The Electoral Role of Religion in Post-Independence India

Chapter Seven
The Electoral Function of Religion in

Post-independence India
233
The political functions of religion in post independence India are vast, varied and significant. In
the previous chapter, the researcher examined some of these functions. In this chapter, other
functions of religion during this period of Indian history, especially in the electorate, in the rise
of secessionism and its impact on international relations are investigated.
A) Electoral Function of Religion: Use of Religion by Political Parties

and Leaders
In India, electoral politics including nomination of the candidates, campaigning, communal

representation and so on, accentuated the process of communalism in almost every state.1 As
Arora mentions, ‘almost all political parties are, in one way or the other, guilty of using religion-
related issues for narrow political gains and even the hands of religious leaders are not clean.
This is perhaps because religion is a source of identity and a bonding factor in the lives of
people, mainly in developing societies like India.’2 This is why religion becomes a very
important factor in electoral policies.
The Constitution of 1950 abolished the system of communal electorates.3 But, politicians
depend on votes, and the electoral process almost forces them to exploit the religious divisions in
society.4 Elections and parties intensify religious cleavage, as other cleavages, precisely because
political leaders can use identity loyalties to mobilize voters and hence may deliberately
exacerbate cleavages to rally support.5 According to Chakrabarty, after independence also,
‘caste, religion and language were the only three distinct categories of communities that figured
prominently in its deliberations. Religion, caste and language continue to remain probably the
most effective factors in political mobilization in India even after decades of the successful
experiment of electoral democracy.’6 Hence, many candidates of various parties use communal
strategies and tactics.
1
Shakir, 1986a, 184.
2
Arora, 2008.
3
Weiner, 2006, 126.
4
Van Der Veer, 2006, 261.
5
Weiner, 2006, 137.
6
Chakrabarty, 2008, 38.
234
During the post-independence period also, numerous variations on Gandhi's techniques of
mass mobilization have been applied countless times in movements, small and big. Increasingly,
however, mass mobilization has become associated more with competitive demagogy, with the
manipulation of symbols for the sole purpose of building a political following in win an election
or to achieve some other purpose and with snarl’s regard for any moral goal.1 Among the
particular form of anti-minority mobilization has been used in India, traditional religious
ceremonies and processions institutionally privileges over others forms of mobilization. ‘A
favorite strategy of Hindu party leaders who calculate that they will gain electorally from
polarization around a Hindu identity is to organize unusually large religious processions that take
new routes through minority neighborhoods, to hoist the national flag over a disputed site, or to
sponsor processions to celebrate national anniversaries.’2 At election time until 1990s, for
instance, the politicians strived to persuade the voters that the threat from Pakistan or from
secessionists in Punjab and Kashmir or the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya, are
what really should matter to them.3
In the initial years of post-independence in India, the dominant political discourse was
secular in its thrust and was not consistent with areas governed by caste or religious domains.
Whereas since the mid-1980s, the dominant political discourse increasingly became consistent
with a communal, sectarian, and caste-based cultural reservoir. The political parties transformed
this reservoir into electoral capital.4 So, the nature of electoral competition has undergone
important changes during the post-independence period. The Congress Party dominated national
and state politics from 1950 to the early 1970s. Between 1970 and 1990, the party faced greater
opposition in both levels. It lost state elections to regional parties in some states and its seat share
in the Lok Sabha declined. The next transition to multiparty competition was by the mid-1990s.5
Religion, especially as an instrument in the hands of the opposition of Congress, has had
important role in these transformations. Therefore, Indian election studies mention the demise of
1
Brass, 1994, 24.
2
Wilkinson, 2004, 23-4.
3
Brass, 1994, 99.
4
Pramod Kumar, “Contextualizing Religious, Caste and Regional Dynamics in Electoral Politics: Emerging
Paradoxes,” in India’s 2004 Elections; Grass – roots and National Perspectives, eds. Ramashray Roy and Paul
Wallace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007), 69.
5
Nirmala Ravishankar, “The Cost of Ruling: Anti-Incumbency in Elections,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
44, No. 10 (2009).
235
the so-called “Congress system” in India, and the rise of communal voting patterns based on
caste and religion.1
However, in the last decades of 20th century, upper-caste-dominated parties, because of their
challenges tried to highlight the threat posed by Muslims and anti-Muslim wedge issues. For
example, Muslims' alleged slaughter of cows, the renaming of a town with a Muslim origin name
with an ‘authentic Indian’ (i.e., Hindu) name, taking a Hindu procession route through a Muslim
neighborhood, or disputing the status of a plot of land claimed or occupied by Muslims etc..
These wedge issues allowed the parties to potentially rally a large proportion of Hindus to their
side, while entailing no economic cost for the party's existing upper-caste supporters.2
1) Vote Banks Based on Religion
During the post independence period communally divisive 'vote bank politics' and 'pampering'
Muslims or other minorities in order to get their votes some time have been seen.3 This politics is
“The practice of creating and maintaining vote banks through divisive policies. This brand of
politics encourages voters to vote on the basis of narrow communal considerations often against
their better judgement.”4 Congress among Muslim and other minorities and BJP among Hindus
have tried to create vote banks.
For example, while the Muslim League supported the Emergency in 1975, the Muslims were
hostile to the emergency. When it was suspended and elections were held in early 1977, the
Muslims in northern India exploded in anger at the Congress government. Indira Gandhi
succeeded in wooing them back, however. 'Without their support, Congress could not have won
in 1980, and with their support, Congress probably would have won in 1977.’5 She decided to
make the minorities' support expendable and seek power in 1984 on the plank of 'national
security' on the strength of the vote of the majority community. After her assassination in 1984,
1
Jungug Choi, “Strategic Voting in India: Its Extent and Determinants in the 2004 General Election,” Asian Survey,
Vol. 49, No. 4 (2009).
2
Wilkinson, 2004, 23.
3
Kumar, 2007, 67.
4
Vanaik, 2006, 197.
5
Noorani, 2003, 13-14.
236
Rajiv Gandhi, followed the line she had laid down, with signal success. The BJP faced a bitter
defeat in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections.1
The Congress attention to Minorities led to the development of ill-feelings towards Muslims
in the mind of the Sangh Parivar, though even otherwise they did not have very good feelings
towards Muslims, but it helped them in creating a Hindu vote bank in their favor and almost
polarizing and identifying two communities with two political parties, i.e., BJP for the Hindus
and Congress for the Muslims.2 For instance, the Ayodhya movement consolidated the Hindu
majority vote bank and consequently the BJP increased its electoral tally in Parliament from two
seats in 1984 to 182 seats in the 1999 elections.3
2) Religion in Electoral Politics of Jana Sangh and Janata Party

