Constitutional Principles and Human Rights in Citizenship, Marriage and Religious Disputes

TC-27
LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2019
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDISTAN
W.P. No. ___/2019

Rakshakdayini (Petitioner No. 1)
v.
Union of Indistan (Respondent No. 1)
CLUBBED WITH
SLP No. ___/2019
Tauhid – The Spritual Life (Petitioner No. 2)
v.
Union of Indistan (Respondent No. 1)
CLUBBED WITH
T.P. (Civil) No. ___/2019
Rathin Raj Sharma (Appellant No. 1)
v.
Rachel David (Respondent No. 2)
PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 & 136(1) OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAN
__________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDISTAN
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPEALANT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………..………3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………………………..……..5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ……..……………………………………………..……8
STATEMENT OF FACTS …………………………………………………………..……….9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES …………………………………………………….…..………..13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………….14
ARGUMENT ADVANCED………………………………………………………………....16
I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?

II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE
REQUESTING PARTY ON THE GROUND OF HIS/HER
CONVERSION TO ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF
THE WORLD BY ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER, AND IT’S
BEARING ON THE RIGHT TO RELIGION?
III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDISTAN
CONSTITUTION, IF SO, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH
PROTECTION AND WHAT ROLE HAS A MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN
DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF SUCH STATELESS
PERSON?
IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL
NATURE ARISING FROM PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF
JURISDICTION OF DOMESTIC COURTS THEREOF?
V. WHETHER DIVORCE PETITION CAN BE QUASHED ON THE
GROUND OF JUDGEMENT FILED BY SC THAT ADULTERY IS
NO LONGER AN OFFENCE?
PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………..31
UU-LCD-NMCC-2019 Page 2 of 32
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
AIR All Indistan Reporter
Art. Article
Crl. Criminal
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure (1973)
FIR First Information Report
Govt. Government
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code(1860)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
No. Number
Org. Organization
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Ors Others
PIL Public Interest Litigation
s. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SLP Special Leave Petition
T.P. transfer Petition
Tr. Transfer
U.S. United States
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Right
v. Versus
Viz. Videlicet
WP Writ Petition
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Sl No. STATUTES REFERRED YEAR
1 The Citizenship Act 1955
2 The Constitution of Indistan 1950
3 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939
4 The Family Courts Act 1984
5 The Hindu Marriage Act 1955
6 The Indian Evidence Act 1872
7 The Indian Penal Code 1860
CASES REFERRED
Appear
Sr No. Title Citation on
page(s)
1. A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 2007 SC 154. 15
2. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port (2004) 3 SCC 214. 15

of Mumbai
3. Baldota Brothers v. Libra Mining Works AIR 1961 SC 100. 15
4. Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of AIR 1964 SC 1372 15

Andhra Pradesh
5. Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceuticals Works Limited AIR 1959 SC 633. 15

v. Employees
6. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. (1989) 4 SCC 635 16

S. Bhatt
7. State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan AIR 1992 SC 16

1277.
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8. Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 568 16
9. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 17
10. Shubhash Kumar v. State of Bihar 1991 AIR 420 17
11. S.P. Gupta V Union Of India 1982 SC 149 17
12. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 17
13. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. Writ Petition (crl.) 17

199 of 2003
14. Vilayat Raj Alias Vilayat Khan v. Smt. Sunila AIR 1983 Delhi 19
351
15. Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650 21
16. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 S.C. 23

1461
17. Isaac Isanga Musumba and Ors. v. State of W.P. (Crl.) No. 80 23
Maharashtra and Ors of 2013)
18. Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 19061 SC 24

