Russian Studies in Philosophy

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Eidetics and Logic in Losev's Methodology

ANDREI TASHCHIAN

To cite this article: ANDREI TASHCHIAN (2005) Eidetics and Logic in Losev's Methodology,
Russian Studies in Philosophy, 44:1, 44-61, DOI: 10.1080/10611967.2005.11063503

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44 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Russian Studies in Philosophy, vol. 44, no. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 44–61.
© 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
1061–1967/2005 $9.50 + 0.00.

ANDREI TASHCHIAN

Eidetics and Logic in

Losev’s Methodology

Philosophy is thinking in the concepts, logical thinking. For there is no reality

that would not also be thinking, and all determinations of being are at the same
time determinations of thinking. Thus, the universal subject of philosophy is the
concept itself, Logos itself. Hence philosophy always appears as the philosophy
of Logos.1
This is what philosophy is according to its concept. But in reality, in history, it
becomes for itself that which it is in itself originally only in its culminating stage.
In the historical form of philosophy as the becoming of the logical form, the oppo-
sition between thinking and being, subject and object, method and object, has not
yet reached its resolution in absolute unity, and the contradiction between them is
not yet fully sublated. For this reason, in many doctrines in the history of philoso-
phy that contained, to use Hegelian language, a deep speculative content, the form
of its expression, which was historical, remained unsatisfactory. Russian philoso-
phy claims to be the historical stage at which a reconciliation of the mentioned
contradictions is achieved. Thus, many of its representatives define it primarily as
the philosophy of Logos. As we know, one of its basic tendencies is to contrast
itself with the Western philosophical tradition. To a considerable degree the pro-
claimed “struggle for Logos” against the modern European Ratio manifests itself
in this. However, this claim must be certified and justified by the very content of
Russian philosophical thought, developed into a system of logical determinations.
Without that system logicality itself has the nature of randomness and is, there-
fore, untrue from a scientific point of view.

English translation © 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the original Russian text, “Eidetika
i logika v metodologii Loseva.” Presented at an international conference on Aleksei
Fedorovich Losev, “A.F. Losev and Twentieth-Century Human Sciences,” Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio, October 18–20, 2002.
Andrei Artomovich Tashchian is a candidate of philosophical sciences and a lecturer
at Kuban State University in Krasnodar.
Translated by Taras Zakydalsky.
44
 SUMMER 2005 45

The system, not in the sense of an externally imposed schema or abstract prin-
ciple, but as a concrete internal unity of definitions, was developed most fully in
Russian philosophy by “the last Russian philosopher,” A.F. Losev. The first ques-
tion, thus, is this: in his philosophy, did the concept-logos as content become the
unfolded concept-logos as form, that is, did the logos, the concept appear for Losev
the substantial form of being and thinking? Unfortunately, the answer to it can be
unambiguously negative. For the Russian thinker only eidos, the “total signifi-
cational [smyslovoi] countenance of the object” was such a form.
Yet, to be fair, one should note that in The Ancient Cosmos and Contemporary
Science [Antichnyi kosmos i sovremennaia nauka], Losev calls logos as well as
eidos a fundamental concept (3, 68). However, only one of them really can be a
substantial form. Otherwise the building of thought, divided in itself, would not
stand. Therefore, in the final analysis, Losev always subordinates logos to eidos,
making the former an aspect of the latter.
Such a subordination of logos to a different category of thought attests to the
incongruity in the Russian philosopher’s dialectic between its logical form and its
by no means logical content. The fact that the manifest contradiction is not sublated
should serve, obviously, as a sufficient reason for renouncing our initial assump-
tion that Losev’s dialectic as logic has generally the nature of a result for the devel-
opment of Russian philosophical thought.
Yet, in spite of our apodictic judgment, we must remember that without a more
substantial study of the raised question, this conclusion will remain abstract-
formal. Indeed it is completely possible that Losev’s idea of the content of the
concepts of eidos and logos is different from the definitions through which we
think them. We are right to propose our own solutions only if we find contradic-
tions in his thinking. Therefore it is necessary to examine relationship between the
concepts of eidos and logos in his philosophy.
Eidos, according to Losev, is the object [predmetnaia] essence in its absolute
significational expression, which is attained as a result of the “act” or “energy” of
the essence.2 But if eidos is in general “integral meaning,” then what is logos and
how does it appear?
The Losevan “deduction” of logos, as he presents it in The Philosophy of the
Name [Filosofiia imeni], can be reduced to the following propositions. Eidos in
dialectical antithetics is correlated with its other-being, “meon,” acting on it in a
formative way. As a result of formatting this extra-eidetic sphere a new signi-
ficational given—logos—is obtained. Thus the latter, according to Losev, is a newly
reconstructed meaning that is defined by its formal nature. Hence, Losev calls the
strictly logical aspect in the object essence nothing but the formal-logical aspect,
thus contrasting it with the “intuitive dialectical nature” of eidos. It appears from
this reasoning of the Russian philosopher that he completely identifies the logical
in general with the formal-logical, thus substituting the specificity of an object for
its universality.
We must also note the illegitimacy of Losev’s counterposing the formal nature
46 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

