרתם‬to console the Israelites
that the fact that they transmit ritual impurity is a compliment for them as it shows that prior
to that disease they were in a state of ritual purity, a status never enjoyed by Gentiles. The
word ‫ אמר‬is used as indicating spiritual superiority in Deut. 26,17 where G'd described the
mutual bond between G'd and Israel in those terms. The considerations we have just outlined
form the mystical dimension of the statement in Shabbat 13 that a ‫שוטה‬, a person of unsound
mind, does not suffer afflictions. The meaning is that he does not realise that he is
discriminated against by suffering what others do not suffer.

‫איש איש כי יהיה זב‬, any man that has an issue, etc. Why did the Torah repeat the word ‫?איש‬
Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of something we learned in Tanna de bey Eliyahu
chapter 15 that if a man experiences a seminal emission he is obligated to immerse himself in
a ritual bath. Such a person may reason that inasmuch as no outsider is aware of this emission,
he need not bother to go to a ritual bath. He will use the same kind of reasoning when it
occurs a second time. If he experiences such an emission a third time without having purified
himself in the interval, he would become guilty of what is written in Job 33,29 ‫פעמים שלוש עם‬
‫גבר‬, "twice or three times with a man;" i.e. that G'd lets man get away with his inadequacies
twice or three times before disciplining him severely. Ignoring the need for ritual immersion
will eventually result in such a man becoming a ‫זב‬, afflicted with the flux which forms the
subject matter of our paragraph. The word ,‫ איש איש‬alludes to the person who ignores the need
to purify himself repeatedly. We find the word ‫ איש‬used in Deut. 23,11 where the Torah
speaks of a man experiencing nocturnal seminal emissions and becoming ritually impure as a
result. The Torah hints that such a person cannot expect to get away with his failure to purify
himself more than twice.

‫זוכו טמא הוא‬, in his issue, he is impure. Our sages in Torat Kohanim understand the last three
words of the verse, i.e. ‫ זובו טמא הוא‬as belonging together. The verse tells us that the flux he
emitted is ritually impure. You may ask that this could have been arrived at by simple logic,
seeing that the Torah had told us that the person who emitted the flux is ritually impure
although he is one step removed from the cause of the impurity; it would therefore stand to
reason that the agent causing the impurity would be ritually unclean! We may counter that we
do not apply this kind of reasoning in connection with the scapegoat which is considered pure
although it confers ritual impurity on the persons touching it (compare Leviticus 16,28). The
Torah therefore had to write that the emission itself is ritually impure. Torat Kohanim uses
another argument justifying the statement ‫זובו טמא הוא‬. The emission is ritually impure
whereas any blood issuing from the same bodily orifice of this afflicted person is not impure.
Had it not been for these three words I would have reasoned that seeing that the spittle of the
afflicted person is impure although it issues forth from a pure area of the individual, blood
which issues forth from the same orifice as the seminal discharge would most certainly be
ritually impure! The Torah therefore wrote ‫זובו טמא הוא‬, that only "it," i.e. the seminal
discharge from that canal is ritually impure. The scholar quoted in Torat Kohanim uses
similar reasoning in reverse when he needs to find an otherwise unnecessary word or letter to
include the urine of the person afflicted with ‫ זוב‬as conferring ritual impurity. This is based on
the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ וזאת‬in verse 3. Had it not been for that extra letter I would have
reasoned that if the spittle which issues forth from a "clean" part of the afflicted person's body
transmits ritual impurity then urine which issues forth from an already impure part of his body
certainly does so? Why then did the Torah have to include such a ‫ הלכה‬by writing ‫?וזאת‬
Answer: Seeing above reasoning is not true in the case of any blood issuing forth from that
orifice which nonetheless does not transmit impurity, the Torah had to write a letter to include
urine in the liquids which do transmit impurity. Niddah 56 raises the question of why blood is
included in the list of liquids which does not transmit impurity whereas urine is included in
the list of liquids which does transmit impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai answers that urine
leaves the body only after a quantity has collected, similar to spittle, whereas blood leaves the
body one drop at a time. Besides, both spittle and urine can be re-absorbed by the body in the
form in which they left the body, something that is not possible with blood seeing it congeals
and hardens.

The difficulty with this answer is that if true, all the Torah had to write was the word ‫ וזאת‬in
order to include urine. I would then have applied the previously mentioned contradictory two
‫ קל וחומר‬to arrive at the conclusion that the logic of either cancel each other out. This would
have led me to realise that the Torah wrote the inclusive letter ‫ ו‬in ‫ וזאת‬in order to demolish
the ‫קל וחומר‬. Seeing that the letter ‫ ו‬could include only one liquid, I would have known that the
liquid in question had to be urine according to the explanation offered by Rabbi Shimon ben
Yochai. I would therefore have excluded blood. I would not have needed the word ‫ הוא‬to
exclude blood as not transmitting ritual impurity. [I have omitted a few more arguments along
this line presented by the author. Ed.]

The author concludes from all this that there is a moral-ethical dimension to the restrictive
word ‫הוא‬. The Torah teaches by means of the superfluous word ‫ הוא‬that not only the body of
the afflicted person causes him to be impure but there is a meta-physical dimension. G'd is
trying to impress the afflicted person that his affliction is due to his sinful conduct. The word
‫ הוא‬refers back to the afflicted person, not to the seminal fluid. This is why the Torah decreed
that the entire person becomes a primary source of ritual impurity, i.e. ‫אב הטומאה‬. In that
capacity the afflicted person confers ritual impurity on both humans and all kinds of vessels
he will come in contact with. Although the scholar in the Torat Kohanim had used the word
‫ הוא‬to exclude the afflicted person's blood from conferring impurity on others, this was prior
to the exegetical use made by the interpretation of the word ‫וזאת‬. After having explained the
word ‫וזאת‬, the previous interpretation of the word ‫ הוא‬became subject to revision and to
different interpretations. There are numerous instances in which Torat Kohanim proceeds in
this manner. The author of Torat Kohanim thus left room for subsequent scholars to offer
their own interpretations.

15:3
‫טומאתו בזובו‬, his impurity in his issue, etc. According to Torat Kohanim the sequence of
these words mean that only the whitish coloured discharge transmits impurity as distinct from
a reddish, blood-coloured discharge. The meaning is that but for the restrictive letter ‫ ב‬in the
word ‫בזובו‬, a discharge of blood would have been considered as conferring impurity even if
the Torah had written the word ‫ זובו טמא הוא‬as it did in verse 2, we would have had to rule that
a discharge of blood is also conferring ritual impurity. In other words, the restrictive
expression we discussed at length in verse 2 would not have sufficed. The reason would have
been that the expression ‫ זובו‬was used by the Torah in both verses. We would have been
forced to conclude that the restrictive nature of the word ‫ זובו‬referred only to the afflicted
person himself and not to his discharge. I would then have learned the ‫ קל וחומר‬from the ‫הלכה‬
that his spittle confers impurity as we explained on verse 2. Alternatively, we would have
reasoned that the reason we have to exclude it is only because there was a special letter
needed (the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ )וזאת‬to include urine otherwise we would have excluded it.

‫טומאתו היא‬. it is his impurity. In Torat Kohanim the sages explain the logic as follows: If a
‫זב‬, a male afflicted with this discharge who does not transmit impurity through a discharge of
blood, nonetheless transmits impurity when discharging a whitish fluid, a ‫זבה‬, female
equivalent, who transmits impurity when discharging blood (from that orifice), most certainly
would also transmit impurity if she discharges a whitish fluid. Therefore the Torah had to
write ‫טומאתו היא‬, it is his impurity, seeing the word ‫ טומאתו‬was quite unnecessary unless it was
meant to tell us that a female when in the throes of this disease does not confer impurity by
the discharge of a whitish fluid but only by discharging blood. This exclusion is based on the
pronoun-ending ‫ טומאת־ו‬as opposed to the pronoun-ending ‫טומאת־ה‬. We disagree with the
author of Korban Aharon who uses the word ‫ היא‬as the basis for this exclusion. When you
will examine the exclusion to be derived from the word ‫ היא‬more carefully you will be forced
to admit that the word describes the impurity and not the person who has become impure.

I have already discussed at length the fact that the ‫ קל וחומר‬that Torat Kohanim presents here
as a possible reason why the text had to specifically teach us an exclusion is the exact
opposite of the ‫ קל וחומר‬the author of Torat Kohanim suggested as a possible reason for the
inclusion of the urine in the fluids causing impurity. I have told you that such hypothetical
logical approaches are not necessarily final and may be abandoned when new tools of exegsis
come to light. Another example had been Torat Kohanim on Leviticus 14,7. We can answer
these apparent contradictions by pointing out -as did the Talmud in Niddah 54- that there are
elements in the laws about the blood of a menstruating woman which provide us with a reason
to consider her as the more stringent case. Details are that her blood confers impurity
regardless of whether it is still wet or has already dried whereas the discharge of someone
afflicted with ‫ זיבה‬transmits impurity only while it is wet. Also, a menstruating woman causes
impurity as soon as she has spotted blood the first time, whereas the blood of a person
afflicted with ‫ זיבה‬transmits impurity only after several sightings or sightings on consecutive
days respectively. The menstruating woman causes impurity to things she sits on or lies on as
soon as she sights her menstruating blood the first time, something that is not the case with a
male ‫זב‬. These factors combined entitle us to assume that discharge of blood should cause
impurity, more so than the discharge of a whitish fluid. On the other hand, the fact that a male
‫ זב‬transmits impurity already after several sightings of discharge even on the same day, as
opposed to his female counterpart who only causes such impurity, after sighting a discharge
on the third of three consecutive days, indicates that his discharge is viewed more severely
and that therefore also a bloody discharge of his could confer impurity. For the above cited
reasons we can understand why the two apparently contradictory attempts to learn a
hypothetical ‫ קל וחומר‬are both reasonable.
The reason why the Torah wrote the word ‫( היא‬a second restrictive expression in addition to
‫)טומאתו בזובו‬, may be because the Torah was concerned that unless there was an additonal
restrictive expression one might interpret the first such expression as merely reducing the
level of impurity the whitish fluid from a ‫ זבה‬transmits i.e. a lower degree of impurity than
that transmitted by her blood. Whereas the blood she emits confers ritual impurity on anything
she sits or lies on already at the first sighting, the whitish fluid would not have that effect until
after several sightings on several days, etc,. I would not conclude, however, that the whitish
fluid does not confer impurity at all. Hence the restrictive word ‫ היא‬is needed to teach that
whitish fluid issuing from a ‫ זבה‬does not confer impurity at all. Only the male ‫ זב‬confers
impurity through emission of a whitish fluid. [I confess I have some problem with this seeing
that verse 25 did not mention anything other than the blood of a ‫זבה‬. Why was there a need to
exclude anything other than blood? Ed.]

15:18

‫ורחצו במים‬, they shall both bathe themselves in a ritual bath. The reason the Torah again
mentions the male partner and the requirement that he has to bathe himself -something
mentioned expressly in verse 16- is explained by Torat Kohanim as teaching that both he and
she are subject to exactly the same procedure when it comes to the immersion in a ritual bath.
You may argue that if that was all the verse teaches us there was no need to write ‫וטמאו‬..‫ורחצו‬,
but we could have derived all this from the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ואשה‬, seeing we have numerous
instances where that letter was used to compare the laws in a later paragraph to those spelled
out in the Torah in a previous paragraph (compare the first few chapters of Leviticus)! The
fact is that Torat Kohanim already used the letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ ואשה‬to teach that it includes a
minor of three years and one day. Accordingly, if the Torah had not written the word ‫ורחצו‬, I
would have interpreted that letter as referring to details about the immersion in the ritual bath
instead of interpreting it as including a girl of three years plus. We would have had no
extraneous letter or word to teach us that even a three-year old girl would have to purify
herself if she had become the victim of sexual intercourse with a male.

Had it not been for the interpretation of the sages in Torat Kohanim, I would have interpreted
the words ‫ אשר תצא ממנו שכבת זרע‬in verse 16 to mean that unless the semen actually leaves the
body of the man who became aroused by it, and is visible on the male's flesh, there is no need
for a ritual bath because all of it has been absorbed internally. The same law would not apply
to a woman; she could become ritually defiled even if the semen entered her without a trace of
it being visible on her body. If she touched herself internally and came into contact with the
semen she would be ritually impure. The Torah had to write ‫ורחצו‬, "they have to bathe
themselves," to make it clear that both the male and the female partner in such intercourse
have to undergo the same procedure to become ritually clean again although the manner in
which they each contracted the impurity differed. We are now able to explain the additional
letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫ ואשה‬to mean that on occasion also the woman may be
subject to the same law as the male in that her hidden parts do not become defiled if her
partner cohabited with her in a manner which is not the standard way of conducting sexual
intercourse [anal intercourse, for instance, Ed.]. This would be so according to the view of the
majority of rabbis cited in Yevamot 34. According to the view of Rabbi Yehudah there, the
example of such a ‫ הלכה‬would be a virgin bride on her wedding night. The rabbis derived this
rule from the word ‫אותה‬. Had the Torah not written the word ‫ ורחצו‬and I would have had to
figure out the need for both the man and the woman who was his partner to bathe themselves
in a ritual bath based only on the additional letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫ואשה‬, I would have concluded
that the man transmits ritual impurity even if his semen had not seen the light of day. I would
have interpreted the word ‫ תצא‬in verse 16 to mean that the semen had left its customary place,
i.e. the scrotum, and that it had merely entered the seminal canal of the male member without
being ejaculated. Alternatively, I would have understood the words ‫ כי תצא‬as a future tense,
i.e. that the man's semen was capable of being ejaculated even though it had not actually been
ejaculated, a situation which is similar to the normal situation in a woman. Both would be
considered as ritually impure in such a situation. The Torah wrote the word ‫ ורחצו‬to prevent us
from pursuing this kind of exegesis, i.e. that in this instance the inference we normally draw
from the conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of a paragraph such as the word ‫ ואשה‬does not
apply. If the Torah had written ‫אשה אשר ישכב איש אותה ורחצו‬, i.e. the letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of
the verse would have been absent, I would still have been left with the restrictive meaning
mentioned in connection with the word ‫( אותה‬see above: Rabbi Yehudah, etc.), but I would
have to apply this restriction differently having been told explicitly by the text that the woman
transmits impurity even if the semen is inside her private parts. In such circumstances there
would be no logical reason to differentiate between a virgin-bride (whose hymen was still
intact and who therefore could not keep the semen inside her private parts) and any other
woman. I would have been forced to conclude that the expression ‫ אותה‬is inclusive rather than
restrictive and that the woman transmits impurity if the semen is in any of her private parts
(such as her armpits). By adding the letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫אשה‬, the Torah
makes it clear that just as a woman's private parts other than her vagina do not transmit ritual
impurity due to the presence of semen, so her vagina does not either. Torat Kohanim made it
clear by using the letter inclusively, that the word ‫ אותה‬is to be used only as a restrictive
clause. As a result, the letter ‫ ו‬in ‫ ואשה‬was superfluous and could be used to include a girl of
three years plus one day and up.

15:28

‫ואם טהרה מזובה וספרה‬, But if she be cleansed from her issue, then she shall number, etc.
We have to try to understand the use of the past tense for the word ‫ וספרה‬instead of the future
tense, i.e. ‫ותספור‬. Precisely when is the count to commence? If the count is to commence
immediately, why does the Torah not write ‫ ?ותספור‬If it is to occur only after she has become
purified, the words "afterwards she shall be clean" do not make sense. We may have to
explain this in light of what Torat Kohanim wrote on the meaning of the words ‫טהרה מזובה‬.
They interpret it as a cessation of the issue. The Torah tells us how we are to know that she
may be considered cleansed from her issue, i.e. from the time the flow of blood stops. Her
"purity" is then sufficient to permit her to begin the count of seven days (during which the
flow must not recur). Rashi concurs with this interpretation in Megillah 8. He writes that she
may begin counting without first having to immerse herself in a ritual bath.

There is another way of interpreting our verse. The words ‫ואם טהרה‬, "if she is cleansed," mean
that the flow of blood has stopped; after all, this is the plain meaning of "she is clean from her
flow of blood." You should not think, however, that the impurity has departed from her; the
only thing which has departed from her is the contaminating issue. This is why the Torah
underlined this by the extraneous word ‫מזובה‬, "from her issue." What has not departed is the
impurity transmitted to people touching the afflicted person. She is still ritually impure and
has to count seven days during which she must be free of renewed symptoms. This is why the
wording ‫וספרה‬, a past tense converted by the use of the ‫וו ההיפוך‬, the letter ‫ ו‬which reverses the
tenses is in order.

‫חסלת פרשת מצורע‬

16:1

‫וידבר ה׳ אל משה אחרי מות‬, G'd spoke to Moses after the death, etc. Why doesn't the Torah
spell out what G'd told Moses on this occasion? Secondly, why did the Torah have to add that
this communication occurred after the death of two of Aaron's sons? What bearing does this
have on the content of G'd's message? Thirdly, why did the Torah have to add the words:
‫בקרבתם לפני ה׳ וימותו‬, "when they came close to the presence of G'd and died?" If the Torah
wanted to tell us the reason these sons died, we have been told this already in Leviticus 10,1,
when the Torah wrote: ‫ ?ויקריבו לפני ה׳ אש זרה‬The Torah was far more specific about the death
of these sons in that context than it is here. We could not determine what the sin of these sons
of Aaron had been by relying merely on what the Torah has written here. What is so terrible
about wanting to come close to the presence of G'd? Fourthly, the word ‫וימותו‬, they died, is
quite superfluous seeing the verse commenced with the mention of their deaths? Fifthly, why
did the Torah use the additional letter ‫ ו‬in the word ‫?וימותו‬

It appears that the Torah tries to tell us that G'd warned Moses not to think that seeing that he
personally was closer to the Kingdom of Heaven and at home in G'd's palace, that he could
enter the Sanctuary at will. Even though G'd addressed this command to Aaron, Moses was
not to think that he was not included in this restriction because the Torah itself testified in
Numbers 12, 7-8 that Moses' prophecy was superior to that of Aaron. G'd had to speak to
Moses to warn him not to misunderstand the prohibition He was about to issue to Aaron
concerning entry into the Sanctuary, i.e. the Holy of Holies. G'd said ‫וידבר ה׳ אל משה‬, i.e. the
directive was addressed exclusively to Moses. He spoke to him shortly after the death of the
sons of Aaron who had attempted to come too close as a result of which they died. The Torah
meant that although they were the sons of Aaron, i.e. highly placed personages so much so
that the Torah testified that their death was due to their closeness to G'd, (compare comment
of Vayikra Rabbah 12,2 on Leviticus 10,3 "I will be sanctified through those close to Me.")
G'd did not have pity on them in spite of their closeness to Him. The principal lesson to be
derived from all this is that he who occupies a privileged position is not entitled to take
liberties with G'd who has granted this privilege in the first place.

Another aspect of the word ‫ בקרבתם‬may be that these people were closer to G'd than anyone.
Had Moses been closer to G'd than Nadav and Avihu, G'd should have demonstrated the
lesson of ‫ בקרובי אקדש‬by punishing Moses for some minor infraction he was guilty of. If G'd
chose Nadav and Avihu instead to demonstrate this principle, they must have been the people
closest to G'd at that time. Perhaps G'd explained all this to Moses on this occasion so that
afterwards Moses said to Aaron in Leviticus 10,3: ‫הוא אשר דבר ה׳ לאמור בקרובי אקדש‬, "this is
what G'd has said to say: I will be sanctified by those who are close to Me." We would then
have to assume that the content of G'd's communication in verse 1 of our chapter was said to
Moses immediately after the death of Nadav and Avihu. The fact that their deaths had been
reported earlier does not matter as we have a principle that the Torah is not bound to report
events in chronological order.

Torat Kohanim writes one could have thought that when G'd addressed His warning to "your
brother Aaron," Moses felt that he was not included in that prohibition and could enter the
Holy of Holies at will. They conclude that the word ‫ אחיך‬was meant to include only Aaron's
other sons so that Moses himself would have remained free to enter at will. Accordingly, I
would not have known if Moses was included in the prohibition or not unless G'd told Him so
specifically. The author of Korban Aharon writes that it is clear that only someone who had
received permission to enter at certain specified times had to be told not to enter at other
times. He who had never been permitted to perform a duty inside the Holy of Holies did not
need to be told that he could not enter at will. According to what I have written the entire
warning is contained only in verse 1. I do not think that the reasoning of Korban Aharon is
correct. The author of Torat Kohanim meant that our verse did not mean to exempt Moses
from the warning issued to Aaron at all and that we remain without a verse either permitting
or prohibiting Moses from entering the Holy of Holies. The author chose to use the
extraneous word ‫ אחיך‬to also include Aaron's remaining sons in the prohibition instead of
using it to exempt Moses from the warning.

All of this is in line with the opinion that the word ‫ אחרי‬is a signal that something occurred
close to what was reported earlier, whereas the word ‫ אחר‬indicates that it occurred some
considerable time later than what has been reported last (compare Bereshit Rabbah 44,5).
There is also an opposite view that the word ‫ אחרי‬introduces something that occurred much
later chronologically than what had been reported immediately before, whereas the word ‫אחר‬
refers to what had happened immediately before the paragraph commencing with the words
‫אחר הדברים‬. According to the latter view we have to explain our verse in the following
manner. The death of Aaron's sons was due to their having entered the Sanctuary on their way
to the Holy of Holies without permission. While it is true that in ‫ פרשת שמיני‬the reason for
their deaths given by the Torah is the "strange fire" they introduced into the Sanctuary (10,1),
our verse teaches that they would have been guilty of death for merely entering the Holy of
Holies even if they had not brought strange fire into the Sanctuary. The Torah stressed the
word ‫וימותו‬, "they died," so that we should not think that Nadav and Avihu succeeded to carry
out their intention to enter the Holy of Holies. They died before they could carry out their
intention. The Torah is at pains to let us know this in the event a person would be willing to
enter the Holy of Holies even at the cost of his life. We are warned here that the effort would
be futile as G'd would not allow such a person to realise his intention. The Torah does not
warn us about this because it presumes a criminal intent by someone who insists on entering
the Holy of Holies. On the contrary, the assumption is that such an attempt would be
prompted by the religious fervor of the individual, an overpowering desire to come close to
the source of the ‫ שכינה‬on earth which makes such a person ignore the danger to which he
exposes himself.

All of the above is based on the approach of Rabbi Yossi who claimed that it was the
unauthorized entry which caused the death of Nadav and Avihu. It also conforms to the view
of Rabbi Avraham ibn Ezra according to which they committed two deathly sins, i.e. the
offering of unauthorised incense, and entering the Sanctuary without authority. According to
the view of Rabbi Akiva who holds that they died only because they offered incense, you
have to explain our verse differently if you assume that the word ‫ אחרי‬refers to something
which had occurred some time previously. In order to understand this we must first ask
ourselves why G'd did not mention the legislation involving the Day of Atonement until this
day instead of revealing this information on the day He commanded the details about all the
other sacrificial offerings in the first two portions of the Book of Leviticus. We could have
expected Moses to tell Aaron not to enter the Holy of Holies unbidden in Leviticus 9,7 where
he also told him to approach the altar and offer his sin-offering, etc. This would have been the
logical place to add that Aaron should not enter the Sanctuary unless bidden to do so. The fact
is that one could have derived that prohibition from the positive permission to approach the
altar (in the courtyard of the Tabernacle). All Moses had to tell Aaron at that point was: "offer
your sin-offering," and I would have known that it was to be offered on that altar." If he added
the words ‫קרב אל מזבח‬, Aaron could have figured out that he was allowed only to mount the
copper altar at will, not the golden altar in the Sanctuary. Our sages in Torat Kohanim explain
all sorts of things in connection with that verse. According to our own approach Moses only
told Aaron that he could use only the outer altar. The question is why he did not add that
entering the Holy of Holies would result in his death?

Our sages (Vayikra Rabbah 7,1) remark that the two sons of Aaron died on account of the sin
of the golden calf, based on Deut. 9,20: "G'd was also very angry at Aaron to have destroyed
him;" if it had not been for Moses' prayer all four sons of Aaron would have died prematurely.
The original cause of the death of Nadav and Avihu was the involvement of their father in the
sin of the golden calf, and their deaths served as atonement, much as a sacrifice on the altar
serves as atonement for the owner of his sin-offering. Do not argue that we have quoted
different sages as attributing the deaths of these sons to either their unauthorised offering of
incense, or their entering the Holy of Holies without authorisation or the Torah's speaking of
their unauthorised use of man-made fire. The answer to all these arguments is that had it not
been for the involvement of their father in the sin of the golden calf, G'd would have found a
way to guard the feet of His pious so that they would not become guilty of such an inadvertent
sin as bringing incense, etc. The statement in Zevachim 115 that these sons died as martyrs for
the glory of the name of the Lord is also not at variance with what the Midrash said in
Vayikra Rabbah 7,1. Had it not been for the sin of their father, G'd would have had to glorify
His name by means of the death of another one of His beloved people. We have it on good
authority (Psalms 116,17) that "the death of His pious ones is a very precious event for the
Lord;" the reasons for this may be difficult for anyone other than G'd Himself to fathom.
Nonetheless, it is our tradition that sometimes G'd desires the deaths of such pious people. In
such instances, the pious person in question whose departure from earth G'd desires, must
have committed at least some minor infraction so that his death can be justified legally. I have
elaborated elsewhere on this theme. It is worth looking at Avot de Rabbi Natan chapter 38 in
which the martyrs who died at the hands of the Emperor Hadrian were unhappy that their
violent deaths could be interpreted as due to their having violated basic laws of the Torah.
Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel found a justification for his violent death when his colleague
suggested he could have been guilty of the minor infraction of having had a poor man wait too
long before he gave him food to eat, or that he was guilty of enjoying the honour of
discoursing on Torah before an audience of 600,000 people. It is difficult to accept that a
person should be guilty of a violent death for such a minor indulgence. If this were the norm
G'd applies to His Torah scholars there would hardly be anyone left alive! You must
understand these happenings in light of the fact that G'd already waited for an excuse to gather
in the souls of these people to the Celestial Regions. Simltaneously, the very death of such
martyrs insures that G'd can delay the retribution which the other people of the martyrs'
generation had become guilty of. When we keep this consideration in mind we will better
understand that the death of the sons of Aaron was a blessing for the survivors. As far as the
public was concerned the sin of the golden calf had been forgiven as demonstrated by the
establishment of the Tabernacle and the presence of the ‫ שכינה‬in the Holy of Holies. Aaron's
sin-offering on the eighth day of the consecration rites had been the final public step in that
rehabilitation. The decree according to which Aaron's sons had to die had therefore been
cancelled already. However, the impression this sin had made in the celestial regions had not
been erased. It was the residue of that impression which resulted in G'd not guarding the feet
of these sons from inadvertently committing a deadly sin as described by the Torah and the
various sages.

When we take a long look at all the factors we have just outlined, it is clear that Aaron had not
yet been qualified to enter the inner sanctum of the King of Kings had it not been for the death
of his two sons serving as atonement for his share in the sin of the golden calf. It was only
then that the record of his involvement was erased in the celestial spheres. We can now
understand our verse properly. ‫בזאת יבא אהרון אל הקדש‬.… ‫וידבר ה׳‬, "G'd said..only after
Aaron has been equipped with this (i.e. the atonement attained through the death of his
two sons) Aaron is able to enter the Holy of Holies." The Torah stresses that the two people
who died did so in their capacity as ‫בני אהרון‬, sons of Aaron. This is an allusion to the guilt of
their father which had been fully atoned for by their deaths. This also accounts for the fact
that G'd did not command Aaron concerning not entering the Sanctuary at will until now. As
long as Aaron was not qualified to enter the Sanctuary even when he was to perform a
specific task there, there was no point in prohibiting him from entering when he did not have
a specific function to perform there. Once the Torah had informed us that the death of the
sons of Aaron was linked to the guilt of their father, the Torah also had to inform us that this
was not the only reason they died. There were other reasons which were quite unconnected to
anything their father had done or had failed to do. Their father's part in their death was limited
to G'd having withdrawn His protective supervision from them so that they should not become
guilty of inadvertently committing deadly sins. The word ‫ בקרבתם לפני השם‬may be understood
as the second cause of their death. Had they not been the sons of Aaron who was still guilty of
some involvement in the sin of the golden calf at that time, the fact that they were about to
enter the Holy of Holies might not have resulted in their deaths. In view of the fact that even
both factors combined would not represent sufficient reason for these people to be guilty of
death, G'd added that their closeness to G'd was what made these two priests ideal to serve as
a means of glorifying the name of G'd, i.e. ‫בקרובי אקדש‬. In recognition of the fact that even the
two causes mentioned were not sufficient to account for the deaths of Nadav and Avihu at that
time, the Torah adds the latter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫וימותו‬, to hint that there was a
need for someone to die in order to demonstrate the sacred nature of the Tabernacle and G'd's
presence associated with it. G'd felt that He had to demonstrate that anyone who approached
this sacred place without specific authority would die. This is why the paragraph dealing with
the warning not to enter the Sanctuary at will was legislated here.

Accordingly, we have three factors which combined to cause the death of Nadav and Avihu at
that time. 1) The sin of the golden calf, i.e. Aaron's share in it. 2) offering of the incense; 3)
the need to demonstrate the sanctity of the Tabernacle through the death of someone who
entered it without authority. G'd alluded to all three of these factors when He wrote: ‫אחרי מות‬
‫שני בני אהרון‬, i.e. on account of Aaron's sin, ‫בקרבתם‬, because they approached too closely to the
center of holiness; ‫וימותו‬, because someone had to die to demonstrate ‫אל הקודש‬...‫לבל יבא‬, that
neither ordinary people nor the High Priest himself could enter there unbidden. The Torah had
to list all three reasons here. 1) Had it not been for the sin of the golden calf these righteous
sons of Aaron would certainly have enjoyed sufficient protection from G'd not to allow them
to become guilty of such a trespass. 2) The sin of venturing too close to G'd also had to be
mentioned as they would never have died on account of their father's sin unless they had been
guilty of a sin themselves. 3) The nature of the sanctity of the Tabernacle also had to be
recorded here since, if it had not been for this consideration, G'd would not have allowed the
joy prevailing over the evidence that His presence had returned to the Jewish people to be
disturbed by such a tragic occurrence. He would have waited to let these sons of Aaron die at
some later date. It was because G'd wanted to sanctify the Tabernacle on that day that the
sons of Aaron died on that day. The need to sanctify the Tabernacle on that day would not
have been sufficient reason by itself to let them die then.

In view of all the foregoing we can understand what prompted Moses to tell Aaron that he
found out through what happened to Nadav and Avihu that they were men of greater stature
than either Aaron or himself (see Torat Kohanim our quote on page 1035). Moses simply
found out that had it not been for the sin of Aaron their father, G'd could not have found
anything these sons had been guilty of to allow them to die. The same could not have been
said of either Moses or Aaron.

If you follow our approach to the whole subject, it is possible to understand Proverbs 22,20:
"indeed I wrote down for you threefold learnings and knowledge." There were three causes
which combined to result in the deaths of Nadav and Avihu; two of them can be categorised
as ‫מועצות‬, learning, the third one as ‫דעת‬, knowledge. These are the three aspects which caused
the deaths of Nadav and Avihu. It teaches that G'd had not completely forgiven Aaron despite
his threefold efforts, i.e. his prayers, his good deeds and his sacrificial offerings. The word
‫ מועצות‬is also an allusion to the failure of G'd to watch over the feet of the righteous so that
they should not stumble into sin. This second aspect of ‫ מועצות‬is even more sophisticated than
the former one. G'd deliberately failed to forgive Aaron completely so that He would have an
excuse to allow Nadav and Aavihu to die.

Another reason why the Torah wrote ‫ אחרי מות‬is connected with the prohibition for Aaron to
enter the Holy of Holies dressed in his golden garments (Rosh Hashanah 26) as the accuser
(reminder of the gold of the golden calf) could not function as counsel for defense at the same
time. The Torah was concerned that we might reason that the prohibition to wear his golden
garments was applicable only as long as the last vestiges of Aaron's sin had not yet been
erased in the celestial regions. I might have thought that as soon as his sons died and had
thereby achieved atonement for their father's remaining vestiges of sin, Aaron would be
allowed into the Holy of Holies even while wearing his golden garments. The Torah had to
tell us that even after the deaths of his two sons Aaron could still not wear his golden
garments in the Holy of Holies. All he was to wear when entering that part of the Sanctuary
was ‫כתנת בד קדש ילבש‬, "a holy linen tunic, etc." While it is true that our sages in Erchin 16
mention that the golden garments performed a function in the atonement process, the gold
could not atone sufficiently for the sins to become completely "snow white." Please read what
I have written in my commentary on Shabbat 30 what Solomon had in mind when he said
"remember the kindness of David Your servant" (Chronicles II 6,42). [I have not seen the
author's comment, but I presume that although David had tried to obtain forgiveness by all the
means at his disposal, it was not until the prayer of his son Solomon that G'd erased the last
vestiges of his sin. The Talmud is on record that the gates of the Sanctuary had refused to
open for Solomon until he completed this prayer. Ed.]

When the Torah mentions the cause of death as ‫בקרבתם לפני השם‬, this is meant to free Moses
from the suspicion that his own prayer on behalf of Aaron at the time of the golden calf
episode had been unsuccessful. The Torah had mentioned Moses's prayer on behalf of Aaron
in Deut. 9.20. Moses himself may have been under the allusion that his prayer had not elicited
the desired response. G'd told him therefore that these sons did not die because of Aaron's sin
alone, i.e. Aaron's guilt had been reduced to a level where he would not be punished by the
death of his sons. Moses' prayer had been effective enough to reduce Aaron's guilt and save
his sons. Once we accept this approach we need not say that Moses' prayer was effective only
50% and that instead of all four of Aaron's sons having to die only two of them died (compare
Vayikra Rabbah 10,5). None of them had to die were it not for the fact that two of them had
become guilty of a sin of their own. What the Midrash meant was that since eventually two of
Aaron's sons died at the hands of G'd this was proof that Moses' prayer was only partially
effective. We measure the effectiveness of a prayer by its ultimate outcome, not by the short-
term reprieve it may afford a sinner.
‫וימותו‬, they died; Perhaps G'd had informed Moses that these two sons of Aaron had
committed the sin of approaching too closely or offering incense using man-made fire while
they had already been guilty of death due to a sin committed by their father when G'd had
become angry at Aaron. Had it not been for this, G'd might have stretched His patience so that
they would not have died immediately for the sin committed now. If they had escaped death
until that moment it had only been due to the prayer of Moses on behalf of Aaron at the time.

Another approach to the word ‫ וימותו‬focuses on the nature of these sons' deaths rather than on
the fact of their deaths. The Torah writes: ‫בקרבתם לפני השם‬, to describe that due to their love
for G'd these people came too near the celestial source of light which has a deadly effect on
man. This is the mystical dimension of what is commonly known as "death by Divine kiss,"
the kind of death experienced by both Aaron and Moses eventually. The deaths of Nadav and
Avihu were similar to the death of all other completely righteous men. The only difference
was that in the case of the deaths of people such as Moses and Aaron G'd's "kiss of death"
approaches them, whereas in this case Nadav and Avihu approached "the kiss of death."

This is the meaning of the extra letter ‫ ו‬in ‫בקרבתם לפני ה׳ ו־ימותו‬. The Torah alludes to the fact
that though these righteous people felt that they were approaching an area which would result
in this "kiss of death" they did not flinch and kept getting closer. They attained a state of
religious intoxication. The desire of their souls to fuse with the divine was so overpowering
that they no longer made decisions in which their powers of conscious perception were
involved. If we were to evaluate part of the emotional process these people underwent,
perhaps the following may help. There are times when certain people feel such an
overpowering hatred for someone that they will abandon all restraining influences in the
desire to exercise their revenge even while they are subconsciously aware that they are
forfeiting their very lives by the act of revenge. This may be the mystical dimension of what
appears as licentious behaviour by prophets in Samuel I 19. There is a mystifying verse in
Samuel I 19,24 which tells of Saul's pursuit of David and the religious experiences first
experienced by the messengers despatched to capture David who at that time was in the
proximity of the prophet Samuel and other prophets. All the messengers are reported as being
overcome by an aura of religious experiences of these prophets. Eventually, the same
happened to Saul himself. He is described as having divested himself of his clothing and
remained naked [symbol of the desire to abandon the restrictions imposed on man by his
body, Ed.] for a whole day in the presence of the prophet Samuel. Perhaps that verse affords
us an inkling of the result of overpowering emotions of hatred. When we think of the other
extreme of man's emotional range, his love for his source, i.e. his Creator, and the
overpowering desire to be united with that source, we may have an inkling of what possessed
Nadav and Avihu at the time. Basically speaking, we are dealing with the natural abhorrence
each soul has for the need to be imprisoned inside a mere body. It is always the soul's desire
to escape this body. Nadav and Avihu's souls experienced such an urge in an unusual manner.
[At this point the author describes how a person may arrive at progressively purer insights due
to his mind's ability to triumph over the impeding element of self, ego. Eventually, such a
person will view "life" itself in an entirely new light such as hinted at by Moses in Deut. 30
19 when he exhorts the Jewish people to "choose life." The letter ‫ ב‬at the beginning of the
word ‫ב־חיים‬, is understood to refer to a life devoid of what he calls ‫הרגש הכללי‬, emotions felt
by all normal human beings. The author blesses the Lord for having granted selected
individuals the ability to rise to such spiritual heights. Ed.]

There is yet another approach to our problem based on Torat Kohanim which quotes a
Baraitha in Yuma 53."Rabbi Eliezer says: ‫ כי בענן אראה אזהרה; יכול קודם מיתת בני‬,‫ולא ימות עונש‬
 ,‫ הא כיצד אזהרה קודם‬.‫ תלמוד לומר אראה‬,‫ תלמוד לומר אחרי מות; יכול שניהם אחר מיתת בני אהרון‬,‫אהרון‬
‫מיתה אחר כך‬. "The words: 'so that he shall not die," are the penalty for entering; 'for I will be
visible through the cloud is the warning;' I might have thought that this warning was issued
prior to the deaths of the sons of Aaron; hence the Torah writes: 'after the death.' How did it
all work? The warning was issued before, the death followed afterwards." The Talmud there
enquires what we are to learn from Rabbi Eliezer's statement. Rava says that the expression
‫ אראה‬is a future tense, and that the Torah speaks of something that had not yet occurred, i.e.
the cloud had not yet enveloped the Tabernacle (Leviticus 9,23). Accordingly, the sons of
Aaron who are reported to have offered incense did so after the cloud had already appeared on
that very day (Leviticus 10,1) and they were killed before a penalty had been decreed for this
by the Torah. Keeping this in mind, we have to explain our verse here as follows: ‫אחרי מות‬,
after the death, etc.; G'd does not want you to think that the fact that the Torah records the
prohibition to enter the Holy of Holies at will except when the High Priest was equipped with
the cloud of incense was a belated warning, and that the sons of Aaron died for not heeding it.
It says in 10,1 that "the sons of Aaron each took a censer with incense and placed fire on it,
etc." The fact is the sons of Aaron had not been warned not to enter the Holy of Holies. This
leaves us with the question why they had to die. The Torah therefore had to inform us that
these deaths were not just a legal matter, a penalty which anyone else who had done the same
thing would also have been subject to. The reason that the sons of Aaron died when
attempting to enter the Holy of Holies was because ‫בקרבם לפני ה׳‬, they attempted to draw too
near to G'd. Seeing that they considered themselves as fit to be so close to G'd, G'd applied a
more stringent yardstick when judging their behaviour. This is why a minor misdemeanour
was treated as if it were a major sin. The Torah alluded to this with the additional letter ‫ ו‬in
the word ‫וימותו‬, i.e. there was an additional factor which contributed to their deaths.

We find the following comment in Torat Kohanim concerning the words: "speak to Aaron,
etc;" we do not know what G'd had said to Moses in the previous verse (verse 1). Rabbi
Eleazer ben Azaryah used to say that this could be explained by a parable. A physician comes
to a patient and tells him not to eat cold food and not to lie on wet moss. Later on another
physician enters the room of that patient and tells him not to eat cold food or to lie down on
wet moss else he would die just as so-and-so has died. The comment of the second physicain
made a more powerful impression on the patient than the instruction of the first physician. We
must understand why these instructions were issued in this order. Besides, why does Torat
Kohanim not simply commence the comment with the words: "Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah
said, etc.?"

It appears that Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah did not address the problem of the warning itself
but the problem of why the warning coupled with the threat of death for ignoring it was so
much delayed that G'd issued it to Aaron only in our portion instead of in chapter 9, and why
he compared it to the parable with the physician. Normally, a physician who wants to impress
his patient mentions that failure to adhere to his instructions has already cost patients' lives.
The physician of the Jewish people, i.e. G'd, did just this when He issued His instructions to
Aaron in this instance. Until the sons of Aaron died G'd had not been in a position to
accompany His warning with an example of the consequences of not heeding it. Torat
Kohanim therefore quoted Rabbi Eleazar who also answered the question why the same
warning had to be issued a second time. We have a rule in the Talmud that there are occasions
when a scholar who explains a problem does so by means of an answer without his having
spelled out the question first. In our case the unspoken question was what G'd had told Moses
in verse 1. We now understand that in the first verse G'd told Moses why these sons of Aaron
had died though their quest had been to draw near to Him. Now G'd told Moses to warn
Aaron that the same could happen to him even if he did not bring strange fire or incense at a
time he was not authorised to enter the Holy of Holies. He should remember what happened
to his two sons.

I have seen a further statement at the end of the Baraitha containing Rabbi Eleazar ben
Azaryah's statement that the last of the warnings had achieved the greatest effect. This is why
the Torah said: "speak to your brother Aaron that he shall not enter, etc. If he would enter he
would die." Mention is made there of Exodus 4,14 where G'd had told Moses that his brother
Aaron would be very happy about his appointment. Here G'd also told Moses to say to "your
brother Aaron" as if we did not know that Aaron was Moses' brother. Moses was supposed to
frighten Aaron so that he should not share the fate of his sons. The whole reason that Moses
was to warn him was that seeing he was his brother, plus the fact that Moses was not
forbidden to enter this would be difficult for Aaron to accept. The problem with all this is that
Torat Kohanim had already used the word ‫ אחיך‬as including Aaron's other sons in the
prohibition as I have mentioned earlier.

I believe the intent behind that statement is clear from its position in the chapter. It is peculiar
that G'd told Moses to warn Aaron not to die as had his sons before he had even told him of
the prohibition to enter the Holy of Holies at will (verse 2). We would have expected such a
warning to follow on the heels of the prohibition not to enter the Tabernacle at will. The fact
that Moses isssued the warning earlier indicates that the basis of the warning was nothing but
brotherly concern for Aaron. This is why Torat Kohanim made reference to Exodus 4,14
where the brotherly relations between Moses and Aaron have been stressed. At that time G'd
had indicated to Moses that Aaron would become the High Priest and Moses had not minded
(Zevachim 102). At the same time Aaron had rejoiced when he saw that his younger brother
had been chosen to be leader of the people. When G'd suggested that Moses tell Aaron about
the danger of entering the Holy of Holies, He meant for Moses to demonstrate his concern for
Aaron's well being.

We may interpret the additional letter ‫ ו‬in the words ‫ ואל יבא‬as a warning that Aaron should
take care that what happened to his sons would not happen to him. The words ‫ ולא ימות‬then are
a continuation of that warning.

I have seen in the commentary of Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi that according to the interpretation
of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah there were three kinds of warnings [according to a variant
reading in Torat Kohanim. Ed.] The Rabbi is at pains to reconcile the various verses
according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah. According to my own point of
view, all Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah was concerned with was what G'd had said to Moses in
verse 1 where the Torah did not elaborate on the content of G'd's communication to Moses.
He arrived at the conclusion that in that communication G'd advised Moses to tell Aaron that
if he would violate His instructions he would die just as his sons had died. Moses was
troubled by the fact that G'd had not merely told him to warn Aaron not to enter on pain of
death but had added that he would die "just as his sons had died." This is why Rabbi Eleazar
ben Azaryah related the parable illustrating the point. Rabbi Eleazar related the story as
involving three physicians, not just one or two. Each physician added an additional element of
urgency to the warning expressed by the previous physician. According to Rabbi Eleazar, G'd
was the physician who was the most persuasive in His warning when He said the patient
should take care not to die as had so-and-so before him. According to the explanation offered
by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, G'd did not compare to either of the three physicians mentioned
by Rabbi Eleazar. According to him the first and second physicians did not draw a
comparison with another patient, whereas the third physician did mention death already
during his first warning, something which is not applicable to G'd who had not warned Aaron
in that manner until the third warning. [I do not bother to add the additional criticism levelled
by our author against the interpretation offered by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi. Ed.]

16:2

‫ויאמר ה׳ אל משה‬, G'd said to Moses, etc. The Torah employs the "soft" language usually
associated with the word ‫אמור‬, although the subject matter is a dire warning according to
Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah. The very warning was a demonstration of G'd's loving concern
for Aaron, just as the physician who warned the patient of the consequences of not following
his advice did so out of concern for the life of his patient.

Alternatively, G'd demonstrated how much He valued Moses by showing that even when His
message concerned primarily Aaron He did not address Aaron with that message but Moses.
We may understand the very words ‫ ויאמר ה׳ אל משה‬in a way similar to Deut. 26,18: ‫וה׳ האמירך‬
‫היום‬, "and G'd achieved by speaking to you this day, etc." Bamidbar Rabbah 14,21 comments
on this that even where we find the Torah reporting that G'd "spoke to Moses and Aaron," the
meaning is that Moses was to tell Aaron what G'd had said to him. Our verse then is proof of
that statement seeing that G'd addressed Moses even when the commandment He wanted to
communicate was addressed exclusively to Aaron.

‫ואל יבא‬, and that he must not enter, etc. In addition to the reason we offered previously for
the unusual letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of a message, we may say that inasmuch as Moses had
told Aaron on the very first day of his anointment as High Priest to go ahead and offer his sin-
offering on the outer altar (Leviticus 9,7) the meaning was that it was only the altar situated in
the courtyard which Aaron had unrestricted access to. Our sages derive this from the principle
called ‫לאו הבא מכלל עשה‬, that the wording of a positive commandment contains within it a
negative commandment which was not spelled out by the Torah specifically. The letter ‫ ו‬in
the word ‫ ואל‬provides the clue to that negative commandment.

‫בכל עת‬, at all times. The implication is that there are times when Aaron would be permitted to
enter the Holy of Holies. Details of this are mentioned later beginning with the words ‫בזאת יבא‬
‫אהרון אל הקודש‬. Once every year Aaron was to enter the Holy of Holies. The reason the Torah
had to introduce this information by the negative commandment that Aaron was not to enter
the Holy of Holies before mentioning the exception, was to tell him that if he refrained from
entering the Holy of Holies during the rest of the year he would merit entering the Holy of
Holies on the Day of Atonement. If, however, he were to enter the Holy of Holies during any
other period he would forfeit the opportunity of entering it on the Day of Atonement at a time
when permission had been granted. The Torah chose the expression ‫בכל עת‬, so as to prohibit
entering the Holy of Holies even on the Day of Atonement except in order to perform certain
regulated activities, i.e. to burn incense and to splash blood of two sacrifices onto the dividing
curtain. When we keep this in mind we derive another meaning from the letter ‫ ו‬at the
beginning of the words ‫ואל יבא‬. The letter relates to an additional warning. Aaron was not only
not to enter the Holy of Holies except on the Day of Atonement, but even on that day he was
to enter it only for the purpose designated in our chapter. In Torat Kohanim they derive the
prohibition of entering the Holy of Holies on the other days from the words ‫אל הקודש‬. The
reason is that the Torah could have written merely the words ‫ מבית לפרוכת‬and I would have
known what was meant. The additional words ‫ אל הקודש‬therefore became available for
exegesis. Do not concern yourself with the letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫ואל‬. It is not
unusual for the Torah to write such a letter in such a context. We have proved this at length on
other occasions.

‫כי בענן אראה על הכפורת‬, "for I will appear in a cloud above the ark-cover." Seeing the
Torah had reported G'd's cloud of glory as becoming visible to the entire people in Leviticus
9,23, the Torah had to tell us that there was an even greater proof of G'd's presence in the
form of a light of a celestial source above the ark-cover.

16:3

‫בזאת יבא אהרון‬, "Aaron is to enter with the following:" The reason the Torah repeats
Aaron's name though it could have written merely: "with this he is to enter, etc.," is that what
has been written in verse 2 applied only to Aaron. From this verse on the Torah deals with
commandments applicable not only to the High Priest personally; seeing that Aaron's duties in
the Sanctuary were performed on behalf of the entire people, and the clothing he wore while
performing this service was as a representative of the people as a whole, G'd commanded His
people to perform these rites using Aaron as their representative so as to obtain forgiveness
once a year. Torat Kohanim emphasises that the linen tunic Aaron wore was paid for by the
Temple treasury. The Torah hinted at this by mentioning Aaron by name as the people's
representative.

16:4

‫כתנת בד קודש ילבש‬, "He shall put on the holy linen tunic, etc." The reason the Torah used
the word ‫קרש‬, holy, in connection with the linen tunic and was not content to include it in the
subsequently mentioned ‫בגדי קודש‬, sacred garments, may be that the Torah was afraid that we
would reason that G'd had only ordered three garments to be paid for from the treasury of the
Temple seeing they are not garments an ordinary person has to wear anyway. Inasmuch as
every person has to wear a tunic, it could have been reasoned that Aaron had to pay out of his
own funds for that tunic. The Torah therefore added the word ‫קדש‬, sacred, to teach that this
tunic too was paid for by funds from the Temple treasury. The Torah added the words ‫בגדי‬
‫קודש הם‬, so that we should not think that only the tunic was to be paid for by the Temple
treasury. The Torah wanted to make plain that the same rule applied to all four garments.

Furthermore, the Torah may have intended to inform us that the material the tunic was made
from was paid for by the Temple treasury. The same applied to the other three garments
mentioned here. The Torah wanted to make this plain already when mentioning the first
garment. The meaning of the words ‫בגדי קודש הם‬, may be that the cost of constructing the
garments, not only their materials, should be defrayed by the Temple treasury.

The Torah may also have intended to convey that these garments are of holy character by
writing the words ‫בגדי קודש הם‬, One should not think that it is demeaning that the very servant
of G'd who had been equipped with eight garments described in Exodus 28,2-5 as ‫לכבוד‬
‫ולתפארת‬, "for glory and splendour," should now wear only inferior garments when performing
the service inside the Holy of Holies. Only the four garments listed here are suitable for the
mission the High Priest was to fulfil inside the Holy of Holies. One of the reasons is that ‫אין‬
‫קטגור נעשה סנגור‬, that the accuser cannot also function as the counsel of defence, as we pointed
out repeatedly. The presence of gold on the garments of the High Priest would have reminded
the attribute of Justice of the episode of the golden calf.
Alternatively, the reason such garments would not have been in place inside the Holy of
Holies is based on Proverbs 25,6: "Do not be boastful in front of a king;" it is bad manners to
harp on one's own importance in the presence of G'd Almighty. The words ‫ בגדי קודש הם‬are the
Torah's reassurance to us that just these four garments are the sacred vestments suitable for
the service about to be described in our chapter. Our sages see in the expression ‫ קודש ילבש‬a
reference to where the tunic is to be worn, i.e. inside the Holy of Holies, the place where the
Holy Presence of G'd resides. The apparent repetition ‫ בגדי קודש הם‬mean that all of these
garments are to be the property of the Temple treasury. (Torat Kohanim).

16:7

‫ולקח את שני השעירים‬, "He will take the two male goats, etc." This entire procedure needs
much explaining. Why would G'd command procedures such as these? If it is one of the
commandments for which the Torah has not provided a rationale, why has it not been
described as a ‫חוק‬, something the Torah normally does in situations where our intellect is too
limited to understand G'd's motivations? The problem is made worse in light of the comment
of our sages (Zohar volume 3, page 101) that the Azazel is a euphemism for Satan. If we
accept this, the entire procedure smacks of a pagan rite, G'd forbid? This impression is
reinforced by the statement in Yuma that the two goats are to be indistinguishable from one
another in appearance!

In order to understand this whole subject we must first refer to a statement made by our sages
in Avot 4,11 where we are told by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov that if one performs a single ‫מצוה‬
one acquires an advocate on one's behalf; the reverse is true if one commits a sin. Rabbi
Eliezer ben Yaakov's words are explained by the Zohar volume 2, page 76 and elsewhere as
well as by the Ari Zal. A sin is perceived as creating a spiritually negative force in our world.
It is this spiritually negative force which is considered the actual sin perpetrated by the
individual in question. We have explained Jeremiah 2,19 and Isaiah 64,6 as conveying this
idea. When G'd forgave David in Samuel II 12,14, telling him he would not die, the message
was also that the evil power David had created through his deed would be destroyed as a
result of his repentance. This is why the prophet Nathan could say that "G'd has also removed
your sin and you will not die." The sin man committed created the lethal force which has the
power to kill the sinner. Once the sin has been removed, the force that potentially could have
killed the sinner has been neutralised, is unable to kill. In other words, it is not G'd who kills
but the forces created by the sinner are what cause death. Seeing that G'd much prefers our
welfare to our death, He commanded that whosoever committed a sinful act unintentionally
should offer a sin-offering; the owner should place his weight on the animal which is to serve
as this offering, an act which drains him of the negative influences he has absorbed due to his
evil deeds and transfers them to the sacrificial animal instead. G'd has informed us that this
act of man when performed in the precincts of the Holy Temple is imbued with the unifying
power of the ‫אלוקי הרוחות לכל בשר‬, G'd's attribute as the spirit of all flesh. This is the mystical
dimension of the need to perform ‫ סמיכה‬prior to the offering of sin-offerings. Every activity
performed by man as part of the sin-offering procedure, i.e. the slaughtering, and the burning
up of the animal's parts designated for this, he performs as a continuation of the act of placing
his own physical weight on the animal first. The evil force his sin had created is neutralised, is
completely uprooted. You have been aware already that the sin-offering is applicable only in
respect of sins committed inadvertently because such a sin does not add to the already extant
power of the pollutant which is residual in man since Adam ate from the tree of knowledge. If
man committed a sin knowingly and willingly, something which increases this pollutant
within him, he cannot erase this by means of a sin-offering. This is what is meant by Solomon
in Proverbs 21,27: "the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination." G'd abhors someone who
abuses the institution of the sacrificial altar to offer his abomination on it. There is nothing as
abhorrent to G'd as the misuse of the altar in an attempt to expiate for intentional sins.

After these introductory lines we may be able to understand the procedure prescribed in our
paragraph, especially when we add the following comment quoted in Torat Kohanim. on
verse 16. "He shall make atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleannesses of the
children of Israel and their transgressions, etc." The verse speaks of the sin of defiling the
Temple and its sacrifices which are being atoned for by the male goat whose blood is
sprinkled inside the Sanctuary onto the dividing curtain. All other sins listed in the Torah,
both the relatively minor ones as well as the most severe ones, both intentionally committed
ones as well as those committed unintentionally, even those for which judicial execution of
the sinner is mandatory, etc., will be atoned for by the scapegoat." Thus far Torat Kohanim.
The wording in the Talmud is as follows: "The scapegoat carries on it all the sins of the
Jewish people, the intentional sins, (both serious ones and relatively minor ones), as well as
unintentionally committed trespasses." The atonement for sins committed by the priests is
also attained by means of the scapegoat as we know from Menachot 92 and Shavuot 13. The
exact quote from the Talmud there reads as follows: "Rabbi Yehudah says that the priests also
attain their atonement by means of the scapegoat." After G'd has informed us of all this you
have sufficient reason to understand the purpose of the two male goats. Between them they
carry away the accumulated pollutants which have polluted the souls of the Israelites during
the preceding year. G'd is willing to accept as a sacrifice the animal whose function it is to
atone for the defiling of the Temple precincts and the various animals therein which became
contaminated before being offered on the altar. He does not abhor that sacrifice. G'd is not
willing to accept the animal which carries the burden of all the other sins of the Israelites and
He consigns that animal to death in a place far removed from the sacred precincts of the Holy
Temple. He commanded Aaron to place his weight on that scapegoat prior to dispatching it to
its death, seeing that Aaron acts as the plenipotentiary of the Jewish people. He could do so
seeing we have the principle that a man's messenger can take the place of the one who has
authorised him to be his messenger. When the Torah writes: "he shall place them on the head
of the live scapegoat, the verse makes it plain that Aaron transfers all the pollutants which
have contaminated the souls of the Jewish people to the scapegoat by means of placing his
weight on that animal's head. The Torah simply informed us that the scapegoat is G'd's
appointee for carrying the sins of the Israelites away to a barren land.

We will understand the procedure better by means of a parable. A king examined the
garments of his son and found that some of them were clean whereas others were stained. If
the garment had a single stain, the king rubs it clean and returns the garment to his son. If he
comes across garments which are greatly soiled, he hands these garments to one of his
servants instructing him to launder it. The servant does not mind getting his hands dirty while
washing the garment. G'd acts in a similar manner with the Jewish people, His children. When
one of them presents an offering asking Him to remove a minor stain, i.e. the result of
inadvertently committed sins or a stain caused by defiling a Holy Place, G'd does not despise
such an offering. However, all the pollutants the Israelites accumulated on their souls due to
all the other sins are something G'd considers as most despicable. This is why He instructed
one of His most junior servants- the scapegoat- to consign these dirty clothes to a barren spot
on earth. This servant is considered expendable by G'd. The death of the scapecoat without
slaughter is considered as an undesirable assignment for this servant. Nonetheless, the fact
that the servant accomplishes by this mission something similar to what is accomplished by
the slaughter of its colleague, namely the cleansing of the Israelites from sin, his mission is a
worthy one. This is alluded to in our verse by the requirement that both male goats need to be
almost indistinguishable in outward appearance and they have to be presented in the courtyard
of the Temple before the lot is cast to determine which one of them is to perform which
function. The reason G'd did not command to simply take any male goat from the market to
serve as the scapegoat is, that it is impossible for one such animal to absorb all the sins of the
Jewish people on its head until it has been imbued with additional strength by having been
presented in the holy precincts in the presence of G'd. Once this occurred it was not clear to
an observer which of the two goats had been chosen for the task of carrying away the sins of
the Jewish people. This is why the Torah arranged for Aaron to draw lots. Only G'd Himself
could determine which of His servants (goats) would perform which task. If we consider that
according to the kabbalists numerous animals became bodies which housed the souls of
former sinners whose souls were given an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves through
another re-incarnation on earth, the chances are that the goat which had been chosen by lot to
be the scapegoat was such an animal. There are also mystical dimensions to the procedure of
the lottery itself as mentioned in the Zohar volume three page 101.

16:10

‫יעמד חי‬, shall be set alive, etc. These words need analysis. Yuma 40 and Torat Kohanim offer
many explanations. According to our own approach the meaning is simply that Aaron was not
to confess the sins of Israel on that animal immediately after the lot had been drawn, but was
to leave it "alive" for a while. We have explained on several occasions that sinners are called
"dead" even while they are physically still alive. An animal which carries the burden of the
sins of the nation would therefore certainly be considered "dead" from the moment it assumed
that burden. Consequently, the Torah had to mention that this procedure was not to take place
immediately and that in the meantime the scape-goat remained "alive." Our interpretation is
confirmed by the Torah as correct as you can see from verse 21. Only then does Aaron place
his hands (weight) on the head of the ‫שעיר החי‬, the "living goat," and confesses the sins of the
people and transfers them to the head of that animal. At that point the Torah no longer adds
the adjective "the live one," when speaking of the scapegoat. Seeing the animal is considered
dead from that point on we can understand why the messenger who took the scapegoat to the
place from where it was thrown off the rock had to immerse himself in a ritual bath. He had
become ritually defiled by contact with an animal considered dead according to halachah
though it had been walking all the time that the ‫ איש עתי‬accompanied it (verse 22).

16:26

‫" והמשלח לעזאזל‬And he who sends the scapegoat to Azzazel, etc." Who or "what" precisely
is the "Azzazel?" We are told in Yuma 67 that it is something "tough and hard." This in turn
has given rise to many explanations none of which are satisfactory. My eyes have been
opened by kabbalists who are privy to the "370 illuminating lights of the Torah," who have
written in the Zohar volume 2 page 157 that the barren desert is the habitat of Samael (Satan).
In fact, the reason such a piece of earth is called "desert" is because it is Satan's habitat. An
alternate name for this desert is Azzazel; a derivative of that name is ‫ עזאל‬,‫עוזא‬. Perhaps the
word ‫ עזאזל‬is a composite of ‫עז אזל‬, "a place where the glory of their existence departed."
Alternatively, ‫עזא זל‬, the site of the force of something base, mean; seeing that Samael is the
basest of all spiritual forces, the description would be quite appropriate.