The Hindu organizations launched movements like Shila Pujan, Rath Yatra and the Ayodhya
movement. This formed the context in which the BJP contested the Lok Sabha elections of 1991.
Though it was not the first time that the 'joint family' of Sangh had mobilized Hindus around
Hindu cultural symbols for political gains during the elections. The RSS had mobilized large
number of Hindu saints in 1967 and they had demonstrated in Delhi in support of their demand
for a ban on ‘cow slaughter’ in India. At that time, Indira Gandhi confronted the Sangh and the
priests by alleging that their religion-based political mobilization is a great threat to secular and
culturally plural India.4 Sankhdher mentions a case of Jana Sangh’s use of religion in elections as
following:
Whether the Samiti liked it or not, and in spite of Muni Sushil Kumar's disclaimer, the Jana Sangh in Delhi
made cow protection an election issue. It may be surmised that the followers of the Goraksha movement should have
voted for Jana Sangh candidates. In one case, especially that of Rain Gopal Shalwale, Jana Sangh candidate from
Chandni Chowk (scene of daily arrest of agitators for cow protection), himself a staunch cow-protectionist, the vote
(Hindu largely) must have gone in the favour. It is possible that the Sadhus' indulgence, in what was so apparently a
political activity and was tantamount to political blackmail, earned little support of the thinking people, who, after
all, so few. Tied up with emotion and legend, the issue had several lures for the common-man. Deen Dayal
Upadhyaya, Jana Sangh General Secretary, made an offer to the Congress to select any one constituency anywhere
even if it were the Prime Minister's own, where the election could be fought on anti-cow slaughter issue alone.
Whether or not the confidence was justified, the Jana Sangh knew that the issue was worth exploiting for getting
1
Noorani, 2003, 14.
2
T. P. Jindal, Ayodhya Imbroglio (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1995), 12-3.
3
Kumar, 2007, 68.
4
Bhambhri, 2007, 186.
237
votes. Though the Samiti had failed in getting its objective fulfilled, the Jana Sangh succeeded in the political
objectives.1
And, also, Janata Party sometimes regarded the right of minorities and religious freedom to
gain minorities’ support so that it could to attract some Muslims. For example, its manifesto for
elections 1984 contains the following points:
The state government or the administration should not intervene with the exercise of religious freedom or
engage in or permit propaganda against any element of the religious heritage of any religious group. […] The
autonomy of the minority educational institution should be fully guarded against undue and motivated interference
by the administration.2
3) Religion in Congress-I Electoral Politics
In comparison to the BJP politics of militant and aggressive Hindutva, the Congress-I (Indira
Gandhi) practiced 'soft Hindutva'. Although it has always depended on the support of Muslims
and other minorities and, by far, ignores the religious interests of the majority,3 but the party and
its leaders especially Indira and Rajiv Gandhi have compromised with principles when they have
had to win elections. They have made alliances and mobilized campaigns on communal lines,
though Congress is a secular party and denounces communalism in all shape and form, and
though India’s constitution defines India as a Secular Republic.4 Besides, the Congress has
always selected candidates on the basis of their community. And it has also entered into an
election alliance with some communal parties such as MuL.5
According to Gupta some of social activists used the 'Hindu backlash or Hindu assertion'
theory for supporting Congress (I) in 1980s. The Congress and Mrs. Gandhi used it for national
unity against the threat of disintegrative and inimical forces internal and external. The Hindu
backlash apparently in the wake of Indira Gandhi's murder was sufficiently consolidated to give
1
Sankhdher, 1973, 270 – 1.
2
Gupta, 1985, 42.
3
4
David Ludden, ed., Making India Hindu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13.
5
Kumar, 1990, 103.
238
Rajiv Gandhi the biggest mandate any Indian leader has ever secured. So Hindu assertion has
been on the cards.1 In this regard, he mentions that:
[Social activists urged] the people to support the government of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi—subsequently disowned
both by the BJP and the RSS—also appealed to many who were wedded to the politics—of the Hindu ethos. They
began to consider the Congress (I) to be the Centre of the Hindu elms. Consequently, parties who had earlier
claimed to be Hindu nationalists were stripped of their garments and left shivering in the cold. For, when a Hindu
backlash takes place, it is these parties who are first shorn of their traditional votes as happened in Jammu in the
Assembly election and to a lesser extent, in the Delhi Metropolitan Council elections.2
So, the defensiveness and assertiveness of contemporary Hindu have been a sentiment used
by political leaders so that Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi tapped it. Indira Gandhi believed that
by catalyzing communalist sentiments, by becoming the main mouthpiece for Hindu
communalism, she was protecting India from the dangers of it. In her opinion, communalism was
safe only in her hands and that by taking it up, she could disarm it. In the early 1980s, she
adopted themes that have traditionally belonged to the Hindu right. The Congress-I justified
Hindu chauvinism in 1982 because Indira Gandhi saw the move to the communalist right. They
anticipated the main threat from the right. Therefore, they tried to undermine the parties that
stood to the right of the Congress-I – mainly the BJP. Besides, in 1982 the Congress-I leaders
recognized that a confrontational posture towards the overwhelmingly Muslim National
Conference party in Kashmir and the Sikh extremists in Punjab might gain them the support of
many Hindu in the Kashmir and Delhi elections. Because of this tactic, numerous activists of the
RSS deserted the BJP to support Congress-I candidates in those elections.3
This remained the strategy of Congress-I leaders right through the election of 1984. The
manifesto of Congress-I for this election shows details of their promises and use of communal
issues. About minorities it says that:
The Congress-I will continue to safeguard educational, religious and cultural rights of the minorities. It
reiterates its policy of non-Interference with the personal law of the minorities. In 1980, the Congress-I promised
that Urdu will be recognized in some States as a second language. Urdu has already been accorded second language
status in Bihar. Similar action will be taken in other States.4
1
Gupta, 1985, 73 & 76.
2
Ibid., 73.
3
James Manor, “Parties and the Party System,” in State and politics in India, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 111-4.
4
Gupta, 1985, 32.
239
Also, Rajiv Gandhi refused to criticize the RSS, which at every previous election had
supported the Jana Sangh/BJP, but which swung heavily, and in some cases openly, behind the
congress-I on this occasion. The Prime Minister further refused to reject RSS support, thereby
conforming to the precedent set by his mother in mid-1983 in Kerala where the Congress-I
received RSS backing and one of his leading party spokesmen even declined to admit that it was
a communal organization. So, Congress-I used a large number of RSS activists during the 1984
election.1 By the support of the RSS in the December 1984 parliamentary elections for the first
time in post-Independence elections, the Congress party won a majority of votes among caste
Hindus in northern India.2 Besides, as Brass mentions, Rajiv Gandhi who swang “between the
methods of his grandfather and his mother and lacked any distinctive leadership qualities of his
own, survived until his assassination in May, 1991 largely on the basis of divine right.”3 The
Congress party with Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao as Prime Ministers, made
compromises with militant Hindu organizations on Temple and Mosque controversies. This
encouraged the Sangh fraternity and they succeeded in destroying the Babri Mosque.4
The Congress Policy toward Muslims:
Since the pre-independence period, the Congress has had a political alliance with orthodox
Muslims and specifically with those associated with Jamiyyat- ul -Ulama, a Muslim clerics’
organization associated with the orthodox Islamic university at Deoband, in western U.P. This
cooperation has involved a political bargain in which the ulama have given their support on the
assumption that the Muslim Personal Law would be maintained, as would endowments, mosques
and other institutions and aspects of Muslim culture. The apparent liberality and secular
approach of the Congress leadership toward the Muslims under Nehru and later under Indira
Gandhi drew to the Congress the most secular, liberal and often Marxist Muslim politicians as
well.5 Apart from this, most of time it has had alliance with Muslim regional parties like Muslim
league and J & K National Conference.
Here Indira Gandhi’s letter to Shahi Imam of Jama mosque in Delhi, Syed Abdullah Bukhari
Sahib on 20 November 1979 is valuable to mention, as an example of this relationship. He has
1
Manor, 1998, 110-2.
2
Weiner, 1998, 480.
3
Brass, 1994, 26.
4
5
Brass, 1994, 231-3.
240
played a personal role in national politics since 1977 when he spoke out against Indira Gandhi
and the Emergency and campaigned against the Congress for the Janata Party in the Lok Sabha
elections. In 1980, the Imam, disaffected with the Janata regime, supported the Congress, but he
again moved to oppose the Congress in 1984. He and his son, the Naib Imam Ahmad Bukhari,
have increasingly opposed the Congress and adopted militant postures with regard to the Babri
mosque issue.1 In this letter, conceding to Imam’s Demands, Gandhi mentions:
Throughout the country, all secular-minded people are deeply concerned with the deteriorating communal
situation. Various organizations of the minorities have approached us in this regard. Shri Antulay has told me of his
talk with you and I have gone through the pamphlet containing your demands. Most of these are covered by the
decisions already taken by us. Some incidents, including the 1975 Jama Masjid incident, which took place in the
past and during the Emergency, resulted in stress and strain and I am sorry that they left an atmosphere of
misunderstanding and bitterness. Let this past be forgotten so that we can begin on a note of harmony and
cooperation. Congress, being irrevocably committed to secularism, will take posit, measures to build a secular
society and to counter the trends of disharmony brought about by the policies and actions of the Janata Party
government. It will safeguard the rights of the minorities, including Muslims and Christians, and ensure their
effective participation in all spheres of national life, with full protection to their educational institutions and full
freedom of religious practice and cultural pursuit.
[…] We agree that all derogatory references to religious leaders should be deleted from textbooks. Our party is
committed not to interfere in Muslim personal law. We have also assured the minority character of the Aligarh
University. You are probably aware that our party had already declared in some states that Urdu would be
recognized as a second language to be used for official purposes in some areas. It will be the endeavour of our party
to continue to strive for the protection, preservation, and promotion of this great language by providing all facilities
for the teaching of Urdu at all levels. […] Equitable employment opportunities to minorities, including Muslims and
Christians, will be ensured in government services including the law and order and security personnel.
[…] The Jama Masjid is not only a monument of architectural beauty but a sacred place for millions of people
in India and abroad. It will be our endeavour to work out a scheme providing adequate safeguards for the proper
management of Jama Masjid. Such a scheme will call for a proposal to make the management of the mosque self-
supporting. The working of Muslim aukaf and laws connected therewith requires periodic review and it will be our
endeavour that the supervision and management of waqf property are looked into seriously and advice sought from
Muslim religious leaders like yourself in order to streamline and remove defects, if any, in the existing laws or make
such improvements as may be necessary in the tight of the experiences gained in their working so far.2
4) Hindutva as an Electoral Agenda: BJP and Using Religion in Electoral Politics
As mentioned, communalism has been based on enchanted sectarian loyalties that in India, it
clearly depends on religion.3 It is based on the fundamentalist idea that Hindus and Muslims
1
Brass, 1994, 236.
2
Noorani, 2003, 183-5.
3
Richard G. Fox, “Communism and Modernity,” In Making India Hindu, ed. David Ludden (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 238.
241
constitute the separate communities in essential opposition to one another.1 The BJP raises
Hindutva-related issues not only because it is a ‘fundamentalist’ party, but also to make an
appeal to Hindus to vote along religious lines. So, the word ‘communalism’ was used for this
practice, which involves casting the religious minorities of Muslims and Christians in the role of
the enemies of the nation. As part of its ‘communal’ agenda, the BJP allegedly organizes and
incites communal violence, and raises divisive issues, such as ‘Islamic terrorism’, uniform civil
code, and Christian conversions.2
The BJP grew out of RSS, as already mentioned and most of its leaders shared an RSS
background and ideology, but its charge was different. The BJP was to operate primarily in the
sphere of electoral politics and so it needed to pursue a more broad-based and pragmatic
rhetorical strategy.3 So, one of the main BJP strategies was identity-based mobilization and it
was certainly their most preferred strategy, as a religious nationalist organization. Wherever
possible, the party identified local themes or issues, often related to communal identity, national
security, or territoriality, which could be connected with broader Hindu nationalist agendas. The
party used these strategies of sectarian or communal mobilizations in the late 1980s and early
1990s with varying degrees of success, to emphasize interreligious cleavages over intra-Hindu
caste differences. “Although by its own account, the agitations organized in the late 1980s and
early 1990s temporarily failed, to resonate with poor voters and in the 1993 state assembly
elections, the party suffered numerous defeats, but it continued its strategies and succeeded in the
following years.”4 Also after their resignation in 1996, the BJP was forced to consider the
strategy of coalition building with regional allies especially based on religion.5
a) BJP and Ayodya Issue
In the two succeeding national elections in 1989 and 1991, the BJP exploited the Ayodhya issue,
recaptured the Hindu vote lost to the Congress and brought Hindu electoral consolidation to a
higher level of unity in north India than ever before. The demolition of the Babri mosque in the
1
Ludden, 2006, 12.
2
Arora, 2008.
3
Richard H. Davis, “The Iconography of Rama’s Chariot,” in Making India Hindu, ed. David Ludden (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 42.
4
Thachil, 2011.
5
Gillan, 2007, 31-2.
242
pilgrimage town of Ayodhya enhanced the support of the BJP among militant Hindus and has
been followed by intensified efforts on the part of its leadership to consolidate the Hindu vote
with a view to capturing power in the country in the next elections.1
The BJP has risen to power because of its involvement in Ram Janmabhoomi Movement by
targeting the Muslim community which was made responsible for the construction of a Babri
Mosque over Ram Temple by Mughal Emperor Babar.2 In the elections 1991 the BJP profited
from upper-caste backlash against Mandal, which it linked to its campaign around the temple in
Ayodhya.3 In Brass’ opinion, V. P. Singh’s decision to go ahead with ‘Mandal’, a reservations