of logos to the dialectical nature of eidos. First, the formal nature of logos is its
definition as such, its quality, which strictly speaking posits the very being of logos.
The dialectical nature of eidos, according to the entire preceding logic of Losev’s
work, is still not posited by anything and can be viewed only as a “subjective
reflection” of an author who hurriedly reassures the reader that his object of in-
quiry possesses such and such properties. Among the properties of eidos such as
intuitiveness and pictorialness there is also dialecticality. A property, however, is
not a quality.3 The first is something “added” or accidental; the second has a sub-
stantial nature. Therefore Losev’s counterposing of logos and eidos in the men-
tioned respect is in no way logically justified. Second, dialecticality itself, according
to Losev, is something logical, since in many of his works he defines dialectics
precisely as logos,4 in particular, as the logos of eidos. But the logos of eidos,
certainly, is not eidos itself, but is exactly logos, even if Losev assigned it a formal
nature. Therefore, even if we reveal here an opposition between the dialectical and
the formal natures, it remains in any case an intralogical opposition, not an oppo-
sition between the eidetic and the logical spheres. The very fact that Losev defines
logos as formal follows merely from the fact that the concept appears in the pro-
cess of eidos’s forming of other-being. Therefore, the formal nature of logos in
Losev can have only one meaning; namely, that it is literally the form (µορφ´η) as
image, which by being in the “other” “acts in a formative way on that ‘other,’”
selects and unifies separate aspects into a whole, reinforces and conjoins into a
definite significational unity” (3, 702). At the same time, the entire subsequent
description of logos in The Philosophy of the Name presents it to us as an ab-
stract aspect of an object essence, as an abstraction from eidos. However, the
conception of logos as abstractness is by no means derived from its conception
as image. This logical incongruity can be explained by the fact that, because of
the homonymy of concepts, Losev in the succeeding argument commits the fal-
lacy of “quadrupling terms.” In fact Losev confused the use of “formal” in its
special sense with the traditional sense in which it means “abstracted from the
content.”5 And indeed, all the passion of Losev’s criticism of logism in general
hinges on this annoying misunderstanding!
Without having defined for himself a strict concept of formality, Losev voices
yet another judgment that contradicts his own conception. Thus, upon noting three
necessary aspects in each essence—the genealogical, eidetic, and genetic—the
thinker establishes the second of them as “the aspect of forming [emphasis added—
A.T.] a thing” (3, 683). Consequently, eidos now proves to be “formal.” But what
about logos? It is clear that we are dealing not with a purely logical contradiction,
but confusion caused by an insufficiently thought-out selection of terminology.
We find analogous deficiencies in Losev’s “deduction” of logos. According to
him, the “other” can be formed and given meaning only if the “intuitively-eidetic-
dialectical immediate wholeness and as it were pictorialness” serves as an “image
or paradigm” for it (3, 702). But an “image” for forming something can only be
form itself, an image itself (understood as a prototype). But in that case, following
 SUMMER 2005 47

the meaning of Losev’s expression, by form we must understand precisely eidos,

not logos, which again contradicts the general thrust of his reflections. Moreover,
by its very concept (as its etymology clearly indicates) eidos is only “a species (vid)
and, therefore, it cannot be the form (µορφ´η) or image, for in comparison with the
latter it is not determinate, that is, it is abstract.”6
Having fixed the logical (= formal-logical) aspect of the object essence and in
summing up his reasoning, Losev concludes: “From what I have said, it is also
clear that logos exists only in dependence on the eidos and, therefore, on essence;
it is the essence of eidos just as eidos is the essence of the apophatic X” (3, 703). A
real judgment is divided both logically and grammatically into two parts. Penetrat-
ing into the meaning of the first, we discover that this conclusion follows necessar-
ily from false premises. The meaning of the second, however, leads to confusion,
for if logos depends on eidos, then the latter must be the basis and essence of the
former. However, regardless of the fact whether the mentioned expression is a
lapsus linguae or rationis, Losev, without realizing it, expresses here the truth that
logos that is represented as the mediation of eidos is its essence and foundation
(just as essence itself mediates and “sublates” the sphere of being, making it an
aspect of itself). But this means only that the logical is more developed, more
concrete, than the eidetic.
After completing his “deduction,” Losev went on to a comparative description
of eidos and logos. This very fact shows that he did not succeed in producing a
valid dialectical derivation of the concept.
A comparative study is generally meant only as a preparatory stage and is used,
mainly, in the positive sciences. But in philosophy, if a concept is dialectically
derived, the definitions obtained through comparisons are completely superflu-
ous. Losev, in fact, understood, that the purpose of the description proposed by
him “was only to approximate a truly dialectical structure” (3, 707). However, the
fact that he intended “to obtain the basic and “essential formula” on the basis of
those “partial comparisons” immediately suggests to us that the deduction of logos
was inadequate. Nevertheless, keeping this inadequacy in mind, it makes sense to
analyze in detail the presented comparison of eidos and logos in the hope that this
will give us at least an analytical grasp of the content of these concepts.
The main “ point of resemblance” between eidos and logos that Losev notes is the
fact that both the first and the second is the “meaning of essence.” Their equivalence
in this aspect is self-evident in Losev, so that he even prefers to call the extra-eidetic
meon “alogical.” But the main thing, certainly, is that in which they differ. And here
he asserts, “the difference arises with the aspect of the givenness of that meaning.
The question is how is meaning given in eidos and how is it given in logos” (3, 703).
Let us immediately note that this way of posing the problem is dialectically
unacceptable. Emphasizing in our study objects only as given, that is, only as they
are in their evident being, we, first, leave them in indifferent solitariness and ab-
straction from each other. Eidos is eidos and is not logos. Logos is logos and is not
eidos. Either one or the other. This is the most rationalistic aliud—aliud [either one
48 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

or the other], the one-sidedness of which was pointed out by Hegel. Second, in
dialectics, as far as we know, the things distinguished by their essence are opposi-
tions that in turn constitute a contradiction. But the latter has to be sublated in that
which serves as its foundation. In Losev’s dialectics, however, we do not find such
a foundation, and the contradiction between eidos and logos remains unsublated.
Of course, we could object: “But as oppositions are not eidos and logos one
insofar as both the former and the latter are essence, meaning, in which their con-
tradiction is sublated in this way?” Responding to this controversy, let us recall
that for the mentioned categories the unity of essence is a completely abstract
unity in which they are logically still completely indifferent. This means that in the
unity of essence eidos and logos are not yet posited, not given and, therefore, there
can be no talk about their opposition or comparison. Abstract unity is not true
unity, because it does not yet contain that of which it is in fact the unity. If that is
so, then these concepts in Losev are in relation to each other only special (as spe-
cial aspects of essence), and as such they only negate and contradict each other
and are not reconciled in a concrete unity or concrete universal.
Similar mistakes are found also in Losev’s understanding of the correlation of
dialectics and formal logic, which are necessarily based on the correlations of the
analyzed categories. Thus, on the one hand, in all his philosophical writings Losev
loudly declares that for him dialectics is the only true and absolute method. On the
other hand, Losev comes out with statements of the following type: “Yes, dialec-
tics is absolute in the realm of eidos, just as formal logic is in the realm of the logos
of concepts” (3, 75). The meaning of this passage is completely clear: both dialec-
tics and formal logic have their special sphere of thought (logic), in which each is
independent, and neither depends on the other. But if this is so, then we have only
two different and finite special methods, neither of which can claim to be universal
and absolute. This conclusion is suggested also by another statement of Losev’s in
which he reports that “the fundamental law of formal logic, the law of contradic-
tion, does not exist for dialectics, which has the completely opposite law of the
unity of contradictions” (3, 69). But indeed if there are two spheres of thought
with opposed and mutually contradictory principles, then we have an antinomy
that requires but does not find its solution in Losev. The very fact that formal laws
are opposed to dialectical laws implies that both are relative, not that one of these
two “types” of logic is absolute. It is superfluous to say that the mentioned judg-
ment of the Russian dialectician contradicts his own ideas of the dialectic as the
absolute and universal method.
As we see, however, under logical and conceptual treatment, these ideas are
reduced ad absurdum. In addition, finally, the philosopher makes one more admis-
sion, which is paradoxical within the framework of his views, and paralogical in
its essence. As if apologizing for his criticism of formal logic, whose adherents he,
by the way, calls “ignoramuses in philosophy with whom there is nothing to dis-
cuss,” Losev writes: “Besides this psychological reaction to formal logicians, it is
necessary, however, to say that dialectics and formal logic are really two different
 SUMMER 2005 49