1457
19. Joseph Shine v . Union of India (2019)3 SCC 39. 28
20. Yusuf Aziz v. State of Bombay 1954 AIR 321 29
21. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India 985 AIR 1618 29
22. V Revathy v. Union of India 1988 AIR 835 29
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondents humbly submits before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indistan, the
memorandum for the respondent filed by Petitioners and Appellants as the Supreme Court
has already clubbed the three petitions together and listed them for arguments under Art.
139A(1) of the Constitution of Indistan, 1950. However, the Respondent seeks permission of
this Hon’ble Court to contend the maintainability of the petitions.
1. W.P. No. ___/2019
The petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
Indistan.
2. SLP No. ___/2019
The petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution of
Indistan.
3. T.P. (Civil) No. ___/2019
The Hon’ble Court has withdrawn the appeal filed by the Appellant No. 2, Rathin Raj
Sharma from Delhi High Court in itself under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of Indistan.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS ABOUT RACHEL :
1. Rachel David was born as a Jew in an orthodox Jewish family in the City of Delaware
in the State of New Jersey of U.S. where she got modern education and was leading a
life according to the Jewish religion, culture and tradition. She was pursuing a
Management course at a Management College in Delaware city of New Jersey.
2. She was a staunch follower of Judaism and a strong supporter of the Jewish
movement for a separate homeland of Jews in the Middle East. Rachel and her parents
have always been ready to help in any Jewish cause, whether monetary or in kind.
3. Rachel was once convicted by the Californian court for the offence of smuggling.
Moreover, Rachel was a habitual drug addict since adolescence.
EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER :
1. Rachel came in contact with an Indistan boy named Rathin Raj Sharma who was also
pursuing the same course. Soon, both of them became friends.
2. Rathin was a boy of pleasing nature & a smart personality who was known among his
friends as a devoted and dedicated student. He was also well versed in Yoga and other
techniques of meditation, and was often, seen teaching Yoga to his friends and others.
He himself was famous as a person of character in his college.
3. In America, Rathin used to occasionally consume alcohol in the company of his
friends, and often lost his self-control and abused his friends and other persons present
in the vicinity. But Rachel was not aware of this habit of Rathin and in her mind the
image of Rathin was of an honest and decent man.
4. Rathin and Rachel became intimate friends in the course of time and Rathin, with the
intention of curing her in order to assist her in getting rid of her habit of taking
narcotic drugs, taught her Yoga and meditation. He also taught her how to control her
emotions and senses. Soon she learnt how to control her desires and got rid of her
habit of taking narcotic drugs and started living a normal life.
5. Now the image of Rathin, in the eyes of Rachel became gloriously magnified and she
fell in love with Rathin. Similarly, Rathin also got attracted to Rachel and, they both
decided to marry and started living together under the same roof in the city of
Delaware.
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6. Rachel started taking a keen interest in Hinduism and got more and more knowledge
about Hinduism. She got so highly influenced by this religion that she decided that
she would convert to the Hindu religion.
7. Once Rathin was prosecuted for rape upon a girl in club in the state of intoxication but
the trial court acquitted him as the girl had a past of bad character and evidence
proved that she had provoked Rathin to commit sexual intercourse.
8. Rachel was shocked to know about this crime by Rathin yet she supported Rathin in
every manner when the prosecution against Rathin was going on in the trial court. On
acquittal, Rathin apologized for his conduct and promised her never to repeat it.
9. Rathin’s family were a strong believer of Hinduism and would not allow anyone in
the family to go against its beliefs. On coming to know about Rathin’s decision to
marry Rachel , they strongly opposed him but later on unwillingly consented to their
marriage on the condition that she would convert herself to Hindu and accept the
religion with all its tradition and culture.
10. Rachel who had a liking for Hinduism adopted the religion willingly for the purpose
of marriage. She voluntarily gave a written undertaking to the parents of Rathin that
she would follow the Hindu religion till the end of her life and never retreat to
Judaism. She did so and both, Rathin and Rachel married in accordance with the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in Indistan. Later on, they got their
marriage registered before the registrar in the Delaware city of the U.S.
11. On completion of his study, Rathin decided to start his own business in Stockholm a
city of Sweden and moved to Stockholm along with Rachel. Rachel also got
employment in Stockholm, and she left the U.S. and also relinquished her U.S.
