04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued.
CO N T EN T S
V. 5TH WEEK (common caarriers; carriage of passengers) continued - cases 12-20 ........... 1
12 M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. v. CA, 11 SCRA 98 -Dela Paz............................................... 1
13 Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 642 –Geraldez ................................................................................... 2
14 Batangas Transportation Co. v. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171 –King ..................................... 3
15 Bacarro v. Castano, 118 SCRA 187 –Lagos .............................................................................. 5
16 Brinas v. People, 125 SCRA 687 –Lopa ..................................................................................... 6
17 BLTB v. IAC, 167 SCRA 379 –Lucenario ................................................................................... 8
18 Calalas v. CA, 332 SCRA 356 –Magtagnob .............................................................................. 10
19 Mallari v. CA, 324 SCRA 147 –Muti........................................................................................... 11
20 Anuran v. Buno, 17 SCRA 224 –Narvasa ................................................................................ 13
V . 5 T H W E E K ( CO M MO N CA ARR IE R S ; CAR R IA GE O F P A S S EN GER S )
CO N T INU E D - CA S E S 1 2 - 20
12 M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. V. CA, 11 SCRA 98 -DELA PAZ
M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT, and MARTA CONSIGNADO, respondents.
Common Carrier M, Ruiz
Passenger Victoria and Spouses Monserrat
Problem a rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where the
child Victoria was standing in front of her mother
Who won Passenger
Emergency Digest:
Victoria and Spouses Monserrat , as paying passengers, rode the bus of M RUIZ bound
for Antipolo Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna the tire exploded causing the floor to give way
under Victoria. Victoria fell through the hole and died. The Spouses filed a case for
damages. CFI dismissed the complaint stating even if found negligent, the liability had
been discharged by Exhibits 2 and 3. CA granted citing Exhibits 2 and 3 were not a
waiver to damages. Passengers in a bus of M. RUIZ and Martin Buena as the driver.
The SC ruled that there was a contract of carriage between the parties which imposes
the duty to transport them, using the utmost diligence. M RUIZ failed to discharge
this diligence. The child died because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the
presumption that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance. CA found that
the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak. The tire
was not strong or safe, the load was heavy, the air pressure was not properly checked,
combined with the overspeeding bus could have caused the tire to explode.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to
claimants. What is expressed is the SPOUSES’ belief that MRUIZ are not liable to them
and acknowledgment of the voluntary help by transportation company.The belief is
baseless, the Spouses only entertained such impression because they are ignorant,
illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3, thoroughly confused
and distracted by the death of their child.
M RUIZ (owner) AND BUENA (driver) ARE LIABLE.
Complete Digest:
FACTS:
In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers in a
bus of M. Ruiz Highway Transit Inc driven by co-defendant Buena, bound for Antipolo,
Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, a rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where
Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole,
and died..ñët
The spouses sued M. RUIZ and BUENA to recover damages for the death of 4 year old,
Victoria. The CFI DISMISSED the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident was not
due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was
attributable to defendants, their liability had been discharged, as evidenced by Exhibits
2 and 3 .1
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the finding that (1) defendants failed to
prove the extraordinary diligence required of carriers; and (2) Exhibits 2 and 3 did not
effect a waiver of plaintiffs' right to damages. CA required M. RUIZ and BUENA to pay
P6,000.00 as indemnity for the child's death; P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00
1 "We, spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Maria Consignado hereby say that on the 22nd day of the month of May,
1954, we were riding in the truck of M. Ruiz Highway Transit, No. 102, driven by Martin Buena. That due to
unforeseen events, the left rear tire directly where we were sitting burst and destroyed the floor of the truck
which caused the death of our child. Because what happened could not be attributed to anybody's fault and
could be considered as an act of God, we cannot claim and likewise do not claim anything before any court
of justice. Our only request is that the management of the truck give us a little help they may be willing to
extend to us.
"Party of the Second Part:
"In view of the statement of the Party of the First Part, we are agreeable to their request to the amount within our
means. ..."
(Signatures omitted)
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"I, Guillermo Monserrat, certify that today, Saturday, May 22, 1954, I received from Mrs. Maria Ruiz, owner of
the M. Ruiz Transportation the amount of One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P150.00).
"I also certify that I am the father of the child Victoria Monserrat who died in the Truck No. 102 of M. Ruiz
Transportation this day, Saturday, May 22, 1954, in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. "To my entire satisfaction on account of
the help given to me by the owner of the transportation, I sign my name hereinbelow, in this town of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, this 22nd of May, 1954, in the presence of these witnesses."

as attorney's fees, with interest from the date of its decision, (minus the P150.00 that
had been given to plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
M RUIZ AND BUENA filed the present petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUE:
I. WON there was a contact of carriage? YES
II. WON M RUIZ was negligent? YES, CA FACTUAL FINDING
III. WON Exhibits 2 and 3 cancelled the liability of M RUIZ AND BUENA? NO.
HELD: The appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
RATIO:
I. WON there was a contact of carriage? YES
The appellate court made its finding that between M RUIZ and deceased VICTORIA
MONSERAT there existed a contract of carriage.