policy recommendation for backward castes in public section jobs by the Janata
Party government in 1979, appeared to undermine the BJP drive to consolidate the Hindu vote in
the country under its own banner and instead to divide it and make use of Hindu divisions and
Muslim support to isolate it. The Mandal decision forced the party leadership to prepare for a
new election and to seek to strengthen its base in UP and Bihar with its only strong weapon, the
demand to build a new temple to Ram on the existing site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya.4
This movement of the Sangh family paid dividends to the BJP because it could mobilize
other backward castes also.5 The BJP knew that ‘the birthplace of Ram’ movement was a single
issue that could enable them to capture the attention of the Indian electorate chiefly by drawing
the voters’ attention to it, emotively. This movement during the 1980s brought religion and mass
ritual explicitly into the political arena. The immense scale of politico-religious processions
converted Indian public space as Hindu space and conveying the basic script of Hindutva
discourse. Thus, Hindu nationalist ideology permeated new media, reaching people through an
unprecedented level of multi-media exposure that naturalized Hindutva ideology and created an
immensely popular and accessible political idiom. These activities peaked in 1992 with the
destruction of the Babri mosque.6
1
Brass, 1994, 15.
2
3
Basu, 2006, 59.
4
Brass, 1994, 243.
5
6
Edwina Mason, “The Water Controversy and the Politics of Hindu Nationalism,” in Hindu Nationalism and
Governance, eds. John McGuire and Ian Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 304.
243
However, the BJP and Sangh familly practiced the strategy of Hindu mobilization on the
issue of Ram birthplace. Although the BJP leadership tried to distance itself from the widespread
demonizing of Muslims by publicly exhibiting a more inclusive policy, as Lal Krishna Advani
would claim ‘the enemy is not Muslims but rather the ‘politics of appeasement’ pursued by
‘pseudo-secularism’.’1 The instrumentalization of the Ayodhya issue and the related communal
riots that polarized the electorate along religious lines helped the BJP make progress election
after election. Before the election in 1989, BJP which had stayed aloof from the Ayodhya
campaign for construction of the Rama Mandir till then, under the impulse of Advani (who had
succeeded Vajpayee as party president), joined the movement. The party passed an important
resolution formalizing this shift in June 1989. The BJP benefited from this Hindu mobilization in
and the polarization of the electorate through violence. The party won 88 seats and became part
of the coalition supporting the V. P. Singh government (1989-90).2
For BJP, the Ayodhya movement was a mass movement to reaffirm the nation's cultural
identity that can provide an enduring basis for national unity besides the dynamo for a resurgent,
resolute and modern India.3 The BJP, which was struggling to become a national party and an
alternative to the Congress, adopted the above-mentioned resolution to build a temple of Rama in
Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which the party claimed as the birthplace of God Rama.
The BJP and Hindu nationalists alleged that Muslim ruler Babur had demolished a temple of
Rama to build the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in the 16th century. In June 1990, the VHP
declared that they would go ahead with the building of the temple at Ayodha and BJP announced
that its leader L.K Advani would take a Rama Rath (chariot) procession through the length and
breadth of the country, mobilizing support for the temple. In September 1990, the BJP,
responding to its own complex electoral calculations, decided to join in the procession,
fundamentally altering the scope and complexion of the mobilization. In the same time, Advani
announced his decision to launch his ‘Rath Yatra’ from the Somnath temple in Gujarat to
Ayodhya, through the Hindi-speaking heartland and went on the 10,000 Km Rath Yatra (journey
by chariot) to promise the construction of a temple of Rama. But he was stopped before entering
Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, Advani became as a hero in 1991. In the meantime, the BJP stepped up
1
Davis, 2006, 49.
2
Jaffrelot, 2007a, 280-1.
3
Ibid., 291.
244
its campaign for the building of a temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya. In June 1991, BJP had
won the state elections in U.P, the largest state in India, on this issue.1
The BJP rallied to the call of religious mobilization strategy and even participated in the
processions which took place all over India. Polarizing the electorate provided the BJP with a
Hindu ‘vote bank’.2 The BJP made the greatest electoral effort in its history during this election,
in which it exploited fully the Ayodhya issue, anti-Muslim hostilities which its leaders and
workers had themselves done so much to inculcate in the upper caste Hindu population,
particularly in north India and the Hindu-Muslim riots which occurred before and during the
election campaign.3
Thus, in the Lok Sabha elections 1991, riding on the wave produced by the Rath yatra and
the movement to construct a temple to Ram in Ayodhya, the BJP achieved its greatest electoral
victory since its formation and emerged as the second largest party in parliament with 119 seats.4
The Ayodhya issue, in turn, transformed the BJP from a peripheral party of the right (with just
two seats in the lower House, in 1984) to a powerful electoral force and the primary national
opposition to the declining Congress party.5 In continuation of the process, the BJP focused on
the Ayodhya issue to take office at the Center soon:
In the following months, a series of administrative and legal steps were taken by the U.P. government to
facilitate Hindu access to the site and to gain control of all lands surrounding it. While the U.P. government took
legal steps to acquire or make it possible for VHP to acquire all land and structures surrounding the mosque, the
latter proceeded in tandem with plans for a mass kar seva (voluntary work) in November-December, 1991.6
Indeed, as Davis mentions, many commentators and political analysts have argued that ‘this
fabric of religious imagery was merely a cover, a cynical exploitation of the religious sentiments
of Indian people for political ends. Even Advani seems to have shared this view some of time, as
when he spoke of turning Rama devotion into state power. And, indeed, the BJP electoral
calculations seem prescient, at least in the short run, for their promotion of the Ayodhya issue did
earn them significant electoral gains.’7
1
Arora, 2008; chatterjee, 1998: 35 &37; Davis, 2006: 42; Brass, 1994, 243; Jaffrelot, 2007a, 20.
2
Basu, 2006, 56.
3
Brass, 1994, 243.
4
Ibid: 87.
5
Davis, 2006, 30.
6
Brass, 1994, 244.
7
Davis, 2006, 51-2.
245
In July 1992, L.K. Advani, as the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha (House of the
People), reportedly told the House, “You must recognize the fact that from two seats in
parliament in 1985, we have come to 117 seats in 1991. This has happened primarily because we
took up this issue (Ayodhya).”1 Before that also, Advani in an interview in 1991 mentioned that
issue of Ayodhya is main issue in the coming elections of 1991. In answering a question on
linkage between a purely religious ritual like temple building with the larger Hindutva concept,
he said:
I would like to answer this question by recalling Sardar Patel’s approach to Hindu—Muslim problems. His
approach was that this is broadly a Hindu country and the tendency to shy away from Hindu feeling is not
secularism. Take the case of Somnath, something like that could not have happened now. Some might say it was the
aftermath of Partition and therefore it (the reconstruction of Somnath) took place. I would say no. It was because of
Patel. Nehru did not like it even then.2
In 1992, the BJP state government in U.P. helped the Sangh to succeed in Ayodhya. Lord
Rama and his epic, Ramayana, had become political icons. Hindu nationalism and communalism
permeated Indian politics, media, and popular culture.3 With its own government in the state, its
mobilization reached a peak. State government of Uttar Pradesh, headed by Kalyan Singh of BJP
had almost pledged total support for Kar Sevaks, the activists of the VHP and had been ever
ready to extend any help for Kar Sevaks. Kalyan Singh, very candidly declared in public that he
will not kill any Kar Sevak or even use police force on Kar Sevak under any circumstances,
whatever these could be, it was also clear to Central Government and its Home Minister. He did
not stop gathering of Kar Sevaks at Ayodhya, also did not make any sincere appeal to Kar
Sevaks, not to perform Kar Seva. After that he had behaved like a warrior who has won the war.4
On 6 December 1992, kar Sevaks stormed the premises and demolished the Babri Mosque.
Subsequently, The government of Kalyan Singh was dismissed in UP and a few days later the
BJP governments in Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were dismissed as well.
But this polarized people along religious lines. The communal situation was at its worst ever
since independence. As a result, the BJP emerged as a mainstream party.5
1
Arora, 2008.
2
Jaffrelot, 2007a, 282.
3
Ludden, 2006, 17.
4
Jindal, 1995, 3-11.
5
Chatterjee, 1998: 37; Arora, 2008.
246
Most of the Indian researchers have confirmed religious mobilization by BJP and its role in
Ayodhya events. So that, Wilkinson cites that in 1993 Neeraj Chatunedi, an MLA, was frank
‘when he told a journalist that Hindu-Muslim riots sparked by a procession of his BJP supporters
would polarize Hindu voters in his favor.’1 Van Der Veer narrates the role of BJP in
destruction of Babri mosque as following:
The publicly announced aim of the rally was to destroy a sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya that allegedly
was built on the birthplace of Rama, one of the major gods in the Hindu pantheon. Despite this public
announcement, the rally was allowed by the authorities; and under the eyes of the gathered press, and without much
hindrance by the huge paramilitary police force present in Ayodhya, activists started to demolish the old structure,
until, after a day of hard work, only rubble remained. A high-ranking police officer told the press that the police
could have easily intervened and prevented the demolition. However, they had not received orders to do so.
Naturally, they did not get any orders from the state officials of Uttar Pradesh, since Uttar Pradesh was governed by
the BJP, which was behind the demolition. The paramilitary forces, however, were under the direct command of
what in India is called “the center”, that is, the union government in Delhi. Why did the center not act? Well, the
story goes that India’s prime minister, Narasimha Rao, was just taking a nap and, since he is a very old man, nobody
would want to disturb him, when he woke up, the demolition had already proceeded too far.2
Until recent times this problem and use of religious slogan has been continued. The
proceedings of the Ayodhya events and Liberhan Ayodhya Commission of Inquiry in the Rajya
Sabha, India’s Upper House, after almost 17 years in 2009,3 led to a scuffle between a few
Samajwadi Party (SP) and BJP members. In this time BJP’s members raised the slogan ‘Jai Shri
Ram’ (‘victory to Lord Rama’, the icon of Hindu nationalist politics) and in reply of them SP’s
members shouted a counter-slogan, ‘Ya Ali’.4
b) Towards Power: Continuity of Religious Mobilization and Coalition Politics
After demolition of the mosque, rioting spread instantly into many regions of India and also into
Bangladesh, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Bombs set Bombay afire and the Indian
government immediately accused Pakistan. Communalism engulfed south Asia like in 1947,
with violence and death. In 1993, there were massive killings of Muslims in Bombay and
Gujarat. The Killing finally subsided and the Indian government banned the RSS, VHP, Bajrang
Dal and two Islamic parties (the Islamic Sevak Sangh and the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind), and though
the VHP continued to operate widely in India despite the ban, in 1993 and 1994, the BJP did not
1
2
Van Der Veer, 2006, 253-4.
3
“Ayodhya Mosque Report Blames India's BJP Opposition,” BBC News, 24 November 2009, accessed, 27 Aug.
2013, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8376755.stm.
4
Mitra, 2011.
247
do as well at the polls. It even lost in U.P. to a coalition on non-Congress parties based on the
support of lower caste groups. But in 1995, the BJP won state elections in Gujarat and formed a
government in the state of Maharashtra in alliance with the Shiv Sena. The Sangh Parivar sought
to play a major role in forming the next Indian government.1 The general elections of mid-1996
confirmed these trends. The BJP made a strong showing in the northern and western states and
emerged as the single largest party in Parliament.2
At this stage also, the BJP used the Hindu organization in electoral process. The indirect
political role of the VHP has been important because its campaigns have led to the electoral
successes of BJP. The VHP tried to unite the Hindus worldwide in order to recapture the Indian
state from the secularists who “dominated” it and to prevent conversions from the Hindu fold to
Islam. Religious leaders have enormous followings and acceptability in India. Not only the
people, but also the politicians seek their “blessings.” There are many Hindu gurus who are
known for their overt support to the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda, such as Sadhvi Ritambhara,
Morari Bapu, Asaram Bapu, Vasudevanand Saraswati, and Swami Satyamitranand Giri.3
The BJP believed that by mobilizing a large segment of Hindus around anti-minority issues
as it had done in 1989-91, it could once again secure an overall majority in the UP assembly. Its
chosen statewide symbol was the western U.P. town of Mathura. In August 1995, the BJP and its
allied Hindu nationalist organization, the VHP, announced their attention to Vishnu Mahayana
(religious offering to the Hindu god Vishnu) and a Parikrama (circumambulation) around what it
referred to as the “disputed” complex that houses both the Hindu Keshav Das temple and Shahi
Masjid Idgah. The VHP timed the Parikrama to coincide with the religious festival of
Janamashthami, which draws thousands of Hindus to Mathura every year. It planned the Yagne
for a Friday, when it would coincide with large numbers of Muslim worshipers offering their
afternoon prayers at the nearby Idgah.4
The Mathura town was selected because it is one of the most important Hindu religious sites
in north India. The Keshav Das temple-Muslim Idgah complex is one of disputed mosque-temple
sites and a site for anti Muslim mobilization in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, the backward-caste was
1
Ludden, 2006, 17.
2
Chatterjee, 1998, 38.
3
van der Veer, 2002; Arora, 2008.
4
248
located there and BJP needed substantial support of them to win the upcoming assembly
elections. The Keshav Das temple and the city and district of Mathura are closely associated with
the Hindu God Krishna, who is regarded as a Yadav (a backward caste) and the hope was that a
campaign built around Krishna would win over large numbers of backward castes suspicious of
the BJP's upper-caste image. As one Hindu nationalist leader put it, "As of now, the Yadavas,
almost to a man, are with the S.P. (Samajwadi Party) led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. But when
the call of a Yadava god comes, can they remain indifferent?"1
Lobo and Das narrate other examples as following:
In villages, also, some reasons have been identified for unusual and intense spread of riots to a sustained anti-
Muslim propaganda by the BJP, VHP and the RSS combine, and activities carried out by a variety of religious and
quasi-religious organizations. In tribal areas, where traditionally the Congress had a stronghold, Muslims were
targeted as external to the Hindus and by extension to the Indian society and thereby anti-social as well as anti-
