Psychological grounds for Moral, Eudaimonological and Gnoseological Pessimism

in Plato’s Republic

NATALIA COSTA RUGNITZ

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the interpretation according to which, by way of analyzing

Plato’s theory about the embodied soul as it is exposed in the Republic, it is possible to identify

a certain “pessimistic spirit” lying behind the Moral, Gnoseological and Eudaimonological

conceptions related to it. We will attend fundamentally to (i) the central role attributed to

motivational conflict (stasis) on psychic life; (ii) the several difficulties associated with the

realization of reason’s proper function (érgon) and (iii) the conception of the appetitive part of

the soul (epithumetikós) as an extremely powerful brute that draws the soul naturally to excess.

Finally, we will point out (iv) in which ways these characteristics prevent the mass (oi polloi)

from achieving knowledge (episteme), exercising truly moral action and, thus, from being

actually happy.

KEY-WORDS: Plato, tripartite soul, conflict (stasis), eudaimonia, pessimism

...

1
 (i) In order to introduce his inquiry about the constitution of human soul, Plato makes

use of the principlei according to which “the same will never do or suffer opposites in the same

respect, in relation to the same thing and at the same time”ii. Given that contraries take place

within human psyché in the way stated by this principle, it becomes necessary, according to

Plato, that each individual is not “the same”, but in some way “many”iii. After analyzing two

specific cases of “motivational conflict” - that is: cases in which contrary “impulses”iv towards a

unique object are experienced simultaneously - Plato concludes that the psyché must be

fragmented into three spheres: rational, emotional and desiderative. The cases from which he

elaborates tripartition differ in a very interesting way. The first - that of the man who, despite

being furiously thirsty, simply refrains from drinking - is presented on a concise way, as if the

act of not satisfying the desire was somehow easy and painlessv. On the secondvi, however, the

character is divided between the yearning of closely observing some dead bodies and the

awareness that this is a repugnant thing to be done, actually fighting against himself – “for a

time he resisted and veiled his head”, Plato says. When he finally runs towards the corpses and

contemplates them, he reprehends himself, saying to his eyes (symbol of the uncontrollable

epithumia that is being satisfied): “There, you wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!”.

The different “dramatic quality” of these two cases suggests how wide the range of experiences

that indicate partition is; in other words, it can be understood as a means of expressing the idea

that the fragmented condition of human soul is so prominent that makes itself evident

independently of how habitual or exotic the episodes of “self-differentiation” may be. From

those quotidian experiences in which basic tendencies are inhibited without any anger or

2
regret, to those involving despair and psychological breakdowns, the same thing expresses: the

lack of inner unity that, according to Plato, affects human psychologyvii.

(ii) Regarding parts of the soul, it is well known that reason crowns the hierarchy

between them, and the “way of living” in which it expresses fully – the one of the Philosopher-

is the culmination of human perfectionviii. Nevertheless, despite his “glorification” of reason,

Plato seems to be far from Socratic intellectualism. Plato explicitly doubts, indeed, not so much

about reason, but rather about human capacity to use reason in its plenitude: the allegory of

the line shows how complex the path that leads to episteme is; that of the cave, that liberation

of shadows is rare and unnaturalix. Moreover, Plato assumes that there are circumstances that

can pervert or even destroy rational capacity - for example, if theoretical discussions are

exercised before time, the student may fall into skepticism foreverx. To complete the picture,

he states that domination of the lower tendencies is not the only alternative to it: reason is

prone to be ignored by desires and emotions, and also subjugated by them, acquiring an

instrumental rolexi.

(iii) On the other hand, Plato considers reason the scarcest element of the soul, and

appetite the most abundantxii. Appetite - which is not only considered to be deprived of

rationality but, given its connection with the body, also averse to reason- is represented as “a

manifold and many-headed beast”xiii that includes elements “contrary to all norms”, that is,

immoral desiresxiv that “are to be found in us all” – Plato says. The fact that the whole process

of psychic decline, presented from Book VIII on, could be understood as a progressive liberation

of the epithumetikósxv, strengthens the presentation of appetite as a powerful brute, in many

ways contrary to morality.