II. WON M RUIZ was negligent? YES, CA FACTUAL FINDING
CA found that the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor thereof was
weak — persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded
due to one or a combination of the following:
"The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly checked;
the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have overstrained the
tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have
expanded the already compressed air therein."
As paying passengers, M RUIZ was duty bound to transport them, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed.
The child died because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption
that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil Code).
Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the
presumption.
M RUIZ did not present any evidence to establish that the puncture of the tire was due
to accidental puncture by a sharp instrument, as a nail, or to latent defect in the tire.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier
liable for failure to provide a safe floor in the bus.
III. WON Exhibits 2 and 3 cancelled the liability of M RUIZ AND BUENA? NO.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to
claimants. What is expressed there is the latter's belief — clearly erroneous that
petitioners are not liable to them and acknowledgment of the voluntary help extended
by petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That respondents
entertained such an ill-founded impression is not to be wondered at. They are ignorant,
illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3, thoroughly confused
and distracted by the death of their child.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 2
13 ROQUE V. BUAN, 21 SCRA 642 –GERALDEZ
ANTONIO V. ROQUE vs. BIENVENIDO P. BUAN, ET AL., (1967) - Geraldez
Common Carrier Phil Rabbit Bus Lines
Owner of CC Respondent Buan
Passenger Roque
Problem Bus met a cargo truck coming from other direction. Bus swerved
to the right, hence sideswiping the bridge railing, causing two iron
window grills to detach and dangle
Who won Passenger Roque
ER: Roque rode a Rabbit (owned by Buan) to Pampanga. While on a bridge, the Rabbit
was about to hit a truck head on, so it swerved to avoid the collision. According to
Roque, the Rabbit hit the side of the bridge, causing damage to the bus and injuring him
through a fracture and exposed elbow. Driver says it didn’t hit the bridge, but instead,
the elbow of Roque was sticking out as he slept and so it caught the railing, causing him
injury. Basically a back and forth on this. TC rules for Roque. CA rules for Rabbit. SC
agrees with factual findings of TC. In addition, it says that negligence on the part of the
common carrier is presumed where, as in the present case, the passenger suffers
injuries. This presumption ain’t even necessary as the case rests on something stronger
than an assumption.
Facts:
1. According to Petitioner Roque, corroborated by one other passenger:
a. Florencio Buan was the operator of Philippine Rabit Bus Lines. Defendants
here are those duly authorized to continue the operations (heirs).
b. Feb 12, 1955, 2PM, Roque was on a bus going to Angeles, Pamapanga.
c. It was driven by Celestino Soliman, employee of operator.
d. It was running at 60kmh. When it reached the Sulipan bridge, it met
a cargo truck coming form the other direction. To avoid, it swerved
to the right, thereby sideswiping the bridge railing.
e. The impact was so violent that two iron window grills were detached
and dangling. The right portion of the bus was dented inward.
f. Roque was seated by the side window where the grills were
detached, his right arm resting on the sill of the window. As such, he
suffered an abrasion, a fracture, and a wound exposing his elbow
point.
2. According to Defense (relying only on Driver Soliman, no passengers):
a. Bus was going at 40-50kmh. As it approached the bridge, it reduced to
10kmh.
b. He then heard the conductor say “para”, and upon asking why, was
answered that “this arm was protruding and hit the bridge”
c. When driver asked Roque why it was out, the latter replied that “he fell
asleep”.

3. Trial Court found:
a. Defendant presented the company mechanic, carpenter, and admin officer
of Rabbit and a police lieutenant that said the bus was not dented nor
scratched and that the grills were in place.
b. But the court believed plaintiff Roque’s version and that of the other
passenger, which Reoque just met on that trip. It further took notice of the
fact that the driver had just been driving that bus for two months prior to
the accident. There was a lack of diligence.
c. In regard to the injuries, we are inclined to believe the plaintiff that he
rested his arms on the sill, but within the frame of the window. He was
also not asleep thereby allowing him to know the speed of the bus.
4. CA:
a. the only conclusion we can think of as to why plaintiff was injured is that
he must have extended his right elbow beyond or outside the grills of the
window of the bus, as some passengers are wont to do unconsciously, and
the bridge railing caught Roque’s elbow.
Issue: Who wins? Roque.
Ratio:
 We observe that the trial court's findings in the affirmative are factually based on
the testimony of the plaintiff and of the corroborating witness, whose demeanor
while testifying, was within the observation of the trial court which, after
appreciating their testimoniesa, found no reason not to accord them credit.