citizenship when she became a Swedish citizen. However, Rathin remained an
Indistan citizen.
12. Unfortunately, the business of Rathin did not succeed in Stockholm and he incurred
heavy losses. He decided to start his business in Indistan, and despite the
unwillingness of Rachel who had settled in her, the couple moved to Indistan.
Consenting to his wishes, Rachel for Indistan citizenship in order to live in Indistan
forever, and did so. She communicated to the Swedish government her intention to
surrender her Swedish citizenship was for the purpose of becoming an Indistan citizen
which was accepted and the Swedish Government released her citizenship.
13. Parents of Rachel were not happy with Rachel converting to Hindsm and tried to
convince her for reconversion which failed. Rachel’s father had made a will before
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death for his property worth 17 Million dollars which shall be divided equally among
her and her brother David on the condition that she reconverted to Judaism.
14. On return to Indistan, the couple were leading a happy and peaceful life, when one
day in intimate moments with Rachel, Rathin disclosed to her that in the early period
of their marriage he had an affair with a married lady named Maria with whom he
developed an adulterous relationship, and now Maria has filed a complaint in the
criminal court against him for the offence of rape. Thus, he is facing a criminal trial.
Rachel was shocked with this disclosure and her trust on Rathin was shattered
completely. In any case, she decided to remain calm.
15. Meanwhile, Indistan Authorities while disposing her application for getting Indistan
citizenship rejected her prayer for granting her Indistan citizenship keeping in view
her past criminal record. When the prosecution on behalf of Maria started against,
Rachel initially supported her husband and had forgiven him. However, with the
passing of time, due to distrust on her husband, her faith in Hinduism weakened and
she relinquished the Hindu religion and reconverted to Judaism by going to the
synagogue, declared before the Rabbi that she has relinquished the Hindu religion and
now reconverted to Judaism. She further declared that now onwards, she would lead a
secluded life devoted to the Jewish religion and renounced the worldly life.
16. Rachel applied in the family court for the decree of divorce under S. 13 (1) on the
grounds that (i) Adultery (ii) Conversion to other religion (iii) Renunciation of the
world. She prayed for the decree of Divorce. She also expressed her desire to settle in
Israel as she at this time is a stateless person and according to the laws of Israel she
could apply for the citizenship of Israel.
17. Rathin denied all the charges in his written statement and claimed the defense of
privileged communication as against the ground of adultery for divorce and also filed
a counterclaim for the decree of restitution of conjugal rights against Rachel.
18. When the criminal case against Rathin was pending, SC of Indistan in a landmark
judgment, in the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of Indistan AIR 2018 SC, declared
that adultery is no longer an offence. Rathin, on the basis of this judgment, filed a
petition in the HC for quashing the criminal case against him. He also filed a petition
for quashing the divorce petition filed against him by his wife Rachel on the same
ground as adultery is no longer an offence.
19. Family court passed the decree of divorce in favour of Rachel allowing her to follow
Jewish religion and to settle in Israel for the rest of her life. Rathin opposed this by
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producing the written undertaking signed by Rachel at the time of marriage. He filed
an appeal before the Delhi High Court on the ground that Family Court without
properly appraising the evidence offered by him decided the matter and granted the
decree of divorce to Rachel.
20. A NGO, named Rakshakdayini which works for the unity of the Indistan families
filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Indistan Constitution before the SC of
Indistan for quashing the decree of divorce and to declare in the public interest that no
spouse should be allowed to withdraw from marriage on the ground of conversion
into another religion or to support any religious or regional movement.
21. Tauhid-The Spiritual Life (An Islamic International Org. ) filed a petition before the
Delhi HC to prevent Rachel from leaving Indistan for the purpose of joining Israel
when they came to know about her intention to migrate to Israel and support Jewish
state. Delhi HC rejected the petition on the ground that the issue involved multi-
dimensional problems that the HC is incompetent to settle. Tauhid-The Spiritual Life
filed an appeal under Art. 136 of Indistan Constitution against the decision of Delhi
HC that the matter is of “grave public concern”.
22. The SC of Indistan clubbed the petitions viz. the petition filed by “Tauhid-The
Spiritual Life”, Rakshakdayini and withdrew the appeal of Rathin from Delhi HC in
itself and clubbed the petitions as the matter in them is interconnected.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE

REQUESTING PARTY ON THE GROUND OF HIS/HER CONVERSION TO
ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF THE WORLD BY
ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER, AND IT’S BEARING ON THE
RIGHT TO RELIGION?
III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDISTAN CONSTITUTION, IF
SO, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION AND WHAT ROLE
HAS A MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF
SUCH STATELESS PERSON?
IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE ARISING
FROM PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF
DOMESTIC COURTS THEREOF?
V. WHETHER DIVORCE PETITION CAN BE QUASHED ON THE GROUND

OF JUDGEMENT FILED BY SC THAT ADULTERY IS NO LONGER AN
OFFENCE?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Whether the petitions are maintainable before Supreme Court of Indistan or

not?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that :-
 SLP filed by “Tauhid –The Spiritual Life” is not maintainable as no such
exceptional circumstances arises and there has been no substantial and grave
injustice done to the petitioner by the Delhi High Court which makes it
eligible for the petitioner to file an appeal under s.136(1)of the constitution.
 Writ Petition filed by Rakshakdayini is not maintainable as there has been no
violation of Fundamental Rights and the matter relates to the private decree of
divorce and is not a public issue at large . Hence the PIL filed under Art.32 is
not maintainable.
2. Whether a Hindu marriage can be dissolved by the requesting party on the

ground of his/her conversion to another religion or renunciation of the world by
entering any religious order, and it’s bearing on the right to religion?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble SC that Hindu Marriage can be dissolved
by the requesting party on the ground of his/her own conversion of religion or
renunciation of the world by entering any religious order on the basis that the primary
emphasis for requesting divorce is concentrated on any other ground of divorce in
addition to conversion and renunciation of petitioner. In the instant case Rachel
accuses Rathin of having voluntary sexual intercourse with another women which can
be justified in the court of law based on confession made by him which is admissible
in the court of law under s.122 of the Indian Evidence Act , 1872. Also various
judgments of SC lays emphasis on the right to religion of a married spouse as
conversion merely does not result in dissolution of the marriage under the Hindu
Marriage Act ,1955.
3. Whether a stateless person has the protection of fundamental rights under the
Indistan Constitution, if so, what is the scope of such protection and what role
has a marriage to play in determining the citizenship of such stateless person?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitution of Indistan
gives various fundamental rights to both its citizens and also its non-citizens. Those
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rights available to any person being resident in the state of Indistan are Art. 14,20,21,
21A, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution of Indistan. Any person can
approach the court under Art. 32 which enforces the constitutional remedy available
to any person based on the maxim “ubi jus ibi remedium”. The fundamental rights
available to the non-citizen are in consonance with the rights mentioned under UDHR
which provides any person the essentials required for a living and dignity of any
person before the court of Law.
Marriage has an important role to play in determining the citizenship of a married
spouse as mentioned under the following statutes and conventions :
 Sec 5 of Citizenship Act, 1955
 Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
 Article 3 of Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
4. Whether constitutional principles and human rights prevail over disputes of

international nature arising from personal laws, and scope of jurisdiction of
domestic courts thereof?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that constitutional principles and human
rights prevail over disputes of international nature and in the instant matter Indistan which
follows the concept of Dualist Approach presumes that in case of conflict of international
and domestic law , it is the domestic laws that is applicable. Thus the Domestic Court has
no jurisdiction as it is incompetent to look into matters of dispute of International nature.
5. Whether divorce petition can be quashed on the ground of judgment filed by SC

that adultery is no longer an offence?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that divorce petition cannot be
quashed on the ground that Adultery is no longer an offence as under the judgment
passed in the case of Joseph Shine v. UOI the clearly mentions that it sets aside
Adultery as a criminal offence by declaring S. 497 of the IPC and S. 198 of the CrPC
as unconstitutional and has made it clear that adultery still remains a ground in case of
civil matters i.e. in the instant matter it can be used as ground for divorce under Hindu
Marriage Act , 1955.
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ARGUMENT ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE SUPREME