national elements. In many such villages, the Muslim shopkeepers-cum-moneylenders got projected as exploiters.
This helped the Sangh Parivar in weakening the hold of Congress in some tribal pockets. […] In some other villages
specific pockets like that of the Dangs, such forces were however able to create an antagonism channelized through
a Hindu vs. Christian opposition - something that had facilitated the assertion of Hindutva elements across specific
areas within a short time.2
In 1995, also, for electoral gain, the BJP launched hate campaigns against Muslims which
spread like wildfire. Thousands of leaflets, posters and pamphlets, videos, audio cassettes and
public speeches of the Sangh Parivar activists reinforced stereotypes of Muslims.3 In this regard,
Basu mentions an example that shows how BJP used religious messages through media in
elections:
In an election the BJP’s use of both print and audiovisual media especially cassette tapes is remarkably well
suited to its project of creating an imagined Hindu community. The messages have been designed to nationalize
anti-Muslim sentiment. In many towns in which riots occurred, people reported hearing terrifying screams from
rooftops. These voices were in fact a cassette recording blasted over loud speakers. The recording begins by
invoking Allah (Allaho Akbar!) to indicate that Muslim is crying out. It then invokes the Hindu god Rama (Jai Shri
Rama!) presumably a Hindu cry. Cries Follow: “Beat them! Beat them!” and, in the voices of women and children
screaming, “Help, help!” this particular recording, played countless times, apparently had its desired effects.4
Although, the electoral success of the BJP, in national elections has often been attributed to
the rise of Hindu religious sentiments, but its ability to forge a coalition between religious groups
and the middle classes, also, had an important effect on the BJP’s success especially after 1996.
1
2
Lancy Lobo and Biswaroop Das, Communal Violence and Minorities: Gujarat Society in Ferment (New Delhi:
Rawat Publications, 2006), 152.
3
Ibid., 80.
4
Basu, 2006, 64.
249
The electoral success of the BJP in the late 1990s hence lay in both religious mobilizing and its
ability to put together a viable coalition between religious Hindus and those disaffected by
excessive political intervention in the economy.1 BJP’s coalition was chiefly on the basis of
Hindu culture. The growing importance of coalition politics have struck at the very foundation of
Hindu nationalism. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was largely 'cultural' on 'the non-
threatening image of Hindutva'.2
c) After Capturing Power
Despite the damaging consequences of the demolition of the Babri mosque, for the Sangh, the
Ayodhya campaign itself (before the act of demolition) was a massive political success. It
propelled the BJP and the Sangh to national prominence and extended their mass support far
beyond what they had hitherto achieved.3 With the demolition of the Babri mosque, the Sangh
fulfilled its professed goal and maximized the political benefits of that campaign and in this way
caste versus caste politics was replaced by religion versus religion politics.4
After coming to power, also, some BJP leaders used the different Hindu symbols and
communal stance to legitimize their political aims. For example, in Gujarat, according to Shah,
Narendra Damodardas Modi, who had worked as an organizer for the Rath Yatra in 1989,
‘managed to carve out his image as Hindu Hriday Samrat, the King of Hindu hearts.’5 During the
2002 communal problems and the subsequent elections, he repeatedly talked about Hindutva,
Hindu ethos, tolerance and magnanimity of Hindus and their glorious past. He regarded Muslims
as "backward" and accused them of an agenda to increase their population to become a majority.
According to him, Islam and Christianity are the "real roots" of terrorism in India. Through such
claims and slogans, he established himself as the champion of Hindus. ‘To reinforce the image,
the public relations officer of the Government of Gujarat (GOG) projected him as a "God with a
beard." On the eve of the Assembly elections, Modi was portrayed as charioteer Krishna,
carrying Sudarshan Chakra and guiding State Energy Minister Saurbha Patel shown as Arjun.
1
Chhibber, 1997.
2
Chakrabarty, 2008, 81.
3
Vanaik, 2006, 188.
4
Ibid.,191; Bhambhri, 2007, 122.
5
Ghanshyam Shah, “Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: the 2009 Lok Sabha Electiions in Gujarat,” in India’s
2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, eds. Paul Wallace and Ramashray
Roy (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011), 167 & 172.
250
The famous sloka (stanza) from Bhagwad Gita, "Yada Yada Hi Dharmasya…" was painted just
above Modi, showing him as the savior of Dharma.’1
In the Lok Sabha as well as the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative Assembly) and local
government elections, though the main focus of the campaign of Modi, Chief Minister of
Gujarat, was development, his Hindutva plank was also well entrenched. In the 2002 elections,
his anti-Muslim posture was blatant in his phases, idioms and illustrations. In the election
campaign for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 2005, Modi equated the sitting Congress
Mayor, a Muslim woman to a Mughal period begum. He announced, "We have decided to free
the people of Karnavati [Ahmedabad] from the shackles of Mughal rule where begum Sahebas
and Badshahs are in control." He asked the voters "to free the people of Ahmedabad from
Mughal rule.”2 He had referred to the Central government as the Delhi Sultanate or Delhi
durbar. He frequently accused the Congress of playing vote bank politics by appeasing
minorities, particularly Muslims. BJP's advertisements were: "Congress will sell the country for
votes? … Reservation on religious basis for votes ... Removed POTA [Prevention of Terrorist
Activities Act] for votes, protect terrorism for votes, protecting mafias for vote BJP has disclosed
this hypocrisy ... BJP will win.”3
Apart from the above issue, religion has been used and it has also had impact on BJP’s
politics in various parts of India. In eastern India, the BJP as a Hindu party presented itself as the
natural oppositional party to both Congress and the CPI (M) Left Front government in West
Bengal. In Assam, it represented the Muslim migrants from Bangladesh as foreigners and
therefore, as the enemy.4 In Mumbai, 2001, it had the both pragmatic politics, in the case of the
Dalits, and the ideological premises of Hindutva, in the case of the Muslims. ‘In the
remembrance by Muslims of the destruction of the Babri mosque and the memorial celebration
by Dalits of the death of their leader, B.R. Ambedkar, the city authorities handled each event
differently, with the Dalits being privileged over the Muslims.’5 In addition, because of the 1992-
93 riots and after that some events in Kashmir, the Muslims remained isolated in the electoral
1
Shah, 2011, 172.
2
Ibid., 183.
3
Quoted by: Ibid.
4
John McGuire, “The BJP and Governance in India an Overview,” in Hindu Nationalism and Governance, eds.
John McGuire and Ian Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4.
5
Ibid., 5.
251
campaigning in Mumbai. This situation affected the municipal elections in 2002. In these
elections, also, in rural Maharashtra, through the VHP, BJP generated increased communal
hostility. Eventually, as the result of election, the Shiv Sena/BJP alliance was victorious and it
won a majority of seats. Therefore, the political alliance between the BJP and the Shiv Sena, the
ideological premises of Hindutva and pragmatism have shaped the politics in this region. In the
western India, it has been mentioned that the negative impact of the attack on Muslims in
Gujarat, where Modi, the hardline BJP chief minister, was accused of facilitating the killing of
Muslims in that state was a key factor in the significant loss of seats for the NDA allies led by
BJP in Gujarat.1
BJP’s agenda also targeted other minorities. In the late 1990s the Hindu right wing in many
states switched strategies and began polarizing Hindu voters against Christians rather than
Muslims, especially, since 1998, when Sonia Gandhi, an Italy-born Catholic and wife of late
former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, became the president of the Congress party. In his
first campaign speech for the Vidhan Sabha polls 2002, Modi mentioned changing the design of
the new two-rupee coin, replacing the map of India with a cross, a veiled reference to Sonia
Gandhi's religious background as a Christian. So, the BJP has sought to use the gulf between the
Hindu majority community and the religious minorities as a political strategy.2 For instance, in
Parkhand ‘it sought, through the socio-cultural network of the Sangh Parivar, to mobilize support
among the tribals by means of Hindutva ideology and by constructing those tribals who were
Christians as the Other.’3 In this regard, also, Wilkinson mentions an example that:
Dara Singh, the leader of the Bajrang Dal in the state of Orissa, reportedly organized attacks on missionaries in
that state in the run-up to the 1999 parliamentary elections. Electorally, this strategy carries many of the benefits of
the anti-Muslim strategy (with Christians, like Muslims, often being portrayed as tools of foreign powers bent on
converting allegedly defenseless minis and lower castes) and few of the electoral costs, because Christians are a
4
much smaller proportion of the electorate.
5) Voting Behavior of Religious Communities
Religion has had an important impact on the voting behavior of individuals belonging to
minority groups. Indeed, the voters in India are broadly classified into religious and caste
communities. Generally, the Christian and Muslim communities support the Congress while
1
McGuire, 2007, 5-7.
2
Arora, 2008.
3
McGuire, 2007, 3.
4
252
sections of the Hindus vote for Hindu nationalists like BJS and BJP and a considerable number
of Hindus believe in secularism.1 Although sometimes there have been exceptions for example in
1977, when Muslim constituencies in the North in general had given a smaller vote to Congress
than non-Muslim constituencies.2 In elections, according to Rudolph and Rudolph, Muslims
often vote strategically: ‘where Muslims feel themselves a distinct and vulnerable minority, they
avoid antagonizing or seek the protection of mainstream parties by voting as the general
electorate does; they support the likely winner and governing party to be. In constituencies with
high proportions of Muslims, however, Muslims tend to vote for class and Muslim confessional
parties and candidates.’3 In other words, when the Muslims are a numerical minority in an
electoral district, they do not express their best choice in voting but, instead, vote for the winning
party.4
Concerning voting behavior since the first decade of independence, the effect of religion has
been decisive. For instance, according to Sarker, in Legislative Assembly elections 1960, Kerala,
after dissolution of the Communist Ministry by the President of India in 1959, the Muslim
League manifesto was communal, demanding many safeguards and amenities exclusively for the
Muslims (about 20% of the state’s population), though in several other respects it more or less
resembled the programs of other parties in the Alliance. The main unifying factor was its fanatic
anti- Communism. The Congress was in the electoral alliance with a communal body such as the
MuL. The MuL won 11 seats in this election. The Alliance advanced anti-Communist slogans
specifically mentioning some of the actions of the dissolved Ministry, such as ‘the Education Bill
curtailing the freedom of Catholics and Nairs in the management of educational institutions. The
Catholic Church and the Muslim Mullahs exhorted their followers to vote against the
Communists on religious grounds.’5 The anti-Communists were also exploited by Chinese
incursions on the borders of India. Indeed this election was fought primarily as a struggle of anti-
Communists versus Communists. The results showed a crushing defeat for the Communists.
In early 1980s, although BJP used some candidates and support from other religions to attract
their votes but because they were a Hindu party and their strategies were based on Hindutva,
1
Arora, 2008.
2
Shakir, 1986a, 112.
3
Quoted by: Choi, 2009.
4
Ibid.
5
S. C. Sarker, “The Elections in Kerala,” The World Today, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1960).
253
they didn’t succeed. In the elections of 1980, from 64 constituencies where Muslims constitute
between 20 to 50 percent of the votes, the Congress (I) polled 36.48 percent of the votes, while
the Lok Dal, Congress (U) and the CPI (M) together polled 57 percent. The same was true of the
voting pattern of the other minority groups.1 Gupta mentions this issue as following:
Jama Masjid [Delhi] area is the locality in which the Shahi Imam lives and the headquarters of the Jamaat-a-
Islami are located from where Sikandar Bakht comes, and yet in the polling station in that area only one vote was
east for the BJP's Muslim candidate. Jamianagar is another predominantly Muslim area, yet not a single vote was east
on that polling station for the BJP candidate supported by the so-called Islamic parties. This speaks for the Muslims:
In Bombay, the Christian sectarian leadership had joined the BJP on the eve of the election and yet the BJP lost to
the Congress in that area: in the predominantly Christian States of the North-East, the Congress has had an easy time.2
However, the Babari mosque/Ram Janmabhumi dispute and the communal rioting which
occurred in the course of it, affected the Muslim vote significantly in the 1989 elections and even
more profoundly in the 1991 elections, especially in the north. In the 1991 elections, many
Muslim voters appeared to have followed a strategy recommended by Muslim political leaders,
particularly Shahabuddin - to vote in each constituency for whichever secular party was in a
position to defeat the BJP. In these elections, the long-term tendency toward the political
integration of Muslims in the electoral process was reversed. Muslims felt it increasingly
imperative to vote as Muslims for their own protection.3
Besides, since the Muslims have the fear of dominant Hindu parties, they have turned to
Congress among the national parties. For instance, the study of Jaffrelot on the Muslim
Community of BJP voters in Uttar Pradesh shows no voters in 1996 Assembly election
and 5% in 1999 parliamentary election. 4 According to the National Election Study 2004, a
survey on party preference by social group showed Muslim’s trend towards Congress is triple in
compared to BJP (60 against 20).5 The share of votes of parties among Muslim at Maharashtra in
2009 was 69% for Congress-NCP alliance and 9% for BJP-SS. The Lok Sabha elections 2009 in
Karnataka endorsed the trend of Muslims to Congress, too. It attracted 65% of Muslims’ vote,
while BJP’s share was 11%.6 In Andhra Pradesh, apart from a short time after Babri mosque
1
Shakir, 1986a, 111.
2
Gupta, 1985, 74-5.
3
Brass, 1994, 238.
4
Jaffrelot, 2003, 484.
5
Kumar, 2007, 69.
6
Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur, “Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System, But Turmoil Ahead,” in India’s 2009
Elections; Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, eds. Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011a), 265. And,
254
demolition that Muslim moved closer to the TDP and swung away from it when it moved closer
to the BJP, Indian National Congress (INC) have received overwhelming support from Muslims
for example in elections 1996, 2004 and 2009 with 56.7, 63 and 50.7%.1 And also the Muslim
regional parties most of time are in alliance with Congress like Muslim league in the UPA
(United Progressive Alliance) in 2009, while Hindu regional parties are with BJP like ShivSena
in NDA (National Democratic Alliance).2 The following tables, as result of some surveys,
provide perhaps the most reliable indicator of the differences in voting behavior among
various groups in India.
Table 7: The summary results of the 1991 exit poll for minorities
Religion Congress BJP/Shiv Janata Janata CPI/ Others total Refused/