16:29
‫והיתה לכם לחקת עולם‬, "and it shall become for you an eternal statute, etc." The reason the
Torah had to add the word ‫לכם‬, "for you," is that during the earlier part of the chapter G'd had
told Moses to address Aaron. At this point Moses is to address the entire nation, to wit "the
natural-born Jew and the stranger who had converted." The Torah wants to avoid our making
a mistake and tells us that the commandment concerning the activities of the priests only
appears at the beginning of the paragraph. We should not think therefore that the
commandment to afflict oneself on that day applies only to the non-priests. The word ‫לכם‬
makes it plain that it applies to the whole nation including the priests. We might have
reasoned that the priests do not need to afflict themselves, and that especially the High Priest's
service on that day would take the place of the afflictions the people submit themselves to.
People of the stature of Moses and Aaron might have thought that their bodies were pure
enough not to have to undergo the affliction described. This is why the Torah wrote ‫והיתה לכם‬,
"it will be applicable to you" i.e. to Moses and Aaron. We might now have thought that the
law to afflict themselves applied only to Moses and Aaron; therefore the Torah wrote ‫האזרח‬
‫והגר‬, "the natural-born Israelite as well as the proselyte."

‫לחקת עולם‬, as an eternal statute. The reason for the word ‫ עולם‬is because some people would
reason that the purpose of the affliction is to expiate for sins. He who feels he has not sinned
might decide that he need not submit to the afflictions either. The Torah therefore tells us that
the statute is not connected to the guilt or otherwise of the individual, or even of the nation as
a whole. On a more profound level, the word ‫ עולם‬with its connotation of something
concealed is a reference to the hereafter. Our afflictions in this world have a profound effect
on our wellbeing in the hereafter.

‫תענו את נפשותיכם‬, ''afflict your persons!" The meaning of the word ‫ נפשותיכם‬here is an
affliction which is evenly distributed to all parts of the body and soul, i.e. the abstention from
food and drink. Should you argue that what is meant is abstention from work such as on the
Sabbath, such an affliction would not meet the criteria we just laid down. 1) the part of the
body which performs a certain labour is more affected than other parts of the body when one
either abstains from performing that work or performs it; 2) the Torah should have written
‫תענו את גופותיכם‬, "afflict your bodies," seeing that the soul is not involved unless it is deprived
of food and drink. The argument of the Karaites that the words are addressed to the hardship
of not being allowed to perform physical labour is null and void.

‫האזרח והגר‬, the natural-born Israelite and the proselyte. Torat Kohanim derives from these
two words (the extra letter ‫ ה‬in front) that the wife of the natural-born Israelite as well as the
wife of the proselyte are included in this legislation. They further deduce from the word
‫ בתוככם‬that wives and slaves are included. This still leaves the problem why the Torah even
had to mention that this legislation applies to natural-born Israelites. Surely we did not need
the whole word so that we could derive from the letter ‫ ה‬at the beginning that the wife is
included! Surely G'd has many other words at His disposal if He wanted to include the wives
without His having to write such a superfluous expression as ‫ אזרח‬and ‫גר‬.

We will understand the matter when recalling a statement in Sukkah 28. We are told there:
"what is the reason the Torah wrote ‫ ?האזרח‬Answer: "to include the women in the legislation
to afflict oneself on the Day of Atonement." Our source for this is Rabbi Yehudah in the name
of Rabbi Nafka who said that the Torah compared women to men as far as the the penalties
for transgressions are concerned. Clearly then the only reason the word had to be written was
to teach that the duty to abstain from food and drink applies already shortly before the onset
of the Day of Atonement proper (a few minutes before sunset). Seeing that failure to abstain
earlier does not carry the karet penalty [as the Torah associates that penalty with the words
"on the day itself" Ed.], I might have thought that women are not liable to the additional time
for fasting though they have to abstain from food and drink during the Day of Atonement
proper; hence the Torah had to write the word ‫ האזרח‬to teach us that she who has to fast on the
day proper also has to fast already during the period the rabbis have seen fit to add before the
onset of the Day of Atonement proper. When you consider this statement you can understand
why the Torah had to write the word ‫אזרח‬. The only extraneous letter then was the letter ‫ה‬
which included the additional period in the requirement to fast. The word ‫ האזרח‬then means
that in this case, just as in other cases where the Torah employs the word ‫האזרח‬, it applies to
women in the same manner as it does to men. Once the Torah had used the word ‫ האזרח‬to
exclude someone from something, it was reasonable that the exclusion would apply to a
recent convert who would not require the atonement feature of the Day of Atonement. The
Torah therefore added the word ‫ והגר‬to ensure we do not make such a mistake. This left us
with the question why the Torah had to add the letter ‫ ה‬also in front of the word ‫ ?וגר‬Inasmuch
as the Torah is not on record as comparing proselytes' wives culpability as similar to that of
their husbands,' I might have thought that a distinction would be made regarding the laws
connected with abstention from food and drink. The Torah therefore added the letter ‫ ה‬in front
of the word ‫ גר‬to show us that this is not so. Furthermore, the reason the Torah had to spell all
this out is that otherwise we might have read into the letter ‫ ה‬in front of the word ‫ הכהנים‬that
this is a restrictive clause and that the entire legislation applies only to the priests.

16:34

‫והיתה זאת לכם לחוקת עולם‬, "and this shall be for you an eternal statute, etc." This verse
refers back to the priests and in particular the High Priest to whom the Torah addressed itself
at the beginning of our chapter. The legislation mentioned there is described now as
everlasting, i.e. when the facilities exist the procedures of the Day of Atonement are
irrevocable. The procedure by means of which atonement is attained on that day contains
mystical elements which can only be activated by the High Priest, etc.

Another reason for the verse here is that we might have thought that the restriction on wearing
his golden garments applied only at that time and only to Aaron seeing he himself had been
involved in the golden calf episode and it had not yet been fully atoned for. In the future,
however, the respective High Priest would be able to discharge his duties in his full regalia.
The Torah therefore had to inform us that this is not so. The Torah adds the words ‫לכפר על בני‬
‫ ישראל‬to tell us that although all of Aaron's share in that sin had been completely erased even
in the celestial spheres, the same could not be said of the people. They would need further
instalments of atonement year after year indefinitely. Seeing this was so Aaron became part of
that vicious circle once again.

‫ויעש באשר צוה ה׳ את משה‬. He did as the Lord commanded Moses. Torat Kohanim writes
that this verse is a compliment to Aaron who did not perform all these procedures in order to
attain greater stature amongst the people and to aggrandize himself, but who performed all his
duties only as a servant of G'd with no ulterior motive. It appears that the Torah also
compliments Moses himself seeing that G'd had not spoken to Aaron except via Moses. The
Torah goes on record that G'd did not address the person to whom His message was intended
directly, but did so only via his trusted servant Moses. When the Torah stated that Aaron
complied exactly with what G'd had said, this is proof that Moses had relayed G'd's
instructions without adding or omitting one iota. The fact that Moses replicated exactly what
G'd told him without adding or detracting is the foundation of our belief in the authenticity of
the written Torah, i.e. that it reflects G'd's word no less and no more.

17:3

‫איש איש …אשד ישחט‬, any person who slaughters, etc. Why is the word ‫ איש‬repeated here?
In Zevachim 108 they explain this in terms of Rabbi Shimon who claimed that if someone
slaughters an animal (intended as a sacrifice) on behalf of a private individual he would be
guilty of slaughtering sacred things outside the Temple precincts. They base this on the
repeated mention of ‫ איש‬meaning ‫איש לאיש‬. They do not explain it as meaning that if two
people combined in that act that they would both be culpable for that sin. The reason is that
the Torah phrased culpability by referring to ‫האיש ההוא‬, i.e. a single individual. The Talmud
also explains the restrictive word ‫ ההוא‬as excluding anyone who committed this act
accidentally, erroneously or inadvertently. At the same time they explain the word as
excluding two people who combined to slaughter the animal by saying the Torah did not write
‫ההם‬, but ‫ההוא‬. We find this somewhat difficult seeing that Torat Kohanim is on record as
deriving this halachah from the words ‫ דם שפך‬and not from the word ‫ההוא‬. One may answer
that inasmuch as there are two separate restrictive expressions, i.e. ‫ ההוא‬as well as ‫( שפך‬verse
4), Torat Kohanim derives from the one that when two people slaughter jointly that they are
not culpable, and from the other that if the act did not occur intentionally and without outside
coercion the perpetrator is not punishable.

‫אשד ישחט‬, who will slaughter, etc. Torat Kohanim phrases its comment thus: "From the
mention of the words 'ox, sheep, and goat' I can only derive culpability for slaughtering four-
legged mammals; whence do I know that slaughtering birds intended for the altar outside the
precincts of the Temple or Tabernacle is also prohibited on pain of the karet penalty? Answer:
from the words ‫או אשר ישחט‬. I could have reasoned that if slaughtering the bird's neck, which
is not the normal procedure is culpable, then someone who merely severed the bird's neck by
pinching, i.e. ‫ מליקה‬i.e. the normal procedure, would certainly be culpable if he performed this
act outside the precincts of the Temple, therefore the Torah had to tell us that he would only
be culpable for ‫שחיטה‬, slaughter, but not for ‫מליקה‬, pinching." Thus far Torat Kohanim. From
the above we learn that the word ‫ או‬serves to include culpability for slaughtering the bird in
the wrong place whereas from the words ‫ אשר ישחט‬I derive that pinching is not culpable which
I would otherwise have considered punishable due to the ‫קל וחומר‬. How do I reconcile this
with a Baraitha in Zevachim 107 where we are told by Rabbi Yishmael that he derives the
culpability for slaughtering the bird from the expression ‫אשר ישחט‬, whereas he derives the
exclusion of culpability for pinching the bird's neck from the words ‫( זה הדבר‬in verse 1) which
I would have included on the basis of the ‫ קל וחומר‬had it not been for the words ‫ ?זה הדבר‬Even
Rabbi Akiva who disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim uses the extra words ‫ דם יחשב‬in
order to derive the law that slaughtering sacrificial birds in the wrong place is culpable. He
derives the exclusion of this culpability when the bird's neck is merely pinched from the
expression ‫אשר ישחט‬. We are forced to conclude that the author of Torat Kohanim was neither
Rabbi Yishmael nor Rabbi Akiva. It is quite impossible to reconcile the view of Rabbi
Yishmael with that of the author of Torat Kohanim, because the former uses the expression ‫זה‬
‫ הדבר‬for an exegesis based on a ‫גזרה שוה‬, comparing it to the same expression in Numbers
30,2, where the Torah speaks about who can cancel vows. On the other hand, the fact that
Torat Kohanim does not record the exegetical comment of Rabbi Yishmael concerning the
extraneous words ‫דם יחשב‬, who includes culpability of someone who sprinkles the blood
outside the precincts of the Tabernacle, it appears that the author of Torat Kohanim accepts
the view of Rabbi Akiva. The exegetical use made by Torat Kohanim of the words ‫ או זבח‬in
verse 8 i.e. that the blood is included in the prohibition and culpability of ‫ שחוטי חוץ‬makes it
plain that Torat Kohanim does appear to accept the viewpoint of Rabbi Akiva as per the folio
of the Talmud we quoted. From all this it emerges that the exegesis that the slaughtering of
the bird is culpable when performed outside the courtyard of the Tabernacle is based on the
words ‫דם יחשב‬, whereas the exclusion of pinching the bird's neck as culpable is based on the
words ‫אשר ישחט‬. The question therefore arises why the author of Torat Kohanim derives two
separate ‫ הלכות‬from the words ‫ ?אשר ישחט‬Besides, why does the author of Torat Kohanim
need the words ‫ דם יחשב‬in verse 4?

I have seen the following comment by Maimonides in chapter 18 of his treatise on Ma-asseh
Hakorbanot. "When two people get hold of a knife and they perform ritual slaughter jointly
they are free from punishment because the Torah wrote: ‫אשר ישחט או אשר ישחט‬, i.e. one who
slaughters not two who slaughter." Why did Maimonides have to look for a different
expression in our verses and could not derive this ‫ הלכה‬from the existing exegesis either in the
Talmud or Torat Kohanim ? Another difficulty in the statement by Maimonides is that the
very words from the verse used by Maimonides for exonerating two people who slaughter
jointly have already been used exegetically to derive the law about slaughtering birds,
something which both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva had agreed on in Zevachim 107? We
have explained earlier that according to one of these Rabbis the word ‫ אשר ישחט‬is used to
include culpabiity for slaughtering the bird, whereas according to the other Rabbi this word
serves to exclude culpability if one merely pinched the neck of the bird in question.
Maimonides accepts this latter ruling in chapter 19 of the treatise we mentioned earlier. We
have still another difficulty with the exegesis of Maimonides' ruling in the matter of someone
slaughtering on behalf of a private individual, i.e. ‫איש‬. He derives this from the words ‫דם יחשב‬
‫לאיש ההוא דם שפך‬. This is how Maimonides explains his exegesis: "Although the person in
question had not intended to slaughter these ‫קדשים‬, sacrificial animals, for G'd as such, he will
still be culpable because the Torah wrote: "it shall be accounted as blood (guilt) for that man,
he has spilled blood." The latter words mean that though in his own mind this blood was
similar to ordinary blood spilled on the ground and not blood intended for the altar at all he is
guilty. Thus far Maimonides. The Talmud, on the other hand, uses the words ‫ איש איש‬as the
basis for the culpability of someone who slaughters such an animal; furthermore, Torat
Kohanim uses the words ‫ דם שפך‬as the exegetical base for excluding joint slaughter by two
parties or people who slaughtered inadvertently or while under duress as we mentioned
earlier. How can we use the same words exegetically to derive the prohibition of ‫?שחוטי חוץ‬
The last mentioned explanation is offered in the name of Rabbi Yossi who disagrees with
Rabbi Shimon concerning the meaning of ‫ איש איש‬in Zevachim 108.

We must understand therefore that Maimonides chose to bring proof for his ‫ הלכה‬from the
superfluous words ‫דם שפך‬, as it is a stronger kind of proof than the exegesis based on the
repetition of the word ‫איש‬. Proof of this is found in Baba Metzia 31 where the repetition of the
word ‫ העבט תעביטנו‬in Deut.15,8 is discussed. In that instance Rabbi Shimon took the view that
the Torah employed normal human syntax and that the extra word was not intended for
special exegetical purposes. Tossaphot write there that when there is evidence in the verse
under discussion that the repetition is not justifiable in the context of that verse, we say that it
has exegetical significance. When there is some justification for the repetition, however, we
may choose not to look for further ‫ הלכות‬based on that word. Rabbi Shimon holds that in the
case of Deut. 15,8 the words ‫די מחסורו אשר יחסד לו‬, "in the amount that he is short," provide
ample reason to rule that when the impoverished person does not want to turn his assets into
cash and prefers to receive handouts, one need not assist such a person. This is what is meant
by our "ignoring the repetition ‫ תעביטנו‬and declaring that the Torah uses ordinary human
syntax." Considering this comment by Tossaphot, we can appreciate why the words ‫איש איש‬
are not as good an exegetical base as are the words ‫ דם שפך‬which are used by the Talmud as
the exegetical basis according to Rabbi Yossi. Although the Talmud uses this exegetical basis
only according to the view of Rabbi Yossi, we are entitled to assume that Rabbi Shimon feels
the same way about it seeing we have no reason to assume that the two Rabbis disagree.
While it is true that the Talmud (Zevachim 108) presents Rabbi Shimon as using the repetition
by the Torah of the word ‫ איש איש‬as teaching that it is culpable to slaughter a mammal outside
the precincts of the Temple if said animal was slated to be a sacrificial animal, this was only
before Rabbi Shimon had heard of the exegetical value of the words ‫דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך‬.
This is presumably why Maimonides also quoted this latter exegesis as the basis for our ‫הלכה‬.

[The author proceeds to deal with the first question he raised against Maimonides. I have
decided to skip this. Ed.]

17:5

‫זבחי שלמים לה׳‬. "sacrifices of peace-offerings to G'd." Why did the Torah not content itself
by writing ‫וזבחו אותם‬, instead of repeating the words ‫ זבחי שלמים‬once more? Perhaps G'd
wanted to demonstrate His fondness of the holy offerings brought by His people. He did so by
emphasising that He considered these offerings as "peace-offerings," offerings by means of
which Israel and G'd are perceived as dining at the same table, just like children at the table of
their father. When the Torah writes ‫שלמים לה׳ אותם‬, we may view the word ‫ אותם‬as referring to
the previous subject ‫ בני ישראל‬which was mentioned at the beginning of our verse. The Torah
describes how the soul of the Israelites leaves its mortal sheath, so to speak, in order to
perform the service for its Maker, completely unaware of the "exaggerated" fondness
displayed in return by G'd towards a soul so attuned to its G'd. All this is still insignificant
compared to what we owe G'd in response to all He has done on our behalf already before we
got around to acknowledging this by means of any peace-offerings.

17:8

‫ואליהם תאמר‬, "And to them you are to say, etc." According to Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim
107 we are dealing here with an example of a phenomenon known as ‫ערוב פרשיות‬, i.e. that the
Torah writes a verse in a paragraph dealing with one subject whereas that verse really had its
place in a different paragraph dealing with another subject matter. In our case our verse
teaches that whereas so far the prohibition against ‫ שחוטי חוץ‬was presumed to apply only to the
act of slaughtering outside and not to burning up the remains of the animals outside the sacred
precincts, our verse comes to include also the burning up of the remains of such animals in all
instances where these animals had been slated to be burned up on the altar. According to the
first Mishnah in Zevachim chapter 13 if one slaughtered the sacrificial animal within the
sacred precincts but burned the remains outside those precincts one is just as guilty as if one
had slaughtered the animal outside the permitted perimeter. This prohibition applies even if
the remains of that animal had not been meant to be burned up on the altar at all. Compare
Rashi on the Mishnah.

‫ עיין בפסוק שלפני זה‬.'‫איש איש וגו‬:

‫מבית ישראל‬, from the house of Israel, etc. The Torah had to write the words "from the house
of Israel" and could not content itself with writing the pronoun ‫ ואליהם‬at the beginning of this
verse which would have created the impression that it referred to the matters discussed earlier
in the paragraph. The word ‫ איש איש‬would have referred to two people who commit a sin
jointly such as slaughtering an animal intended for the altar outside the sacred perimeter as we
have already discussed. The Torah was afraid that an exegete would use the repetition of the
word ‫ איש‬to include Gentiles. The Talmud in Menachot 73 when explaining the word ‫איש איש‬
in Leviticus 22,18 uses the repetition to mean that free-willed offerings by Gentiles are
acceptable for the altar of the Temple. In order to prevent us from interpreting the additional
word ‫ איש‬in our context in a similar manner the Torah had to add the words ‫מבית ישראל‬. Burnt-
offerings and peace-offerings are acceptable only from Israelites. This in turns leads us to
interpret the other meanings we have attributed to the extra word ‫ איש‬in our chapter. Once the
Torah was worried about our misinterpreting the word ‫איש איש‬, so that it had to add the words
‫מבית ישראל‬, the Torah next had to worry that the words ‫ מבית ישראל‬would lead us to interpret
that even proselytes could not offer burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. This is why the
Torah had to add the words: "and from amongst the proselyte who lives amongst you."

At this point there was a need to write all these words of an inclusive nature. Were it not for
these additional examples of inclusive letters, etc. we would be tempted to interpret that the
Torah did not include anything which was not spelled out specifically. This is true even
according to Rabbi Yossi who holds that the Torah used the ordinary human syntax. Perhaps
Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that the principle of the Torah using ordinary human syntax applies
only when there is some evidence that the Torah does not want us to use a specific extraneous
word exegetically. [The Talmud in Baba Metzia 31 deals with numerous phenomena of the
Torah repeating a word, such as :,‫ עזוב תעזוב‬,‫ הקם תקים‬,‫ הוכח תוכיח‬,‫ שלח תשלח‬and others. In all
these instances the extra word is used exegetically, no one claiming that the Torah uses
ordinary human syntax. Ed.] Although the Talmud queries the right of Rabbi Yossi Haglili
who fails to use the extra word ‫ איש‬exegetically in one context to use it exegetically in other
contexts, this would hold true were it not for the fact that the Talmud found an alternate
expression to arrive at the same ‫ הלכה‬by using the word ‫ דם שפך‬exegetically instead of the
extra word ‫איש‬. Whenever the result of interpreting the extra word ‫ איש‬is not in conflict with
known ‫הלכות‬, we do not resort to the principle that "the Torah merely used ordinary human
syntax." Tossaphot on Baba Metzia 31 point out that it is unreasonable to suppose that the
rabbis were unable to find some exegetical use for the repetition of the word ‫ איש‬in every case
where it appears, or for that matter, for any of the many examples where the Torah repeats a
word, albeit in a slightly modified form. While it is true that Tossaphot there address the
opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the same applies to the opinion expressed by Rabbi Yossi Haglili.
The main thrust of the argument of those who hold that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax
is that we fall back on that principle only where exegetical use of the word would bring us
into conflict with accepted ‫הלכות‬. It can be demonstrated that even Rabbi Shimon frequently
accepts that principle although he does use repetitions exegetically.

17:10

‫ואיש איש מבית ישראל אשר יאכל‬, "And any person from the house of Israel who will eat,
etc." Torat Kohanim explains the repetition of the word ‫ איש‬in these words: "The word ‫ישראל‬
refers to the Israelites; the word ‫ גר‬refers to a proselyte; the letter ‫ ה‬before the word ‫ גר‬refers
to the wife of the proselyte; the word ‫ בתוכם‬refers to women and slaves. In view of this, why
did the Torah have to repeat the word ‫ ?איש‬Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon answers that it is
meant to include a baby of a Jewish mother fathered by a stranger or a slave." We need to
know why the Torah had to write so many words to include all these details just as the
Baraitha in Sukkah 28 asked concerning the word ‫ האזרח‬including the wives, etc. In that
instance we find the following discussion [concerning who has to observe the commandment
of fasting on the Day of Atonement, (Leviticus 23,27) a positive commandment applicable
only at a certain time, something not normally applicable to women, Ed.]. "Rabbi Yehudah
said in the name of Rav that the Torah compared men and women as being equal when it
comes to the penalties for violations of Torah laws. As a result, the question arises why the
Torah had to write words such as ‫ האזרח‬to restrict the law to adult males, or the words ‫איש או‬
‫ אשה‬in Numbers 5,6 where clearly we speak of violation of a negative commandment,
something that applies to women even if the Torah did not write the word ‫ "?אשה‬The answer
given there is that the Torah included the application of the law even to the additional time
before nightfall. Without the extra word I might have assumed that seeing neither men nor
women are culpable for failure to observe that part of the fast, women would not even be
obligated to observe it; therefore the Torah had to write a word indicating that observance is
obligatory for women also. Using the approach underlying the discussion in the Talmud, we
are entitled to ask here also why the Torah needed to write anything to include women? Who
would have thought that women are relieved of the prohibition to eat blood? It is a negative
commandment and it goes without saying that women are culpable if they violate it! Besides,
why would we have made a difference between a baby born by a proselyte and one born by a
natural-born Jewess that the Torah had to write something special to include such a woman?
Furthermore, whom did the author of Torat Kohanim refer to when he spoke about a baby
fathered by a proselyte so that the Torah had to specifically include such a child in its
legislation by writing ‫ ?איש איש‬If such a child reverts to paganism when he grows up, clearly
the legislation does not apply to him. If, on the other hand, he grows up as a Jew, why would
we need a word in the Torah in order to let us know that this legislation applies to him? In
view of the fact that Torat Kohanim describes the child as an Israelite, it is clear that the
assumption is that the child remained Jewish willingly. There is no reason why he should be
inferior to a proselyte who was not even born as a Jew!

The author of Korban Aharon writes that the correct wording in the Baraitha quoting Rabbi
Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon should be: ‫מן הגוי ומן העבד‬. The lesson would be that although the
father of such a child is or was a pagan or a slave who had not been forbidden to eat blood,
the child is forbidden to eat blood as he is considered part of the people his mother belongs to.
The child of any union between a male Gentile and female Jewess is considered Jewish as we
know from Yevamot 23, where the Talmud bases this on Deut. 7,3-4 the word ‫ בנך‬referring to
a grandchild whose father was a Gentile. Thus far Korban Aharon. I find it difficult to accept
a distinction between the son of such a mixed union who has decided to opt out of Judaism
and one who has not. Once the Torah designated such a son as Jewish he is Jewish in the full
sense of the word. If the Torah spoke of a son who did not want to remain Jewish, he has
thrown off all of Torah! The Torah certainly does not address such a person! If we are able to
impose Torah law on such a youngster we are obligated to do so just as we do with any
natural-born Israelite who defies Torah law. If he is not under our control, what point is there
in the Torah writing laws concerning such a person?

I believe that in order to understand what motivated the comments of Torat Kohanim and
Korban Aharon it would help if we first examined the reason underlying the prohibition to eat
blood which is the subject of our paragraph. Our sages have enlightened us in describing the
souls of all Israelites as of a quality which is unmatched, when they interpreted Deut. 32,9 ‫כי‬
‫חלק ה׳ עמו‬, to mean that "His people are part of G'd Himself." They also added that although
we live our lives in the "lower" world, physically distant from the "higher" celestial regions,
we nonetheless retain a ‫חוט של חסד‬, an umbilical cord of love which ties us to the celestial
regions as demonstrated by the words ‫יעקב חבל נחלתו‬, that "Jacob is the "rope" of His
inheritance" (ibid.). The "soul" of an animal, on the other hand, is rooted in the "lower" world.
It is related only to the spiritual forces of the lowest order, the ‫קליפת נוגה‬. Whenever man
-knowing it is forbidden-consumes the life-blood of an animal i.e. blood whose loss would
result in the death of that animal (as opposed to blood of the capillaries), such eating is
punishable by ‫כרת‬, the premature death and/or extinction of the Jew eating such blood. The
reason is very simple. By eating such blood and absorbing a lower category of animal soul
thus diluting the "higher" soul G'd has equipped him with, one demonstrates his contempt for
higher spiritual values, denying his ‫דבקות‬, attachment, to one's celestial origin. The Torah
writes: "I will set My face against the person (soul) who eats the blood and will cut him off
from amongst his people." The Torah refers to what we have called the ‫חוט החסד‬, the "thread
(or rope) of love" which connects the Jewish soul to its celestial origin. All Jewish souls have
a common celestial origin near the throne of G'd; this is why the Torah spoke of ‫מקרב עמה‬,
"from the midst of his people."

Furthermore, it is a well known fact that though the Jewish people share a common root, they
are different individually in their relative spiritual levels. This is the mystical dimension of
Kohelet 5,7: ‫כי גבוה מעל גבוה שומר וגבוהים עליהם‬, "for there is One higher than the high Who
watches and there are high ones above them." Seeing this is so, one might reason that in view
of the fact that this animal which is ritually fit to be eaten cannot therefore have a ritually
impure "soul," (life-force) and that imbibing its soul could not be damaging to our souls. I
would have reasoned that if consumption of blood is capable of contaminating Jewish souls at
all, it can have such an effect only on the most superior of souls, i.e. that of the males. It
would follow that the penalty decreed by the Torah is restricted to Jewish males. This is why
the Torah had to write words which make it plain that women are no less culpable for
infraction of this prohibition than are men. Once the Torah had to write words or letters to
include people whom we would not normally have included in that legislation, it had to spell
out all the ones included or I would have reasoned that the respective inclusion applied only
to the particular "lower" category of person singled out by special reference. The Torah
therefore had to demonstrate that though Jewish souls are not all of the same calibre, all are
holy enough to jeopardise their holiness if the bodies they inhabit consume animal blood.

You may also choose to pursue a different approach to our problem. You may argue that
consumption of animal blood, i.e. the "soul" of such an animal could prove damaging only to
the lowest categories of Jewish souls, and that therefore only those kinds of Jews should be
prohibited from eating animal blood. A superior soul would be able to resist the subversive
influence of such an animal's "soul" although it might not be totally immune to it. Such
potential damage would certainly not be sufficient to rate the harsh ‫ כרת‬penalty. The Torah
therefore carefully phrased the legislation in such a way that we cannot arrive at such faulty
conclusions. By writing a series of expressions each one designed to include more and more
categories of people in this legislation the Torah makes it clear that it applies to both people
equipped with superior souls and those whose souls are on a lower level.

Here is a list of different levels of sanctity. The highest level belongs to the Israelite males;
the second highest level belongs to their wives seeing that a female soul is not on the same
level of spirituality as is that of a male; the next lower level is the son of a union between a
natural born Jewish father and a proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the son of a
proselyte married to a natural-born Jewish woman. Next in line is the female proselyte,
daughter of either of the two last mentioned unions. Below this is the son of a union between
a male proselyte and a female proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the daughter
born from a union between a male and a female proselyte. Finally, there is the level of the
proselyte himself. All of the above-mentioned levels are alluded to in the Torah at some point
or other. The first and highest category of sanctity from birth is spelled out in the Baraitha of
Torat Kohanim when they interpret the word ‫ ישראל‬in our verse as a reference to a male,
natural-born, Israelite. Proselytes are mentioned twice in that paragraph when the words ‫הגר‬
‫ הגר‬are understood as referring to two separate types of proselytes. You will also find that in
Sukkah 28 they interpret the letter ‫ ה‬of the word ‫ האזרח‬as including the wives of the
proselytes. This teaches us that the letter ‫ ה‬in the word ‫ הגר‬is to be understood as a ‫רבוי‬, an
additional dimension of the word ‫גר‬. This means that the words ‫ הגר הגר‬in our verse really
include four different kinds of combinations of proselytes. You therefore have a total of 4
extra words or letters each including additional categories of proselytes. Perhaps the wording
of the author of our paragraph in Torat Kohanim who wrote ‫גר אלו גרים‬, instead of ‫ זה גר‬as we
would have expected, reflects that what he had in mind are two different categories of
proselytes as opposed to a multiplicity of proselytes all of the same category, whereas the
letter ‫ ה‬in front of the first ‫ גר‬refers to the wives of the proselytes. When the author of Torat
Kohanim went on to write that the word ‫ בתוכם‬refers to the wives and slaves, he meant
natural-born Jewish wives and slaves whose status in Jewish halachah is the same as that of
women. Do not query the need for these people to have been especially included in the
legislation seeing we could have included them by applying a ‫ קל וחומר‬from the application of
the legislation to proselytes, i.e. if even proselytes are included what possible reason could
there be for not including natural-born Jewish women? After all, natural-born Jewish women
possess souls that are intrinsically less holy than those of their husbands, and if so what need
was there for the Torah to mention them as being included in the group of people to whom the
‫ כרת‬penalty applies if even their husbands are so vulnerable that they are liable to the ‫כרת‬
penalty if they eat blood? Remember that if it had not been for the inclusive word ‫ בתוכם‬which
we used to include women in the prohibition to eat blood and the resultant penalty, we would
not have used the letter ‫ ה‬in the word ‫ הגר‬to include two categories of proselytes as we have
described. Altogether we are faced with six different "inclusive" words or letters. The Torah
wrote ‫ איש איש‬i.e. 2 more "inclusive" words which the author of Torat Kohanim uses to
include the child born of an Israelite woman from a union with either a proselyte of a slave
i.e. a child containing Jewish seed albeit seed from a Jew who was not a natural-born Jew.
This is why the Torah wrote the additional words ‫מן הגר‬, "originating in a proselyte." The
intention of the verse was to refer to a proselyte who had married a natural-born Jewess or
vice versa. These last named two categories are derived from the words ‫איש איש‬.

Do not raise the objection that there was no need to write extra words or letters to include all
these different levels of proselytes and the offspring of their unions seeing that even a total
proselyte, i.e. one in whose veins not a drop of "Jewish" blood flows is subject to this
legislation? If it had not been for the extra word ‫ איש‬which tells us that the proselytes
mentioned in this verse were second generation proselytes, i.e. those whose father or mother
or both had already been Jewish at the time they were conceived, I would not have known all
this. Having written the extra word ‫ איש‬enabled the Torah to describe that there are different
levels of proselytes, the most spiritually endowed being the ones in whose veins there flows
some blood of a natural-born Jew. These are followed by the proselytes in which no such
blood of natural-born Jews flows at all. You may ask whence do we know that a female child
whose father was a proselyte and whose mother was a natural-born Jewess is subject to this
legislation? Answer: if even a proselyte in whose veins no Jewish blood flows at all is
included in the above legislation there was no need to add further ‫רבויים‬, letters of an inclusive
nature, to add such people to the groups of people covered by our verse.

‫בנפש האכלת‬, against the person (soul) eating, etc. Torat Kohanim understands the word ‫בנפש‬
in the singular as teaching that G'd does not punish a community who collectively consume
blood with the ‫ כרת‬penalty, as the sin does not have the power to destroy the holiness of a
group of people.

‫מקרב עמה‬, from amongst his people. According to Torat Kohanim the purpose is ‫ועמה שלום‬,
"and his people will be at peace." I am not sure what this is supposed to mean. If the people
are guilty of that penalty because they are each responsible for the proper conduct of a fellow
Jew, why should they not be punished? If, on the other hand, the Torah does not speak of
people whose culpability originates in the ‫ הלכה‬of ‫ערב‬, i.e. that each Jew is a sort of guarantor
vis-a vis-G'd of a fellow Jew's behaviour, such as in instances when the sin was committed
accidentally or unbeknown to the fellow Jew, why would the Torah have to even hint that
such people are free from this penalty or any penalty at all? I believe that what Torat
Kohanim had in mind was that when you cut off diseased branches from a tree you thereby
improve what remains of the tree. The words ‫מקרב עמה‬, from the midst of his people, mean
that G'd decided to cut off this branch in order for the diseased branch not to infect the rest of
the tree so that the tree itself remains healthy, ‫שלם‬.

17:11

‫כי נפש הבשר בדם היא‬, for the life-force of all flesh is in its blood; why is the fact that the life-
force is in the blood repeated twice in this verse? According to what I have written earlier this
verse explains why the soul of the person eating blood is destroyed. The reason is that the
blood contains the ‫נפש‬, the essence of the animal it comes from. Consuming that life-force
results in the soul- i.e. life-force of the person who consumed it becoming diluted with this
spiritually inferior life-force. We still need to investigate why the Torah chose the expression
‫נפש הבשר‬, "life-force of the flesh," instead of writing "the life-force is within the blood?" I
believe G'd was anxious to answer a potential questioner that if the imbibing of the animal is
so detrimental to the soul of a Jew, why did He not forbid the consumption of the flesh (meat)
also? After all, the flesh too contained the life-force of the animal so that eating it would also
cause irreparable harm to a Jewish soul? The Torah therefore repeats that it is only the blood
in the flesh which contains the essence of the animal not the flesh itself. The essence of the
animal is found in its blood, and not in the flesh. This is the meaning of ‫נפש הבשר בדם היא‬. G'd
did not make a human being in such a fashion. In the case of man, the life-force is not only in
the blood but also in the flesh and the bones. Our sages refer to this life-force as ‫הבלה‬, a
certain moisture which survives in the bones of the righteous for many years after they have
died. This is why they do not rot away. On the other hand, the wicked who are compared to
animals are those who will not be resurrected when the time comes seeing that all their bones
have dried out and have rotted away completely so that not an iota of their one-time life-force
still exists.

‫ואני נתתיו לכם‬, "As for Me, I have given to you, etc." The Torah is telling us that the proof of
the fact that the blood of the animal contains its "soul," its life-force, is that G'd allowed us to
offer up the blood of the animal on the altar as a means to obtain atonement for our
inadvertent trespasses. The process may be called ‫נפש תחת נפש‬, G'd accepts one "soul" in lieu
of another soul, i.e. the soul (life-force) of the sinner.

The verse also intends to warn us not to kill animals without an ulterior purpose. We are only
allowed to take the life of an animal (the ones which are fit for consumption by Jews) to help
us atone for our sins. The sequence of the words ‫ נתתיו לכם על המזבח‬are intended to
demonstrate that the "gift" G'd has made us of the domesticated animals on earth carries with
it some restrictions. We are not absolute owners of these animals to do with them whatever
we please; rather they should serve to help us recapture our standing with the Almighty in the
event that we became guilty of certain sins. We are taught in Sanhedrin 2 that if a domestic
animal is guilty of an offence for which the Torah decreed that said animal has to die, such as
initiating sexual intercourse with a human being, it is judged by a tribunal of no fewer than 23
judges, the same number required to judge a human being, someone who has killed a human
being. It is not permitted to slaughter such an animal except when one wants to consume its
meat. In Deut. 12,20 the Torah is on record as permitting man to indulge his craving for meat.
In other words, the Torah had to write a special verse in order to permit us to eat meat which
was not intended as sacrificial meat.

17:13

‫אשד יצוד ציד חיה או עוף‬, who hunts any beast or fowl, etc. We need to analyse why the
Torah had to write this whole introduction instead of merely writing that if someone
slaughters or otherwise kills a free-roaming animal or fowl he has to cover its blood with
earth. Furthermore, if it is a decree without the Torah revealing its rationale, why does the
Torah not merely write ‫יכסהו‬, "he shall cover its blood with dust," instead of writing ‫וכסהו‬,
which implies that he had to fulfil another commandment prior to covering the blood of the
creature in question.

I believe that by writing the words ‫ אשר יצוד‬the Torah intended to forbid the hunting of any
species that are impure, i.e. whose meat is forbidden for Jews to eat although it may be used
in another context. I have discussed this in my book ‫ פרי תואר‬item 117 in accordance with the
view of Maimonides in his treatise Maachalot Assurot chapter 8 where he writes that
permission to hunt is dependent on one's intention to hunt those free-roaming animals which
we are allowed to eat. The fact that amongst the herd of animals one hunts there are some
which do not qualify as food for Jews does not pose an halachic problem to the hunter in such
an instance. This is the true meaning of the expression ‫כי יצוד אשר יאכל‬, i.e. the activity of
hunting is permissible only when its object is to provide you with permissible food. The
Torah continues with ‫וכסהו‬, [the emphasis being on the conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬Ed.] to draw our
attention to the preceding ‫מצוה‬, namely not to engage in hunting animals for sport but only for
food. The Torah writes that the permission to eat, i.e. ‫אשר יאכל‬, is contingent on the covering
of the blood of such animal by earth once it has been spilled i.e. ‫ושפך את דמו‬. In Deut. 12,24
the Torah warns that blood of free-roaming animals must not be consumed either. This
teaches that already in our verse the Torah was concerned with our not eating the blood even
of free-roaming animals or fowl by writing ‫כי נפש כל בשד‬, that the life-force of all flesh, not
only that of pure domestic animals, is situated in its blood. As a result of what we have just
described you find three distinct commandments in our verse. 1) Not to hunt impure animals
for one's pleasure; 2) Not to eat the blood of either ‫ חיה‬or 3 ;‫ )עוף‬To cover the blood of such
animals instead of pouring it down the sink, etc.

I believe we can also detect in the expression ‫ ושפך וכסהו‬an allusion to the need to cover only
some of the blood with earth whereas the rest may be poured down the sink, compare Chulin
88.

17:14

‫דמו בנפשו‬, its blood is bound up with its essence. The meaning of this expression is that the
blood is equivalent to its life-force [the life-force being something abstract. Ed.]. Here the
Torah has provided us with the reason why we have to cover i.e. "bury" the blood of the
above-named categories of animals. Seeing that the blood is its life-force, it is a matter of
showing some respect for that life-force. The Torah also commanded that the remains of a
human being be buried only as a demonstration of respect for the life (or life-force) of a
human being.

The reason the Torah did not use the same syntax when it described the free-roaming animals
as it did when it referred to the pure domesticated mammals where the Torah described the
blood as ‫דמו בנפשו‬, may be because the "pure" domesticated animal possesses a "soul,"
something which has been placed in its blood, whereas in the case of free-roaming animals or
fowl the blood itself is in lieu of the "soul" G'd provided for the "pure" domesticated animals.
This explains why such free-roaming animals and fowls are not suitable as sacrifices on the
altar to achieve atonement for their owners with the exception of the pigeon and the turtle-
dove. Even in the case of the latter, their blood is not sprinkled on the altar, seeing it does not
represent the "soul" of the bird but its blood, i.e "soul" equivalent has been removed when the
priest pinched the neck of the pigeon instead of slaughtering it.

‫כי נפש כל בשד דמו היא‬, for the life-force of all flesh is its blood. The Torah explains that the
reason it forbade us to eat the blood of such animals is not that it is used to attain atonement
for our own souls, i.e. the life we had forfeited by our sin, in which case there would have
been a reason to distinguish between the blood of those animals which are fit as a sacrifice
and those which are not. Rather, the reason is that we are not to consume the essence of such
an animal.

‫כל אוכליו יכדת‬, anyone eating it will be cut off. I have explained already why this penalty is
appropriate. The reason the Torah writes the word ‫ אוכליו‬in the plural whereas the penalty ‫יכרת‬
is in the singular is to alert us to the effect of the penalty. ‫ כרת‬means the withdrawal of the
life-sustaining connection with the soul's celestial root. Seeing that all the Jewish souls have a
common root, any reference to that root is in the singular. The reason the Torah describes the
people consuming such blood as ‫אוכליו‬, i.e. in the plural is, that there are many who derive
some satisfaction of what a single person eats. The source of physical vitality attached to the
celestial root contains a variety of preparatory steps to enable it to be absorbed successfully by
bodies which have become fused with a soul. Although the body is essentially a material
phenomenon G'd has created a force called ‫ נפש‬whose nature it is to develop liaison with
material forces and which develops an urge to participate in the experiences a body finds
pleasant. G'd created this force so that the soul would be able to function harmoniously within
the body. The corresponding force, i.e. a somewhat diluted version of the purely spiritual soul,
‫נשמה‬, is known as ‫רוח‬, spirit; it is called thus because just as the wind is a phenomenon on
earth but remains intangible, so this phenomenon we call ‫רוח‬, spirit, performs both a physical
and a spiritual function. When man eats, i.e. when the body eats, these other parts of the
human personality also receive their sustenance from the food absorbed first by the body. This
is why the Torah speaks about multiple ‫אוכליו‬, "beings which eat of the blood." We may
perceive of the following as all partaking of the nourishment a human being absorbs in
ascending order. The body, the animalistic life-force ‫ ;נפש‬the ‫רוח‬, and finally the ‫נשמה‬. As to
the element subject to the ‫ כרת‬penalty, this is applied only to the ‫חוט החסד‬, the "umbilical cord
of love" connecting the ‫ נשמה‬to its celestial root. When this cord is severed from its root all
other parts of the spiritual side of man will dry up and wither automatically..

We may also understand the verse on the basis of Torat Kohanim which explained on the
word ‫ בנפש‬in verse 10 that the penalty applies to an individual eating and not to a community
eating blood as the animalistic life-force contained in the blood is not powerful enough to
destroy the fabric of the collective souls of such a community. This is alluded to here when
the Torah refers to a number of people who eat but to the destruction of only a single soul.

I have tried to understand why G'd commanded that the blood of free-roaming animals or
fowl has to be buried whereas the blood of pure domestic animals which have not been
offered as a sacrifice does not need to be covered with earth. It is understandable that when
the blood has been offered on the altar that no further procedure is needed; however, seeing
that even when the Temple was standing most animals which were slaughtered were not
offered as sacrifices, why did the blood of such animals not enjoy burial? Seeing we have
explained that the "soul" of such a ‫ בהמה טהורה‬is superior to the life-force G'd supplied to free-
roaming animals and fowl, why do we appear to discriminate against the ‫ בהמה טהורה‬by
pouring away its life-blood instead of according it the honour of burial? Our question is
reinforced by the fact that G'd rejected all free-roaming animals and almost all birds as unfit
to serve as a sacrifice?

When we consider that I have explained that the blood of the free-roaming beast is itself its
"soul" i.e. its life-force, as distinct from the pure domestic animal whose life-force is separate
from its blood though carried by its blood, it emerges that G'd commanded only blood which
is at the same time the essence of the vitality of the creature to be buried. Any blood which
does not represent the essence of the creature does not need to be accorded such a symbolic
funeral. Although the blood of the pure domestic animal contains its life-force, its "soul," the
fact remains that its blood and its "soul" are not identical. Covering of the blood is required
only for the ‫מורגש‬, the tangibly peceptible, not for the ‫היולי‬, that which is perceived only in the
abstract, in its potential.

I wish to pursue the thought of why G'd decided to create the categories of the pure domestic
animals as being so essentially different from the free-roaming beasts, animals which at first
glance appear to have so much in common. We will understand the reason better if we first
appreciate the factors which enable G'd's various creatures to fulfil their overall purpose and
function on earth. Inasmuch as G'd is the source of all life in its various forms, He has made
sure that all His creatures are equipped with the wherewithal to function in nature. He made
all living creatures as composites of four basic raw materials, i.e. fire, air (spirit), water, and
dust. The origin of these four raw materials is something that has not been made accessible to
us, it is (at least partially) spiritual in nature and is described in kabbalistic literature as the
"four legs of the throne of the Almighty," Ezekiel describes four carriers of this throne as
creatures with the faces of four different animals including man in the opening chapter of his
book as carriers of G'd's throne. There are also four angels who correspond to this basic
"foursome" of creation, i.e. Gabriel, Rafael, Michael, and Nuriel. These three "foursomes"
may be perceived as providing providing the background to the creation of a physical
universe, the gradual reduction of pure spirit to something material. Each "foursome" is a
preparatory level to a lower level of spirituality, something closer to the physical material
world. The "foursome" described as part of G'd's throne in Ezekiel are the four categories of
creatures which form the basis of life on earth. The face of ‫ אדם‬refers to the human species;
the face of the ox refers to the pure domestic animals; the face of the lion refers to the free-
roaming beasts on earth; and, finally, the face of the eagle refers to the fowl. Just as there are
four categories of life on earth [living creatures containing blood Ed.] so there are four
categories of inert beings, i.e. fire, wind, water, and dust. All creatures are composites of these
four elements. Even amongst the intangible souls or life-forces G'd has created we find
"foursomes." The highest of these are the celestial lights G'd has created which are almost part
of the essence of G'd Himself. In every single sphere of creation we find the active, the
dispenser, the male on one hand, and the passive, the recipient, the female. In the final
analysis even the most inert component of our physical universe is the recipient of celestial
input, i.e. from the region of the throne of G'd.

Let us now examine the nature of the celestial influences the foursomes in our world are
exposed to. Inasmuch as the face of one of the foursomes in Ezekiel's vision is that of the ox,
i.e. a pure domestic animal, it is reasonable to suppose that the pure domestic animals in our
universe i.e. its counterpart in our regions, receive their spiritual input via their celestial
counterpart. However, the face of the lion represents an impure free-roaming animal. It is
reasonable therefore to assume that all free-roaming animals (including the pure ones) receive
the kind of spiritual input from the celestial regions associated with their counterpart the lion
and what it represents. They are therefore deprived of primary positive spiritual input. The
same applies to the fowl, seeing that the face of the eagle in Ezekiel's vision is also that of an
impure category of bird. We need to examine why the counterpart of these "faces on the
throne of G'd" have not been granted positive spiritual input as did the pure domestic animals
which are recipients of spiritual input from the ox in Ezekiel's vision? Furthermore what is the
source of the criteria which enabled some free-roaming beasts such as the gazelle, etc. to be
considered pure beasts, fit for consumption by Jews?

Remember that there are levels of perceptions which the recipient's mind is incapable of
perceiving even if the source from which such perceptive powers emanate makes an effort to
transmit such receptive power. Torah scholars are well aware of the fact that there are
gradations of such perceptive powers and some of them are endowed with greater such
powers than others. [I believe we can best describe what the author is trying to tell us when
we imagine the receiver of a person equipped to handle a minimum of 5000 volt being
bombarded from a transmitter which sends out impulses of 1000 volt maximum. The receiver
in the hands of the person described would not be able to handle such transmissions. I shall
continue to paraphrase the comments of our author as I feel that rendering them literally
would not result in the reader's enlightenment. Ed.] The lion and eagle in our world are to be
perceived as possessing such receivers having made efforts to exceed the natural receptive
powers granted to them. As a result, the impulses emitted from their celestial counterparts are
largely wasted on them and they are forced to stay outside the garden that G'd had intended
for them to be part of seeing they have not achieved the spiritual goals they were meant to
achieve. As a result of being under-achievers in G'd's overall scheme for His universe, He
commanded the Israelites to keep a distance from such animals so as not to absorb any of their
failings. We know from Deut. 4,11 that in order to remain both spiritually and physically alive
one needs to maintain a close affinity to G'd and His commandments. We know from Job 14,4
that it is reserved for G'd alone to know by what devious paths purity can develop out of
something that started with an impure base. If the original bird in Ezekiel's vision was the
eagle, symbol of an impure bird, and so was the eagle in our world, this does not mean that
amongst all the fowl some will not evolve which bear the mark of purity, such as the pigeons
amongst the domesticated birds or the chickens, geese, turkeys, etc.. The same holds true for
the free-roaming mammals. Although their archtype is the lion, this did not prevent certain
categories evolving into pure free-roaming beasts such as the hart, the gazelle, and the
roebuck. Due to their being cut off, or better, having caused themselves to be cut off from
their celestial counterpart and not having received the required positive spiritual input from
the source of their part of the celestial "foursome," the only level of "soul" these animals
possess is their blood itself.

17:15
‫וכל נפש אשר תאכל גבלה‬, and every person eating an animal which died of natural causes,
etc. The reason the paragraph commences with the letter ‫ ו‬before ‫ כל‬is to remind us that all the
rules which apply to the eight different categories of Israelites and proselytes we listed in the
last paragraph (verse 10) apply here also. The Torah here mentioned two categories, i.e. ‫אזרח‬
‫וגר‬, natural-born Jew and proselyte, to tell us that these are respective "headings" for the
various categories of natural-born Jews and proselytes.

18:2

,‫ ואמדת כמעשה ארץ מצדים‬.…‫דבד‬, "speak ….and say:…according to the doings in the land
of Egypt, etc." We need to know why our verse repeated the instruction to Moses by writing
both ‫ דבר‬and ‫ואמרת‬. Besides, what news does our verse convey by having G'd describe
Himself as "I am the Lord your G'd?" Was there anyone who did not know this as yet?
Besides, what is the Torah's intention with the unusual introduction ‫ ?כמעשה‬If the object of the
word ‫ כמעשה‬was not known how would we know to what these ‫ מצות‬addressed themselves?
This is true both for the ‫ מעשה‬which was presumed to be the norm in Egypt as well as the
‫ מעשה‬which was presumed to be the norm in the land of Canaan at that time. The entire
paragraph from verse 2 through 5 is extremely vague.

Our sages in Torat Kohanim said that the Torah compared practices rampant in Egypt with
practices rampant in the land of Canaan. According to their interpretation, why did the Torah
have to repeat the commandment? If all the Torah wanted to tell us was that the people of
both these countries committed the same kind of sins, why did the Torah have to phrase this
in such a cumber-some manner? Besides, why did the Torah have to add the gratuitous
remark ‫אשר ישבתם בה‬, "that you have dwelled amongst," when speaking of Egypt? Who did
not know that the Jewish people used to reside in Egypt? Is there then another country called
"Egypt?" We can ask a similar question concerning the land of Canaan concerning which the
Torah writes: "which I am about to bring you to?" What other land of Canaan is there? Even
assuming that there was another country called Canaan, one we have never heard of, how
would we know anything about their practices?

It appears to us that the fact that the commandment mentioned here appears next to the
various laws about incest as well as the fact that in verse 24 we are told not to defile ourselves
by transgressing any of these commandments seeing that the nations mentioned have defiled
themselves by ignoring these sexual mores, it is clear that the commandment introduced by
the word ‫ כמעשה‬refers to sexual mores. Once we keep this in mind we have no problem
explaining the wording of the Torah here.

It is well known that a Jew is able to fulfil all the commandments G'd has demanded of His
people without suffering undue hardship and that he can develop a tendency to do so
willingly. The only exception to this rule is the commandment to refrain from certain sexual
unions. The ‫נפש‬, animalistic life-force within man, exercises a powerful influence over man
urging him to disregard those commandments. The Israelite can successfully battle this urge
only if he a) controls his visual contact with the opposite sex and b) if he controls his
fantasizing. If a person fails to control these two senses he will fall victim to temptation. If a
person does not limit his visual contact with the opposite sex, the fact that he does not think
about it does not guarantee that he will not be aroused through visual contact. You may learn
a valuable lesson in the psychology of sexual attraction from the following incident reported
in Kidushin 81. Rav Amram who was the Rabbi of the pious, had a number of female
prisoners whose freedom was bought by the community of Nehardea brought to his house. He
gave them accomodation in the upper floor in his house and disconnected the stairs to that
floor to prevent men from visiting there. It happened that one of these women passed the
place where the ladder used to stand and Rabbi Amram felt as if he had seen a bright light, i.e.
the beauty of that woman made a powerful impression upon him and he felt a strong attraction
to her. He brought a ladder which was so heavy that it took ten people to move it and moved it
single-handedly to climb to the upper floor. By the time he had climbed half the rungs of the
ladder he managed to control his lust and cried out: "Amram! the house is on fire!" As soon as
people heard him they came running and observed that Rabbi Amram was standing half way
up that ladder. The rabbis scolded him for having caused them embarassment as it was clear
to all of them what had prompted Rabbi Amram to call out. So he told them it was better they
should be embarassed on his behalf in this world than to have to be embarassed by him when
they would meet him in the Hereafter. He made the evil urge swear an oath to stop tempting
him and the latter swore such an oath. Thereupon he said to Satan: "see here, you are fire and
I am only flesh; I have proven now that though I am flesh I am stronger than you." The story
proves that even though Rabbi Amram had not been able to control his thoughts, as long as he
was not aroused by looking at the object of his lust he was able to fight his impulses. There is
another story told in Yalkut Shimoni parshat Vayechi in which someone had himself blinded
in order to withstand the lure of the evil urge to commit sexual offences. If exposure to even
one of these causes of temptation is dangerous, how much more so is it impossible to fight off
temptation which is the result of both a lively imagination and the visual allure of the object
of one's fantasy. The author lists a few more examples of the deadly nature of combining
fantasy with visual allure. When one is exposed to both these temptations they are almost
impossible to resist. The author explains the statement in Berachot 34 that "in the place where
the rehabilitated sinners stand, the perfectly righteous are not able to stand," as meaning that
the perfectly righteous never had to battle his sexual urges, whereas the rehabilitated sinner
"stood still," i.e. arrested his urge to run towards the object of his temptation only after a
battle with his evil urge.

This brings us to the commentary on our verse. The Lord G'd was very clever in giving this
commandment. He explained to us that an ordinary person who finds himself in the throes of
sexual passion need not say that the fight against his evil urge is doomed to failure anyway.
G'd does not demand anything of us which we are incapable of delivering. If He did not know
that given the proper circumstances which we ourselves can create we are able to fulfil what
He expects from us, He would not have given such a commandment. G'd expects His
commandment to test only those people who have first taken measures not to expose
themselves visually to such temptation or to indulge in fantasies arousing their desire. If a
person did not take the above-mentioned precautions to help him fight temptation based on
his sexual urge he is not likely to withstand temptation when it comes his way. This is what
the Torah hinted at when it wrote ‫כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם‬, meaning that although you
resided in a country such as Egypt which is a centre of sexual permissiveness and you were
therefore not able to avoid thinking about such temptations, I still command you to triumph
over your evil urge. The word ‫ ישיבה‬is a metaphor for inactivity, for an inhibition. The Torah
refers to the Jewish people who displayed the ability to resist sexual temptation while they
were surrounded by it. This encouraged G'd to legislate such resistance to temptation in an
environment which would be more friendly to those who wish to resist temptation. You are
not to emulate the actions of the Egyptians.

At the same time, G'd continues: "though I will bring you to a country in which you will be
constantly aroused by seeing sexual permissiveness all around you so that you would not even
have to exercise your imagination in order to become aroused, I demand from you not to copy
their activities."

As far as someone saying that he is unable to control his thoughts in this manner, the Torah
introduced this commandment by the repeated ‫דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת אליהם אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬,
"speak and say to the children of Israel I am the Lord your G'd," that while it is quite true that
the human species as such finds it almost impossible to control their fantasies regarding their
sexual passions this is not so in the case of Israelites seeing that the Lord is our G'd. Our
affinity to G'd enables us to master drives which are of a purely biological nature. As soon as
an Israelite has agreed to cleave to G'd this means that G'd in His turn dominates his nature,
i.e. that the ‫צורה תשלוט בחומר‬, "mind controls matter." This is in accordance with the statement
of our sages in Bereshit Rabbah 34,11 that the hearts of the righteous are under their control
whereas the wicked are controlled by their hearts. What the Midrash means is that the heart is
the seat of man's desires whereas the seat of his will-power is his mind, his brain. G'd has
granted man two separate levels of decision-making power. In matters of the libido the heart
is the dominating factor, though the will situated in and controlled by the brain is capable of
overriding the urges of the heart and prevent it from carrying out its urge. You find that
people are able to impose fasts on themselves through sheer will-power though they have a
strong urge to eat and drink, an urge that originates in their hearts. The same is true of
people's ability to overrule their hearts' craving to indulge their sexual urges. The righteous
always conduct themselves in this manner, their hearts being controlled by their will-power in
spite of any urges originating in their hearts which they may experience. Their ‫שכל‬,
intelligence, i.e. their soul, makes the choice of how to act. If, moreover, G'd has warned us
not to indulge in certain activities or that He has made it plain that certain categories of
activities are abhorrent to Him, the rightous will desist from idulging his urge even if He did
not spell out any specific penalty in that context. As a result, the will of a righteous person
does not experience any difficulty in curbing the craving to indulge in such an activity. The
wicked, on the other hand, are so captive to the urgings originating in their hearts that their
will is not powerful enough to restrain their hearts. Perhaps this is due to their not possessing
a ‫נשמה‬, soul, (in the case of Gentiles) or that their soul has already become too contaminated
by their behaviour so that it has submitted to other forces within the personality of the body it
inhabits. G'd said: ‫כי אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, that due to our ‫ נשמה‬in which some divinity resides, we the
Israelites are able to successfully combat the cravings of our libido. Compare Psalms 78,60:
‫אהל שכן באדם‬, "the tent He set within man." In this verse G'd refers to the soul in man as a
form of Tabernacle. It is this which lends the Israelite the strength to cope with even the
strongest temptations of the evil urge.

This is also what David had in mind when he said in Psalms 40,9: "my desire is to do what
pleases You." David meant that he cleaved to G'd so much that even his heart, the seat of his
desire was anxious to do G'd's will. David's heart did not have to be reigned in by his will-
power, but it had so reformed that it would do G'd's will of its own free will. His heart hated
those things which the heart, the seat of desire for material physical things normally desires.
David alluded to this with the word ‫חפצתי‬, in the past tense, meaning that whatever used to be
his ‫חפץ‬, the desire inspired by his heart, seat of his physical cravings, had stopped being that.
David also alluded to this in Psalms 109,22 when he said: ‫ולבי חלל בקרבי‬, "my heart was empty
(or dead) within me;" in either event he says that the desires which normally fill a heart have
departed from him. Instead, in 40,9 David says: "‫ותורתך בתוך מעי‬," "Your teachings fill my
innards." David says that whereas a normal person feels that his guts have been filled with
physical food, he feels that his guts have been filled with G'd's Torah which have replaced the
need for such physical food.
Perhaps David wanted to tell us something I have heard in the name of the sainted Ari Zal in
the introduction to his ‫שער הגלגולים‬. There are occasions when a person who was good
changes into an evil person and that person himself is unable to account for such a change in
his character. The sainted rabbi attributes this character change in a person to his having eaten
some some food which contained forbidden, i.e. harmful natural ingredients or the residue of
an evil being whose soul had undergone a transmigration. When the basically good person
consumes such food it affects his character negatively as he absorbs part of the life-force of
the soul of the wicked. It follows that one has to be extremely careful not to eat anything
which might have absorbed the soul of a sinner in a previous incarnation. David may
therefore have alluded to something of this nature when he said that even his heart, i.e. the
seat of his ‫חפץ‬, had become attuned to doing the will of its Creator and that his guts were full
of G'd's Torah, i.e. food permitted by the Torah.

The following will help to understand the plain meaning of ‫ותורתך בתוך מעי‬, "Your Torah is
inside my guts." The origin of all plants, be they the kind that are essential for the survival of
our ‫נפש‬, our physical life-force, be they part of the multitude of beneficial herbs nature is full
of, or be they plants which we merely eat for our own gratification, is rooted in the Torah
which is the "mother" of all. Just as the Torah itself contains several levels i.e. ,, ‫ דרש‬,‫רמז‬, ‫פשט‬
‫ סוד‬so the various foodstuffs we find in this world may also be classified according to
different levels; each level i.e. category of food, makes a different kind of contribution to our
wellbeing. In my commentary on Song of Songs called ‫ ראשון לציון‬have explained the verse
(2,4) ‫ הביאני אל בית היין‬that just as there are herbs which have a natural beneficial effect on
those who consume them, so there are commandments in the Torah the fulfilment of which
has a natural beneficial effect on the body of the person fulfilling them. This is a most
important prerequisite to the understanding of the commandments of the Torah. I have
mentioned here only an outline of the subject in order to make Psalms 40,9 intelligble on the
basis of the plain meaning of the verse. The nutritional value of every food a person eats
derives from its having absorbed some of the sanctity of Torah. Ever since the time Adam ate
from the tree of knowledge beneficial and harmful effects of food have become mixed up so
that every food contains a negative element also. G'd commanded us not to eat from the fruit
of a tree which is less than four years old in order to allow time for the harmful effects to have
been screened out. Wheat, (since Adam's sin) is surrounded by husks, straw, and other parts
which have to be discarded. G'd has instructed us through the Torah to abstain from numerous
foods in which the harmful elements cannot be separated from the beneficial elements so that
the life-force of the chosen people not become contaminated. It follows that when an Israelite
eats food which is permitted, it is as if he benefited directly from the light of Torah, the light
from the celestial regions. The only difference is that this light underwent a metamorphosis in
accordance with the needs of the physical universe all of whose creatures require physical
food each in accordance with his specific needs. David simply said that G'd's Torah reached
his guts via the method G'd had prescribed for this food to fulfil its function within man. His
desire to carry out G'd's will was aided by his having partaken only of permitted food. His
guts do not contain anything which would deter him from making his desire correspond to
G'd's will.