methods, and strictly speaking, it is impossible to destroy one of them as a sacri-

fice to the other” (3, 334) [emphasis added—A.T.]. Thus, it turns out that his entire
reproof to formalism is a contingent “psychological reaction,” not a demand of
logical necessity. As for sacrificing one methodology for another, one should note
that only special features, details in other such features and details are “destroyed”
or rejected. But in dialectics, if one method is related to another as the universal to
the particular, then this particular method is not at all destroyed in the universal,
but is preserved and is included in the concrete unity. Losev, however, does not
accept this understanding of the problem and, thus, reveals a weakness in his analysis
of the correlation of dialectics and formal logic, which is based precisely on the
examined correlation of eidos and logos.
Now let us move directly to the analysis of the content of the mentioned catego-
ries. Losev examines them in light of antinomian schematics. As he asserts, eidos
is simple, whole and one, being necessarily an object of contemplation. Logos, on
the contrary, is complex, discrete, and multiple. Why does the “formal-logical”
concept (let me repeat: Losev cannot think any other kind of “concept”) appear to
be of this kind to him? Because “if a given concept is characterized by the sum of
definite aspects ‘of the content’ or signs, then one cannot say in any way that in
itself the concept is simple and whole. Eidos is simple and whole, and the logos or
“concept” lives by isolating and enumerating the aspects of eidos. The concept
itself plays precisely the role of an enumerated aspect; it is the registration of
separate aspects, and it cannot possibly be whole and simple”
(3, 704) [emphasis added—A.T.]. For Losev it is also clear that because of this
logos is deprived of that contemplativeness, that “pictorialness” that is so charac-
teristic of eidos.
It is obvious from our point of view that the logic of the presented judgments
was poorly thought out. Simplicity and complexity, wholeness and discreteness,
unity and multiplicity—all these determinations Losev one-sidedly retains in ab-
straction; for a dialectician this is inadmissible. And again the noted weakness is a
consequence of the philosopher’s comparative study, which is only able to “ex-
tract” abstract attributes from the concrete content.
Let eidos be simple, whole, and one. But is this all? Perhaps it does not consist
of such scrupulously selected “phenomenologo-dialectical” aspects? Motion, rest,
identity, and difference—what are they, are they eidos or not? And what about
schema, topos, and categorial eidos? Losev himself even remarks that eidos is
“individual commonality.” This means that “every eidos, being unique and origi-
nal, being an individuality irreducible to separate aspects, is at the same time a
complete and absolute separateness of all its aspects” (ibid.). But we, as dialecti-
cians, must say the same also about logos itself, the “concept” in itself, at least the
formal concept. If we, on the contrary, assume and say that concept A is only the
separateness and multiplicity of attributes a1, a2 . . . an and is not their unity, then
any attribute in relation to the unit of the concept will be zero, and the sum of these
attributes as a sum of zeros, will also be equal to zero. But this means that the unit
50 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

will prove to be equal to zero (this, of course, is absurd). Consequently, logos or

“concept” too is not only the separateness of its “signs” but also their uncondi-
tional unity.
As far as the “contemplativeness” and, moreover, the “pictorialness” of eidos
are concerned, it might be interesting to follow Losev and determine what judg-
ments are entailed by his previously uncovered ambiguous use of the word formal.
So, if logos, according to Losev, is form (µορφ´η), and form, in turn, as we know,
is image, then logos is image. But this means that logos is an object not a bit less
contemplated and pictured than “species (vid),” that is, eidos. Consequently, start-
ing with Losev’s own premises, logos is the same kind of “contemplated pictorial-
ness” as eidos. The contradiction, thus, is evident.
Furthermore, “pictorialness” conceals a great temptation for the philosophiz-
ing thinker.7 Actually, the object, if it is convenient, can be thought of in “pictures,”
that is, at the level of representation, in finite, special forms. However, thinking as
such, logical thinking is thinking in infinite, universal forms, that is, in concepts.
Thinking in representations is ordinary, nonphilosophical thinking, which, in view
of its ordinariness and “habitualness,” can be preferred by a consciousness that is
philosophically “astray.” For a “righteous” philosophical mind a “picture” argu-
ment cannot be in principle acceptable.8
In connection with the examination of the relation of eidos and logos it is nec-
essary to consider the following aspect. When we explained that eidos is not only
wholeness and unity, but also separateness, then the finiteness of our derivation
could have provoked specific objections based on Losev’s own premises. Thus,
Losev himself notes that in eidos, according to his thought, there are two aspects
that can be distinguished, as he says, conditionally. The first is “contemplative-
static,” which, we are to understand, embodies unity and simplicity. The other is
“dialectical-dynamic” and presupposes an “articulated image” (3, 702). However,
what kind of “conditions” can there be in dialectics, if it is ontology itself, and any
θ´εσει in it is also a φ´υσει? Another of Losev’s statements is identical in meaning to
the cited position; according to it, the entire set of the dialectical aspects of eidos is
established (obviously, only) “by means of necessary logical, that is, formal-logi-
cal methods of thought” (3, 701). Thus, according to Losev, it turns out that all
these aspects in eidos “are formalized” by logos, by the “concept”; in eidos as
such, in itself, there is no separateness or multiplicity. This means then that objec-
tively eidos is only one and simple, and subjectively, that is, in our understanding
and understanding generally, it is divisible into parts and multiple, which, strictly
speaking, is logos as such. In this case, the latent dualism of Losev’s eidology
becomes manifest. By the way, his theory of understanding makes precisely this
conclusion possible. Let us analyze its basic theses.
First of all, we should note that Losev distinguishes in principle the spheres of
thinking and understanding (5, 49). Thus, while thinking is unconditionally
object-oriented, and the meaning (eidos) of an object is the object itself, under-
standing takes its object in its realization and other-being, and the concept (logos)
 SUMMER 2005 51