 If the decision of the Court of Appeals on the controversial matter suffers, as it does,
from some ambiguity, the doubt should be resolved to sustain the trial court in the
light of the familiar and accepted rule that "the judge who tries a case in the court
below, has vastly superior advantage for the ascertainment of truth and the
detection of falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a court of review. The
appellate court can merely follow with the eye, the cold words of the witness as
transcribed upon the record, knowing at the same time, from actual experience,
that more or less, of what the witness actually did say, is always lost in the process
of transcribing. (Moran)
 We are not prepared to agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion as to the reason
why the plaintiff's arm was injured —- that "he must have extended his right elbow
beyond or outside the grills of the window of the bus." The conclusion is: firstly,
contrary to the established act; secondly, it is an inference based on mere
assumption; thirdly, it is contrary to the res ipsa loquitur rule; and fourthly, it is not
in conformity with the physical law of nature.
 [We take judicial notice of the width of the bridge, and the fact that hitting the side
of the bridge at 10kmh will only result in a scratch.]
 The sworn statement of the driver belie his testimony in court; firstly, that it was
the conductor who called his attention about the injured passenger; and secondly,
that Roque admitted that he had put his arm out of the window and told him that he
(Roque) was "asleep", for if, Roque really gave these replies, the driver would have
so stated in his sworn statement to the Chief of Police. Such a significant fact, still
fresh in the mind of the driver when he gave his statement to the police, could not
have been forgotten by him.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 3
 Negligence on the part of the common carrier is presumed where, as in the
present case, the passenger suffers injuries.
o In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they proved that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
1755. (Art. 1756, New Civil Code.)
o When the action is based on a contract of carriage and not of tort, the
court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part
of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to any damages sought for by
the plaintiff. For the carrier by accepting the passenger assumes
express obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that may be suffered: by the passenger
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
(Art. 1776, New Civil Code) This is an exception to the general rule
that negligence must be proved and it is incumbent upon the carrier
to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. (Dy Sy vs. Malate Taxicab etc., L-
8937, November 29, 1957.)
 The negligence of the defendants in the case at bar, rests on something more solid
than a legal presumption. We are persuaded, that the accident occurred because of
want of care and prudence on the part of bus driver. As the defendants failed to
prove their observance of extraordinary diligence in discharging their obligation
unto plaintiff, their liability as public utility operator is beyond question.
 But, while we must sustain the trial court's award of actual or compensatory
damages, and attorney's fees, the grant of moral damages cannot be upheld. The
action herein is based on a breach of contract of carriage.
14 BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO. V. CAGUIM BAL, 22 SCRA 171 –KING
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL,
PANCRACIO CAGUIMBAL, MARIA MARANAN DE CAGUIMBAL, BIÑAN
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and MARCIANO ILAGAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-
22985 January 24, 1968
Common Carrier Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO)
Passenger Pedro Caguimbal
Problem Collision among 2 buses and a calesa, Passenger dies
Who won Passenger Caguimbal. BTCO is liable notwithstanding the
negligence of the other bus because it failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as it did not step out of the road when it
was letting of its passenger
ER:
 Caguimbal was a passenger in the BTCO bus (southbound). Along the way, one
passenger wanted to alight. So BTCO bus, swerved to the right, to let off its
passenger. However, there was more room for it to go to the right so that it could

safely let off its passenger. Also the BTCO bus could also see the calesa and Biñan
bus coming. At this point, the calesa and Biñan bus were northbound. Biñan bus
was behind the calesa. Going at a speed of 70km/h, it then tried to overtake the
calesa. However, there was no adequate space for it to overtake. It bumped the
BTCO bus and the calesa. Caguimbal died. Calesa destroyed. BTCO bus partially
wrecked. RTC dismissed the complaint of the heirs. CA reversed ordering BTCO,
Biñan to pay. BTCO appeals.
 Defense: Negligence of the other bus, Ammen case: it exercised the required
diligence as required by the circumstance
Issue: Is BTCO liable notwithstanding the negligence of the Biñan bus? –YES
 No doubt that Binan was the main cause of the accident. However, it was found that
the bus could have gone further to the right to let off its passenger. Before it
stopped, it already had a view of the calesa and the Biñan bus. He should have
adjusted accordingly.
 Common carriers cannot make the passengers rely on the diligence of other parties.
It is their duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in safely carrying its passenger.
COMPLETE
Facts:
 Collision among 3 Vehicles:
o 1) Batangas Transportation Company Bus (BTCO Bus)
o 2) Biñan Transportation Bus (Biñan Bus)
o 3) Horse driven rig (Calesa)
 BTCO bus driven by Tomas Ramirez had a route from Calamba, Laguna to Batangas,
Batangas. It was south bound. plate TPU-507
 Biñan bus driven by Marcian Ilagan plate TPU-820. Northbound.
 Horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya was then ahead of the Biñan
bus. It was also north-bound
 Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a
paying passenger of BTCO bus. His destination was his residence at Calansyan, San
Jose Batangas.
 The incident occurred at past 5.30am.
 As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop
as he was going to alight.
 When he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down
his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop.
 At this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of
several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction
 At the same time, the Biñan bus was about 100 meters away likewise going
northward and following the direction of the calesa.
 Upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as
established by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Biñan bus at the time of the
accident.