Let us now go back to the main subject under discussion, the Israelite's imagination as applied
to matters concerning his libido. The more he thinks about this subject the more his desire
becomes aroused making it harder for his ‫רצון‬, will, to control his emotions, the urges rooted
in his being flesh and blood. Whereas normally, one needs to concentrate on the subject of
G'd's commandments in order to ensure that one fulfils them in the best way possible, in this
case one must avoid even thinking about it so that one does not see the object of one's desire
with one's eyes. The moment one looks upon the object in question one places one's
innocence in jeopardy. We know that King David fell victim to his carnal urges as a result of
looking at Bat Sheva (Samuel II 11,2) bathing on the roof of her house. Up until that moment
David's heart which had been devoid of lust had not been aroused. He did what he did only as
a result of what he saw with his eyes. The moment one begins to think carnal thoughts one's
temptation is reinforced, and as a result this makes preoccupation with carnal thoughts appear
as something natural. The wise Solomon was fully aware of this and this is why he wrote in
Proverbs 1,10: "my son, if sinners entice you, do not consent." He meant that one should not
engage in arguing with anyone who tries to entice one to sin. The mere fact that one argues
about it already strengthens the forces of temptation. When David said in Psalms 19,9 that the
precepts of G'd are clear and brilliant, he referred to the expressions ‫ דבור‬and ‫אמירה‬
respectively, i.e. that on the one hand G'd gave clear directives, i.e. like the decree of a king,
‫ ;דבור‬on the other hand, He also phrased this commandment as ‫אמירה‬, as a soft-spoken one, the
kind of tone one adopts with highly placed people and He asked Moses to tell them that He is
their G'd, i.e. to bestow His Holy Name on them. There is no greater tribute G'd can pay to a
people.

18:4

‫את משפטי תעשו‬, "You shall carry out My ordinances, etc." In view of the fact that the
entire chapter deals only with regulations about forbidden sexual unions, what does the Torah
mean by referring to "My statutes and My ordinances?" Besides, what does the Torah mean
with the words ‫ללכת בהם‬, "to walk in them?"

I believe we may explain this in connection with what we wrote that thinking about the
subject of sex increases one's lust at the expense of the power of the will to dominate one's
decision-making process. The Torah was afraid to tell us to distance ourselves from the
subject of sex absolutely in order that we would not refrain from fulfilling the commandment
to be fruitful and to multiply, or to marry the widow of a brother who died without children,
and other related commandments. Taking the warnings of the Torah too much to heart would
result in something counterproductive to G'd's "statutes and ordinances." Therefore the Torah
introduced the subject by first repeating the need to carry out G'd's ordinances, i.e. ‫את משפטי‬
‫תעשו‬, referring to the commandment to be fruitful and to multiply, before warning us to
observe the prohibitions about to be legislated in that context, i.e. ‫ואת חקותי תשמרו‬. Sukkah 52
describes man as possessing a small organ which becomes more hungry in direct proportion
to the amount of food it is provided with, whereas it feels satisfied with less and less if one
starves it. The organ is, of course, man's reproductive organ. Therefore G'd had to tell us to
walk in His ordinances, i.e. to perform the basic commandment of procreation, populating
earth, etc.. At the same time, and while fulfilling those ordinances, we must be careful also to
observe G'd's statutes, i.e. the limitations legislated in this chapter as to who we are allowed to
mate with.

Alternatively, we may view the entire legislation about forbidden sexual unions as a form of
mental preparation for the performance of the positive commandment to procreate in the
proper spirit. If the Torah had not introduced the whole subject matter by asking us to carry
out the various positive ordinances and by refraining from the various statutes so that we
would be mentally prepared to conform with G'd's wishes, we would have considered
indulgence in the sexual act as something which contaminates the soul and body of the human
being. We would have thought that it is so fraught with both spiritual and physical impurity
that it contaminates each and every organ of a human being as well as all his faculties. As a
result, we would have considered ourselves as unable to fulfil any of the Torah's positive
commandments properly unless we abstained from all sexual activity. We would have
considered ourselves as in the class of the wicked whose ‫מצוה‬-performance Assaph describes
in Psalms 50,16 as: "who are you to recite My laws and to mouth the terms of My covenant?"
Assaph implies that G'd is not interested in anyone performing His commandments unless
such a person has attained a certain level of sanctity first.

The Torah added the words ‫ ללכת בהם‬as a reference to the raw material the human being
represents when performing G'd's commandments. If man has performed the sexual act after
proper spiritual and mental preparation he will be able to father children whose natural
tendency it will be to observe G'd's commandments. David referred to something like this
when he said in Psalms 119,59: "I have considered my ways and have turned back my feet to
Your decrees." Our sages in Vayikra Rabbah 35,1 understand these words to mean that David
had so trained himself that his feet automatically would walk towards the Torah Academy out
of habit and out of a desire to study G'd's Torah. When the Torah asked us ‫ללכת בהם‬, it urged
us to so relate to G'd's commandments that we would develop a "natural" tendency to walk in
the paths of Torah.

Another meaning of the words ‫ ללכת בהם‬may be similar to the meaning of Ezekiel 33,12 who
said: "the righteousness of the righteous one will not save him on the day of his iniquity."
Ezekiel meant that even if a person had lived a perfectly righteous life all his years but turns
to sin in the end he has lost the merits he accumulated during the years prior to his turning to
sin. His merits will not accompany him on his way to judgment after death. [According to the
Talmud this is so only if he regrets having lived a righteous life before he turned to sin. Ed.]
When we consider the words of Ezekiel we must understand the words ‫ ללכת בהם‬to mean that
a person has to walk in the path of the Lord's commandments in order that his merits will
accompany him on his most important journey, i.e. on the way to the last judgment.

Another meaning of the Torah's admonition to walk in G'd's ordinances and statutes is to
remind us not to perform them in order to receive our reward in this life. Our sages in Eyruvin
22 phrase the line in Deut. 7,11 ‫ היום לעשותם‬as meaning "you are to perform the
commandments this day (in this life) in order to receive your reward tomorrow, i.e. in the
hereafter." It is a warning to us not to want to cash in all our rewards in this life.

Another meaning of the expression ‫ ללכת בהם‬may be related to the verse in Proverbs 6,23: ‫כי‬
‫נר מצוה ותורה אור‬, that a single commandment is like a lamp whereas the Torah in its entirety is
compared to Light with a capital L. The celestial universe is distant and when the soul of man
ascends from this world to the celestial regions he will find the road dark if he lived the life of
a sinner. On the other hand, if a person lived a life filled with ‫מצוה‬- performance, the
commandments he performed will light up the way between this world and the celestial
regions. We have a verse in Psalms 119,105: "Your word is a lamp at my feet, a Light for my
path," expressing a similar sentiment. What the Psalmist means is that both the lamp and the
Light possess features not shared by the other. The advantage of a lamp is that its source of
light is close to the person holding it, and this is why our sages in Pessachim 2 insist that the
search for leavened things on the evening prior to Passover must be conducted in the presence
of a lamp, i.e. at night when there is no light. A lamp's advantage is that it illuminates all the
dark corners in the room, something the brightest natural daylight fails to do. On the other
hand, Light possesses a great advantage compared to a lamp as it enables one to see for great
distances. This is why David said that performance of G'd's commandments results in two
benefits to the person performing them; 1) he will be able to see what is nearby, i.e. ‫;נר לרגלי‬
"they are a lamp at my feet," at the same time it also provides Light increasing the ability to
see for long distances ahead. This is why David said ‫ואור לנתיבתי‬. When the Torah said that the
function of the ordinances and the statutes is ‫ללכת בהם‬, to walk by them, it referred to both the
lamp and the Light which performance of the commandments secures for the people
performing them.

In the Zohar volume 1, page 170 Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai states that the 613
commandments which are divided into 248 positive commandments and 365 negative
commandments, are symbolic of man's bones and sinews respectively. The performance of
each commandment provides a positive momentum for the respective bone or sinew it
represents. The words ‫ ללכת בהם‬refer to the power of ‫מצוה‬-performance to move man's limbs.
Performance of each ‫ מצוה‬also results in G'd's name, or rather part of it, coming to rest on the
limb or sinew which that ‫ מצוה‬represents. The word ‫ מצוה‬is equivalent to the 4-lettered name
of G'd ‫י־ה־ו־ה‬, when one employs the system known as ‫ג־ר‬,‫ב־ש‬,‫ א־ת‬i.e. that one reverses the
sequence of the letters in the aleph-bet. Inasmuch as we subscribe to the principle of ‫ה׳ אחד‬
‫ושמו אחד‬, that the unity of G'd is expressed also in His very name, this is the mystical
dimension of Exodus 25,8: ‫ושכנתי בתוכם‬. "I will be present within them." In that verse G'd
demonstrated that we, the Jewish people, have become the carriers of the ‫מרכבה‬, the presence
of G'd and His entourage. The same idea is also found in Leviticus 26,12 where G'd speaks of
"walking" amongst us. All of this is provided we fulfil what is written in Deut. 4,4: "you who
cleave to G'd are alive this day."

18:5

‫ושמרתם את חקותי‬, "You shall keep My statutes, etc." Why did the Torah have to repeat in
this verse almost word for word the same directive it had written in the previous verse?
Perhaps we may best explain this on the basis of Sanhedrin 74 where the Talmud explains the
words ‫וחי בהן‬, "so that he may live by them," as meaning "so that he will not die by them." If a
Jew is forced to violate one of G'd's commandments, he should rather violate such a
commandment than make a martyr of himself. The Talmud adds that there are three
exceptions to this rule, idol-worship, forbidden sexual relations, and killing an innocent
person. If a Jew is threatened with death if he does not violate any of these three
commandments he must choose death rather than violate any of these commandments. You
will observe that in verse 4 no mention is made of ‫וחי בהם‬, that one should prefer life over
martyrdom, whereas in our verse the Torah added the words ‫וחי בהם‬. It follows that the
commandments mentioned in verse 4 are those for which a person must be prepared to martyr
himself and to sanctify the name of G'd by laying down his life.

Furthermore, when we examine the different nuances in these two verses we will be
enlightened further. In verse 4 the Torah writes ‫אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, "I am the Lord your G'd,"
whereas in our verse the Torah only writes: ‫אני השם‬, "I am the Lord." We may infer from this
that the Torah addresses different Jews in the two verses. In one verse the Torah addresses the
Jews who fulfil the commandments due to a feeling of love for G'd, whereas in the other verse
the Torah addresses Jews who fulfil the commandments due to a fear of punishment should
they fail to observe G'd's laws. Sotah 31 has already taught us that the reward for people
performing the commandments out of a sense of fear of the Lord extends for up to one
thousand generations, whereas the reward for people whose motivation is love for G'd extends
for up to two thousand generations. It is quite impossible for a person to attain the level of
serving the Lord out of feelings of love until he had first experienced the level of serving the
Lord out of a feeling of fear of punishment. This is the mystical dimension of Psalms 118,19:
"this is the gate of the Lord, the righteous are able to enter it." In accordance with this, verse 4
addresses itself to people who serve the Lord from a sense of fear, and the Torah writes: ‫את‬
‫משפטי תעשו‬, "you are to perform My ordinances, etc., ending with the words "I am the Lord
your G'd," the word ‫ אלוקיכם‬being a clear reference to G'd in His capacity of the attribute of
Justice. In verse 5, however, when the Torah addresses itself to someone who has already
passed the initial stage of serving the Lord out of fear and he serves the Lord out of feelings of
love, the Torah no longer has to make mention of the attribute of Justice because the person
addressed would not be influenced in his observance by mention of that attribute.

The Torah adds the words ‫ וחי בהם‬in our verse to tell us that when someone serves the Lord
out of feelings of love, he will also partake of the good to be found in this life in addition to
any reward he accumulates for use in the hereafter, in eternity. Perhaps this is why the Torah
wrote the letter ‫ ו‬before the word ‫חי‬, to tell us that the good experienced by such a person in
this life is additional to i.e. ‫ו‬, to the reward he stores up for himself in the hereafter. People
addressed in verse 4 who serve G'd motivated by fear do not qualify for this assurance.
According to what we have just explained the words ‫ ללכת בהם‬in verse 4 apply basically to the
hereafter whereas they apply also in this life if the people concerned serve G'd because they
love Him. We may explain Deut. 11,13 "It will be if you hearken diligently to My
commandments…to love the Lord your G'd….and I will grant the rain of your land in its
season, etc." in the same way we have just mentioned, that ‫מצוה‬-performance based on love of
G'd results in dividends in this life and that such people deserve reward in both worlds. This
in spite of the fact that our sages in Kidushin 39 state that there is no reward in this life for
‫מצוה‬-performance. The Talmud did not refer to people who receive a bonus in this life rather
than the actual reward due them. The Torah (Deut. 11,14) also alludes to reward in the
hereafter by commencing with the conjunctive letter ‫ו‬, i.e. ‫ונתתי‬. The meaning of that letter ‫ ו‬is
that any blessing experienced in this life is only a bonus in addition to the reward itself which
will be paid in the hereafter, the exact nature of which the Torah has not revealed.

‫האדם‬, man. We have several statements in the Talmud (Baba Kama 38, Avodah Zarah 3 et al)
in the name of Rabbi Yirmiyah according to which a Gentile who engages in study of the
Torah may attain a spiritual level comparable to that of a Jewish High Priest. The Talmud
derives this from our verse, i.e. ‫האדם וחי בהם‬. The Torah does not speak of "priests, Levites, or
Israelites, but only of ‫האדם‬." Thus far Rabbi Yirmiyah. Rabbi Yirmiyah's comment was
prompted by the apparently superfluous word ‫האדם‬. He was also perplexed by the fact that the
Torah wrote those few words in the third person whereas the rest of the two verses are written
in direct speech. The Torah should have written ‫ אשר תעשו אותם‬if it wanted to be consistent
with the syntax of the chapter up to this point. Rabbi Yirmiyah therefore concluded that the
words ‫ האדם וחי בהם‬refer to someone not included in the people addressed by the Torah
directly in the previous verses, i.e. neither Israelites, Levites, or priests. The only person left
therefore is the Gentile. Tossaphot query this from a Baraitha in Baba Metzia 114 which
quotes Rabbi Shimon as saying that only Israelites qualify for the complimentary description
‫אדם‬, based on Ezekiel 34,31 "‫ אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬,‫אדם אתם‬." Tossaphot answer that we must
distinguish between the term ‫ אדם‬and ‫האדם‬. Whereas the term ‫ אדם‬refers only to Jews, the term
‫ האדם‬does not have such a narrow connotation. I saw a similar comment in the Zohar volume
1, page 25 stating that this is not merely an artificial semantic distinction. Adding a letter does
not enhance the concept it represents but diminishes it. Perhaps it is true that when a Gentile
occupies himself with Torah for valid reasons he too will be able to qualify for the
complimentary title ‫אדם‬. At any rate, Rabbi Yirmiyah sees in the additional letter ‫ ה‬an
indication that Gentiles are included in the term ‫ אדם‬if they study Torah. The letter ‫ ה‬is not to
be considered as integral to the noun ‫האדם‬.
18:24

‫אל תטמאו בבל אלה‬, "Do not defile yourselves with any of these things." Torat Kohanim
comments that this refers to both some of them and all of them. This seems very strange as the
Torah could have simply stated that we must not defile ourselves by sexual intercourse with
even a single one of the categories mentioned in this chapter and we could have avoided any
chance of misunderstanding. Another difficulty is the ending of the verse "for the nations
whom I drive out on your account have become defiled with all these." In view of these words
how can we interpret the first half to mean that defilement through involvement in only one of
these forbidden unions is meant? The words ‫ בכל אלה‬are not clear; they appear to mean that
every one of the Canaanite nations indulged in all of the abominable practices listed in this
chapter.

We may have to resort to a kabbalistic approach in order to properly understand our verse.
This involves knowing the reason why the Torah has not taken us into its confidence
concerning the relative importance of one commandment when compared to another; nor has
the Torah informed us about specific ‫ סגולות‬treasures or characteristics of individual
commandments. On the contrary, when speaking about the Torah, Solomon says in Proverbs
5,6: "She does not chart a path of life, her ways are unstable, you do not know them." Our
sages in Avot 2,1 tell us that we should not say that one particular ‫ מצוה‬is important whereas
another is not so important. The Jerusalem Talmud Peah 1,1 as well as Devarim Rabbah 6
provide proof for this by saying G'd allocates the same amount of reward for fulfilling a
"minor" commandment as He does for someone who fulfils a "major" commandment. We
have good reason to believe that G'd considers some commandments as "major" and others as
"minor." Why then did the Torah not provide us with a key to help us determine the relative
importance of the commandments?

Presumably the reason is that the so-called "minor" commandments are as necessary in G'd's
plans for our personality development as are the so-called "major" commandments. Each ‫מצוה‬
is a ‫סגולה‬, a treasure of a unique kind. What does it matter that the reward for one kind of ‫מצוה‬
is greater or smaller than the reward for its counterpart seeing that each reward is something
unique, contributes in a unique manner to our personality development to ensure our progress
to becoming the most perfect human being? This is why G'd presented the commandments as
if they were all of the same level of importance in order that the Israelites should perform all
of them. This is what Solomon had in mind when he said in Kohelet 9,10: "whatever you are
able to do with your might, do it!"

Another reason may be this. There are commandments the fulfilment of which may result in
material wealth in this world, whereas others may result in longevity in this world. The
performance of still other commandments may determine if someone will be blessed with
children, etc., etc. G'd was afraid that if He revealed to us which commandment would bring
which blessing in its wake some people who are interested only in a particular blessing would
neglect performance of those commandments which promise blessings they do not
particularly care for. This is why G'd decided to conceal these details to ensure that we
endeavour to observe and carry out all the commandments. This encourages a person to
perform a ‫ מצוה‬which has a unique benefit for his wellbeing though he does not know of this.
This helps us understand why we sometimes observe people who are basically wicked and
non-religious enjoy prosperity and peace of mind. They may have performed one of the
commandments whose specific ‫ סגולה‬it is to bestow on him economic success and peace of
mind in this world. The sins these people are guilty of do not prevent G'd from letting them
enjoy the particular blessing they are entitled to on the basis of the ‫ מצרה‬they did fulfil.
Whatever we have written thus far about the Torah keeping us in the dark about the relative
importance of different commandments, applies only to the performance of positive
commandments.When it comes to the severity of transgressing negative commandments,
however, the Torah has made it plain by means of the penalties provided which transgressions
are more serious than others. Some transgressions are of consequence only to man's life in the
hereafter. This is why people guilty of them may enjoy a successful life in this world, not
knowing that all this is at the expense of their share of the life in the hereafter. Other
transgressions result in afflictions long delayed but in this life. Still others may result in
relatively benign punishments; there are others in which the penalty is of a particularly harsh
and cruel-appearing nature. You will find that many sinners were obviously guilty of sins for
which the Torah threatened ‫כרת‬, untimely death, and yet we find these sinners alive and well
into ripe old age. How are we to explain this? Clearly, some people receive their due in this
world whereas others receive it only after departing this life. It is a psychological fact that
most people feel more concerned about what might happen to them in this life than about
what awaits them in the hereafter.

We know that G'd is very strict with even the people closest to Him and does not allow them
to speak an untruth or even something which may be interpreted as a lie. When Rabbi Akiva
returned from his journey to the ‫פרדס‬, the regions where the secrets of Torah are to be found,
he warned his colleagues that when they approached an area that appeared like transparent
stones of marble [like crystallised water Ed.], they should not mistakenly describe it as water
(Chagigah 14). If such restrictions apply to humans, how much more so may we expect the
Torah not to express itself in a misleading fashion?

This brings us to the explanation of our verse. The penalty the Torah threatens for violation of
the sexual mores is expulsion from the Holy Land by the land itself, and is applicable only to
the commission of one of the many detestable acts described in this chapter as I will
demonstrate shortly. Other types of abominations of a sexual nature result in different kinds of
retribution, each according to its specific transgression. G'd did not want to point out which
one of the many forbidden sexual unions described in our chapter results in the sinner being
spewed out by the Holy Land in order that a person should worry about this prospect when
contemplating violation of any (i.e. all) of these prohibitions. This is in accordance with the
psychology that one worries more about a penalty that has been spelled out than about one
which is couched in vague terminology. Seeing each of the prospective violations might result
in the sinner being spewed out of the country he has more reason to worry. The words ‫אל‬
‫ תטמאו בכל אלה‬therefore means "do not defile yourselves through any one of these
abominations." ‫כי בכל אלה נטמאו הגוים אשר אני משלח מפניכם ותטמא הארץ ואפקוד עונה‬, means that
there is a single cause, i.e. one of the many abominations, which was the reason the
Canaanites lost their country. If that was so, it is clear that also the words ‫אל תטאמו בכל אלה‬
refers to a single sin and not the sin of violating all the abominations mentioned in our
chapter.

The Torah also writes ‫ולא תעשו מכל התועבות‬..‫ושמרתם‬, "be careful not to commit any of these
abominations." This verse tells you that the inhabitants of Canaan were indeed guilty of
engaging in all of these perverse practices, that from a moral point of view they may all be
subsumed under the same heading. The only abominations which are not potentially subject
to the penalty of the land expelling its perpetrators are the abominations the Canaanites did
not become guilty of. This is why the Torah had to write the words: ‫כי כל‬, "for all, etc." You
may view the whole subject in parable form. You have a number of vessels in front of you,
each one containing drinking water. You have become aware that a poisonous snake spit into
one of the vessels but you do not know into which one. People will be scared to drink out of
any of these vessels fearing it is the one containing the invisible poison. Although only a
single sin causes expulsion from the country whereas G'd issued many prohibitions, it is a sad
fact that man is inclined to commit such abominations and he is considered in law as someone
who is by nature taking the law into his own hands instead of keeping his distance from
abominations as a matter of nature. I have enlarged on this phenomenon in my book ‫פרי תואר‬
on Yore Deyah 110 where I explained that everyone who is considered as having a 50-50
chance of sinning is considered as a definite potential sinner. In halachah we call this ‫כל קבוע‬
‫כמחצה על מחצה דמי‬, that as long as there is at least one definitely forbidden object in front of us
even if there are 100 permitted items, as long as we have not identified the forbidden item a
person consuming one of these items is not given the benefit of the doubt that the chances that
he ate the permitted items are overwhelmingly in his favour; he is considered as having had a
50-50 chance of having eaten the forbidden item. Once G'd had frightened the Israelite into
considering that he might be guilty of expulsion if he indulged in forbidden sexual relations
and that even the other prohibitions carry the ‫ כרת‬penalty he has every reason to refrain from
committing such a sin.

18:25

‫ותטמא הארץ‬, and the land became defiled, etc. The Torah here intends to tell us something
similar to what we have read in the Zohar volume 3 page 53 that the actions of Israel
determine the amount of spirituality in our world both positively and negatively. Our sages in
Avot 4,11 say that a spiritually positive force is created with the performance of every
commandment, whereas a spiritually negative force is created due to a sin being committed.
The Torah alludes to this concept when it wrote ‫ואפקוד עונה עליה‬, "I punished it for its iniquity,
etc." This is in line with Jeremiah 2,19 that "your wickedness caused you to be disciplined."
Performance of sinful deeds keeps strengthening the accuser against us at the celestial court.
Man will be paid in accordance with his deeds. Tomer Devorah chapter 1 describes this
payment as the creation of a destructive "angel" who will in due course repay the sinner who
had created him. This "angel" loses potency in direct proportion to the afflictions experienced
by its victim, so that once the victim has experienced sufficient pain the "angel" expires by
itself. G'd deals with everyone absolutely fairly, treating each person individually. The
meaning of ‫ ואפקד עונה‬is that the sin itself and its effect is visited upon the sinner. I have
already explained why the Torah uses the singular. According to our approach it is possible
that the various destructive "angels" man creates due to his sins are activated one at a time and
not simultaneously and that this is why the Torah describes the sin in the singular.

18:26

‫ועמדתם אתם‬, "and you shall observe, etc." The reason the Torah uses the word ‫אתם‬, "you,"
after having already addressed the people as "you" by addressing them directly is, that this
commandment is intended as a warning that the various statutes and ordinances not be
disregarded by all the people who have been commanded to observe them. A person should
not say that his only concern is that he personally should not be the cause of the particular
commandment being ignored. By saying ‫ושמרתם את חקותי‬, the Torah imposes upon each one
of us the obligation to see to it that others observe these statutes. Seeing that such an
obligation devolves only on the people with influence on the people, i.e. Moses and his court,
the Torah added the word ‫ אתם‬to make sure that we understood who was being addressed
here. It is the function of a Jewish court to ensure that the people observe G'd's
commandments. In Torat Kohanim our sages said that the reason that Moses and his court are
being charged with that responsibility is that they themselves were already in the habit of
observing these commandments. This made them a natural for supervising observance of
these laws by the whole nation. We have a similar approach to Song of Songs 4,12: ‫גן נעול‬
‫אהותי כלה גל נעול מעין חתום‬. "A garden locked up is my sister, a spring locked up a fountain
sealed." Solomon used a well understood hyperbole to describe chaste behaviour by the
Jewish people. The message is that the legislation about sexual prohibitions is not something
new and strange to the Jewish people but that they had always excelled in chastity as part of
their nature. The Torah may have alluded to this by reminding the people with the word ‫אתם‬,
i.e. "something that you are already used to."

‫האזרח והגר‬, "the natural-born Jew as well as the proselyte." Torat Kohanim explains that
were it not for the extra letter ‫ ה‬at the beginning of the word ‫ אזרח‬I would have interpreted
these laws as applying only to the males. The same is true about the letter ‫ ה‬at the beginning
of the word ‫הגר‬. As it is, the laws also apply to the wives of the natural-born Jews as well as to
the wives of the proselytes. Thus far Torat Kohanim. The only reason that the Torah had to
write something at all in order to include the women is the word ‫ אתם‬which is clearly
masculine.

Another reason the Torah even mentions the proselytes is to tell us that if both the Israelites
and the proselytes will adhere to these regulations on sexual chastity, then the deviations
practiced by the local population will lose the power to make the land spew out its inhabitants.
The tendency of the land to do this was limited to the period prior to the Israelites occupying
it. In other words, it is entirely up to Israel and the proselytes if the land will or will not spew
out its inhabitants.

You are no doubt aware of Exodus 23,33 in which the Torah warns not to conclude any
treaties with the local inhabitants of the land of Canaan as they are apt to persuade you to sin
against G'd. Maimonides as well as the author of the Semak remark that a Gentile who fails to
observe the seven Noachide laws is not even allowed to dwell in the land of Israel for this
very reason. This teaches you that if it had not been for their failure to accept the Noachide
laws the land would not have spewed out anybody on their account. [Many of the prohibitions
in our chapter do not form part of the Noachide laws. Ed.]

18:28

‫ולא תקיא הארץ אתכם…כאשו קאה‬, "so that the land will not spew you out as it spewed out,
etc." The Torah was not content with the statement in verse 25 that the land had already
spewed out its inhabitants on account of their sins. It stresses the urgency of the matter much
as what has been described in Torat Kohanim about the patient who receives a visit from a
doctor who warns him not to eat certain things. This is followed by another doctor who warns
the same patient that if he fails to heed his warning he would die just as another patient who
had failed to heed the warning had died already. The patient takes the second warning more
seriously than the first warning. Our verse may be viewed as the second warning.

18:30

‫ושמדתם את משמדתי‬, "You shall observe My ordinance, etc." Here G'd issues a warning to
observe the "security fence" erected by the sages so as to make it unlikely that one breaches
one of the Biblical commandments concerning sexual mores. The word ‫ משמרת‬refers to such a
"fence." The reason the Torah added the words ‫לבלתי עשות‬, "not to do, etc," is to explain that
the "fence" is designed to protect us from even inadvertently breaching the ‫ עריות‬legislation.
Even though a person would not become guilty of the penalties provided for people who
willingly violate the prohibitons in this chapter, they would still defile themselves. In order to
avoid this, the Torah urges "observe My protective fence."

The Torah concludes the chapter with the words: "I am the Lord your G'd" in order to inform
us that we are in danger of jeopardising this superior status even if we violate the
commandments in this chapter only inadvertently. The abominations mentioned in this
chapter are so serious that commission of any one of them even inadvertently creates a schism
between the Israelite and his G'd. It makes it difficult for G'd's presence to remain amongst us.
Such a presence can reside only amongst people devoid of abominable acts and concerned
with maintaining their sanctity.

‫חסלת פרשת אחרי‬

19:2

‫אל כל עדת בני ישדאל‬, "to the whole community of the children of Israel." Torat Kohanim
explains why the Torah writes the words "to all." Seeing that most of the important
commandments of the Torah are contained in this portion Moses addressed them to the whole
nation as outlined in Eyruvin 54. Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi describes the logistics of this
[seeing they did not have a public address system in those days, Ed.] as distinctly different
from other occasions when Moses revealed legislation. Whereas usually the people
approached Moses in group after group- "a group" meaning a ‫בית אב‬,- in this instance they all
approached simultaneously. This is very difficult. If the Rabbi meant that whereas usually the
elders came to Moses first to be followed by the people at large in groups, Moses would have
had to repeat the same lecture more than 65 times. According to the Baraitha in Eyruvin 54
Moses taught the same legislation only four times. The Talmud there describes that by the
time Moses taught the legislation to the people at large, Aaron had heard it four times, etc. If
Rabbi Mizrachi meant by the words "group after group," that Aaron was one group, Nadav
and Avihu a second group, and the elders a third group, whereas in this instance the Israelites,
the elders, Nadav and Avihu and Aaron all came at the same time, the question is why Moses
used a different system when he taught all the other commandments. Why did Moses not
teach all of the people these commandments 4 times? Surely if the other commandments
warranted that Aaron would hear them 4 times, in this instance it was warranted that all the
people hear these commandments 4 times! It would be better if they heard it each time from
Moses directly than just once, and the other times only from people who themselves had
heard it only from Moses. I believe there are one of two possible reasons for the manner in
which Moses normally taught the Torah precepts G'd had revealed to him. 1) He wanted to
accord honour to the different levels of spiritual achievements attained by his respective
listeners. Accordingly, he would first honour Aaron, then his sons, followed by the elders, and
finally the people at large. 2) He wanted to ensure true transmission of his words. Seeing that
he taught each group of people separately, when they in turn discussed what they had learned
they would be able to compare if each one remembered exactly the same. If the entire people
had learned the same lesson from Moses four times in a row, there would not have been any
way to compare any discrepancies due to someone's faulty memory. This is something that
the listener would be well aware of. It would therefore have been better to follow the pattern
of teaching the legislation separately to different groups at different times in this portion also.
Why would Moses deprive Aaron of his privileged status when teaching this legislation, or,
why would he deprive everyone of the chance to double-check if he heard and remembered
correctly? The more important the legislation, the more important that there should be
unanimity about exactly what the legislation consisted of! On the other hand, if it was
appropriate to teach these commandments to all the people at the same time, why was it not
appropriate to have done so with the commandments Moses revealed prior to this occasion? It
appears, at least when we look at this superficially, that the Torah's departure from its norm in
this case represented a change for the worse!

I believe that the solution to our problem is that up until now Moses had not taught the
commandments directly to the women but had spoken only to the men even when he
addressed the people at large. In this instance G'd ordered Moses to speak directly also to the
women and even to the children. They were to line up just as they had lined up at the
revelation at Mount Sinai. We will offer an alternate solution shortly.

‫ואמדת אליהם‬, "and say to them." According to Vayikra Rabbah 24, the reason we find both
the harsh ‫ דבר‬and the softer ‫ ואמרת‬is that seeing this portion contains so much basic legislation
G'd wanted it presented in a manner similar to the revelation at Mount Sinai. We find the
combination of ‫ דבר ואמרת‬also in Exodus 19,3 where the dual form of ‫ כה תאמר ותגד‬is also
explained as both harsh speech and softer speech.

‫קדושים תהיו‬, "be holy!" We need to analyse what precisely G'd meant when He commanded
us to either be or become "holy." I believe the Torah wanted to add a positive commandment
as a corollary to the string of negative commandments we have just read in chapter 18.
Inasmuch as G'd commanded us to be holy, a person who violates any of the transgressions of
a sexual nature is not only guilty of violating a negative commandment but also
simultaneously violates the commandment to strive and be holy.

Furthermore, our verse may reflect something we have learned in Kidushin 39: "If a person
sits quietly and refrains from committing a transgression he is given a reward as if he had
performed a positive commandment. This is the meaning of our verse. If you are presented
with an opportunity to commit a sin and you refrain from grasping that opportunity, you have
fulfilled the commandment to be or to become holy. The reason G'd commanded Moses to tell
this commandment directly to the whole congregation of Israel was to inform them directly of
this and to show them how easy it is to be counted amongst the people described as "holy."
Every single individual can achieve that spiritual level by merely fighting off the desire to
violate a commandment when the opportunity presents itself. Every Israelite is on the same
spiritual level concerning the acquisition of this merit. This also explains why the Torah used
both the harsh ‫ דבר‬and the softer ‫ ואמרת‬when introducing this comandment. The harsh ‫דבר‬
reminds us that violation of a commandment in chapter 18 is simultaneously a violation of the
commandment to be holy. The softer ‫ ואמרת‬is a reminder that the merit of becoming holy can
be attained by simply not violating a commandment when presented with an invitation to do
so. Possibly, it is only the Israelites who qualify for reward simply for resisting the invitation
to commit a sinful act. To assure us that this is so the Torah may have written the words: "to
all the children of Israel."

‫כי קדוש אני‬, "for I am holy." What kind of a reason is this? Besides, how can a creature be
expected to be similar to its Creator? Does not G'd possess many virtues and attributes not
found amongst the Israelites? If the Torah wrote this line to explain that the reason why G'd
commanded us to strive to be holy is that He Himself is holy, i.e. He wants us to be as much
like Him as possible, but that this is not a reason which obligates us to be so, why would the
Torah suddenly feel it incumbent upon itself to state a reason why G'd wishes us to behave in
a certain manner?

It appears that our sages were sensitive to this point and that this is why they said the
following in Torat Kohanim "If you sanctify yourselves I will account it for you as if you Had
sanctified Me." Accordingly, we must view the word ‫ קדוש‬not merely as an adjective, but as a
description of the usefulness of our action as well as of its reverse. If we were to do the
reverse, G'd forbid, our moral failure would impair the very holiness of G'd Himself! The
sages in Torat Kohanim phrased it thus: "If you do not strive to become holy, I will account it
for you as if you had failed to sanctify Me." Possibly this is also a reason why the Torah used
the dual ‫דבר ואמדת‬, to teach us through the word ‫ דבר‬how seriously the Torah views the mere
lack of effort to sanctify ourselves. On the other hand, ‫ ואמרת‬alludes to the Torah viewing a
person who does try to sanctify himself as someone achieving spiritual stature.

Another way of explaining this verse is this. In the last chapter G'd issued a number of
directives all of which ask us to deny a natural biological urge, something that threatens to
dominate and subvert our ‫רצון‬, our will, which is seated in the mind. I have already written
concerning this subject on Leviticus 18,2 when the Torah referred to practices rampant both in
Egypt and in the land of Canaan. We explained in that context that it is impossible to resist the
lure of one's biological urge unless one not only avoids visual exposure but also makes a
conscious effort not to allow one's imagination to dwell on the subject. Seeing that G'd did
command us to procreate and thereby to insure the continuity of the human species, one
cannot totally dissociate oneself from the subject of sex and all that this entails. Not only that,
there are times when the very preoccupation with that subject becomes a positive
commandment, how else is one to engage in one's marital duty at the right time and place? Is
this not what Solomon (Proverbs 30,19) had in mind when he spoke of ‫דרך גבר בעלמה‬, "the
way of a man with a maiden?" He referred to the duty to procreate, something which cannot
be done by total denial of any thoughts involving one's sexuality.

The Torah commanded us to be holy in order that we elevate the subject of procreation to a
spiritual experience, not to the fulfilment of a mere biological urge. Marital relations are not
to be merely a means to gratify the urges of one's body. The act is to be performed as a ‫מצוה‬,
much like putting on ‫טלית ותפלין‬. When a person feels himself assailed by thoughts of sex
unrelated to the duty to sire children, he should reject such thoughts and suppress them. He
should conduct himself in accordance with the story told by a woman of her husband's
conduct during marital relations (Nedarim 20). She described the reason why they were
blessed with exceedingly handsome looking children as due to her husband's rigorous self-
control even during the act of procreation. She said that her husband acted as if the very act
itself were forced upon him by a demon. Such a person can truly be described as holy, and it
is this the Torah wishes us to strive for and emulate.

Seeing that man will ask how it can be expected of him to suppress thoughts and emotions
which overcome him without his having invited them, and how would he know which
thoughts are inspired by simply physical urges, the Torah writes ‫כי קדוש אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, that
whenever someone performs a ‫מצדה‬, G'd's holy name will come to rest on one of his organs. It
will invariably be the organ involved in performance of that ‫מצוה‬. It follows that if man uses
his male organ only for the performance of the commandment to procreate and to multiply
that he will enjoy a heavenly assist helping him control his biological urges (Tikkuney Ha-
Zohar 70). In fact our verse alludes to the type of ‫ מצוה‬which secures one this heavenly assist.
I have explained on Leviticus 18,4 why half the holy name of G'd is spelled recognisably
while the other half is spelled in a deliberately obscure fashion (page 1181).

Another approach to the words ‫ כי קדוש אני‬is that these words are a reminder of the mutual
bond between Israel and its G'd. We know from Deut. 4,4 that "you who cleave to the Lord
are alive this day," that the key to our survival is the ‫דבקות‬, the affinity we maintain with G'd.
This theme has been repeated by the prophet Jeremiah in Jeremiah 13,11 where the prophet
(G'd) describes this relationship in these words: "for as a loincloth clings close to the loins of
a man, so I brought close to Me the whole House of Israel;" G'd therefore has the right to
demand of us: ‫קדושים תהיו‬, "be and maintain your sanctity because I am holy and you adhere
to Me." If you were to argue: "how can one compare the straw to the grain," G'd answers "I
am the Lord your G'd." This is a clear allusion to the principle that the presence of the ‫ שכינה‬in
our midst is directly related to the degree of affinity we display in our relationship with G'd.

Another reason why the Torah writes: "be holy for I am holy," is that had it not been for this
line we would have thought that as long as we had refrained from violating any of the sexual
mores legislated in chapter 18 in deed, we had conformed with G'd's wishes. We would have
thought that mere visual contact or fantasizing about such unions is not forbidden. We are told
in Berachot 61 that even counting coins into the hands of a woman (in order to have an
excuse to look at her) is forbidden. This prohibition is even derived from a biblical verse
(Proverbs 11,21): ‫יד ליד לא ינקה רע‬, "when [man and woman] join hands they will not be
considered innocent of doing evil." (compare my translation of Alshich's commentary on that
verse, page 209). In this instance G'd commanded the words "be holy," i.e. matters which are
designed to maintain our distance from direct involvement with the women forbidden to us as
sexual partners. The Zohar on 19,4 has interpreted the words: "do not turn in the direction of
idols" in a similar manner. The Torah was not concerned with idolworship in that verse but
with a mode of life which brings us into proximity with idols. We have interpreted Deut.
23,11 to mean that a ritually pure person will not experience involuntary seminal emission
during his sleep. This is based on the same approach as the Torah employs here. He who does
not entertain thoughts of forbidden sexual unions will not be aroused and lose control. A
person is liable to claim that such nocturnal emissions during his sleep are entirely beyond his
control, why should they be held against him? The Torah replies: "for I the Lord your G'd am
holy." G'd implies: "I am able to protect you against such experiences for I will prevent a
Jewish person falling victim to this kind of defilement unless the Israelite in question allows
himself to dwell on the subject of forbidden sexual unions."

We may also interpret the words ‫ קדושים תהיו‬by emphasizing the future tense, i.e. ‫תהיו‬, "you
shall become holy." The implication is that this is a commandment which is an ongoing
process. The Torah asks us to eat ‫ מצה‬on Passover, to sit in huts on ‫סוכות‬, to abstain from
certain kinds of activities on the Sabbath, etc. The common denominator of all those
commandments is that they apply on certain days or on certain dates only. Not so the
commandment of "be holy." This commandment applies day in day out throughout our
lifetime. The imperative to strive for sanctity is one that we cannot take a vacation from. Even
while we are busy performing this commandment it is one that we never have mastered
completely. Whatever sanctity we attain is superior to what we had achieved previously but
inferior to what we still hope to achieve. We know from our prophets that they too possessed
sanctity in varying degrees, Moses having achieved the relatively highest level of sanctity.
Nonetheless it is entirely possible that one can achieve even greater heights of sanctity than
the level attained by Moses. The level of sanctity that will have been achieved by the Messiah
when he reveals himself will prove to be even superior to that of Moses. We know this from
Isaiah 11,2 in which the attributes of the Messiah are described. They include: "The spirit of
the Lord shall descend upon him, a spirit of wisdom and insight, etc. etc." If we accept the
words of Bamidbar Rabbah 19 and Devarim Rabbah chapter 2 that Moses himself will be the
Messiah, this is further proof that there is no upper limit to the "holiness" described here by
the Torah. The Torah writes ‫ תהיו‬in order to remind us that the ultimate realisation of the ideal
of holiness will forever remain "in the future."

The Torah supplies the reason for this with the words "for I the Lord your G'd am holy." G'd
implies that just as there is no limit to His holiness, so our striving for holiness must remain
something that has no upper limit. G'd desires that His favourite creatures engage in an
ongoing process of becoming more and more like their father in Heaven.

When G'd supplied the reason that we have to strive to become holy as "for I am holy," He
meant that if one wants to compare oneself to someone superior the degree of effort one has to
make depends on the relative loftiness of one's ideal, of the person one wants to emulate.
Seeing that it is G'd who wants us to emulate Him, we can imagine that the effort to strive for
holiness is not merely a relative one but the task is monumental inasmuch as our ideal is so
indescribably superior to us. When a junior minister invites the king to be his guest, he makes
suitable preparations so that the king will feel at home in his house. When we invite G'd to
make His residence amongst the Jewish people must we not make extraordinary preparations
to merit His presence on a permanent basis? This is what the Torah reminds us of when it
describes G'd as "for I the Lord your G'd am holy."

You are familiar with the statement in Shabbat 112 that if "former generations could be
compared to angels then we nowadays are merely like ordinary mortals; if, however, even the
earlier generations were comparable only to ordinary mortals, then our generation is
comparable to donkeys." This only underlines how much and how hard we have to strive to
fulfil the commandment the Torah has legislated in our verse. As an illustration of how hard
even the members of former generations worked at this, look at the example of Rabbi Eleazar
ben Azaryah (compare Shabbat 54). When the cow of his neighbour [the text in our Mishnah
speaks of Rabbi Eleazar's own cow, Ed.] left her stable on the Sabbath wearing a strap
between her horns -something the Rabbis disapproved of-although according to the view of
Rabbi Eleazar it was perfectly permissible, he fasted so many days that his teeth turned black
(compare Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat chapter 5) as a form of penitence. The Torah uses the
word ‫ דבר‬when introducing this commandment to alert us to the extraordinary demands this
commandment makes upon us; on the other hand, the Torah continues with ‫ואמרת‬, to remind
us of the extraordinary spiritual benefits that accrue to people who take observance of this
moral directive seriously. The words ‫ אל כל עדת בני ישראל‬are necessary so we should not say
that a commandment demanding such stature could only be addressed to the elite of the
people. The Torah stressed that everyone is included in this commandment to teach us that
every single Israelite could become a potential Moses if he tried (compare Tannah be bey
Eliyahu, and Maimonides hilchot Teshuvah chapter 5).

Yet another meaning of the words ‫ קדושים תהיו‬views this call as an ivitation to become like the
angels who are called ‫קדושים‬. We know this from Daniel 8,13 where Daniel reports
overhearing a ‫ קדוש‬speak, etc. We must understand this as similar to Psalms 82,6 in which the
Psalmist Assaph describes the human species as ‫אלוהים‬, divine beings prior to Adam's sin.
Seeing that G'd used to reside in the heavens, the domain of the angels, it is no more than
reasonable to describe the Israelites as angels once they qualified to provide G'd's new home
on earth. You may be interested to read about the reaction of the angels in the celestial regions
when they found out that G'd took up residence amongst the humans on earth. (compare
Zohar volume 2 page 140). In view of the agitation amongst the angels in the celestial regions
who heard that G'd intended to move His residence to earth, He decided to command the
Israelites to be holy like angels in order that the angels should cease complaining. This lends
additional meaning to the words "I am the Lord your G'd." Thus far the Zohar on the subject.

19:3

‫איש אמו ואביו חידאו‬, "Each one of you shall fear his mother and father." The reason the
Torah wrote this commandment next to the commandment to be holy is also related to the
legislation about forbidden sexual unions. Our sages in Sotah 36 interpret Genesis 49,24: "and
his arms were made firm by the hand of the Mighty One of Jacob" as a reference to how his
father's image helped save Joseph from the temptation he experienced at the hands of the wife
of Potiphar. At the critical moment, when Mrs Potiphar grabbed hold of Joseph's tunic, he saw
a vision of his father's face outside the window. This caused him to resist the advances of Mrs
Potiphar and to leave the tunic in her hand and flee her presence. According to the Talmud,
Joseph's semen escaped via his hands instead of via his male organ, etc. I have heard it said in
the name of Kabbalists (Kav Hayashar chapter 2) that the image of one's father's face
strengthens the forces of sanctity within his son and helps him resist becoming a victim to
temptation involving sexual abominations. The reason the Torah speaks about "his mother
and his father you shall fear," at this juncture close to chapter 18 is that anyone in the throes
of carnal temptation should summon up the image of his parents before his eyes. He will find
that this will help him resist the temptation.

We also have a hint here that if someone indulges in forbidden sex he shames the honour of
his father. This is why the Torah wrote the commandment to fear mother and father so close
to the legislation dealing with fordidden sex. In other words, indulgence in forbidden sex is
equivalent to a violation of the commandment to fear one's mother and father. The parents
would curse a son who commits such an act because they feel ashamed to have brought such a
son into the world. This is also the reason the mother is mentioned here first as she feels the
shame more deeply than her husband. Solomon explained this in Proverbs 10,1 when he
wrote: "and a foolish son is his mother's sorrow." [The "foolishness" of the son is that he was
invaded by a spirit of foolishness else he would not have committed the sin. See commentary
of Alshich on that verse, my translation page 179. Ed.]

Having appreciated this, we can now understand why the second half of our verse speaks
about the need to observe the Sabbath legislation. The Zohar volume 2 page 277 and volume
3 page 301 explains that the seven days of the week were allocated to seven righteous people.
[They are identical with the seven "guests" we welcome in our Sukkah, a different one each
day. Ed.] According to the Zohar Chadash at the beginning of Parshat Toldot the Sabbath
was allocated to Joseph. He represents the mystical dimension of peace. This is the reason we
greet each other with the greeting ‫ שבת שלום‬on the Sabbath. It is also the reason that we re-
phrase the conclusion of the prayer ‫ השכיבנו‬on Friday nights by adding the words "spread over
us the the tabernacle (shelter) of Your peace, etc." Joseph earned his title "the righteous"
because he preserved the covenant G'd had concluded with all Jews through the circumcision
when He put the stamp of that holy covenant on our very flesh. When the Torah speaks of
"My Sabbath days" in the plural, it refers to two dimensions of the Sabbath. The first is the
generally accepted meaning of the word, i.e. the need to observe the Sabbath itself. The
second is the need not to defile the holy covenant of the circumcision. Actually, both
commandments are merely two sides of the same coin, so to speak. This is the reason that
both circumcision and the Sabbath are referred to in the Torah as ‫אות‬, a visible sign. The
Sabbath is called ‫ אות‬in Exodus 31,13, whereas the circumcision is called ‫ אות‬in Genesis
17,11. The two commandments are different when it comes to their performance as an
activity; [Sabbath is repetitive for instance, commitment having to be renewed weekly,
whereas circumcision is once in a lifetime, and other differences, Ed.] from a passive point of
view, i.e. the spiritual credit accruing to people observing these commandments both are so
similar as to be considered one. Anyone who actively observes either one of these
commandments confers the benefit of both commandments on his soul. This is why the Torah
speaks of ‫שבתתוי‬.

‫ואביו תיראו‬, "and fear your (his) father." Torat Kohanim draws attention to the fact that
whereas here the Torah mentions the mother first, the father is mentioned first in the Ten
Commandments where the Torah commands us to "honour your father and your mother." The
reason the Torah varies the order is to teach us that both father and mother are of equal
importance; however, the father takes precedence over the mother when it is impossible to
accord honour to both simultaneously seeing that both father and mother (wife) are obligated
to honour the father i.e. husband. The Baraitha in Kidushin 31 also deals with this subject:
Rabbi said "it is clear to G'd that it is natural for a son to honour his mother more than his
father, and that it is natural for a son to fear his father more than his mother. This is why G'd
mentioned the need to honour one's father before He mentioned the need to honour one's
mother, and He mentioned the need to fear one's mother before He mentioned the need to fear
one's father." I have difficulties with both the reasoning underlying the exegesis of Torat
Kohanim and that of Rabbi in the Talmud. If we really think about these two verses we will
find that the Torah gave more weight to the father in both. In the Ten Commandments the
word "father" appears next to the word "honour." In our verse the word "you shall fear" also
appears next to the word "his father." It is a fact that our sages follow the above-mentioned
method of Rabbi on numerous occasions in their exegesis. If it were not for the fact that the
exegesis is designed to teach us a halachah, I would not hesitate to accept this interpretation
as we are entitled to use the method used by Rabbi. Our sages did not mind as long as a
departure from their rules did not result in a ‫ הלכה‬which is contrary to our tradition. In this
instance, however, there would result a difference in the ‫הלכה‬, i.e. that if we accept the above
exegesis the father would not take precedence in situations where there are conflicting claims
on the son's sense of respect for either parent. If you accept our interpretation, for instance, if
both mother and father ask the son to give them some water to drink, the son would have to
give first to his father based on both interpretations. If, however, father and mother were
divorced so that the mother (ex-wife) no longer is obligated to honour her (ex) husband,
according to our interpretation the son would be obligated to first give water to his father,
whereas according to both the Talmud and Torat Kohanim the son would have the choice
whose request he wanted to honour first. In fact, the Talmud presents the scenario of the son
of a widowed mother asking Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua: "what is the ‫ הלכה‬if father and
mother are divorced and they both want to be given water? The answer given by Rabbi
Eliezer was to put a bowl of water at the disposal of both father and mother so both can help
themselves from it. It is apparent that Rabbi Eliezer felt that father and mother are absolutely
equal as far as the son's obligation to honour them is concerned.

It is possible that this is based on a further piece of exegsis we find in Torat Kohanim on this
verse. Here is the quotation: "The Torah writes ‫איש אמו ואביו תיראו‬. From the word ‫ איש‬I know
only that the duty to fear mother and father applies to males. How do I know it also applies to
females? This is why the Torah wrote the word ‫ תיראו‬in the plural. If so, why did the Torah
commence the verse with the word ‫ ?איש‬Answer: "Usually the man is free to observe this
commandment whereas most women are preoccupied with carrying out prior commitments."
Thus far Torat Kohanim. According to this last Baraitha the word ‫ איש‬is restrictive and
excludes women when it comes to paying honour to father and mother [seeing the Torah does
not use such phraseology in the Ten Commandments, Ed.] though the word ‫( תיראו‬pl) had
included women when it comes to displaying fear, i.e. respect for both mother and father. We
may now extrapolate that as far as honouring the mother is concerned the Torah imposed this
duty primarily on the man. Seeing the Torah had already done this explicitly in the Ten
Commandments, this directive may now be used to teach us something different though
related. It teaches that as far as honouring either father or mother is concerned the mother is to
take precedence when it is impossible to honour both father and mother simultaneously. All of
this is an argument to explain why the Baraitha in Torat Kohanim wrote as it did. According
to the view expressed by Rabbi in Kidushin 31 which explained why the Torah mentioned the
father as being the subject of honour prior to mentioning the mother we are still left with a
problem. Perhaps the fact that the explanation of Rabbi is homiletical in nature makes it
unnecessary to resolve the problem, seeing no ‫ הלכה‬is involved. After all, both mother and
father are to be feared. We do not need much of an ambiguity in the Torah to permit us to
draw conclusions of a homiletical nature.

It is also possible that the sages of the Baraitha did not feel that the position of the word
"father" in relation to the directive was of consequence when we have to decide which of the
two (father or mother) are entitled to precedence in a situation when both claim the honour
due to them at the same time. The reason is that the Torah was forced to mention the two
parties consecutively and could not mention them simultaneously. As a result, they assumed
that whoever was mentioned first in the verse is the one vis-a-vis whom the particular duty
described devolves first. It follows that if it is a matter of honour the father has to be shown
honour first; if it is a matter of fear the mother has to be shown respect first, whenever it is
impossible to do so simultaneously. The reason the word ‫ תיראו‬is written at the end of the
verse is to show that the law also applies to women.

There is another reason why the Torah commences with addressing an individual whereas at
the end of the verse it addresses several people, at least. The Torah hints that if a son
demonstrates that he respects his own father, the chances are that his son in turn will also
show respect for him. You may attribute this to the principle we wrote about in connection
with Genesis 49,3 that the roots of sanctity and impurity respectively are found in the mind of
the father when he engages in marital intercourse in order to fulfil the commandment to be
fruitful and to multiply. His spiritual input at that critical time will be reflected in the spiritual
level of the child that is born from a union based on lofty ideals. Alternatively, the matter is
psychological. When a son observes that his father belittles his grandfather or grandmother,
he in turn will not feel the inclination to show respect or honour to his own father or mother.
On the other hand, when a son observes that his father treats his grandfather with great
respect, he in turn will be in awe of his father. As a result of such considerations the
fulfilment of one act of reverence will lead to the fulfilment of two (or more) acts of reverence
spanning at least two generations. This is reflected in the Torah's use of the word ‫ תיראו‬in the
plural at the end of our verse. The Torah wrote the word at the end of the verse [not like ‫כבד‬
‫ את אביך‬at the beginning of the verse in the Ten Commandments, Ed.] to show that one act of
respect will eventually produce more acts of respect. This is a perfect illustration of what our
sages in Avot 4,2 described as ‫מצוה גוררת מצוה‬, that the fulfilment of one ‫ מצוה‬brings another in
its wake.
Yet another way of explaining our verse is based on a ruling in Tur item 240 where the author
rules as follows: "I believe that inasmuch as the father demonstrated that he is wicked by not
honouring or respecting his father, the son (grandson) is not obligated to show honour to a
wicked father. We base this ruling on Baba Kama 94 where the Talmud rules that if a father
bequeathed a stolen cow to his children the latter have to return it to the party from whom it
was stolen as part of the commandment to honour their father. The Talmud challenges this
ruling saying that seeing the father had placed himself outside the circle of Torah observing
Jews by stealing, the son is not bound by the commandment "honour your father?" The
Talmud answers that the case under consideration was one where the father had done ‫תשובה‬,
had repented. We see from here that the author of the Tur holds that unless one had seen the
father repent we do not merely assume that he had done so and we would not accord him the
honour our verse calls for. [The whole exemption of someone from the law of honouring
father and mother is based on the word ‫ בעמך‬in Exodus 22,27 that one must not curse a prince.
The word ‫ בעמך‬IS considered a restrictive clause, i.e. the law applies only if the prince acts in
accordance with Torah tradition. Ed.] According to the above we have to read our verse as
follows: "a man must display respect for his mother and father provided the man (his own
father) conducts himself with his own father and mother in accordance with what the Torah
demands." This is the reason ‫תיראו‬, that you must accord them respect. If, however, a father
slighted his father or mother, the son is free from the obligation our verse imposes upon him.
The words ‫אמו ואביו‬, "his mother and his father" refer back to the word ‫ איש‬who is perceived
as the man who begot the son in question.

In my book ‫ פרי תואר‬I upheld the words of Maimonides on this subject who holds that one
may assume that one's father had repented even if one did not have direct evidence of this.
Maimonides bases this on Kidushin 49 where the Talmud discusses someone betrothing a
woman on the assumption that he is a righteous person. If the individual in question had been
known to have violated Torah commandments in the past we nonetheless assume that he
would not have made such a statement unless he had repented previous mistakes. We have
therefore repudiated the argument advanced by the Tur. How could we assume that the father
mentioned in Baba Kama had become a penitent seeing he himself had not returned the stolen
cow? Where there is no circumstantial evidence that the father who was a sinner had not
repented, I assume that he had and his son is therefore duty-bound to observe the legislation
presented in our verse. Our words that the son is free from the obligation to honour his father
when his own father is still actively engaged in belittling his (own) father are absolutely
correct as we then have no reason to assume that the father in question had repented. Such a
father is no better than the father who bequeathed a stolen cow to his children in the example
in Baba Batra.

Another way of looking at this plural form of the word ‫ תיראו‬is that it addresses the father
himself. If the father behaved in a manner which is sinful, he would become guilty of
violating the commandment not to put an obstacle before a blind man, i.e. not to cause his son
to become guilty of neglect of the commandment legislated in our verse by making himself
unworthy of being respected by his own son.

‫ואת שבתותי תשמדו‬, "and observe My Sabbath days." Our sages in Baba Metzia 32 ask:
"Whence do we know that if a father orders his son to desecrate the Sabbath, etc., that the son
is not obligated to do his father's bidding?" Answer: "It says ‫איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי‬
‫תשמרו‬, that the commandment to respect one's father is premised on one's observing G'd's
Sabbath days." G'd reminds us that He is the One whom both the father and the son have to
honour." Thus far the Talmud. From the comparison of "you and your father are obligated to
honour Me," it is clear that the example of the Sabbath in our verse is only just that i.e. that a
son must not violate any of the Torah laws even when it results in his declining to respect his
father's halachically illegal request. Why did the Torah choose to describe Sabbath
observance, a law whose violation is punishable by death, as the example for G'd's laws
taking precedence over a father's demands when it could have made the same point by writing
the commandment to respect one's father next to the law to restore someone's lost property,
for instance? Moreover, there was no need to add the words "I am the Lord your G'd?" How
does this add to our case? Everybody knows that G'd's laws take precedence over man's law,
i.e. the father's authority over his son.

I believe we can explain all this in light of what Maimonides wrote in Hilchot Mamrim
chapter 5. Here is what he wrote: "If someone's father or mother are absolute sinners it is still
a punishable offence for their son to physically abuse them." All the codifiers conclude from
this that all that is forbidden is physical abuse of one's parents in such a case; however, the
son or daughter does not have to accord such parents any honour or respect. I have raised this
problem in my commentary on Yore Deyah when dealing with Maimonides' view in
connection with what he wrote in chapter 7 of Hilchot Mamrim that according to my
understanding Maimonides' ruling applies only if the father was guilty of transgressions
‫לתאבון‬, because he had trouble controlling his evil urge and he sinned only occasionally. In
our case we talk about a habitual sinner; this is why Maimonides in chapter 5 made sure to
use the wording ‫רשע גמור‬, "a confirmed sinner," instead of simply writing: "a sinner." I believe
that the term "confirmed sinner, ‫רשע גמור‬, is applicable to people who habitually violate any
commandment that presents itself for them to observe. A son is totally absolved of the
commandment to honour or respect father and mother when he has the misfortune to have
such a ‫ רשע גמור‬as his father. Our verse addresses such a situation when it writes: ‫איש אמו ואביו‬
‫תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו‬. The last three words refer to the duty of both generations to observe
G'd's commandments. The reason the Torah chose the example of the Sabbath to illustratte its
point is because Sabbath-observance is equivalent to total Torah-observance as we know from
Shemot Rabbah 25,12.