Sena Dal/TDP Dal (S) CPI(M) DK
Muslim 45.4 3.4 28.0 5.5 13.9 3.8 100 (3.8)
Other religious 27.4 30.0 6.2 13.8 0.4 22.2 100 (7.8)
minorities
Source: adopted from, Butler, Labiri and Roy, 1998, 131
Table 8: The Percentages of Party preference among Muslims (1996-99)
Parties\year 1996 1999

Congress 56.0 45.9
BJP 1.8 -
Shiv sena 1.8 1.2
Source: Palshikar, 2006, 268.
Table 9: Muslim and Christian preference of parties in Lok Sabha elections 2009 at Kerala
Religious group UDF% LDF% BJP% Others%

Muslim 68.2 31.8 - 5.4
Christian 68.2 44.4 - -
UDF: United Democratic Front, led by the Indian National Congress party
LDF: Left Democratic Front, led by CPI-M
Source: Kumar, 2011, 244
Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur, “The Surge of Saffron: Some Genuine and Some Imitation?” in India’s 2009
Elections; Coalition Politics, Party Competition, and Congress Continuity, eds. Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011b), 280.
1
Srinivasulu, 2011, 298 & 300.
2
Ashraf, 2010, 992 & 994.
255
Therefore, there has been the vote of no-confidence of the minorities in the BJP because it
has had less attention to the minorities as it has had ‘a notional and nominal presence of Muslims
and Christians within the party. The presence of minority communities in the BJP is only a case
of 'show boys' for publicity purposes.’1 For example, the Muslim Community of BJP Candidates
in Lok Sabha Elections in Madhya Pradesh gradually declined so that in 1984 and 1991 were
2.6% and 2.5% and eventually after that especially with growth of communalism and when it
took power, in 1996 and 1999 had no candidates. While the Muslim Community of Congress (I)
Candidates to Lok Sabha in Madhaya Pradesh in both years 1996 and 1999 were 2.5%. And in
1991 and 1996 General Elections in Uttar Pradesh, BJP had no Muslim candidate, while it was
10% and 11% for Congress.2
Unlike the minorities, Hindu people have had a trend of voting for BJP. For example
according to Kumar, in the 2002 Assembly elections and the 2004 parliamentary elections in
Gujarat, the BJP could consolidate the Hindu vote and win with massive margins. Kumar
mentions:
In the 2002 Gujarat Assembly elections, 154 out of 182 constituencies were affected by communal riots, and
the BJP could win in 127. Among the riot-free constituencies, more seats went to the BJP than to the Congress
(more than 60 percent). In other words, the BJP won irrespective of the presence or extent of riots in Gujarat,
whereas it could win more than 60 percent of the constituencies which had no rioting or low rioting. The Congress,
on the other hand, did win seats in the heavily and moderately riot-hit constituencies.3
6) Religion and Kashmir Electoral Politics
After the Emergency in 1977, the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir sought to capitalize on the new
situation. It allied itself with the Janata Party both at the national level, and in J&K. In this time,
Sheikh Abdullah clearly used the religious sentiment and mentioned that a vote for the Jamaat-e-
Islami is a vote for the Jana Sangh, a Hindu-chauvinist constituent of the Janata Party whose
‘hands are still red with the blood of Muslims.’ NC leaders insisted that Islam would be in
danger if the Jamaat-Janata alliance took power.4
1
2
Jaffrelot, 2003, 451 & 481-2.
3
Kumar, 2007, 69-70.
4
Praveen Krishna Swami, “Ethnic—Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir Elections,
2008 and 2009,” in India’s 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, eds.
Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011), 346.
256
Religion was also the central axis along with the Muslim United Front (MUF), formed after
1986, as a new party and a rival for ruling National Conference (NC) party. It attracted the
support of a cross-section of Kashmir’s political forces including Separatists, Kashmiri youth
and the pro-Pakistan Jamiat-e- Islami, an Islamist political organization. From the outset, the
MUF campaign focused on Islamic issues—the proliferation of bars in Srinagar was, for
example, a major target, on the grounds that this was part of a larger attack on Muslim religious
practices and culture. For MUF's major constituents, the acquisition of state power was a
precursor to these ends. At a March 4, 1987, rally in Srinagar, MUF candidates, clad in the white
robes of the Muslim pious, declared variously that Islam could not survive under the authority of
a secular state and that Farooq Abdullah was an agent of Hindu imperialism.1 In Kashmir's
elections in 1987, the MUF looked strong but in the wake of the election, hundreds of its leaders
and activists were arrested.2
Another party in this region is People's Democratic Party (PDP). Since its birth in 1999, the
party had worked hard to win over Islamists in its south Kashmir heartlands. By 2002, the party
had achieved some success in building bridges with the Jamaat-e-Islami and the jihadist group it
helped give birth to, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Though its electoral gains were limited, it
increasingly used religious themes and matters to appeal to Muslim voters. In 2008, this kind of
rhetoric succeeded in securing the PDP the undisguised support of the Jamaat-e-Islami's cadre,
even though the Islamist party formally called on them to boycott the elections. Although the
PDP failed to emerge as the principal voice of the Kashmir valley, but it succeeded in winning
21 seats, up from 16 in 2002. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, after all, the PDP registered wins
in 25 Kashmir valley assembly segments, compared to the 21 that were won by the NC.3
In relation to Kashmir, the shrine war has also had impact on politics in the state. There has
been a conflict between Muslim led by radical Islamist and Hindus led by some Hindu leaders
like Leela Karan Sharma related with BJP, in Kashmir under shrine war in late 20th and early 21st
centuries. In 2004, there occurred some conflicts between J&K's Chief Minister Mufti
Mohammad Sayeed, and the State's union government-appointed Governor, S.K. Sinha,
regarding Amarnath Yatra , an annual pilgrimage for Hindus, to the cave of Amarnath. It led to
1
Swami, 2011, 347.
2
Johnson, 2006, 100.
3
Swami, 2011, 345.
257
the eventual collapse of the Congress–PDP alliance.1 As Swami mentions the mobilizations of
both Muslim and Hindus in Kashmir, ‘though built around religious themes, were led by
politicians—not clerics.’2 Some religious leaders like Maqbool Akhrani, south Kashmir-based
Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis neo-fundamentalist activist among Muslim, who mobilized against migrant
workers in 2006 and Swami Dinah Bharati, leader of obscure denominations and temples, who
played roles in the Hindu-chauvinist agitation, were not major religious figures and they had had
political relations. Despite the centrality of religion to the Shrine War, therefore, conventional
political actors - whether Islamists like Geelani, opposed to India, or Unionist political parties
like the PDP, NC, Congress, or the BJP - all initiated its crisis and shaped its course. Neither
religious institutions nor clerics had any significant role in the movement. So, the political parties
played important role in what was marketed as a purely Islamist-led or Hindutva-led movement.3
7) Religious Violence for Electoral Goals
Some authors like Brass believe and some implication of this has already been mentioned in this
research, political elites have had effect on the creation of hostilities between religious groups
especially Hindus and Muslims. Shakir believed that ‘earlier, the riots were a 2-3-day affair. But
now the riots continue for weeks together. This shows that there is what may be called
systematic and organized madness. They are pre-planned and politically-oriented, accompanied
by identical means of rousing religious passions and followed by desired results conducive to the
growth of anti-secular politics.’4 The following events, by far, have shown this fact.
Political elites started to arouse Hindu consciousness and feelings concerning the holy places
like Ayodhya and the God Ram, to direct them to a specific, material site, to promote Hindu-
Muslim antagonism for political purposes and to define the Hindu community as a political
entity.5 Apart from the previous issues that have been mentioned, especially like the Ayodhya
problem, there are other communal violence which were orchestrated for political gains or they
had impact on it. Many politicians and parties use this issue to improve their electoral prospects.
Wilkinson has narrated some communal riots related to the electoral ends in various places in
India. About Maharashtra, he writes that:
1
Swami, 2011, 337.
2
Ibid., 342-3.
3
Ibid., 343.
4
Shakir, 1983, 47.
5
Brass, 1994, 247.
258
In January 1986, riots broke out in Aurangabad (Maharashtra) following processions and protests organized by
the Shiv Sena, which was trying to break the electoral hold of the Congress in the city. The riots helped the Sena
defeat the Congress (I) in the subsequent elections, and the Shiv Sena chief in the city, Chandrakant Khaire, had no
doubt about dint connection. He claimed that the riots were critical in building support the Sena in the city and that
"ever since the first stir our party has received tremendous sympathy from the Hindus".
Reports on the riots that broke out in the Maharashtra town of Nasik, for example, describe how politicians
from the Shiv Sena Party tried to solidify Hindu support against the Muslim-supported Congress (I) in advance of
the 1986 elections by taking processions through Muslim-dominated areas of the town, shouting political slogans as
they passed through the Hamid Chowk. Muslims stoned the processions as they went by, sparking several days of
violence between Hindus, Muslims, and the police in which 8 people were killed and 65 injured. A former Congress
member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Shantaram Rapur explained at the time that the riots took place because
the Sena “wants to create terror, divide the people and show themselves as protectors of Hindus”.1
In Uttar Pradesh, most of the constituencies in which the upper-caste BJP was competing
with a Muslim supported backward-caste party for political power, experienced riots. Between
the 1989 and 1991 state elections, for instance, 33 riots in which 295 people died took place. ‘Of
these riots, 19 riots and 188 deaths from 1989 to 1991 took place in the small proportion of urban
constituencies (18% of all constituencies) in which the BJP had been one of the top two finishers
in the 1989 elections: these constituencies accounted for 57% of the total number of riots and
67% of the total number of deaths.’2 In Wilkinson’s opinion, the electorally motivated riots in
Uttar Pradesh has often been ‘an organized Hindu nationalist attempt to disrupt a Muslim
procession, to hold an anti-Muslim public meeting, or to raise the fears that Muslims were just
about to turn upon Hindus.’3 To prove this he adds that:
In Agra, for example a major riot took place in December 1990 because Muslims objected to a Hindu
nationalist attempt to take a procession carrying the ashes of "Hindu martyrs" through Muslim neighborhoods of
Tajganj and Loha Mandi. In Saharanpur in March, violence broke out when members of a Hindu procession
deliberately shouted provocative slogans in front of a mosque. In Ganjdundwara the riot followed a speech by the
firebrand BJP member of Parliament Ms. Uma Bharati. In Aligarh in December violence was triggered by published
reports in the Hindi newspaper Aaj (Today), later found to be false, that Muslim doctors in the Jawaharlal Nehru
Medical College Hospital had murdered dozens of Hindu patients.4
The outcome of this polarization in U.P. was in favor of the BJP on polling day. It had more
vote share in riot-affected towns than those not affected. Wilkinson mentions that, in the towns
affected by Hindu-Muslim riots in the above-mentioned period, BJP vote went up by an average
of 24%, from 19% to 43%, while in the average town its BJP vote went up only 7%, from 29%
to 36%. The vote was also more polarized in riot-hit towns than in towns in general. The two
1
2
Ibid., 49.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
259
major parties in riot-affected towns securing a combined average 69% share of the vote
compared with 64% in the avenge town. This had a dramatic effect on the electoral outcomes
and boosted the BJPs votes significantly. It defeated incumbents from the middle-caste, Muslim-
supported Janata Dal in all but two of the riot-affected towns and in eight towns its share of the
vote rose to around 50%. So, many Hindu voters, alarmed by the riots, switched their votes from
the Janata Dal Party to the BJP in order to keep out the Muslim-supported parties.1
In Hyderabad, also, the electoral politics has always determined the objective and the
direction of communal violence.2 Wilkinson mentions that the communal mobilization attempts
especially through religious festivals in late 1970s sparked off Hindu-Muslim riots during
election campaigns in 1983, 1984, and 1985 in Hyderabad. Hindu and Muslim political parties
organized religious events that would provoke the other community and unify their own. These
riots sometimes have had deaths and injuries.3 He also mentions the impact of riots in Madhya
Pradesh:
In December 1992 riots broke out in urban areas throughout Madhya Pradesh. The riot in Bhopal was especially
bad, with 107 deaths (mainly Muslims), 400 injured, and 2,500 arrests. These riots instigated by Hindu nationalist
organizations, and against which the BJP state government took no firm action, had the saint dramatic impact on the
electoral results in the 1993 assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh. Hindus in the 12 urban constituencies where
Muslims were electorally significant voted solidly for the Hindu parties with the best chance of keeping the Muslim-
supported parties and candidates out. The BJP won in 8 of the 12 seats. The Scheduled Caste Hindus, who live in
close proximity to the Muslim neighborhoods, and were therefore most worried about the prospects of Hindu-
Muslim violence, shifted their votes to the BJP. In the 1993 elections, for the first time in Madhya Pradesh's history,
not one Muslim was elected to the state assembly.
The effects of Hindu-Muslim polarization due to the riots were most dramatic in the Bhopal North constituency.
In 1989 the constituency's Muslim independent candidate Arif Aqueel had been able to fend off a BJP challenge
because the Congress candidate, who received 8% of the votes, split the Hindu vote. But in 1993, in the aftermath of
the riot, the BJP candidate Rant Sharma won with more than 50% of the votes on a very heavy turnout (76%
compared with 62% in 1989), handily defeating Aqueel's 43%. The victorious Sharma credited his victory to the
riots; Hindu women in particular had been frightened by the riots into switching their votes to the BJP.4
In the recent years, the effect of religious violence on BJP electoral success in Gujarat can be
mentioned. In March 2002, in Arora’s words, members of the VHP and its youth wing Bajrang
Dal led the killing of Muslims in Gujarat that according to unofficial figures given by human
rights groups it led to more than 2000 murders. It happened after a few VHP workers were killed
in a train fire in Godhra district, which the VHP claimed it was an act of terrorism by Muslims.
1
2
Shakir, 1983, 53.
3
For more details see: Wilkinson, 2004, 48-9.
4
Ibid, 51.
260
‘The violence helped the BJP to come back to power in the elections that followed in 2002 and
then in 2007.’1
Another example in this regard is related to the Christian-Hindu Conflicts. Some political
analysts believe that the VHP’s attacks on Christians especially in Orissa in 2007 were a strategy
of the BJP to polarize voters, as state assembly elections were approaching. These attacks were
done under the pretext of avenging an alleged assault on a Hindu sage, Laxmananda Saraswati,
who is known for persecuting Christians. They included four murders of Christians and burnt
730 houses and 95 churches.2
Hence, such is the kind of violent politics that has been continued throughout the post-
independence period and the effective electoral strategies have been polarizing the electorate
through communal processions and other events to divide people and increase the salience of
religious identities. According to the above discussion, religious violence from time to time has
improved the electoral performance of some parties, especially that of the BJP.
B) Communalism: Role of Religion in Violence and Political Disorder
Communalism has played an important role in fanning religious violence and political and social
disorder in India. For instance, sometimes, according to Shakir, at the eve of the riots the
handbills and leaflets of RSS have been distributed. In one of the handbills, distributed in
Ahmedabad in 1969, call of dharma yudha (religious war) was given. In another, the Hindus
were told to ‘wipe out those who have dishonored your mothers and sisters; show them that the
Muslims who have insulted Hindu religion and molested our mothers and sisters will not be able
to stay in India. Drive away the Muslims ...Hindus should unite, finish off the Muslim goondas,
wherever you see them.’ In 1982, also, communal feelings were aroused in a similar way in this
city. The V.H.P. distributed One Gujrati leaflet. It ‘alleged that the conversion of Harijans to
Islam is not on account of their persecution by the upper caste Hindu but because of large
amount of petro-dollars flowing into the country.’ Because of this tension between Hindu and
1
Arora, 2008.
2
Ibid.
261
Muslim and being a minority, the Muslim leaders perceive Indian politics and economics in
terms of communal categories. 1
The researcher has already mentioned some political uses of religion and communalism
especially with reference to electoral politics. Shakir mentions other political uses when he
writes about some effective factors in the growth of communalism; especially in relation with
ruling classes:
Preservation of personal laws which deal with the problems of family, property, inheritance and succession,
encouragement to obscurantist organizations (like the Sadhu Samaj) to preach moral and spiritual values, fostering
elaborate rituals, festivals, religious melas, giving permission to godmen to open ashrams, universities, research
centres, and even factories and prohibiting cow-slaughter in order to respect the religious susceptibilities are a few
examples of using religion "for legitimising exploitative social order" for helping towards “obtaining power through
religion-based policies” and for "ensuring the support of particular religious groups".
The ruling class has a major stake in the existence communalism and communal organizations of differs
communities. The organizations divide the subalterns along religious and communal lines. […] The ruling class is
morally afraid of such unity [of the dominated classes] as it constitutes the biggest threat to its rule. […] Assam is a
case in point. The root of the problem is under-development and this is ignored and a solution is sought in hardening
the religious divisions—Hindu against Muslim, indigenous against migrant, plainsman against hill dweller, tribal
against non-tribal, caste Hindu against Scheduled Caste Hindu. The standard strategy is to fight one communalism
with the help of another communalism both at the inter-community and intra-community levels: Hindu
communalism with Muslim communalism, Jamaat-e-Islam communalism with Jamiatul Ulema communalism, Akali
communalism with extremist Sikh and Hindu communalism. In the north-east the ruling class promotes a feeling of
alienation in the minds of the local people and in states like Punjab and Kashmir joins hands with communalists.2
Therefore, the ruling class and the state managers have been using communalism, as
mentioned, for political purposes and to conceal the class realities of the Indian polity. ‘It has
been a convenient way of dividing the oppressed and the exploited sections of society.’3
Nevertheless, this political use of communalism, along with other factors particularly religious
sentiment per se, has also had negative impact on politics and its sequence has often been
violence and political disorder.
In the previous chapters it was mentioned that many Hindus and Muslims were murdered in
communal riots following the partition (there are different report, 200,000 – a million people)
and 9-13 millions forced to migrate from their homes in 1946-48 when India was partitioned into
Muslim and Hindu majority states.4 But Partition not only was not the end of conflict but also
1
Shakir, 1983, 48, 51 & 54.
2
Shakir, 1986a, 184.
3
Ibid., 186.
4
Wilkinson, 2004, 13. And, Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with Her Neighbours (Delhi: Isha Books, 2008),
215.
262
was the beginning point of new conflict as long as throughout the post independence period.
Whereas, in the Islamicizing of Pakistan, most of the violence has been directed against ethnic
groups; Bengalis, Baloch, Sindhis, and Mohajirs, and also there were inter-religion problem
(between various Islamic sects), ‘in the Hinduizing of India most of the violence has been
religion-based, against religious minorities in general in various parts of the country. Muslims
especially have come to be demonized as oppressors of the Hindus who are supposedly the 'true
people of the Indus' and as a subversive fifth column in any conflict with Pakistan.’1 Hindu-
Muslim riots continued after partition, although on a very limited scale under the Nehru regime,
until 1964. After that, there was an increase in rioting especially in the 1980s with a growing
radical Hinduism, communalist organizations and Hindu political factor in Indian politics and
attempting to take advantage of it. This led to a revitalized Hindu-Muslim antagonism.2
Before 1980, the political impact of communalism remained limited and Hindu nationalist
parties won few votes. After 1980, however, killing classified as “communal” increased rapidly
and so did the Muslim body count. The death toll in the 1980s quadrupled the 1970s figure and
rose to more than seven thousand. In this context, the BJP soared.3 Therefore, India turned full
circle and the Hindu saints in politics in the 1980s and 1990s are legitimizing a politics of
militant Hindutva directed against every minority community in the country. They raised the
issue of 'liberation of temples' from 'Government control' or for using violence to halt the so-
called invasion by Muslim, Christian or a vaguely defined Western.4 A total of 138 reported
Hindu-Muslim riots took place in 167 towns in Uttar Pradesh between 1970-1995, in which
1,151 people were killed and 2,345 injured.5 BJP government has increased this process.
Although religious violence with focus on religious minorities mainly Muslims and Christians
has been a part of India’s history, its incidence suddenly rose to new heights after the BJP came
into power at the national level in 1998. For example, between 1950 and 1998 there were only 50
recorded cases of anti-Christian attacks. While, the number of these attacks was 100 in 2000 and
from 2001 to 2005 at least 200 were reported every year.6
1
Brasted and Khan, 2007, 439-40.
2
Van Der Veer, 2006, 252.
3
Ludden, 2006: 16.
4
5
6
Arora, 2008.
263
In India, according to Weiner, there has been a deep and justifiable fear of uncontrollable
violence among religious, caste and linguistic groups. This fear has served to legitimize armed
intervention by the state and it has easily been used by governments. In this regard apart from
Hindu-Muslim conflicts in various parts of India, Hindu-Sikh conflict can be mentioned.1 There
was an anti-Sikh riots following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and
the Sikhs were targeted. In his words, ‘the collusion of sections of the police with sections of
the congress party against minorities was particularly evident in the attacks against Sikhs in the
capital following Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination. Not until the army was called in did the attacks
subside.’2
Generally speaking, Hindu-Muslim riots have threatened the stability of the Indian state, its
economic development and the country's international relations with its Muslim neighbors,
especially its nuclear-armed rival Pakistan. According to Wilkinson, since the 1950s, the number
of Hindu-Muslim riots in India has grown to alarming proportions, reaching a dangerous peak
after Ayodhya problem in 1992-3. The number of riots in various states has been different. In
Kerala and Tamil Nadu the level of Hindu-Muslim violence in the post independence era has
been very low, at a rate far lower than that in states such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bihar, and
Uttar Pradesh. From 1950 to 1995, in Kerala, there were 19 reported Hindu-Muslim riots in
which 16 people died and 290 were injured. Totally, in India the approximately 10000 deaths
and 30,000 injuries have occurred in reported Hindu-Muslim riots since 1950 till the end of the
20th century.3 Besides, through table N. 10 (see: p. 265) he shows average riots per month
between 1975 and 1995 in different states. Brass (1990) also in the table N. 11 (see: p. 265)
shows the increasing of the numbers of communal incidents and of persons killed between 1954
and 1982.
1
Weiner, 1998, 489 & 492.
2
Ibid., 488.
3
Wilkinson, 2004, 12 & 185.
264
Table 10: Minority representation and Hindu-Muslim violence in the states 1975-1995
states %State Average Average %Cabinet over %Police over or %Combined