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 (iv) This liberation of appetite and the subsequent growth of immorality that are

implicated in the degeneration of the Philosopher “state of spirit”, involve also a distancing of

reason from its proper function and an evident loss of psychic unity, or, as Plato puts it: a loss of

“the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony”xvi. But one conclusion that could be drawn

here is that this lack of unity and harmony – that is, motivational conflict, as presented at the

begging- can be seen, due to the very way in which each part is described, as a state towards

which the soul will very easily fall into. In fact, it is also well known that according to Plato the

majority (οἱ πολλοὶ) is not able to achieve the soul condition of the Philosopher: there are

people born without no inclination at all towards rational exercisexvii, and the majority would

develop reason “quite late”xviii. “Simple and moderate appetites – Plato says- guided by reason

and the right opinion, you will find in few (ἐν ὀλίγοισ)”xix. He argues, as well, that appetitive

pleasure is, to the mass, equivalent to the Good, and finally he states that “the figure of a man

‘equilibrated’ and ‘assimilated’ to virtue perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed *…+is a

thing they [τοὺσ πολλοὺσ+ have never seen”xx.

(v) But if the majority is in this way unable to develop reason sufficiently, then episteme

will fall far from its reach; furthermore, given that reason is so closely related to truly moral

action, then the majority will never conquer genuine virtue. Finally, is eudaimonia. From the

beginning of the dialogue, there is an explicit effort to find out the relation between justice

(and virtue in general) and happinessxxi, and in the last paragraph Socrates suggests that

happiness is the prize for virtuexxii. However, if the soul is naturally liable to ignorance, conflict

and, consequently, to immorality, then happiness will also be unattainable. These seem good

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motives to talk not so much on an “aristocratic” Moral, Eudaimonological and Gnoseological

conceptions, but rather about a “pessimistic spirit” lying behind Plato’s conception of human

possibilitiesxxiii.

i
Some commentators prefer to call this the “Principle of Contraries” or “of Non-contradiction”. Robinson (1971)
refers to it as the “Principle of Opposites”, arguing that the Aristotelian PNC is about propositions (or terms), while
the platonic version enunciated here refers to “things”. Delcomminette (2008) points out that it is possible to
consider Plato’s formulation as a “version” of the PNC, given that this, in most of its formulations, dispenses the
restriction “in the same relation”, which is present on the platonic formula and fundamental to the development
of the subsequent argument. Note that: κατὰταὐτόν = in the same part or aspect of itself; πρὸσ ταὐτόν = in
relation to the same (other) thing
ii
“δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάςχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸσ ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήςει ἅμα, ὥςτε ἄν που
εὑρίςκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖσ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰςόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω”, Pl. Rep. IV 436b-c.
iii
Pl. Rep. IV 437b-d.
iv
“But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or
whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another — learn with one part of
ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their
kind, or whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when we once Begin” (ὅταν ὁρμήςωμεν)”
(Pl. Rep. IV 436a-b). Note here the root ὁρμή, which can be translated as “impulse”.
v
“The soul of the thirsty [man], in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its
impulse is towards this *…+ Then, if anything draws it back when thirsty, it must be something different in it from
that which thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same
part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing”, Pl. Rep. 439a-b. Let’s say, for example
(and being kind of benevolent towards Plato, whose formulation in fact is not clear at all) that he knows the
available water is polluted and for this reason he doesn’t drink. Thus understood, this example represents perhaps
the most ordinary type of situation in which we found ourselves experiencing motivational contraries - a situation
characterized by simultaneous tendencies that “affirm and deny” (Pl. Rep. IV 437b) one and the same object
vi
“Leontius, the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,
becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them
and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of
all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, ‘There, ye wretches, take your fill of
the fine spectacle!'”, Pl. Rep. 439e-440a.
vii
This is, in fact, an idea that the philosopher explicitly defends at the end of Book IX, where he says that the
internal unity of human beings is an “external sheath”, a peripheral appearance that confuse those who cannot
reach the internal reality: “fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul *…+ One of those natures that
the ancient fables tell of, as that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous other examples that are
told of many forms grown together in one *…+ Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast
that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such
growths. Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest and the second
second in size *…+ Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together *…+ Then mould about them
outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within but who can see only
the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man” (588b-e).
viii
Among the three elements that compose the soul, reason- λογιςτικὸν- is the only that has the power (δφναμιν)
to guide it out of the contingent categories of sensation, up to the ontologically superior Idea’s topos, where
stability lies. Plato, as his master, states that when exerted on its plenitude - that is, dialectically- reason involves
much more than a mere collection of logical-discursive capacities: it allows an experience of the essence. With its