One may also approach the moral-ethical allusions contained in this verse as evident from the
plural ‫ שבתותי‬as opposed to the Torah's custom to speak about the Sabbath in the singular. Our
sages in Shabbat 69 explain the plural to mean that in certain cases the non-observance of
many work-prohibitions over a period of numerous Sabbaths may be viewed as a sin which
requires only a single sin-offering to atone for it. This is so when the person in question was
unaware of a Sabbath legislation at all. The Zohar part 2 page 5 understands the plural to refer
to the two parts of each Sabbath, i.e. night and day. This had to be stated as the Torah requires
us to separately sanctify (‫ )קדוש‬both Friday night and Sabbath morning. We know that the
sanctity of the night is not of the same level as the sanctity of the day; had the Torah not
spoken of "My Sabbath-days" in the plural we would not have known that we had to sanctify
also the evening. Our mystical literature views the sanctity of the Sabbath evening as in the
nature of the light to which a bride relates, the ‫ שמר‬aspect of the Sabbath. The sanctity of the
Sabbath morning is viewed as a supernatural light one which surpasses the intensity of the
light at night, something to which the bridegroom relates, i.e. the ‫ זכור‬aspect of the Sabbath.
Kabbalists are familiar with these concepts. This is why the Zohar volume 2 page 88
compares the Sabbath evening meal to the apples from a holy piece of earth, whereas when
one partakes of the meal of the Sabbath day it is considered comparable to dining at G'd's own
table. This is the reason that the sages called the ‫ קדוש‬sanctification of the Sabbath we recite
by day, by the name ‫קדושא רבא‬, "the major sanctification" (compare Pessachim 106).
[Interestingly, the Talmud relates this to prove that on Sabbath morning the ‫ קדוש‬consists of
reciting only the benediction over wine without the addition of any paragraph from the Torah.
Ed.] I have also found at the end of the Shulchan Aruch of the Ari Zal that he relates that
during the period of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah someone erred by writing that the Sabbath is
different from all other days in that the day precedes the night. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah
became aware of this writer's error by some miracle (not having seen the text or heard about
it) and he succeeded in preventing publication of this work. In his book ‫אגרת שבת‬, the Ari Zal
explains the words of our verse as follows in order to prove that the writer who believed the
day precedes the night in the case of the Sabbath erred. The Torah mentioned the mother
before the father and equated the commandment to respect mother and father to the
commandment to observe the Sabbath days. The reason that the Torah wrote ‫איש אמו ואביו‬
‫ תיראו‬mentioning the mother before the father is to establish a linkage with the words ‫ואת‬
‫שבתותי תשמרו‬, the word ‫ ואת‬referring to the preceding evening whereas the word ‫ שבתותי‬refers
to the daytime. The Torah hints that we need to recite ‫ קדוש‬also at night, a period compared to
the feminine attribute (‫ )אמו‬as well as by day the period compared to the masculine attribute (
‫)אביו‬. The reason that both commandments appear in the same verse side by side then is to
compare the order of precedence of the parts of the Sabbath to the order of precedence of the
two parents; the night i.e. the feminine attribute precedes the day, the masculine attribute.

19:4

‫" אל חפנו אל האלילם‬Do not turn to the idols, etc. This verse prohibits idolatrous thoughts.
One should not turn one's thoughts in that direction. In order to understand this better
remember that when a Jew thinks of idolatry it is as if he regresses, i.e. read ‫אחורים‬,
"backwards," instead of ‫אחרים‬, "others." On the other hand, when a Jew dwells on the subject
of the true G'd, it is as if G'd turns His face towards him.

‫האלילם‬, the idols. The reason the Torah uses the plural form when speaking of even a single
idol is that idolatry represents a belief in a multiplicity of domains in this world, separation of
powers. Judaism, however, represents the belief in a single Creator, in a single Supreme
Power in this universe. When idols are described as deities, ‫אלוהים‬, they are automatically
described as ‫אלוהים אחרים‬, other deities, i.e. in the plural.

‫ואלהי מסכה לא תעשו לכם‬, "neither construct for yourselves molten gods;" seeing that the
Torah has already prohibited all kinds of idols why did it single out the molten gods as
something we must not construct? Besides, why did the Torah have to stress the word ‫לכם‬,
"for yourselves?" Perhaps we can understand this in connection with chapter 18 in Tikkuney
Ha-Zohar where we read that if someone performs a good deed G'd's presence will dwell
upon him; if, however, he transgresses one of G'd's commandments the ‫ שכינה‬will depart from
the respective organ that should have performed a commandment and that organ will become
the home of a spirit of defilement, of ‫טומאה‬. This spirit of ‫ טומאה‬is the "iron curtain" which is a
barrier between such a person and his G'd. Isaiah 59,2 spelled it out when he said: "your
iniquities have created a barrier between yourselves and your G'd." When the Torah writes
‫ואלהי מסכה‬, this means "and a god which forms an iron curtain (from the word ‫מסך‬, curtain)
you must not construct for yourselves." If you do, you would separate yourselves from your
source of life. G'd adds the words: "I am the Lord your G'd," to remind you Who it is that you
sever your connections with if you violate this commandment.

The words: "I am the Lord your G'd" may also mean that if we refrain from violating this
commandment we qualify for the promise that the Lord is indeed our G'd. Our sages in
Chulin 5 phrased this as follows: "Anyone who denies the validity of idolatry is considered as
if he had expressed his belief in everything written in the Torah."

A moral-ethical dimension of this verse may teach us the lesson spelled out in Megillah 28 in
connection with Kings II 3,14 ‫לולי פני יהושפט אני נשא אם אביט עליך‬, "if I did not (at the same
time) behold the face of Jehoshaphat king of Yehudah I would not even look at your face."
Elisha explained to Achav that it is forbidden to even look at a confirmed sinner such as he.
G'd warns that we must not make ourselves into a molten image so that it will be prohibited
to even look at ourselves.

19:8

‫ ונכרתה הנפש ההיא מעמיה‬and this person (soul) will be cut off from its people. We must
explore the reason why the penalty for a priest who eats sacrificial meat after the time the
Torah allocated for it is so severe. Why is this sin worse than eating all kinds of animals
which were not allowed to be consumed at any time, such as creeping things, certain kinds of
grasshoppers, or even mammals which died of natural causes or were found to be diseased?
You should know that the reason is connected to what we learned in Baba Metzia 114 that the
corpse of an Israelite confers ritual impurity on people under the same roof, whereas the
corpse of a pagan does not. In other words, the bodies of Israelites are of a higher level of
sanctity (while alive) than are the bodies of pagans. Once the sanctity departs from the body
of the Jew when he dies, this is replaced by all kinds of spiritually negative phenomena. This
accounts for the fact that the difference between a live Jew and a dead Jew is far greater than
the difference between a live pagan and a dead pagan. No sanctity departed from the pagan
when he died, hence no additional ‫קליפות‬, spiritually negative forces, will invade that body.
The same principle operates in connection with the legislation in our verse. The parts of the
animal offered on the altar have enjoyed a higher status than any other animal dead or alive,
seeing the remains of this animal have been considered fit to be offered up in holy precincts,
an area that most Israelites are not allowed to enter either dead or alive. As soon as the time
allocated for these parts to be eaten has elapsed the animal forfeits all the holiness it possessed
and this is replaced in turn by spiritually negative forces, just as in the case of the body of a
Jew who has died. These forces of ‫ טומאה‬which have now invaded the remains of that animal
cause the premature death, etc. of the priest who will eat these parts belatedly. None of the
other animals which the Torah has outlawed for consumption by Jews had ever been imbued
with any sanctity so that this could have been replaced upon its death by spiritually negative
forces which would represent mortal danger to a Jew eating such an animal. Any negative
influences a Jew absorbs when he eats these forbidden animals can be expunged by the sinner
receiving corporal punishment, ‫מלקות‬.

The reason the Torah gives for the harsh penalty "that he (the priest) has defiled something
that is sacred," appears to mean that the Torah is concerned with the status of the remains of
the animal; according to our approach, however, it seems to indicate that G'd is very
concerned with the sacred status of the priest. The Torah does not want the priest to jeopardise
his status. Possibly, the fact that peace-offerings are not complete until the priests had
consumed their portions, is the reason why the Torah had to be very blunt in outlawing eating
any of that sacrificial meat after the deadline, even if, as a result of the priest not having eaten
all of it on time some of it became ‫נותר‬.

19:9
‫ובקצרכם את קציר ארצכם‬, "And when you reap the harvest of your land, etc." The Torah
commenced this verse by speaking in the plural, whereas it concluded by addressing an
individual i.e. ‫לא תכלה פאת שדך‬, "you (sing.) must not reap the corner of your field." The Torah
may have wanted to dispel the faulty notion that when the amount of gleanings, etc. does not
amount to anywhere near enough to provide something meaningful for the poor that the law
does not apply. We find an example of such thinking in Kings II 4,43 where Gechazi, Elisha's
servant, questioned the use of sharing out twenty loaves amongst over one hundred of Elisha's
followers. The Torah therefore addresses each farmer individually to tell him that even though
his individual contribution is minimal he must abide by this legislation. The Torah uses the
singular for each one of the types of gifts for the poor listed in our verse.

The Torah may have felt forced to write this positive commandment immediately following
mention of the severe ‫ כרת‬penalty for the priest who violates the perimeters of eating
sacrificial meat. It wanted to disabuse a person who has become guilty of such a penalty from
saying to himself that there is no point in observing any of G'd's commandments because he
had already forfeited his share of the hereafter by violating a different commandment. The
Torah says: "when you reap the harvest of your fields;" this is a reference to the people (i.e.
the nation at large) who had "harvested" i.e. cut themselves off by commission of a sin which
made them subject to extinction. G'd directs: "do not destroy the corner of your field to
harvest it;" this is a warning to the people or individuals not to become guilty of additional
misdemeanours. He advises us that not the whole soul will be destroyed. The only part of the
personality (soul) which will be destroyed is the branch to which this particular
commandment had been addressed in the first place. Other parts of that soul continue to
maintain their affinity with their holy origin. Every Jewish soul has roots in the celestial
regions, one root corresponding to each of the commandments in the Torah. The Torah
continues: ‫ולקט קצירך לא תלקט‬, "do not gather the gleanings of your harvest." This is a
reminder not even to repeat the specific sin for which one has already once become guilty of
the ‫ כרת‬penalty. The rationale for this can best be understood in light of a comment by the Ari
Zal. He said that it is in the nature of sanctity to leave behind some mark even if its bulk has
been erased. If this is so, it follows that although the sinner has "harvested," i.e. put an end to
his spiritual career by his sin, there is still a residue of the former sanctity he has forfeited by
his deed. The Torah commanded such a sinner to be careful not to commit an act which would
wipe out even that residue by repeating his sin, i.e. ‫לקט‬. It is G'd's hope and desire that this
‫לקט‬, residue of former sanctity, should prompt the sinner to become a penitent so that G'd will
have cause to extend His mercy to him. After all, we are told in Yuma 86 that although a
person may be guilty of a variety of sins which are punishable either by execution in this life
or ‫ כרת‬at the hands of G'd, his repentance will atone for such sins. We are all aware of the call
of Hoseah to the sinner (Hoseah 14,2) to become a penitent and to express his guilt first of all
with his lips. Our sages explain in this connection that "repentance is great indeed as it
penetrates up until the throne of G'd's glory." The meaning of these words is that although the
‫חוט‬, the lifeline which connects every Jewish soul directly to that throne, had already been
severed so that only the thinnest of threads remains within the sinner, repentance enables the
sinner to re-establish contact with the throne of G'd.

19:11

‫לא תגנבו‬, "Do not steal, etc." What is the reason the Torah chose to write this commandment
next to that of leaving your gleanings for the poor? Perhaps Torat Kohanim provides the clue.
They quote Ben Bag Bag who said: "do not steal your own property back from the thief lest
you will be perceived as a thief" (i.e. by those who do not know that what you took was yours
in the first place). Thus far Torat Kohanim. Here the Torah warns the farmer that if he collects
the gleanings of his own harvest he should not rationalise this by saying that he is only taking
what belongs to him anyway.

Our verse actually contains three prohibitions. 1) "Do not steal!" i.e. to not take someone
else's money without that person being aware of it. 2) "Do not deal falsely!" i.e. do not deny
that you have in your possession money belonging to your fellow man though you obtained
this money legally. 3) "Do not lie!" i.e. do not deny that you have money of your fellow man
in your possession and there are witnesses who testify to this. The Torah tells us that even in a
case such as this where the claim of the thief is easily disproved and the money will be
restored to its rightful owner, the thief is guilty of having lied.

The Torah also hints here that in the event a person violates the first of these three
commandments and steals, G'd will see to it that the theft becomes known. Our sages in
Chagigah 16 have stated that if someone commits a sin in secret G'd will make the sin public
so that the sinner's wickedness will be exposed. This is why the Torah writes the prohibition
to deny one's guilt immediately after writing the prohibition to steal. When the Torah wrote ‫לא‬
‫תכחשו‬, "do not falsely deny your guilt," it speaks of a situation where the culprit would be able
to get away with his denial legally such as when he is confronted by only one witness; if the
thief confesses, all well and good; if he denies the accusation, the Seer, i.e. G'd Himself, will
act as the second witness against the guilty person; needless to say that in that event the
culprit will not be able to get away with his lie; the Torah adds: "do not lie!" to teach that in
addition to the culprit's denial having proven useless to him he will also have become guilty
of the sin of lying.

The reason the Torah employs the plural here and in subsequent verses as opposed to the first
ten verses in this chapter and the commandments starting with verse 16 may be to warn the
victim of the thief not to take the law into his own hands and retrieve what has been stolen
from him in that fashion. The words ‫ לא תגנובו‬therefore are addressed to both the original thief
as well as the victim who resorts to stealing to retrieve his own property. The result of taking
the law into your own hands would likely result in both of you becoming guilty of violating
the related commandments ‫לא תכחשו ולא תשקרו‬. As to the reason why also verse 12 is in the
plural, I believe the reason is identical. If someone observes that the thief denies on oath that
he has stolen someone's property, that someone may feel justified in recovering his property
by swearing a false oath himself. This is why the Torah warns ‫לא תשבעו בשמי לשקר‬, not to
swear a false oath by citing G'd as one's witness. Inasmuch as this would involve a
desecration of the name of G'd, the Torah reverts to addressing such a person in the singular
(in the middle of verse 12); this makes it plain that the Torah addresses only the person who
profanes G'd's name in order to salvage his own property by swearing an oath. There was no
need to include the thief seeing he was already included in the general prohibition ‫לא תשעבו‬
‫בשמי לשקר‬. It is also possible that the words ‫ לא תשעבו‬are a warning to the party who tries to
make a second party swear an oath when he has reason to believe that that party will perjure
himself. Better not to let him swear than to contribute to his desecrating G'd's name. In the
worst case scenario then there will only be one person involved in desecrating G'd's name.

19:13

‫לא תעשוק את דעך‬, "Do not oppress your fellow Jew." After the Torah had forbidden the
acquisition of someone else's money through theft a person might conclude that the Torah's
objection is only to thievery and not to other ways of appropriating something which is
rightfully someone else's. This is why the Torah had to outlaw the obtaining of money by
someone exploiting his position of strength vis-a-vis a person whose social or financial
position places him at a disadvantage. The prohibition includes withholding wages of a
labourer even only for one night.

The reason the Torah describes the injured party as ‫רע‬, a colleague or friend, is to warn us not
to presume on the other party's friendship towards us to shortchange them in what is due to
them. One must not play loose with a friend's money because he is one's friend and
presumably will not voice his objection for the sake of preserving the friendship. The word ‫את‬
‫ רעך‬is justified seeing the subject is one which involves only people, not G'd directly.
Moreover, if the friend forgives the harm done to him such behaviour is not considered a sin
vis-a-vis G'd.

A moral-ethical dimension of these verses is found in Berachot 35 where the Talmud

discusses Proverbs 28,24: "he who robs father or mother saying it is no sin is a companion of
a destroyer." The Talmud views the verse as referring to someone enjoying the products of
this world without first reciting a benediction acknowledging that it all belongs to G'd. Father
and mother in that verse are supposed to be G'd and the concept of the people of Israel,
commonly referred to as ‫כנסת ישראל‬. The word ‫ רעך‬in our verse would refer to G'd Himself.
We are entitled to this homiletical approach based on Proverbs 27,10 where Solomon warns
not to abandon "your friend and the friend of your father." This means one should not "rob"
G'd of what He provides without first acknowledging it, taking permission, so to speak. The
reason the Torah adds the words "do not rob," is to tell you that even the paucity of
‫מצוה‬-performance contains an element of robbery. When one fails to carry out a
commandment which one is obligated to observe and has the opportunity to observe one
causes harm to the entire Jewish people, i.e. one is guilty of transgressing the commandment
‫לא תלין‬, not performing one's duty on time. When the Torah writes: "do not keep overnight
with you the wages due to a labourer," this is a demand to perform daily and punctually in
one's ‫מצוה‬-performance. Vayikra Rabbah 26,4 describes the practice of day borrowing from
night during the summer months, whereas night borrows from day during the winter months.
[ideally, both day and night should be 12 hours long all year long were it not for the fact that
the earth's axis is (nowadays, since the deluge) at an angle. Ed.] The Midrash presents this as
an ideal way of two parties helping each other out without recourse to written contracts,
demands for repayment, etc. When the Torah writes ‫לא תלין פעולת שכיר אתך‬, "do not hold back
the wages of your labourer with you all night long," the word ‫אתך‬, refers back to the word
‫שכיר‬, "someone hired by G'd," a reference to the spirit G'd has granted His labourers, i.e. man.
G'd looks upon man as His hired hand. He has granted this spirit both to the hired hand as
well as to the resident. Man's wages are that he is granted the privilege to carry out the
commandments of G'd. Anyone of us failing to do so or doing so belatedly harms the whole
people.

This verse also contains an allusion to the well known statement by our sages (Berachot 28)
that Torah scholars do not find much sustenance in this life. We also have a Yalkut Shimoni
(item 934 on Proverbs) on Proverbs 3,3 which appears to promise much temporal reward for
Torah study. The Torah is supposed to have wanted to know why people studying it are
usually so poor. I have heard a good answer to this question in the name of the Ari Zal. He
explained that the physical universe we live in would be unable to absorb all the goodness G'd
would have to bestow on the Torah scholars. G'd therefore decided to bestow such goodness
only on the average individuals who in turn are charged with looking after the material needs
of the Torah scholars. This teaches that the only reason there are apparently undeserving
wealthy people in this world is that they serve as a ‫מרזב‬, a channel to furnish sustenace to the
Torah scholars. G'd has commanded here that that a (wealthy) person must not oppress a
Torah scholar by withholding the material benefits from him which it is his function to
provide for his ‫רע‬, his friend, the Torah scholar.

The word ‫ את‬in the verse ‫לא תעשוק‬, next to the word ‫רעך‬, -a reference to G'd as we explained,-
is to be understood as similar to what Rabbi Akiva explained in Pessachim 22. In that instance
Rabbi Akiva explains the word ‫ את‬in ‫ את ה׳ אלוקיך תירא‬as referring to Torah scholars. The
Torah intended to warn us to revere Torah scholars, the judges, in much the same manner as
we revere G'd Himself. Judges are also known as ‫אלהים‬, so that we can say the Torah warns
not to steal or rob as G'd has representatives on earth who will deprive the thief or robber of
whatever he has taken unlawfully.

19:15

‫לא תעשו עול במשפט‬. "Do not render an unfair decision in judgment." This warning is
addressed to litigants who are not to try and secure favourable judgment by ruses. If this were
to happen it would be considered an ‫עול‬, an injustice, a perversion of justice. This is the
reason the Torah addressed the prohibition in the plural form, i.e. litigants (pl).You may
understand this as follows: ‫עול במשפט‬, the injustice would occur during judgment the judges
hand down seeing that the judge is obligated to arrive at his decision on the basis of the
arguments presented by the litigants. This is also the reason that this commandment followed
the directive not to place obstacles before the "blind." Usually the reason a judge arrives at a
faulty decision is that one of the litigants has deceived him.

Another meaning of this verse is that if a litigant finds that the judge found in his favour
although he himself is aware that such a ruling was unfair, he must not accept the judgment
but must strive to have such a judgment set aside. This is another reason the Torah used the
plural here, seeing that we deal with injustice to at least two parties.

The verse also addresses the judge himself. If the judge himself feels that the judgment he is
bound to hand down on the basis of the evidence presented is unjust, he would become guilty
of perverted judgment. He is to hand down only the kind of verdict he himself will be
comfortable with.

We also need to consider the vowel patach under the letter ‫ ב‬in the word ‫במשפט‬. This
definitive article reminds us of something we learned in Beytzah 16 that on New Year's Day
G'd allocates to man his material needs for the new year, based on what he deserves. If a
judge were to declare the guilty as innocent and vice versa he would pervert G'd's judgment.
As a result, the victim would question G'd's fairness as it were.

19:16

‫לא תלך רכיל בעמיך‬, "Do not go about your people bearing tales." Our sages in the Zohar
have already preceded me in drawing attention to the apparent duplication when the Torah
speaks both about ‫לא תלך‬, "do not go," and ‫רכיל‬, "bearing tales." The latter word implies that
one goes from one person to another. So why do we need the words: "do not go?" The
Zohar's answer in Nasso subsection Idra Rabbah 128 is of a mystical dimension. I believe the
plain meaning of the Torah is a warning to each individual not to become a vehicle for
potential defamatory information about a second party. How does one prevent this? By not
revealing any information even innocent information in the hearing of anyone who might use
this information or part of it and turn it into something defamatory. If that were to happen
then the person who merely related the original harmless sounding story shares part of the
guilt. The Torah purposely writes ‫בעמיך‬, "amongst your own people," referring to people close
to you who are indiscreet and blabber about any confidence they have heard or overheard. G'd
adds: "I am the Lord" i.e. I am going to track down whence the defamatory remarks
originated.

Another aspect of our verse is that the Torah warns that we must not associate with nor
tolerate the presence of people who spread evil gossip. Providing such people with a home or
otherwise assisting them makes the host an accessory to their sin, part of the cause.

‫לא תעמוד על דם רעך‬, "Do not stand idly by when your colleague's blood is being spilled."
This part of the verse is a natural corollary of the prohibition to bear tales. When one becomes
aware of an assassination attempt for instance, one has to warn the potential victim in order to
enable him to save himself. The Torah writes the words: "Do not stand by idly, etc," to warn
us that relaying a warning to a person of an attempt to assassinate him which one has
overheard does not fall under the prohibition not to bear tales. Failure to warn the potential
victim which results in the murder being carried out makes the party who did not issue the
warning guilty of violating this commandment. Jeremiah 40,14 reports that Gedalyah ben
Achikom was warned of an assassination attempt against him by a fellow Jew Ishmael ben
Netanyah. Gedalyah's refusal to believe that he was in danger resulted in his death at the hand
of assassins.

19:17

‫לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך‬, "do not hate your brother in your heart, etc." The Torah urges us
that if we harbour some resentment against a fellow Jew not to bottle it up in one's heart
saying nothing but hating the Jew in question. One has to come out with one's feelings into
the open, ‫בפיך‬, and rebuke the person who one thinks as guilty of having bad-mouthed him or
otherwise hurt him to cause such hatred. ‫הוכח תוכיח‬, "rebuke him, even repeatedly," ‫ולא תשא‬
‫עליו חטא‬, "so that you will not bear a sin on account of him." Do not assume in your heart that
whatever it is the other Jew has done to cause you to hate him he has done purposely and that
he continues to feel hostile towards you. Give him the benefit of the doubt and discuss the
matter with him. The discussion could lead to one of two possible results. 1) He may explain
to you that he had a good reason for what he did so that there is no reason to hate him. 2) He
may change his attitude towards you, undertaking not to continue his hostile conduct. As a
result he becomes "your friend, your brother."

Another approach to our verse is based on the unusual structure of the verse. It should have
read: "‫לא תשנא בלבבך את אחיך‬, the word "in your heart" which we consider central should not
have been written at the end. The source of the hatred, the heart, should have been mentioned
before the object of the hatred, a fellow Jew. If the Torah reversed this order there must be a
reason for this. I believe that the message is that a person should not think that the Torah only
forbids the kind of hatred which is the forerunner of acts of revenge or violence but does not
forbid harbouring ill feelings towards someone in one's heart. By mentioning the object of
one's hatred immediately next to the prohibition to hate, the Torah made it clear that even the
kind of hatred which is not related to acts of retaliation is forbidden. As soon as a person
distances himself mentally and emotionally from his fellow Jew he begins to violate the
prohibition of hatred as defined by the Torah in this verse.
We need to examine why the Torah chose the term ‫אחיך‬, "your brother," when describing who
it is you hate, whereas the person that you are advised or directed to admonish is described as
‫עמיתך‬, "your colleague."

Perhaps the best way to understand this distinction is based on what we read in Tannah de bey
Eliyahu Rabbah at the end of chapter 3. We are told that if one observes a man known as a
Torah scholar commit an obvious violation of a Torah precept, one should not think about this
during the night, but rather assume that said scholar had already repented his mistake. We also
find in Pessachim 113 where the Talmud discusses the implications of Exodus 23,5 that one
must not stand by idly when the ass of someone whom one hates breaks down under its
burden but one must assist the owner to unload the beast. The Talmud explains that the ‫שנאך‬
who is described as the owner of the donkey is a person whom one has observed commit sins,
in other words someone who one is permitted to hate. Accordingly, there are exceptions to the
rule "not to hate your brother." A Torah scholar is exempted from the list of sinners one is
allowed to hate as it is to be presumed that he is not a habitual sinner but has momentarily
committed a mistake which he will promptly regret. The Torah described such a Torah
scholar as "your brother," to teach you that even if this Torah scholar became guilty of a
transgression you must not hate him but assume that he has already done penitence and
recaptured his status (and therefore stature) as a Torah-observant Jew. We base this on Psalms
122, 8 ‫למען אחי ורעי אדברה נא שלום בך‬, "for the sake of my brethren and friends I pray for your
wellbeing." We can also derive this from the way the Talmud Kidushin 57 interprets the verse
‫את ח׳ אלוקיך תירא‬, "you shall fear the Lord your G'd," where the word ‫ את‬is taken to refer to the
Torah scholars (Deut. 6,13). Similarly, the word ‫ אחיך‬here refers to G'd Himself who is
described on occasion as a "brother of Israel" (compare Midrash Shochar Tov 23).

When the Torah wrote ‫הוכח תוכיח‬, it speaks of a different situation altogether, i.e. it addresses
your conduct vis-a-vis the average Israelite. In order to make this clear, that "average"
Israelite is not described as "your brother" but as "your colleague." This is more pronounced
by the Torah not saying ‫הוכח תוכיחנו‬, "you shall rebuke him repeatedly, as we would have
expected if the Torah had not changed the subject it speaks of in the first half of this verse. By
rebuking your "average Israelite" you will help him to avoid becoming guilty of hating you so
that the righteous will not be punished for his share in the guilt of the wicked. Failure to
rebuke, however, will make the individual who is Torah-observant an accessory in the guilt of
the sinners who have not been rebuked.

‫) האי צורבא מרבנן דסנו ליה בני מאתיה משום דמוכח להו במילי‬:‫עוד ירצה על דרך אומרם ז''ל (כתובות קה‬
‫ ומעתה יאמר החכם למה לי קנאה למה לי שנאה ותחרות עם זרע ישראל ואחדל מהוכיח ואהיה אהוב ונחמד‬.‫דשמיא‬
‫ לזה נתחכם ה' וקודם שצוהו להוכיח צוה לבני ישראל שלא ישנאוהו ואחר כך צוהו להוכיח שהרי ישראל‬,‫לכולן‬
‫ לזה אמר ולא תשא‬,‫ ואם תאמר ומי יערבנו לעם שלא ישנאוהו וישמרו מצות לא תשנא‬.‫מוזהרים מה' לבל ישנאוהו‬
‫ ואומר לשון יחיד לשלול החשד אפילו מיחיד‬.‫עליו חטא פירוש שלא יחשדם בחטא זה אלא יחזיקם בכשרות‬
‫ ובזה יוכיח ויחזור ויוכיח עד שיקבלו מוסרו‬,‫שיחזיק כל איש ישראל שלא ישנאו בשער מוכיח‬:

We have proof of this In Ezekiel 33,9 where the prophet is told that seeing he had warned the
people he himself will be saved and does not have to share their fate.

I have found another interesting statement in chapter 18 of Tannah de bey Eliyahu Rabbah
who writes as follows: "Does the Torah here refer to brothers of the same father or brothers of
the same mother? In answer to this question he says that the word "your brother" refers to G'd
who does not have any "brothers" either in this world, the world to come, or after the arrival
of the Messiah, except for the righteous who perform His commandments meticulously day
after day. Thus far Tannah de bey Eliyahu Rabbah. From this comment It emerges that
"brothers" are considered as closer relations than "sons" or "daughters" as we know from Shir
Hashirim Rabbah 3 that G'd first called Israel "My daughter," whereas eventually He called
her "My sister" (i.e. a higher form of endearment).

19:18

‫לא תקום ולא תטור‬, "Do not take vengeance and do not bear a grudge." Yuma 23 defines
vengeance as someone responding in kind to a hateful act by his neighbour he has
experienced, whereas the "grudge" is defined as repaying a hateful act with a kind act
pointing out, however, that one is morally superior to the person who committed the hateful
act. The proof for this is the verse following that one should "love your neighbour as
yourself." The reason the Torah has to say this is to indicate that it is G'd's wish that we relate
to our fellow Jews with the same love we have for ourselves. If the person described as
bearing a grudge told his neighbour that despite the fact that the latter refused to lend him his
spade, he in turn was willing to lend him his own spade, he indicated that he had harboured
resentment against his neighbour first. G'd tells us that the reason we must not bear a grudge
is because the Lord is our G'd. This means that by means of individual Israelites experiencing
a unification of their hearts, G'd's Unity itself is enhanced. This is all based on the kabbalistic
concept that all Jewish souls are branches of the Holy name of G'd (‫ )י־ה־ו־ה‬based on Deut.
32,9 "for His people are part of Him" (compare Zohar volume 3 page 16).

The Torah was very shrewd in giving these directives to the Israelite in a staggered form. 1)
First of all, one is not to hate a fellow Jew; 2) next, one is not take revenge for something a
fellow Jew has done to him; 3) one is not even to bear a grudge; 4) one is to love one's fellow
Jew. The Torah uses 2 different descriptions for a fellow Jew, a) "your brother;" b) "your
colleague" or "member of your people." This tells us that the legislation applies only to Jews
who basically are Torah-observant but with whom you have a disagreement of a personal
nature. If your hatred for them is due to such a Jew displaying his disdain for the Jewish
religion one must not only not love them but hate them as we have been told by David in
Psalms 139,21 "You know I hate those who hate You, etc."

19:19

‫ בהמתך לא תרביע כלאים‬,‫את חקותי תשמרו‬, "You shall keep My statutes. Do not let your cattle
mate with a different species of animal." Here is the way Torat Kohanim interprets this
verse: "From the wording of the text I only know a prohibition concerning a domestic animal
owned by one. How do I know that the same prohibition applies also to the domestic animals
owned by one's neighbour? We derive this from the extraneous word ‫ את‬in the expression ‫את‬
‫חקרתי‬. If this is correct, why did the Torah use the suffix "your" altogether when describing
the domestic animal? It could have written ‫ בהמה לא תרביע כלאים‬and saved both the word ‫ את‬as
well as the possessive ending ‫ך‬. I have seen a comment by the author of Korban Aharon
explaining that the verse deals with a normal situation, i.e. an owner cross-mating his own
animals. I do not believe that this is an adequate reason for the Torah phrasing the
commandment in this fashion.

I believe that the key to the verse is the fact that the Torah wrote this law immediately after
the commandment to love fellow Israelites like ourselves. The message of that commandment
is that G'd loves for Jews whose souls are all branches of the same pool of sanctity to behave
accordingly towards each other. As a result we might think that G'd does not mind if those
mammals which are fit for consumption by us, i.e. the ‫בהמות טהורות‬, would intermate. The
Torah tells us that this is against G'd's will. The ending ‫ ך‬in the word refers to the fact that
these animals are yours to eat, not that they are owned by you. Torat Kohanim also writes
that the verse as it stands forbids only the crossbreeding or mating of pure animals with other
pure animals. Whence do I know that one must not crossbreed or mate impure animals with
pure animals? Answer: This is why the Torah says ‫את חקותי תשמרו‬. This shows you quite
clearly that the author had understood the word ‫ בהמתך‬to mean pure animals as opposed to
animals which are your own. If the Torah had not written the suffix ‫ך‬, I would not have
known that the subject are pure animals at all, but would have assumed that inasmuch as the
pure animals are fit to eat, mating between pure animals would be permissible as opposed to
mating between impure and pure species.

19:23

‫וכי תבאו אל הארץ‬, "and when you arrive in the country, etc." This verse contains three
commandments. 1) The arrival in the land of our ancestors. We understand this in accordance
with Ketuvot 110 that ‫הכל מעלין לארץ ישראל‬, a father may force all the members of his
household to migrate to the land of Israel as opposed to leaving the land of Israel. 2) One must
plant fruit-bearing trees in order to enhance the stature of the land. 3) One has to observe the
years of ‫ ערלה‬before one is entitled to eat or use the fruit of these trees.

The introduction of the verse with the letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of this paragraph indicates that
one's migration to the land of Israel should not be motivated purely by self-gratification but it
should be accompanied by a love for the land G'd has given us as an inheritance, the land G'd
has chosen for His name to dwell in. Mount Zion bears His name. The Torah commands us to
plant these trees so that we should not think all we have to do in the Holy Land is to simply it
make it our home without civilising the country. You have appreciated that the words ‫אל הארץ‬,
to the land, etc., imply that the Torah speaks about spiritual values connected with this land.

Perhaps we may look at the verse homiletically and view in the expression ‫עץ מאכל‬, "a fruit-
bearing tree" an allusion to Torah students who are also referred to as ‫נטעים‬, "saplings" on
occasion. The Talmud Shabbat 118 quotes Rabbi Yossi as sayings: "I have had marital
relations on five occasions and I have planted five saplings." [in my text of the Talmud the
word is not saplings but ‫ ארזים‬mighty cedars. Ed.] He referred, of course, to the five Torah
scholars whom he fathered as a result of these unions and who are all enumerated by name in
the Talmud. We have a verse in Isaiah 65,22 which describes the lives of "My people are like
the life of a tree." The Zohar writes something similar on the commandment in Deut. 20,19
where the Torah prohibits destroying fruit-bearing trees in order to conquer a town one has
laid siege to sooner. The words not to "destroy its trees" are understood as referring to Torah
students. The air in the Holy Land helps in the acquisition of wisdom and purifies one's soul
as we know from Baba Batra 158. The reason Torah students are compared to fruit-bearing
trees is that they provide spiritual food for their listeners. You may wish to read about a story
about Rabbi Akiva in Massechet Kallah Rabbati chapter 2 which described the venerable
Rabbi teaching an orphaned child how to read. The father of this child had encountered great
difficulties in the hereafter until the day his son was able to read and recite prayers. This
paved the way for his father's progress in the hereafter.

‫שלש שנים יהיה לכם ערלים‬, "for three years shall it be unto you as 'uncircumcised;'" the
meaning of ‫ ערלים‬is ‫אטומים‬, shut, impenetrable; during the first three years a Torah student
studies he does not dare open his mouth to give forth of his newly acquired wisdom just as
most babies do not speak intelligently during the first three years of their lives. (Tanchuma
Kedoshim 14). One normally starts teaching the child Torah in his fourth year so that he can
recite the most simple prayers. Prayers such as Keriat Shema, Modeh Ani are called here ‫קדש‬
‫הלולים‬. In the fifth year the fruit of the tree is permitted to be eaten, compare the Mishnah in
Avot 5,24 that a five year old child is old enough to start learning the written Torah. He begins
to qualify for the description "a fruit-bearing tree."

The Torah immediately follows with the prohibition ‫לא תאכלו על הדם‬, "do not eat it with
blood!" This is a hint that one should not make the consumption of physical food a totally
secular experience as if one's life were bound up in the act of eating, much as the life of an
animal is bound up in its blood. ‫לא תנחשו‬, "do not practice divination." If one were to eat
blood one identifies with the concept of the ‫נחש‬, the original serpent, Satan the seducer. Isaiah
describes the mystical dimension of this when he wrote (Isaiah 65,25) "and the bread of the
serpent is dust." According to this it is the serpent's nature to try and consume man who is
made of dust, or to reduce man to a totally materially oriented creature. ‫לא תעוננו‬, "do not
practice soothsaying." We find a reference to this in Job 7,9 ‫כלה ענן וילך‬, "just as the cloud
once it has disappeared is gone forever, so man, once he has died is gone forever." This verse
describes people who spent their lives chasing only the physical, the tangible, ignoring life's
spiritual aspects. The Torah exhorts us not to exhaust our existence in our physical needs and
pleasures.

19:26

‫לא תאכלו על הדם‬, "You shall not eat with the blood;" Bereshit Rabbah 21,7 say that the
reason that this commandment appears next to the prohibition of ‫ ערלה‬is an allusion to Adam
who had eaten from the tree of knowledge before its period of being ‫ ערלה‬had expired. [the
other trees had been expressly permitted by G'd so that that prohibiton was overridden. Ed]
According to the Midrash, all Adam had to do was to wait until the advent of the Sabbath. He
would have been permitted to recite the benediction over wine; [according to the view that the
fruit of the tree of knowledge were grapes. Ed.] This is the mystical dimension of the
statement in Sanhedrin 38 that ‫אדם מושך בערלתו היה‬, that "Adam was pulling at his ‫ערלה‬." The
word refers to the as yet not permitted fruit; Adam was too impatient. This is why the Torah
writes next to the commandment ‫וערלתם ערלתו‬, "do not eat with the blood," i.e. "do not eat of
the fruit of the tree which is still ‫ ערלה‬because of the blood," i.e. all bloodshed in the world
originated when Adam ate from that tree prematurely. We may extrapolate from this that had
it not been for Adam's failure at the time there never would have been such a prohibition as
the one described in our paragraph. Neither plants nor animals would have become restricted
to man at all, either temporarily or permanently.

19:27

‫לא תקיפו פאת ראשכם‬, "Do not round off the corners of your head, etc." In this instance the
Torah addresses the Israelites in the plural, whereas when speaking of the beard (in the same
verse) it addresses the individual, i.e. in the singular. This teaches that the first admonition in
the verse applies even to people who cannot apply the second half of the verse to themselves
seeing they do not have a beard. We could easily have made such a mistake as women who do
not have beards also are not subject to the prohibition of rounding the corners of their heads
compare (Kidushin 38). Should you ask why we have arrived at such an apparently arbitrary
distinction, i.e. that the males are included in both prohibitions whereas the women are
exempt from both, the answer is that the males become subject to the second prohibiton as
soon as they are old enough whereas the women as a rule never become subject to the second
prohibition. Nature did not endow them with hair in that area of their faces.

19:28

‫ושרם לנפש לא תתנו בבשרכם‬, "And you shall not make an incision on your flesh in
mourning of someone who died." The reason the Torah emphasises the word ‫ נפש‬is to make
plain that though the incision is an injury to one's body, the reason for it is the departure of
someone's ‫נפש‬, someone's soul. The Torah is careful to describe this as ‫לא תתנו בבשרכם‬, "do
not give it on your flesh," to explain that the incision will not leave an injury on one's soul
but only on one's flesh. The reason that the incision does not leave permanent damage on
one's soul is that the body is considered the sheath of the soul, and man is very excited and
hasty when he loses a dear relative to death (Shabbat 43). The Torah therefore continues with
a different kind of bodily defacement which leaves a deeper and more permanent mark, i.e.
‫וכתובת קעקע לא תתנו בכם‬, "and do not tatoo yourselves;" you will note that in this instance the
Torah did not use the restrictive word ‫בבשרכם‬, to show you that tatoos are considered as
injuring not only the body but also the soul. The reason tatooing leaves an injury also on one's
soul is that it is something which requires great care, is not performed hastily like the incision
called ‫שרט‬. It is only natural then that it leaves a far deeper impression on one's personality
than the hastily performed incision. We are told in Baba Batra 16 that a person is not "seized"
i.e. held totally responsible, for things he does at the time when he experiences deep mental
anguish.

The Torah concludes the verse with the words ‫אני השם‬. The reason for this is explained by
Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in Zohar volume 3, page 247. The word ‫ אני‬refers to G'd's throne
which we are in the habit of referring to as His ‫שכינה‬, His Presence. The tetragram i.e. the
name ‫ י־ה־ו־ה‬on the other hand, is a reference to He who sits on that throne. With the
expression ‫ אני השם‬G'd indicates that He is punctilious regarding the honour due to Him as
well as the honour due to His throne. The relationship between man's body and his soul is
similar to the relationship between G'd's throne and His essence. Seeing man has been created
in the image of G'd, He does not want us to injure either our bodies or our souls.

19:29

‫אל תחלל את בתך‬, "Do not profane your daughter, etc." G'd commands the father of a
daughter not to make her into a sex-object even by merely displaying her beauty and enjoying
the compliments paid to her beauty. The honour of a daughter is not in the admiring glances
she receives by men ogling her but by her presiding in her domain inside the home. Even
though a father displays his daughter in order to facilitate finding a suitable husband for her,
G'd still commanded that from the girl's point of you it is a profanation for her; such displays
may eventually lead to the daughter engaging in harlotry even at the instigation of her father.
Once the father uses his daughter's physical charms to attract a husband and thereby a
substantial dowry for himself, he may become tempted to use her earnings from illicit sex for
himself instead. He may be exploiting the natural sexual desires which are kindled when the
girl knows she is on display and admired. The next step in such permissiveness may be the
spread of harlotry in the land until the land becomes so permeated by this sin that it will spew
out its inhabitants. Eventually, the whole sin will be debited to the father who first ignored the
prohibition in our verse. Read what I have written on Leviticus 18,2 in connection with the
verse ‫כמעשה ארץ מצרים‬. I have explained there that the sense of vision and the fantasies it
conjures up is stronger than the will-power seated in one's brain and that this is why one must
not feed the sense of vision with anything liable to arouse one's libido or someone else's libido
either.

19:30

‫את שבתתי תשמרו‬, "You shall observe My Sabbaths, etc." Why did the Torah repeat here a
commandment already written at the beginning of our Parshah (19,3)? Here is how Torat
Kohanim explains this: "I might have thought that the commandment to build the Holy
Temple supersedes that of not working on the Sabbath. The Torah therefore repeats that you
must observe "My Sabbaths" to teach us that the Sabbath legislation takes precedence even
over the commandment to build the Holy Temple." The words of Torat Kohanim do explain
why the subject of building the Temple and the subject of Sabbath observance appear side by
side; they do not, however, address the question why the Torah could not then have dispensed
with mentioning this commandment in 19,3? Or, the commandment of building the Holy
Temple should have been written in verse 3 instead of here.

I believe that the commandment to observe the Sabbath is connected to what was written
before rather than to the commandment to build the Holy Temple. Whereas the Torah
commanded the father not to desecrate his daughter by instructing her to practice harlotry, the
fact remains that some girls engage in that profession without being urged by their fathers to
do so. When they do that they do not only desecrate their own name but they bring shame on
the name of their fathers as well even though the father was quite innocent in the matter. This
is why the Torah commanded the father to keep strict control of the movements of his
daughter so that she will not prostitute herself. The Torah blames the father, i.e. the person
who begot the child for the eventual misdemeanours of the child. The fact is that there are
three separate causes which may be to blame for the delinquency of children. 1) If at the time
of conception the father was bent on the physical pleasure of the union with his wife instead
of being motivated purely by the desire to fulfil G'd's commandment to be fruitful when they
had marital relations. As a result, the child born from such a union may inherit a tendency to
engage in sex for gratification of a biological urge. 2) The cause may be the mother; if the
deeds of the mother are not morally good, "the lamb will tend to become like the sheep which
has given birth to it" (compare Ketuvot 63). 3) If both father and mother had forbidden
thoughts at the time they conceived the child. The classic example is King Chiskiyah and his
wife (the daughter of the prophet Isaiah) who produced two great sinners from that union
(compare Sanhedrin 104). The tragedy of that incident is the fact that though both father and
mother were pillars of piety they nonetheless produced such issue.

The words ‫ את שבתותי תשמרו‬are addressesd to possibility number one, similar to something the
Zohar explains on Isaiah 56,4: ‫לסריסים אשר ישמרו את שבתותי‬, "as to the eunuchs who have
chosen to observe My Sabbaths" (volume 2 page 89). The "eunuchs" referred to are the
righteous people who make eunuchs of themselves by refusing to have marital relations with
their wives except on Friday nights, and who, as a result, produce only morally elitist children
by ensuring that they are all born with holy souls. Thus far the Zohar on that subject. The
lesson we derive from that is that if someone wants to make sure that the children he sires are
of that holy level, he must first learn how to control his libido and put it exclusively into the
service of performing G'd's commandment to be fruitful. In other words, "do not have
relations with your wife except on Friday nights." When you have achieved this level of
conduct you may be certain that your daughter will not engage in harlotry or anything similar
to it. Concerning the second reason we have listed which may be to blame for a child turning
out to be delinquent, namely that its mother had sensual thoughts which the daughter
inherited, the Torah writes ‫ואת מקדשי תיראו‬, "and revere My Holy Temple." This is a warning
to be afraid to violate the sanctity of the Temple, i.e. to ensure that a daughter will never
become a ‫סוטה‬, a wife suspected of infidelity who can clear her name only by drinking the ‫מים‬
‫המאררים‬, the waters described in Numbers chapter 5 which have to be drunk on hallowed
ground and which bear within them a deadly disease if the suspected woman drinking them
had been guilty of the suspicion her husband cast on her. Finally, (verse 31) concerning the
third reason which may be responsible for even the most elitist fathers and mothers producing
children they will be ashamed of, the Torah writes ‫אל תפנו אל האבות ואל הידעונים‬, "do not
turn to the ghosts and to familiar spirits;" these phenomena are manifestations of different
kinds of spiritual impurity whose natural tendency is to stick to people's souls much like
leeches stick to their bodies.

The word ‫ אבות‬is from the root ‫אבה‬, in the sense of Deut. 23,6 where G'd is depicted as not
willing to listen to Bileam. The word ‫ ידעני‬contains an allusion to ‫ידוע‬, something one knows,
is familiar with. A person should not claim that seeing he is familiar with these kinds of
phenomena that he is immune to them. As soon as one establishes the kind of intimacy with
such phenomena that enable one to claim that one knows all about them, one has already
become victimised by these spiritually negative phenomena and their manifestations.

‫אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, "I am the Lord your G'd." The Torah writes these words as the reason for
prohibiting contact with these forms of soothsaying. Seeing that G'd, i.e. something divine,
dwells inside every Jew, contact with such manifestations of Satan and what he represents
would result in the divine within us leaving us. We would lose whatever sanctity we had
possessed and become part of the evil represented by these forces. Anyone who does not take
care of these three commandments will only have himself to blame if his daughter profanes
herself or the father himself took the first step by displaying her.

19:32

‫מפני שיבה תקום‬, "You shall rise in the presence of an aged person, etc." Kidushin 32
explains that the word ‫ שיבה‬refers to someone advanced in years, whereas the word ‫ זקן‬refers
to someone who has acquired wisdom. The word ‫ תקום‬means to rise as a sign of respect, ‫והדרת‬
‫פני‬. The wording in the Talmud is difficult as in order to correspond to what the Talmud says
the Torah should have written: ‫מפני שיבה ומפני זקן תקום והדרת‬. Perhaps the Talmud intended to
distinguish between different signs of recognition to be accorded to physical maturity, old
age, and to spiritual maturity, i.e. ‫זקנה‬. In the former case it suffices to rise from one's seat
momentarily, whereas in the latter case one is to remain standing for longer; the idea is that
‫זקנה‬, spiritual maturity, rates a greater degree of recognition than ‫שיבה‬, mere physical old age.

We may also take our cue from Bereshit Rabbah 65,9 where we are told that Abraham asked
to look old in order that he could be told apart from his son Isaac who resembled him greatly
(based on Genesis 24,1 ‫)ואברהם זקן‬. When the Torah says to rise on account of a man aged in
years, this is the way to be ‫מהדר‬, to lend distinction to someone like Abraham who was
advanced in years.

There may also be an allusion here to the statement in Bereshit Rabbah 12,6 that one of the
consequences of Adam's sin was that he lost in "height," i.e. that the wicked do not attain their
full height or that they shrink in height. G'd therefore commanded Adam to be sure to repent
his error and to mend his ways so that he could attain his full stature. Our sages said in
Yevamot 50 that if one possesses the necessary merit one is granted the full number of years
allocated to him (70 or more) at birth; if one has not lived in accordance with G'd's
commandments one forfeits some of these years and dies before one has completed the
normal lifespan of 70 years. The word ‫ קומה‬therefore does not represent physical height but
spiritual height. The measure of the verse then is: "if you want to reach a good old age, attain
the spiritual height you are meant to attain!" The verse challenges each individual to develop
to his full spiritual potential as much as it directs us to display honour for people who have
attained old age. Inasmuch as Kohelet 12,1 has already told us that old age is frequently
accompanied by afflictions so that one curses those years, the Torah suggests that the way to
head off these frequent by-products of aging is to ‫תקום‬, rise to one's spiritual stature ‫מפני‬, on
account of what might otherwise befall one in old age. Once one reaches that stage, one
becomes totally dependent on G'd's personal and beneficial providence.

The words ‫ והדרת פני זקן‬may even allude to one's own old age; our sages (Sukkah 53) are on
record as saying about themselves: "hail to our youth which has not shamed our old age;"
they referred to the kind of old age in which one can recall that one had led an exemplary life
already from one's youth so that no one could point to a "skeleton in one's cupboard." The
Torah therefore advises young men to lead the kind of lives now that would not make it
necessary for them to ever be ashamed of their younger years. We are taught in Chagigah 14
that when a righteous person departs this life they compliment Abraham in heaven on the fact
that this righteous person was a descendant of his. On the other hand, when a wicked person
dies not only does no one compliment Abraham, but he is pained by the failure of that person
to have become a penitent before he died. When the Torah speaks of "enhance the face of the
old man," the reference is to Abraham who feels chagrined that not all of his descendants are
true to his example. The Torah continues to warn us of what is in store in the hereafter by
writing ‫ויראת מאלוקיך‬, "and you shall fear your G'd." This refers to the fear of the punishment
to be meted out when the soul comes up for judgment. ‫אני השם‬, "I am the Lord." This refers
to the reward for one's exemplary lifestyle, i.e. that one qualifies for life in the hereafter.
Alternatively, these concluding words of our verse may illustrate both fear and love. G'd is
telling us that He is to be both feared and loved. G'd's very name is the epitome of love, He is
the root cause of all love.

19:33

‫וכי יגור אתך גר‬, "And if a proselyte sojourn with you in your land, etc." The Torah
commences with the singular, i.e. ‫אתך‬, amongst you (sing), while switching to plural, i.e.
‫ארצכם‬, "your country" (pl); the reason is that proselytes have been attracted to Judaism
through the original proselyte, the first Jew, Abraham, the "spiritual father" of all proselytes.
Another factor in attracting pagans to convert to Judaism is the Holy Land itself. We perceive
all the souls of the converts as having been "captured" souls which had been ensnared by
Satan either in bulk as a result of Adam's sin or individually on subsequent occasions. The
word ‫ אתך‬alludes to Abraham's ability to attract converts, the word ‫ ארצכם‬to the ability of the
land of Israel itself to exert such an influence.

This verse also contains an allusion to the manner in which the ‫ שכינה‬remains with us in this
life. Accordingly, the "alien" referred to is the One whose original home was in a different,
i.e. celestial domain. G'd commanded His presence to take up residence within each
individual Jew as mentioned in Psalms 78,60: ‫אהל שכן באדם‬, "a tent which He established
within (amongst) man." ‫ארצכם‬, in your land; this is a reference to the Holy Land, the home
of G'd's presence. It left its home to take up residence on earth. ‫כאזרח מכם‬, This is a warning
for strangers in the land of Israel to convert to Judasim.
19:34

‫כאזרח מכם‬, "he shall be like a natural-born resident amongst you." Here the Torah reveals
the mystical dimension (i.e. their spiritual status) of all the souls of the Jewish people while
they were submerged in Egypt and its culture amongst the various nations. This is why the
Torah describes them as "like one of your very own," i.e. you have much more in common
with converts than you think. Should you query how it is possible that the seed of wicked
people, someone whose father was a Gentile, could suddenly be rated as equal to people
whose fathers were beloved of G'd, the Torah reminds us ‫כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים‬, "that the
souls of these strangers (converts) were intertwined with those of your own when you were
still in Egypt." Please read what I have written on this subject in Parshat Yitro on 20,2 (page
673) and the meaning of "I have taken you out of Egypt, etc." What applied to that situation
also applies to the situation described here. The "stranger" who was part of the ‫קליפות‬, the
spiritually negative domain, has come to take refuge under the wings of G'd's ‫שכינה‬. As of
now his soul has returned to its holy roots. Once we adopt this approach it is clear that when
the Torah speaks of ‫כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים‬, "for you yourselves were strangers in the land of
Egypt," the Torah compliments the converts. If the Torah were concerned only with the
conversion of people whose souls were never attached to sanctity and whose bodies now
wanted to become part of the families of the Israelites, it is hardly likely that they would
suddenly become beloved by G'd seeing that their family background is so different. Jewish
families are not comparable to Gentile families. The only reason these proselytes are
embraced wholeheartedly by the Torah is that the Torah views these converts as people who
are returning to their roots.

20:2

‫ואל בני ישראל תאמר‬, "Moreover, you shall say to the children of Israel, etc." The reason for
the expression "and to the children of Israel" is that all of them are to be involved in executing
anyone who hands any of his children to the fire-god Molech. The conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬at the
very beginning of the paragraph hints that not only the person who delivers a child to the
Molech is guilty of punishment but also those who fail to punish such a person.

20:3

‫ואני אתן את פני באיש ההוא‬, "And also I Myself will set My face against that person, etc."
What further punishment does G'd have in mind seeing the guilty party has already been
executed by a human tribunal?

I believe the Torah informs us that in addition to the physical death of that person by
execution there is further punishment in store for his soul. This is alluded to by the words
‫והכרתי אותו מקרב עמו‬, "I will cut him off from amongst his people." This is a reference to the
holy root from which all Jewish souls emanate. The Torah explains the reason for these two
punishments and writes: 1) "for he has given of his seed to Molech in order to defile My
Sanctuary" 2)…"and to desecrate My holy name." The execution of the sinner's body is the
retribution for defiling the Sanctuary, the destruction of the sinner's holy roots is retribution
for profaning the Lord's name.

20:4
‫ואם העלם יעלימו עם הארץ‬, "And if the people at large choose to ignore, etc." The reason the
word "they will ignore" is repeated is to tell us that if the people choose to ignore the first
time this abominable crime is committed, they will have paved the way for ignoring all
subsequent repetitions of this abomination. Even if they would want to punish people then for
practicing this cult, the guilty party would challenge the authorities pointing out that the first
guilty party had been allowed to get away with this practice. Alternatively, the first word ‫העלם‬
refers to the failure of preventing the father from carrying out his intention to sacrifice his son
to the Molech; the second ‫ יעלימו‬refers to the failure of the people to bring such a father to
justice.

20:5

‫ושמתי אני את פני‬, "then also l will set My face, etc." The plain meaning of the text appears to
be that if the people will not exact retribution then G'd will turn His wrath also against the
whole family of that father. If the people had carried out the prescribed judgment, G'd on His
part would have punished only the guilty individual. This seems a most unusual aspect of
G'd's justice! If members of the family shared in the father's guilt why would G'd not punish
them regardless of whether the father has been executed?

We feel that the meaning of the verse is to tell us that whenever the judges appointed by G'd
on earth fail to mete out justice, justice will be meted out in the celestial spheres. G'd
announces this by saying: "I will set My face, etc." Once the heavenly tribunal opens the file
of the accused, the files of his family members will be scrutinised at the same time. This is
what the Torah meant by mentioning ‫ובמשפחתו‬, "and against his family." The Torah explained
in our verse that G'd's setting His face against the sinner would result in his being being cut
off, plus all others who had gone astray by making common cause with the father. The files of
the family members will be examined each on his own merit. Any family member who will
not be found guilty of the Molech cult whether in deed or thought will not be wiped out. The
Torah uses the words ‫הזונים אחריו לזנות‬, "who go astray after him in order to go astray" (the
Molech cult) in the present tense to tell us that even if they had not yet been guilty in deed
they are considered as guilty as if they already had performed the abominable act. Ezekiel
14,5 expressed this thought more directly when he wrote ‫למען תפש את בית ישראל בלבם‬, "in order
to catch the house of Israel while (the sin) is still in their hearts." [We find independent
confirmation of this in Chulin 142. Ed.]

As a result of what we said we may intepret our verse as assuring us that if the people at large
bring the guilty party to justice he alone will be punished and his family will not even be
examined by the heavenly tribunal at that time. Should the people fail to get involved, G'd
will involve the family of the sinner to the extent that they harbour thoughts similar to those
of the father. If so, the family members will be punished by G'd for their ideology though they
cannot, of course, be brought to trial on earth. This is the meaning of Devarim Rabbah 5,4
that "in a place where there is judgment there is no judgment, whereas in a place where there
is no judgment there is judgment." The difficulty with this saying is that it is obvious that
when judgment is carried out in our world that there is no need to carry out judgment in the
celestial spheres. Why would the Midrash have to tell us something so obvious? When you
follow our approach, however, the Midrash makes sense as the judgment in the celestial
spheres referred to is that of the family of the guilty party. You will find that our sages said in
Rosh Hashanah 16 that whenever the Book of judgment of a person is opened in the celestial
spheres that person's life is in danger and he needs a special merit in order to emerge
unscathed.
20:7

‫והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים‬, "and sanctify yourselves so that you will be holy." G'd directs
that we should strive to be holy; when people do this they are assured of attaining the spiritual
level of angels who are called ‫קדושים‬, "holy beings." We know this from Daniel 8,13 " ‫ויאמר‬
‫אחד קדוש‬," "one holy one said, etc." This is what is meant by ‫והייתם קדושים‬. Our sages in
Bamidbar Rabbah 20, comment on Numbers 23,23 ‫כעת יאמר ליעקב ולישראל מה פעל אל‬. "at a
time when Jacob as well as Israel is told at once what G'd had worked." They describe an
outer circle of angels and an inner circle of Israelites. The angels who are standing in the outer
circle are forced to ask the Israelites (who are closer to the centre) what G'd has been doing.
This teaches that when the Bible speaks of "His holy ones" in a context of angels, the
reference is to the Jewish people. In verse 8 the Torah specifies the means by which the
Israelites are to sanctify themselves by saying: ‫ושמרתם את חוקותי ועשיתם אותם‬. The word
‫ ושמרתם‬refers to observance of negative commandments, whereas the word ‫ ועשיתם‬refers to
the performance of positive commandments. Between them the commandments are the means
by which G'd will sanctify us. The Torah associates G'd's four lettered name ‫ י־ה־ו־ה‬with the
performance of the commandments. The Tikkuney Ha-Zohar chapter 70 explain how by the
performance of each commandment the respective organ with which that commandment is
performed merits that G'd's name comes to rest on it, a concept alluded to in the letters of the
word ‫מצוה‬.

20:9

‫כי איש איש אשר יקלל‬, "for any man whatsoever who curses, etc." Why did the Torah
commence this verse with the word ‫כי‬, a word which indicates that the reason for something is
to be found in what had been discussed previously? How is the fact that someone might curse
his father or his mother related to what the Torah described in the previous verses? Moreover,
why did the Torah have to repeat the word ‫ ?איש‬Torat Kohanim claims that if the Torah had
written the word ‫ איש‬only once I would have assumed that the prohibition applies only to
males and not to females. As a result the Torah was forced to repeat the word ‫ איש איש‬to
include everybody in this prohibition. This is most perplexing. Why would anyone have
doubted that this commandment applies also to females? We have learned repeatedly that
negative commandments apply equally to males and females and that the penalties are the
same for both males and females (compare Baba Kama 15). If the Torah did not feel
comfortable with the choice of the word ‫איש‬, it could simply have written the word ‫ אדם‬and I
would have known that both males and females were being addressed. Furthermore, why did
the Torah repeat the words: "for he has cursed his father or his mother?"

I believe that the key to all this is in the previous commandment concerning someone who
subjected a son or daughter to the cult of the fire-god Molech. In that instance the Torah was
careful to make the culprit culpable only if he sacrificed "some of his own seed." Nothing was
said about someone inducting someone else's offspring to the cult of that fire-god. According
to that verse if someone sacrificed his brother, sister, or other relative to the fire-god he would
not be punishable. In fact we have the following Baraitha in Sanhedrin 64 which states: "he is
not guilty (of punishment) unless he committed this abomination with a direct descendant of
his." Thus far the Baraitha. We have to explain why there should be a penalty for inducting
one's offspring whereas doing the same thing with one's other relatives is not punishable. The
reason may be that one's children are considered as if they were part of a person's assets. This
is why there is a direct relationship between someone who sacrifices his possessions to an idol
such as passing his child through the fires of the Molech cult. When one does a similar thing
with people who are not considered as his possessions the idol to whom one presents such a
sacrifice remains unimpressed When the idol remains unimpressed so does G'd; seeing one
did not"sacrifice" his dearly beloved possessions to an alien deity. We know from Baba
Metzia 7 that even when one sanctifies one's property for G'd one cannot do so unless one
owns what one has sanctified. In view of all this a person may say that a father does not own
his child outright seeing that the mother is an equal party. The Talmud in Niddah 31 tells us
that father and mother are partners in the child they produce, the father having contributed the
white (bloodcells) whereas the mother contributed the red (bloodcells). Seeing that this is so
the father cannot be held totally responsible for the actions of his son because the son
represents the mother's input also. After telling us of the punishment for a father who uses his
son or daughter as an offering to the fire-god Molech, the Torah continues with ‫איש איש אשר‬
‫יקלל‬, saying ‫מות יומת‬, such a son or daughter shall be executed. The Torah is careful to speak
about cursing ‫את אביו ואת אמו‬, i.e. either the father by himself or the mother by herself. Torat
Kohanim explains that it suffices to curse either father or mother to incur the penalty
prescribed. In other words, we do not apply the principle that seeing son and daughter are
both composites of the input of both father and mother, that the mother's part (of the sinner)
cannot be executed on account of a sin committed by the father's part of the sinner. The
reason the son has to die is because he insulted either the father's or the mother's honour.