Muslim riots per killed per or under under under
month month representation representation representation
of Muslims of Muslims
Andhra Pradesh 9 0.15 1.27 -4 1 -3
Bihar 14 0.19 2.86 -5 -12 -17
Gujarat 9 0.80 3.69 -4 -3 -7
Haryana 4 0.01 0.02 -1 -3 -5
Himachal Pradesh 2 0.00 0.00 -2 -1 -2
Karnataka 11 0.22 0.94 0 -3 -3
Kerala 22 0.03 0.02 -10 -13 -23
Madhya Pradesh 5 0.09 0.73 -1 0 -2
Maharashtra 10 0.54 4.61 -4 -6 -10
Rajasthan 8 0.07 0.29 -4 -3 -7
Tamil Nadu 5 0.06 0.13 -1 0 -1
Uttar Pradesh 17 0.49 4.28 -4 -10 -14
West Bengal 23 0.09 0.42 -15 -16 -32
Source: Wilkinson, 2004, 128.
Table 11: Incidents of communal violence and numbers of persons killed by community, 1954-82
year incidents Hindus Muslims Others/Police Total

1954 33 - - - -
1955 72 - - - -
1956 74 - - - -
1957 55 - - - -
1958 41 - - - -
1959 42 - - - -
1960 26 - - - -
1961 92 - - - -
1962 60 - - - -
1963 61 - - - -
1964 1070 - - - -
1965 173 - - - -
1966 133 - - - -
1967 209 - - - -
1968 346 24 99 10 133
1969 519 66 558 49 674
1970 521 68 176 54 298
1971 321 38 65 0 103
1972 240 21 45 3 70
1973 242 26 45 1 72
1974 248 26 62 0 87
1975 205 11 22 0 33
1976 169 20 19 0 39
1977 188 12 24 0 36
1978 219 51 56 1 108
1979 304 80 50 31 261
1980 427 87 278 10 375
1981 319 - - - 196
1982 474 - - - 238
Total 6933 530 1498 159 2723
Source: Brass, 1990, 240.
265
The two important waves of the widespread violence, for example, are the cases Babri
Masque and Gujarat. The demolition of the Babri mosque on 6 December 1992 and the ensuing
Hindu–Muslim riots led to Hindus and Muslims attacking one another haphazardly across many
Indian states, Pakistan and Bangladesh so that it included 1200 dead within a few days in India.
It prompted New Delhi to take a number of repressive measures, including the dissolution of
assemblies in states where the BJP was in power (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal
Pradesh, and Rajasthan) and a ban on the RSS and the VHP.1 Another major wave of violence
and mass rioting after 1992 was the Gujarat’s riots in 2002, in which an estimated 850 to 2,000
people were murdered. These riots were the logical product of Sangh Parivar's statements about
'Muslim Community' beginning from February 28, 2002.2 Gujarat riots have been described as
'Hindu revenge and retaliation'. Lobo and Das narrates it as following:
The anti-Muslim violence of 2002 in Gujarat is one of the worst examples of carnage in the recent history of
India. The violence continued intermittently over eight months from February 27 when Muslims allegedly set 56
Hindu militants on fire in a train in Godhra. On the same evening attacks on Muslims began in different parts of the
state. The state remained an on-looker at best in controlling the massacre and partisan at worst in favour of Hindu
militants. The rioters, according to official figures, killed 573 persons during the first three months of the violence.
Of these, 87 per cent were Muslims - men, women and children (Communalism Combat, 2002). According to
unofficial estimates, the figures of the dead during the eight months were 1,500. The carnage was barbaric in the
extreme. Quite a few Muslim women were stripped, gang-raped, chopped up and burnt alive. A large number of
persons were injured and maimed. Many houses and shops were looted and burnt; property worth several billion
rupees was destroyed.3
However, religious conflict or religious communalism has had the main role in above
mentioned violence and riots that sometimes led to political disorder. Relevant to what has been
discussed so far, there is another phenomenon, that of religious terrorism that has gained a lot of
prominence in the recent decades.
C) Separatism and Secessionism Based on Religion
During the post-independence period, also, there have been some territorial demands on the
bases of religious identity that since the 1980s they have been enhanced. The Muslims and the
Sikhs have been the two foremost movements for political secession in contemporary India that
1
Jaffrelot, 2007a, 21; Ludden, 2006, xii.
2
Wilkinson, 2004, 12; Bhambhri, 2007, 314.
3
Lobo and Das, 2006, 77.
266
possess both religious and territorial bases and the Sikhs also made a demand for a separate
state.1 From 1989, against a background of suppression of Muslim groups, insurgency against the
Indian Army increased. India has claimed that Muslim separatists were funded and armed by the
Pakistan government, although Pakistan denied actual physical support.2
On one hand, someone like Wilkinson believes that ‘the Hindu-Muslim divide is still
important because the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has split the Indian state apart once already and
has the potential to do so again.’3 On the other, some others believe that Muslim separatism, as a
counterforce in the pre-Independence sense is no longer a viable possibility. Nevertheless,
Muslim solidarity has increased in recent decades as well, as a consequence of conflicts between
Hindus and Muslims intensified in the 1980s and 1990s especially of the struggle over the Babri
mosque in the Hindu city of Ayodhya. This situation has led to a number of secessionist
tendencies within India in various places, such as in the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland,
Assam, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.4 New separatist movements have also sprung up in
Bihar and West Bengal, although to some extent these movements represent political expediency
by regional leaders rather than genuine attempts to break away from India.5
Capoccia et al in their study show that seventy-one regional political actors of the 181 that
posed any territorial demands in India between 1952 and 2002 namely 39.22% of them fall in the
category of religion-based demands. Of these, 60 are Muslim, nine are Sikh, and two are Hindu.
Of this 181 actors 49 shifted their demands from more to less intense at some point during their
existence. They find that the impact of the religious worldview of a regional political actor on the
likelihood of moderating its territorial demands is obvious.6 And they show that most religious
actors do not moderate their territorial demands:
The analysis confirms that, the religious worldview of a regional political actor has a strong negative effect on
the hazard of moderating its territorial demands. More precisely, religious actors are 99.8% less likely to drop their
territorial demand than nonreligious actors. […] After about 50 years, virtually no religious actors are estimated to
1
Deol, 2000.
2
Johnson, 2006, 100.
3
4
Brass, 1994, 229; Kinnvall and Svensson, 2010.
5
Johnson, 2006, 40
6
Giovanni Capoccia, Lawrence Sáez and Eline de Rooij, “When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in
India 1952–2002,” The Journal of Politics, Volume 74, Issue 04 (2012).
267
have moderated their territorial demands, whereas around 45% of the nonreligious actors are estimated to have done
so.1
They have also studied the impact of state repression and inclusion in the electoral process on
the resilience of the actors. They show that religious actors, regardless of whether they
experienced state repression, are consistently more resilient in their demands than nonreligious
actors are. The religious actors who have experienced repression are far less resilient in their
demands than nonreligious actors are. Besides, ‘although inclusion in the electoral process itself
does not significantly affect the resilience of demands for each type of actor, religious actors are
consistently more resilient in their demands than nonreligious actors.’ In India, indeed, religious
mobilization has led to violence more than nonreligious mobilization. This has had effect on the
resilience of territorial demands advanced by religious groups. The tendency of the central state
has also been less accommodating towards religious grievances.2
According to them, an actor’s religious worldview and resilience of its territorial demands
are strictly empirically associated and, demands of religious political actors for autonomy or
secession are less likely to be tractable than identical grievances of nonreligious political actors.
This negative effect on demand tractability is especially related to certain religious traditions
including Islam and Sikhism. In the period analyzed by them, Islamic and Sikh groups constitute
the quasi-totality of Indian religious sub-national actors that have posed territorial demands.3
Here, as example, the researcher explains separatism and secessionism in Jammu & Kashmir.
Separatism in Kashmir: Between 1947 and 1990, the state of Jammu & Kashmir was ruled
by a succession of elected governments, headed by Muslim chief ministers. But they have not
been of like mind regarding the nature of the state’s relation with the Union. Although the
representation of Muslims in the bureaucracy and the professions and the overall economic
situation, had improved considerably, yet a secessionist movement erupted there in the mid-
1980s. It turned violent in 1989, and the state has been under the rule of the union government
since early 1990. Well-trained and heavily armed militants, supported by Pakistani authorities,
are being fought by the security forces and there is blood-letting on both sides.4 So, majority
1
Capoccia, Sáez and Rooij, 2012.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Madan, 2011, 257.
268
nationalism especially by BJP then appears to be a defensive response to far more dangerous
currents within the country.1
The militant secessionism of Kashmiri Muslims is more inspired by religious and ethnic
(Muslim-Kashmiri) considerations than by pure Islamic fundamentalism, but the influence of the
latter (particularly after the Iranian revolution) is not absent.2 The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation
Front has been the largest pro-independence group. It is generally believed that the JKLF
advocates Independence for a secular Kashmir state based on distinctive culture, region, and
language of Kashmiri, containing both Muslim and Hindu population, though they are Muslim.3
Besides, since indigenous popular uprising began in the late 1980s, the armed militancy has
increased. Several new militant groups, mostly having radical Islamic views, often with foreign
origins, have also emerged: e.g. Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), Lashkar-e-Toyeba (LET) and
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.4 In 1993, a united All-Party Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference emerged that
campaigned peacefully for an end to India's presence in the state. This coalition contained 23
secessionist organizations, including trade unions and religious political groups. ‘Amongst the
last are the political wings of some militant groups. Like the Separatists guerrillas, however,
Hurriyat influence in Kashmir is undermined by its lack of unity and no decision about
Kashmir's future after Indian rule can be settled.’5
However, since late 1980s a shift in the ideological emphasis of the movement was seen from
a nationalistic and secularist one to an Islamic one. Therefore, some of the groups that were in
the forefront of the armed insurgency in 1989 - particularly the JKLF - have receded into the
background. At recent times, ‘the prevailing political tendency among the militants in Kashmir is
pro-Pakistani, with a heavy emphasis on religion.’6 In Kashmir, particularly in Srinagar and its
surroundings, the Muslim clergies (Mullahs) have fanned the dissatisfactions, by pro-Pakistani
and anti-Indian elements. Agents provocateurs have been sowing the seeds of dissension, of
Islamic fundamentalism, of separatism and calling for a ‘Jihad' against the 'Kafir' or unbeliever.
1
Basu, 2006, 62.
2
Madan, 2011, 258.
3
Brass, 1994, 222; Johnson, 2006, 100.
4
Johnson, 2006, 101.
5
Ibid, 102.
6
Trivedi, 2008, 235.
269
The Islamic factor has been decisive in swaying the Kashmiris in their quest for a separate
identity.1
For instance, the position of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Kashmir's Islamist patriarch and political
separatist leader, stemmed from his belief that Islam and Hinduism were locked in an irreducible
civilizational opposition. At a rally in Srinagar, 2004, Geelani had made clear this position,
saying that, “The people of state should, as their religious duty, raise voice against India's
aggression.”2 In his opinion this duty stemmed from the fact that to "practice Islam completely
under the subjugation of India is impossible because human beings in practice worship those
whose rules they abide by.”3 Geelani legitimized the secessionist movement in J& K in the
supposed oppositional dualities of Hindus and Muslims. In his prison diaries, about faith, belief
and customs, he argued ‘Hindus and Muslims are set irrevocably apart, as they are divided by
such matters as food, clothing, and lifestyles.’ He believes that it is difficult for Muslims to live
in a Hindu dominion as "for a fish to stay alive in a desert.”4 He argued Muslims “cannot live
harmoniously with a Hindu majority without their own religion and traditions coming under a
grave threat, one major factor being Hinduism's capacity to assimilate other religions. For Islam
to be preserved and promoted in Kashmir, it is necessary for it to be separated from India.”5
Besides, there is a separate Jamaat-e-Islami in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is a
major force behind the armed secessionist movement there. It has given the call for Islamic
society and government: ‘As Kashmiris it is our duty to struggle for…independence…and to
establish that social order in the state which we would like to see triumphant in the whole
world.’6 The Jamaat-e-Islami had long argued that faith made imperative the Nizam-e-Mustafa,
the state as the Prophet Mohammad had envisaged it. In a broader sense, the organization saw its
politics as emerging from the ideological belief that "Kashmiri Muslims need to be converted
afresh for accommodating Islamic beliefs in the local framework.”7
Therefore, apart from other separatist groups, there have been militant Islamist groups in
Kashmir that have led to conflict and fighting. The fighting between Indian army and Separatists
1
Chopra, 1990, 188.
2
Quoted by: Swami, 2011, 338.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 339.
5
Ibid.
6
Quoted by: Madan, 2011, 143.
7
Quoted by: Swami, 2011, 347.
270
groups especially the United Jihad Council and the Hizbul Mujahideen has continued so that in
2000 ‘attacks on Indian Army camps resumed and a car bomb in Srinagar killed 9 and wounded
25 people. The sickening cycle of violence returned. In the winter of 2000, 400 civilians and 200
security personnel were killed.’1 As a recent example of the conflict, Islamist protestors marched
on Srinagar's historic Lal Chowk tower on August 15, 2008, the anniversary of India's
independence. Islamist political flags fluttered from atop the clock tower. With strict orders not
to use force on the unarmed protestors, police stationed at Lal Chowk brought down the flag and
withdrew. Elsewhere in Srinagar, mobs destroyed police and CRPF posts, attacked police
stations, and burnt down the offices of pro-India politicians.2
Secessionism in Jammu: In Jammu region, also, there have been two trends related to
secessionism. On one hand, Hindu-chauvinist groups in Jammu have sometime agitation
demanding the land back. After 2002 election that the BJP found itself discredited by its failure
to contain terrorism, much of the Hindutva movement's cadre turned to a new grouping, the
Jammu State Morcha (JSM). JSM leaders wanted a new Hindu-majority state carved out of J&K.
In the event, both the JSM and the BJP were wiped out in the elections, winning just one seat
each.3 After the speeding up of the process of the creation of a separate state of Telangana out of
Andhra Pradesh, the JSM proclaimed to revive its campaign seeking statehood for Jammu.4 On
the other hand, some outright pro-Pakistan Muslim groups and others in Jammu are calling for
autonomy for that region either within or outside of Jammu & Kashmir.5
Hence, in the some states such as the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir, Assam and Punjab
the violent and secessionist movements have overshadowed or displaced the formal political
process. These secessionist movements accompanied by prolonged and bloody confrontations
between armed groups and government security forces marked the polities of these states.
1
Johnson, 2006, 109-10.
2
Swami, 2011, 335.
3
Ibid, 341.
4
See: “JSM to Revive Campaign Seeking Statehood for Jammu,” accessed, 1 Aug. 2013, at:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Jammu%20Sec/JSM-to-revive-campaign-seeking-statehood-for-
Jammu/Article1-1101876.aspx.
5
Brass, 1994, 220.
271
D) The Impact of Religion on International Relations of India
Social structure, culture including religion and history are among factors that influence foreign
policy and international relations. A society, which is sharply divided based on wealth, religion,
regional imbalances, etc., cannot pursue effective foreign policy because of division and lack of
cooperation among various groups. On the other hand, a homogeneous society possessing strong
sense of national unity can pursue a more effective foreign policy because of the support of all
sections of society who share the same values and memories.1 So, religion is a factor to share
foreign policy and religious factor is one of the common factors that promotes cooperation
among states2 or conflict between them.
The Indian cultural values and traditions emanated from Hinduism greatly influenced her
foreign policy. On one hand, the sense that India, its secularism notwithstanding, is the heir to
Hindu civilization, informs the growing assertiveness of India in its relations with its neighbors
and in its commitment to greater military (and nuclear) power.3 On the other, as Khanna
mentions, the three values that have helped shaping India's foreign policy are: ‘tolerance, the
equation of means and ends, and non-violence’ that this “traditional values have come down to-
us from the scriptures like the Vedas and Dharmashatras and the writings of great men like
Swami Vivekananda, Tagore, Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi.”4
Hindus have been scattered in many countries especially in the neighbors of India and
southeastern Asia. This scattering has made a ground for relations between countries. Besides,
the RSS, for instance, has established itself in some 150 countries, while the VHP has become
the central organization claiming to represent the entire Hindu world and a Hindutva worldview.
The VHP through Vishwa Hindu Parishad International (VHPI) establish links with Hindus in
other countries. Through the close ties, these organizations influenced the BJP foreign policy
especially when it was on power.5 Some countries also include majority of Muslim. The
historical tension between these two religions has created a ground for tension between countries
1
Prem Arora, Indian Foreign Policy (India: Cosmos Bookhive, 2001), 5-6.
2
V. N. Khanna, Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 2001), 232.
3
Weiner, 1998, 480.
4
Khanna, 2001, 19.
5
Kinnvall and Svensson, 2010.
272
especially India and Pakistan. So, the impact of religion on relations with some neighbors can be
clearly seen.
However, the impact of religion can be mentioned in the international relations of India
especially with its neighbors including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Maldives as
Muslim countries that their relations have often been under the effect of Islam-Hinduism
conflict; China as communist country that their relations have been under the effect of the
conflict between religion and anti-communist; Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar (Burma) and Ceylon
that their relations have been under the effect of common religion (Hinduism and its offshoot,
Buddhism). India has many common historical, social, cultural and political bonds with these
countries.1 Here, as example, the relations between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal
are explained.
1) The Impact of Religion on India–Pakistan Relations
The issue of religious identity, which began in earnest in the immediate run-up to independence,
has outshined other issues between India and Pakistan. They have contested the ideological
underpinnings of nation from the time of partition.2 Both countries have fought three wars since
partition and independence in; 1947 because of the Pakistan’s support of Kashmir insurgency,
1965 or second Kashmir War because of Kashmir’s problem and 1971 because of Bangladesh
Libration War. So, the peace process between them has been precarious. Moreover, two
skirmishes in Siachen Glacier region in Kashmir in 1984-87 occurred.3 In the summer of 1999,
also, the Kargil conflict occurred, sometimes called as the fourth Indo–Pakistan war which lasted
for about two months.4 They have also had nuclear competitions a number of times in recent
1
See: V. P. Dutt, India’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999). And, Arora,
2001; Lobo and Das, 2007; Johnson, 2006.
2
Brasted and Khan, 2007, 430.
3
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “Politics of Mistrust and Confidence Building,” in India and Pakistan; Crisis of
Relationship, ed. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990). And, Chopra, 1990; Arora,
2001.
4
Achin Vanaik, “Making India Strong: The BJP-Led Government’s Foreign Policy Perspectives,” in Hindu
Nationalism and Governance, eds. John McGuire and Ian Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007),
386. And, Trivedi, 2008, 217.
273
history, most notably during the Kargil crisis and the 2002 deployment of 1,000,000 men
following terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in New Delhi.1
However, religious problem has been the root of Pakistan-India hostility. The partition of
subcontinent into two independent nations created a long-standing antagonism between the
secular India with Hindu majority and Islamic Pakistan. The partition was not the end of
religious problem and the problem of religious minorities persisted. After separation, the
minorities’ problem became a weapon in the Indo-Pak cold war.2 Even after that, over 40 million
Muslims remained in India and about ten million Hindus remained in East Pakistan. It had
important effect on their relations and they charged each other of communalism. Though there
were some agreement between them on this issue like the Inter-Dominion Agreement of April
1948 and agreement 1950 between Nehru with Liaquat Ali Khan on minorities, the complaints
regarding maltreatment of minorities continued thereafter also and the problem of minorities
continued to plague relations between the two countries.3
India- Pakistan relationships have sometimes deteriorated because of the claim that Pakistan
supports terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir. Pakistan has wanted to play guardianship role in
respect of the Indian Muslims. India claims that the communal violence is an internal affair and
