3.

5 Agreement and Disagreement in Attitude and Belief

Because literal meanings and emotive meanings are independent of one anoth-
er, it is possible for parties discussing some controversial matter to be in dis-
agreement (or agreement) about what the facts really are, and at the same time
to be in agreement (or disagreement) in their feelings about those facts. We dis-
tinguish disagreements in beliifand disagreements in attitude; resolving them will
call for quite different responses. This may be illustrated in the context of one
emotionally charged controversy-that concerning the use of the death penalty,
capital punishment.
Two people may disagree about the facts. Let us suppose that X believes
that the death penalty is the most effective way to deter murderers, while Y
believes that it is not. Which of these claims is correct may be difficult to de-
termine, but it is at least clear that X and Y here disagree in belief. They may
also disagree in their attitude about capital punishment, one of them ap-
proving and the other disapproving of its use. They may of course disagree
both in belief and in attitude. So four different relations may arise: (1) the
disputants may agree in both belief and in attitude; (2) they may disagree in
both belief and in attitude; (3) they may disagree in belief but agree in atti-
tude; and (4) they may disagree in attitude but agree in belief. Consider
each in turn:
1. X and Y agree in belief and agree in attitude. It may be that both believe
that capital punishment is a highly effective deterrent and both approve of
it asjust. Or they may both believe that it is not an effective deterrent and
may both disapprove of it as unjust. It is even possible that they agree that
capital punishment is an effective deterrent, but also agree that it is unjust
for other reasons. In any event, if they agree both in belief and in attitude
they will be in full harmony,
2. X and Y may disagree in belief and disagree in attitude. They may disagree
about whether capital punishment really is an effective deterrent, and also
disagree about whether it isjust to impose it.
3. X and Y may disagree in belief but still agree in attitude. X believes it is an
effective deterrent, while Y denies that this is so. And yet both may find it
cruel and, as a form of killing, morally wrong; or both may agree in think-
ing that it is the only morally fitting way for the state to respond to some
particularly heinous crimes.
 • - and Y may disagree in attitude but agree in belief. They may agree in be-
ieving it to be an effective deterrent, one of them approving of it as a nee-
ry and appropriate punishment for some crimes, while the other
. pproves of it as cruel and intrinsically unjust whatever its consequences
may be. Or they may agree in believing the death penalty to be no more ef-
ective than its feasible alternatives, while one nevertheless approves of it as
e morally right response to some crimes, while the other disapproves of it
needlessly cruel and wrong.

re the object is to overcome disagreement, the response must take into ac-
[ the real nature of the conflict. One who is confused about what is at issue
[ likely to be effective in persuasion. If the disagreement is essentially one
lief, it can best be resolved by ascertaining the facts. That may not be easy,
[ least the aim is clear. Whether the death penalty is, or is not, an effective
the most effective) punishment for deterring murders is a factual matter-
ne that turns out to be quite difficult to resolve. The murder rates in juris-
ons that employ the death penalty and in those that do not are relevant,
these rates may vary, but it may be that differences in the populations of
jurisdictions are what account for such variation. Determining real causal
ections in this context is tricky because deterrence is successful when
e are not committed. We aim to learn how many capital crimes that would
been committed if a given punishment were not in force, have not been
itted because it is in force. This is a very difficult question to answer. So X
think the death penalty justified because it is the best way to protect inrio-
lives from murderers, and Y I!lay agree that it would be justified if that were
. but believes that it is not true. The truth about what deters most effective-
mains in dispute. But at least the methods of scientific inquiry are available
. and can be directed at the question of fact about which there is continu-
_ di agreement.
But suppose, on the other hand, that X and Y are in agreement about the facts
rtaining to the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the death penalty as a deter-
Still, they may hold sharply conflicting attitudes about that punishment, be-
one finds the killing abhorrent and wrong, while the other finds the
tion of murderers to be fitting and right. Here the techniques for settling dis-
ment are rather different, more varied, and less direct. Seeking to apply sci-
c methods, compiling evidence, undertaking quantitative analyses, and the
. are likely to miss the point. The facts that are agreed upon are valued differ-
..and those conflicting valuations are at least in part emotive in character.
uch words as good and bad, right and wrong, in their strictly ethical uses tend
ve very strong emotive impact. When we characterize an action as right or
utcome as good, we are expressing an attitude of approval toward it; whereas
n we say that it is wrong or bad, we are expressing disapproval. That much
ot be denied. Some writers on ethics contend, however, that these terms
e no literal or cognitive meaning; only emotive meaning is allowed them.
er writers on ethics vigorously insist that such terms do have cognitive mean-
_ and refer to the objective characteristics of what is being discussed. In this
deep quarrel, the student of logic need not take sides. But it is at least clear that
many attitudes of approval or disapproval do not involve any moral judgments.
There are aesthetic values too, and there are personal values reflecting individ-
ual preferences or tastes. A deeply felt attitude toward a thing-repugnance for
some foods, or attraction to some item of dress, for example-need not involve
any moral or factual judgment, and yet may be given strong verbal expression.
When disagreement is in attitude rather than in belief, the two parties may
formulate their divergent judgments in statements that are logically consistent
with one another. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this logical con-
sistency that the parties do not really disagree, or that their disagreement is
"merely verbal." They are not simply saying the same thing with different words;
they are using their words to express conflicting attitudes toward that thing, or
toward that situation whose facts may be agreed upon. Their disagreement may
not be in that sense "literal"-but it is nevertheless genuine. Because words
function expressively as well as informatively, we cannot say that such disagree-
ments are "merely" a matter of words.
Whether a given disagreement is one of belief, or is one of attitude, or of
both belief and attitude, is sometimes difficult to determine. The distinction be-
tween the two types of disagreement is often obscured by the waysin which con-
flicting opinions are expressed, and may depend upon the interpretation of the
words of the disputants. The issue at the core of the dispute often remains in
doubt. If X and Y disagree about whether one outcome is "better" or "more im-
portant" than another, they are both likely to think that there are differences of
belief that divide them, and that may well be true. But some disputes that ap-
pear on the surface to be differences about alleged matters of fact, although
they are genuine disputes, are in reality disputes about attitudes. This is espe-
cially true when what is in dispute are the values of known things or acts.
One of the greatest of all football coaches, and one of the greatest of all
writers on sports, differed profoundly about the importance of winning. Wrote
the journalist, Grantland Rice:
For when the One Great Scorer comes
To write against your name.
He marks-not that you won or lost-
But how you played the game.