The Torah repeats ‫אביו ואמו קלל‬, "he cursed his father or his mother," to tell us that anyone
cursing father or mother automatically also cursed his other parent. This is so because each
individual contains elements of both his father and his mother. This is a practical consequence
of the statement of our sages in Berachot 24 ‫אשתו כגופו‬, that one's wife is considered part of
one's body.

Accordingly, it does not matter whether the sin is committed by either son or daughter or is
committed against either one's son or one's daughter, the act is totally culpable, i.e. it is
considered as if it had been committed by both the female and the male part of the human
being who executed it. The words ‫ איש איש‬remind us of the fact that every individual is a
composite of male and female input but that the Torah does not separate between them once
they are part of one body. We are taught in Niddah 31 "when a woman experiences orgasm
first she will give birth to a male child." This means that the female input determines the sex
of the male child and that the male input determines the sex of the female child. As a result of
this statement the Torah differentiates in the ritual impurity legislation applying to the mother
depending on whether she gave birth to a male child or to a female child. This also
demonstrates that the two partners who respectively beget or give birth to the child are not
equal in all respects. This fact gave rise to the thought that fathers should not be executed
when they use a son for the Molech cult, nor mothers when they use a daughter for that cult
seeing a person is considered the product of his father or mother respectively rather than an
independent entity. The Torah therefore had to repeat ‫ איש איש‬to ensure that we appreciate that
the individual committing the sin is evaluated as an entity by itself, is not part of either mother
or father when it comes to his culpability. Either a father or a mother using either son or
daughter for the abomination described in our paragraph is fully liable for his or her
respective sin.

Yalkut Shimoni item 619 on our verse interprets the word ‫אביו‬, "his father," as excluding the
grandfather from the death penalty if he uses his grandson as an offering for the Molech cult,
and the word ‫ אמו‬as excluding the grandmother from that penalty if she does likewise. The
Torah was very conscious that careless wording would lead to faulty conclusions on the part
of the sages. Therefore the Torah wrote ‫ איש איש‬in the legislation about cursing father or
mother so no one should interpret that the culpability extends only to ‫אביו‬, "his father," and
not to ‫אביה‬, "her father," i.e. that if a daughter cursed her father she would not be culpable for
her deed.

20:22

‫ושמרתם את כל חקותי‬, "And you shall observe all My statutes, etc. The reason the Torah had
to repeat this verse although we have read it already in 18,26 is to urge us to ensure that the
statutes do not become abolished in practice through failure of either oneself or others to
observe them. Observance of the statutes insures that the land will not spew you out. If the
community one lives in fails to protest non-observance of these ‫ חוקים‬by others one will still
be subject to the land spewing out its inhabitants even if personally one had been meticulous
in one's observance of Torah law.

20:24

‫ארץ זבת חלב ודבש‬..‫ואני אתננה לכם‬, "And I give to you… a land flowing with milk and
honey." After G'd had already said: "in order for you to inherit it," why does the Torah have
to add the words: "and I will give it to you?" Besides, why does the Torah link the excellence
of the land to our inheriting it? The answer may be that not only does G'd give us the land as
an inheritance, but He gives us an addditonal gift namely the excellence of this land. The
Torah also hints that the excellence of the land is linked to our inhabiting it as an
inheritance. Should the Temple and Jewish independence be destroyed, the excellence of the
land would disappear because it no longer serves as our inheritance. Unfortunately we have
had to learn the truth of this due to our sins.

20:26

‫והייתם לי קדושים‬, "And you shall be holy unto Me, etc." The reason the Torah adds the word
‫ לי‬in this verse may best be understood in connection with the comment of Torat Kohanim on
this verse that one should never say: "I cannot eat pig's meat," but one should say: "I would
love to eat pig's meat but alas, G'd has forbidden it to me." Similarly in our verse G'd does not
want us to be holy because we detest the various phenomena in this world G'd has prohibited
to us, but He wants us to be holy because He has commanded us to be so, i.e. ‫לי‬. This is also
the reason this verse appears next to the commandment to separate between the ritually pure
and the ritually impure mammals and fowl (verse 25).

The Torah added: ‫כי קדוש אני‬, "for I am holy," to tell us the reason we must keep our distance
from the impure creatures. G'd continues to explain this concept of separation. He has
separated us from the Gentiles; it is no more than fitting then that we separate ourselves from
the impure species. We have reason to bless the Lord for having set us apart from both human
and animal impurity.

‫חסלת פרשת קדושים‬

21:1

‫ אמור וגו׳‬,‫ ויאמר ה׳ אל משה‬G'd said to Moses: "say! etc." Why does this paragraph begin
with the word ‫ אמור‬instead of the word ‫ דבר‬which is the customary introduction when G'd
announces legislation? Furthermore, why did the Torah mention the "adjective," i.e. the
priests before mentioning the noun that the "adjective" belongs to, i.e. the "sons of Aaron?"
The correct description should have been ‫ !בני אהרון הכהנים‬Our sages both in Torat Kohanim
and elsewhere have offered a number of explanations why the Torah chose this order. Perhaps
the Tanchuma is worth quoting. "G'd said to Moses: 'it is not fitting that someone who goes in
and out of My Tabernacle should be exposed to looking at dead bodies all the time, etc.'"
Thus far Tanchuma. The address with the word ‫ אמור‬implies a compliment, an advantage; the
words ‫ אל הכהנים‬is intended to justify the compliment, i.e. because the priests go in and out in
the Tabernacle, i.e. in G'd's Presence where they perform service for the King of Kings. What
does this compliment or advantage consist of? The priests are not to defile themselves through
contact with the dead, as mentioned in Tanchuma. Seeing the ‫ כהנים‬are privileged to enter the
Tabernacle and to be in G'd's presence most of the time, their present superior status is
mentioned first before the Torah tells us how they came to be priests, i.e. through being
descendants of Aaron. If the Torah had used the customary phraseology this point would not
have come across.

‫ואמרת אלהם לנפש לא יטמא בעמיו‬, "and say to them not to defile himself for the dead
amongst his people." Why is the word ‫ ואמרת‬i.e. ‫ אמור ואמרת‬repeated? Our sages in Yevamot
114 as well as in Torat Kohanim offer a variety of commentaries on this. I believe that there is
room for still other approaches not yet explored by our classical commentaries. We may do
well to refer to what Maimonides wrote in chapter 3 of his treatise on the rules to be observed
by mourners. This is what he wrote: "If someone deliberately defiles a priest and the priest co-
operates of his own free will, the priest is subject to the corporal punishment of 39 lashes,
whereas the person who initiated the defilement is guilty of transgressing the injunction not to
place an obstacle in the path of a blind man (Leviticus 19,14). Neither Radbaz nor Maharik
comment on this. The problem is whence does Maimonides get the ruling that the priest is
liable to 39 lashes? Lechem Mishneh comments as follows: "Maimonides wrote in his treatise
on kilayim that if someone dresses a fellow Jew in garments containing a mixture of wool and
linen such a person is guilty of 39 lashes provided the person wearing this mixture is unaware
of committing a sin." Kesseph Mishneh (Rabbi Joseph Karo) queries this ruling mentioning
that the Rosh asked this question of the Rashba without receiving an answer. Perhaps
Maimonides' source was Nazir 44 according to which the person who defiles a Nazir is not
treated in the same way as the Nazir who became defiled as a result of that person's doing.
This is based on Numbers 6,9: ‫ וטמא ראש נזרו‬which means that under normal circumstances the
same guilt applies to the person causing the sin as to the one committing it. This is why
Maimonides writes in chapter 5,20 of his treatise about the laws of the Nazirite that in this
case if the Nazir himself was unaware of committing a sin neither he nor the person defiling
him deliberately is subject to ‫מלקות‬, corporal punishment. Maimonides quotes the verse in
Numbers 6,9 as the basis for his ruling. He understands that verse to mean that culpability
does not occur until the Nazirite himself defiles his head. This ruling appears
incomprehensible. 1) Why should the Nazirite legislation not serve as a ‫בנין אב‬, as a model for
many other similar situations where two parties are involved in committing a sin, the first one
being guilty of ‫ ?לפני עור לא תתן מכשול‬Furthermore, the situation involving the Nazirite
required a special verse to exclude culpability because I could have learned a ‫ קל וחומר‬from
the situation in which he shaved his hair and is guilty. Seeing that defiling himself is a more
serious sin than shaving off his hair, the Torah had to write a verse to tell us that even defiling
himself does not carry the penalty of ‫מלקות‬. If this is so, it follows that had it not been for this
‫קל וחומר‬, I would not have needed to write a single verse to exclude the Nazirite's not being
guilty of ‫ מלקות‬if someone had deliberately defiled him. In fact the query against
Maimonides's ruling in chapter 3 of his treatise on the laws for mourners would have been
still stronger!
I believe the true reason why Maimonides ruled as he did is based on the Talmud in Nazir 44.
This is what the Talmud writes there: "if in the case of someone defiling the Nazirite we do
not treat the person causing the impurity as equally guilty as the person who has become
defiled (although as a result of this action the preceding days of the Nazirite's abstention are
completely invalidated), then in the parallel case of someone shaving off the Nazirite's hair I
most certainly would not treat such a person as guilty of corporal punishment (seeing the
result of his action did not cause the Nazirite to lose more than a maximum of thirty days of
the preceding days during which he had not shaved)! The Torah therefore had to write the
word ‫ תער לא יעביר על ראשו‬that the Nazirite must not allow someone else to shave him, to
insure that I do not learn such a ‫קל וחומר‬. According to the Talmud we equate the spelling ‫לא‬
‫ יעביר‬with the spelling ‫לא יעבור‬, i.e. that he himself must not apply the razor to his own hair or
to someone else's hair. Rashi corrects this wording by saying "someone else must not apply a
razor to the hair of the Nazirite." We now need to examine why the Talmud assumes that the
word ‫( לא יעביר‬which is spelled defective) refers to someone other than the Nazirite himself
applying the razor to his hair. If the Talmud applied the principle of using our tradition as the
basis for the spelling, the word ‫ יעבר‬should have been spelled ‫ יעביר‬with the letter ‫ י‬to indicate
the fact that it is meant transitively, i.e. ‫לשון הפעיל‬. Even if we were to argue that the absence
of the letter ‫ י‬is not crucial to the meaning, at least the word ‫ לו‬is missing without which I
would not know that the meaning of ‫ יעבר‬without the letter ‫ י‬is transitive and that the Nazirite
must not shave others!

I believe that the Talmud concentrated on the fact that the Torah used the expression ‫תער לא‬
‫יעבר על ראשו‬, "a razor must not pass over his head," instead of the simple ‫לא יגלח את ראשו‬, "he
must not shave his head," or at least ‫ לא יעביר על ראשו‬with the letter ‫ י‬to indicate the transitive
meaning of the expression. If the Torah had used the simple expression we would have known
that the prohibition applied to the person who was commanded not to shave rather than to the
action of the razor. The word ‫ יעביר‬would refer to the Nazir himself who is mentioned
adjacently in that verse. The Torah would then have attributed the prohibition to the person
committing it and not to the action of the razor. This would not be the impression if we accept
the wording ‫תער לא יעבור על ראשו‬, "a razor must not be applied to his head;" this wording
suggests that the principal concern of the Torah is the fact that the hair of the Nazirite is
shaved, regardless by whom. This is what the Talmud had in mind with the words: ‫קרי ביה לא‬
‫יעבור הוא ולא יעביר לו אחר‬, "read as if it said: 'neither he himself nor someone else must apply
the razor to his head.'" Clearly the word is meant to prohibit shaving the Nazirite either by
himself or someone else. The words ‫ קרי ביה‬in the Talmud are not really accurate but they
describe a concept rather than a grammatical comment.

We can now extrapolate to the laws of ‫ כלאים‬in 19,19 where the Torah wrote: ‫ובגד כלאים שעטנז‬
‫לא יעלה עליך‬, "a garment made of a mixture of linen and wool shall not cover you" (‫)יעלה עליך‬
instead of writing ‫לא תעלה עליך‬. The word ‫ תעלה‬is transitive and applies to the person putting
such a garment on the wearer. The word ‫ יעלה‬is intransitive and applies to the garment rather
than to the person putting it on. The Torah's wording makes it plain that it is immaterial who
puts the garment on the wearer. If he wears it knowingly he is guilty of violating the
prohibition of ‫כלאים‬. This is why Maimonides rules in chapter 10 subsection 1 of his treatise
Hilchot Kilayim that "if someone deliberately places a garment containing a mixture of linen
and wool on a fellow Jew he is subject to 39 lashes." Similarly, any ruling in our situation
dealing with the defilement of the priest is based on the wording ‫לא יטמא‬, "he (the priest) must
not become defiled." The fact that the Torah does not add a pronoun indicating that it is only
the priest himself who must not defile himself makes the verse a warning to anyone else not
to contribute to the defilement of the priest. It follows that anyone who defiles a priest, be it
the priest himself or someone else, is subject to the penalty of 39 lashes. Maimonides is
consistent in all his rulings then.

This brings us to the reason why the Torah saw fit to repeat the word ‫אמר‬, by writing ‫אמר‬
‫ואמרת‬. It is simply that the Torah commands both the priest himself and anyone else not to
defile him. The word ‫ אמר‬tells the priest not to defile himself, whereas the word ‫ ואמרת‬tells
others not to defile the priest. Perhaps the word ‫אלהם‬, "to them," refers back to the Israelites
(not the priests) who are commanded to observe all the commandments. You will note that at
the very end of this chapter (verse 24) the Torah writes: "Moses spoke to Aaron, to his sons
and to all the children of Israel." This indicates that the legislation in this chapter is addressed
to all of the Israelites. This justifies our explanation that also at the beginning of the chapter
the Torah extends a warning to the whole people, not just to the priests, that they must not
cause the priests to become ritually defiled. Torat Kohanim on 21,24 writes as follows: "The
words ‫ וידבר משה‬are a warning to Aaron through his children whereas the words ‫אל כל בני‬
‫ ישראל‬are a warning to the sons by the Israelites. They are each warned to ensure that the
others do not become guilty of the sin of ritual impurity." Both what we read in Torat
Kohanim and what we have written ourselves are ‫דברי אלוקים חיים‬, legitimate exegesis of the
text of the Torah.

‫לנפש לא יטמא‬, "he must not become defiled through a dead body." Torat Kohanim derives
from this word ‫ נפש‬that contact with an amount of blood equivalent to 86 grams (‫ )רביעית‬is
sufficient to confer ritual impurity on the priest. I have seen that Maimonides writes as
follows in chapter 3 subsection 1 of his Hilchot Avel: "There is no halachic difference
between impurities of the body of the dead and impurities which emanated in the body of the
dead (such as blood which oozed out) seeing the Torah used the expression ‫ נפש‬when
prohibiting ritual defilement through the dead." Commentators attack Maimonides for this
statement basing themselves on a Baraitha in Torat Kohanim which writes as follows: "From
our verse (21,1) I only learn that one defiles oneself through contact with the dead body itself.
Whence do we know that one also becomes defiled through contact with the blood (of the
dead person?)" Answer: This is why the Torah wrote the otherwise extraneous word ‫לנפש‬.
How do I know that all other excretions from the dead body also confer ritual impurity on
contact? This is why the Torah added the word ‫אלהם‬." Thus far Torat Kohanim. Kesseph
Mishneh defends Maimonides by pointing out that he must have thought that the word ‫ לנפש‬is
sufficient to teach us that everything which originates in the dead body confers the same
degree of ritual impurity on all those who come in contact with it; there is no need for further
scriptural proof; any additional word in the Torah is only in the nature of an ‫אסמכתא‬,
something to jog our memory. Thus far Kesseph Mishneh. I do not accept the comment by the
author of Kesseph Mishneh. What gave Maimonides the right to come up with a new
approach other than the one of the Baraitha?

The fact of the matter is that Maimonides bases himself on another Baraitha which he found
in Pessikta. This is what is written there: "The words ‫ אמר ואמרת‬are meant to tell us that the
adults are warned to see to it that the minors do not become ritually impure; the words ‫לנפש לא‬
‫ יטמא‬are intended to tell us that even a ‫רביעית דם‬, a small amount of 86 grams of blood is
enough to confer ritual impurity on contact if it has escaped from the dead body." Thus far the
Pessikta. The Baraitha we just quoted is mentioned in Yevamot 114. We are entitled to
understand that Baraitha as including all other excretions from the dead body as being
included in this legislation based on the word ‫לנפש‬, seeing the author used the repetition of the
words ‫ אמר ואמרת‬as commanding the adults to warn the minors concerning this legislation. I
am quite certain that the author of the Kesseph Mishneh had not seen or remembered this
latter Baraitha. Proof of this is to be found in something the same author wrote in the same
chapter we have quoted earlier in subsection 12. "Adult priests are responsible to see that they
do not cause a priest who is a minor to become ritually impure. If, however, the priest who is
a minor causes himself to become ritually impure it is not the task of the Jewish court to
prevent this." So far Maimonides on the subject. According to Kesseph Mishneh this is in
accordance with Rashi's interpretation of the meaning ‫אמר ואמרת‬. Clearly, if the author of
Kesseph Mishneh had known about this Baraitha he would not have written that Maimonides
based his ruling on Rashi's exegesis which is of much more recent origin.

There remains the question of how anyone derived from the word ‫ לנפש‬that a ‫ רביעית‬of blood
confers ritual impurity on contact? Perhaps we must understand that the meaning of the word
‫ לנפש‬is confined to the ability of blood to confer ritual impurity to the category of impurity
called ‫טומאת מת‬, as distinct from other categories of ritual impurities. It would have sufficed
for the Torah to write ‫ למת לא יטמא‬that the priest must not become ritually impure through a
dead body. The fact that the Torah added the word ‫ לנפש‬led our sages to conclude that an
amount of blood which is sufficient to keep an organism alive is the amount which is capable
of conferring the ritual impurity associated with dead bodies. People who are themselves
ritually impure only through indirect contact with the dead are not included in that definition
of ‫לנפש‬.

‫לא יטמא‬. "He must not become defiled." The Torah switched to the use of the singular
although the verse had commenced with G'd addressing the Israelites in the plural, i.e. ‫אלהם‬.
According to the reasoning of the scholar who explained the repetition of the words ‫אמר ואמרת‬
as a warning that a person other than the priest himself should also not cause the priest to
become defiled, the switch from plural to singular is easy to understand, i.e. the people (pl.)
are commanded not to defile the priest (sing.).

In addition, the Torah may have been afraid to write ‫לא יטמאו‬, "they shall not become defiled"
as the impression would have been that the Torah only minded if the priests as a group
became defiled, not if an individual priest became defiled. The Torah therefore worded the
commandment in the singular i.e. ‫ יטמא‬to show the Torah shows its concern for the defilement
of each individual priest.

Furthermore, the Torah had to avoid the comparison of this legislation with Leviticus 10,9
where the Torah commanded that the priests were not to enter the Tabernacle while
intoxicated. In that instance the legislation was phrased as applicable only in connection with
the priests entering the precincts of the Tabernacle drunk when they were about to perform the
sacrificial service. The impression left was that at times when the priests were not engaged in
service they were free to indulge in wine and alcohol. It would have been easy to deduce from
there that when the priests were not about to engage in sacrificial service they are at liberty to
defile themselves. The Torah used the singular when legislating this commandment to make it
clear that the priests are not to defile themselves at any time, except for the occasions listed in
subsequent verses. This teaches that the prohibition for a priest to defile himself is totally
unconnected to the Temple-service and its requirements. The Temple-service, after all, is not
in danger of becoming defunct due to the temporary impurity of a single priest. The duty of
the priest to remain in a state of ritual purity is one that devolves upon him independent of any
consideration for the function he can perform only while in such a state.

21:2
‫כי אם לשארו‬, except to his wife, etc. Torat Kohanim explains that the meaning of the word
‫ שארו‬is "his wife." The words ‫הקרוב‬, "who is close," a word which is not really necessary,
refers to the exclusion of ‫ארוסה‬, a woman betrothed to a priest who does not yet live in his
home, the final marriage vows not having been completed as yet. She is excluded from
relatives for the sake of whose burial a priest must defile himself as a mourner. The word ‫אליו‬
"to him," another extraneous word, teaches that the death of a divorced wife of a priest also
does not qualify as an excuse for her erstwhile husband to defile himself ritually. The reason
is that such a woman is no longer ‫קרוב‬, close to her former husband the priest. Why does the
Torah add the words ‫ ?לאמו ולאביו‬Seeing the mother is not of the same tribe as the son (or is
subject to being demoted in status if she survives her husband the priest), I might have
thought that the son may not defile himself at her death. The Torah therefore had to tell us that
the son is to defile himself at his mother's death. Once we have established this, why would I
have thought that the son must not defile himself over the death of his father unless the Torah
spelled this out for us? Would I not have reasoned that inasmuch as the son must defile
himself at his mother's death even though the mother was most likely not the daughter of a
priest, the son most certainly has to defile himself at his father's death seeing the father was a
priest also (and is not subject to lose his status through the death of his spouse)? The Torah
had to write that the son who is a priest must defile himself due to the death of his father
although we do not know for a fact that the man who described himself as his father really
was his father. Paternity is established only by reason of ‫ חזקה‬not by reason of definitive
knowledge such as maternity. The scholars of Luneil raised an objection to this Torat
Kohanim. They felt there was no need for the Torah to mention that the son must defile
himself at the death of his father as I could have arrived at this legislation by learning a ‫קל‬
‫ וחומר‬from his mother. They reasoned that the son has to defile himself precisely because
either the father is a priest who does not cause himself to be demoted and as such qualifies as
a close relative even more than the mother who is subject to demotion in status; or there is no
certainty that his father is his real father in which case the son is not a priest and there is no
reason he cannot defile himself at the death of this man. [the scholars of Luneil described the
son as a bastard, something I have not been able to understand. Why could the father not
simply have been a non-priest claiming to be a priest? Ed.]

Our author does not consider the objection of the scholars of Luneil as serious seeing our
verse is concerned with permitting something which had so far been forbidden to the parties
concerned. We cannot permit something which was forbidden by using the ‫קל וחומר‬
(according to the principle ‫ )דיו לבוא מן הדין כנדון‬as our exegetical instrument. All a ‫ קל וחומר‬can
accomplish is to teach that a situation is similar to the one which forms the basis of the ‫קל‬
‫ ;וחומר‬It cannot teach additional halachot of a more stringent nature. The Torah permits the
son to defile himself for the sake of near relatives whereas the prohibition to defile himself at
the death of more distant relatives remains in force. Furthermore, in the event that the son
does not want to defile himself, he is forced to do so as part of honouring his father who has
died. This is the meaning of the words ‫לה יטמא‬, "he must defile himself for her sake." Torat
Kohanim explain these words by saying: "it is a positive commandment for every priest to
defile himself at the death of any of the seven relatives mentioned in our verse." While it is
true that the Torah wrote this expression only next to the sister of the priest, Torat Kohanim
already explained this in connection with a true story involving a priest called Joseph whose
wife died on Passover eve and the priest did not want to defile himself so as not to forego the
commandment to offer the Passover sacrifice, etc. The local rabbinic authorities forced that
husband to defile himself and take part in the burial of his wife. Thus far the story related in
Torat Kohanim. The story proves that the authorities did not restrict the meaning of the words
‫ לה יטמא‬as applicable only in the event a priest loses a sister. What all this proves is that one
must defile oneself for the sake of any of the relatives enumerated in verses 2 and 3. It
follows that if I had derived the directive to defile oneself at the death of one's father based on
exegesis alone I could not have arrived at such a law as I would not have been able to be
certain that the man who died was indeed the father of the son described here. I certainly
would not have been entitled to refrain from offering the Passover sacrifice if such a "father"
had died on the eve of Passover. Doubts concerning the application of a biblical
commandment cannot be resolved through abrogation of that commandment, even
temporarily. Not only would such a son not be permitted to defile himself on the father's
grave based on the doubt (according to Maimonides and Pri Chadash who hold that doubt
concerning a biblical commandment's applicability may be resolved by a lenient ruling), but
even according to those who hold that we never apply a lenient ruling when the doubt
concerns a biblical injunction the son could still not defile himself merely on the chance that
the deceased was not his real father and as a result postpone celebrating the Passover on time.
After all, no doubt exists about the need to perform the commandments connected with
Passover. The Torah therefore had to write both the words ‫ לאמו ולאביו‬to tell us that a son who
is a priest must defile himself for the purpose of bringing either his father or his mother to
burial.

Furthermore, we are dealing here with a situation where the son's status as a priest is based
only on the assumption that his father who claims to be his father is also a priest, another
assumption which is itself not based on definitie evidence. In view of the fact that neither son
nor father can establish a definitve claim as to their paternity and priesthood respectively, I
would not have allowed the son to violate his legal status and defile himself on the basis of a
‫ חזקה‬that the man he knew as his father was indeed his father unless the Torah had decreed
this specifically

‫ולבנו ולבתו ולאחיו‬, "and for the death of his son, his daughter or his brother." Torat
Kohanim comment as follows on this verse: "The Torah should have been content to mention
the son and the daughter; why did the Torah also have to write that the son must defile
himself for the sake of burying his father and his mother? If the Torah wrote that a father must
defile himself in order to bury his son or daughter whom he is not obligated to honour, is it
not logical that he certainly has to defile himself for the sake of burying his father or mother
whom he is obligated to honour?" If this reasoning were correct, I would have had to
conclude that the words "son or daughter" were meant to apply to children who were aborted
and had never drawn a breath of life. The Torah therefore had to write the words "son and
daughter" to ensure that I would not apply the ‫ קל וחומר‬we just described. The Torah told us
that only sons and daughters who had demonstrated viability qualify for their father the priest
defiling himself at their burial." Thus far Torat Kohanim. I find this difficult to understand. If
it were correct, all the Torah had to write were the words ‫לאמו ולבנו‬, and I would have derived
this information from these two examples. The word ‫ לאביו‬would have been quite
unnecessary. Also, according to the argument that seeing the mother is a definite blood-
relation therefore I could not have concluded that the father also qualified for the son defiling
himself at his grave unless the Torah had stated so specifically, we could have extrapolated
this from the words "his son or his daughter." Whose father is known with certainty? Yet the
Torah spelled out that the father must defile himself at the grave of a son whose identity as his
son is based on an assumption, ‫ חזקה‬only. We cannot even argue that the identity of the father
is less certain than the identtiy of either son or daughter (as far as their respective paternity is
concerned) for we find that the author of Torat Kohanim used their identities as the basis for
his ‫ קל וחומר‬to include the father in the same legislation. So we are back to the question of
why the Torah had to spell out that the "son" has to defile himself at the burial of his "father?"
If the only reason the Torah wrote "his father" was to teach that the commandment to defile
himself applied only to children who were viable, so that the term "father" applied in the full
meaning of the word, we could have derived this from the fact that the Torah wrote ‫לאמו‬
though this too could have been derived from ‫ קל וחומר‬seeing we already have the words ‫בנו‬
‫ובתו‬. There is no reason to say that we need both the words ‫ לאביו ולאמו‬together in order to
exclude aborted fetuses; why would the word "father" or "mother" not be sufficient to teach
us that rule? Besides, if we really needed both these words why did the author of Torat
Kohanim go to the trouble to demonstrate that each word by itself was required separately?
We already needed both words together to exclude the aborted infants from the regulation
discussed by the Torah in our verse?

‫ונראה לומר שאם לא אמר לאביו הייתי דן על זה הדרך מה תלמוד לומר לאמו בנו ובתו שאינו חייב בכבודם מטמא‬
‫ והיינו‬,‫ אילו כן הייתי דן גם אביו תלמוד לומר לאמו למעט אביו מטעם שאינו אלא חזקה‬,‫להם אמו לא כל שכן‬
‫ וכגון שלא היה מציאות שתתעבר אשתו אלא‬,‫מתחייבין לפרש כי בנו ובתו שאמר הכתוב הם דומים לאמו בידוע‬
‫ מה שאין כן אחר שאמר הכתוב לאביו והקשינו למה הוצרך ויבא‬,‫ממנו על ידי ידיעה ברורה במציאות שיכול להיות‬
.‫דינו מאמו והכרחנו לומר שבא לומר אפילו אינו אלא חזקה אם כן אמו למה לי שמע מינה למעט בנו ובתו נפלים‬
‫ וסמך על מה שהעירך בסמוך בדרשת לאביו שבא לומר‬,‫ לאו דוקא‬,‫והגם שהתנא אמר לאביו ולאמו למעט הנפלים‬
‫אפילו אינו אלא חזקה‬:

However, another statement concerning the words ‫ לאמו ולאביו‬at the end of Torat Kohanim
presents a problem. We read there as follows: "If the Torah had only written the word ‫לאביו‬
and had not also written the word ‫ לאמו‬I would have reasoned that if the Torah demanded that
the son defile himself for the burial of his father whose identity is based merely on ‫חזקה‬, an
assumption, such a son most certainly would have to defile himself at the death of his mother
who is his biological mother beyond any doubt! I would then have countered that the mother's
status as a priest's wife is not constant since she stands to lose it on the death of her husband
or through a divorce. Therefore the Torah had to write the word ‫ לאמו‬to also include her in the
number of blood relations for whose burial the son who is a priest has to defile himself." We
see that the Torah had to write the word ‫ לאמו‬to include a mother who had already forfeited
her status as a priest's wife prior to her death! If so, what word is there left for exegetical use
to exclude aborted infants from the legislation that the father who is a priest must defile
himself on their account? On the other hand, if you use the word to exclude these aborted
fetuses, which word is left to include that the son, the priest, must defile himself over a dead
mother who had become ‫נתחללה‬, lost her former status as the wife of a priest? Besides,
whence do I know that the father the priest has to defile himself on account of a daughter who
had lost her status as the wife of a priest? One could argue that case in either direction! One
could say that seeing the son has to honour his mother regardless of her marital status, he also
has to defile himself on her account when she dies; on the other hand, one could argue that the
Torah had already made it plain that the fact that a woman forfeited her marital status as the
wife of a priest did not affect her blood relationship to her son and therefore should have no
bearing on the need of her biological son the priest to defile himself at her funeral; also that
just as the son has to defile himself for his mother, so, in the event that he has a daughter he
has to defile himself if she dies.

Let us examine precisely how the author of Torat Kohanim arrived at the conclusion that the
son the priest must defile himself on account of a mother who had lost her status as the wife
of a priest. Was this conclusion based on the extraneous word ‫ ?לאמו‬Perhaps the word ‫לאמו‬
was not at all superfluous and we needed it to prove that defilement is in order seeing the
mother's status was inferior as she was subject to becoming ‫מתחללת‬, losing her privileges as
the wife of a priest, something that cannot happen to the father except if he does something
wrong himself. Similarly, the author of Torat Kohanim had been careful to point out already
at the beginning of his discourse: "What distinguishes the father? The fact that he is not
subject to losing his status as a priest." This meant that this consideration established the basis
for a certain asymmetry in the status of the "father the priest" and the "mother the priest's
wife." The remarkable thing is that even though in effect the mother died without ever losing
her status as the wife of a priest, the fact that she might have done so is considered as
sufficient reason to rate her priestly status as inferior to that of her husband. Following this
train of thought, we are entitled to the conclusion that if the mother had indeed already been
disqualified from being the wife of a priest her son would really not be allowed to defile
himself at her burial. We are therefore compelled to say that the author of Torat Kohanim
proceeded from the premise that mention of the word ‫ לאמו‬means that a priest has to defile
himself for his mother regardless of whether or not she has in effect been disqualified from
being the wife of a priest. Now the fact remains that if the Torah had only written the word
‫ לאביו‬I would have been entitled to argue that the mother is inferior in status to her husband
the priest even while she enjoys her status as the wife of her husband the priest because of her
potential disqualification. Now that the Torah also wrote the word ‫ לאמו‬the Torah made clear
that even if she had become disqualified her son the priest has to defile himself on her account
when she dies. You can apply the same reasoning to the word ‫ולבתו‬, and on account of his
daughter. By the simple expedient of mentioning the daughter the Torah included a daughter
who had become disqualified as a possible wife for a priest. Her father the priest must defile
himself on her account in the event she dies. The only factor which governs all this legislation
is the biological relationship. Seeing a mother or daughter who do not qualify as a wife for a
priest have not ceased to be called mother or daughter respectively, the legislation for the son
or father to defile himself is in place. This brings us back to the question why the Torah had to
write the word ‫לאמו‬, seeing we could have derived the law for the mother from the word ‫?בתו‬

Nonetheless, if the Torah had not written the word ‫לאמו‬, I would not have concluded that the
word ‫ לאביו‬was meant to exclude children which had been aborted before they became viable,
but I would have concluded that it excluded ‫אמו‬, his mother. It is far more more reasonable to
exclude the mother of the priest than to search for such far-fetched exclusions as the need to
defile oneself at the death of premature stillborn children. The reason I would have excluded
the mother would be her status, i.e. the fact that she is constantly subject to losing her status as
a priest's wife and the privileges which accrue to her thanks to that fact. We would have
limited the fact that the daughter qualifies for her father defiling himself as applying to a
daughter who had not actually jeopardised her status as a priest's wife, or at least as
potentially a priest's wife, whereas I would have limited the exclusion of the priest's mother to
a mother who had actually lost that status. A mother who had not jeopardised her status as the
wife of a priest would qualify for her son the priest defiling himself at her funeral. I would
have used a ‫ קל וחומר‬extrapolating from the word ‫ בתו‬to arrive at that conclusion. When
discussing the status of a daughter, even one who had forfeited her status, we would have
remembered that she is still called "his daughter" in the Torah regardless of whether she
qualifies for marriage to a priest or not. We would then have reverted to apply that same
reasoning to a daughter who had jeopardised her status by comparing her to a mother who had
jeopardised her status, based on the unnecessary word ‫לאביו‬. We would have reasoned that just
as a mother who has jeopardised her status as the wife of a priest does not cause her son the
priest to defile herself on account of her funeral, so a daughter in her condition most certainly
does not confer the duty on her father the priest to defile himself on account of her death. We
would have argued this in spite of the fact that the very word ‫ בתו‬in the Torah implies that this
daughter did not jeopardise her status as a blood relative by losing her status as a woman a
priest may marry. The word ‫ בתו‬would only commit us if I did not either have a restrictive
clause or a ‫ קל וחומר‬to counter our reading of the text. We would therefore read the word ‫בתו‬
as applying only to a daughter who had not lost her status, i.e. ‫לא נתחללה‬.

What emerges from all these examinations of the deeper meaning of our text is that if the
Torah had not written the word ‫ לאביו‬which could have misled us into thinking that it was
intended to exclude the son the priest defiling himself at his mother's funeral, there would
indeed have been no need to write the word ‫לאמו‬. I would have derived all the ‫ הלכות‬I needed
from the words ‫בנו ובתו‬, his son or his daughter as mentioned earlier. If the Torah had not
written the word ‫ לאמו‬from which the error concerning excluding the father whose status is
based only on ‫ חזקה‬would have resulted, there would have been no need to write the word
‫לאביו‬. If so, you would ask why does the Torah not simply write only ‫לאביו‬, leaving out the
word ‫ לאמו‬altogether? In order to forestall this question Torat Kohanim explained that the
word was intended to exclude premature stillborn infants. Seeing that this is so there is no
more room to argue that the word ‫ לאמו‬or ‫ לאביו‬should have been written by itself. The
moment the Torah would write only one of these two words I would arrive at an erroneous
conclusion and demolish the whole pyramid we have built thus far. The Torah was therefore
very clever in writing exactly what it did. Torat Kohanim was conscious of this and informed
us of a possible error we could make if the Torah had not written precisely the words we find
in our text.

21:8

‫וקדשתו‬, "You shall sanctify him, etc." The Torah refrains from addressing the priests in the
plural, i.e. as a group as it had done up to now. Yevamot 88 explains that the word ‫ וקדשתו‬is a
warning to a priest who married a divorcee, or some other category of woman forbidden to
him and who refuses to divorce her. The court is to administer corporal punishment to such a
priest and otherwise afflict him until he agrees to divorce such a woman. The words ‫כי את לחם‬
‫" אלוקיך הוא מקריב‬for he offers the bread of your G'd" mean that as long as there are many
other priests who are ritually able to perform the service in the Temple there is no need to
apply corporal punishment to the dissident priest who refuses to divorce a wife he married in
violation of Torah law. This explains why the Torah addressed the priest in the singular in this
instance.

‫קדוש יהיה לך‬, "he shall be holy unto you." This means that in order for him to be holy he has
to be a priest unto you. In other words, it is up to you to see that he conducts himself in a holy
manner. The emphasis on the words "for he is holy" stems from the premise that holiness is
something that is acquired through one's free-willed effort, one does not achieve it because it
is forced upon one. How then can the Torah command us to "force" holiness on the priest?
This is why the Torah had to repeat: "for he is holy," that the holiness of the priest is of a
different nature than that of ordinary Israelites (if and when they achieve it in some measure).
We do not impose holiness on the priest. We are commanded to see to it that he does not lose
or abandon the holiness which is his by birth. The Torah underlines this at the end of our
verse with the words: "for I the Lord sanctify you." G'd allows His Presence to rest on the
whole people only through the priests. When there is no priest there is no sacrificial service;
when there is no sacrificial service there is no Sanctuary. When there is no Sanctuary G'd's
Presence is not at home amongst us.

21:17
‫דבר אל אהרון לאמר‬, "speak to Aaron to say: etc." The reason the Torah added the word ‫לאמר‬
once more, is to tell him that Aaron in his capacity as High Priest is charged with the task to
see to it that no physically blemished priests perform service in the Tabernacle. He has to
warn all the priests to be careful to abide by this commandment. The result of this wording is
that the priests themselves are commanded to observe this directive and Aaron is commanded
to see that the priests abide by this directive.

‫איש מזרעך‬, "any man who is a descendant of yours, etc." The Torah did not adhere to the
order it had displayed at the beginning of the Parshah, nor did it use the order it employed
subsequently, i.e. "speak to Aaron and to his sons that they should abstain, etc." Neither did
the Torah use the form of address used in Leviticus 10,9 where the Torah addressed both
Aaron and his sons directly about not entering the holy precincts after having drunk wine or
alcohol. Why these changes in syntax each time? Perhaps the fact that since neither Aaron nor
his sons personally suffered from any of the deficiencies mentioned in this paragraph, G'd did
not mention them directly but referred only to their future issue amongst whom there could be
someone who did suffer from the blemishes listed in this chapter. Although Aaron's sons are
also included in the description ‫" זרעך‬your seed," the change in the Torah's syntax is intended
to alert us that in this instance the sons are not included in the word ‫זרעך‬. In fact, the Torah
made this point even clearer by writing ‫מזרעך‬, "some of your seed," instead of the usual ‫זרעך‬,
"your seed." This was a promise to Aaron and his sons that they themselves would not be
disqualified by a physical blemish during their respective lives. (compare my commentary on
22,4, "‫)"והוא צרוע‬.

21:21

‫כל איש…מזרע אהרון‬, "Any man of the descendants of Aaron..who has a blemish,etc." The
reason the warning has been repeated is to alert the Israelites that they must not allow a priest
who suffers from such a blemish to perform sacrificial service. The Torah phrased this
warning in indirect speech to make clear it was not addressed to the priest directly.

22:3

‫אמר אלהם‬, "say to them, etc." Torat Kohanim write that the people addressed in this verse
were the ones standing at Mount Sinai. The author tried to answer why the Torah added the
apparently superfluous words ‫ אמר אלהם‬seeing that the verse is a continuation of chapter 21
and the opening verses of this chapter. The previous directives had been addressed to the
priests, so that this chapter is merely a continuation. If, on the other hand, this chapter is
addressed to the Israelites at large, these had not even been mentioned in any of the adjoining
verses! It follows therefore that it was addressed to all the people who had stood at Mount
Sinai, the time they had become G'd's bride, so to speak. When the Torah does not bother to
mention to whom the speaker addresses Himself, we may assume that the speaker is G'd
Himself and that He speaks about the whole people. It follows that the retribution threatened
in this paragraph for desecrating the holy name of G'd applies to all the people who had heard
the revelation at Mount Sinai. [the word ‫ אלהם‬is therefore equivalent to ‫עלהם‬. Ed.] You may
well ask that if this is so why does the Torah in all other instances mention that the Israelites
are addressed by writng such formulae as ‫דבר אל בני ישראל‬, or something similar instead of
merely writing ‫ ?אמר אלהם‬Our sages in Vayikra Rabbah 2,5 already answered this with a
parable. A father had an only son and he always mentioned the fact that he was his son by
saying to him: "eat my son, drink my son, etc. Similarly, G'd told Moses on an almost daily
basis: 'Tell the Israelites, etc.' He mentions their name as a reminder of how fond He is of
them." This kind of address is standard procedure in the Torah. Whenever the situation
appears to allow for some additional message we endeavour to extract it from that text.

22:4

‫מזרע אהרון‬, "from the seed of Aaron, etc." Why did this prohibition have to be mentioned a
second time seeing that it was included in the overall directive in verse 3 that approaching
holy things or holy places is forbidden on pain of the penalty of karet? Actually, the
purification process for a priest afflicted with ‫ צרעת‬or ‫ זיבה‬or other impurity emanating from
his body is not completed until sunset in order for him to be allowed to eat ‫קדשי קדשים‬,
sacrificial offerings of a kind forbidden to be eaten by an ordinary Israelite. If an ordinary
Israelite had contracted the same kind of impurity he would be allowed to eat from the peace-
offerings (a lower form of sanctity) as soon as he had immersed himself in a ritual bath
without awaiting sunset. This is stated in Torat Kohanim. [I have not found it. Ed.]

‫והוא צרוע‬, "and he suffers from ‫צרעת‬, the skin affliction, etc." On this word Torat Kohanim
write. "From this wording I would only have known that the descendants of Aaron (or another
High Priest) would be subject to this legislation. How do I know that the same legislation
applies to the High Priest himself? Answer: This is why the Torah added the word ‫והוא‬, 'and
he himself.'" Thus far Torat Kohanim. In this instance we cannot apply what we explained on
21,7, that the words ‫ איש מזרעך‬imply that G'd would protect both Aaron and his sons from
becoming afflicted with a ‫מום‬, a physical blemish of the kind that disqualifies them from
performing sacrificial service, seeing the Torah includes impurity caused by emission of
semen, something which is not only natural but absolutely necessary in the fulfilment of the
commandment to be fruitful and to multiply. We know for a fact that Aaron, -as opposed to
Moses- did not separate from his wife and thereby avoid emission of semen. If the Torah had
not added the word ‫ והוא‬I could have erred thinking that Aaron himself was permitted to eat
sacrificial meat while in a state of such ritual impurities as are described in this verse. Once
the Torah included Aaron in this prohibition his sons are automatically included in it also. As
a result of these considerations, the earlier verse in which the Torah speaks about priests who
suffer from a physical blemish and which did not include Aaron could have been interpreted
as Aaron being exempted from this legislation in principle. Torat Kohanim therefore told us
that the reason he is exempted is only that G'd promised that neither he nor his sons would
suffer such a blemish.

22:12

‫ובת כהן כי תהיה לאיש זר‬, "And the daughter of a priest who marries an non-priest," etc.
Torat Kohanim uses the restrictive word ‫היא‬, "she," to exclude her mother, meaning her
mother (the wife of a priest) may eat ‫ תרומה‬even though her daughter is not allowed to do so
even if the mother had meanwhile become a widow (who had not remarried).

I have seen an allusion of a moral-ethical nature in this paragraph which it is important for
people to appreciate. Remember that Sanhedrin 93 taught us that the spiritual level of the
Israelites is higher than that of the angels. We have also been taught in the Zohar second
volume page 155 that G'd created four different worlds, each one higher than its counterpart.
All this is derived from Isaiah 43,7 ‫ אף־עשיתיו‬,‫ יצרתיו‬,‫כל הנקרא בשמי ולכבודי בראתיו‬. "All that is
called by My name I have created, for My glory, fashioned it, and completed it." The word
‫ לכבודי‬refers to a higher world called ‫עולם האצילות‬. The word ‫ בראתיו‬refers to a world known as
‫עולם הבריאה‬. The word ‫ יצרתיו‬refers to the world known as ‫עולם היצירה‬, whereas the word
‫ עשיתיו‬refers to our world, the world known as ‫עולם העשיה‬. You must also appreciate that G'd's
glory fills the entire universe including all these worlds we have described. It says in Deut.
33,27 ‫ומתחת זרעות עולם‬, "and from beneath the arms of the world." G'd's "light" illuminates all
four worlds. This is the mystical dimension of the tetragram, the four-lettered name of G'd
‫י־ה־ו־ה‬. The letter ‫ י‬refers to G'd illuminating the domain called ‫עולם האצילות‬, the totally
spiritual, abstract world which we described. The first letter ‫ ה‬refers to the ‫ ;עולם הבריאה‬the
letter ‫ ו‬refers to the ‫עולם היצירה‬, and the second letter ‫ ה‬refers to the ‫עולם העשיה‬.

The Zohar volume 1 page 80 also states that the vital parts of man are divided into four
categories each of which is identified by a different name. One part is called ‫נפש‬, a second
part is called ‫ רוח‬whereas a third part is called ‫נשמה‬. A fourth, and still more spiritual part, is
called ‫חיה‬. The part called ‫ חיה‬belongs to a domain called ‫[ אפנים‬a domain of the angels
supporting G'd's throne Ed.] a celestial domain which may best be described as the "soul of
the soul; Kabbalists claim that the vital part of man which is due to the light G'd employs in
the ‫עולם העשיה‬, our physical universe, is relatively weak and provides only the small part of
the vitality needed to enable creatures to move. This is the only part of the "soul" that we are
conscious of in this life. G'd arranged things in this way seeing the world we live is relatively
gross, coarse. This "soul" is commonly referred to as ‫נפש‬, "a physical life-force." On the other
hand, the category of "vitality" which emanates from the light of G'd with which He
illuminates the ‫ עולם היצירה‬is commonly known as ‫רוה‬, spirit. It is a commensurately stronger
spiritual force. The "vitality" which originates in the light with which G'd illuminates the ‫עולם‬
‫ הבריה‬is called ‫נשמה‬, in accordance with the degree of spirituality which permeates the world it
originates in. Finally, the vitality originating in the ‫ עולם האצילות‬is best known as ‫נשמה לנשמה‬,
"the soul of the soul."

The Lord G'd, Master of all the worlds, established some degree of fusion between the various
spiritual domains with the physical domain in the creature called ‫אדם‬, man. The phyical part
of man is composed of four basic elements; G'd imposed the laws governing the various
levels of spirituality in the different worlds on these elements. You must know that ‫גשמיות‬,
corporeality, opposes fusion with spirituality by definition, by its very nature. This opposition
between these two domains is more powerful than the opposition between fire and water. This
is why G'd in His wisdom created within man the lowest level of spirituality, i.e. the ‫נפש‬
because it represents only a minimum of spirituality and is therefore not as opposed to
corporeality as would be higher forms of spirituality. G'd imbued this ‫ נפש‬with a minute part
of the next higher form of spirit, i.e. the ‫רוח‬. As a result we may view the ‫ נפש‬as sort of a half-
way house between body and spirit. The ‫ רוח‬by itself would be unable to maintain an
existence due to the fierce resistence by the physical elements in man. In a similar fashion we
may view the ‫ רוח‬as a half-way house between the ‫ נפש‬and the ‫נשמה‬, for the value relationship
between the ‫ נפש‬and that of the ‫ נשמה‬which has been illuminated by an immeasurably greater
light from G'd is similar to that of the body to that of the ‫רוח‬. Similarly, the ‫ נשמה‬itself may be
viewed like a half-way house between the ‫ רוח‬and the ‫נשמה לנשמה‬. In other words the ‫ נפש‬is
able to to stand on its own, the ‫ רוח‬requires two elements to support it whereas the ‫נשמה‬
requires three elements to support it, whereas the ‫ נשמה לנשמה‬requires four elements to
suppport it.

Another statement by the sages of the Zohar volume 2 page 94 describes the progressive
strengthening of the pious by means of the ‫לקח טוב‬, the good lesson, the Torah which enables
man to rise to spiritually higher and higher levels. In this fashion the ‫ נפש‬develops into ‫רוח‬,
and ‫ רוח‬in turn develops into ‫נשמה‬. Eventually, the ‫ נשמה‬develops into ‫נשמה לנשמה‬, the "soul of
souls" known in kabbalistic parlance as ‫חיה‬. This is the purpose of the creation of man the
most advanced terrestrial creature.

Our sages have said further that as a direct result of man achieving the spiritual tasks set for
him he in turn will make use of G'd's universe as if it belonged to him. This is the mystical
dimension of Psalms 128,2: "When you enjoy the fruit of your labour you will be happy and
you will be well off." David assures us that the ‫ אשר‬and the ‫ טוב‬he is speaking about will be
"yours." This is also what the sages had in mind when they said that before or upon entering
this world the ‫ נפש‬consumes what it enjoys in this world as if she were a grown up daughter
[who still depends on her father without contributing to the expense of the household, Ed.],
whereas when that ‫ נפש‬returns (after death of the body) she has qualified for the status of a
married daughter.

You also need to appreciate that whatever G'd created in this world is dependent on input of
sustenance from a higher world called the ‫עולם האצילות‬. This is an allusion to the light of G'd
represented by the letter ‫ י‬in the tetragram. The ‫מזון‬, sustenance, we refer to is called ‫קדש‬,
holy, the source of all the goodness referred to in the Psalm we quoted. This is the deeper
meaning of Nechemyah 9,6 ‫ואתה מחיה את כולם‬, "and You provide sustenance for them all." The
degree and visibility of G'd's contribution to the maintenance of phenomena in our terrestrial
world becomes more and more distant looking, much as the source of a plant which grows
bigger and bigger seems further and further removed from the source it originally received its
nourishment. G'd has arranged things in this manner so that every creature receives what it is
entitled to in accordance with its spiritual development. It is also G'd who provides water for
physical earth. This is its bounty, i.e. the vitality which corresponds to the vitality called ‫נפש‬
in man. This is the only way earth is able to fulfil its function of growing plants, etc.
Indirectly then, earth too contributes to the development of the various levels of vitality in
man, i.e. ‫ נשמה‬,‫ רוח‬,‫נפש‬, and ‫נשמה לנשמה‬. There is no creature in the universe be it the
terrestrial regions or the celestial regions which does not depend on the continued input by its
holy source, its sacred origin. Each creature, be it totally abstract or totally physical is
provided with its respective needs by G'd Almighty.

Another thing which you the reader must know is that some people achieve the highest of the
levels of spirituality we have described, i.e. they possess the ‫נשמה לנשמה‬, whereas others
achieve only lower levels respectively. However, if someone has not progressed beyond the
level of possessing the ‫ נפש‬which is common to all creatures at birth even his good deeds
count for nothing. His deeds do not possess the spiritual power to raise them towards the
celestial regions. Our deeds in this terrestrial world impact on higher celestial regions only by
means of the ‫רוח‬, the first higher level of spirituality. The ‫ נפש‬itself is elevated to the level of
‫ רוח‬by means of man's (intentional) good deeds. When man achieves that level, the good
deeds he performed previously become "his own," so that he is called in our literature ‫בעל‬
‫מעשים טובים‬, "the owner of good deeds." This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 23,2: ‫אם‬
‫בעל נפש אתה‬, "if you have become the owner of the ‫נפש‬. Ownership of your ‫ נפש‬is the result of
having laboured to acquire it. The concept is that the ‫ רוח‬becomes the "owner" of the ‫ נפש‬as a
result of fatigue caused by performance of good deeds by the body whom it inhabits. Both the
‫ נפש‬and the ‫ רוח‬ascend together and imbibe from the same holy source of sustenance as
equals. The same holds true for the ‫ רוח‬in its value relationship compared to the ‫נשמה‬, and for
the ‫ נשמה‬in its comparative value relationship with the ‫נשמה לנשמה‬. Acquisiton of the requisite
spiritual level by a person may be due to one of two reasons. 1) The spiritual power bestowed
by the father at the time of conception of the fetus; I have explained this in greater detail in
Genesis 49,3 on the words ‫ראובן בכרי‬, "Reuben is my firstborn." 2) It may be achieved by the
independent effort of the person involved especially if assisted by Torah study. In connection
with Leviticus 22,27: ‫שור או כשב או עז כי יולד‬, "when an ox, a sheep, or a goat is born, etc.."
The Zohar volume 3 page 91 describes that a human being through the help of Torah study is
capable by his own efforts to achieve the highest spiritual plateau even though at birth he was
spiritually under-endowed to the worst possible degree. The key to his success is how much
he is prepared to tire himself in the process of Torah study. You should realise that in addition
to the positive achievements of a spiritual nature we have described, the residue of Adam's sin
which inhabits every human being to a greater or lesser degree affects different categories of
people differently according to the level of spirituality they have attained. The reason for this
is simply that the impact of that residue on the force called ‫ נפש‬is not to be compared with the
impact of that same residue of spiritual pollution on such forces as ‫ נשמה‬,‫רוח‬, or ‫נשמה לנשמה‬
respectively.

We know from Ezekiel 18,4 that ‫הנפש החוטאת היא תמות‬, "that the ‫ נפש‬which sins will die, i.e.
that the defect or blemish on the ‫ נפש‬is powerful enough to cause the sinner's destruction, his
physical death. If the person who is on the spiritual level of ‫ רוח‬displays such symptoms as
‫צרעת‬, etc., this is already considered a sign of a very grave defect although it does not result in
physical death. Kohelet 17,7 describes this as a situation ‫והרוח תשוב אל האלוקים אשר נתנה‬, "the
spirit ought to return to G'd who has provided it." However, our sages in Shabbat 152 explain
that statement as a commandment to man that when the time comes for him to die he is to
return the spirit G'd has provided in its original unstained condition, without the spots
signifying that the person suffered a ‫צרעת‬, skin-eczema, i.e. has been guilty of
misdemeanours. If man has not managed to get rid of these blemishes (through repentance,
etc.) it will prevent his ‫ רוח‬from returning to its celestial origin and his spirit will instead be
consigned to the domain of the ‫סטרא אחרא‬, a spiritually negative domain. Although the
immediate impact of a defect in a person of the ‫ נשמה‬spiritual level is "only" the fact that G'd
will withdraw the level of Divine light that such a person was bathed in, this very absence is
equivalent to a major disgrace for such a person. The impact of any misdemeanour is in direct
ratio to the esteem that such a person was held in by G'd before he became guilty of that
misdemeanour. The result of a misdemeanour committed by someone who had attained the
level of spirituality we defined as ‫נשמה לנשמה‬, is not the withdrawal of G'd's light but the
withdrawal of the automatic protection which G'd grants such people against becoming guilty
of trespasses against the laws of the Torah. This is discussed in Tikkuney Ha-Zohar chapter 70
in connection with the verse in Proverbs 12,21 ‫לא יאנה לצדיק כל און‬, "no harm will befall the
righteous." The author of ‫ תקוני הזהר‬understands that the kind of person described by Solomon
in that verse is the one who has attained the level of ‫נשמה לנשמה‬. When such a person will find
himself on the threshold of committimg a second sin, the holy soul which so far protected him
against actually committing such a sin is withdrawn from him so that he remains unprotected
in the presence of his temptation. His situation is comparable to a person who had once
enjoyed the privilege of playing host to the King in his home but who had been foolish
enough to expel his illustrious guest.

After G'd has informed us about all these aspects of the various parts of the soul, etc., the
Torah commenced (verse 10) with the words ‫וכל זר לא יאכל קדש‬, "that any non-priest must not
eat something holy," it is clear that the Torah speaks of different categories of "holy things,"
i.e. of 1) sacrificial meat, and 2) of things the holiness of which is hidden, i.e. the bounty from
G'd who provides spiritual food for the ‫בני אלוקים‬, the people who have acquired a degree of
sanctity.
The words ‫ תושב כהן ושכיר‬allude to the phenomenon of ‫ נפש‬and ‫ רוח‬respectively. The ‫ רוח‬is
described as ‫תושב כהן‬, a permanent resident within a priest, who is by definition the home of
the ‫ נשמה‬called ‫כהן‬, a superior level of spirituality. The word ‫ שכיר‬describes the force we know
as ‫נפש‬, seeing it is this force which carries out all the activities man performs. The Torah tells
us that these two aspects of man are not entitled to consume the kind of spiritual food the
Torah here calls ‫קדש‬, seeing that this food is of a very superior level of holiness. It is
worthwhile to read what Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai wrote in the Zohar volume 2 page 121
about the difference between the word kodesh and kadosh.

The Torah continues ‫וכהן כי יקנה נפש קנין כספו‬, "when a priest buys a soul, an acquisition by his
money, etc." Here the Torah describes the superior ‫ נשמה העליונה‬by the term ‫כהן‬. The Torah
describes this ‫ נשמה‬as if it were masculine by speaking of the ‫ נשמה‬i.e. as ‫ כספו‬something
masculine. The Torah's message is that once a person has achieved this level of spirituality it
deserves to be described in masculine terms. [Normally, the Torah would have spoken of the
purchase being made by the aspect of a person called ‫נפש‬, and the Torah would have had to
write ‫ ונפש כי תקנה‬instead of ‫כי יקנה‬. Ed.] The words ‫ כי יקנה נפש‬mean that the means by which
this ‫ כהן‬has attained the spiritual level of ‫ נשמה‬is that his deeds were superior enough for him
to "acquire" his ‫ נפש‬and to elevate it to the level of his ‫ נשמה‬so that such a person may now be
called ‫בעל נפש‬, as we mentioned in connection with Proverbs 23,2.

‫הוא יאכל בו‬, "he may eat of it;" having attained this level of sanctity enables also the
normally spiritually lowly ‫ נפש‬to partake of that "holy" nourishment which was out of bounds
to it prior to its spiritual ascent.

‫ויליד ביתו‬, "and those born in his house." This is a reference to the souls which had
descended into a nether domain after Adam's sin, and which are gradually being rescued from
that spiritually negative environment through the good deeds of the righteous. The good deeds
are like a magnet which attracts the sparks of goodness which existed in isolated form in
different parts of the universe. They are here described as "children of the ‫נשמה‬," the Torah
telling us that even they will experience such a spiritual ascent.

The Torah continues (verse 12) ‫ובת כהן‬. Here the Torah refers to the ‫ נשמה‬which has become
defective and defiled through the deeds it performed so that it has forfeited the right to enjoy
G'd's spiritual nourishment, the one described by the Torah previously as kodesh. When the
Torah writes ‫כי תהיה לאיש זר‬, "who will be married to a stranger," the reference is to the fact
that she (the soul) has betrothed herself to the forces of Satan (the stranger). ‫והיא בתרומת‬
‫הקדשים לא תאכל‬, "and she must not eat portions set aside from holy things." The Torah makes a
point of singling out ‫ בתרומת‬to tell us that even things of which only 2% are sanctified must
not be eaten by someone whose soul has been demoted due to a misdemeanour; such a
backsliding person must certainly not eat from the ‫ קדש‬itself. The emphasis, i.e. repetition of
the word ‫ והיא‬is intended to separate this law from what follows in the next verse seeing the
next verse starts with the conjunctive letter ‫ ו‬at the beginning of the word ‫ובת‬. The denial of
this kind of food to such a person who had achieved the level of ‫ נשמה‬is a true affliction for
his life-force and that soul will feel painfully demoted as a result of forfeiting the divine light
which had illuminated its life previously.