of an object is its meaning, which is grasped in its transition to other-being. As a

result of this, Losev believes, in understanding other-being introduces into the
meaning that which is not in the object itself. Thus, understanding, according to
Losev, turns out to be this or that interpretation of meaning; this is why under-
standing is always “subjective” (ibid.).9
If other-being is given in the concept “at the degree of its first positing,” then
we have an abstract or scientific concept, that is, logos. The word (term) express-
ing such a concept is still identical with it. But any extrascientific word is no longer
identical with its concept, and other-being has an increasing significance in it. So
Losev calls the entire conceptual sphere the sphere of expressive meaning (5, 47)
(emphasis added—A.T.). In the final analysis, understanding, according to the
Russian thinker, is not even strictly speaking an intellectual process like thinking.
Therefore, it is completely characteristic that Losev takes the “science of words,”
that is, philology, to be a legitimate science of understanding.
Yet, let me again cast doubt on the logical justifiability of Losev’s proposed
theses. First of all, I should point out that the definition of logos as meaning in
its other-being is inadequate. In spite of the affectation of Losev’s expressions, it
is completely clear that logos is not any sensuous other-being, but “the very
significational becoming of the essence in other-being.” The latter, by the way, is
Losev’s final formulation of logos. Meanwhile, it is completely incomprehen-
sible why eidos as the something of becoming, as its result, is derived before
logos, since logos precisely as merely the becoming of eidos is a more abstract,
more content-impoverished category. In connection with this, Losev assumes
without any justification that in the other-being becoming some kind of new
content is introduced into eidos that is not in eidos itself. Any other-being gets
all its determinations from that something from which it differs. Therefore, there
can be no talk of “contributing.” And this is how it is in Losev: the structure of
eidetic meaning in logos remains unclouded by any “contributions,” but only in
logos as a scientific concept that is expressed in a term. But what follows from
the fact that, according to Losev, the concept in its linguistic expression proves
to be a term? The etymology of the latter, as we know, tells us that this word
designates something finite and conditional (that is, contingent and arbitrary)
that, as we say, exists “by becoming,” and not by “nature.” Furthermore, the
artificial univocity of a term is, in fact, the most genuine abstraction and the
pitiless vivisection of the polysemy of the living human word. And here, accord-
ing to Losev, it turns out that this emasculated word is a genuine linguistic form
of the concept. Of course, one cannot in any way agree with this. First of all, I
must note that ambiguity and connotation in the words of a natural language is
by no means a calamity, but a source of riches for scientific research, and it is the
necessary consequence of the speculative nature of the concrete concept as the
universal form of thought. Being concrete, the concept is expressed in different
meanings of the word whose unity is ensured by “crosslinking”; being common,
the concept requires specialization and individualization in the material of lan-
52 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

guage, and this constitutes the special nature of verbal expression in a given lan-
guage in contrast to others (in The Philosophy of the Name this is an aspect of
noema). The need for terms appears in him who is unable to think in concepts and
tries to fix his abstract ideas and to hold on to them by paying for this with the
impoverishment of the verbal content. However, “the concept is flesh” (Ο Λ´ογος
σ´αρξ εγ´ενετο). For this reason logical thinking necessarily exists in natural words.
The emasculated spirit of pseudoscientificity, which seeks support in the finite, in
terms, is undoubtedly alien to true logic as dialectics, that is, to thinking through
concepts in words.
Furthermore, Losev carries out a noticeable logical diversion when he sud-
denly passes from logos-concepts to logos-words. It is based, apparently, on hom-
onymy again. At the outset Losev tried to prove the thesis of the nonidentity of the
understood meaning and the thought meaning. And he already had to admit the
opposite at the level of “scientific” logos. Further, in order to justify his assump-
tion, Losev replaces his initial thesis and attempts in vain to prove the nonidentity
of concepts and the words expressing them.
Let us note yet one more point, that Losev calls the sphere of understanding, of
concept, the sphere of expression as such. First, one should object that this defini-
tion is the work of subjective reflection, and it is not posited and proved logically.
We could say with better reason that the very sphere of essence, “object essence,”
is the sphere of expression, insofar as the sphere of being is reflected and, there-
fore, expressed in it. Moreover, if we accepted Losev’s position on the fundamen-
tal expressiveness of the sphere of understanding, then on the level of logos with
respect to eidos this expressiveness for some reason is not observed, but on the
level of all the rest of understanding it is observed. True enough, Losev attempts to
explain this by the fact that in logos other-being is given “at the stage of its first
positing.” Apparently, it is necessary to believe that this other-being is given in
the last understanding at the second, the third, and so forth stages. But does this
change the essence of the matter? Stage is a category of quantity, which, as we
know, is “indifference to one’s definiteness,” externality with respect to it. There-
fore, in dialectics, which posits its own, that is, qualitative, definitions of ob-
jects, there is no room for empty talk about their quantity. But Losev, from the
very beginning, one-sidedly dismembers the sphere of understanding into the
“adequate” and “inadequate” and, thus, advocates dualism. This particular dual-
ism is based, as we see, on a universal dualism inherent in the Losev’s concep-
tion of understanding. Indeed, thinking, according to Losev, remains only
objectivity and does not become subjectivity or understanding by itself. But un-
derstanding, in spite of all of Losev’s reservations, is always subjective interpre-
tation and is not objective thinking as such.
In this connection it is necessary to look into yet this subject of the Russian
philosopher’s conception. Although logos is generally a concept, there is beside it
another very important category of understanding—idea. However, while logos
nevertheless is examined in the sphere of object essence, idea occurs in the pre-
 SUMMER 2005 53