 As the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite
directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to
pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 4
 Without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Biñan
bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the
left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and
struck the calesa which was completely wrecked
 As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely,
Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured.
o The driver of the calesa was seriously injured and the horse was killed.
o posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely
smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open.
 The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the present action, which was tried
jointly with a similar action of the Tolentinos, to recover damages from BTCO.
 BTCO filed a third-party complaint against Biñan Transportation Company and its
driver, Marciano Ilagan.
 The Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
sue Biñan which had stopped participating pending its insolvency proceedings.
 On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the CA reversed said decision and rendered
judgment for them. It ordered BTCO, Biñan, Ilagan (bus driver of Biñan) to pay the
heirs of Caguimbal.
o It rendered judgment against the BTCO upon the ground that its driver,
Tomas Perez, had failed to exercise the "extraordinary diligence," required
in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, "in the vigilance for the safety" of his
passengers.
 Hence, this appeal by BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) in
finding said appellant liable for damages; and 2) in awarding attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether BTCO is liable for the injuries and death of the passengers
notwithstanding the negligence of the other bus?- YES
The recklessness of Biñan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the
accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of
the Biñan bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed
between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big
enough therefor, in view of which the Biñan bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and
then the calesa.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove
his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted
portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen to it — had he exercised
"extraordinary diligence" — that his bus was completely outside the asphalted
portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which
being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus.
He could have and should have done this, because, when the passenger expressed his
wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had seen the "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few
meters away, coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters
behind the rig cruising at a good speed. When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to

permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Biñan bus
would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would
probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the road,
and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow
the Biñan bus to go through.
It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped, and,
hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the
passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or
"extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a
situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety
dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes
the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any
injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code).
In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its
part.
For this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. relied upon by BTCO, is
not in point, for, in said case, the public utility driver had done everything he could to
avoid the accident, and could not have possibly avoided it, for he "swerved the bus to the
very extreme right of the road," which the driver, in the present case, had failed to do.
15 BACARRO V. CASTAN O, 118 SCRA 187 –LAGOS
ROSITO Z. BACARRO, WILLIAM SEVILLA, and FELARIO MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs.
GERUNDIO B. CASTAÑO, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Common Carrier Jeep driven by Montefalcon
Passenger Castaño
Problem Cargo truck wanted to overtake jeep. Jeep gave way but did not
slow down. Jeep unable to return to the proper lane and instead
ran obliquely towards the canal until it fell into the ditch
Who won Passenger Castaño
ER:
 Castaño boarded a jeep being driven by Montefalcon. While approaching Sumasap
Bridge, a cargo truck coming from behind blew its horn to signal its intention to
overtake the jeep. The jeep gave way by swerving to the right, such that both
vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around twenty (20) meters, and that
thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former
lane and instead it obliquely ran unto an inclined terrain towards the right
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 5
until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing Castaño’s right leg in the
process.
 WON Montefalcon was negligent? Yes, the fact is Montefalcon did not slacken his
speed. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were
getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower, the truck would be
too close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it.
 WON only diligence of a good father of a family is required of Montefalcon? No,
reliance on Art. 1763 is misplaced. There was a contract of carriage hence extra-
ordinary diligence is required of the common carrier as provided for in Arts. 1733,
1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code.
 Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A
common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of
being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide “using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons.” (Article 1755). Once a passenger in
the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier
and driver are presumed to be at fault.
Facts:
 CASTAÑO boarded the jeep at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis Oriental. The
jeep was filled to capacity, with 12 passengers in total.
 The jeep was running quite fast and while it was approaching the Sumasap bridge,
there was a cargo truck who blew its horn, signaling its intent to overtake.
 The jeep gave way, by swerving to the right, but it did not change speed (40
km/hr). The cargo truck and the jeep were running side by side for a distance
of around 20 meters. The driver of the jeep was not able to return the jeep to
the proper lane and instead ran obliquely towards the canal until it fell into
the ditch.
 When the jeep was running on the side of the road, the road was inclined a little
and Castaño was pushed outward by the passengers beside him such that he was
clinging with his leg and half of his body outside the jeep.
 The jeep then fell, breaking the leg of Castaño.
 Castaño was rushed to St. Mary’s Hospital where he stayed for 2 months. Because of
the accident, his right leg is now shorter by 1 ½ inches necessitating him to use
specially made shoes. He complained that he was not able to squat, kneel, nor sit for
a long time because of his leg. He also lost two fingers on his right hand and the
remaining 3 fingers feels numb up to this time.
 Montefalcon’s defense hinged on his allegation that the accident was because the
cargo truck overtook the jeep so closely that in the process of overtaking
sideswiped the jeep, hitting the reserve tire placed at the left side of the jeep. This
caused the jeep to swerve and run into the ditch, falling into the canal.
 CFI decided in favor of Castaño and the CA affirmed.
 Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON Montefalcon, the driver, is negligent? YES
WON only diligence of a good father of a family required of Montefalcon? NO
WON the accident was a fortuitous event? NO

Held: CA decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Montefalcon was negligent
 Had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was
overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have
been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting
narrower the truck would be too close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped
it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the
right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at
the same time.