COURT OF INDISTAN OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the WP filed by Rakshakdayini
and SLP filed by “Tauhid –The Spiritual Life” is not maintainable before the Court of
Law . The petitioner lacks the essential ingredients to maintain the matter before the
Apex Court. Though the Hon’ble Court has clubbed the matters, yet certain issues
regarding maintainability of the case must be highlighted before this Court to prevent
any miscarriage of justice.
I. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY “TAUHID- THE
SPIRITUAL LIFE” IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitution, by virtue
of Art. 136 has not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or Court
of Error. It only intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience requires
such intervention.1 The power under Art. 136 is an extraordinary power to be
exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances.2 The respondents most humbly
submit that in this particular case no such special circumstances have occurred
that would make this Hon’ble Court exercise its extraordinary power.
Respondent has placed its reliance on the case of Baldota Brothers v. Libra
Mining Works, 3 wherein this Court has held that- “There is no distinction in the
scope of the exercise of power under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India at the
stage of application for special leave and the stage where the appeal is finally
disposed off and it is open for the Court to question the proprietary of the leave
granted by it even at the time of hearing of the appeal.” Hence, it is submitted
before the Supreme Court that a Special Leave once granted can be subsequently
revoked.4 Therefore, it is open to the Court to question the propriety of the leave
1
A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 2007 SC 154.

2
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214.
3
Baldota Brothers v. Libra Mining Works ,AIR 1961 SC 100.

4
Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372.
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granted and to dismiss the appeal without going into the merits if it finds that
there was no proper case for granting special leave.5
It is humbly contended by the respondent that the petitioner must show that
exceptional circumstances exist and that if there is no interference, it will result
in substantial and grave injustice and the case has features of sufficient gravity
to warrant review of the decision appealed against, on merits. Only then the
Court would exercise its overriding powers under Art. 136 6. Special leave will
not be granted when there is no failure of justice or when substantial justice is
done, though the decision might suffer from some legal errors7.
Moreover, the decision of Rachel to migrate to Israel and support the Jewish
State is not a matter of Grave Public Concern and is a part of her right to practice
and profess any religion irrespective of the person being a citizen of Indistan or
not.
II. THAT WRIT PETITION FILED BY RAKSHAKDAYINI UNDER ART.
32 OF INDISTAN CONSTITUTION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the writ petition filed by
Rakshakdayini under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indistan is not maintainable
because :
i. Article 32 can be invoked primarily to get a remedy against breach of
Fundamental Rights and in the instant matter the remedy being
demanded by Rakshakdayini is related to matters of divorce on ground of
conversion of religion to support another religious movement.
ii. Rakshakdayani which files the petition for quashing the decree of divorce
of Rathin and Rachel is not an interested party . Hence they do not have
the locus standi to file the petition.
iii. The concept of public interest litigation as against the rule of locus was
evolved by our courts in the 1980s to help the weaker sections of society,
who due to their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, were not able to assert
5
Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceuticals Works Limited v. Employees, AIR 1959 SC 633.
6
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 576 (16th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, Nagpur 2011).
7
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, (1989) 4 SCC 635; See also, State of H. P. v.
Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277.
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their rights. Justice Krishna Iyer in Fertilser Kamgar Union8 made a