other countries cannot interfere in this matter.4 In this regard, Saikia mentions that the ISI (Inter
Services Intelligence- Pakistan) intention of supporting the MFOs in India was triggered off by
the following considerations:
To utilise the MFOs as conduits between the ISI and the ethnic militant groups of North East India; To further
an agenda of Islamisation in the region; To facilitate the demographic invasion that is presently underway in the
region with massive illegal infiltration from Bangladesh; To communalise the situation in the region by engineering
riots, defiling Hindu places of worship and attacking important Hindu personalities and women'; To carve out—
quite like the Bangladesh Islamic Manch agenda—a Brihot Bangladesh by including areas of Muslim majority with
the present geographical boundaries of Bangladesh.5
1
Lall, 2008.
2
Noorani, 2003, 8.
3
Arora, 2001, 85.
4
Rajendra Sareen, “Prospects and Problems of Bilateral Cooperation,” in India and Pakistan: Crisis of Relationship,
ed. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990), 65.
5
Jaideep Saikia, Terror Sans Frontiers; Islamist Militancy in North East India (New Delhi: Vision Books, 2004),
128.
274
Because of this issue, the BJP wanted a direct confrontation between India and Pakistan in
the early 1990s. While the BJP wanted India to emerge as a military power, Congress
Government (1991–1996) followed a foreign policy of establishing friendly relations with all
neighboring countries, except Pakistan. At the international level, the Government of India has
exposed Pakistan's direct involvement in promoting terrorism in India. ‘The Narsimha Rao
Government has alerted powerful western countries against Pakistan and it has suggested to the
United States to declare Pakistan as a terrorist State.’1
At this time, also, the Babri Mosque events led to further deterioration in relations.2 So, the
relationship between India and Pakistan is often colored by communal shades.3 There has often
been spiral of action and reaction between them, for example, military confrontation (as Kargil,
1999) and then military stalemate (1,000,000 men on both sides of the border in 2002) and
Nuclear competition. Besides, even today Pakistan and the Kashmir question has remained the
central issue in India's foreign policy.4
As Johnson says, “small-scale actions by Muslim Separatists groups more or less under the
Pakistan government's control, and counter-insurgency operations by Indian security forces,
continue to bedevil the state. Pakistan has conducted clandestine support for insurgents and
sometimes fought in conventional operations.”5 For example, the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center in USA, provided ground for tension between two countries
once again. Indian hardliners saw the role of Pakistan in the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack
on the Indian Parliament by two terrorist groups especially the Jaish-e-Mohammad ('Army of
Mohammed'), emerged in Pakistan under the leadership of the Islamic cleric Maulana Masood
Azhar. It was sponsored, in their opinion, by the ISI agency and other sections of the Pakistan
establishment.6 The Indian government believed it could prove a direct link between Pakistan
and the Separatists because Jaish-e-Mohammad calls on its followers to fight against Indian rule.
India strongly protested the attack and decided to recall its High Commission from Islamabad.7
1
Bhambhri, 2007, 155-6.
2
For details see: Dutt, 1999, 122.
3
Khanna, 2001, 64.
4
McGuire, 2007, 23.
5
Johnson, 2006, 92.
6
Vanaik, 2007, 387.
7
Johnson, 2006, 112; Arora, 2001, 101.
275
a) Pakistan in the Foreign and Defense Policies of the BJP-Led Government
Both anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan sentiments have been basic factors of Hindutva ideology. On
one hand, their hostility with Islam even led them to find themselves very much at case with the
Samuel Huntingdon thesis that claims the Islamic World is a major opponent of the Christian
West. This has been suitable with Hindutva's anti-Muslimness so that they have been ‘happy to
offer a cultural—civilizational alliance between Hindu India and the Christian West against the
Islamic (and 'terrorist') world.’1 On the other, in the discourse of Hindu nationalist, Pakistan as
the foreign enemy is the necessity of an Indian security state. According to Manchanda, indeed,
the relationship between the BJP, the media and foreign policy produced a militarized Hindu
nationalist discourse so that the BJP has viewed India as having been under siege in the face of
the internal enemy, Indian Muslims, and the external enemy, Muslims of Pakistan and
Bangladesh. ‘Militarized nationalism, anti-democratic impulses and hate politics are integral
aspects of the Indian national security state package justified by diehard hostility of its
neighbors.’2
The Hindu nationalist discourse had an effect on foreign relations, particularly with Pakistan
and especially during BJP government. With coming to power at the Centre in 1998, the BJP got
an opportunity to follow an anti-Pakistan and anti-China foreign policy and an aggressive
military based defense policy. The Sangh Parivar has identified Pakistan as the 'nerve centre of
Islamic terrorism' and L.K. Advani, as the Home Minister, had committed to fight against
Pakistan supported violent Islamic activities in the name of religion and Jihad in India.3 This
discourse affected both initiating the nuclear arms race and a war with Pakistan in the district of
Kargil in 1999.4 Also, the Hindu right became the central concern to international relations per
se, particularly after September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror by USA. The BJP-led
National Democratic Alliance mobilized the Indian army along the border with Pakistan after the
attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.5
1
Vanaik, 2007, 389 & 39.
2
Rita Manchanda, “Militarized Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” in
Hindu Nationalism and Governance, eds. John McGuire and Ian Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2007), 368.
3
Bhambhri, 2007, 201 & 314.
4
Johnson, 2006, 107.
5
Kinnvall and Svensson, 2010.
276
Hence, the BJP has always advocated a very rough foreign policy against Pakistan based on a
premise that Pakistan as a Muslim country can never be positive towards a Hindu majority India.
Anti-Muslim ideology of the Sangh family is a fundamental principle of their foreign policy. In
this relation, The BJP has been consistent supporters of Israel in India because Israel was
fighting against most of Islamic countries especially Arabs and anti-Islamic Sangh family has
viewed Israel as a natural friend of their anti-Muslim ideological and political plank.1
b) Kashmir Dispute
The issue of Jammu & Kashmir became so complicated so that from independence it remained a
source of high tension and conflict between India and Pakistan. Though the Kashmiri people,
both the Hindus popularly known as Kashmiri Pandits and the Muslims have evolved their own
identity, the Kashmir region has had an overwhelming Muslim population over the centuries.2
So, the role of religion, Islam, has been important in this region and it has had a significant
impact on relationship between Pakistan and India.
The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been a focal point for Indian politics especially Hindu
nationalism since the time of Partition. Although in the summer of 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the
Viceroy, had attempted to persuade the Maharaja to accept a plebiscite, hoping that the Muslims
of Kashmir who constituted the vast majority of population, would vote for integration into
Pakistan. And while Jinnah and the MuL had considered J&K, a Muslim-majority state, as a part
of Pakistan. For Hindu nationalists, the state was inseparably a part of India and it remained
under Indian rule.3 However, this issue has the religious root and it is related to conflict between
Muslim and Hindu. As Sareen mentions, “what Pakistan seeks is to impose dogmatism,
fanaticism and religious intolerance on Kashmir.”4 Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is not based on
ethnic or linguistic affinity as Kashmiris have different ethnicity and language. ‘The only ground
advanced is that the population of the Kashmir valley is Muslim.’5 So, as already mentioned,
both the 1947-48 and the 1965 wars occurred because of Pakistan’s attempt to annex the state of
1
2
Khanna, 2001, 65; Chopra, 1990, 172.
3
Chopra, 1990, 10; Jaffrelot, 2007a, 93 & 193.
4
Sareen, 1990, 64.
5
K. Subrahmanyam, “Kashmir,” in India and Pakistan: Crisis of Relationship, ed. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh
(New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990), 140.
277
Jammu & Kashmir by force.1 The conclusion of first Indo-Pakistan War, under the broker of the
United Nations, was the partition of Jammu and Kashmir State into two parts until a popular
referendum, of which the largest and most populous remained with India. From 1950, the Indian
government recognized Kashmir as a separate state with greater autonomy, but, in 1953, India
removed the Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah, and shelved the issue of a referendum.2
During the partition of India in 1947, unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh the two princely states
- that under British rule had a semi-autonomous status, with majority Hindus (about 80% each
state) but Muslim rulers that were eventually accessed by India, the Kashmir another princely
state with majority Muslim but a Hindu ruler was not accepted by India that Pakistan accesses
it.3 This issue was the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage and caused maximum
tension in Indo-Pakistan relations. The problem of Kashmir arose because the Hindu governor of
Kashmir (Maharaja Hari Singh) postponed the decision regarding accession of state to India or
Pakistan, hoping to preserve his independence. But when Pakistan-backed raiders attacked the
Kashmir Valley to force its accession to Pakistan, he responded by releasing the National
Conference leaders including Sheikh Abdullah, seeking India's military help, and acceding to
India.4
So, the Kashmir issue remained between both countries. Unlike Junagadh, that its ruler
joined Pakistan in the beginning but the people didn’t accept it, in Kashmir after many tensions
in early years, on 6 February 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir ratified
state's accession to India. On 19 November 1956, the Constituent Assembly adopted a
constitution which made the state an integral part of India. On 26 January 1957, India formalized
the accession of Kashmir to India and made it irrevocable.5 Despite this, the tensions between
two countries and the Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir have continued.
Kashmir has always been the site of competitive nationalisms, both religious and secular.
There have been four such nationalisms (Indian, Pakistani, Islamic and Kashmiri), each with a
1
Jasjit singh, 1990, 103.
2
Johnson, 2006, 96; Brass, 1994, 216.
3
see: Trivedi, 2008, 218; Arora, 2001, 87
4
Prem Shankar Jha, The Origins of a Dispute, Kashmir 1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2. And,
Arora, 2001, 87; Behera, 2007, 408.
5
Arora, 2001, 89.
278
distinctive diagnosis of the problem, and a corresponding ‘solution’.1 Pakistan has followed the
Two- Nation Theory based on Muslim majority province. Therefore, it wants to access the whole
of Kashmir not just the part acquired in the 1948 war.2 After the late 1980s, with the emergence
of indigenous Islamic groups and movements in the Kashmir Valley pressing for either an
independent Islamic Kashmir or union with an Islamic Pakistan, Pakistan captured an
opportunity to influence there. In this regard, President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmad Khan
Leghari, in his national day speech (March 23, 1997) mentioned Kashmir as a "matter of
Pakistan's survival.” He extended full support to separatist elements in Jammu & Kashmir and
called for help of Muslim countries to end "repression and human rights violations in Kashmir.”
He said that Pakistan stood fully with separatists "to achieve their cause.” For Pakistani Foreign
Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, also Kashmir was the core issue. In May 1997, where Indian and
Pakistani Prime Ministers met, Gohar had said, "you can't sustain the talks if the core issue of
Kashmir is ignored.”3 However, in India’s view, Pakistan has been stirring up violence in its part
of Kashmir by supporting Islamic guerrillas including training and funding that has waged a
separatist war since 1989. Pakistan, on the other hand, has always denied the charge and has
called it as an indigenous freedom struggle.4
Pakistan also used the instrument of common religion with other countries for support in
Kashmir’s issue at the international level. For instance, in the meeting of the UN Human Rights
Commission in Geneva in 1994, Pakistan used religion as a common factor with some countries
to attract their support for Kashmir issue against India and to get a resolution of some kind or the
other adopted by the Commission with regard to the human rights situation in Kashmir.
Moreover, against the growing concern in the West about externally supported terrorism in
Kashmir, the Organization of Islamic Conference talked about self-determination in Kashmir and
called upon India to allow international human rights organizations as well as an OIC delegation
to visit Kashmir. India rejected the OIC proposal to send a three-man fact- finding mission and
its attempt to inject itself into the Kashmir dispute. In OIC, some countries such as Saudi Arabia
and Iran actively and more than others supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. 5
1
Sareen, 1990, 64.
2
Vanaik, 2007, 398-9.
3
Khanna, 2001, 99.
4
Trivedi, 2008, 217.
5
Dutt, 1999, 114 & 127.
279
Hence, Islam has had an important political function for Pakistan concerning the Kashmir
Issue. Apart from the above-mentioned points, the important political point is that, indeed, the
problem of Kashmir is strategic so that there is other issues also like Pakistan's three main rivers,
Indus, Jhelum and Chenab originate from Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan wants to control this area
and for its goal and covering other issues, it uses religion and Muslim people.
2) The Impact of Religion on India–Bangladesh Relations
India played a vital role in the emergence of Bangladesh, which earlier formed part of Pakistan.
It had full sympathy with the people of East Pakistan in their struggle for independence. As
Khanna mentions, “The birth of Bangladesh in December 1971 was a direct outcome of the Indo-
Pakistan war.”1 In this time, the conflict between Pakistan and India led to this support as for
both sides (India and Bangladesh) the enemy of Pakistan was their friend and also they had
common enemy that was again Pakistan.
India tried to develop very friendly relations with Bangladesh right from its inception. India
was one of the first countries that recognized it and established diplomatic and trade relations
with it.2 Soon after recognition of Bangladesh, while the war was still going on, the first Indo-
Bangladesh Treaty was concluded on December 10, 1971. On March 19, 1972 the Treaty of
Friendship and Peace was signed for a period of 25 years.3 But this situation was changed soon
under the effect of confrontation of Islam and Hinduism. In 1975, some army majors staged a
coup and Mujibur Rehman, the creator of Bangladesh who signed the treaty, was killed along
with his entire family. By this time, anti-Indianism was clearly visible in Bangladesh and
fundamentalism started emerging. The coup leaders made it clear that Bangladesh was no more
secular. Since 1975, Bangladesh came to be ruled by pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian forces.
Bangladesh later in 1988 declared Islam as the state religion.4 The relationship between two
countries was greatly upset in December 1992 following demolition of Babri mosque and their
relations declined.
1
Khanna, 2001, 151.
2
Arora, 2001, 118.
3
Khanna, 2001, 152-3.
4
Ibid,155.
280
With the above-mentioned political change in Bangladesh, resurgence and growth of
fundamentalism especially political activities of Jamaat-e-lslami Party in Bangladesh1 has
gradually had a negative impact on the relation between both countries. These groups have the
relation with Pakistan and Islamic groups especially Indian ones. There are many Indian Muslim
fundamentalist organization camps in Bangladesh especially those from North East India. Saikia
mentions 17 camps.2
Bangladesh and the BJP: In the BJP foreign policy, the Muslims in Bangladesh as Pakistan
and India have been interpreted as anti- Hindu. In addition, for the leader of the BJP-led coalition
government in India in 1998, Vajpayee, it was in the interests of India to support the Bangladesh
Awami League (BAL) against the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Because any
destabilization of the BAL in Bangladesh would inevitably lead to the establishment of a BNP
government. BNP has always been and would be much more dependent upon Islamist policies
than the BAL and more favourable to Pakistan. Jamaati-Islami influence on the BNP in
Bangladesh has attracted special attention from the BJP, because of its declared intention to turn
Bangladesh into an Islamic state, while the BNP promise to have ‘special relations with the
Islamic countries' as part of its election manifesto was well publicized.3
The change of government of Bangladesh in 2001 was of great concern for Hindus, and
therefore for relations with the BJP, because the Hindu communities in Bangladesh were
vulnerable. It was not only in revenge for Hindu support for the BAL before and during its
period of rule, but also a reflection of deep communal tensions which had always existed to a
greater or lesser degree in Bangladeshi society. The BJP feared that the communal attacks lead to
an influx of Hindu Bangladeshis into West Bengal.4
Besides, given the international climate on Muslim-inspired terrorism and a shift towards
religious fundamentalism in Bangladesh, the BJP’s view was changed over the BNP government
in Dhaka. When the USA diplomatic mission in Kolkata was attacked in 2002, from militants
1
See: Trivedi, 2008, 110-3.
2
Saikia, 2004, 188-9.
3
Denis Wright, “Bangladesh and the BJP,” in Hindu Nationalism and Governance, eds. John McGuire and Ian
Copland (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 452-3 & 462.
4
Ibid., 460-1.
281
presumed to be Muslim terrorists, Bangladesh immediately became subject to suspicion as a base
for action of Pakistani groups such as the Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami. According to Wright:
The BJP government in India had no compunction about embarrassing the BNP in Bangladesh, and was willing
to turn the screws a little more by withdrawing, in December 2001, from trade talks supposedly aimed at easing
Bangladesh's enormous trade deficit with India. That aside, the attack on the US Mission in Kolkata is an indication
1
of the increasing encroachment of global issues into political exchanges between the two governments.
3) The Impact of Religion on India–Nepal Relations
Nepal is the only Hindu state in the world. Popular and cultural ties of India with Nepal have
consistently been close. India and Nepal are bound together by history, geography, kinship,
religion, faith, cultural legacy and linguistic affinity.2 In fact, about 25 percent of Nepal's
population have migrated from India during the past century.3 Because of this, they have good
relations in various fields like economic, political and so on. Nepal's main trading partner has
been India.4 With regard to this intimacy, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai in his speech
before Lok Sabha in 1977 said, "We are bound to Nepal by ties of geography and mutual
economic interests and by religion, social and cultural bonds between our two peoples in a
unique fashion with no close parallel anywhere in the world.”5
In 1950, New Delhi and Kathmandu initiated their intertwined relationship with the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship enclosing letters that defined security relations between the two countries.
Apart from this, during post-independence period there have been different agreements
especially economical treaties between both countries.6 For example, during 1984-85 Nepal's 52
percent of total export-import trade was with India. Most of the goods produced in India and
needed by Nepal are usually available without much difficulty.7 Hence, although there have been
some problems because of other reasons especially interference of China, their relations have
been better than other countries and one of the reasons is that they have same religion.
1
Wright, 2007, 463.
2
Khanna, 2001, 139; Trivedi, 2008, 179.
3
Arora, 2001, 141.
4
Khanna, 2001, 140.
5
Quoted by: Arora, 2001, 141.
6
Trivedi, 2008, 179-181.
7
Khanna, 2001, 150-1.
282
The common religion and Hindu nationalism have also had an impact on the relations
between political forces of two countries. For example, during the movement of democracy in
Nepal that spearheaded by the Nepali Congress, it was also joined by the leftists, the BJP, in the
name of supporting a Hindu kingdom, appeared to be sympathetic to the authoritarian rule of the
Palace under the fiction of ‘Panchayati Raj’. Therefore, at a meeting of the Nepali Congress in
Kathmandu in 1990, the representative of the BJP were not presence, while representatives of
other major Indian political parties participated to offer their support in the struggle for
democracy.1
Sum up
This chapter was allocated to examine some aspects of the political functions of religion in post-
independence India. In comparison to the pre independence times that the function of religion
even in elections, indeed, was in the line of separatism, the electoral function of religion in post
independence India is remarkable. The researcher has shown the impact of religion on voting
behavior and it has been explained how the parties and politicians used religion in electoral
actions. Besides, it has been shown that the religion-based secessionist and separatist movements
are still there, although its danger as a threat for a second partition has been declined. Religious
violence has continued and as a negative function of religion has threatened the social and
political order of society. Also as a new function after independence, religion has played both
negative and positive role in the international arena, in the relations of India with her neighbors.
It has emerged as the main factor in the wars between India and Pakistan so that Islam and
Muslims have become the basis of Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir. Besides, Hinduism and
religions closer to it like Buddhism have provided a field to reinforce the relations of India with
some of the neighboring countries.
1
Dutt, 1999, 174.
283