Exercise of extraordinary diligence required
 There was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the herein
petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755
and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on
the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
o Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
o Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
o Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and
obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws.
 Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A
common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of
being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide “using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons.” (Article 1755). Once a passenger in
the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier
and driver are presumed to be at fault.
Accident was not a fortuitous event
The sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have
been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide
enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 6
16 BRINAS V. PEOPLE, 125 SCRA 687 –LOPA
CLEMENTE BRIÑAS vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983
Common Carrier Manila Railroad Company
Driver Victor Milan
Conductor Clemente Brinas
Asst. Conductor Hermogenes Buencamino
Passenger 55-year old Martina Bool and 3-year old granddaughter Emelita
Gesmundo
Problem Conductor made an erroneous and premature announcement that
they’ve reached Lusacan. Old woman and child stumbled from the
train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an
oncoming train, causing their instant death.
Who won Passengers as to award, but deleted subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency imposed by the lower court.
Emergency Digest: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a
train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother
Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for
Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon. They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about
2pm. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the
conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted “Lusacan, Lusacan!” The old
woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and
holding her baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train
suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child stumbled from the train
causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing
their instant death. A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver,
Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted Milan and
Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the decision. Separate civil
action for damages were filed against Manila Railroad Company.
Issue:
1. W/N Brinas was liable?
2. W/N inclusion of payment of death indemnity was proper despite separate civil action
for damages already filed?
Held:
 The appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full
three minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In making the
erroneous and premature announcement, appellant was negligent. He ought to
have known that train passengers invariably prepare to alight upon notice from the
conductor that the destination was reached and that the train was about to stop.

 Although it might be argued that the negligent act of the appellant was not the
immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury, for the train jerked
before the victims stumbled, yet in legal contemplation appellant's negligent act
was the proximate cause of the injury.
 A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action
for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to
file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the
Manila Railroad Company.
 When death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of
damages may be recovered:
(1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
(3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and
(6) interest in proper cases.
 The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed slim of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death.
 This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the
others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence
presented.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
 January 1957 - Victor Milan (engine driver), Clemente Briñas (conductor) and
Hermogenes Buencamino (assistant conductor) were operating the passenger
Train No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad Company, then running from Tagkawayan to
San Pablo City
 Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan,
Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter
Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong
 Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night,
the train slowed down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Thereupon,
the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong,
carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When
Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a
result the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more. The train
didn’t get to the Lagalag station until around 3 minutes later.
 Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found
along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag.
o lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks,
sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the
forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 7
o the corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks
with the head and both legs severed and the left hand missing. The head
was located farther west between the rails. An arm was found midway
from the body of the child to the body of the old woman.
o bodies were Identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
Among the personal effects found on Martina was a train ticket
 Dr. Huertas testified on the cause of death of the victims (Shock, traumatic injury
caused by the running over by the wheel of the train)
 Decision of the CFI of QC: CONVICTED Brinas (conductor) for DOUBLE HOMICIDE
THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE but ACQUITTED Buencamino (asst. conductor) and
Millan (engine driver)
 On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
 heirs filed this during the pendency of the criminal prosecution
 Separate Civil Action for Damages against Manila Railroad Company filed during the
pendency of the criminal action
Issues:
1. W/N the CA erred in convicting the petitioner-appellant under the facts as found by
the said court. NO
2. W/N the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the petitioner-
appellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of the
deceased have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against the
railroad company arising from the same mishap. YES
Held: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for
death indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead
of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita Gesmundo instead of
P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Ratio:
W/N the CA erred in convicting the petitioner-appellant under the facts as found
by the said court
 We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings.
 In finding petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court found
o The appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a
full three minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In
making the erroneous and premature announcement, appellant was
negligent. He ought to have known that train passengers invariably
prepare to alight upon notice from the conductor that the destination was
reached and that the train was about to stop.
o Although it might be argued that the negligent act of the appellant was not
the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury, for the

train jerked before the victims stumbled, yet in legal contemplation
appellant's negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury.
o Tucker v. Milan: 'The proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily the
immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is only
when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is to be
charged with the disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and
continuous sequence between the negligent act the injury (sic) that it can
reasonably be said that but for the act the injury could not have occurred,
such negligent act is the proximate cause of the injury, and whoever is
responsible therefore is liable for damages resulting therefrom. One who
negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the
natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third
person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible intervenes to
precipitate the loss.
 It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like
trains and buses that
o before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor
announces the name of the place.
o as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and
proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes
to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that
if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no
way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
 It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said
stop was still a full three minutes ahead.
 The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner' appelant Briñas. The connection between the
premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of
the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
 The negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing
the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and
Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and
does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
W/N the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the petitioner-
appellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of
the deceased have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against
the railroad company arising from the same mishap
 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa
contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law.
 We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case that
the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant
Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct
sources of obligation.