forceful plea that the “law should not be a closed shop”, else “the system
may crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity”. Thereafter in S.P
Gupta9 (commonly called the first Judges case) and in Bandhua Mukti
Morcha10, Justice Bhagwati evolved the concept of “public injury” and
allowed a public spirited citizen to approach the court for redressal
of public injury relating to environment, human rights, administration of
justice, arbitrary action of the executive, investigation of cases involving
persons occupying high-public offices, etc.
iv. Even though it is very much essential to curb the misuse and abuse of
PIL, any move by the government to regulate the PIL results in
widespread protests from those who are not aware of its abuse and equate
any form of regulation with erosion of their fundamental rights. Under
these circumstances the Supreme Court of Indistan is required to step in
by incorporating safe guards provided by the Civil Procedure Code in
matters of stay orders /injunctions in the arena of PIL.
PIL is a tool in hands of public spirited citizens who have a good motive behind
the PIL and to prevent it from becoming a weapon in the hands of those litigants
who want to either misuse this concept for either commercial gain or publicity
the apex court has time and again laid down various guidelines and by imposing
costs on the frivolous public interest litigation the courts have only strengthened
their stance.
In the last few years, there have been serious concerns about the use and misuse
of public interest litigations and these concerns have been expressed at various
levels. The time has come for a serious re-examination of the misuse of public
interest litigation. There are numerous cases in the history of law where PIL has
Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568.

9
S.P Gupta v. Union of India, 1982 SC 149.

10
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 and (1997) 10 SCC 549.
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been misused. As in the case of Shubhash Kumar v. State of Bihar 11 , S.P.

Gupta V Union Of India12 , Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra13.
This misuse comes in various forms. Justice Pasayat in the case of Ashok Kumar
Pandey v. State of W.B.14 Described as “busybodies, meddlesome interlopers,
wayfarers or officious interveners who approach the court with extraneous
motivation or for glare of publicity”. Cautioning the High Courts on the misuse
of the PIL, the Bench said “PIL is a weapon which has to be used with great
care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that
behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest
and/or publicity seeking is not lurking”. The Bench made it clear that a PIL
should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not
publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. It observed that it should not
be allowed to become “publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation or
politics interest litigation or, the latest trend, praise income litigation.
Therefore it is humbly submitted to the hon’ble court that the WP filed by
Rakshakdayini is not maintainable as this petition is filed solely for the purpose
of misusing the powers of PIL as Rakshakdayini has been incompetent to
establish a public concern and has have no locus standi and this matter is solely
the private matter for divorce between Rachel and Rathin. Also there has been
no violation of Fundamental Rights in the instant case which is essential for
maintainability of writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indistan.
III. THAT APPEAL FILED BY RATHIN AGAINST RACHEL IS
MAINTAINABLE .
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the appeal filed by Rathin
under S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with S. 19 of the Family
11
Shubhash Kumar v. State of Bihar ,1991 AIR 420.

12
S.P. Gupta V Union Of India ,1982 SC 149.

13
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96.

14
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. , Writ Petition (crl.) 199 of 2003 (Supreme Court ,18/10/2003).
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Courts Act 1984 is maintainable except in situation of passing of Limitation

