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(1) where ω = e .
3
1
We can then directly compare the security to the six mation is maximised for fixed S, i.e. for a given distur-
state scheme for qubits, where only symmetric attacks bance D. We introduce the general parametrisation for
have been studied. By imposing that the disturbance the normalised auxiliary states,
D = 1 − Tr(| ψi ihψi |̺outB ), where ̺B
out
is the reduced
density operator of the state sent on to Bob, takes the | A0 i = xA | 0̄i + yA | 1̄i + zA | 2̄i ,
same value for all 12 possible input states | ψi i, we derive | B1 i = xB | 0̄i + yB | 1̄i + zB | 2̄i ,
the following relations that involve the scalar products of | C2 i = xC | 0̄i + yC | 1̄i + zC | 2̄i , (11)
Eve’s output states:
p where {| 0̄i, | 1̄i, | 2̄i} is an orthonormal basis which is or-
2D(1 − D)(hA1 |A0 i + hB1 |B0 i + hC2 |B0 i + hA1 |C2 i) thogonal to all the other auxiliary states. In order to
+D(hC1 |C0 i + 3hB0 |A1 i) = 0 , (6) treat the basis states | 0i, | 1i, | 2i in the same way, we
require that the overlaps of these three states are equal.
p
2D(1 − D)(hB1 |C0 i + hA2 |B1 i + hA2 |A0 i + hC2 |C0 i)
We choose xA = yB = zC = x, while all other coeffi-
+D(hB2 |B0 i + 3hC0 |A2 i) = 0 , (7)
p cients are equal. Without loss of generality we can take
2D(1 − D)(hB2 |B1 i + hC2 |C1 i + hB2 |A0 i + hA0 |C1 i) the coefficients to be real.
+D(hA2 |A1 i + 3hC1 |B2 i) = 0 , (8) With this strategy we find the optimal mutual infor-
hA1 |C0 i + hA2 |B0 i + hB0 |C1 i mation between Alice and Eve to be
+hB2 |A1 i + hC1 |A2 i + hC0 |B2 i = 0 . (9) IAE = 1 + (1 − D)[f (D) log3 f (D)
1 − f (D)
Note that both real and imaginary part of these expres- +(1 − f (D)) log3 ], (12)
sions have to vanish. Writing the disturbance introduced 2
through the eavesdropping transformation (1) as a func- where f (D) is given by
tion of the scalar products of Eve’s states, and taking
√ p
into account unitarity (2) and the conditions (6)-(9), we 3 − 2D + 2 2 D(3 − 4D)
find the following simple form: f (D) = . (13)
9(1 − D)
1−S The relation between x and D is x2 = f (D). Inserting
D=2 , (10)
3 − 2S this into equations (11) leads, together with the ansatz
where S = Re[hA0 |B1 i + hB1 |C2 i + hC2 |A0 i]/3. Notice (1) and a straightforward choice of the ancilla states,
that in the expression for the disturbance only the scalar to the explicit form of the optimal transformation. Eve
products among the eavesdropper’s states | A0 i, | B1 i and needs to employ two three-level systems for the optimal
| C2 i appear, while all the others do not contribute. attack.
We will now derive the optimal eavesdropping trans- The information for Bob decreases with increasing dis-
formation for a fixed value D of the disturbance, namely turbance:
we maximise the mutual information IAE between Alice D
and Eve. (This is a standard figure of merit for the de- IAB = 1 + (1 − D) log3 (1 − D) + D log3 . (14)
2
scription of the efficiency of an eavesdropping attack [3].)
As mentioned above, the disturbance introduced by Eve Note that we renormalized the functions given in (12)
is independent of the scalar products of her states, apart and (14), as in [2], in order to be able to directly relate
from the ones involving | A0 i, | B1 i and | C2 i. Therefore, the values to the 2-dimensional case.
for any value of D, Eve is free to choose those states on We will now compare the security of the 3-dimensional
which D does not depend in such a way that she retrieves scenario as described above with the most secure 2-
the maximal information. The optimal choice is to take dimensional scheme, that employs six states (i.e. three
all of these states orthogonal to each other, because in mutually unbiased bases) [4,5]. The according informa-
this case Eve can infer the original state sent by Alice in tion curves of both protocols are shown in figure 1.
an unambiguous way from her measured state. We find that the 3-dimensional protocol is more se-
We will now consider only the scalar products that cure in two respects: first, the information curves for
appear in S and choose them such that the mutual infor- Bob and Eve intersect at a higher disturbance Dc than
for the 2-dimensional case, namely Dc,3 = 0.227, while
Dc,2 = 0.156. In other words, Eve has to introduce more
noise in order to gain the same information as Bob. In
then Alice and Bob could detect an asymmetric eavesdropper general, for disturbances D < Dc , a key distribution
by checking the error rate in a subset of states. Otherwise, protocol can be considered secure, because IAB > IAE
the trade-off between Eve’s information and the signal key is [3]. Therefore, the 3-dimensional protocol is secure up
more complicated to handle. to higher disturbances. Second, for a fixed disturbance
2
scalar products between | A0 i, | B1 i, .... The function f is
then given by
p
d − 2D + (d − 2D)2 − d2 (1 − 2D)2
fd (D) = . (17)
d2 (1 − D)
In figure 2 we plot Eve’s corresponding information
IAE,d = 1 + (1 − D)[fd (D) logd fd (D)
1 − fd (D)
+(1 − fd (D)) logd ], (18)
d−1
as a function of the dimension d for a fixed value of the
disturbance D. We conjecture that this mutual informa-
tion is optimal when employing the maximal number of
FIG. 1. Mutual information for Alice/Bob and Alice/Eve mutually unbiased bases for a given dimension [6].
as a function of the disturbance, for 2-dimensional and 3-di-
mensional quantum states.
3
information than in the case of qubits. Therefore a
three-dimensional scheme offers higher security than two-
dimensional systems. We generalised the upper limit for
Eve’s information IAE from d = 3 to higher dimensions:
this limit decreases with the dimension, and numerically
we find that it reaches IAE = D in the limit d → ∞.
As quantum cryptography is the most advanced tech-
nology in quantum information, and security issues play
a fundamental role in any study of cryptography, it is
important to discuss quantitative properties of the secu-
rity in quantum key distribution: here quantity becomes
quality.
While completing this manuscript we learnt about re-
lated work by M. Bourennane et al [10].
We wish to thank Maciej Lewenstein for discus-
sions. This work has been supported by DFG (Schwer-
punkt “Quanteninformationsverarbeitung”), the ESF-
Programme PESC, and the EU IST-Programme EQUIP.