5
potency to coincide with Forms – and crucially with the form of Good- reason is, according to the philosopher, the
source of the best type of motivations: the target of rational impulse is truth, and rational actions are, thus,
founded on knowledge of truth. This is just one of the reasons why Plato considers that the best possible state of
mind is that in which the subject not only acts, but also naturally feels and desires, according to rational dictates.
When he draws the five principal ways of living, the character of the Philosopher-king shines at the top of the
hierarchy, characterized more by self-unity that by self-control. The greatness of the Philosopher character comes
mainly from the fact that he has achieved something that the majority of men is not able to achieve: he has
overcome his lower tendencies.
ix
Pl. Rep.VII 515c.
x
Pl. Rep. VII 539c.
xi
Cfr. for example Pl. Rep. 560d-561a, 572e, 574d.
xii
Pl. Rep. IX 588a
xiii
Pl. Rep. IX 588C
xiv
Such as that of wanting to “lie with one’s mother *…+ or with anyone else, man, god or brute”, or to commit “any
*…+ deed of blood”, Pl. Rep. IX 571c-d.
xv
As is well seen on the case of the man tyrannized by a paranomoi epithumia, whose “criminal behaviors” (against
family, gods, etc.) are particularly quoted: “And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the
frequent and fierce nestlings of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by
the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—
must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?” *…+ And
so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source or else be afflicted with great travail and pain. And just as the
new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he
himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better of his father and mother, and, after spending his own
share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate. And if they resist him, would he not at
first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? *…+ And if he failed in that, would he not next
seize it by force? *…+ And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he
be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? *…+And again, when the resources of his father and mother are
exhausted and fail such a one, and the swarm of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay
hands on the wall of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will
make a clean sweep of some temple” (Pl. Rep. IX 573e- 574d). On the other hand, by observing the intermediate
psychic dynamics it is possible to note that the more the subject moves away from the ideal functioning of the
soul, the more he moves away from virtue: Plato refers occasionally to “virtues” (or, given that he never uses this
expression, to “morally relevant features of character”) of the several intermediate men, such as that of the
timocratic (that becomes visible when comparing him with the oligarchic, since loving honor is seen as something
more noble that loving money), of the oligarchic (that underlies the critic tone towards the democratic disregard of
shame, auto-control and moderation on the expenses of the oligarchic) and of the democratic (who, being
condescending in relation to all appetites, at least is not slave of a despotic one as the tyrant is). The fact that the
transition between the best and the worst of psychic dynamics is this way accompanied by a hierarchy of morally
relevant features of character confirms the relation between psychological functioning and moral corruption.
xvi
Pl. Rep. VIII 554e
xvii
Remember here the “noble lie” and the myth of the three classes, Pl. Rep. III 415a.
xviii
Pl. Rep. 441a-b. Cfr. also: Pl. Rep. 535a and 539d on the necessity to exercise on dialectics only those who can
tolerate in.
xix
Pl. Rep. IV 431c. In this line, he defends that the nature of the “perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men
and is found in only a few (τῶν ὀλίγων )”(Pl. Rep. 491a-b), and that “Philosophy *…+ is impossible for the multitude
(πλῆθοσ)”(Pl. Rep. IV 493e-494a), while he contrasts the “noblest *…+ the most excellent nature, which is rare
enough in any case”, to “small natures”(Pl. Rep. IV 495b). Cfr. also: Pl. Rep. 473, 486-487, 491d, 489d (“perversion
of the majority”), 493a, 506a.
xx
Pl. Rep. VI 498e.
xxi
Cfr. Pl. Rep. 344e, 347e, 427d, 544a, etc.

6
xxii
“*…+ we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may
be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors
in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I
have told you, we shall fare well” (Pl. Rep. X 621c-d).
xxiii
Two problems that arise at this point are: (i) Is it possible to consider Plato a member – perhaps the first one- of
the philosophical tradition of Pessimism? If yes, with what consequences? and (ii) through which mechanisms does
the “pessimistic spirit” of his anthropology, as it appears in the Republic, coexist with the evident tone of
enthusiasm that at the same time characterizes the dialogue as a whole?

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