22:13

‫ובת כהן כי תהיה אלמנה‬, "And if a priest's daughter will become widowed, etc." In this verse
the Torah speaks of the person who had achieved the most spiritually advanced level that of
being ‫נשמה לנשמה‬. We have explained that as a result of such an ascent this kind of person is
separated from sin almost absolutely, his whole lifestyle being one of avoiding even the
proximity of sin. The Torah hints at this by describing such a ‫ בת כהן‬as "married," i.e. closely
attached to her holy roots. This is the kind of soul of which Solomon had spoken in Proverbs
12,21 when he described it as not becoming the victim of any mishap, i.e. sin. When such an
elevated soul somehow commits a sin, the result is that it will lose its status of being
"married" to her holy roots and will become "widowed or divorced," as the case may be, in
either case forfeiting the source of its sustenance, the most holy domain, the ‫עולם האצילות‬. The
example ‫ גרושה‬refers to the nature of its misdemeanour having been more serious than the one
in which it is described as ‫אלמנה‬, widowed. When the Torah adds ‫וזרע אין לה‬, that she (the soul
of souls) did not have any seed, this is a simile for such a soul (person) not having performed
the kind of good deeds in this world that are known as ‫פרות‬, "fruit." Nonetheless, the
punishment is "only" that "she will return to her father's house," to eat of the food dished out
at the table of her father such as she did before her soul had begun to ascend to spiritual
heights. The fact that she has to eat once more the kind of food she used to eat when she had
been only on the level of ‫ נפש‬or ‫רוח‬, is a very painful experience for such a soul. It is
equivalent to a person who had sinned and who had never ascended beyond the ‫ נפש‬level of
existence, having to die as a punishment for his sin. If the person who had attained the
spiritual level of being a ‫ נשמה לנשמה‬had also performed the kind of good deeds on earth
known as ‫פרות‬, its punishment for having committed a trespass would be "only" that she is
considered as eating at her own table.

‫וכל זר לא יאכל קדש‬, "any non-priest must not eat sacred things." Here the Torah provides a
rationale why G'd does not display His mercy to such a soul, permitting her to eat sacred
things if not as a matter of right then at least as a matter of G'd's grace. When a soul which
had once ascended to lofty spiritual heights had allowed herself to backslide and make
common cause with spiritually negative forces known as ‫זר‬, as alien, she can no longer
qualify for partaking from ‫קדש‬, "G'd's table," as it were.

22:14

‫ונתן לכהן את הקדש‬, "and he shall give to the priest the holy thing." Our sages in the sixth
chapter of Terumot are divided about the meaning of this verse. Rabbi Eliezer holds that what
is meant is anything which can potentially become holy, sacred may be used as compensation
for the ‫ תרומה‬which a person had consumed inadvertently. Rabbi Akiva holds that only the
same category of food which the person consumed inadvertently may be used as
compensation for the ‫ תרומה‬which someone who was not entitled to ate inadvertently. Thus far
the Mishnah. Perhaps Rabbi Akiva meant that by means of making this restitution the Torah
considers it as if the guilty person had actually restored the holy things he had consumed and
had recreated a situation similar to that which existed before he inadvertently ate the holy
things.

22:16

‫והשיאו אותם עון אשמה‬, "and so cause them to bear the sin which brings guilt, etc." The
meaning of the verse is that if the guilty person did not make restitution of both the value of
the amount of holy things consumed plus the 20%, the parameter of the sin will grow wider so
that it will be classified as if it had been committed intentionally (i.e. ‫)עון‬. The justification for
this is that when one fails to correct a sin inadvertently committed although one has been
given an opportunity to correct it, the original sin becomes so much more serious. The word
‫ והשיאו‬is equivalent to ‫" ינשאו‬they will have to bear them;" ‫ הם‬i.e. the combined sins. The
Torah adds: ‫באכלם את קדשיהם‬, the sin will now be considered not merely failure to pay the
penalty but it will be considered as if they had eaten their holy things on purpose. Compare
my comments on the last verse.

23:2

‫מועדי ה׳ אשר תקראו אותם‬, "appointed seasons (festivals) of G'd which you shall proclaim,
etc." G'd decreed that these festivals will come into force as a result of the court declaring
them to be in force (Torat Kohanim). We need to understand why the Torah repeated the
words ‫אלה הם מועדי‬, "these are My festivals." We must also try and understand how the
Sabbath (verse 3) fits into this chapter seeing it is most certainly not subject to the
manipulations of the Jewish High Court! Moreover, why did the Torah have to write the
words: "these are the festivals of the Lord" a third time in verse 4?

I believe we must understand this verse in the following manner. In the first instance G'd
informed the Jewish people that in principle the exact time (though not the calendar date) of
these "appointed seasons" are subject to input by the Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court. In
view of this principle, the Torah feared that we might err and believe that even the Sabbath
itself was subject to such input by the Sanhedrin, i.e. to postponement if it suited the court.
The Torah therefore wrote: "these are My appointed seasons, you are to have work performed
for six consecutive days and only the seventh day is the Sabbath on which you may not
perform all manner of work." The Torah had to write once more: "these are the appointed
seasons of the Lord which you are to proclaim," to inform us that we are entitled to adjust the
part of the calendar dealing with those days to suit our needs. This is followed by the
respective dates in the first month, the third month and the seventh month which are liable to
be affected by adjustments made by the Sanhedrin.

There may be yet another reason why the Torah repeated the formula ‫אשר תקראו אותם‬, "which
you are to proclaim (or may) proclaim." Maimonides writes as follows in chapter 4 of his
treatise on the sanctification of the new month: "There are three considerations which justify
lengthening the year by means of the insertion of an extra month. 1) Bringing it in line with
the solar seasons of the year. 2) Ensuring that Passover occcurs in the spring as demanded by
the Torah. 3) Enabling the period when the fruit of the trees ripen to occur in summer.
Maimonides mentions some other reasons which may prompt the Sanhedrin to adjust the
calendar, such as to enable travellers to make their pilgrimage to Jerusalem at a time when the
roads are passable, etc., or at a time when the bridges are safe from flooding, etc. The
secondary reasons are mostly connected to the fact that many Israelites lived in the diaspora.
In other words, the two principal considerations for adjusting the calendar are A) climate-
related reasons. B) people-related reasons. Seeing that the Torah described the Passover
festival as occurring in the season of the spring, the religious authorities made the necessary
adjustments to conform with this requirement. The Torah repeats the right of the Sanhedrin to
proclaim when these dates should occur in order for us to know that both climate-related
considerations and people-related considerations are valid reasons for the Sanhedrin to make
use of its authority in this regard.

23:5

‫בין הערבים פסח לשם‬, "at dusk it is the Lord's passover." This means that the part of the
passover offering which belongs to G'd, i.e. the sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the
fat parts of the lamb must occur on the eve of the 14th of Nissan. However, the part of that
sacrifice which is to be consumed by every Jew has to occur after nightfall in conjunction
with the eating of unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Furthermore, the expression "a passover
to G'd" is a reminder of the very first passover sacrifice, the one the Jews slaughtered in
Egypt. That Passover was of immediate benefit to the Jewish people so that the sacrifice could
hardly be called "a passover for G'd." It included elements which were never repeated. In
Shemot Rabbah 19 we are told concerning the Passover of Moses (not he personally but the
one he commanded at the time) that it contained the fragrance carrried by the winds from
Paradise. Compare what I have written in my commentary on Exodus 12,43 in this
connection. In addition to that, the first Passover was responsible for G'd killing the firstborn
of the Egyptians. Now that the Passover was merely a commemoration of what had occurred
as part of the first Passover the people offering it could truly claim that they did so for G'd i.e.
that it is a "passover for G'd."

23:15

‫וספרתם לכם‬, "and you shall count for yourselves, etc." The reason the Torah adds the word
"for yourselves" is that G'd commanded to count for seven weeks consecutively. We are told
in the Zohar volume 3 page 97 that seeing the Jewish people were in a state of impurity and
G'd wanted to betroth them to Himself He applied the legislation pertaining to a menstruant
woman who is required to purify herself for seven days. He therefore commanded them to
"purify" themselves for seven weeks by counting those days much as a menstruant counts the
seven days. The count then was for the benefit of the Israelites in order that they would
become G'd's "bride" as it were and would be able to step under the wedding canopy at Mount
Sinai. The reason that the period of counting was seven weeks instead of seven days was the
extraordinary amount of impurity the Jewish people had accumulated during their extended
stay in Egypt. Another reason is that in this instance we speak about an entire people having
to shed their accumulated impurities. I have explained on Exodus 19,1 that the word ‫בצאתם‬
was to be understood as a cause for G'd having delayed the giving of the Torah, i.e. the
presence of the Israelites in Egypt for a long time necessitated the period of seven weeks
during which the Jews prepared themselves for this event. The sentiment that the reason the
Torah was not given immediately after the Exodus is supported by the words ‫ממחרת השבת‬, that
the Torah would not be given immediately after the Sabbath, i.e. Passover, but after a period
described as the morrow of that day. The nature of this count is that the days have to be whole
days, as opposed to parts of days. Seeing the 15th of Nissan at that time was a Sabbath and
that on part of that day the Israelites were still in Egypt, the count of the seven weeks could
not commence until the following day, i.e. ‫ממחרת‬. While it is true that this consideration
applied only to the generation of Israelites who left Egypt at that time, the Torah legislated
that the same procedure be followed year after year starting with the year of the Exodus.
Kabbalists understand why we have to re-enact history in this fashion. According to the plain
meaning of the text the reason the Torah refers to "the day following the Sabbath" is a
reminder of the fact that while in Egypt the Jews had to perform slave labour also on the
Sabbath. You may do well to read what I have written on Genesis 2,2 in connection with the
words ‫ויכל אלוקים ביום השביעי‬.

A moral-ethical approach to our verse may be derived if we see in the word ‫ וספרתם‬the root
‫ספיר‬, sapphire, the material the second tablets were made of (compare Vayikra Rabbah 32,2).
The souls of the Jewish people are compared to the nature of sapphires which lose their lustre
when they become dirty. As a result of sins committed by their owners (bodies inhabited by
these souls) something similar happens to their souls. The message of the word ‫ וספרתם‬is that
by means of the count the Jewish people would "polish up" their souls so that they would be
unblemished by the time they would experience the revelation at Mount Sinai.

‫ממחרת השבת מיום הביאכם‬, "on the morrow of the Sabbath from the day you offer the
Omer, etc." The meaning is that the count commences now before you come to the Holy
Land. As far as what is to happen after the people will come to the land of Canaan the Torah
writes: "from the day you offer the Omer sacrifice." The reason the Torah first mentioned the
words ‫ממחרת השבת‬, is that the commandment of counting commenced already at the time of
the Exodus.

23:22

‫ובקצרכם את קציר ארצכם‬, "And when you reap the harvest of your land, etc." Why does the
Torah introduce this kind of legislation at this juncture when it is totally out of context with
the subject matter being legislated in this chapter? Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us that
the owner of a field from which the barley for the Omer sacrifice has already been taken is
still subject to the variety of tithes the farmer is commanded to leave for the poor when he
harvests his field. Had the Torah not written this I might have thought that inasmuch as this
field had already become a sacrifice to G'd in that the Omer of barley had been offered from it
on the altar it would no longer be subject to the legislation of the various donations which
have to be separated from the harvest. Perhaps this is why only two of those gifts to the poor
are mentioned here, i.e. ‫פאה ולקט‬, the corner and the gleanings, both of which are duties which
devolve on the actual field itself. This is different from the legislation of ‫שכחה‬, already
harvested sheaves, which the owner has forgotten to pick up. Our sages in Torat Kohanim say
that the Torah alludes to the moral-ethical message that anyone who gives ‫ לקט‬,‫פאה‬, and ‫שכחה‬
is considered as if he had assured the continued existence of the Holy Temple and had offered
sacrifices therein; thus far Torat Kohanim. The reason they mention the word ‫ שכחה‬although it
does not even appear in our verse is because it is also a commandment similar to ‫לקט ופאה‬. In
this way they have hinted at what we have written above.

23:27

‫יום הבפורים הוא מקרא קדש‬, "it is a Day of Atonement, a holy convocation." The reason the
Torah writes the word ‫ הוא‬is to tell us that this day is in a class by itself, the date alone making
it a Day of Atonement independent of any pronouncement. As a result one qualifies for
reward by observing the second half of the verse, i.e. proclaiming it holy and afflicting
oneself through abstention from food and drink, etc. This is an additional bonus apart from the
atonement we are granted simply by being alive on that day.

23:28

‫וכל מלאכה לא תעשו‬, "and you must not perform any work." The unusual way the Torah
explains the reason for the work prohibition may be understood in light of something we have
been taught in Sotah 40. The Talmud there states that the congregation is not to recite verses
from scripture while the priests are pronouncing the blessing, as it would be equivalent to a
slave receiving a blessing from his master while not even bothering to listen. We may
understand the legislation here in a similar manner. Seeing that the Day of Atonement itself
confers a blessing, i.e. forgiveness, it would be most inappropriate to observe "business as
usual" on such a day. It is more appropriate to spend one's time contemplating the grandeur of
the Lord of the universe who has set aside a day on which His creatures are rehabilitated.
23:34

‫הזה חג הסכות‬, "this one is the festival of huts." The extraneous words are explained in Torat
Kohanim. Please refer to my comment on this in connection with Leviticus 14,7.

23:37

‫מועדי השם‬, "the appointed seasons of the Lord, etc." Torat Kohanim on verse 35 quotes
Rabbi Akiva as saying that these are the days on which the performance of work is prohibited.
I believe this may also be the reason why the Torah concludes by writing: ‫ומלבד מתנותיכם‬, "and
beside your gifts, etc., which you will present to the Lord." These "gifts" include burnt-
offerings. We know from Beytzah 19 that burnt-offerings may not be offered on festivals. The
Talmud derives this from the word ‫לכם‬, "for you," and "not for G'd." When we take this into
consideration it is clear that verse 38 speaks of the intermediate days of the festivals of
Passover and Sukkot.

24:2

‫צו את בני ישראל‬, "command the children of Israel, etc." Why is this the appropriate place in
the Torah to acquaint us with the rules of the oil for the Candlestick and the manner in which
it is to be lit? We also need to explain why the procedures involving the Table have to be
written at this juncture. After all, the Torah has dealt with those subjects when it described the
construction of the Tabernacle! We shall leave aside Rashi's comment as we do not consider
his words as adequate to answer the problem we have raised. Nachmanides wrote that at that
time the olive oil which the princes had donated when the materials for the Tabernacle were
being collected had come to an end. This is mere speculation, there is no supporting evidence
for this assumption.

Perhaps the fact that the Torah here deals with commandments whose common denominator
is the number seven, i.e. 7 days of Passover, 7 days of Tabernacles, the New Year and Day of
Atonement which occur in the 7th month, prompted the Torah to add laws about the 7-armed
Candlestick. The procedures involving the Table also have a mystical dimension involving the
number seven, seeing the Torah speaks about two rows of six breads (verse 6). When you add
the table itself to the respective rows of 6 showbreads you have the number seven. The
number seven is always considered as completing a cycle. You also had the legislation of the
Omer in this portion; that commandment also involved the counting of seven times seven
days, i.e. seven weeks. You have a reference to the commandment of the Sabbath, another
commandment which features the number seven. We may therefore assume that the Torah
was interested in mentioning all the commandments featuring the number seven in one
portion.

It is also possible that the laws pertaining to the Candlestick were written adjoining the
legislation about the festival of Tabernacles to teach us some lessons about the difference
between physical and spiritual light. G'd neither needs the light of the Candlestick to
illuminate the Tabernacle for Him, nor did the Jewish people travel through the desert for 40
years using physical light (compare Torat Kohanim on the words ‫ מחוץ לפרוכת‬in verse 3). The
‫ענני הכבוד‬, the clouds of glory i.e. the ‫שכינה‬, illuminated the way for the Jewish people and the
shade they provided actually screened out the sunlight during all those years (compare
Tossaphot on Shabbat. 22,B). It follows that the commandment to light the Candlestick daily
was only for the sake of the dividing curtain which was so called as it provided testimony for
the nations of the world that G'd's presence resided within the camp of the Jewish people.

24:10

‫ויצא בן אשה ישראלית‬, The son of a Jewish woman went out, etc. We must understand the
meaning of the expression ‫ ויצא‬as analogous to the way Tanchuma understood the same word
when the Torah described the emergence of the golden calf in Exodus 32,24. Tanchuma
defined the word as describing an unplanned occurrence, i.e. the emergence of the golden calf
from that crucible was totally unexpected. We may therefore relate to the portion of the ‫מקלל‬,
the blasphemer, as the ultimate result of an act by the mother which was totally outside her
consciousness. Shemot Rabbah 1,28 describes that the Egyptian overseer killed by Moses
once entered the house of his victim pretending to be her husband and slept with her. The
child born from that union developed into the blasphemer who is the subject of our verse. This
is the reason the Torah describes the mother as ‫אשה ישראלית‬, comparing her to ‫איש הישראלי‬, to
tell us that her guilt in this matter was no greater than the guilt of the ‫איש הישראלי‬, i.e. she was
free from guilt. The Torah goes on to write ‫בתוך בני ישראל‬, to inform us that there were no
‫ממזרים‬, bastards, amongst the Jewish people, i.e. children from unions who may not marry
Israelites.

We may also deduce from the word ‫ ויצא‬that the Israelites were not prepared to allocate space
to that individual in their respective parts of the encampment, each one claiming that he did
not belong there. Torat Kohanim write that the manner in which the Torah introduces the
blasphemer indicates that he had converted to Judaism. [seeing he was born before the Torah
was given, he was not automatically Jewish due to his having a Jewish mother. Ed.] Both
commentaries are perfectly true and compatible with Torah principles.

‫ואיש הישראלי‬. and the Jewish man. It is possible that the reason the Torah does not disclose
the name of this man is that it was he who caused the name of G'd to be blasphemed by the
son of the Jewish woman, Shlomit bat Divri. G'd is not anxious to condemn a person,
especially not in a book such as the Torah which will be read for all future generations so that
a dishonourable mention is especially painful to the party concerned.

Furthermore, the Torah wanted to reveal that the substance of the quarrel between these two
men concerned the difference between being known as merely "the son of a Jewish woman,"
and being known as "the son of a Jew." The wording of the Torah comprises all that our sages
have said about the substance of this quarrel in Vayikra Rabbah 32,3, some saying the quarrel
was about the showbread legislation, the blasphemer ridiculing it. Others say that the quarrel
centred about whether the blasphemer was a member of the Jewish people, and if so if he
could claim membership of a particular tribe. The Torah did not bother to be specific and
mention his name as it did not make any difference in the end.

24:11

‫ושם אמו‬, and the name of his mother, etc. Why was the name of this woman only mentioned
here instead of at the time her existence was mentioned in verse 10 prior to the confrontation
of her son with Moses? One may answer this in either one of two ways. 1) It reflects credit
upon her seeing the Torah wrote: "they brought him to Moses, whereas the name of his
mother was Shlomit." This implies that his mother was one of those who brought the
blasphemer to Moses to be judged. 2) Mention of Shlomit at this stage reflects discredit upon
her. Had it not been for the fact that others brought the blasphemer to Moses for judgment his
mother could have remained anonymous. The general tenor of the story indicates that the
blasphemer's mother could not overcome her feelings of pity for her son. The Torah teaches
the lesson which we learned in Proverbs 12,10 that compassion for the wicked is actually an
act of cruelty. The Torah discloses the name of the woman who had been foolish enough to
display such feelings for her son the blasphemer. The fact that the Torah also reveals the name
of her tribe is an indication that members of a tribe have a tendency to be protective of
members of that tribe. This is why the Midrash we quoted earlier stated that when a person
disgraces himself he also disgraces his tribe.

24:22

‫כגר כאזרת‬, convert and natural-born Israelite alike. The Torah did not write: ‫הגר כאזרח‬, "the
convert himself is equal to the natural-born Israelite." The reason is that in the scale of
relative degrees of sanctity the convert ranks below the natural-born Israelite. The wording
the Torah did use relates only to both categories of Israelites being equal before the law.

24:23

‫ובני ישראל עשו כאשר צוה השם‬. The children of Israel did as G'd commanded. Why did the
Torah write that the children of Israel did what G'd commanded after it had already reported
in the first part of the verse that they took the blasphemer out of the camp and executed him
by stoning him? Seeing that the cause of this execution was a quarrel between a Jew and the
son of a Jewess, one could have argued that though the judgment was carried out, many
people harboured reservations in their hearts about this execution. The Torah therefore repeats
that the children of Israel did what G'd commanded to indicate that their motivation was to
carry out G'd's commandment.

Alternatively, the Torah wished to give credit to the whole people for having fulfilled this
commandment although it was obviously impossible for the entire nation to physically
participate in this execution.

The Torah may even go beyond this and credit the whole people with having fulfilled all the
commandments because they all identified with this execution. This is why the line is couched
in general terms, the Torah not specifying which command of G'd the people had fulfilled.

It is also possible that the Torah had to write this line seeing that the command to execute the
blasphemer had been addressed to Moses, G'd addressing him in the singular and saying
(verse 14) "take the blasphemer outside the camp and have all those who heard his blasphemy
place their hands upon his head and the whole congregation shall stone him." According to
that verse we thought that whereas Moses was only to take the blasphemer outside, the entire
people had to execute him. Here the Torah wrote: "they took the blasphemer outside the camp
and stoned him to death." The verse makes the people the whole subject. The Torah now
proceeds to praise Israel for not having waited until Moses took the blasphemer outside the
camp; they did so themselves and proceeded to complete the commandment to execute him. If
we adopt the previous ways of interpreting the verse the word ‫" הוצא‬take out" which G'd said
to Moses may be understood to mean that either Moses or the people were to do this.

‫חסלת פרשת אמור‬

25:1

‫בהר סיני‬, at Mount Sinai. We need to know why the Torah found it necessary to mention that
this legislation was revealed at Mount Sinai. While it is true that our sages in Torat Kohanim
explain that this is merely a reminder of the fact that all the commandments were given to
Moses at Mount Sinai, both in general terms as well as in all their details, this does not answer
the question why the Torah selected this commandment to remind us of that fact. It would
have made much better sense to state this fact either when relating the first or the last of the
Torah's commandments. Perhaps the fact that here G'd describes His gift to the Jewish people,
the land of Israel, prompted Him to remind the people that the gift of the land was conditional
on the people observing the commandments they had accepted at the time they stood at Mount
Sinai and received the Ten Commandments. The present tense, i.e. ‫ אשר אני נותן‬ties the gift to
Mount Sinai where the Israelites undertook to keep the Torah.

Another reason may be related to a statement we find in Avodah Zarah 20 and considered as
binding by Maimonides in chapter 3 of his treatise called Zechiyah. Here is what Maimonides
writes: "It is forbidden to give a gift to a pagan (unless it is in return for services rendered)."
We must remember that prior to acceptance of the Torah by the Jewish people they
themselves were legally in the category of pagans, i.e. G'd could not legally make a gift of the
land of Israel to the Jewish people until they offered some value in return. He could only give
the land of Israel to them after the revelation at Mount Sinai. G'd alluded to this when the
Torah mentioned Mount Sinai as the reason for "the land which I am about to give to you."
This also answers the question why G'd had to say: "which I am giving to you." There was
never any doubt that it was G'd from whom we would receive this gift so that we could have
erred if the Torah did not repeat it. You will note that in Leviticus 19,23 where the Torah
legislates about the ‫ ערלה‬restrictions the subject is introduced as follows: "when you come to
the land and plant fruit-bearing trees, etc." In that instance the Torah did not mention who
gives the land to the Israelites, etc. This supports our theory about why G'd selected the
example of our verse to teach us that the gift of the land of Israel is tied to the experience at
Mount Sinai.

25:2

‫דנר אל בני ישראל‬, "speak to the children of Israel, etc." The reason the Torah repeats ‫דבר‬
‫ ואמרת‬is that this legislation involves both a prohibition to work the land (for a limited period)
as well as denying oneself ownership of what one's field or orchard produces during that year
(especially the fruit of the trees which grow without planting). The Torah uses the relatively
harsh expression ‫ דבר‬to introduce the prohibition to work the land seeing it is difficult for a
farmer to reconcile himself to such a commandment. The expresssion ‫ ואמרת‬applies to the
requirement to declare one's produce ‫הפקר‬, i.e. accessible to anyone who finds it, something
which does not involve too much hardship as the farmer becomes the beneficiary of his
neighbour's parallel declaration. Moreover, G'd's promise that the land would produce an
extra generous harvest during the sixth year of the cycle (compare verse 21) will gladden the
heart of the farmer and reconcile him to loss of ownership of what his own field or orchard
produces during the seventh year.

Another reason why the apparent duplication of ‫ דבר ואמרת‬is justified is the dual nature of the
"Sabbath" i.e. rest, of the land. One aspect of this legislation is that the King commanded us to
let the land lie fallow, ergo we carry out this command. 2) Although the practical performance
of this commandment involves the relationship between man and man rather than the
relationship between man and G'd, our obligation to comply is anchored in our relationship
with G'd, i.e. the fact that the gift of the land to the Jewish people had been made conditional
on our observing the Torah. When G'd did not say: "I have given you the land," but "I am
giving you the land," He made it plain that the condition which is attached to that gift is an
ongoing one, i.e. the land never became ours irrevocably. The word ‫ דבר‬therefore alludes to
G'd's right to legislate; the word ‫ ואמרת‬on the other hand, refers to the social element of this
legislation which also is the prerogative of the King to legislate. The Torah is under no
obligation to furnish us with the reasons which motivated G'd the legislator, when He
commanded us to perform these statutes.

‫ושבתה הארץ שבח לשם‬, "and the land shall keep a Sabbath for G'd." What precisely does
the Torah have in mind here? If the Torah refers to the seventh year, this is already stated in
verse 4, "in the seventh year shall be a Sabbath of solemn rest for the land."

We must therefore understand this verse as belonging to the previous verse in which G'd
proclaimed that He was giving us the land. Our verse is a codicil, i.e. that G'd has made a
reservation concerning that gift. The reservation is that we, the new "owners," agree to to let
the land rest from time to time; "to G'd," i.e. to the G'd who still has title to the land. In verse
4 the Torah defines the nature of this "rest," i.e. when and for how long it is to occur. First we
are to work the land for six consecutive years and only the seventh year is to be a year of rest.
If the Torah had not written the verse ‫ ושבתה הארץ‬and contented itself with verse 4, I would
not have known that G'd had reserved a claim to that land for Himself.

Upon closer examination we find that G'd was extremely kind in this matter. Generally
speaking when a gift is conditional, such a gift may be revoked when the party who received
it violates the condition attached to it. In this instance G'd did us a favour by retaining part of
the land He had given us as a conditional gift. When the Jewish people violated the conditions
of the gift by not observing the Shemittah legislation they did not lose the entire land but
merely had to recompense G'd for having deprived Him of what He had reserved for Himself,
i.e. the seventh year, the ‫שבת לשם‬. We find proof of this in 26,34-35 where the Torah writes:
"then the land shall be paid her Sabbaths, …the rest it had not had, etc." As a result of G'd
retaining part ownership of the land of Israel the gift part of the land will never be cancelled.

The reason why the Torah wrote the word ‫ ושבתה‬next to the words ‫ אשר אני נותן‬is connected to
what we learned in Baba Metzia 23 that when a Torah scholar identifies an object he claims as
belonging to him this is accepted without an accompanying oath. G'd's word is certainly at
least as trustworthy as that of the greatest Torah scholar and there was therefore no need for
Him to use an oath when giving the land of Israel to us. Besides, the gift may be considered
an act of charity and G'd's utterance concerning it is to be considered as equivalent to a vow
(compare Rosh Hashanah 6) so that the words ‫ ושבתה הארץ‬immediately after the promise ‫אשר‬
‫ אני נותן‬are actually part of the gift itself and not an afterthought. If the Torah had relied only
on verse 4 the ‫ שמטה‬legislation could no longer have been considered as an integral part of the
gift of the land. The verse speaking about our working the land for six consecutive years, etc.,
would have constituted an interruption of the subject matter.

25:3

‫שש שנים תזרע‬, "You shall plant seed for six years, etc." The Torah wanted to phrase the
procedure of the farmer seeding his land as a positive commandment, and the pruning of the
vines in the seventh year as a negative commandment so that the negative commandment
which is a derivative of a positive commandment is also considered as a positive
commandment (compare Pessachim 41). Although Maimonides wrote in the first chapter of
his treatise Hilchot Shemittah that the positive commandment is based on the words ‫ושבתה‬
‫ הארץ שבת‬at the end of verse 2, this would certainly not be enough to make the act of seeding
and the act of pruning positive commandments. Perhaps what Maimonides had in mind was to
make a person who ignores the laws of seeding and pruning guilty of violating two positive
commandments instead of merely one.

‫ושש שנים תזמר‬, "and for 6 years you shall prune your vineyard." Why did the Torah repeat
the words ‫ ושש שנים‬when it could have written: ‫ ?שש שנים תזרע שדך ותזמר כרמך‬Our sages
explain this in chapter 5 of Massechet Shvi-it by reference to ‫בנות שוח שביעית שלהם שניה‬,
certain kinds of white figs which ripen only once in three years. The shemittah legislation
applies starting only with the second year of the cycle. The Talmud explains that in the case
of the fruits of that tree the cut-off date is the date they blossom which occurs in the seventh
year so that these fruit are harvested in the second year after the shemittah year. In other
words, when it comes to the trees, the time the fruit blossoms determines the calculation for
when the shemittah year applies. In the case of grains and vegetables however, the time they
are harvested determines the application of the shemittah prohibition as we know from Rosh
Hashanah 13. There is a good reason then why the Torah had to write the words ‫שש שנים‬
twice, seeing that trees and fields have different six-year cycles respectively, the former
determined by the time of the harvest the latter by the time the fruit blossoms.

‫ואספת את תבואתה‬, "and you shall gather in its harvest." What need was there for the Torah
to write the word ‫ ?ואספת‬Perhaps the Torah's use of the expression ‫ ואספת את תבואתה‬is meant to
contrast with the ‫ספיחים‬, the wild growing crop of the seventh year which was not planted
which must not be gathered in. The intention of the Torah then would be to add a positive
commandment, i.e. the type of positive commandment which is actually a derivative of the
negative commandment not to harvest the wild growing crop. This would make the negative
commandment not to harvest this kind of crop into a positive commandment with the
appropriate halachic consequences for people transgressing it. Possibly the Torah hints that
although a piece of land which has been farmed for six years consecutively does not have the
strength left to produce a crop in the seventh year, especially seeing it has not even been
ploughed or seeded, in this case this is precisely what will happen. The normal procedure is to
cultivate a field for a year and then to give that piece of land a year of rest (compare Baba
Batra 29). In other words, the Torah praises the quality of the soil in the land of Israel and
assures us that observance of the legislation in this chapter will enhance the value of the land.
We may even interpret the opening words ‫ דבר ואמרת‬as reflecting this message. The word ‫דבר‬
is normal, the word ‫ ואמרת‬which tones town the harsh ‫ דבר‬hinting at the veiled blessing that
the observance of the ‫ שמטה‬legislation will result in an improvement of the yield from the soil.

We may also find a clue to the meaning of our verse in Sanhedrin 26 which reports Rabbi
Yannai calling on the people to plant their fields in the seventh year as the government levied
a tax on the fields and people could not have met this unless they planted a crop. Tossaphot
comment on this: "how could Rabbi Yannai permit something which is forbidden by biblical
injunction?" They answer on two levels. Rabbi Yannai spoke of a period when the shemittah
legislation applies only because of a rabbinic decree. Alternatively, when a matter of ‫פקוח נפש‬,
physical survival, is involved it is in order to temporarily cancel even a biblical injunction.

25:6
‫והיתה שנת הארץ לכם לאכלה‬, "And the Sabbath-produce of the land shall be for you as
food;" The principal reason for this verse is to inform us that contrary to other sacred matters
which are restricted to the altar or to the priests, in this instance everybody is entitled to
consume what has grown during the seventh year. The Torah then details who are all the
people who are included in that permission. You may well ask that in view of this, why did
the Torah have to write the word ‫לכם‬, "to you," which is normally a restrictive word, i.e. "you
and no one else?" All the Torah had to write was ‫ !הארץ לך לאכלה‬I suppose the best approach
to this is as follows. Normally, I would have expected that whosoever is mentioned in the
verse first is first in line for the permission to eat. We have a parallel to this when the Torah
legislated the order of priorities when giving charity. In that instance (Deut. 15,7) The Torah
lists: "your poor (family members)," followed by "the poor of your town," followed by the
people in "your land" (based on Sifri on that verse). To ensure that we do not understand the
last half of our verse in the same way as Deut. 15,7 the Torah here first wrote the word ‫ לכם‬to
tell us that all people have an equal claim on what grows in the fields during that year.

25:14

‫וכי תמכרו ממכר לעמיתך‬, "And if you sell anything to your neighbour, etc." Torat Kohanim
on this verse asks: "whence do we know that the legislation concerning overcharging does not
apply to transactions involving real estate?" Answer: "this is why the Torah wrote ‫או קנה מיד‬
‫עמיתך‬, "or if you will buy from the hand of your neighbour." This means that the
commandment not to charge too much applies only to ‫מטלטלין‬, mobile goods, chattels. The
Talmud Baba Metzia 56 queries this ruling pointing to Numbers 21,26 where the word ‫ יד‬is
used in connection with land, i.e. "he took his whole land from his hand, as far as the river
Arnon." The Talmud concludes by saying that in every other instance the word ‫ ידו‬is to be
understood literally, whereas only in this instance (Numbers 21,26) the word means "in his
possession." Thus far the Talmud. The question arises why we do not use the verse in
Numbers to deduce that the word ‫ ידו‬never needs to be understood literally as "his hand?" We
must answer that the meaning of the word ‫ ידו‬is certainly "his hand" in the literal sense of the
word. It is not disputed that the meaning of the word ‫ ידו‬may also be "something under one's
control," however the literal meaning is the more likely in our context. When I have the
choice of how to understand the word I naturally choose the meaning which fits the context in
which the word appears. Moreover, if the Torah had not intended that we understand the word
‫ ידו‬literally it should have used a different word to prevent us from misunderstanding its
purpose. We need to explore therefore why the sages inisted that the legislation against
overcharging in our verse speaks only of the sale of chattels and that the verse does not speak
at all of sales involving real estate.

It appears that although the exegesis employed by our sages is based on their prior knowledge
of these ‫ הלכות‬which had been handed down orally from Mount Sinai, they were interested in
linking all these ‫ הלכות‬to the written text of the Torah. The plain meaning of our verse is
perfectly compatible with the known ‫ הלכות‬on this subject. We must remember that the Torah
had already prohibited the irrevocable sale of real estate in the land of Israel through the
institution known as ‫יובל‬, Jubilee year legislation. That legislation precluded overcharging for
the land as the Torah expressly stipulated that the sale price be based on the number of
harvests the land in question would produce before the next Jubilee year (verses 16-17). Verse
17 speaks specifically about not overcharging an unsuspecting purchaser who thought that he
bought title to that land outright. The seller meanwhile intended to invoke Torah law in the
Jubilee year and claim back the land in question without compensating the buyer. In such a
situation, i.e. that the seller purports to sell property against which there is no potential lien,
the principle of overcharging does apply so that the original sale is invalidated due to the
seller having misrepresented what he sold. Seeing that the Torah took care of potential
overcharging for land in those verses, it is clear that in verse 14 the Torah speaks only of the
sale of chattels and the word ‫ ידו‬is to be applied only in its literal sense. In our case the Torah
protected the buyer of land against being overcharged seeing no outsider would protest the
sale, only the seller himself who claims to base his protest on Torah law. The Torah therefore
saw fit to protect the unsuspecting buyer against this particular claim only by writing that the
price had to be based on the number of years till the Jubilee year from the time of the sale. By
contrast then, the words ‫ אל תונו‬in verse 14 apply only to the sale of chattels.

25:15

‫במספר שנים אחר היובל‬, "according to the number of years after the Jubilee year, etc," We
must establish first of all why the Torah speaks of the years "after the Jubilee," rather than
"the number of years until the Jubilee year," seeing that the years the purchase is in effect are
part of those years? Secondly, why did the Torah change its wording in the middle of a verse?
The Torah describes the transaction as a purchase,‫מקנתו‬, when speaking of the number of
years which determines the purchase price, i.e. making the purchaser the principal figure.
When the Torah speaks of the number of harvests, however, it switches and describes the
transaction as a sale, i.e. ‫הוא מוכר לך‬, "he sells to you?"

We have the following Mishnah in Massechet Arachin folio 29: "When someone sells a field
in the Jubilee year he is not allowed to redeem it until at least 2 years have elapsed seeing that
the Torah stipulates that the sale has to be in effect for "a number of harvests," i.e. not less
than two harvests. If one of those two years happens to be a year of drought so that no harvest
is brought in, or it was the shemittah year (when the harvest is public property), such a year
does not form part of the two years we have just mentioned. Rabbi Eliezer says that if the
seller sold the field immediately before New Year's day while it had not yet been harvested
the buyer may enjoy 3 harvests before the seller can redeem the field." Thus far the Mishnah.
When the Talmud elaborates on this, it is pointed out that the Mishnah did not say that
redemption of the field in less than two years would be legally ineffective, but said only that
the "seller is not allowed to redeem it." This means that there is both a negative and a positive
commandment, the positive commandment being that one must allow the purchaser to enjoy
the field for at least two harvests. The wording of the Torah applies the positive
commandment also to the purchaser, not merely to the seller having to allow the purchaser to
enjoy possession for a minimum of two harvests ; this is based on the word ‫" תקנה‬you shall
purchase." We also find a Baraitha in that connection which states as follows: "if the
purchaser enjoyed only one harvest prior to the Jubilee year one allows him to enjoy the
harvest of an additional year after the Jubilee year." As a result of the foregoing we have four
separate ‫הלכות‬, rulings, on the subject which are based on our verse. 1) It is a commandment
applicable to both seller and buyer that the sale be valid for no less than two years as stated in
the Torah. 2) If there were three harvests within the space of two years they all belong to the
purchaser. 3) If there was a year of drought so that there was no harvest, the purchaser is
entitled to another year. 4) If the Jubilee year occurs during one of the two years the purchaser
contracted for, this year is considered as null and void and the purchaser continues in
possession for another year. Maimonides rules in accordance with what we have just stated in
chapter 11 of his treatise Shemittah Veyovel.

Keeping the above in mind the wording of the Torah can be fully appreciated. The words
‫ במספר שנים אחר היובל‬mean "the number of years that have to be completed in the event the
Jubilee year does not require the present owner of the field to relinquish it." The Torah then
changed its wording from buyer to seller in order to make the law apply to the purchaser as
well. Both seller and buyer are responsible for the sale not to remain effective for less than the
time legislated by the Torah. The Torah mentions both the number of years and the number of
harvests (pl) in order to allow for the eventuality of a drought or the Jubilee year which would
result in the number of harvests being less than the number of years contracted for.

We need to understand the reason why G'd does not permit the buyer to return the field he
purchased to the seller before two (harvest) years have passed. Since when is it forbidden for
a person to waive financial claims in favour of someone else? The answer to this peculiar
piece of legislation must be sought in the Torah's looking askance at anyone who sells land
which is his heritage in the Holy Land. Torat Kohanim on verse 25: "if your brother becomes
poor and sells part of his ancestral heritage, etc." explains that a person is not permitted to sell
his field and to use the proceeds to invest in livestock or chattels. They base this on the fact
that the Torah described permission to sell as due only to poverty, i.e. ‫כי ימוך‬. The Torah
hopes to dissuade a potential seller of his ancestral property from selling if he is aware that he
will not be able to redeem it for at least two years.

Another reason may be connected to a ruling by Maimonides in chapter 11 of Hilchot

Shemittah Veyovel that if someone sold his field for a period of 60 years such a field does not
revert to the seller in the Jubilee year. The only purchases which are reversed in the Jubilee
year are lands sold without a specific time frame, or a piece of property sold "forever." The
author of Kesseph Mishneh does not quote the origin for Maimonides' ruling. Perhaps
Maimonides derived it from a nuance in our text here. When the Torah writes ‫במספר שנים אחר‬
‫ היובל‬the meaning may be that if the seller mentions a specific number of years that the sale is
to be in force, be it 40 years or 60 years, ‫ימכר לך‬, "he may go ahead and sell it to you." -The
additional words ‫ ימכר לך‬mean that the sale is effective for the number of years contracted. In
such a situation the Jubilee year does not override the agreement reached between buyer and
seller. The words ‫ במספר שני תבואות‬explain why such a sale can remain effective beyond the
Jubilee year, i.e. seeing that the seller sold a number of harvests he did not contravene Torah
law not to sell soil. The Torah's principal concern is that a Jew must not sell the land which is
his heritage in the land of Israel.

25:17

‫ולא תונו איש את עמיתו‬, "And you shall not take advantage of one another." Baba Metzia 58
explains that our verse discusses ‫אונאת דברים‬, "verbal wrongs." The plain meaning of the verse
is that seeing the Torah had already issued a similarly phrased commandment in verse 14, and
we had explained that commandment as applicable when overcharging for chattels, we could
have thought that overcharging for land was permitted. The Torah therefore had to repeat this
commandment in connection with land sales so that the reader would not err and assume it is
permitted to overcharge on land. The verse therefore concludes with the exhortation: "you
shall fear your G'd," telling us that although the normal legislation against overcharging does
not have a legal effect when the sale of real estate is involved, this is so only in connection
with land sales in the rest of the world and to members of society at large (Gentiles). The
prohibition to overcharge is in effect, however. The reason there are no legal repercussions
when someone overcharges for the land he sells is that G'd personally will exact the
appropriate penalty from the guilty party; this is why after the words: "you shall fear your
G'd" the Torah adds the words: "for I am the Lord your G'd." G'd reminds us that He Himself
will judge us in this respect and that we must not assume that it is permissible to overcharge
when selling real estate. There are many instances of the Torah forbidding something without
making such prohibitions a matter punishable by our legal system. You may do well to read
what I have written on Exodus 21,12 in this connection. In our specific case, a court might
find it difficult to determine precisely when the seller has violated the rule that he must not
overcharge, seeing a purchaser may have been willing to pay more than the market price. (the
same applies if the buyer bought the property for less than the market price, exploiting the
economic weakness of the seller). G'd alone knows where to draw the line between what a
buyer is truly willing to pay and what he feels he is forced to pay. This is why G'd Himself
will administer any penalty due to either of the parties involved.

I have already stated earlier that the principle of a sale being declared an "erroneous
transaction" and the court reversing it applies also to land sales. Maimonides also writes in
that vein in chapter 15 of his treatise Hilchot Mechirah. The principle is based on the
transaction having a blemish of which the buyer was unaware at the time he concluded the
purchase. In such cases the buyer is at liberty to return the land even if a number of years have
passed since the purchase was concluded. Our explanation is based on the wording of ‫אל תונו‬
the Torah uses here. The expression ‫ אונאת דברים‬covers every deception caused by words
which misrepresent true facts. Lying to a person is a form of "wronging" him and includes
overcharging for land, i.e. misrepresenting its true value.

25:19

‫ונתנה הארץ פריה‬, "And the earth shall yield her fruit, etc." The meaning of "her fruit" is
that which corresponds to the potential it has been endowed with. When we observe the earth
producing fruit this does not prove that the amount of fruit we observe the earth produce is
equivalent to the amount the earth is capable of producing. We find in Ketuvot 112 that a
certain sage was angry at the earth and decreed that it be prevented from yielding its fruit. As
a result of this curse the earth produced far less than previously. If someone had not seen the
amount of fruit that piece of earth produced before the sage cursed it, he would have thought
that the amount it produced subsequently was the maximum it was capable of producing.

‫ואכלתם לשבע‬, "and you will eat to your satisfaction, etc." Perhaps the Torah had to
emphasise this as we could have thought that if the earth were to produce fruit according to its
full potential the excess fat of the produce would be so filling that one could not eat one's fill,
i.e. ‫לשבע‬. The Torah therefore reassures us that we will be able to enjoy such fruit to the full.

‫וישבתם לבטח עליה‬. "and you will dwell on it in safety." Although the Torah had already
written in verse 18 that we would dwell in the land in safety as a result of performing G'd's
comandments, the Torah repeats this promise to assure us that the excellence of the land's
produce will not attract raiders bent on stealing our harvests. This verse contains G'd's
promise that neighbouring countries would not attack us out of greed for our excellent land.

25:20

‫וכי תאמרו מה נאכל בשנה השביעית‬, "When you will say: 'what shall we eat in the seventh
year?'" The plain meaning of the verse is as follows: "When you will say (in the seventh
year) 'what shall we eat?'" The question posed by the Torah as being asked by the Israelites in
this verse could be read in one of two different ways 1) the Torah reveals a motive for the
Israelites' reluctance to observe the commandment not to seed the land during the seventh
year, i.e. "if we do not seed what shall we eat?" 2) The question centers on the result of
observing the commandment not to seed in the seventh year. The Israelites will ask that
seeing they have observed G'd's directives "what shall we eat?" In order to make sure we
understand the question as the second alternative we mentioned, the Torah adds ‫הן לא נזרע‬,
"behold we may not seed?" The question is one posed by the son to the father who wants to
know where his sustenance is to come from seeing it is not available by natural means. The
Torah answers that in that case, i.e. that you have fulfilled G'd's command, He will command
the earth to provide a more than usually bountiful harvest in the sixth year so that you will not
experience any shortfall. This blessing will occur only if your question was not intended to
excuse your failure to observe My command. If you were asking to excuse your non-
observance, the promise of a bountiful harvest in the sixth year will not materialise.

25:21

‫וצויתי את ברכתי‬, "And I shall command My blessing, etc." The blessing referred to in this
verse does not pertain to the growth of the crop; that blessing has already been mentioned
when the Torah spoke of the earth giving its full yield. The blessing the Torah speaks of here
is in the nature of what we read in Kings I 17 and Kings II chapter 4 where the prophet made
the little bit of oil of the respective petitioners stretch miraculously. This is alluded to in the
words of our verse that ‫ועשת את התבואה‬, i.e. that the existing crop will be made to last for three
years. My comments on Genesis 33,9-11 are relevant to this verse.

‫לשלש השנים‬, for the three years. The meaning of the verse is that the blessing will be in
effect during the sixth, the seventh and eighth year. Statistically speaking the period of three
years the Torah speaks of commences in the month of Sivan during the sixth year, i.e. the
month most of the grain is harvested, and continues till the month of Sivan in the ninth year.
The Torah had to write the word ‫ לשלש השנים‬so we would not think that part of a year is
considered a whole year [as when we count the years a king reigned. Ed.]

25:22

‫וזרעתם את השנה השמינית‬, "And you will seed the eighth year, etc." The Torah had to spell
this out on account of having written that the harvest of the sixth year would last for three
years. We might have thought that if the harvest of the sixth year lasts into the ninth year why
sow in the eighth year? Surely G'd would not perform an unnecessary miracle! The Torah
provides the reason by writing that the people were to enjoy the harvest brought in during the
sixth year until the harvest of what was planted in the eighth year was at hand. The lesson of
the verse is that a harvest which is three years old is superior to grain from the new harvest.
(Baba Batra 91 confirms this).

25:25

‫כי ימוך אחיך ומכר מאחוזתו‬, "If your brother becomes poor and has to sell part of his
heritage, etc." This paragraph contains cardinal moral-ethical lessons to mankind. Kohelet
10,18 alludes to this when he says: "through slothfulness the ceiling sags." Our sages in
Taanit 7 comment on this "you have made "poor" the One of Whom it is said (Psalms 104,3)
"‫" "המקרה במים עליותיו‬Who sets the rafters of His lofts in the waters;" When people who dwell
in the lower parts of the universe stray from the correct path they cause the beneficial
outpourigs from the upper part of the universe to cease. They thereby endanger the continuous
presence of sanctity on earth. In the final analysis the fate of the universe is determined by the
conduct of the creatures who inhabit earth, i.e. "the lower world."
When the Torah says: ‫" ומכר מאחוזתו‬and he sells part of his heritage," this is a reference to the
‫משכן‬, the Holy Tabernacle, which is G'd's heritage. The Torah warns us that our sins may
result in G'd "selling off" His heritage, i.e. our enemies appropriating our (G'd's) Sanctuary.
We find an allusion to this concept in Psalms 79,1 where Assaph describes the Gentiles as
having entered G'd's domain. Midrash Tehillim comments on this verse that the redemption of
G'd's Sanctuary is in the hands of the righteous who endeavour to be close to G'd. G'd has
already told us this in Leviticus 10,3 when He said ‫בקרובי אקדש‬, "I will be sanctified by those
near Me." "They, the righteous, have to redeem what I had to sell." G'd is perceived as calling
on the righteous in their capacity as ‫אחי ורעי‬, "My brothers and My friends" (compare Psalms
122,8). Redemption will occur when the righteous succeed in awakening the hearts of their
contemporaries by convincing them that it is really not in their best interest to spend their time
exiled from the table of their Father in Heaven. The righteous have to convince the average
Jew that what he considers success in his world is illusory if bought at the expense of
forfeiting his respective eternity in a better world. In the future all Torah scholars who have
failed in their efforts to convince their peers to adopt a Torah-true lifetsyle, etc. will have to
render an account before the highest tribunal. G'd will hold those Torah scholars responsible
for the continued disgrace suffered by the Holy Temple.

25:26

‫ואיש כי לא יהיה לו גואל‬, "And if a man has no redeemer, etc." According to Sanhedrin 93
the Torah occasionally uses the word ‫ איש‬as a simile for G'd, such as in Exodus 15,3 ‫ה׳ איש‬
‫מלחמה‬. The Torah's message in this verse is that in the event no Jewish leader is at hand to
arouse the people to return to G'd as penitents, this is no reason to abandon hope altogether.
Rather, ‫והשיגה ידו ומצא כדי גאולתו‬, the Jewish people will achieve their redemption by
alternative means. Sanhedrin 98 describes both afflictions and national exile as means to
bring about redemption. The expression ‫ והשיגה ידו‬may be understood as similar to Deut. 2,15:
‫יד ה׳ היתה בם‬, "the hand of G'd was against them," a reference to G'd exacting retribution
through exiling a nation under harsh conditions. Such an exile will eventually lead to
redemption of the Holy Temple.

25:27

‫וחשב את שני ממכרו‬, "let him count the number of years of his sale," etc." The sale occurred
due to our sins as mentioned by Isaiah 50,1: "here you have been sold due to your sins," and
the sin is equivalent to a debt to be paid off. When the time comes to tear up the I.O.U. a
careful accounting is made of any remaining indebtedness before the promissory note is torn
up. The Torah speaks about the remaining years the Temple has been in foreign hands. The
time it is redeemed depends on the quantity and severity of the collective sins of the people of
Israel. We are told in Yuma 86 that if a person actually enjoyed the sins he committed, he has
to flagellate himself in a measure which corresponds to the amount of pleasure he had when
committing the sins he is guilty of. This is part of the rehabilitation of the sinner. In this
manner he will repay his debt. G'd will deal with us in this manner at the time the redemption
will be close at hand. This is also what the sages had in mind in Sanhedrin 98 when they refer
to the ‫ חבלי משיח‬the birth-pangs to be endured as part of the coming of the Messiah. After that,
‫ושב לאחוזתו‬, G'd will return to His heritage. The word ‫ ושב‬also refers to Israel. We have a
parallel in Deut. 30,3 ‫" ושב ה׳ את שבותך‬and G'd will return with your captive ones;" we would
have expected the Torah to speak about ‫ והשיב‬i.e. "He will bring back" instead of "He will
come back" (compare Megillah 29).
25:28

‫ואם לא מצאו ידו די השיב‬, "But if he does not have sufficient means to restore it to himself,
etc." If G'd observes that the people do not possess the strength to endure all the suffering that
is their lot, and the debt they owe is still great, ‫והיה ממכרו עד שנת היובל‬, "then its sale will
extend (only) to the Jubilee year, etc." Here the Torah refers to G'd's timetable, i.e. the
ultimate date for the eventual redemption. At that time, ‫ויצא ביובל ושב לאחוזתו‬, He will come
out in the Jubilee year and return to His heritage (rebuild the Temple). Exile will come to an
end even if the Israelites will be (G'd forbid) absolute sinners.

25:29

‫ואיש כי ימכר בית מושב‬, "And if a man sells a house which is (his) residence, etc." After the
Torah has described how G'd "sold" the Temple, the Torah now explains how it could happen
that G'd would "sell" His heritage, the Holy Temple. This is why the paragraph starts with the
word ‫ואיש‬, so that we understand that the word refers to G'd, just as it had in the previous
paragraph. The extraneous word ‫ מושב‬refers to the house in which G'd has His residence, the
Holy Temple; the expression ‫ עיר חומה‬refers to Jerusalem, the "walled city" which is described
by David in Psalms 125 ,2 as "the city ringed by mountains, (i.e. like wall)." The Torah
continues by explaining that these very "walls" are why the city may be be redeemed after as
little as a year already. The reason is similar to what has been revealed to us by Midrash
Tehillim on Psalms 79,1. We were told there that when G'd vented His anger on the stones
and timber of the city allowing it to be destroyed, this was in lieu of venting all His anger on
the people inside the city. Had G'd not vented His anger on stone and wood, not a single Jew
would have survived that experience. If Israel had been wiped out, there would never again
have been either a Holy Temple or a city of Jerusalem.

25:35

‫וכי ימוך אחיך ומטה ידו‬, "If your brother becomes poor and his means fail while he is with
you, etc." This paragraph tries to awaken us to the reason why the spirit of G'd "our Brother"
who used to dwell in our midst has become so infirm. When the Torah describes "our Brother
becoming poor," it refers to the "spirit of life within us; the reason it seems to weaken is that it
observed that we failed to study Torah and practice the commandments. There is no greater
kind of poverty than the dearth of merits due to Torah study and the performance of kind
deeds towards one's fellow man. As a result, the individual Israelite's light fails. The word ‫עמך‬
emphasises that the failure is due to its having concentrated on you. Had it not been for G'd
channelling His light through you (the Jewish people), His light would have permeated the
whole universe from one end to the other. Under the changed conditions, G'd wants to return
the ‫ רוח‬light, to His celestial domains as described in Kohelet 12,7: "and the spirit returns to
the Lord who had provided it." Shabbat 152 comments on this that G'd demands that the spirit
be returned to Him in mint condition, i.e. ‫" שנתנה לך‬in the condition He gave it to you." The
Torah goes on ‫" והחזקת בו‬you are to uphold him;" this means that you are to assist such a Jew
who has strayed from the true path to do ‫ תשובה‬to help him rehabilitate himself. There is no
other means which can ensure that the vital ‫ רוח‬be sustained within us which is comparable to
the power of repentance.

‫גר ותושב וחי עמך‬, "a stranger or a resident he shall live with you." According to a mystical
text ‫ קב הישר‬chapter 32 there are souls G'd places in a body (person) in accordance with the
principle we call ‫סוד העבור‬, so that they can participate in the performance of a specific
commandment and that person will acquire the merit which results from performance of that
commandment. Other souls are provided for man for no specific task but as an opportunity
afforded to the body (person) within whom the soul dwells to rehabilitate that personality. The
words ‫ גר ותושב‬refer to these two kinds of souls. The former is called ‫גר‬, the latter is called
‫תושב‬. The Torah says: ‫" וחי עמך‬it shall live within you" concerning either kind of soul, seeing a
person does not know which kind of soul he has been endowed with he is well advised to
assume that it is his task to rehabilitate himself by doing ‫ תשובה‬so that he would not lose the
light G'd has granted him and as a result of which He resides within him. ‫אל תקח מאתו נשך‬
‫ותרבית‬, "Do not take an advance from him or accrued Interest;" I will explain presently
what is meant by these words. When the verse goes on ‫ויראת מאלוקך‬, "you shall fear your G'd,"
this refers to the light which G'd has endowed you with by granting you a pure soul which you
are under an obligation to return in mint condition. The Torah demands further ‫וחי אחיך עמך‬,
that when the time comes to return your soul to G'd it should return equipped with additional
vitality acquired through the fact that you lived a life dedicated to the service of G'd. While it
is true that Kohelet only spoke about returning the ‫ רוח‬in the condition that you received it,
this was a minimal demand. Alternatively, you may refer to what I explained in my book ‫חפץ‬
‫ השם‬on Shabbat 152, that the words "as He has has given to you," mean that the soul by
definition is a spiritual force which is apt to add vitality and spiritual light to the body it
inhabits.

25:37

‫את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך‬, "You shall not give him your money upon interest;" Here the
Torah explains what the words ‫ נשך ומרבית‬are all about; they darken the divine light G'd
provides. The word ‫ את כספך‬refers to the material things man yearns for in this world
believing them to be of real value though their value is totally illusory. ‫ לא תתן לו בנשך‬When
man fulfils his animalistic instincts and thereby tries to gratify his spiritual needs his spirit is
actually "bitten," ‫ נשוך‬and the poison of sin is absorbed by that person's ‫רוח‬. The Torah
continues: ‫ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך‬, "and you must not give him your food in return for increase."
The Torah means that even your food, i.e. something that it is certainly permissible for you to
eat you must not consume to excess, i.e. ‫מרבית‬. When a person follows the needs of his palate
he gradually increases his appetite for more food than is needed to sustain him. This is turn
also leads to the divine light G'd has granted us by means of our pure soul being gradually
more and more "blacked out." The stronger the physical in man the weaker his spiritual
capacity. Encouraging the body to grow stronger through gratifying its appetites therefore is
sinful. This is why Proverbs 13,25 teaches us that "the righteous eats onIy to satisfy the needs
of his life-force, ‫נפש‬." Solomon says this to remind us that it is not our palate which should
dictate the quantity or quality of our food-intake. When the Torah continues ‫( אני השם‬verse
38), this means that although G'd has taken us out of Egypt in order to give us the land of
Canaan, the purpose was not in order for the Jewish people to stuff themselves on the good
fruit of the land but in order for Him to be our G'd, something that requires the land of Israel.
Our sages in Torat Kohanim say that anyone who merely lives in the land of Israel is as if he
had accepted for himself G'd's sovereignty.

25:39

‫וכי ימוך אחיך‬, "And if your brother becomes poor, etc." This paragraph is an allusion to
something we find in the Tikkuney HaZohar chapter 10 that G'd ordered the spiritual
representative of Edom (Samael) in the celestial spheres not do deal cruelly with Israel. When
the Torah speaks of the Jewish people becoming poor this is a reference to the exile under the
Romans. The reason the Torah speaks of "your brother" is the same as the prophet Maleachi
reminding the Jewish people in G'd's name (Maleachi 1,2) that Esau was Jacob's brother but
that nonetheless G'd loved Jacob. The word ‫עמך‬, "with you," is a reminder that the
impoverishment of Israel is due to its proximity to Esau/Edom and the fact that it started to
copy the evil ways of Edom. The words ‫ונמכר לך‬, "and he sold himself to you," may be
understood as similar to Isaiah 52,3 in which the Jewish people are described as having sold
themselves in return for ‫חנם‬, "nought". According to the Zohar volume 2 page 128, Samael is
equated with the domain of ‫חנם‬, nought, seeing the prophet speaks of the exile under Roman
(Edom) domination. (compare Psalms 137,7 where the Jewish people ask G'd to repay Edom
for the cruel treatment they dished out to the people of Israel)

‫ לא תעבוד בו עבודת עבד‬is G'd's command to Edom the host country not to make the Jewish
people perform slave labour. (compare Jeremiah 2,14 who asks plaintively: "is Israel then a
slave?") but to treat them as one treats a hired hand, ‫כשכיר כתושב יהיה לך‬, "it shall be like a
hired hand or a resident for you." The reason the Torah uses two alternatives here is that Israel
may be divided into two categories. 1) The multitude; 2) the elite, as per Samuel II 23,8 where
this elite is described as "sitting in the council of the wise." You find on occasion that
Israelites rose to the rank of tax collectors even while in exile; these tax collectors may have
been the elite in terms of secular rank but they do not represent Israel's spiritual elite. Israel's
spiritual elite are characterised by Moses in Deut. 33,3, as ‫והם תכו לרגליך ישא מדברותיך‬, "but
they followed in Your footsteps, accepted Your pronouncements." Concerning this verse our
sages in Baba Batra 8 quote Ezra 7,24 that it was forbidden by royal decree to impose any
kind of taxes on the Torah scholars (literally the priests and the Levites) even in exile (under
Artaxerxes). When the Torah speaks of the Edomites who have exiled us treating us like hired
hands, ‫שכיר‬, this refers to the common people; the term ‫תושב‬, however, refers to the spiritual
elite of the Jewish people in exile. They are not to be burdened with taxes and other
governmental demands.

The Torah continues ‫עד שנת היובל יעבוד עמך‬, "until the Jubilee year he will serve with
you;" in this instance the Jubilee year is a reference to the most remote date possible for the
redemption. G'd advises Edom that in the end the Jewish people will go free from its exile, i.e.
‫ויצא מעמך‬. The reference to ‫ ובניו‬is to the "sparks" which have become isolated and which are
the mystical dimension of the whole concept of the value of exile. This is the mystical aspect
of Kohelet 8,9: "there is a time when one man rules over another to his detriment." [These
holy souls had been scattered throughout the nations as a result of Adam's sin and are to be
rescued and reunited with the pool of holy souls through their coming into contact with the
Jewish people. The author explained this concept on several occasions. Ed.]

You may well ask what would have happened to all these souls if Israel had not sinned and as
a result had been scattered throughout the world in exile? Know that if Israel had not sinned
they would have possessed the spiritual power to attract these lost souls from wherever they
were instead of having to be physically near them in order to exert some influence on them. It
was the Israelites' sin which weakened their spiritual power; these sins so weakened Israel's
spiritual power to act as a magnet for these souls that even while in exile and physically close
to them they do not succeed in all instances to rescue the souls in question.