 A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action
for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 8
file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the
Manila Railroad Company.
 The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the
separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death
indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant.
 When death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of
damages may be recovered:
(1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
(3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and
(6) interest in proper cases.
 The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed slim of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death.
o This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas
the others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the
evidence presented.
17 BLTB V. IAC, 167 SCRA 379 –LUCENARIO
Common Carrier BLTB
Passenger (3 Deaths) Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and
several injuries to others
Problem BLTB Bus tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car on a no-overtaking
zone & curved part of the highway. Suddenly Superlines Bus came
from the opposite direction and BAM!
Who won Passengers
Emergency Recitation:
 There was a vehicular accident between BLTB Bus and Superlines Bus on a curved
part of the highway. BLTB Bus tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car but then suddenly
saw the Superlines Bus coming from the opposite direction. It tried to slow down
and return to its proper lane but it was too late. 3 BLTB bus passengers died and 2
injured.
 Victims filed civil case against the BLTB, Superlines, and drivers. And criminal case
against the drivers.
 [Related to Admission] CFI held BLTB driver’s negligence as the proximate cause.
Driver admitted in his cross-examination that that the continuous yellow line on the
ascending bend of the highway where the accident took place signifies a no-
overtaking zone. Hence, CFI ruled that his attempt to overtake the Ford in such area
amounted to negligence. And there is a presumption of negligence when the driver
is violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap. They were unable to
overcome this presumption.
 BLTB appealed because court held it solidarily liable based on culpa contractual. It
claimed that petitioners anchored its claim on culpa aquilana and not culpa

contractual because if it did, it would have only impleaded BLTB and its driver, not
all of them including Superlines and its driver.
 ISSUE: W/N BLTB was properly held liable  YES
 Court decision shows that it found BLTB liable based on BOTH culpa contract and
culpa aquilana. (See ratio of court decision wherein it discussed BLTB’s liability
both on the basis of culpa contractual and culpa aquilana).
 The negligence of its driver is binding against BLTB, more so when we consider the
fact that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible for the payment of the damages sought by the passenger.
 By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to
transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the
carrier
FACTS:
 There was a vehicular accident between a BLTB Bus and Superlines Bus at a
highway traversing Brgy. Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon
 It happened on an ascending, curved part of the highway wherein the two lanes
were separated by a continuous yellow line signifying it was a no-overtaking zone
 The BLTB Bus nevertheless tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car when it suddenly saw
the Superlines Bus coming from the opposite direction.
 It tried to slow down and return to its proper lane but it was too late. The buses
collided.
 Collision resulted in the deaths of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo
Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales – all
passengers of the BLTB Bus
 Survivors and surviving heirs of deceased filed a civil case in CFI Marinduque
against BLTB, Superlines, and its drivers. Also filed a criminal case in CFI Quezon
against the drivers.
 BLTB and Superlines both denied liability and passed the blame on each other.
They filed counterclaims against plaintiff and cross-claims against each other.
 CFI absolved Superlines and Superlines driver. Found BLTB and driver solidarily
liable.
 BLTB appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed CFI order and found BLTB liable on the ground
of culpa contractual.
 Hence, BLTB files this appeal.
 BLTB’s defense: It cannot be liable based on culpa contractual because the cause of
action of plaintiffs hinges on culpa aquilana or tort. The clearest indicator of this is
that they sued ALL defendants (including Superlines and the drivers). If their action
was based on culpa contractual, then they wouldn’t have sued all defendants but
merely should have impleaded BLTB and its driver.
ISSUE: W/N BLTB was properly held liable based on culpa contractual?  YES
HELD: Petition denied. IAC decision affirmed.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 9
RATIO:
[Related to Admissions against Interest]
The BLTB Bus driver basically admitted his guilt on cross examination:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three
and injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the negligence of
the driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated and drove said
bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the
ascending bend of the highway (which was divided into two lanes by
a continuous yellow strip. The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in his
cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending
bend of the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone. It is no surprise
then that the driver of the Superlines bus was exonerated by the
lower court. He had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would
overtake in such a dangerous situation. These facts show that patient
imprudence of the BLTB driver.
A reading of the court’s decision shows that it anchored BLTB’s liability BOTH on culpa
contractual and culpa aquilana.
 The finding that the negligence of the BLTB Bus driver was the proximate cause of
the accident
 He was violating a traffic regulation (no overtaking zone) at the time of the mishap
so he is presumed to have acted negligently. In failing to observe these simple
precautions, BLTB's driver undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence demanded
by the circumstances
More specifically, the ratio of the court was:
On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is
also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death
of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its
employee (Marahan v. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 888, 894), and such liability
does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees (Article 1759, Civil Code).
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its
passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its
passengers safely to their destination. That obligation is so serious
that the Civil Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious person
(Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Article 1756, Civil Code). In the present
case, the appellants have failed to prove extraordinary diligence.
Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus
driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and
the owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers.

The liability of BLTB is also solidarily with its even though the
liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus
company from contract.