objective structural sphere. Besides, although in Losev idea belongs to the same
logical plane as concept, it does not in any way coincide with it. At least in the
constructions of The Philosophy of the Name our thinker does not solve this prob-
lem. But this is a fundamental question.
First of all, we should assert their substantial identity in the fact that both logos
and idea are meaning, eidos in its other-being. But what is the other-being of
meaning itself? Eidos, according to Losev, in its perfect definiteness, can no
longer be concretized otherwise than by its complete correlation with meon. But
this correlation is nothing but the comprehension of meaning, as a result of which
meaning is sublated. The sublation [s-niatie] of meaning is its concept [po-niatie].
Thus, the region of significational other-being is the region of its understanding,
its concept. Now, it is absolutely clear, why idea and logos are identical as cat-
egories of the understanding.10
So, the idea itself is concept, it itself is logos. The distinction between concept
and idea is a distinction between concept and itself as between that which under-
stands and that which is understood, subject and object. Only as a result of this
distinction can concrete identity in this sphere be attained and this is idea.
Idea, in fact, turns out to be the unity of λ´ογοζ and ´υλη, that is, concept and
reality. But it is inadmissible to think that reality is something that exists along-
side, outside the concept itself. Reality is its own positing of the concept of itself as
negative; therefore, the reality of the concept is its own aspect, upon attaining
which and upon defining itself in it, the concept becomes idea. This is why idea is
“a concept, its reality, and the unity of the first and the second.”
Having defined thus the concept of idea, it is necessary to examine now the
correlation of eidos and idea. The fact that Losev himself undertook a separate
study of this correlation in the philosophy of Plato attests to the importance of
solving this problem. First of all, I should note that Plato’s doctrine of “ideas” is
chiefly eidology (doctrine of eidei), but not ideology (doctrine of ideas as such).
Losev himself asserts this after thoroughly studying and statically assessing the
Platonic texts, in which the words “eidos” (ε´ιδος) and “idea” (ιδ´εα) are used:
“ninety-six cases of ‘idea’ in hundreds and thousands of pages—this is odd. What
kind of ‘doctrine of ideas’ is this in which the term ‘idea’ is, one can say, almost
never used, since of the ninety-six texts containing ‘idea’ only very few . . . have a
solid bearing on the ‘doctrine of ideas’” (4, 282). What appears at first glance as a
paradoxical oddity that violates traditional historical views of the Greek idealist’s
philosophy can be easily logically explained. The thing is that the Platonic eidei
are really objective mental-contemplative essences, as Losev himself correctly de-
fined them. The Russian thinker, however, did not understand clearly enough that
eidei are only essence, not concepts. By the way, in his lectures in the history of
philosophy Hegel had indicated clearly the lack of development of the Platonic
eidei and noted that concepts appear only in Aristotle. Losev, however, disregarded
Aristotle in this respect. And this is understandable, for Aristotle is logical, while
Plato, like Losev himself, is eidetic. Therefore, in spite of the fact that Losev him-
54 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

self noted the nature of “self-consciousness,” “intellectuality,” and the logicality

of ideas, he did not consider this definiteness to be most fundamental. This pre-
vented him, first, from understanding Aristotle and appreciating fairly the logi-
cal development that occurred in his philosophy in comparison with Plato’s;
and, second, from defining concretely the difference between eidos and idea in
Plato’s philosophy. It is true that in Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology
Losev produced a grandiose scrupulous study of Plato’s texts in which the terms
eidos and idea are used. At the logical level, however, we must admit that in this
part of the work the Russian Platonist proved to be much more of a philologist
than a philosopher. The only result of the full-scale analysis of the dialogues of
the ancient classic was the conclusion that he used ε´ιδος in the differential sense,
while he used ιδ´εα in the integral sense. Here in these abstract definitions, Losev
sees the “authentic” Plato, free from any “subjective” interpretations (for ex-
ample, Hegelian).
However, deciding or not being able to give more concrete definitions, Losev
did not realize that the Platonic idea is a concept or logos and that the rare use of
the term in Plato is further evidence of a certain limitation to Platonic thought.
Indeed the “differentiality” of eidos indicates its relativity and abstractness in
comparison with the absoluteness and concreteness of an “integral” idea, which
is logos.
Thus, an idea in both Plato and Losev is a self-conscious meaning, intelligence.
But it is such, as we saw, only inasmuch as it is conceptual, logical. Thus, the
intelligence of an idea is formed by the intelligence of logos itself, something that
Losev, unfortunately, did not understand. Moreover, when he talks about intelli-
gent meaning in general, the latter proves to be for some reason only an “aspect”
of eidos. Naturally, this causes bewilderment, for, according to Losev, intelligence,
being more concrete, is the definition of the more abstract eidetic sphere as such.
This aspect of self-consciousness in eidos the Russian philosopher calls myth.
But if myth is the comprehension of meaning, then, as I have shown earlier, it is its
sublation and concept, that is, myth is precisely logos, logos as idea, not eidos. In
this context it is striking that Losev had an analogous logical construction
“concept-myth” (Essays), which, however, he did not systematically realize any-
where, and because of this the combination “eidos-myth” acquired an uncondi-
tional character. Meanwhile our logical deduction showed that where in the sphere
of essence we have eidos and form, that is, species and image, there in the sphere
of intelligence we must have logos and myth.
Having investigated the correlation of eidos and logos as such, let us examine
what they are in a system, and, correspondingly, the correlation between these
systems. According to Losev, a logical system, a system of concepts is scientific
knowledge in general or simply science. However, as the Russian thinker believes,
science must be preceded by eidetic knowledge. This follows completely from his
view of the problem of the interrelations between eidos and logos: “To speak sci-
entifically, that is, to speak of being in logos, it is necessary first to speak of it in
 SUMMER 2005 55