The Torah continues: ‫ושב אל משפחתו‬, "and HE will return to his family;" when the redeemer
arrives G'd will plant His light amongst us so that He will again take up residence amongst
His family, the people of Israel. At such a time the dead will arise and each one will return to
‫אחוזת אבותיו‬, "the heritage of his fathers," the Holy Temple established by G'd's hands Himself.
‫לא תרדה בו בפרך‬, "Do not rule over it with oppression." Samael will be guilty of the death
penalty in the future because he ignored the instructions in this verse as we know from
Sukkah 52.

25:55

‫כי לי בני ישראל עבדים‬, "For the children of Israel are My servants, etc." Why did the Torah
write once more ‫עבדי הם‬, "they are My servants?" Perhaps the point G'd makes here is that
"they are My servants" as they are of sacred origin, their souls and their bodies are
intrinsically holy independent of the Exodus from Egypt. The factor which obligates the
Israelites to conduct themselves in a manner befitting holy creatures is "that I took them out of
the land of Egypt." Ever since, G'd says, they themselves realise that they are My servants.

‫אני ה׳ אלוקיכם‬, "I am the Lord your G'd." Why did the verse commence in the third person,
i.e. G'd speaking about the Israelites, whereas it concludes with direct speech, i.e. "I am the
Lord your G'd?" Perhaps we have to look for the reason in the laws governing the sale and
purchase of a slave. We have the law that if someone acquires a Jewish servant he has to free
him in the Jubilee year. G'd therefore had to state that the Jew remains His servant also in the
Jubilee year and beyond, i.e. ‫עבדי הם‬. The purchaser of the Jewish servant may argue that this
fact is justification for a Jew not being allowed to sell himself into permanent servitude, but
this fact does not impose an obligation on the purchaser. If the Jew had sold himself to a
resident stranger, ‫גר תושב‬, that resident stranger would argue that he had no oligation to
release the servant merely because of the Jubilee year. G'd therefore states categorically: "I
am the Lord your G'd," i.e. I address you the purchaser the very person whom the Torah
addressed at the beginning of this paragraph in verse 39 and subsequently in verse 44 when it
spoke about ‫ונמכר לך‬, "and he was sold to you." The Torah wanted to be sure the owner
understood that he was expected to comply with the entire legislation recorded here.

26:2

‫את שבתתי תשמורו‬, "Observe My Sabbaths!" Why did the Torah again repeat the
commandment to observe the Sabbath? I believe the Torah wanted to write the commandment
of Sabbath-observance next to the commandment preceding it not to make anything
resembling idolatrous symbols. This is the Torah's way of reminding us that just as idolatry or
rather abstaining from it is equivalent to observing the entire Torah, so Sabbath-observance is
also equivalent to observance of the whole Torah. [This does not absolve a person from the
observance of any other commandment; it simply means that one demonstrates one's
commitment to Torah by either Sabbath-observance or abstaining from anything idolatrous.
Ed.]

In addition to that the fact that the ‫ שמיטות‬are also called "Sabbaths" (compare 28,2) and that
commandment is tied to reverence for the Holy Temple, we are reminded of the statement that
the Holy Temple was destroyed due to the failure to observe the ‫ שמיטה‬laws (compare 26,34).

The Torah linked Sabbath-observance to reverence for the Holy Temple to tell us not to
become guilty of the destruction of the Temple due to failure to observe the Sabbath. We have
pointed out previously that when G'd pours out His anger over stones and wood, this is one
way of G'd's restraining His anger at human beings.

‫חסלת פרשת בהר סיני‬

26:3

‫אם בחקותי תלכו‬, "If you walk in My statutes, etc." In Torat Kohanim they explain this as
follows: "if the Torah had spoken only about ‫בחוקותי‬, I would have assumed that what was
meant were the ‫מצות‬. Now that the Torah added the words ‫ואת מצותי‬, the word ‫ בחקותי‬cannot
apply to the ‫ מצות‬seeing the Torah already wrote about them. The additional word ‫בחקותי‬
therefore teaches us that that one has to toil in order to get Torah knowledge." The reason the
Torah refers to toiling over Torah by using the expression ‫ חקה‬is because there is a
commandment to study matters again and again even if one had already studied them several
times and they have been well absorbed. G'd wants us to study Torah out of a fondness for it
and this is why He formulated a statute to that effect. We find that our sages in Kohelet
Rabbah 3 state that G'd decreed that we will forget part of what we learned in order that we
should sit down and learn it repeatedly.

The reason the word ‫חקותי‬, "My statutes," is in the plural is an allusion to the two aspects of
Torah, i.e. the oral as well as the written Torah. We have a tradition not to spell the word ‫חקתי‬
with the letter ‫ ו‬between the ‫ ק‬and the ‫( ת‬which would normally indicate that the word is in the
plural) in order to emphasise the essential unity of the oral and the written Torah. Another
allusion in the plural ending of the word ‫ בחקתי‬is to the instruction G'd gave Joshua in Joshua
1,8 to study (review) Torah by day and by night. We must allocate time to Torah study both
by day and by night. This makes Torah-study a dual activity. According to the traditional
spelling the study occurs on the same day (date) (i.e. the day following the night) so that
essentially we study Torah twice daily. Moreover, the plural hints at the fact that in order to
observe G'd's commandments two elements are essential. One has to study Torah and teach it
to others as the Torah says in Deut. 11,19: "teach them (the words of Torah) to your children,
etc." The word ‫ בחקתי‬therefore refers to both of these activities forming part of walking in
G'd's statutes. Moreover, there is the aspect of performing positive commandments and not
violating negative commandments. These latter two activities are covered by the words ‫את‬
‫מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם‬.

The reason the Torah uses the term ‫הליכה‬, walking, when speaking about the ‫ חקים‬is to remind
us that one needs to be occupied with matters of Torah even when engaged in walking on
one's way, much as when the Torah said in Deut. 6,7 ‫" ובלכתך בדרך‬and when you walk on the
way."

A second reason why the Torah uses the expression of "walking" in G'd's statutes is based on
an interpretation of Vayikra Rabbah 35,1 of the verse in Psalms 119,59: "I have considered
my ways and have turned back to Your decrees." According to the Midrash David had
considered daily to do "his own thing" but had found that invariably his feet brought him to
the Torah academy or the House of prayer. The lesson is that when one applies oneself to
Torah and its precepts diligently one's very organs will automatically help one to head in the
spiritually correct direction. You may translate the line: "if according to My statutes, you will
find yourselves walking in the right direction."

A third meaning of the simile "you will walk" is based on the Zohar volume 3 page 202 that
Torah can be studied on four different levels, the ‫ דרוש‬,‫ רמז‬,‫פשט‬, and ‫סוד‬. These four methods
between them account for what our sages call the 70 facets of the Torah. Each of these 70
facets is perceived as being a "path" one walks in the study of G'd's statutes. The lesson is that
the approach to Torah study should be along a variety of paths.
A fourth meaning of the word ‫ תלכו‬is based on Proverbs 3,6: ‫בכל דרכיך דעהו‬, "In all your ways
acknowledge Him." Maimonides writes in chapter 3 of his treatise Hilchot Deyot that "a
person should set his mind on having a perfect body in order to possess the physical strength
to devote himself to Torah study for it is impossible to properly evaluate and understand
Torah and G'd's objectives when one suffers from hunger, thirst or physical pain. When one
follows the path I suggest regularly, one is a servant of the Lord." Thus far Maimonides. This
is the meaning of our verse "if you walk in the path of My statutes," i.e. if your walking is
designed to comprehend My statutes. All your physical activities should be guided by the
desire to better observe My commandments.

A fifth reason for the Torah's choice of the word ‫ תלכו‬may be understood in light of
Sanhedrin 34 that people studying the Torah have been given permission to offer their
respective commentaries and to explore a variety of paths in doing so. [The simile used by the
Talmud is that when one beats with a hammer on an anvil the sparks fly in all directions. Ed.]
An experienced scholar will elicit new insights through studying the text repeatedly in
accordance with his mental capacity. The words ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אותם‬are perceived as
the framework for investigative Torah exploration. As long as the purpose of Torah study is to
lead to performance of G'd's commandments, the Torah encourages the pursuit of diverse
paths of study. Under no circumstances must the pursuit of novel ways of Biblical exegesis
result in what our sages call ‫מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה‬, "revelation of aspects of the Torah
which conflict with traditional rulings." That which has always been known as impure must
not be declared pure nor vice versa. If Torah study results in such abnormal results it is clear
that the approach of the scholar was defective, flawed. This is why we are told in Avot 3,11
that anyone who reveals that he has reached a result in his Torah study which upsets
traditional ‫ הלכות‬will not enjoy a share in the life after death.

A sixth reason why the Torah used the word ‫ תלכו‬may be understood in light of Avot 2,6 that
an unlearned man cannot truly be pious. This is interpreted to mean that it is forbidden for
such a man to practice the lifestyle reserved for the truly pious who impose a variety of
restrictive practices upon themselves. The reason is that such a person while thinking that he
imposes a restriction upon himself which is pleasing in the eyes of G'd actually contravenes
Torah law through his ignorance of what the rules our ‫ הלכות‬are based on. An example of
ignorance leading the most well meaning person astray is that the ignorant person knows that
it is a commandment to sleep with one's wife on the night following her ritual immersion. He
may therefore do so on the night of the Day of Atonement when this is forbidden. For this and
simliar reasons the sages forbade the ‫ עם הארץ‬to practice what is called ‫ לפנים משורת הדין‬so that
by adhering to the law i.e. ‫ בחקתי תלכו‬walking in My statutes he will perform the ‫מצות‬
properly.

A seventh reason for the Torah's use of the word ‫ תלכו‬may be related to the statement of our
sages in Avot 4 to exile oneself to a place where Torah is to be found. One needs to beat a
path to Torah centers in order to study there, hence the Torah speaks of ‫תלכו‬, "you shall walk."
There is a story in Chagigah 5 about a certain Rabbi Idi who used to have to travel 3 months
in one direction to attend to his business and three months back home in order to spend a
single day in the house of his Rabbi. The Torah suggests here that even if one has the
opportunity to study at home it is better to to leave home in order to study and to fulfil the
commandment to "walk in My statutes."

As to the words ‫ואת מצותי תשמרו‬, these may be understood in light of a comment by our sages
in Shabbat 31: "Rabbi Yannai proclaimed: 'how sad if a person who does not own a courtyard
constructs an entrance-gate to such a non-existent courtyard.' He referred to people who do
not have reverence for G'd and yet study Torah. The important thing is to observe the
commandments. Unless studying Torah has as its objective performance of its precepts, such
study is of questionable value. When the Torah speaks of ‫ בחקותי תלכו‬it referred to study
whereas it admonishes us that this must be in order ‫את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אותם‬, 'to observe
and perform My commandments.'" We have a statement in Berachot 17 according to which if
someone studies for unwholesome reasons he would have been better off if he had never been
born. Tossaphot question this statement in light of the well known principle that it is
acceptable to do things for the wrong reason because this leads to one eventually doing the
right thing for the right reason. They answer that there are two ways of doing things for the
wrong reason. 1) To find a reason to criticise G'd's Torah; 2) to gain personal fame due to
one's Torah knowledge. If one studies Torah in order to criticise G'd and the Torah scholars it
is better if one had not been born at all; if, on the other hand, one had ulterior motives such as
wanting to be called Rabbi and the like, we may assume that eventually one will study Torah
for the right reasons without ulterior motives. The Torah here assures us that if one does not
pursue Torah study for the wrong reasons ‫תשמרו ועשיתם אותם‬, you will observe and perform
My commandments even when confronted with temptation, etc. The Torah you have studied
for the right reasons will protect you against the pitfalls and the temptation by Satan. Sotah 21
is on record that Torah protects and saves from the evil inclination; Avodah Zarah 17 tells of
Rabbi Chaninah and Rabbi Yonathan who were faced with the choice of either passing a
house of idol worship or a whorehouse. They debated which was the worse temptation and
decided to pass the house of ill-repute in order to merit the reward for resisting the temptation
to enter there. When they reached the house in question the harlots withdrew to the inside.
One Rabbi asked the other how they had merited to not even have to come face to face with
temptation. The colleague answered by quoting Proverbs 2,11: "Foresight will protect you,
understanding will preserve you." If one is on one's guard against temptation one will be
fortified against it. Rava concluded that the word ‫( מזמה‬which we translated as "foresight")
refers to matters of harlotry against which Torah study is an effective defence. The word
‫ ועשיתם‬is also understood by Kidushin 39 as follows: "When a person sits still, not committing
a sin, he receives the reward due for performing a commandment; they understood this to
mean that when a sin approaches him he will be saved from committing it; we learn from here
that though a person was only passive in abstaining from wrongdoing it is accounted for him
as an activity, i.e. ‫ועשיתם אותם‬.

It is true that in Pessachim 50 the Talmud interprets the difference between the expression:
"for your kindness extends to the Heavens" (Psalms 57,11) and Psalms 108,5 "for Your
kindness extends beyond the Heavens" to mean that the former refers to a person studying
Torah ‫שלא לשמה‬, but to gain honour for himself. The reason for this is not that G'd is so
delighted with this kind of Torah study but He is confident of the eventual impact Torah study
makes on the student, refining his character and changing his outlook in life. This kind of
Torah study does not possess the power to protect the person studying against the temptation
by the evil urge. This fact helps us answer the statement of Rabbi Yoseph that Torah protects
the student both at the time he is busy studying as well as at other times. The world asks that
if this statement is true how was it that the Torah study of Doeg and Achitophel did not
protect them against the evil urge in their time? According to our approach we can answer this
simply by assuming that their Torah study was not ‫ לשמה‬but that they had ulterior motives and
this is why the merit of their Torah study did not act as a shield against the ‫יצר הרע‬, the evil
urge.
An eighth reason why the Torah wrote the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse may have been illustrated
by the story we related earlier about Rabbi Chaninah and Rabbi Yonathan debating which
path to take (Avodah Zarah 17). The Rabbi who had suggested to take the path leading past
the house of idolatry did so because he did not worry about the evil urge to commit idolatry,
that evil urge having already been destroyed by G'd (compare Sanhedrin 64). The other Rabbi
who was prepared to walk by the house of ill-repute was aware of the existence of the
temptation but wanted to earn the merit for not succumbing to it. This Rabbi probably relied
on having learned Torah ‫ לשמה‬something which would protect him in such situations. He
interpreted the three words ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬, as a promise by G'd to be able to walk calmly into
any situation firm in the knowledge that he had studied G'd's Torah ‫לשמה‬, for the Torah's sake
and not for his own personal reasons. In fact he interpreted the words ‫ ועשיתם אותם‬as an
encouragement to face difficult situations rather than to avoid them in order to receive the
appropriate reward.

A ninth reason why the Torh wrote the word ‫ תלכו‬may become clear when we recall a
statement in Avot 6,3 that the Torah may be acquired in 48 different ways. This means that not
every person who wishes to can "acquire" Torah; there are only 48 different ways in which
Torah can be acquired. Our verse warns the potential Torah student that one of the
preconditions for acquiring Torah is that one observes G'd's commandments. All the details
listed in the Mishnah for successful Torah study are summed up in this one line.

The tenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬is the Torah's desire to communicate to us the exalted
nature of Torah study and preoccupation with Torah. It is an activity which cannot be
compared to the preoccupation with any other commandment. When a person is preoccupied
with the performance of any other commandment, he may or may not succeed as due to some
sin he may fail to observe it correctly. When a person studies Torah for the right reason he
need not worry that his purpose will be thwarted because of anything wrong he did in the past.
Rather, his righteousness will accompany him as we know from Sotah 21 that "a sin may
extinguish a ‫ מצוה‬one is in the process of performing; it will not, however, extinguish Torah.
This merit will accompany its student on the way to the Hereafter. See what I have written on
the subject on Leviticus 18,4: ‫ואת חקתי תשמרו ללכת בהם‬.

The eleventh reason why the Torah wrote the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is related to the Talmud's
(Shabbat 63) interpretation of the verse ‫אורך ימים בימינה‬, (Proverbs 3,16) "that the "right" side
of the Torah offers its student long life." It means that people who keep to the "right" of Torah
will enjoy life in the hereafter, whereas the ones keeping on Torah's "left" will enjoy their
reward only in this life. The same idea is expressed in our verse, i.e. "if your preoccupation is
with My statutes, it should not be for the sake of what Torah has to offer in this life, but ‫תלכו‬,
it should be for the sake of what a Torah student has to look forward to in the hereafter i.e. the
group of people who are called the "rightists."

A twelfth reason for the Torah's use of the word ‫ תלכו‬is connected to the admonition in Avot
3,9: "if a person abuses his acquired wisdom to neutralize his fear of committing a sin, he will
find that his wisdom does not endure." The reverse is true also, says the author of that
Mishnah. Our verse alludes to the same idea when the Torah writes that the governing
consideration in one's effort to acquire Torah wisdom must be to observe the commandments
which ensure that one does not commit a sin.

A thirteenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬is based on the first Mishnah in ‫ פאה‬that of all the
things for which the Torah did not set a minimum quantity in order for a person to be able to
claim that he had fulfilled that particular commandment the study of Torah is the prime
example. The word ‫ תלכו‬describes an activity without setting a specific objective to be
reached. As long as one is on the way, i.e. studies G'd's statutes, one has complied with the
requirement.

A fourteenth reason for the Torah's use of the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is linked to Leviticus
7,37 ‫זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאת‬. "This is the law for the burnt-offering, the gift-offering and
the sin-offering, etc." Our sages in Menachot 110 explained on this verse that if a person
studied the Torah portion dealing with a burnt-offering it is accounted for him as if he had
personally offered an animal as a burnt-offering. This is based on Hoseah 14,3: "let us pay
with our lips instead of with bulls." This is not the only instance in which Torah study
compensates for the performance of a specific commandment. Whenever a commandment is
not capable of fulfilment by a person (such as all the legislation involving the priesthood for
non-priests) study of the relevant portion in the Torah is accounted for the person studying it
as if he had personally fulfilled that commandment. Accordingly we understand ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬
followed by ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו‬to mean that "if you study the commandments which you can
only study, then you will be considered as having fulfilled My commandments." The word
‫ תשמרו‬means you are anxiously awaiting an opportunity to physically fulfil such
commandments. As a result -‫ועשיתם אותם‬, you will not only receive the reward for studying
the laws in question but for having fulfilled them physically.

A fifteenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬may be the reverse of the coin. A person should not use
his study of G'd's commandments as an excuse not to perform them physically. The words ‫ואת‬
‫מצותי תשמרו‬, refer to the negative commandments which you have to observe. The only
commandments one is relieved from observing as a result of Torah study are the ones which
are incapable of fulfilment either temporarily or permanently.

A sixteenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬may be connected to a statement in Berachot 14 that a
person must not set out on a journey until he had studied some words of Torah. [My text only
says that one must not do one's thing before one has prayed. Ed.] The Zohar volume 1 page
69 writes that if people engage in a journey together without exchanging words of Torah
between them they are endangering their lives. Accordingly we may understand the word in
our verse to mean: "if you study Torah, i.e. go in My statutes, you will travel safely seeing
that the merit of Torah study accompanies and protects a person."

A seventeenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬is based on Shabbat 63 where the Talmud speaks of
someone who had intended to perform a commandment but was prevented from doing so by
forces beyond his control. The fact that the Torah speaks in the future tense in our verse is
understood as an allusion to just such a situation. The Torah therefore assures such a person
that G'd will consider the good intention as actually having been executed. You will be
rewarded as if you had performed the commandment.

The eighteenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬is related to Sukkah 45 where the elite (people
experiencing some revelation of the ‫ )שכינה‬of the Jewish people are divided into three levels.
The lowest level is the group granted what is termed a "blurred vision." The next higher level
of the elite are the people who are granted a "clear vision." The highest level of the elite are
those who enjoy such communications without first having to obtain special permission from
G'd. I have explained Job 3,19 ‫קטון וגדול שם הוא ועבד חפשי מאדוניו‬, "both the small and the great
are there and the slave is free of his masters" in a similar sense. The "small" refers to the
person granted a blurred vision, the "great" to the the person granted a clear vision, and the
slave who is free of his masters refers to the person who does not need to ask permisssion in
order to receive a communication from G'd. The word ‫ קטון‬is an allusion to the "small
luminary," the moon in Genesis 1,16, whereas the word ‫ גדול‬is borrowed from the same verse
where it refers to the sun. I would not be sure what are the criteria by means of which a
human being achieves the great honour described in that verse. This is why the Torah here
defined the rules by saying ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬, to tell us that Torah study, performance of its
precepts, and the manner in which we do so is the key to achieving this level of
communication with G'd.

The nineteenth reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is related to Sanhedrin 102 where the
Talmud describes G'd asking Jerobam king of Israel, to repent so that both G'd, Jerobam, and
David could stroll together in Paradise. Kabbalists explain that the "strolling" the Talmud had
in mind is hyperbole for the most intimate and delightful communication. Hail to a human
being who is granted this kind of intimacy with the Divine. The way to achieve such a goal is
via ‫אם בחקת תלכו‬, walking in the paths of G'd's statutes, etc. Torah is the means enabling a
human being to penetrate areas closed to normal individuals.

The twentieth reason why the Torah saw fit to write ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬may be appreciated in
conjunction with Yalkut Shimoni item 831 on Psalms. We are told there that when G'd created
man He did not do so in order for man merely to remain stationary in this present world
forever and not to commit a sin. In fact, such an existence would in itself represent spiritual
decline and be sinful. It had always been G'd's intention for man to ascend to the celestial
regions just as did the prophet Elijah (Kings II 2,11). Due to the original sin, man has to have
his skin removed and his body remains behind in this world when his soul ascends to Heaven.
Our verse informs us that by means of intensive preoccupation with Torah he may overcome
the pain involved in separation of body and soul but to feel like a person who walks from one
place to another when that day arrives. In other words: ‫אם בחקתי‬, if you are deeply engrossed
in My statutes then you will merely walk from the physical domain to the celestial domain.
[The relevant passage in Psalms is chapter 82 verse 6. Ed.] The Zohar volume 2 page 174
states that the truly righteous do not feel the pain of dying and that this is what Solomon
alluded to when he said in Kohelet 5,11: "sweet is the sleep of the labourer." When someone
labours on behalf of G'd his sleep i.e. his death is sweet and he accepts it with joy. Elijah is
living proof that if one intensifies one's Torah study even one's body does not die.

The twenty-first reason for the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is related to a statement in Avot 4,22
that man had no control over his being born, nor does he have any control over when he may
die. The Rabbi meant that man does not die voluntarily even if he wants to die (at a certain
point in his life). Alternatively, if he expresses a wish to die he is not free to do so. We are
told in Niddah 36: "When Rav was about to die he told Rabbi Assi to instruct a certain Shilo
that he had changed his opinion about a certain ruling he had given. The latter refused to
believe this and told his wife to prepare his ‫תכריכין‬, the gown he was to be buried in, as he
wanted to die and confront Rav in Heaven concerning this halachic ruling. His wife complied
and he died, etc." We see from this incident that on occasion man is in control as to when he
wants to die. Our verse ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬teaches us what are the criteria which determine who is
of such stature that G'd honours his wish to die at a certain time even though it is not the time
at which G'd had originally intended for that person to die.

The twenty-second reason why the Torah wrote the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is to teach us
about the exceptional usefulness of profound Torah study. A person preoccupied with Torah
constantly pines for ascent to a higher world because he appreciates the value his personality
will derive from sitting in the celestial regions close to G'd. I have explained Psalms 49,16 in
that sense. The Psalmist says: "But G'd will redeem my life from the clutches of ‫שאול‬, Hades,
for He will take me. Selah." The author, one of Korach's sons, means that when a person is
certain that he will not be consigned to ‫ שאול‬but will enjoy ‫ גן עדן‬after he leaves this world, he
becomes filled with the desire to proceed to that sphere, i.e. ‫יקחני סלה‬. These words are a
prayer to G'd. You may compare Yalkut Shimoni in Parshat Massey item 787 that when
Aaron ascended Hor Hahor on the way to die he said to Moses that if he had known the
manner of his death beforehand he would have volunteered to die sooner. This is what is
alluded to in our verse ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬, "if you follow My statutes by toiling in your application
to Torah study, you will be willing to march, ‫תלכו‬, towards death."

The twenty-third allusion in the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכון‬is found in connection with a comment
of the Zohar volume 3 page 91 on Leviticus 22,27: "when an ox or sheep is born, etc." The
author points out that the essential difference between man and beast is that "once a beast
always a beast;" man, on the other hand, is able to refine himself into something far superior
to what he is at birth. Man's deeds are the key to his spiritual elevation. Man is endowed with
greater and greater potential in accordance with the merits he accumulates. The Torah here
provides the key as to how these merits may be earned. This is the meaning of ‫אם בחקתי חלכו‬,
study of and immersion in Torah enables one to progress, ‫תלכו‬.

A twenty-fourth approach to our verse is based on the Zohar's comment in volume 1 page
175 on Proverbs 6,22: "When you walk it will guide you." The paths by means of which you
will experience spiritual ascent when you leave this world normally lead to a region of
darkness and the shadow of death. These regions abound with rebuke by G'd. If, however, a
person leaves this life equipped with Torah, it will light the path for him as we know from
Psalms 119,105: "Your word is a lamp at my feet, a light for my path." The Torah's
recommendation is therefore ‫אם בחוקתי‬, if you are equipped with My statutes, you will walk,
you will proceed." If not, your fate is expressed by Proverbs 4,19: "the path of the wicked is
like darkness."

A twenty-fifth lesson to be derived from the word ‫ תלכו‬in our verse is that the Torah refers
here to a commandment known as ‫חקה‬, i.e. the commandment to wear phylacteries. In Exodus
13,10 the Torah specifically refers to this commandment as a ‫חקה‬, statute, when we read:
‫ושמרתם את החקה הזאת‬, "you shall observe this statute." Prior to that statement the Torah had
spoken (verse 9) about placing phylacteries on one's head and one's arm as a commemoration
of the Exodus and G'd's part in it. When the Torah describes performance of the
commandment with the word ‫תלכו‬, you must remember that in former days the average Jew
wore his phylacteries all day long, on his way to prayer, on his way to study, etc. In fact, we
are told in Sukkah 28 that Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai and Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi did not
use to walk a distance of eight feet without first putting on their phylacteries. This is what the
words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬are all about. When the Torah adds ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו‬this refers to the
regulations governing the wearing of phylacteries such as that one must have a clean body in
order to be permitted to wear ‫תפלין‬. Shabbat 49 makes a point of warning us against passing
gas while wearing phylacteries. One must not fail to be conscious of wearing phylacteries and
what this implies. The Torah adds: ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬the word otam being spelled attem "you." This
is a hint that by wearing phylacteries and fulfilling the regulations attached to that you will
refine yourselves so that G'd's Presence will come to rest upon you. This is what is meant by
Deut. 28,10: "and all the nations will observe that the name of G'd is proclaimed upon you."
A twenty-sixth allusion to be found in these words can be gleaned from Bereshit Rabbah
44,12 on Genesis 15,5: "please look at the sky." G'd meant that Abraham should look beyond
a universe governed by horoscopic influences. The words ‫ חקתי‬in our verse mean that if we
concentrate on G'd's statutes instead of on what are perceived as the laws of nature as
reflected by horoscopic influences, ‫תלכו‬, "you will be able to proceed" beyond what you think
is the limitation imposed on your fate by astrological factors. Abraham succeded in doing so
and that is why he was able to father children although he had thought that the horoscopic
constellation under which he was born made this impossible. The Torah adds: ‫ועשיתם אתם‬.
Isaiah 41,2 refers to ‫ צדק יקראהו לרגלו‬when speaking about Abraham. According to the Talmud
in Shabbat 156 G'd asked Abraham if he thought that his fate was governed by the star ‫צדק‬,
Jupiter. Clearly, Abraham was occupied with astrology and had examined what his chances
were to father children else he would not have said to G'd that He had prevented him from
having them. How would he have known if not through a study of astrology? He did,
however, give G'd credit for having arranged the constellations even at that stage of his
development. We have to understand the words ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬as an instruction how to re-arrange
the laws of nature in our favour through observance of G'd's statutes. This is the real meaning
of the saying of our sages there that ‫אין מזל לישראל‬, "the fortunes of the Jewish people are not
irrevocably determined by astrological factors." Another way of interpreting the meaning of
the words ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, is based on Isaiah 66,22: "just as the new heaven and the new earth
which I shall make will stand before Me;" G'd did not speak of something He had already
made,‫עשיתי‬, but about something He would do. This teaches that Torah study and performing
of its precepts lead to the creation of an entire new universe (compare Zohar volume 1 page
5). The Torah tells us that it is up to us to bring this about, i.e. ‫ועשיתם אתם‬.

A twenty-seventh approach to our verse is connected to the statement in Shabbat 156 that a
person born under the constellation Venus would tend to be lecherous. Another statement we
find there is that the Chaldaens told the mother of Rabbi Nachman that her son was going to
be a thief. She made sure he always had his head covered as a reminder that he had a G'd
above him to whom he was accountable. These and other examples seem to prove that our
sages thought that Israelites are subject to the influence of horoscopic constellations during
the hour of their birth! G'd was very conscious of the fact that if we were allowed to think
along those lines we would use our mazzal as an excuse to claim that we were predestined to
be evil and could not be held accountable. This is why the Torah had to write ‫אם בחקתי‬, if you
rely merely on the laws of nature such as astrological constellations,‫תלכו‬, you will cause
yourselves to walk along a path that does not free you from accountability; but ‫ואת מצותי‬
‫ תשמרו‬if nonetheless you will observe My commandments then your ‫ מזל‬is subject to change
just as happened to Rabbi Nachman, i.e. ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, you will be the architect of reversing the
horoscopic influences you were born under.

A twenty-eighth way of interpreting the wording of our verse. We again refer to folio 156 in
Shabbat. We are told there that someone born under the constellation of Mars [the hour when
that constellation predominates, Ed.] will be a bloodthirsty man. Rabbi Ashi suggested a
variety of ways for channelling such tendencies into something harmless and useful, such as
such people becoming butchers or physicians concerned with performing bloodletting, or
performers of circumcisions. According to that approach the words ‫ אם בחקתי‬refer to
channelling a predeliction to engage in a nefarious vocation due to the horoscopic influences
under which one has been born into something acceptable so that one can neutralise these
influences. This is why the Torah exhorts ‫את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אתם‬, to channel what were
perceived to be negative traits into something positive, i.e. Torah study and a vocation
involving ‫מצוה‬-performance.
A twenty-ninth way of explaining the wording in our verse reflects something we have
learned from Sifri Ha-azinu that a person has to learn a moral lesson from observing the laws
of nature in operation. We observe the planets all performing G'd's directives joyfully, never
deviating from their orbits. The Torah speaks of ‫אם‬, "if" you walk in My statutes; the lesson
the Torah teaches is that if, like the planets, we will approach G'd's statutes with an attitude
similar to that of the planets in their orbits, we will succeed in observing all of G'd's
commandments both the negative ones and the positive ones. Our inspiration should be
derived from the planets who obey G'd although they do not receive a reward for their loyalty
nor do they face penalties for non-compliance.

A thirtieth way of looking at our verse is based on Avot 3,17 that "where there is no
prosperity Torah cannot flourish, whereas where there is no Torah you cannot expect
economic prosperity." I have explained that Mishnah to mean that the words "if there is no
flour" mean that when you observe that G'd grants His blessing you may be certain that the
reason for this is the presence of Torah. This is what Moses had in mind in Deut. 32,2 when
he said: "let my doctrine drop as the rain." Just as rain is caused by G'd alone, so in
accordance with the amount He wishes to supply, our economic prosperity is due to our
absorbing and living in accordance with G'd's doctrine. On the other hand, when you observe
lack of economic prosperity you may similarly attribute this to the fact that Torah is not being
studied and observed by the multitude. When the Torah speaks about ‫ אם בחקתי‬this means that
if you want to be the beneficiary of My statutes, i.e. the causal relationship between economic
prosperity and G'd you must observe My commandments. The words ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו‬are
similar to the word ‫ לקחי‬used by Moses as the measure of the rain G'd will allocate in the
verse we quoted from ‫ פרשת האזינו‬above. The Torah added the words ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬as a reminder
that if we want prosperity to be constant we must be constant in ‫מצוה‬-performance.

A thirty-first meaning of the words in our verse is related to Psalms 72,5: "Let them fear you
as long as the sun shines, etc." our sages in Berachot 29 comment on this verse that the time
for all creatures to perform their service for the Lord is in the morning, the time allocated for
our morning prayers. The next time for the creatures to perform their service for G'd is when
the sun sets. We may understand the meaning of ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬as reflecting Psalms 55,15: "let
us walk together in G'd's house when there is turmoil (outside)." The words ‫ואת מצותי תשמרו‬
refer to the practice of the early ‫ חסידים‬who used to assemble an hour before prayer in order to
prepare themselves emotionally (Berachot 29). The words ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬are to be understood as
a medicine against natural disasters involving the sun and the moon (eclipses and the like
which are interpreted as harbingers of catastrophes) The premise underlying this concept is
that misconduct by the inhabitants of the "lower" part of the universe will have an impact on
the conduct of the planets, especially those influencing our daily lives such as the sun and
moon (compare Sukkah 29).

The thirty-second allusion found in the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬is related to the word ‫ חקה‬being
applied by the Torah to animal sacrifice as we know from Leviticus 6,11 and 7,36. The words
then mean that these sacrifices will be acceptable only if they are the result of observing the
commandments pertaining to these sacrifices, i.e. ‫ואת מצותי חשמרו‬. A stolen animal is not fit to
be offered as a sacrifice as we have the principle of ‫מצוה הבאה בעברה‬, that the fulfilment of a
commandment is worthless if one had to commit a transgression in order to fulfil it. Even if
the person from whom such an animal was stolen had already abandoned hope to retrieve it
such an animal is not acceptable to G'd as a sacrifice. A stolen animal is in the same category
as one that is physically flawed, such as a lame animal. Sukkah 30 quotes Rabbi Yochanan
interpreting Isaiah 61,8: ‫אני ה׳ אהב משפט שונא גזל בעולה‬, "I the Lord love justice and hate
robbery in a burnt-offering" to mean that G'd hates a burnt-offering consisting of a stolen
animal. He compared such an offering to a king who passed the customs house telling his
subjects to join him in paying the duties required. The servants asked him: "do not the
proceeds of all duties belong to you anyway? The king answered that the travellers were to
learn from his personal conduct not to engage in smuggling. Similarly, G'd hates a sacrifice
which is a stolen animal although in the last analysis all animals belong to Him. We have
learned in Kidushin 39 that if someone is presented with an opportunity to commit a sin and is
saved from committing it, he is rewarded as if he had performed a positive commandment.
This is the reason the Torah does not want a stolen animal as a sacrifice. We are to train
ourselves to escape from anything which smacks of robbery (even if according to legal
yardsticks the animal in question had become ownerless prior to its being a sacrifice due to its
former owner having mentally given up on ever getting it back). The Torah calls failure to
offer such an animal ‫מעשה‬, a deed, i.e. ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, even though in the literal sense of the
words no deed had been performed.

A thirty-third way of explaining the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬in our verse has to do with the
perception of ordinary people when they evaluate ‫מצוה‬-performance. Most people believe that
unless they understand the deeper significance of a commandment they perform such
performance is as useless as a body without a soul. In fact the Ari Zal is reported to have said
something to this effect according to Likutey Torah Parshat Eykev where the author quotes
him as saying that a deed which lacks proper concentration is comparable to an empty vessel
seeing that the most important element of the commandment are the thoughts which
accompany its performance. Accordingly, the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬mean that if you have the
right thoughts when about to perform My statutes you may consider that you have performed
My commandments in the manner G'd wanted you to perform them. The plural of the word
‫ מצותי‬then refers to the various aspects of ‫מצוה‬-performance. A person might then conclude
that if the thoughts accompanying the performance are all important, why did he have to
perform the deed itself? The Torah warns you not to jump to such a conclusion by completing
the verse with the words ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, i.e. the thoughts count in your favour only when you also
performed the actual deed. G'd only considers the thought as sufficient when you are
prevented from carrying out the deed through forces beyond your control.

A thirty-fourth reason for the wording of our verse is based on Rabbi Karo's (Shulchan
Aruch Orach Chayim) ruling in Hilchot Tefillin 32,18. This is what he writes: "If a letter in
the parchment is attached to an adjoining letter so that there is no space separating these two
letters, the phylactery is unfit for use." [The difficulty with the writing of phylacteries is that
the letters must be written in the order in which they appear in the Torah and are not subject to
correction once they were not written in the proper order. Ed.] The Rosh in his discussion of
the laws pertaining to the writing of a Torah scroll writes that if two letters touched each other
this results in the Torah scroll being unfit to read from; however, if the scribe succeeds in
separating these two letters through rubbing out the area where they are attached, the Torah
scroll is fit to be used. We learn from the above two quotations that whereas one may rub out
part of the letter in the Torah scroll the same is not allowed in a parchment intended for use in
the phylacteries. Our verse alludes to this ruling if we understand the word ‫ בחקתי‬as a
reference to ‫חקיקה‬, a form of erasure. The Torah tells us ‫ תלכו‬you may "go ahead," i.e. erase
some of My statutes whereas you must strictly preserve ‫מצותי תשמרו‬, other commandments of
Mine, i.e. the laws of the phylacteries, by not erasing any part of them even if it is only the
area where two letters touch each other. The words ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬may be understood as
reflecting a ruling by the Rosh in his responsum number 16, principle number 3. He writes:
"When the open letter ‫( מ‬as opposed to the final letter ‫ )ם‬has accidentally been written in a
manner which makes it appear as if it is closed, it may be completely erased [literally to
hollow out, ‫ לחקק‬Ed.] and a new letter ‫ מ‬may be written in its place. [This refers to the rules
about writing a Torah scroll. Ed.] If instead of following the procedure indicated the scribe
"erased" the part of the original ‫ מ‬which was closed so that it now appears as a regular ‫ מ‬as
intended originally, this does not make a usable letter of it as it violates the principle of ‫חק‬
‫תוכות‬, "hollowing out instead of writing." We have been taught in Gittin 20 that one must not
write by means of hollowing out a blot of ink so that one winds up with the outlines of the
letter one wanted to write. All this is derived from the directive ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, not to hollow it
out but to scrape off the whole letter and rewrite it.

A thirty-fifth reason for the Torah writing the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬may reflect what later
authorities such as Magen Avraham write in chapter 143 of the Shulchan Aruch Orach
Chaim. We find the following comment: "If one finds two letters stuck together in a Torah
scroll one may continue to read from it and does not have to take out another scroll from the
Holy Ark to continue reading." The reason is that the imperfection is capable of being
remedied by the simple expedient of erasure of the offensive area. We therefore apply the
well-known principle of ‫כל שראוי לבילה‬, that if there is enough oil in a mixture of flour and oil
for an offering to thoroughly wet all the flour through proper mixing, we consider all the flour
as having been wetted although the mixing had not been carried out (Menachot 103). Other
authorities such as the author of Turey Zahav on chapter 32 in the Orach Chayim point out
that although the letters had been noticed on the Sabbath, a day on which no repair could be
made due to the nature of the day, this still does not prevent us from continuing to read in that
Torah scroll because the inability to make the repair is not due to the nature of the Torah
scroll itself but only to the day which happens to be the Sabbath. What does all this have to do
with our verse? The Torah writes ‫אם בחקתי‬, that if something is subject to being "erased," i.e.
the place where the two letters touch, ‫תלכו‬, you have permission to give a permissive ruling,
i.e. you may continue to read without having to take out another Torah scroll. This is so even
at a time when you cannot make the correction because of ‫ מצותי‬i.e. the restriction on writing
due to the Sabbath. The reason that you are allowed to carry on reading is ‫ועשיתם אתם‬, because
in principle you are permitted to make the necessary correction as soon as the Sabbath is over.

A thirty-sixth meaning of our words is connected with the ruling of Rabbi Karo in Yoreh
Deyah 276,11. This is what he writes: "if a letter was attached to another letter forming the
name of G'd, it may be erased." Mordechai comments in Menachot on this subject that
although the halachah not to erase the letters of the name of G'd is derived from Deut.12,4
"you must not do so to the Lord your G'd," in this instance we are concerned with an erasure
in order to achieve a correction. This is the meaning of the words ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬, i.e. "even
though I have forbidden you to 'erase' (‫)חקק‬, when such 'erasure' serves the purpose of making
a correction you may proceed." The word ‫ תלכו‬is used in a sense similar to Exodus 18,20:
"and the way they are to walk." The additional words ‫ ואת מצותי‬are a condition to touch only
the area where the two letters touch each other but not to erase either of the letters themselves.
The reason the Torah wrote ‫ מצותי‬in the plural is because two letters are involved. Perhaps one
may also see in these words an allusion to what we learned in Shavuot 35 that it is forbidden
to erase a suffix attached at the end of the name of G'd. This may be the reason that the Torah
employed the word ‫ מצותי‬in the plural, i.e. not only G'd's name must not be erased but also the
suffix must not be erased. When a letter of the next word is attached to such a suffix it must
not be erased as it has been hallowed by the name of G'd preceding it. The words ‫ועשיתם אתם‬
provide the background to the comment of the Mordechai that one may erase the area in
which the letters are joined seeing that when one does this it is something constructive, i.e.
‫ועשיתם‬. This expression may also be the justification for a halachah in Massechet Sofrim
chapter 5 that if the scribe's ink spilled onto a letter of the name of G'd already written, he
may erase that inkstain because his intention is to restore the name of G'd not to erase it. Bet
Yoseph quoting Ri of Ascandrani writes that even if one of the letters is lost (damaged) the
scribe may erase the rest of it in order to restore it. We may base this on the word ‫ אותם‬in the
expression ‫ועשיתם אותם‬, i.e. even if the letter itself has to be erased this is acceptable. The
condition we read into the words ‫ ואת מצותי‬is applicable when the only problem we have to
deal with is that the area where two letters are attached to one another, something that can be
fixed by thinning the letters through a slight erasure at the place they are joined. When we are
dealing with an inkstain blotting out part of the letter this restriction does not apply.

A thirty-seventh reason for the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬in our verse may be something we
learned in Rosh Hashanah 21. Rav Hunnah bar Avin sent an instruction to Rava: "When you
observe that according to the Jewish calendar the winter season [which ends with the equinox
on the 22nd of March in our solar calendar, Ed.] would end later than the 16th of Nissan,
extend the year (add an extra month of Adar) in order to comply with the Biblical requirement
that the Passover festival is to occur in spring i.e. after the equinox (Deut. 16,1)." Our verse
speaks of ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬meaning that you should apply the calculations on which you base
your calendar to comply with the laws of nature, i.e. astronomical considerations based on
interaction between solar and lunar orbits. The word ‫ אם‬is conditional, i.e. ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו‬so
that you will also be able to fulfil My commandments, i.e. that ‫ פסח‬is to occur during spring.
The words ‫ ועשיתם אתם‬are your authority to manipulate the calendar so that you can do justice
to both requirements, as per the instructions of Rav Hunnah bar Avin to Rava.

A thirty-eighth reason for the wording in our verse may be to provide backing for something
we learned in Shabbat 156. "Two scholars, Shemuel and the Gentile scholar Avlet, were
sitting together when they observed certain people walk towards a lake. Avlet pointed to a
certain man in that group and said that the individual in question would not reach that lake
alive. A snake would bite him and he would die. Shemuel replied that if the person in question
was a Jew he would reach his destination alive. It so happened that the person in question
reached the lake alive. When the man in question passed the two scholars on his way back
from the lake, Avlet examined his rucksack and found a snake in it which had been crushed to
death. Shemuel questioned the man to find out what merit he had which had saved him from
imminent death. The man told him that the group he belonged to would usually eat lunch
together, each one unpacking his lunch-box and throwing the contents into a common pool.
On that particular day one of them had not brought a lunch and he felt embarassed about not
having anything to contribute to the common pool. The person who had the snake in his
rucksack pretended to take bread from the rucksack of his companion who did not bring any
food and threw his own bread into the common pool so as to save his friend from
embarassment. Shemuel complimented him on the noble deed. The story indicates that
although according to hososcopic influences the man in question would have died on the way,
the fact that he had accumulated a merit saved him from the death horoscopic influences
would have foreshadowed. This is the meaning of ‫אין מזל לישראל‬, that Jews need not be the
victims of horoscopic influences. The words in our verse provide the condition under which
we can free ourselves from unfavourable horoscopic influences. The so-called ‫חקות‬,
horoscopically decreed laws, are inoperative if ‫את מצותי תשמרו‬, you will observe My
commandments.

A thirty-ninth reason why the Torah chose the wording it did in our verse has to do with
what we learned in Pessachim 56. We are told that King Chiskiyah destroyed the copper
snake Moses constructed (Numbers 21,9). The reason he did so was because he observed
people making an idolatrous symbol out of it. The construction of the snake at the time had
been a ‫חקה‬, statute, which G'd had legislated in order that by looking at the copper snake
people would demonstrate their trust in G'd. When people started to relate to it in the opposite
manner, believing it had magic qualities, the time had come to destroy it. Chiskiyah
interpreted our verse simply as follows: "as long (‫ )אם‬My statutes serve spiritual progress i.e.
‫תלכו‬, it was alright to look at that copper snake. If, however, this was no longer the case, then
the overriding consideration became ‫ ואת מצותי תשמרו‬the need to observe G'd's
commandments.

A fortieth justification for why the Torah wrote these words in our verse may be that the
Torah speaks here about the people eating untithed produce. We find that people who do this
are guilty of death, and that even a priest who does so is guilty of the same. You have good
reason to wonder why it is that a priest who is allowed to eat the tithe (‫ )תרומה‬itself, should be
forbidden on pain of death to eat from a quantity of produce which by definition is a mixture
of both ‫תרומה‬, the tithe due to a priest and ordinary produce which has no status as something
sacred? We must conclude that the law is in the nature of a ‫חוקה‬, statute, concerning which
G'd has not revealed a rationale. Our verse tells us that if the priest will walk in G'd's statutes
not to eat from untithed produce he will contribute to the fulfilment of ‫את מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם‬
‫ אתם‬that the produce will become permissible to eat for the Israelite once the commandment
of tithing it has been performed on it.

The forty-first reason the Torah has written the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬in our verse may be
connected with the advice we are offered in Avot 2,10 to repent one day before one's death. If
one heeds this advice one is a penitent all one's life. The Torah therefore says ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬if
you will be constantly conscious of My statutes that man is bound to die then you will surely
be motivated to observe My commandments so that you can face the Day of Judgment.

A forty-second meaning for the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬in this verse may become clear when we
look at a passage in Baba Metzia 85 where one of the scholars was given a sign by the prophet
Elijah how to recognise the chair of Rabbi Chiyah because the latter did not require angels to
lift his chair to the celestial regions. Rabbi Chiyah's chair ascended unassisted. The reason
Rabbi Chiyah merited this was his unequalled vigor in studying Torah and teaching it. The
word ‫ תלכו‬alludes to this energetic approach to Torah study. When a person studies and
teaches with the vigor of a Rabbi Chiyah his chair will ascend all by itself, i.e. ‫תלכו‬.

26:4

‫ונתתי גשמיכם בעתם‬, "And I will provide your rains at their proper time." We must first
understand why the verse commences with the letter ‫ ו‬seeing the verse is not preceded by
another promise that this verse adds on to. If you accept my interpretation of the word ‫תלכו‬
itself being the promise in the last verse, there is no need to wonder about the letter ‫ ו‬at the
beginning of this verse.

The letter ‫ ו‬may also be justifiable in light of the plain meaning of this verse appearing to
promise that there is a reward for observing the commandments in this life and that this
reward is the beneficial rainfall. One might assume therefore that G'd has discharged His
promise of rewarding us for ‫מצוה‬-observance with economic prosperity. The letter ‫ ו‬indicates
that prior to promising any benefit for our observance in this life the Torah had already
promised reward in the hereafter in the previous verse. I have alluded to this in one of my
commentaries on the words ‫אם בחקתי תלכו‬. Alternatively, the key to the verse is the suffix ‫כם‬
in the word ‫גשמיכם‬, "your rains." Normally, we would have considered that seeing the rain
comes from heaven it is G'd's rain. The Torah had previously promised a reward in the
hereafter, which is something no one in this world can experience. The Torah therefore
wanted us to know that there is something over and beyond that in our world but that it
emanates from the celestial spheres. In order that we should not look upon these rains as a
reward for Torah observance G'd describes them as "your rains." It is something that is ours
not as a result of our ‫מצוה‬-observance but because the Torah scholars are the pillars of the
world. Anyone who studies Torah is entitled to view them as something belonging to him.
Perhaps it is this consideration which led Baba Kama 38 to conclude that since the Israelites
can lay claim to the whole world based on this consideration, the properties of the Gentiles
legally belong to them. [The Talmud there bases the ruling that the Jewish owner of an ox
which gores an animal belonging to a Gentile does not have to pay compensation, on
Chabakuk 3,6. Ed.]

Another reason why the verse commences with the letter ‫ ו‬may be G'd telling us that although
we receive the rain as a gift from Him, He does not consider it as belonging or having
belonged to Him but as belonging to "you."

The Torah is careful to use the word: "And I will give," to underline that it is the exclusive
domain of G'd to provide rain both quantitatively and qualitatively. He alone can judge how
much rain is needed by the earth in the land of Israel. This is the meaning of Vayikra Rabbah
28,3 that while man lies down to sleep G'd is busy gathering the clouds to provide rain.

The word ‫ גשמיכם‬may be understood as a collective term for food or nourishment, both the
kind which is required for the earth, and that which is required for the creatures inhabiting it.
There is both spiritual and physical nourishment. The earth is recipient of nourishment in the
form of rain or dew. I have explained all this in my commentary on ‫פרשת בהר‬.

‫ונתנה הארץ וגו' פירשתי בפרשת בהר סיני‬:

26:5

‫והשיג לכם דיש את בציר‬. "And your threshing shall reach unto the vintage, etc." This is the
blessing applicable to the crop after it has been harvested. Our sages in Baba Metzia 42 have
taught that when one enters one's barn in order to measure the size of one's crop one is to
recite an appropriate prayer invoking G'd's blessing. If G'd would not bless the crop also after
man had harvested it such a prayer would be inadmissible as one must not ask G'd for
something that has already been determined. Please read my comments on Leviticus 25,21 on
the words ‫ועשת את התבואה‬.

‫ואכלתם לחמכם לשובע‬, "and you will eat your bread to your satisfaction." This is the
blessing G'd bestows on the food after we have eaten it and it is within our bowels as stated in
Torat Kohanim who write "one eats a small amount and it is blessed within one's entrails."

Another meaning of these words is that you will not suffer from a fairly common
phenomenon that in spite of large quantities of food intake one does not feel satiated; G'd
promises that one will feel completely satiated.
Another meaning may be related to Megillah 7 where we are told of a popular proverb
according to which the stomach is always able to accomodate an additional amount of good
tasting food and although one previously had one's fill one can still enjoy this.

The emphasis on the word ‫ לחמכם‬means that there is no need for relishes and other additions
but that the bread itself will taste so well a person will not look for any additional condiments.

There may also be a veiled promise here that even if one eats over and beyond what is needed
such eating will not hurt one as opposed to Gittin 70.

Still another lesson contained in our verse is related to Sotah 48 where the Mishnah describes
the quality of fruit in the land of Israel as having declined dramatically both in taste and food
value after the destruction of the Temple. The Mishnah meant that when the fruit contains
what is described as ‫שומן‬, a person eating thereof will experience the feeling of being sated.
The reverse is the case when that element called ‫ שומן‬is absent. The Torah promises here that
the feeling of satiation will be experienced even if one merely eats bread as G'd has endowed
the grain with the element called ‫שומן‬.

‫וישבתם לבטח בארצכם‬, "and you will dwell securely in your land." This promise is most
important because all the preceding promises are esentially meaningless unless one can live
free from worry that an enemy will invade one's country. G'd promises continued prosperity
uninterrupted by the need to defend one's country at the expense of growing crops. The word
‫ בארצכם‬underscores that the whole world will recognise that the land of Israel is rightfully
yours.

Another aspect of the blessing contained in this verse is that foreigners will perform the heavy
labour in our country whereas the Israelites will "sit securely in your land," not even worrying
that the foreign labourers may steal and cheat them out of their harvest.

26:6

‫ונתתי שלום בארץ‬, "and I will grant peace to the land." Why did the Torah have to mention
this seeing it had already promised us that we would dwell securely in our land? Perhaps the
Torah refers to the people of Israel keeping the peace amongst themselves, that there would
not be internal divisiveness. G'd promises to implant a tendency for mutual tolerance amongst
the people. Remember that when the Torah speaks of the land it usually describes it as "your
land," i.e. the land with a suffix. When the word ‫ ארץ‬is used without the suffix it refers to the
whole earth. In this instance you find that G'd wants universal peace. When you consider the
70 bulls the Israelites offered in the Holy Temple on behalf of the Gentile nations on Sukkot,
our rabbis in Sukkah 55 speak about this. Moreover, whenever wars occur on earth even
people who are at peace in their respective countries worry about their becoming themselves
involved in warfare. This is why the Torah adds the assurance ‫ושכבתם ואין מחריד‬, "you will lie
down to sleep without anyone frightening you."

‫והשבתי חיה רעה מו הארץ‬, "and I will banish wild beasts from the land." In view of G'd
having promised that everyone will dwell securely under his respective fig tree and vineyard
it is likely that people will not travel a lot and the outlying roads may become relatively
deserted so that the roaming beasts may lose their fear of man. G'd promises that He will see
to it that there will be a decrease in such activities The word ‫ הארץ‬must be understood as the
land where these wild beasts normally have their lairs and from where they forage. This
explains why the Torah did not use the expression ‫ בארצכם‬in this instance.

26:7

‫ורדפתם את אויביכם‬, "and you will pursue your enemies." Why does the Torah have to give
the Israelites this assurance after having assured them of dwelling securely and no one
frightening them? The assurances which preceded this verse related to Israel feeling secure
from surrounding nations. The latter would neither cause death nor destruction. Now the
Torah speaks about relations between Israel and the nations with Israel as the aggressor. The
Torah assures Israel that the promise of safety from invasion does not mean that it ties Israel's
hands versus its neighbours. The Torah therefore speaks of the Israelites pursuing their
enemies. This reinforces the previous assurances. Even though Israel may have started a pre-
emptive campaign against its enemies, G'd assures them of success. They will return to their
country not having to fear retaliation. If the Torah called the opponents of Israel "enemies,"
this was not because they invaded the country but because they are enemies of the Lord. The
wicked people amongst the Gentiles are always referred to as both G'd's enemies and hence
our enemies. It is a law of nature that the Gentile nations hate us.

‫ונפלו לפניכם לחרב‬. "and they will fall before you by the sword." The unusual ‫ לחרב‬instead of
‫בחרב‬, by the sword, is a hyperbole. The way the enemies will fall before the Jewish armies
will be similar to their falling by the sword. A moral-ethical approach to these words conjures
up the deeds of the Hasmoneans. The historian Josephus describes seeing an angel of the Lord
drawing his sword against the enemy. When the Torah speaks here of ‫ונפלו‬, they will fall, it
may refer to the thrusts of the sword by the angel.

26:8

‫ורדפו מכם חמשה מאה‬, "And five of you will put one hundred of them to flight, etc." The
obvious difficulty in our verse is that the enemies will fall before the pursuing Jewish army.
This promise included such assurances as that even ten thousand enemy soldiers would fall
before as few as two Jewish soldiers. Why did the Torah now limit the blessing contained in
the previous verse?

I believe the verses have to be explained in accordance with what we learned in Sotah 11 that
G'd always quantifies a blessing more generously than He quantifies a curse. [We have
examples in Deut. 5,9-10 where G'd promises to remember sins for up to 4 generations
whereas He will remember good deeds for up to two thousand generations. Ed.] Tossaphot
query the fact that the Talmud phrases the principle as one that applies invariably, i.e. ‫לעולם‬.
They refer to Deut. 32,30 where the Torah asks rhetorically: "How was it that one (enemy
soldier) could pursue a thousand Israelites and two could put ten thousand to flight?" Surely
this is an example of the curse having been quantified as proportionately far more powerful
than the blessing in our portion when you compare the numbers in both instances? They
answer that in Deuteronomy 32 the Torah speaks only of pursuit and not killing and that this
is is hardly a curse. In our portion the pursuit is described as resulting in our enemies dying. I
find this an inadequate response to the question. There is a discussion in Moed Katan 16 about
the exploits of David's heroes one of whom is described as having killed 800 of the enemy
with a single arrow. David complained that the assurance that he could kill a thousand of the
enemy with one stroke had not been fulfilled. A heavenly voice told him that the reason that
G'd's promise had not been fulfilled fully was due to his own involvement with Uriah. It is
clear from the Talmud in Moed Katan that David understood the promise in our verse to refer
not merely to putting the enemy to flight but to killing him. If not, why did he complain about
something G'd had never promised?

We must assume therefore that both verse 7 and verse 8 speak of enemies dying. The way to
answer the query of Tossaphot is best answered by reference to Torat Kohanim who
understand the word ‫ מכם‬in verse 8 as a reference to the physically weakest of the Israelites.
The wording in Torat Kohanim is: "from the weakest amongst you and not from the strongest
amongst you." Why did Torat Kohanim add the words "and not from the strongest amongst
you?" The obvious intention of Torat Kohanim was to emphasise that the words "from the
weakest" should not be interpreted as "even from amongst the weakest amongst you, but
should be understood as "the weakest amongst you excluding the strongest." In light of this it
is not surprising that in this verse the Torah only speaks of a blessing extended to the
physically weak members of the Israelites who are able to mount a pursuit in a ratio of five
against a hundred. Amongst the Gentile nations the physically weak specimen do not take part
in warfare at all. When the Torah asked rhetorically in Deuteronomy how it is that suddenly
one Gentile is able to pursue 1000 Israelites the reference is to the physically strongest
Gentiles amongst them. The Torah did not have to make these distinctions amongst the
Israelites as we know that the curse is always quantified as proportionately weaker than the
corresponding blessing.

From all the above it emerges that G'd actually ordered two separate blessings to be effective
instead of limiting the blessing of verse 7 in verse 8. First of all the Torah describes the valour
of the individual Israelites during generations when the people observe G'd's statutes.
Concerning these men of heroic proportions the Torah says that they will pursue their enemies
and the enemies will fall before them. In the event you are interested how many enemies a
single Israelite can pursue, you only have to refer to the verse in Deuteronomy which
describes the exploits of your enemies. Since you are aware that G'd quantifies a blessing
more generously than a curse you can draw your own conclusions. The Talmud in Sotah 11
only illustrated how David interpreted the blessing. He based himself on the statement that
anyone who studied Torah for a single day is considered as if he had done so for a whole year.
This statement is proven from the punishment G'd meted out to the people of Israel who had
accepted the majority report of the spies. In Numbers 14,34 the Torah condemns the Israelites
to wandering in the desert for one year in exchange for every day the spies had toured the land
of Canaan and had returned with a devastating conclusion. If G'd's quantification of the curse
was 365 to one, then His quantification of a blessing could not possibly be of a lesser ratio. It
is not surprising therefore to hear David complain that even the greatest of his warriors had
not been able to destroy 1000 of the enemy with a single blow.

You will find an interesting remark in Chronicles I 12,15. "These are the leaders (in exploits)
of the army of the tribe of Gad (in the time of David) the weakest disposed of 100 of the
enemy, the strongest disposed of 1.000. This is sort of proof of what the Torah said here that
the weak pursue and kill in a ratio of 5 to 100, and 100 pursue 10.000 must refer to the weaker
specimen amongst the Israelites. When the Book of Chronicles speaks of "one to a hundred
and one to a thousand respectively, the reason the comparison made by the author of the Book
of Chronicles is with "one" i.e. a single warrior, is because these are examples of particularly
powerful individuals, not the run of the mill. All of this leads us to the conclusion that verse 7
which does not impose a limit on how many warriors will pursue how many enemies speaks
of the Israelites whose physique is of heroic dimensions. The Torah deliberately does not
describe their feats in terms of numbers as their prowess is unlimited in principle. For all we
know one such Israelite could pursue a half million of the enemy; under no circumstances
would he pursue fewer than a thousand as in the reverse situation in the Book of
Deuteronomy. Inasmuch as different periods in history produced Israelites of different calibre
the Torah did not go into specifics.

‫ונפלו אויביכם לחרב‬. "and your enemies will fall by the sword." Why did the Torah repeat
this promise both in verse 7 and in verse 8? Torat Kohanim explain that the meaning is that
the enemies will fall by each other's sword. We may add that the Torah wanted to distinguish
between a pursuit by five men of a hundred men of the enemy respectively, and the pursuit by
a hundred men of ten thousand. If Israel can dispose of one thousand pursuers, the defeat of
the enemies will assume proportions that are greater than a mere arithmetical progression. The
word ‫ לחרב‬refers to the effectiveness of the avenging sword.