Said the coach, Vince Lombardi:

Winning isn't everything. It's the only thing.

The attitudes of these two men were plainly in conflict. Do you believe that this
disagreement in attitude was rooted in a disagreement in belief?
The distinction between disagreements of attitude and disagreements of be-
lief is very useful in spite of the difficultieswe encounter in classifyingsome cases.
Awareness of the different uses of language helps us to understand the kinds of
disagreements we may be confronting and the locus of the core dispute. Once
identified, the task of resolution remains, of course. But the more fullywe under-
stand the nature of a disagreement, the better able we will be to resolve it.
 Language and Definitions

12. a. Whenever there is, in any country, uncultivated land and unem-
ployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far
extended as to violate natural right.
—Thomas Jefferson
b. Every man has by nature the right to possess property of his own.
This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the
lower animals.
—Pope
Please See Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 1891
bellow:
13. a. The right of revolution is an inherent one. When people are op-
pressed by their government,
Pleaseit is a natural
See right they enjoy to relieve
bellow:
themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by
withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a govern-
ment more acceptable.Please See bellow:
—Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, vol. 1
b. Inciting to revolution is treason, not only against man, but against
God.
—Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 1885
14. a. Language is the armory of the human mind; and at once contains the
trophies of its past, and the weapons of its future conquests.
—Samuel Taylor Coleridge
b. Language—human language—after all, is little better than the croak
and cackle of fowls, and other utterances of brute nature—sometimes
not so adequate.
—Nathaniel Hawthorne, American Notebooks, 1835
15. a. How does it become a man to behave towards the American govern-
ment today? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated
with it.
—Henry David Thoreau, An Essay on Civil Disobedience, 1849
b. With all the imperfections of our present government, it is without
comparison the best existing, or that ever did exist.
—Thomas Jefferson

3 Disputes and Ambiguity

Many disputes, whether about beliefs or about attitudes, are genuine. However,
some disputes are merely verbal, arising only as a result of linguistic misunder-
standing. The terms used by the disputing parties may have more than one
meaning—they may be ambiguous—but such ambiguity may be unrecognized by
the disputing parties. To uncover and to resolve verbal disagreements, ambigui-
ties must be identified, and the alternative meanings of the critical terms in the
dispute must be distinguished and clarified.
Disputes fall into three categories. The first is the obviously genuine dispute. If
A roots for the Yankees, and B for the Red Sox, they are in genuine disagreement,
although they disagree mainly in attitude. If C believes that Miami is south of

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 Language and Definitions

Honolulu, and D denies this, they too are in genuine disagreement, but in this
dispute about geographic facts a good map can settle the matter.
A second category is disputes in which the apparent conflict is not genuine
and can be resolved by coming to agreement about how some word or phrase is
to be understood. These may be called merely verbal disputes. F may hold that a
tree falling in the wilderness with no person to hear it creates no sound, while G
insists that a sound really is produced by the falling tree. If a “sound” is the out-
come of a human auditory sensation, then F and G may agree that there was
none; or if a “sound” is simply what is produced by vibrations in the air, then
they may agree that a sound was indeed produced. Getting clear about what is
meant by “sound” will resolve the disagreement, which was no more than verbal.
A third category, more slippery, is disputes that are apparently verbal but really
genuine. A misunderstanding about the use of terms may be involved in such
cases, but when that misunderstanding has been cleared up there remains a dis-
agreement that goes beyond the meanings of the words. For example, should a
film in which explicit sexual activity is depicted be considered “pornography”?
J holds that its explicitness makes it pornographic and offensive; K holds that its
beauty and sensitivity make it art and not pornography. Plainly they disagree
about what “pornography” means—but after that ambiguity has been exposed,
it is likely that the parties will still disagree in their judgment of that film.
Whether the film is “pornographic” may be settled by a definition of that term,
but a deeper disagreement is then likely to be exposed. The word “pornograph-
ic” plainly carries pejorative associations. J, who finds the film objectionable, un-
derstands the word “pornographic” in one way, while K, who approves of the
film, uses the word “pornographic” differently. Does the sexually explicit con-
tent of the film make it objectionable and thus “pornographic”? J and K differ in
their uses of the word, but for both of them the emotional meaning of the word is
very negative; and they also differ about the criteria for the application of that
negative word, “pornography.”
In summary, when confronting a dispute that arises in discourse, we must
first ask whether there is some ambiguity that can be eliminated by clarifying the
alternative meanings in play. If there is, then we must ask whether clearing up
that linguistic issue will resolve the matter. If it does, the dispute was indeed
merely verbal. If it does not, the dispute was genuine, although it may have ap-
peared to be merely verbal.

EXERCISES

A. Identify three disagreements in current political or social controversy that

are of the three types described in this section: one that is genuine, one that is
merely verbal, and one that is apparently verbal but really genuine. Explain the
disagreements in each case.
B. Discuss each of the following disputes. If the dispute is obviously genuine,
indicate each of the disputers’ positions with respect to the proposition at issue.

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