The negligence of its driver is binding against BLTB, more so when we consider the fact
that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for
the payment of the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the
carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code).
On its last attempt to escape liability: BLTB also contends that "a common carrier is not
an absolute insurer against all risks of travel and are not liable for acts or accidents
which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that responsibility of a common carrier for
the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code is
not susceptible of a precise and definite formulation
However, BLTB’s contention holds no water because they had totally failed to point out
any factual basis for their defense of force majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that
the cause of the collision was the sole negligence and recklessness of its driver Armando
Pon.
For the defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to
natural causes and exclusively without human intervention.
18 CALALAS V. CA, 33 2 SCRA 356 –MAGTAGNOB
Keyword: extension seat
Topic: carriage of passengers
Common Carrier Jeep owned and Driven by Calalas
Passenger Eliza
Problem An Isuzu bumped the jeepney while the jeepney was letting off a
passenger
Who won Passenger Eliza
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
 Eliza, a college student at Siliman University (Course: PE), took the jeep owned and
driven by Calalas. She was placed in an extension seat because the jeepney was
already full (24 passengers). The jeepney let off a passenger, and Eliza gave way. As
she was doing so, an Isuzu truck bumped the jeep, which injured Eliza. She has to be
in a cast for 3 months and use crutches.
 Eliza filed a case against Calalas. Calalas filed a 3rd party complaint against Salva.
 Note that there was a separate case filed by Calalas against Salva (owner of Isuzu)
for damages to his jeep, wherein the court rules in Calalas’ favor and held Salva
liable.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 10
 RTC- held Salva liable, and absolved Calalas, based on the ruling in the separate
case. CA- ruled that Calalas is available based on breach of contract of carriage.
ISSUE: WON Calalas should be held liable, regardless of the ruling in the separate
case.—YES.
 The SC held that Calalas is liable. The separate case is one of quasi-delict, between
Calalas and Salva, for damages to Calalas’ jeep. This case is one of breach of contract
of carriage, between Eliza and Calalas, for Eliza’s injury. These are different causes
of action.
 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
 Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
 Calalas was not able to prove that he exercised extraordinary diligence. The jeep
was not properly parked because its rear portion was exposed about 2 meters from
the shoulders of the road. It was overloaded with passengers. Hence, the
presumption of negligence remained.
 There was no fortuitous event because it should’ve expected to be hit since the rear
portion was protruding.
 ELIZA won. 
COMPLETE DIGEST
Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in PE at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Eliza was given by the
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle. Sclaw
The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,
Eliza gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven
by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney.
Eliza was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with
severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg
circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. She would remain on a
cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.
Eliza filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte
RTC- Salva is responsible. Calalas was absolved because of another case filed by Calalas
against Salva, where it was held that Salva and his driver are liable to Calalas. Said that
this is quasi-delict.
CA- reversed. Said that this is breach of contract of carriage. Held Calalas liable.
ISSUE:

Whether Calalas should be held liable, even if a previous separate case held the driver of
Isuzu the proximate cause of the accident? – YES, Calalas is liable.
Whether the collision is a fortuitous event? - NO
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is DELETED.
RATIO:
The pronouncement in the previous case absolving Calalas does not bind Eliza as she
was never a party to the suit. Neither are the issues in the other case similar to this case.
The issue in the other case was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to Calalas’ jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
this case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code.
This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of Calalas to prove that he has observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Calalas did not exercise extraordinary diligence.
First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway
in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner
as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 11
passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles
on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that Calalas’ driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Eliza was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than
that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Eliza’s taking an "extension seat" did not amount to an implied assumption of risk.
The collision is not a fortutitous event. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor’s will;
(b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding
two meters into the highway.
19 MALLARI V. CA, 32 4 SCRA 147 –MUTI
ALFREDO MALLARI, SR. and ALFREDO MALLARI, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 128607, Jan. 31, 2000.
Doctrines:
 A driver abandoning his proper lane for purposes of overtaking another vehicle has
the duty to see that the road is clear.
 In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need NOT make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger.
Common Carrier passenger jeepney (driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr.)
Passenger Reyes (died)
Other Vehicle in Bulletin van driven by Angeles
collision
Problem Jeep overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway.
Jeepney then collided with delivery van of Bulletin coming from
opposite direction.
Who won Bulletin
ER: At about 5AM, passenger jeepney (driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr.)
collided with delivery van of Bulletin (driven by Angeles). Points of collision: left rear
portion (jeepney) and left front side (van). Mallari Jr. testified that immediately before
the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera and that
he had seen the van before overtaking the Fiera. The collision caused the death of a
passenger of the jeepney, Reyes, whose widow filed a complaint for damages against the
owner and driver of both the jeepney and van.

HELD: The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the driver of the
passenger jeepney who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. It is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is
binding against the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need
not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in
order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Under
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary diligence.