eidos. It is necessary first to differentiate both objects in general and the spheres of
separate possible knowledge” (3, 767). This primary knowledge of objects in eidos
Losev calls phenomenology, which “is a pretheoretical description and formula-
tion of all possible species and degrees of meaning . . . on the basis of their ad-
equate intuition, that is, their intuition in eidos. It is not theory and science, for
these are the imposition of a certain abstract principle and abstract system that
introduces order into separate and jumbled facts. Furthermore, science is always
also a certain “explanation,” not just description. Phenomenology is intuition and
intuition of meaning as it exists in itself, and for this reason it is fully a significational
picture of the object. The phenomenological method, therefore, strictly speaking,
is not a method, since phenomenology consciously poses only one task—to give a
significational picture of the object itself by describing it according to the method
required by the object itself ” (ibid.).
Thus, in Losev the original eidetic knowledge is phenomenology. The ques-
tion arises, however, does not the phenomenological “description” and even the
“formulation” mean ordering the defined subject into a system? But “knowledge
in a system” or “systematic knowledge” is precisely what science is. Therefore,
the Russian thinker is not completely justified in assuming that phenomenology
is not a scientific form of knowledge. In this connection I should add that the
word phenomenology itself attests to the fact that it is a definite logos and, there-
fore, science. In this respect Hegel, who considered phenomenology to be the
first part of his scientific system, proved to be much more perceptive. It is re-
markable that Losev himself pointed out that Hegelian phenomenology is the
most genuine dialectic, that is, logos or science. Unfortunately, he did not bother
to explain the relation of his understanding of phenomenology to the German
classic’s conception.
Furthermore, when Losev reports that science is “the imposition of a certain
abstract principle and abstract system,” while phenomenology is not a method at
all but only a description of an object that is demanded by the object itself, then
one has the definite impression that Losev either did not have an adequate idea of
the essence of the philosophical object and method and their relation or else,
once again, completely failed to express his thought. Actually, in science, phi-
losophy, or dialectics (and for Losev all these are one and the same), the method
and object must inevitably be identical. Method is the object itself in its self-
unfolding, self-determination, or “self-description” if you like. Therefore, devo-
tion to the object in methodology is not the prerogative of an allegedly prescientific
phenomenology. As to science presupposing the imposition of an abstract prin-
ciple, one should say that in bad science or, at least, in nonphilosophical science,
this may be the state of affairs. However, in dialectics there is nothing abstract
or, as Losev says, “fundamental” that would not be its own substantive aspect of
the object as a concrete whole.
Let us examine one more paradox of Losev’s doctrine. Phenomenology is
eidetic intuition, eidetics. Dialectics is the doctrine of eidei, the logos of eidei.
56 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Eidetic description is the maximum result of phenomenology, while the task of

dialectics is “explanation.” As we know, in general description amounts to bring-
ing forth or enumerating the attributes of an object. However, this definition in
essence coincides with one of Losev’s definitions of logos, formal logos. Thus,
what we have is that “living knowledge” itself, which, according to Losev, must
not and cannot in any way be logic, formal logic, upon being tested, turns out to
express itself in logic.
Losev, however, was fully aware of the formal nature of phenomenology and
dedicated many pages to the critique of Husserlian doctrine. He criticized it for not
being dialectical. On this ground, one can object to my comments by saying that
he fully understood the one-sidedness of phenomenology, when it is absolutized,
and that, in contrast to me, he knew how to distinguish between phenomenology
as a starting “immediate” knowledge and phenomenology as an abstract logical
methodology or phenomenology as logic. But the matter lies precisely in this that
such a division of phenomenology is not logically sustainable in Losev. First, at
least because phenomenology is eidetics, as he himself says, and any methodol-
ogy, including phenomenology (now as a method), is logic. Losev demarcates
quite sharply the spheres of eidos and logos. If they belong to different types, it
becomes incomprehensible what these two forms of phenomenology can have in
common. Second, according to Losev, the transformation of any special method-
ology into an abstract one occurs via its absolutization and hypostatization, that is,
when the part replaces the whole. Let us forget for a time that eidetics and phe-
nomenology are not logic and method, and try to get at the essence of the follow-
ing. Eidos in Losev’s conception is the “total visage” or “countenance” of the
object, that is, strictly speaking, eidetic knowledge is whole and complete. But
logos is only an abstraction of eidos and in this sense only an abstract “principle,”
an aspect of eidos. Therefore, even in combining the uncombinable into one, that
is, in combining in one intellectual plane pure eidetics and the abstract methodol-
ogy allegedly based on it, we must reveal that the first is related to the second as a
whole to its part, as the absolute to the relative, as the substantial to the accidental.
However, it follows from this that it is impossible to convert phenomenology into
an abstracted method, to absolutize and hypostatize it, because it is impossible to
absolutize the absolute and to hypostatize the substantial, which is what eidetics
represents for Losev. Thus phenomenology willy-nilly, although rather nilly, proves
to be an “integral knowledge” in Losev.11
Thus, phenomenology cannot be divided as if one of its parts is only eidetics
and the other only a formal method. Phenomenology as eidetics in Losev is an
investigation of the object in its statics. Renouncing the “explanation” of the ob-
ject, it does not know and cannot know how and why it appeared. Since it is inca-
pable of grasping its significational dynamics, phenomenology is one-sided
knowledge.12 This is enough to make it relative and abstract knowledge that de-
mands absolute and concrete knowledge to which it could belong as a part to a
whole. And this integral methodology, according to Losev, is dialectics. But if this
 SUMMER 2005 57

is so, then there can be no talk of phenomenology’s independence. By the way,

Losev himself pointed this out by calling his method, quite improperly,
phenomenologo-dialectical or dialectical phenomenology, because such defini-
tions, at least from the formal side, commit the sin of pleonasm.
Phenomenology may be understand only as the first stage of dialectical science
or, to put it in other words, it is dialectics at its first stage. At the same time, there
is no need to emphasize the “primacy” and immediacy of phenomenology, seem-
ingly implying by this the one-sided mediateness of everything else, for, I repeat,
everything is as immediate as it is mediated. For this reason in general all dialec-
tics, and not only phenomenology as its first part, can be considered to be immedi-
ate knowledge. And did not Losev himself write about this and, moreover, refer to
Hegel on this?13
Thus, phenomenology is relative, while dialectics is absolute. But dialectics in
the Russian philosopher is logic and therefore it exists in logoi. This means that
absolute knowledge, that is, the dialectics, is possible only through logoi, through
concepts (δι´α λ´ογων), not through eidei. Precisely for this reason concept, not
eidos, is the absolute intelligible form. And precisely eidos is an aspect of logos,
not vice versa.
We arrived at these conclusions starting form Losev’s own conception of eidos
and logos and by exposing its contradictoriness. The only way of overcoming this
contradiction in Losev’s philosophy in particular and in Russian philosophy in
general is to become a completely logical system, for Logos is the very source and
the limit of being and thought.
I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.