26:9

‫ופניתי אליכם‬, "And I will turn to you, etc." This word is to be understood as similar to what
we learned in Taanit 2 that G'd holds three keys; one of them is the key to ‫לידה‬, to birth, i.e.
procreation. This is why G'd had to say: "I will turn to you" before mentioning that He would
make the Jewish people fruitful. The word ‫ ופניתי‬is indicative of G'd personally involving
Himself in the fertility of the Jewish people instead of leaving the matter in the hands of the
agent He has appointed as part of the laws of nature to deal with such tasks. It is also possible
that when the verse continues with ‫והרביתי אתכם‬, "I will multiply you," that this refers to a
second key G'd holds in His hands, i.e. the key to ‫פרנסה‬, livelihood. Adequate food assists
physical growth. This may be why Torat Kohanim understand this blessing as contributing to
the physical size of the Israelites. Moreover, we are taught in Sanhedrin 90 that the words
‫ והקימותי את בריתי אתכם‬at the end of our verse refer to the covenant with the dead that when the
time comes their bodies will be resurrected. The word ‫ והקימותי‬then refers to the third key G'd
holds in His hands, the key to life and death. The word ‫ ופניתי‬may thus be understood as G'd
granting us access to all the three keys in His possession.

Another aspect of this verse is related to the statement in Shabbat 156 that Israel is not subject
to the restrictions inherent in the term mazzal, such as referred to by Isaiah 41,2 when he
described Abraham as having thought his fate was determined by the constellation of Jupiter
(compare page 1302). The word ‫ ופניתי‬simply means that G'd will turn aside the horoscopic
influences and apply a different set of rules to the dispensation of the blessings involving the
three areas to which G'd personally holds the keys. Although, according to Moed Katan 28,
the three domains over which G'd holds the key are not subject to man's merit but to his
mazzal, G'd will make an exception to this rule by "moving the relevant constellation (‫)מפנה‬
"aside," to enable Israel to overcome negative influences. The expression ‫ לפרות‬refers to the
ability to have children, the expression ‫ והרביתי אתכם‬refers to long life, similar to Deut. 11,21
‫ ;למען ירבו ימיכם‬the words ‫ והקימותי את בריתי‬refer to the supply of adequate sustenance. The
reason that the Torah referred to the covenant here is because G'd had concluded such a
covenant with Noach in Genesis 8,22 not to again destroy the seasons and the harvest they are
to produce. Shavuot 36 comments on that verse in Genesis where G'd is reported as saying
this "to His heart," that this is equivalent to an oath. In Genesis 9,12 G'd referred to the "sign
of the covenant" i.e. the rainbow as a reminder of this covenant which included all the various
promises made by G'd after Noach left the ark. The oath G'd swore at the time did not
comprise the whole globe. After all, we all know that part of the surface of the globe does not
produce crops in certain years due to some catastrophe or other, the years of famine both in
Canaan and in Egypt being just a minor example. What G'd had sworn was that He would not
deprive the entire earth of sustenance simultaneously such as happened during the deluge.
Please refer to what I have written on the words "and you shall love the Lord your G'd" on
Deut. 6,5.

Another meaning of the words ‫ ופניתי אליכם‬may be gleaned after we examine Samuel II 6,10.
The prophet reports that David did not want to transfer the Holy Ark to him in Jerusalem and
instead made it detour to the house of Oved Edom Hagitti. As a result of the latter's
willingness to be host to the Holy Ark G'd blessed his entire family. Our sages in Berachot 63
describe the blessing as Oved Edom's wife and eight daughters-in-law being very prolific in
bearing many children during the three months that the ark stayed in Oved Edom's home.
According to Chronicles I 26, 6 children were born to that family during that time. This is the
kind of blessing referred to by the words… ‫ופניתי אליכם והרביתי אתכם‬, "I will turn to you….and
multiply you." Once G'd turns His face to you, the rest will follow automatically. The
expression ‫ והרביתי אתכם‬contains within it a special distinction. Normally, when we encounter
a great number of something, the multiplicity of the numbers is at the expense of the worth of
the individual. If someone owns 1.000 head of cattle for instance, he does not treasure each
animal as a separate possession as much as he would if he only owned three cows. G'd blessed
Oved Edom in that though his family became very numerous this did not detract from the
individual worth of each family member (compare our comments on Exodus 1,9 and Numbers
13,18). The words ‫ והקימותי את בריתי אתכם‬are a blessing similar to that in Isaiah 59,21: "and as
for Me, this will be My covenant with them says the Lord….My words will not depart from
your mouth or the mouth of your children." It is the promise that the Torah will not depart
from their offspring. Another meaning of the words is that G'd renews the covenant which He
had already entered into with the patriarchs.

26:10

‫ואכלתם ישן נושן‬, "And you will eat old store, long kept." This is a promise that the harvest
which has been stored will not rot or become worm-eaten. On the contrary, you will
experience that it improves with age.

‫וישן מפני חדש תוציאו‬, "and you will bring forth the old from before the new." You will not
bring it forth because it has become too old and inferior, but because you have to make room
for the new harvest. The reason the Torah wrote this here and not earlier when the goodness
of the land of Israel is extolled is that the Torah wants to make the point that although the
population keeps increasing this does not mean that there will be a contraction of the surplus
experienced previously. There will still be so much that the people will eat the old rather than
to have to eat the new harvest right away.

26:11

‫ונתתי משכני בתוככם‬, "And I will place My Sanctuary among you." We must understand this
in a sense similar to Psalms 78,60: "the tent He had set among men." The reference is to the
souls of His holy people within whom G'd had made Himself at home.

‫ולא תגעל נפשי אתכם‬, "and My soul will not abhor you." It was not enough to say that G'd
will make His home inside people's souls seeing G'd was afraid that people would not take
such a promise seriously. It seemed to exceed their fondest hopes. They could not imagine
how a creature of flesh and blood could become "home" to G'd's presence. They would have
imagined that G'd merely exaggerated out of His love for the Jewish people. People imagined
something akin to what Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai explained in the Zohar volume 3 page 241
on Song of Songs 5,1: "I came to My garden My sister My bride, I ate My honeycomb and
drank My wine, etc." The entire verse is a parable describing the relationship between a
groom and his bride, i.e. G'd and the people of Israel. Rabbi Shimon's words are worth
studying. Nothing in that verse is remotely comprehensible if we try and stick to the literal
meaning. The very idea of someone such as G'd Who is totally spiritual being described in
such physical terms is repulsive. What G'd is trying to say to the Jewish people is that
although by definition His very Essence should be revolted at the mere thought of intimacy
with His creatures made of flesh and blood, this will not be the case.

‫והתהלכתי בתוככם‬, "And I will walk among you, etc." "Not only will I not find intimacy with
you loathsome but I will continue to walk among you." The expression is one which one
normally applies to kindred souls. It is remindful of a statement by our sages that seeing that
the souls of the Jewish people originate in G'd's own Light, their having been despatched
earthwards does not mean that they have become estranged from their sacred origin. The
author continues in this vein elaborating on this concept of the intimacy that can exist between
man and G'd and how through man's failure to choose the path of Torah this very intimacy
turns into loathing.

Another (esoteric) way of explaining our paragraph is to see in it both promises for success in
this world as well as promises of even greater bliss in the hereafter. The paragraph
commences with the promise of adequate food supply i.e. "I will provide your rains at the
proper times," followed by a promise of a secure and serene existence in the Holy Land, i.e.
"and you will dwell in it in safety."

From here on in the Torah addresses blessings which will accrue in the hereafter. The most
basic is "I will grant peace." Although man may live the life of the completely righteous, the
fact is that the mere thought of leaving this life casts a pall over his serenity. This is especially
so since man never knows when that day on which he will die will occur. G'd compensates us
for this anxiety by promising that on the day such a person will depart this earth he will not
experience fright of what lies beyond this physical life, i.e. "you will lie down and no-one will
frighten you." G'd will see to it that the transition from one form of life to another will be
smooth and painless.

When the Torah speaks of "I will grant peace," you may understand this in light of the
Talmud Shabbat 10 that the name of the Almighty is ‫שלום‬. At the time death approaches, G'd's
Light will approach the righteous; this is the mystical dimension of the term "the kiss of
death" experienced by people such as Moses and Aaron. The experience of death will thereby
be transformed into an experience similar to lying down to sleep, i.e. ‫ושכבתם‬. The Torah has
used this expression when describing the death of the patriarchs. The secret of this is that the
soul which experiences the approach of that Light which is so welcome to it longs for a closer
union with it so much that it is eager to tear itself loose from whatever still binds it to this life
on earth. The process feeds upon itself. I have written more about this at the beginning of my
commentary on ‫( פרשת אחרי מות‬page 1306). This is what Solomon had in mind when he said
in Kohelet 5,11 that "the sleep of the labourer is sweet." The "sleep" he referred to is the
departure of the soul from the body. The person who was a true ‫עובד‬, servant of G'd, will find
this experience "sweet," i.e. pleasant. The Torah adds the words ‫ואין מחריד‬, to tell us that the
angel of death who has the power to frighten ordinary people, making them afraid of death,
does not possess the power to frighten the truly righteous.
Still another meaning of the words ‫ ונתתי שלום‬may relate to the preservation of the body after
death so that the 4 basic raw materials of which the body is composed do not disintegrate.
You are familiar with the story of Rabbi Achai bar Yoshia related in Shabbat 152 whose
remains were found in good shape by Rabbi Nachman many years after his death. Obviously
this could only have been due to G'd commanding the basic raw-materials man is made of not
to disintegrate in this instance. We are told that this could happen by Solomon in Proverbs
6,22: ‫בשכבך תשמר עליך‬, "when you go to sleep (die) it will preserve you." The "it" are the
Torah study and performance of good deeds by the person Solomon speaks of. When the
Torah writes ‫ ושכבתם ואין מחריד‬this may also be understood in the sense of what the prophet
said in Isaiah 57,2 where he described the righteous as "resting comfortably in their slumber"
meaning they will not be disturbed by their remains being worm-eaten. We have confirmation
of this in a story in Baba Metzia 84 where it is related that the remains of Rabbi Eleazar bar
Shimon which had been kept in an upper story in his house had remained intact for a number
of years (18 or 22). His widow had examined them almost daily and they did not deteriorate.
One day she found that a hair had fallen out and there was some blood at the spot where the
hair had come out. We have numerous such stories all of which prove that when the
conditions are right a body may rest in its grave without disintegrating. This may also be the
reason why the Talmud Shabbat 13 describes the body's reaction to worms as being as if a
living body would be pierced by a needle. Every creature is sensitive to an invasion of its
body by an alien body in accordance with the general capacity for sensitivity with which it
has been endowed by G'd.

The words ‫ והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ‬in verse 6 refer to the spirit of impurity which is called ‫חיה‬
‫רעה‬, a spiritually negative vitality which surrounds the body after death. The reason a priest is
forbidden to remain in the roofed domain of a body is the very presence of that ‫ חיה רע‬around
the dead body. This is why contact with the dead or even remaining under the same canopy
with him results in such a person contracting ritual impurity for a period of not less than seven
days. G'd promises here that if the lifetime of the person who has now died was marked by his
observing all the commandments, his remains will not be surrounded by such a spiritually
negative force so that anyone in touch with such remains would not contract ritual impurity.

As to the meaning of the words ‫וחרב לא תעבור בארצכם‬, "a sword will not traverse your land,"
this is the Torah providing the rationale why impurity will not be allowed to surround the
corpses of such righteous people. Man's death is perceived as his succumbing to the flawed
sword of the Angel of Death. This results in the body becoming ‫נבלה‬, unfit to serve as a
sacrifice as would a body which was slaughtered with a ritually pure and unblemished knife.
The Torah has described a ‫ נבלה‬as the kind of corpse fit to feed to the dogs (Exodus 22,30).
Impurity itself is often compared to a dog, an inferior animal, representative of all that is
despised. The Torah assures us that people who live the kind of life they ought to live will not
experience that the sword of the Angel of Death touches their bodies.

The Torah goes on to write: ‫ורדפתם את אויביכם‬, "And you will pursue your enemies." From this
point on the Torah deals with the activities of the invisible spirituality which results through a
person's having lived a life dedicated to Torah and its precepts. The purpose of studying
Torah and performing its commandments with vigor is to pinpoint isolated "sparks" of
holiness. These "sparks" are to be joined one to another so that they can reunite with their
origin. They had become isolated as a result of Adam's sin and the power of the forces of the
‫קליפה‬, the spiritually negative forces in our universe, to separate them from the main body of
holiness. This is the mystical dimension of Isaiah 59,2: "your iniquities have created a
division between yourselves and your G'd." Please read what I have written in connection
with Exodus 19,5 ‫ והייתם לי סגולה‬and how the ‫ קליפות‬are described by such terms as ‫ שונאים‬and
‫אויבים‬. See my commentary on Psalms 92,10: ‫כי הנה אויביך ה׳ יאבדו‬. Here the Torah reveals how
these forces of the ‫ קליפה‬can be pursued through the preoccupation with Torah and its
commandments and how the pursuit will result in these forces collapsing, i.e. ‫ונפלו לחרב‬. In
short, this paragraph describes the defeat of the phenomenon called impurity. The prophet
Zachariah refers to this when he writes in Zachariah 13,2: "And I will abolish the spirit of
impurity." We may understand the word ‫ לחרב‬in our verse in the same spirit as Song of Songs
3,8: ‫איש חרבו על ירכו‬, "each with his sword at his side." Concerning this verse we read in
Tikkuney Hazohar chapter 7 that people who keep the covenant with the Lord by never
touching anything which is forbidden to them possess the power to kill the enemies of the
Lord with the breath of their lips. This is the reason the Torah did not write here the usual
‫בחרב‬, but ‫לחרב‬.

The words ‫ורדפו מכם חמשה מאה‬, may be understood as a reference to the five Books of Moses.
In other words, that which emanates from you, the teaching of the five Books of Moses, will
pursue one hundred manifestations of the ‫קליפות‬. You may apply Proverbs 16,26 to this
situation. "A person who toils, toils for himself." Our sages in Sanhedrin 99 understand this
verse as follows: "When a person toils by studying Torah in one place the Torah will toil on
his behalf in another place by annihilating G'd's enemies.

The end of this verse i.e ‫ומאה מכם רבבה ירדפו‬, may be understood in light of a comment by
Tanchuma at the end of Parshat Korach on Deut. 10,12: ‫מה ה׳ אלוקיך שואל ממך‬, "What does the
Lord your G'd ask of you, etc.?" the Midrash suggests that we substitute for the word ‫מה‬,
"what," the word ‫מאה‬, "one hundred." The word would refer to the recital of one hundred
benedictions daily. The Torah promises that the merit of reciting 100 benedictions daily
enables us to pursue and destroy ten thousand manifestations of the power of the ‫קליפות‬.

When the Torah repeats the words ‫ ונפלו אויביכם לחרב‬a second time this reflects a statement by
our sages in Berachot 5 according to which anyone who recites the ‫ קריאת שמע‬is compared to
someone who seizes a double-edged sword. This is based on Psalms 149,6: "when they have
the exaltations of the Lord in their throats this is equivalent to being armed with a double-
edged sword." The first verse mentioning the enemies falling by the sword detailed the result
of performing sacred deeds. The second verse speaks of the result of uttering holy words.

The Torah goes on: ‫ופניתי אליכם‬, "and I will turn to you." This is a description of the purpose
of the destruction of G'd's and Israel's enemies. As a result of the destruction of these enemies
all the "sparks" of holiness will return to their roots, i.e. the "umbrella" called ‫כנסת ישראל‬, the
concept of the Jewish people. They will resume their classification as being part of the
domain of G'd whence they had originated. From then on they will increase and multiply.
Please read what I have written at the end of ‫ פרשת ויגש‬on Genesis 47,27 (page 382).

Another meaning of the words ‫ ופגיתי אליכם‬is that inasmuch as the iron curtain dividing Israel
from its G'd has collapsed with the defeat of the concept of impurity, G'd can once more turn
to us and cleave to us.

Furthermore, there is a message here that if Israel has made the first move in battering the
wall between it and G'd, G'd in turn will help us so that we shall become ever more successful
in tearing down that wall.
 ‫עוד ירצה ופניתי אליכם על פי דבריהם ז''ל בזוהר (בזוהר ח''ג ש''ג) כי שעשוע הצדיקים שאין למעלה ממנו הוא‬
‫בחצי לילה השני שהקדוש ברוך יושב על כסאו בין הצדיקים שבגן עדן ומסיר פרגוד אחד ומגלה להם אור פנימי‬
‫הנערב ולרוב ההשתוקקות ועוצם הפלגת הרגש העריבות לנשמות עד שמתעלפים ונושרים מהם אורות והם נפשות‬
‫שיורדות לעולם התחתון להאיר יעויין שם דבדיו בזוהר חדש (פר' בלק) והוא מה שדמז במאמר ופניתי אליכם‬
)‫ו׳‬:‫ ואמר לשון פנייה לצד שהאדון ברוך הוא אינו משתנה דכתיב (מלאכי ג׳‬.‫שהוא על שעשוע הגדול ומופלא הנזכר‬
‫אני ה' לא שניתי אלא שמגלה מאורו את אשר יחפוץ ויסתיר כפי מה שאינם ראוים להשיג לזה אמר ופניתי אליכם‬
‫להאיר למולכם אור הפנימי הנסתר יראו עיניכם וישמח לבכם‬.

The words ‫והפריתי אתכם‬, "and I will make you fruitful" are an allusion to the "sparks" of our
holiness which had become prematurely lost and had been aborted and had therefore lost their
"sparkle;" they would now resume their appointed function. The Torah adds: "and I will
multiply you," to reassure us that we should not think that due to our lengthy sojourn in the
domain of the ‫ קליפה‬we have sustained permanent impairment of our ability to develop. The
Torah states that this is not so, but that our light would shine forth like the "Light of the
King's face."

Another interpretation of the words ‫ והרביתי אתכם‬is based on the root of the word being ‫רב‬, in
the sense of ‫רבנות‬, authority, or superiority. Accordingly, the promise here is similar to G'd's
promise in Exodus 19,6 where G'd defines our purpose as a nation to be a kingdom of priests,
a holy nation." We have explained in that context that the reference is to the Jewish people
exceeding even the angels in holiness. The Torah continues with the words ‫והקימותי את בריתי‬
‫ ;אתכם‬this is a reference to the promise that the dead will be resurrected. G'd restricts this
promise to those who have studied Torah. We base this on Ketuvot 111 ‫כל העוסק בטל טל תורה‬
‫מחייהו‬, "everyone who is preoccupied with dew, the dew of Torah will revive him." [Actually,
this is an inaccurate quotation. The Talmud first said that the word ‫ טל‬may refer to the Light
of Torah basing itself on a verse in Isaiah 26,19 i.e. that G'd's dew is equivalent to
illumination. In an extrapolation of this, the Talmud continues by saying that if one did not
study this divine illumination, i.e. Torah, one cannot look forward to resurrection. Ed.]

The promise contained in the words: "and I will keep My covenant" may also refer to
something we learned in Sanhedrin 90 that the patriarchs personally will arise and take
possession of the land of Israel as G'd had promised to each one of them separately in
different chapters of the Book of Genesis. In Exodus 6,4, G'd made a specific promise that the
patriarchs would be resurrected and receive the land He had promised to them. G'd is on
record here that everyone who keeps the covenant with G'd will be resurrected; G'd will keep
with Him the covenant pertaining to making the land of Israel his eternal possession.

We also find an allusion to where the souls will be stored during the time they wait for
resurrection. The ‫ ברית‬the Torah speaks about is the ultimate ‫ברית‬, i.e. ‫שלום‬. The domain in
which the souls of the Israelites will repose during that period of awaiting resurrection of their
assigned bodies is what we usually refer to as the ‫צרור החיים‬.

The Torah continues ‫ואכלתם ישן נושן‬, this is a hyperbole for the meal G'd will serve the
righteous in the hereafter when wine dating back to the days of Adam in ‫ גן עדן‬will be served
as well as the meat of the Leviathan which G'd had salted away since time immemorial. There
is nothing more ancient seeing it dates back to a time preceding the creation of man himself.

The meaning of the words ‫" וישן מפני חדש תוציאו‬that you will clear out the old on account of the
new," may refer to a verse in Job 38,15 which is the subject of discussion in Chagigah 12. G'd
speaks about the wicked being deprived of their light. The Talmud understands that this refers
to the original Light G'd created by means of which Adam was able to see from one end of the
earth to the other. As a result of his sin, he and subsequent human beings were deprived of
this Light. Our verse may allude to the withdrawal of the "new" light which substituted ever
since for the original Light. G'd promises that in the future under discussion He will make
available the original Light for the righteous.

The Torah continues: ‫ונתתי משכני בתוככם‬, "And I will make My Sanctuary among you;" this
means that in the future G'd will lower a Sanctuary from the Heaven as we learned in Baba
Batra 75. Some of our rabbis claim that that Sanctuary will be made of Shoham stones.
Others claim it will be made of Joshpeh stones, each one basing himself on scripture, i.e.
Exodus 15,17: "The Sanctuary of the Lord which You have established with Your own
hands." G'd promises that this Sanctuary which He has fashioned with His own hands He will
erect among us and this is why it will endure forever. The reason G'd will not loathe us is
because He will have done away with the spirit of impurity in this world.

Another meaning of this statement is based on what we explained in conection with Numbers
23,23 that the Israelites will form the inner circle around the Presence of G'd so that the angels
will have to ask us what G'd is in the process of doing.

‫והתהלכתי בתוככם‬, "And I will walk among you." This is best understood as reflecting the
promise of the prophet in Yoel 3,1 that "your sons and daughters will all prophesy." G'd's
Light will walk among them i.e. a reference to the spirit of prophecy. This reminds us of
Moses' wish that all the Jewish people should be granted the spirit of prophecy (Numbers
11,29).

The promise may also refer to something we learned in Taanit 31 that in the future G'd would
provide a circle for the righteous and He would take up a position amongst them so that
everyone of them would look at G'd and exclaim "This is My G'd let me glorify Him." The
reason the Torah chose the expression ‫" והתהלכתי‬I will walk is that His Light will travel to
provide spiritual nourishment to the souls who are sitting around Him. This is called ‫הליכה‬.
The Torah continues with: "I shall be your G'd," referring either to the verse we have just
equated the righteous as proclaiming, or that the very dwelling [‫ נוה‬in the verse ‫זה קלי ואנוהו‬
Ed.] of the righteous is considered something of a divine nature. The additional promise: "and
you will be My people" means that the Jewish people will be closer to G'd than any of the
hosts of the heavens.

The words: "and I will be your G'd," may also reflect the contrast between then and now.
Nowadays the faith in G'd is due to G'd having provided prophets for us who help us maintain
our faith. In the future described in our verse there will no longer be a need for prophets as
G'd will be recognised as such directly by everyone without any external assist. This is in line
with the prophet's Zachariah's promise that "on that day G'd and His name will be one." The
words: "and you will become My people" refer to the fact that the degree of recognition of
G'd by various layers of the population will be the same; there will no longer be such
distinctions as ‫ עם‬on the one side and ‫ בני ישראל‬on the other.

‫אני השם‬. "I am the Lord." We may understand this in light of the comment in Berachot 12
that in the future the outstanding attribute of G'd will no longer be the fact that He took us out
of Egypt but His new manifestation as the G'd who brought the Messiah (compare Jeremiah
23,7). The first half of our verse refers to G'd who manifested Himself through orchestrating
the Exodus from Egypt, whereas the second half refers to G'd redeeming us from any kind of
exile, i.e. the final redemption. Please compare what I have written on Exodus 20,2.

26:14

‫ואם לא תשמעו לי‬, "And if you will fail to hearken to Me, etc." We need to know where
obedience to G'd ever was something optional at the beginning of our portion so that the
Torah would be justified in introducing this paragraph with the conditional "if." The
paragraph should simply have commenced with the words: "If you despise My statutes, etc."
Apparently, the wording of the Torah in this verse shows that the meaning of the opening
paragraph of the portion "if you will walk in My statutes" refers to precoccupation with Torah
study and not to performance of any specific commandmments. This is why the Torah is able
to consider the alternative in our verse as something which is related to one's hearing. It is
similar to Isaiah 55,3: "listen so that you will live," or Proverbs 1,5 "the wise will listen and
increase learning." Inasmuch as the Torah intended to convey so many different lessons with
the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬as I have demonstrated, the failure to exercise these options are at the
root of all the misfortunes which will befall the Jewish people if they ignore such glorious
opportunities as offered by the Torah in the opening verse of our portion.

Furthermore, seeing that the Torah is about to discuss the result of not carrying out G'd's
wishes the Torah pinpoints the root of such non-observance as being the failure to listen to the
Torah's instructions by not studying the Torah. Concerning this we learned in Kidushin 30
that G'd told the Jewish people that the only antidote to the danger of succumbing to the
temptations by the evil urge is Torah, i.e. study of Torah and performance of its precepts.

Our paragraph is also concerned with awakening sleeping hearts. If someone pursues a path
which is not good this is only proof that he has not acquired knowledge about G'd and the
good he would derive by serving the Lord. We may therefore understand the conditional "if
you will not listen" in the sense of "if you fail to understand." Failure to understand the
advantages of serving the Lord may result in someone refusing to do so. The prophet Isaiah
summed it up when he said that Israel went into exile as a direct result of lack of knowledge
(Isaiah 5,13).

Another message contained in our verse is derived from the Torah's emphasis on the words
‫ולא תעשו את כל המצות‬, "and you will not perform all the commandments, etc." Seeing we
have explained on the words ‫ אם בחקתי תלכו‬that one's preoccupation with Torah protects one
against and saves one from the evil urge (Sotah 21), the Torah here spells out the condition
both positively and negatively, i.e. what will happen if you study Torah for My sake, and
what will happen if you do not study for the right reasons. G'd reminds us that even if we
study Torah as long as we do not do so for the sake of G'd and perform the commandments,
Torah will not act as a shield for us against the evil urge.

Another nuance contained in our verse is the message that even preparedness to perform all
the commandments is of not much use by itself; unless one has studied Torah in depth one
simply is not able to perform all its precepts properly. As a result such performance cannot
protect one against temptation by the evil urge. We may also understand this pronouncement
along the lines of Menachot 110 on the verse "This is the Torah of the burnt-offering
(Leviticus 6,2)." If one studies the details of the legislation of the sacrifices nowadays when
there is no chance to translate one's knowledge into practice, he has fulfilled the
commandment better than when the Temple stood and one performed the actual sacrificial
rites without knowing all its details.

The word ‫ לי‬in our verse reminds us that failure to heed the words of Torah is similar to
someone refusing to listen to his king when he wants to speak to his subject. The words ‫אם לא‬
‫ תשמעו לי‬are G'd's way of saying that He, personally, will feel insulted by our failure to study
Torah.

You may also understand the verse as conveying a message similar to that in Jeremiah 16,11:
"and Me they have forsaken and My Torah they have not observed." Rabbi Moshe Alshech
explains this verse by means of a parable. He warns that the Israelites should not think that
because they studied Torah this would neutralise their abominations including idol worship as
proved by the fact that the Temple had not been destroyed while idol worship was going on
for hundreds of years. The Torah explains here what the parameters are to be. "If you do not
listen to Me this will lead to non-performance of My commandments and eventual
destruction." If, however, you listen to Me, i.e. your attitude to G'd is positive, even if you do
not fulfil all the commandments, this will not bring about catastrophe either on a personal or
national level.

Another way of justifying the opening words of our paragraph is that G'd is aware of how
man's mind and heart functions and of the machinations of the evil urge which exploits man's
psyche. G'd therefore decided to address the very first stage of any seduction planned by the
evil urge. We have explained repeatedly that Satan is well aware of the intimate relationship
between G'd and Israel as a result of which he never counsels that a Jew commit acts of
outright rebellion against G'd and His Torah. Satan works far more insidiuously. He will
ostensibly agree that everything written in the Torah is, of course, binding on a Jew but that
all the additional ordinances with which the sages have surrounded Biblical Law are not really
of significance and may be ignored without peril to oneself. Once a person begins to consider
if there is merit to that argument he has already been entrapped by the evil urge.

In our verse the Torah addresses two kinds of seductions. 1) "If you do not hearken to Me;"
this is a reference to G'd having authorised the Torah scholars to make ordinances. This
authority is based on Deut. 17,12; "Any man who deliberately fails to listen to the priest who
stands to minister to the Lord your G'd, that man shall die." The reason the Torah insisted on
writing the word ‫ לי‬in our verse is to remind us that anyone who questions the authority of the
rabbis is as if he questioned G'd Himself (compare Sanhedrin 110). The word ‫ לי‬means: "it
concerns Me." Moreover, the sages are considered as the "Sanctuary" of the Lord.

Concerning the second kind of seductive tactic by Satan namely his trying to convince us that
the number of positive commandments is unnecessarily large, the Torah writes: "and you will
not perform all these commandments." The Torah also implies here that if someone fails to
believe in the authority of the sages to interpret the law he most certainly will not fulfil any
commandment. The reason is simple. The definition of the 613 commandments (‫ )מנין המצות‬is
something which the sages of former generations have determined. Anyone who does not
accept that principle is not considered as having observed any of the commandments. When
the Torah speaks of ‫ ולא תעשו‬this is merely the result of not listening. [The letter ‫ ו‬is not meant
as an alternative to the words ‫ואם לא תשמעו‬. Ed.]

26:15
‫ואם בחקתי תמאסו‬, "And if you will despise My statutes, etc." Why did the Torah have to
repeat the conditional word ‫ ואם‬once more instead of being content with the opening word ‫ואם‬
in the previous verse? Besides, why did the Torah write ‫ בחקתי‬instead of merely ‫חקתי תמאסו‬,
"you will despise My statutes?" The letter ‫ ב‬is no more appropriate for describing a negative
attitude to G'd's statutes than it would have been to the reference about G'd's social laws of
which the Torah merely says ‫את משפטי תגעל נפשכם‬, "your soul abhors My social laws" without
adding the letter ‫ ב‬in front of the word ‫משפטי‬. Moreover, why does the Torah again use the
word ‫ ואם‬when speaking of our attitude to G'd's ‫ ?משפטים‬Why did the Torah not simply lump
together our attitudes to both G'd's statutes and G'd's social laws by writing ‫ואם בחוקותי תמאסו‬,
or something similar? Furthermore, why does the Torah describe the attitude of the sinners to
the "statutes" as one of ‫מאוס‬, i.e. "despicable," whereas the attitude to the social laws is
described as ‫תגעל נפשכם‬, "something your soul abhors," i.e. a stronger form of rejection?
Having already described the sinful Israelites' attitude to G'd's respective commandments,
why did the Torah have to elaborate that "they would refuse to carry out all these
commandments?" The Torah had already mentioned in verse 14 that we speak about a
situation when the Jews would not carry out the positive commandments! We had offered an
explanation to that statement but we must not forget that the verse must make sense as it is
written! What does the Torah mean by adding: "to break My covenant?"

Clearly, we must understand the wording of these verses as corresponding to the manner in
which Satan operates in seducing us into neglecting G'd's commandments. Satan is clever
enough to attack the weakest link in the chain, i.e. observance of the commandments called
‫חקים‬, the ones for which the Torah does not offer a reason and which we ourselves find
impossible to rationalise. Satan appeals to us on two fronts; on the one hand he claims that it
is impossible to believe that someone as clever as G'd could have legislated laws that appear
to make no sense. Alternately, he argues that granted that G'd may indeed have legislated such
a law, but surely the legislation was not meant to be understood literally. Once Satan finds
that he has the attention of his prospective victim he begins to attack other commandments
also even though they appear to have good reasons. He will then easily inveigle his victim to
transgress one of G'd's commandments due to some ficticious argument he presented. The
doubts he sowed in his victim's mind previously had already caused the victim to become
somewhat removed from holiness. Once a person has committed the first sin without
experiencing negative fallout it becomes ever easier for his evil urge to lead him further
astray. Eventually the evil urge will convince a person that instead of facing punishment for
each one of his transgressions he might as well commit a trangression of a cardinal nature and
face only a single punishment for that transgression, i.e. his treason against the covenant he
became a party to at Mount Sinai.

The verses we have here confront the different stages of seduction and deception by the evil
urge. The Torah first deals with the opening argument of the seducer which was aimed at
undermining observance of the ‫ חקים‬by saying "if you will despise those of My
commandments which have no rationale;" our sages in Bamidbar Rabbah 19, portray both
Satan and the nations of the world as questioning the reason for the law of the red heifer. The
letter ‫ ב‬in the word ‫בחקתי‬, is a letter denoting a reason. You may translate the verse as: "If you
despise My statutes because they do not have a rationale, etc." The Torah continues with the
word ‫ואם‬, leading to the next level of seduction by Satan, i.e. that you may follow up your
initial sin by even transgressing some negative commandment. The additional ‫ ואם‬also means
that there is separate culpability for failing to observe negative commandments.
Concerning the second assault on us by Satan, his attempt to seduce us further, the Torah
writes ‫ואם את משפטי תגעל נפשכם‬, this is a reference to commandments for which there is ample
rationale. The reason the Torah uses the stronger "your soul loathes them" is that unless one
did so what possible reason could a Jew have to defy those of G'd's laws which are
demonstrably beneficial and reasonable? Ignoring G'd's statutes could at least be due to one's
failure to appreciate the purpose of that legislation.

Another reason why the Torah attributes non-observance of the social laws to such strong
feelings on the part of the sinner may reflect a statement in the Sefer Hayashar by Rabbenu
Tam chapter 9 who views an attitude such as described here as reflecting a diseased psyche
and body. Berachot 61 describes this as saying that the wicked are judged by their evil
passions. This is the reason the Torah writes ‫לבלתי עשות את כל מצותי‬, such people object to
doing anything which G'd has said merely because G'd has said it. Finally, the words ‫להפרכם‬
‫ את בריתי‬are the Torah's reference to Satan's ultimate challenge when he asks his victim to
commit a provocative act against G'd justifying it by promising his victim that he then will
have to face only a single penalty namely the one for that ultimate act of rebellion. The Torah
goes on record that the prospective sinner should not be deceived but that he would be held
culpable for all his transgressions. We also have this spelled out in Ezekiel 25,8 and Ezekiel
20,33 respectively. Satan had argued that the same rules which apply to mankind at large also
apply to Yehudah (25,8), whereas the prophet threatens Israel in the name of G'd that it will
be treated with G'd's full retributive arm (20,33).

The verses under discussion may also be understood along the lines of the Zohar volume 1
page 100 that in order to achieve perfection in one's service of the Lord three ingredients have
to be present, i.e. thought, speech, and deed. By repeating the word ‫ואם‬, the Torah alludes to
all of these three factors. The words ‫ ואם לא תשמעו‬refer to a flaw in one's speech when serving
G'd; the words ‫ ולא תעשו‬refer to a flaw in the deeds required when serving the Lord. The
words ‫ ואם בחקתי תמאסו‬refer to flaws in the thought processes which accompany one's service
of G'd. Inasmuch as one's thoughts are generated both in one's brain and in one's heart, the
Torah employed the term ‫ תמאסו‬when speaking about thoughts originating in one's brain,
whereas it used the term ‫ תגעל נפשכם‬when referring to thoughts originating in one's heart.

It is also possible that the Torah speaks here about three different spiritual levels that are
present amongst the Jewish people. One level comprises the Torah scholars, the spiritual elite
of the people whose principal concern is Torah and service of the Lord. Concerning this group
of people the Torah says ‫ואם לא תשמעו לי‬, "if you do not hearken to Me, etc." Seeing that this
group of people have to be most circumspect in their performance of the commandments it is
essential that they listen to every detail of the Torah's instructions else they forfeit their very
lives. We are given an example of this in Yuma 86 where the scholars themselves debate the
nature of the sin of desecrating G'd's Holy Name. What may not be considered as desecration
of the Holy Name for one person may yet rank as such for another, depending on his stature in
the community. Rav said that if he entered a butcher store and did not pay immediately this
would be accounted as a desecration of G'd's name (seeing onlookers would assume he
received it for free as a sort of bribe.) Rabbi Yochanan said that if he walked around for a
distance of 4 cubits without Talit and phylacteries this would be accounted against him as the
sin of desecrating the name of the Lord. Concerning such people the Torah wrote: "if you will
not hearken to Me." The Torah adds: "and you will not perform all these commandments."
What is meant by the word all is that such Torah scholars must observe the commandments
down to the very last detail otherwise it would be held against them as a great sin. There is
another category of Jews who are not well versed in the Torah but who are intelligent and
certainly understand the difference between right and wrong, and who are careful to practice
the virtue of gratitude. Concerning this category the Torah writes ‫ ואם בחקתי תמאסו‬that if they
display disdain for the statutes because they do not understand their reasons G'd will punish
them although He will not punish them for performance of the commandments without
attention to all the finer points. There is a third category, the fools, whose knowledge is so
limited that they will not perform the statutes at all, but not because they despise them.
Concerning this latter category the Torah writes: ‫ ;ואת משפטי תגעל נפשכם‬G'd will hold such
fools responsible for their sins only if they loathe social laws which even they are fully
conversant with and the need for which they can fully understand. This latter category of
people will not be punished by the penalties listed in the remainder of this chapter. G'd will
treat them as if they had sinned inadverently.

‫לבלתי עשות את כל מצותי‬, "not to carry out all My commandments." G'd limits retribution to
people who are still bent on defying Him by not performing the commandments. If such
people have changed their attitude and plan on observing the commandments G'd will hold off
punishing them until they have had a chance to prove their penitence. G'd may even hold off
punishing people who have not yet expressed the intention to mend their ways but concerning
whom G'd knows that they will do so.

‫להפרכם את בריתי‬, "to break My covenant." G'd makes the punishments in store for the
Jewish people in the verses following dependent on their intention to break the covenant by
their failure to observe the Torah. People who violate G'd's commandments merely because it
is less burdensome for them or they believe they will enjoy life better by doing so ( ‫מומר‬
‫ )לתאבון‬are not included in what the rest of this chapter threatens in the way of retribution.
Torat Kohanim writes as follows on the verse ‫ואם לא תשמעו‬: "There are people who do not
study the Torah but they do observe its commandments. Concerning such people the Torah
wrote that they will be punished only ‫ולא תעשו‬, if they fail to observe the commandments.
There are other people who neither study nor practice Torah laws but they do not despise
others who are observant. Concerning such people the Torah writes that as long as they do not
despise G'd's statutes the list of retribution which follows does not apply to them. All those
who neither study, nor perform and at the same time despise others who are observant and
who hate the Torah scholars to boot are included in the description ‫תגעל נפשכם‬. Finally, there
are people who actively prevent other Jews from observing the commandments. This latter
category is meant by the words ‫לבלתי עשות‬, 'they do not let others perform.'" Thus far Torat
Kohanim. According to what we have just quoted from Torat Kohanim one forms the
impression that the whole chapter of the retribution G'd threatens is addressed only to the final
category of sinners who not only anger G'd on purpose but interfere with the observance of
the Torah by other Jews. If so, we must ask ourselves why the Torah bothered to list any of
the other categories of sinners altogether? The reason the Torah was not content to list only
the last category of sinner is that the Torah wanted to describe the stages that lead a sinner to
eventually become so entrapped by his evil urge that he even prevents other Jews from
observing their religion. When reading the entire passage one appreciates the terrible
consequences which ensue if one takes the first step in ignoring our traditions. This is what
Jeremiah 9,12 had in mind when he describes the loss of Jewish statehood as due to the
people forsaking the Torah and not listening to G'd's voice. It is the first step away from
tradition which is crucial.

26:16
‫אף אני אעשה זאת לכם‬, "I will also do this unto you, etc." The meaning of the word ‫ אני‬is the
attribute of Mercy. G'd says that under the circumstances even the attribute of Mercy will
agree to the acts of retribution the Torah is about to describe as being performed by the
attribute of Justice.

‫והפקדתי עליכם בהלה‬, "I will appoint terror to afflict you, etc." G'd's selection of the list of
afflictions enumerated here corresponds to the negative virtues of the wicked. Inasmuch as
their principal sin is the neglect of Torah study G'd measured the people with the same
yardstick. Torah has been compared to fire (compare Jeremiah 23,29) "is not My word like
fire says the Lord."

You have to appreciate that the Torah brings out three good qualities in a man's soul. 1)
Preoccupation with words of Torah effectively refines man's soul much as the fire of the
crucible refines ore into pure metal. As a result such a person does not need to descend into
‫שאול‬, hades, after he dies so that his soul will be cleansed by the fires of Hell. Chagigah 27
describes the fire of Torah as being more powerful than the fire of Gehinom. The fires of
Gehinom will therefore not make any impression on the soul of a person who has spent his
life in Torah study. This is why Shemot Rabbah 7,4 describes Gehinom as complaining that it
does not like the righteous as they undermine its power and extinguish its fire. The second
advantage derived by Torah is that it illuminates one's eyes. The Israelites require a great light
in order to be able to benefit from the brilliance of the ‫שכינה‬, G'd's presence. G'd gave us the
Torah which is called light (compare Proverbs 6,23) out of His great love for us. Torah study
will enhance our power of vision. The degree of one's perception of the divine is in direct
ratio to the amount of Torah one has studied. Isaiah 42,7 calls all the people who have not
studied Torah "blind ones," describing the power of Torah as making the blind see. The third
advantage that accrues to the person who studies Torah is that it gladdens his heart; we know
this both from Psalms 19,9: "G'd's precepts gladden the heart of man," as well as from Psalms
97,11: "and for the upright there is radiance." Just as there are three distinct advantages which
accrue to people studying Torah there are three kinds of corresponding penalties for those
who fail to do so. Instead of the purifying fire of Torah study, G'd will smite those who failed
to study with a destructive kind of fire, ‫שחפת וקדחת‬, different kinds of fever. The reason the
Torah also speaks about ‫בהלה‬, terror, is because it is the reverse of the peace of mind one
experiences as the result of engaging in Torah study. Whereas G'd had granted ‫מאור עינים‬,
enhanced vision, to people immersing themselves in Torah, G'd will deprive those who failed
to study Torah by ‫מכלות עינים‬, failure of their eyesight. Whereas G'd had granted joy to the
people who did study Torah, He will afflict those who failed to do so with ‫מדיבת נפש‬, feelings
of melancholy.

Our paragraph also contains an allusion to success of the people studying Torah in the
celestial spheres. We are taught in Uktzin 3,12 (the final Mishnah in the oral Torah) that in the
future G'd will let every righteous person inherit 310 worlds. It is a well known fact that the
negative experiences the wicked have to look forward to parallel the positive experiences
which the righteous will enjoy. Kohelet 7,14 has already spelled this out when Solomon said:
"G'd has made one as well as the other." Just as the 310 worlds described in the above
mentioned Mishnah are distinguished one from the other in quality, so the 310 possible
domains of afflictions for the sinners are also each different from its counterpart. Their
common denominator is called ‫קרי‬, the word ‫ריק‬, empty, spelled backwards. This is the
mystical dimension of ‫וזרעתם לריק זרעכם‬, "you will sow your seed in vain." [In talmudic
parlance the word ‫ קרי‬often refers to the result of semen which has gone to waste, i.e. which is
"empty" of content. Ed.] Instead of 310 worlds the wicked can look forward to 310 different
kinds of emptiness. The 310 worlds which the Mishnah spoke about are based on Proverbs
8,21: ‫להנחיל לאוהבי יש‬, That G'd will give an inheritance to the righteous described as
something substantial. The numerical value of the word ‫ יש‬is 310. The numerical value of the
word ‫ריק‬, empty, is also 310. The Torah therefore threatens the wicked with the exact
opposite it promises to the righteous. The number of spiritually negative manifestations of the
‫ קליפה‬is 310. The Torah uses the word "sowing," as it is also applicable to activities of a
spiritual nature such as in Hoseah 10,12: "sow righteousness for yourselves!" ‫ואכלוהו אויביכם‬
"and your enemies will consume it." The powers of the ‫ קליפה‬derive pleasure from the
activities of the wicked. The Torah describes them as "the enemy of man."

26:17

‫ונתתי פני בכם‬, "And I will set My face against you, etc." The Torah speaks of G'd's angry
"face." The reason that justice or judgment is called ‫פנים‬, face, is that there is always a group
of creatures whose whole intent is to bring about destruction. They are therefore described as
"the face of G'd," i.e. the ones facing the presence of G'd. The words: "I will set My face
against you" are addressed to these evil forces. The words: "and you will fall before your
enemies" are about the Gentile nations all of which are branches of these forces of evil. The
word ‫ פני‬may also mean that G'd will not hide His face from them even while He delivers the
Israelites into the hands of their enemies, otherwise they would perish, G'd forbid. The Torah
reveals the intent of G'd only at the very end of the passage in the words of verse 44. The
reason the Torah writes the word ‫ בכם‬here is to emphasise that at this stage G'd's anger will
become manifest against the people not against the Sanctuary. The Sanctuary will become the
victim of G'd's anger only at a later stage than that discussed in our verse.

26:18

‫לא תשמעו לי‬, "you do not listen to Me." Teshuvah is made conditional on "listening" to G'd,
i.e. studying Torah. True repentance is impossible without Torah study.

‫" שבע על חטאתיכם‬sevenfold for your sins." The Torah does not mean that G'd will exact
seven retributions for each sin but that G'd will exact retribution for the sins of the Jewish
people which number seven. The punishment will fit the crime both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The seven sins consist of the following: 1) failure to listen; 2) failure to
perform; 3) relating to the statutes with disdain; 4) loathing of G'd's social laws; 5) preventing
others from performing the commandments; 6) breaking G'd's covenant; 7) remaining
unaffected by G'd's penalties and thereby closing the gates of repentance. This explains what
the sages meant when they said in Rosh Hashanah 16 that three books are open in front of G'd
on New Year's Day; one contains the names of the totally wicked; one contains the names of
the totally righteous, and one contains the names of the "average" people (the ones whose
merits and demerits are in balance). The latter are given until the Day of Atonement to see if
they will repent. If they fail to do so they will automatically be inscribed in the book of the
confirmed sinners.

26:19

‫ושברתי את גאון עזכם‬, "And I will break the pride of your power." According to Torat
Kohanim our verse speaks of the Holy Temple and its destruction. Seeing the Jewish people
did not repent in spite of their afflictions G'd will deprive them of the Holy Temple. The Jews
erred in thinking that as long as the Temple remained standing this was proof that G'd related
to them positively.

26:20

‫ותם לריק כחכם‬, "and your strength will be spent in vain." The meaning is the same as if the
Torah had written ‫ותם כחכם לריק‬, meaning that your entire efforts will be to no avail. The
Torah had to tell us this as the power of destructive forces often is only partially effective.

26:21

‫ואם תלכו עמי קרי‬, "and if you walk contrary unto Me, etc." Inasmuch as the afflictions
which have been visited upon the Jewish people are clearly the hand of G'd, their failure to
react is described as walking contrary to G'd.

‫שבע כחטאתיכם‬, "seven times more, according to your sins." Even though the Israelites had
not become guilty of additional sins the fact that they had not become penitent is accounted as
if the sins had been committed anew.

26:22

‫חית השדה‬. "the wild beasts of the field." Inasmuch as the Israelites were guilty of behaving
like animals they in turn will be afflicted by animals.

26:24

‫והלכתי אף אני עמכם בקרי‬, "and then I will also walk contrary unto you." This means that
from now on G'd will not bother any longer to make the afflictions fit the sins committed so
that the very afflictions would serve as a reminder to do ‫תשובה‬. Up until this point G'd had
brought the kinds of retribution which could be traced to specific sins the people had been
guilty of. Up until then G'd had done as the Psalmist describes in Psalms 62,13: "You pay
each man according to his deeds." From now on the people will be deprived of the positive
effect of the afflictions as they cannot relate them to any sins they have committed.

26:29

‫ואכלתם בשר בניכם‬, "and you will eat the flesh of your own sons." The reason the Torah
repeats this statement by also writing: "you will eat the flesh of your daughters" is to tell you
that even after having eaten the flesh of their sons their pity will not have been stirred and
they will continue by eating the flesh of their daughters.

It is also possible that the Torah stresses that the sons will be eaten first so that they would not
try and escape when they observed their parents getting ready to eat their daughters. The
daughters were weaker and therefore less likely to escape.

It is also possible that the reason the parents would eat the sons first is because according to
Rashi on Shabbat 66 fathers display extraordinary leniency and mercy towards sons. Once
they had consumed the sons they would certainly not feel any compunction about also
consuming their daughters.
26:30

‫וגעלה נפשי אתכם‬, "and My soul will abhor you." Why did the Torah have to spell this out? It
is something that we can extrapolate from verse 11 where G'd had said that as long as the
Israelites would observe the commandments they would be blessed in that G'd would not
abhor them. Clearly such a blessing would not continue when the people turned sinful. If G'd
wanted to write how blessings would be reversed during periods when the Jewish people
rebelled against G'd, the Torah should have presented all of the previously mentioned
blessings as being reversed.

We must assume therefore, that G'd listed the various punishments independent of the fact
that the blessings would now be absent. I believe the message of the verse is that even the
righteous who would live during these times when the bulk of the people turned sinful would
not enjoy a display of G'd's favour. We find a statement to this effect in Hoseah 4,5 that "even
the prophet who is among you will stumble." Another meaning of all this is that the gift of
prophecy will be withdrawn [or handed to totally ineffectual individuals such as children or
idiots, Ed.] so that no longer will there be prophets to admonish the people. G'd's "soul"
manifests itself through His communication with His prophets. This is just about the worst
curse there is and it is the reason the Torah mentioned it only after having already listed many
other curses. Tragically, we are still witnessing this curse as being in effect in our own days.

26:31

‫ונתתי את עריכם חרבה‬, "and I will turn your cities into ruins." The Torah means that not only
will our cities no longer be a model for other nations but that they will be inferior to the
civilisation of the Gentile nations. This is a source of great distress. Isaiah had this in mind
when he described the cities of Yehudah and Zion as being turned into a desert (Isaiah 64,9)
unless the Jewish people would mend their ways.

‫והשימותי את מקדשיכם‬, "and I will make your Sanctuaries desolate." This is a reference to
symbols of impurity in the Temple. The forces of the ‫ קליפה‬are also known as ‫שממון‬.

‫ולא אדיח בריח ניחחכם‬. "and I will not savour the fragrance of your sweet odours." This
means that G'd will not even be pleased by the good deeds of the Jewish peolpe at that time.
Good deeds also qualify for the description ‫ריח ניחח‬, sweet odour. Jeremiah made the same
point in Lamentations 3, 5 ‫שתם תפלתי‬, "He shut out my prayers."

26:32

‫והשמותי אני את הארץ‬, "And I will make the land desolate, etc." The reason the Torah uses
the word ‫ אני‬although it is implied in the word ‫ והשמותי‬is to identify the Attribute of G'd
causing this desolation. It is the attribute of mercy. Torat Kohanim explains that the
desolation of the land is intended to deny our enemies the pleasure of what had been our land
before they conquered it.

26:33

‫ואתכם אזרה בגוים‬, "And you I will scatter among the nations." This verse is best explained
in conjunction with what we have learned in Ketuvot 111 that G'd made the (Jews) people
swear three (two) oaths at the time they went into exile.. 1) they would not try and recapture
the land of Israel by force of arms; 2) they would not start a rebellion against their host
countries while in exile. 3) G'd made the nations swear that they would not oppress the Jews
excessively. In our verse the Torah alludes to two things. The word ‫ אזרה‬alludes to the oath
not to try and recapture the land of Israel by force. The word ‫ בגוים‬refers to the oath not to
start a rebellion against the host countries. The words ‫והריקותי אחריכם חרב‬, "I will draw out the
sword after you," is a threat that if the Israelites do not abide by the oaths mentioned G'd
would make their lives ‫הפקר‬, abandoned property. The words ‫" והיתה ארצכם שממה‬your land
will be waste-land," is the reason why G'd has to scatter the Israelites among the nations.
Otherwise He could not fulfil His decree for the land to rest by not being worked and thus
make up for the failure of the Jewish people to observe the ‫ שמטה‬years while they occupied
the land. This is also why the Torah emphasises that all this would happpen while the Jewish
people are in exile, i.e. ‫ואתם‬, "as for you."

26:36

‫והנשארים בכם‬, "As to those of you who are still left, etc." Here the Torah refers to Israelites
who continue in their wicked ways in spite of having experienced all the curses listed come
true. At this stage G'd announces that such people would be afflicted with faint-heartedness
while they are in exile and they would experience fear without cause and fall even without
being pursued. In spite of all the terrible experiences the Jewish people undergo while in exile
they will not be wiped out as a nation.

26:40

‫והתודו את עונם‬, "And they will confess their sins, etc." Earlier commentators have not
explained these verses to our satisfaction; most of their commentaries are too far fetched to be
taken seriously. One of the reasons is that there appears no reason why the Jewish people at
that time should confess the sins of their ancestors. As soon as they confess their own sins
they are no longer guilty of perpetuating the evil ways of their fathers (compare Berachot 7).
Secondly, why did the Torah (verse 41) write: "also I will walk contrary unto them?" Why
does the Torah mention a punishment after the people have already confessed their sins?
Thirdly, why does the Torah speak about G'd bringing the Israelites into the land of their
enemies when we have heard this already in verse 33? Fourthly, what is the meaning of the
words ‫או אז יכנע לבבם הערל‬, "or perhaps their uncircumcised heart will be humbled?"
Nachmanides interprets the word "or" as alluding to the two possible causes of the eventual
redemption. Either it would occur due to repentance on a nation-wide scale or it would occur
because G'd's timetable had been exhausted and the Jews had experienced sufficient
punishment during their long years in exile. I believe this is a very forced explanation..

I believe the appropriate approach to these verses is an examination of the causes of sinful
conduct by the people. The people who experienced G'd's retribution on their own bodies had
first observed how their fathers and forefathers had failed to observe the Torah and G'd had
not seemed to react. The sinners appeared to have prospered. As a result of G'd's long-lasting
patience, even reading in the Torah all the warnings about what would happen if we failed to
observe the Torah or even listening to the warnings of the prophets became progressively less
effective. The evidence of the people's eyes contradicted what they read in the Torah. As a
result it became impossible to warn people of the disastrous results in store if they continued
to ignore the Torah's precepts. In fact, the so-called facts undermined the people's belief in the
whole concept of reward and punishment. This is why once G'd began to exact the retribution
He had warned of such misfortunes as befell the Jewish people they would not be recognised
as part of G'd's system of reward and punishment. Only after most of the dire warnings in the
Torah had actually occurred, matching what the prophets had warned of for a long time,
would the people begin to recognise it for what it was. G'd therefore demanded that when the
time came the Israelites would not only have to acknowledge and confess their own sins, but
unless they also confessed that their fathers and ancestors had been at fault, confessions of
their own misdemeanours would not guarantee that this would not occur again.

Confessing their fathers' sins reinforces the people's confession of their own sins as it deprives
them of the argument that whatever sins they had committed were no worse than what their
fathers had committed without being punished. When the Torah writes ‫ואף אשר הלכו עמי בקרי‬,
"even though they walked contrary unto Me," this is the Torah's way of explaining the reason
why the Israelites interpreted their misfortunes as being accidental, ‫מקרה‬, rather than as a
natural consequence of continued defiance of Torah precepts. The people would have to
confess this error as an additional sin.

26:41

‫אף אני אלך עמם בקרי‬, "Also I will walk with them as if accidental." Part of what the people
have to acknowledge as part of their confession is that all G'd's retributions were justified.
Even G'd's having withdrawn His personal supervision over the fate of the Jews must be
acknowledged.

‫והבאתי אותם‬, "and I will bring them, etc." This is also part of what the people will say as
part of their confession. The fact that the Torah demands that the people acknowledge that
their exile was part of G'd's punishment in line with His warnings indicates that they had
previously denied that their exile was connected to their wrongdoing. The people had argued
that if G'd really wanted to use His retribution to result in the people's repentance, exile was a
peculiar means to achieve this. They reasoned that exile was bound to result in assimilation,
the very reverse of what G'd wanted to achieve by disciplining His people. Such
considerations reinforced the people's thinking that what had befallen them was accidental
and not part of G'd's design. This is why G'd wrote that they have to confess also their
erroneous assessment of why they had experienced all the curses predicted in the Torah.

The words ‫ או אז‬mean that the exiled Israelites attribute their presence in other countries to be
a result of natural migration or as an attempt by G'd to induce humility in them. G'd had
known from experience that a sinner may humble himself such as Achav the king of Israel
(Kings I 21, 27-29). Our sages in Berachot 7 have said that "better one severe chastisement
which results in the sinner feeling humbled than 100 lashes of the whip (as these are effective
only externally). Following such a humbling of oneself their guilt may become something
they can acknowledge and come to terms with."

26:42

‫וזכרתי את בריתי יעקוב‬, "And I will remember My covenant, the one with Jacob, etc." The
Torah announces here that whereas the confession of their guilt helps to reduce the severity of
the afflictions to which G'd subjects the Jewish people, G'd has to invoke the merit of the
patriarchs in order to restore them to their former status

The verse also supplies an additional reason for G'd having driven the Jewish people into
exile into the land of their enemies. The abuse the people would be subjected to there will
become the catalyst that will make G'd remember the merit of the patriarchs. In addition, G'd
will remember the sad state of the Holy Land while its people are absent. If G'd had not first
exiled the Jews He would not have any reason to remember the land itself with special
kindness. As it is, the sequence ‫והארץ אזכר‬.…‫ וזכרתי את בריתי‬makes perfect sense.

‫את בריתי יעקוב‬, if the merit of Jacob suffices, all well and good; if not G'd will also invoke the
merit of Isaac, etc.

26:43

‫והארץ תעזב מהם…יען וביען‬, "And the land shall be forsaken without them..…because,
even because, etc." The words ‫ יען וביען‬may be understood as expressing a sentiment similar
to that of Jeremiah 9,12. The Talmudists (Baba Metzia 85) had grappled with the question
why the land should have to be punished for the sins of the Israelites. Finally, G'd Himself
explained the reason through the words of Jeremiah we have quoted. Once the people had
failed to observe the Torah, the land itself was no longer interested in being occupied by the
Jewish people. This reason becomes more plausible in view of the Torah's statement that
during the years of Israel's exile the land had a chance to experience the many ‫ שמטה‬years
Israel had ignored. We therefore have two good reasons why the punishment of exile was
appropriate.

The words ‫ יען וביען‬reflect these two reasons. The Torah repeats once more: 1) ‫במשפטי מאסו‬,
i.e. neglect of the Shemittah legislation; 2) ‫ואת חקתי געלה נפשם‬, "and their soul abhorred My
statutes;" they hated Torah study. It is clear from the end that if the Israelites had been guilty
of only one of these categories of sins their punishment would have taken a different form
altogether. If the people had only neglected to study the Torah but had observed the shemittah
legislation at least they would not have experienced exile.

26:44

‫ואף גם זאת בהיותם‬, "And yet even when they are in the land of their enemies, etc." How
can this verse which speaks of a favour G'd does to the exiled Jewish people be part of this
sequence of dire predictions? Perhaps this is a reference to the earlier part where G'd
explained that He was entitled to withdraw His providence from the people because they had
accused Him of having done so. G'd goes on record that He does not withhold His supervision
from the people and does not despise them [even though the people may not be aware of it.
Ed.]

The verse may also supply another consideration why exile actually saved the Jewish people.
We explained, based on Midrash Tehillim 69 that G'd vented His anger on the stones and the
trees in order to spare as many of the human beings as possible. Had the Jews remained in the
land of Israel they themselves would have experienced G'd's anger on their bodies, much as
did the land itself. Moreover, the presence of a people who had formerly been so exalted with
Jerusalem as their capital, now languishing in foreign lands, maltreated by pagan kings, would
satisfy even the attribute of Justice so that it would not insist on their utter destruction. The
words ‫ ואף גם זאת‬are therefore to be understood as the cause why G'd wanted the Israelites to
experience exile among foreign and hostile nations.

‫להפר בריתי אתם‬, "to break My covenant with them." This is the covenant not to exchange
the Jewish people for another nation, a covenant G'd kept for the people who experienced the
Exodus. It is the deeper meaning of the words: "for I am the Lord their G'd." The sign of the
covenant is that G'd does not adopt another nation in our place. G'd's promise at the time of
‫ מתן תורה‬that the Jewish people would be an ‫ עם סגולה וממלכת כהנים‬was equivalent to a
covenant.

The verse may also refer to the second party to the covenant, the Torah, who would be
orphaned if G'd destroyed the Jewish people seeing no one would observe it. G'd would
therefore have broken His covenant both with the Jewish people and with the Torah.

26:45

‫וזכרתי להם כרית ראשונים‬, "And I will remember for their sakes the covenant with the
ancestors, etc." Torat Kohanim asks: "whence do we know that G'd concluded a covenant
with the tribes?" They quote our verse as the source. Perhaps we should understand this in the
way Jeremiah quotes G'd as remembering the time after the crossing of the sea of reeds when
the Israelites willingly followed G'd into the desert, etc. (compare Jeremiah 2,2). G'd goes on
record here that He will remember such deeds by our forefathers to their descendants in due
course. The word ‫ ראשונים‬refers to the first ever generation of the Jews as a people G'd
concluded a covenant with.

‫ סליק ספר ויקרא‬,‫חסלת פרשת בחוקתי‬