Period .
2. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE

REQUESTING PARTY ON THE GROUND OF HIS/HER CONVERSION TO
ANOTHER RELIGION OR RENUNCIATION OF THE WORLD BY
ENTERING ANY RELIGIOUS ORDER, AND IT’S BEARING ON THE
RIGHT TO RELIGION?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Hindu Marriage can be
dissolved by the requesting party on the ground of his/her conversion to another
religion or renunciation of the world by entering into any religious order. In the
instant matter the primary ground for Divorce which has been pleaded by Rachel is
Adulterous relationship of Rathin with another women which is supported by another
grounds of divorce which relates to Conversion and renunciation of the world on the
part of Rachel.
It is important to note that conversion does not automatically affect a marriage tie, and
secondly. Decree of Divorce is necessary for dissolving the marriage tie which has
been explained in the court.
In case of Vilayat Raj Alias Vilayat Khan v. Smt. Sunila 15 the court observed that
“Change of religion by one of the parties does not automatically dissolve the marriage
15
Vilayat Raj Alias Vilayat Khan v. Smt. Sunila , AIR 1983 Delhi 351.
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but provides a ground to the other party for dissolution. Conversion also does not per
se operate to deprive the party, of rights which may be otherwise available to him
under the Act.
Religion is a matter of one's conscience and freedom of religion has been guaranteed
under our Constitution. A party who has been married under this Act cannot be
debarred from changing his religion. Of course, if he changes his religion, he must be
prepared for the consequences thereof i.e. a likelihood of a petition under S. 13(1)
(ii) of the Act- But if no such petition is moved and he is able to establish that he has
been treated with cruelty, he surely is entitled to relief, unless there are other reasons
for not granting relief.”
The court made reference to the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim marriage
Act, 1939. Under s.4 of the Act, renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or
her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself, operate to dissolve her
marriage. However, by a proviso to the section, it is clarified that after such
renunciation or conversion, the woman shall still be entitled to obtain a decree for the
dissolution of her marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 2. According to the
court, even though the Hindu marriage Act, 1955 does not make any specific
provision to this effect, the converted spouse would nonetheless be entitled to file a
suit under it because he is not seeking any relief on the ground of conversion nor is
his case based on it in any manner. Thus, it implies that even upon conversion a
converted spouse can go to court and seek relief under the provisions of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, provided he does not base the relief on the ground of his
conversion.
In the instant matter , it has been seen that Rachel applies in the family court for
decree of divorce under Sec 13(1) on various grounds which are (i)Adultery on behalf
on Rathin (ii) Conversion from Hinduism on behalf of Rachel (iii) Renunciation of
world on behalf of Rachel .
From the above judgments it can be seen that Rachel’s petition is not primarily
focused on ground of conversion and renunciation but primarily based on Adultery
committed by Rathin .
Rathin admitted before Rachel that in her early period of marriage he had an
adulterous relationship with a married women Maria. Later on Rathin denies the
RESPONDENT TC-27
charges of adultery and claims the ground of Privileged communication as against

ground of adultery of divorce.
S. 12216 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 protects every communication between the
spouses, during the time of marriage, and prevents it from being brought to court as
evidence. Although, s. 122 of the Indian Evidence Act may seem to be very rigid at a
first look, but it has some exceptions to it, such as not protecting the spouse if the
spouse is accused of an offence against the other spouse.
S. 122 of Evidence Act clearly states that as an exception such communication
between the spouses can be used as an evidence if one married person is prosecuted
against the other .
Hence the defense of Privileged communication laid down by Rathin cannot be
availed as it is coved under the exceptions of the privileged of communication during
marriage and the statement made by Rathin before Rachel is admissible before the
court of law as a relevant fact.
The Supreme Court of Indistan has held that marriage under Hindu Law is a
sacrament and in every personal law, it is a sacred institution, which needs to be
preserved and respected.17 Trust being the main essence of a marriage , adultery by
the husband results in breach of trust which further weakens the faith the wife has for
a husband.
It is therefore justified for the Rachel to re-convert back to Judaism and plead before
the court for decree for divorce on the ground of Adultery and her conversion and
renunciation from the world.
Thus a Hindu marriage can be dissolved by the requesting party on the ground of
his/her conversion to another religion or renunciation of the world by entering any
religious order.
16
Sec 122 of Evidence Act ,1872 - Communications during marriage.