Notes

1. Formal logic will rush to condemn the fact that in philosophy the supposition of the
identity of thought and being proves to be a result as a petitio principii. Many limited
thinkers always complained and continue to complain about this today. But we must again
dissipate the critical enthusiasm of such minds by pointing out that in philosophy the iden-
tity of the beginning and the result is a concrete, internally differentiated identity, not an
abstraction of which one-sided thought is alone capable. This concrete unity is as
nonimmediate as it is mediated by the whole course of philosophical development. The
formalist can just as well view a trip around the world and a happy return home to the
starting point, as a futile and empty undertaking for the sole reason that in the end we have
returned to where we started. Because of this, not formal thinkers, but proponents of dialec-
tics such as Schelling and Hegel have compared philosophy more expressively to an odys-
sey (Schelling) and more strictly and precisely to a circle (Hegel).
2. Unfortunately, the framework of this article forces me to restrict myself to this “formal”
definition, that is, to the “naked result,” without conducting a full systematic derivation. By
the way, this deliberate omission has no fundamental significance for this work. Furthermore,
even in Losev himself in The Philosophy of the Name, where he examines mainly the prob-
lematic of the correlation of the eidetic and the logical, a full-fledged deduction of eidos is
replaced by “phenomenology.” Losev succeeded in producing an extensive dialectical deduc-
tion of the mentioned category in his later theoretical work The Self Itself [Samoe samo].
58 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

3. In The Philosophy of the Name, Losev, however, does not distinguish the concepts of
quality and attribute.
4. For example, (3, 776), (3, 68–69).
5. It is precisely this deficiency of formal logic that is noted by German classics, for
example, by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Ordinary logic abstracts [emphasis
added—A.T.] . . . from all the content of knowledge, that is, from any relation to the object,
and examines only the logical form in the relation of the sciences to each other, that is, the
form of thought in general” (2, 92). In Fichte: “logic must establish only the form, separate
from the content. . . . This separation is called abstraction, and so the essence of logic
consists in abstracting from any content of science (6, 46). On this, although with a differ-
ent intention, Hegel says: “If logic is generally acknowledged as the science of thought,
then what we mean is that this thought is the bare form of any knowledge, that logic ab-
stracts from any content and the so-called second constitutive part of any knowledge, the
matter, must be given from the outside, that logic, from which this matter is fully indepen-
dent can indicate, therefore, only the formal conditions of true knowledge, but cannot con-
tain real truth itself” (1, 34).
6. Aristotle already noted that form is more concrete than eidos, for being in a thing it
has a definite character from its relation to ´υ λη or “meon” (Metaphysics, bk. 7, chap. 8,
1034α). Even in Plato’s Timaeus (35α) to form things the Demiurge uses not only eidei and
matter but also a third kind—their unity. What is most remarkable is that Losev has his own
doctrine of type and archetype, which he developed in The Dialectic of Artistic Form
[Dialektika khudozhestvennoi formy]. But, unfortunately, he does not connect it in any
way with the eidetic-logical problematic we are investigating.
7. Losev’s “seduction” by the “pictorialness” of thought, that is, the sphere of ideas,
leads him to grave logical “sins.” Let us consider this passage: “Eidos is seen by thought,
comprehended by mind, and contemplated intellectually; logos is not seen by thought but is
posited by it; it is not comprehended by mind, but is an antenna with which mind traces the
object; it is not contemplated intellectually, but is only the task, assignment, method, law,
pure possibility of intellectual contemplation” (3, 707). First, an ambiguous expression
such as the “comprehensibility” of eidos for thought should be understood primarily as the
form of sensuousness transferred to thought, that is, precisely as representation. Second, let
us note that Losev does not prove in any way, but only postulates the comtemplatability and
intuitiveness of eidos. Furthermore, let us recall that in Descartes, who began the modern
European tradition of intellectual contemplation, intuition in general is concept. Finally,
third, as soon as eidos is “comprehended,” contemplated, and according to some, “sur-
passed,” it obviously proves to be in a one-sided way an object and only an object. Mind, on
the other hand, must be understood only as the subject that contemplates and “compre-
hends” the eidos-object. The logos-“antenna,” insofar as it is not eidetic and, therefore, not
objective, will have to be admitted as a subjective construct (Losev will not assert that logos
is a subject-object, that is, the most synthetic, the most concrete form of thought). But if
logos is subjective, then only it can be “mental” or intellectual. Thus, the conclusion drawn
from Losev’s premises comes into contradiction with his definitions. So far, however, let us
close our eyes to this. If logos is some kind of subjective construct, be it of doubtful neces-
sity, still with it we get adequate knowledge of the object. What is interesting here is some-
thing else. According to the cited expression, although logos in Losev proves to be subjec-
tive, in its subjectivity it is grounded and necessary, that is, objective. But this means that
we have before us nothing but a transcendental object, and Losev’s doctrine of concept, his
logic is the most authentic transcendentalism, not dialectics. This is the source of the neo-
Kantian words: method, law, task, and so on.
To make the inference more convincing I shall cite one more fragment of The Philoso-
phy of the Name: “The logos of a thing is an abstract aspect in it. It is real not to the extent
to which it immediately expresses the essence of the thing but to the extent to which it makes
 SUMMER 2005 59