The Electoral Role of Religion in Post-Independence India

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The Electoral Role of Religion in Post-Independence India

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Chapter Seven

The Electoral Function of Religion in

A) Electoral Function of Religion: Use of Religion by Political Parties

In India, electoral politics including nomination of the candidates, campaigning, communal

1) Vote Banks Based on Religion

2) Religion in Electoral Politics of Jana Sangh and Janata Party

3) Religion in Congress-I Electoral Politics

The Congress Policy toward Muslims:

4) Hindutva as an Electoral Agenda: BJP and Using Religion in Electoral Politics

a) BJP and Ayodya Issue

b) Towards Power: Continuity of Religious Mobilization and Coalition Politics

Lobo and Das narrate other examples as following:

5) Voting Behavior of Religious Communities

Religion Congress BJP/Shiv Janata Janata CPI/ Others total Refused/

Source: adopted from, Butler, Labiri and Roy, 1998, 131

Table 8: The Percentages of Party preference among Muslims (1996-99)

Parties\year 1996 1999

Religious group UDF% LDF% BJP% Others%

LDF: Left Democratic Front, led by CPI-M

Source: Kumar, 2011, 244

6) Religion and Kashmir Electoral Politics

7) Religious Violence for Electoral Goals

B) Communalism: Role of Religion in Violence and Political Disorder

states %State Average Average %Cabinet over %Police over or %Combined

year incidents Hindus Muslims Others/Police Total

C) Separatism and Secessionism Based on Religion

1) The Impact of Religion on India–Pakistan Relations

2) The Impact of Religion on India–Bangladesh Relations

3) The Impact of Religion on India–Nepal Relations

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