Facts:
 At about 5 AM, the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. (“Mallari Jr.”)
and owned by Alfredo Mallari Sr. (“Mallari Sr.”) collided with the delivery van of
Bulletin Publishing Corp. (“Bulletin”) along the National Highway in Barangay San
Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
 Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera
which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van
of Bulletin (driven by Felix Angeles) coming from the opposite direction.
 The sketch of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision
were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the
delivery van of Bulletin.
 The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in
injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to
the gravity of his injuries.
 Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against
Mallari Sr. and Jr., Bulletin and its driver Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the
death of Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the
passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.
 TRIAL COURT: Proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Angeles
considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney.
 CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.
 MALLARI’s arguments:
o There is no evidence to show that Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle at a curve
on the road at the time of the accident and that the testimony of Angeles
on the overtaking made by Mallari Jr. was not credible and unreliable.
o The trial court was in a better position than the CA to assess the evidence
and observe the witnesses as well as determine their credibility.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 12
Issue: Whether Mallari Jr. and Sr. (driver and owner of jeepney) is liable as common
carrier. YES!
Ratio:
 Contrary to Mallari’s allegation that there was NO evidence whatsoever that he
overtook a vehicle at a curve on the road at the time of or before the accident,
Mallari Jr. himself testified that such fact indeed did occur.
 This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA
41361 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
 The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the
road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is
approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right
side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side
relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view.
o In the instant case, by his own admission, Mallari Jr. already saw that the
Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing
to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5 AM mindlessly
occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve
in the highway.
o Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of
Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of
the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his
jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules.
 Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the CA, the Mallaris
failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
 The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding
against Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney
engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on
contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of damages sought by the passenger.
 Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
1 Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. — (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the
center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless
such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking or passing to be made in safety. xxx

 Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to
passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
 Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees. This liability of the common carrier does NOT cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees.
Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or
death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier.
20 ANURAN V. BUNO, 1 7 SCRA 224 –NARVASA
GREGORIO ANURAN, vs BUÑO - Narvasa
Common Carrier Passenger Jeepney owned by spouses Gahol, driven by Buño
Passenger Emelita, Leonor Masongsong
Other vehicle in Water truck.
collision Owner: defendants-spouses Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro
Driver: Guillermo Razon
Problem jeepney was parked on the road, a speeding water truck
negligently bumped it from behind causing 3 passengers’ death
Who won Passengers, all defendants (jeep & water truck folks) are solidarily
liable
ER:
A passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding
along, negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three of its passengers
died, even as two others (passengers too) suffered injuries that required their
confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days. TC&CA: exonerated driver told
truck to pay.
Whether in the release of the driver from liability, is the carrier/jeepney also
released?
The jeepney should not be freed from liability. It must be remembered that the
obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely requires "utmost diligence"
from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art.
1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of
Appeals' finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the
vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver — and the owners — of the jeepney
must answer for injuries to its passengers.
04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 13
Last clear chance does not apply when it is to enforce contractual obligations.
COMPLETE
 The passenger jeepney owned by spouses Gahol, driven by Buño, was on its regular
route travelling from Taal, Batangas. When said passenger jeepney crossed a bridge
separating, it had fourteen passengers, excluding the driver, according to the
testimony of defendant Buño, or sixteen passengers according to the testimony of
plaintiff Edita de Sagun.
o The vehicle was overloaded with passengers at the time, because
according to the partial stipulation of facts "the maximum capacity of the
jeepney was 11, including the driver.
 After crossing the bridge, driver stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his
passengers to alight.
o Parked jeepney in such a way that one-half of its width (the left wheels)
was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right
shoulder of said road.
 A speeding water truck then violently smashed against the parked jeepney from
behind, causing it to turn turtle into a nearby ditch.
 3 passengers died, 2 passengers suffered injuries that required their confinement at
the Provincial Hospital.
 Suits were brought to recover damages against the driver and the owners of the
truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
CFI: rendered judgment absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it
required the truck driver and the owners thereof to make compensation.
CA:
 Jeepney driver exonerated even with some contributory negligence. Applying the
doctrine of the "last clear chance" said Court ordered the owners of the truck to
pay, solidarily with its driver, damages.
Issue: Whether in the release of the driver from liability, is the carrier/jeepney
also released?
 The jeepney should not be freed from liability.
 It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers
safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers
(Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756).
 In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of
Appeals' finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking
the vehicle improperly.
 It must follow that the driver — and the owners — of the jeepney must answer for
injuries to its passengers.
 The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a suit
between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
 04 Transpo Digests. Cases 12-20 Continued. 14

where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its

contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence.
 Now as to damages. The driver and the owners of the truck have not appealed
from the Court of Appeals' assessment. The plaintiffs (petitioners) have not asked
here for a greater amount of indemnity. They merely pray for a declaration that
Pepito Buño, Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara (the driver and the owners of the
jeepney, respectively) be declared jointly and severally liable with the other
defendants.
 Wherefore, affirming the decision under review, we hereby modify it in the sense
prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants last mentioned are
required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed
by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals against said three defendants. So
ordered.