its methodological and fundamental nature conscious. Logos is real not as eidos. Logos is
real as a principle and method, as an instrument, as tongs for handling fire” (3, 706)
(emphasis added—A.T.). And so logos is real, objective, but not generally, not uncondi-
tionally, like eidos, but only “to the extent of making it conscious.” But indeed this kind of
“methodologism” and “instrumentalism” is in fact Kantianism. This concealed and latent
Kantianism in Losev, a passionate critic of Kantian dualism, is, of course, a scandal.
Let us return, however, to the famous “pictorialness” of eidos, which in the Russian
philosopher is the criterion of the concreteness of thought. Pictorialness can be seen at the
same time as the cause and the effect of the fact that Losev in studying the problem of
understanding “goes off the track” and “passes to another kind,” that is, to the sphere of
representation. Precisely because of this he does not distinguish at all a concept as such and
a “concept of formal logic” and mistakenly asserts that the latter is an object of Hegel’s
“subjective” logic. The formal-logical “concept,” of course, is an abstraction of image rep-
resentations, a set of abstract signs. It is really nondialectical. And then this is what we get,
according to Losev: the concept of logos is dialectical, while its object, that is, logos itself
is nondialectical (3, 713). It is necessary to recall also that in dialectics in general, that is, in
concepts, everything is dialectical, while how logoi are applied in reality is a matter that
should interest a dialectician least of all. In dialectics, furthermore, the identity of the con-
ceptual and the object realm is established; hence, if logos is dialectical as a concept then it
is dialectical as an abject. Consequently, Losev is not right when he says that propositions
in concepts or logoi are not dialectical. In general, our logician reduces himself to absur-
dity, for dialectics, according to him, is logos, that is, by his definition nothing is
nondialectical.
The issue takes another turn if we speak of “real” thought, which does not always
attain the conceptual or logical level. In the form of representation thought can reveal and
can also fail to reveal universal content. Traditional formal logic, which is based on com-
mon representations and never oversteps their limits, really deserves “criticism.” But, let
me repeat, formal logic is thought that has not attained its proper form, the form of the
logical. It is precisely to these “formal concepts” that Losev counterposes “pictorial”
eidei.
In addition, the following expression of the Russian philosopher deserve critical
attention:
In eidos the more of its “signs” we count the more complex it becomes, the more it
encompasses itself, the more aspects can be subsumed under it. In logos we abstract
from the living pictorialness of the whole; and here, the more separate aspects of the
picture of eidos we take, the more we violate its wholeness, the less likely that there
will be many classes or groups or objects that come under such a complex set of dis-
crete aspects. In eidos, the more common the object, the more individual, for the more
different attributes it has. . . . In logos, the more common the object, the more formal it
is, the simpler it is, because the more different aspects and “content” must be excluded
from it.
Thus, from the viewpoint of eidos, the eidos “living being” is richer than the eidos
“man” and all other species of living things. The “content” of the eidos “living being” is
broader than the “content” of the eidos “man” and parallel with the increase in extension.
Only he who experiences the concreteness and individuality of the common and for
whom that which is most fragmented and varied is abstract will be able to understand all
this. For an eideticist “living being” is a rich eidos, and “being” is even more living,
richer, and more concrete. At the same time, “man” for him is much more abstract, and
“European” is even more abstract, “Frenchman”—even more, and the highest abstrac-
tion is “Frenchman living in Paris at such and such a time at such and such a place.” The
reverse holds for formal logic. (3, 704–6)
60 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

The cited judgments contain logical defects of a formal and substantive character. First,
it is unclear why in speaking about eidos, Losev makes a “count of signs,” which in his own
conception appears as a definition of logos. Second, it should be noted that however “ab-
stracted from living pictorialness” logos might be, it too, like eidos, becomes more concrete
as its substantive aspects increase. Third, when Losev compares the concreteness of eidos
and logos, he switches concepts: thus, speaking about eidos, he has aspects of content in
mind, but in relation to logos, he has extension in mind. Finally—and this is most basic—
our dialectician, discussing concepts, slides into a “pool” of representations when he allows
himself to examine universal logical categories (such as being) alongside, that is, in the
same genus with an object such as the singular sensuous form-formation in thought (for
example, such and such a Frenchman). According to Losev, what happens here is that the
eidos of being is more concrete than any other more defined object. This is, of course,
absurd, for the very etymology of the word concrete indicates that what is more concrete is
more defined, more complex, and more mediated.
If one follows Losev’s trend of thought, then, taking an example from the realm of
religious ideas, we would have to say that the God of the Jews is more concrete than the
God of Christians insofar as in Scriptures Yahveh is defined only as “Existing,” that is, as
being, while Christ is defined as the Son of Man, that is, as man in general.
8. The purpose of the present comment is to distinguish in principle contemplatedness
as such and pictorialness, which appear as synonyms in Losev. The fact that contemplation
and, therefore, contemplatedness, is a necessary aspect of the cognitive process is, of course,
unquestionable. Pictorialness, on the other hand, is not a necessary condition of knowl-
edge, for according to its concept, it is rather sensuous contemplation. Furthermore, if con-
templation itself reveals a deeply dialectical content as the identity of the contemplated and
the contemplating, subject and object, internal and external, pictorialness has only a one-
sided externality of the image in which the subject does not find himself.
Incidentally, in this respect it would be useful to draw a parallel between philosophical
thinking and Christian praying practice. As we know there are two basic traditions—Catholic
and Protestant. The path of the West lies in sensuous representations, “images,” “dreams,”
“meditations,” and so on, the earthliness and passion of which do not gain grace but lead
into “temptation.” Anyone who is familiar with, say, the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius
Loyola knows what I am talking about. The path of the East is the “protection of the mind,”
that is, forbearance from any imagery and sensuous representations and the attainment of
“pure prayer.” I conclude that Losev, by insisting on the “pictorialness” of his eidei in a
definite sense “fell into temptation,” “a philosophical “temptation,” that is, which was fully
congenial to the Western spiritual tradition in general.
9. True enough, Losev makes the qualification that “this subjectivism is not something
opposed to the objectivistic assessment of being, but only a more complex structure of the
same objective world” (ibid.). But if his thesis that the process of understanding is “the
identification of the thought thing with this or that being, for example, with an emotional,
affective, and any kind you like” (ibid.) (emphasis added—A.T.), is taken into account, then
we shall have to admit that his “qualification” is rather an excuse.
10. It is necessary to add that understanding as comprehension of meaning is reason,
intellect. Hence Losev was wrong when he asserted that understanding is nonintellectual.
This contradiction in Losev has not only a substantive but also a purely formal form. For
example, the passages of The Dialectical Foundations of Mathematics [Dialekticheskie
osnovy matematiki] are refuted by the propositions of The Philosophy of the Name in which
he discusses ideas as adequatio rei et intellectus.
11. In this respect it is interesting to cite one more expression by our thinker: “To judge
about a thing it is necessary to know what it is.” This judgment, however, raises the follow-
ing question: “Why do we need to judge about a thing if we already know what it is? Why
do we need logic, if we have eidetics?”
 SUMMER 2005 61

12. As Losev pointed out many times, neo-Kantianism is interested in the “origin” of the
object. But it too is not free of one-sidedness, since it cannot see meanings in their statics.
13. This reference is odd, since it directs us precisely to Hegel’s critique of “immediate
knowledge.”

References

1. Gegel, G.V. [Hegel, G.W.]. Nauka logiki. St. Petersburg, 1997.

2. Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenii v 8 tomakh, Vol. 3. Moscow, 1994.
3. Losev, A.F. Bytie. Imia. Kosmos. Moscow, 1993.
4. Losev, A.F. Ocheki antichnogo simvolizma i mifologii. Moscow, 1993.
5. Losev, A.F. Khaos i struktura. Moscow, 1997.
6. Fikhte, I.G. [Fichte, J.G.]. Sochineniia v 2 tomakh, Vol. 1. St. Peterburg, 1993.

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