17
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650.
RESPONDENT TC-27
3. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDISTAN CONSTITUTION, IF
SO, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF SUCH PROTECTION AND WHAT ROLE
HAS A MARRIAGE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF
SUCH STATELESS PERSON?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitution of Indistan
gives various fundamental rights to both its citizens and also its non-citizens . But it
does restrict some of the fundamental rights which are unavailable to the non citizens.
Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the Citizens as well as foreigners are as follows:
 Equality before law and equal protection of laws (Article 14).
 Protection in respect of conviction for offences (Article 20).
 Protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21).
 Right to elementary education (Article 21A).
 Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases (Article 22).
 Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour (Article 23).
 Prohibition of employment of children in factories etc., (Article 24).
 Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of
religion (Article 25).
 Freedom to manage religious affairs (Article 26).
 Freedom from payment of taxes for promotion of any religion (Article 27).
RESPONDENT TC-27
 Freedom from attending religious instruction or worship in certain educational

institutions (Article 28).
These rights are a part of fundamental rights given to us in part III of the
Constitution of Indistan .These rights are not reserved for any individual group or
community, and is applicable to each and every ‘person’ residing in the territory of
Indistan.
Indistan has been a founding member of the United Nations joining in October
1945 i.e. two years before acquiring independence from British. Indistan was
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human rights, therefore has taken great
precaution to be in accordance with norms and guidelines laid down by the
declaration. The rights given to under the fundamental form, in part III of the
constitution, similar to a maximum extent as that to the provisions of UN
declaration of Human Right.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a universal and egalitarian declaration,
which provides the most basic rights to the human beings, that is human rights, and
lay down certain standards of human rights. The idea of the Human Right suggests
“if the public discourse of peace time global society can be said to have a common
moral language, it is that of human rights.”
In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala18 , the supreme court observed,” the
Universal Declaration of human rights may not be a legal binding instrument, but it
shows how Indistan understood the nature of the human rights at the time the
constitution was adopted”
However, there are certain rights, which are reserved exclusively for the nationals
of the country itself, and not to the foreign nationals. These rights are:
 Article 15- prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race,
caste, sex, or place of birth.
 Article 16- equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
 Article 19- protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.
 Article 29- protection of interests of minorities.
 Article 30- rights of minorities to establish and administer educational
institutions.
18
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala , AIR 1973 S.C. 1461 .
RESPONDENT TC-27
The Supreme Court in the case of Isaac Isanga Musumba and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. said that “Article 21 of the Constitution [right to life and
liberty] applies to all citizens, whether Indistann or foreign nationals. Their right to
liberty cannot be restrained by police due to a business dispute. Our country gets a
bad name because of the acts of few police officers, and it is unfortunate that the
Mumbai Police, instead of protecting the rights of these foreign nationals, filed an
FIR against them and the charges are baseless.”19
The guarantee of Fundamental Rights to “any person” will be meaningless if they
are not effectively enforced. Hence It is humbly submitted that the rights
guaranteed to any person i.e. to the non citizen are equally important and are
equally enforceable.
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indistan reads as under: “The State shall not deny
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of Indistan.” The said Article is clearly commands the State not to deny to
any person ‘equality before law’, it also commands the State not to deny the ‘equal
protection of the laws’
Right to constitutional remedies works on the Doctrine “Ubi Jus Ibi
Remedium” which means when there is right there is a remedy. As the
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14,20,21, 21A, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27
and 28 are available to all persons whether citizens or foreigners. So no one can be
deprived of these rights and there must be some remedies to protect them.
Under Article 32, Supreme court acts as a guarantor and defender of the
fundamental rights. Thus, it means that a person can directly approach the Supreme
court for the remedy instead through the way of appealing.
It is humbly submitted that the rights guaranteed to any person i.e. to the non
citizen are equally important and are equally enforceable.
The guarantee of Fundamental Rights to “any person” will be meaningless if they
are not effectively enforced. Hence it is humbly submitted that the rights
guaranteed to any person i.e. to the non citizen are equally important and are
equally enforceable.
19
Isaac Isanga Musumba and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors ,W.P. (Crl.) No. 80 of 2013 (Supreme Court
19/06/2013).
RESPONDENT TC-27
The Supreme Court has observed in Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh 20 : “The
Fundamental Rights are intended not only to protect individual’s rights but they are
they are based on high public policy. Liberty of the individual and protection of
fundamental rights are the very essence of the Democratic way of life adopted by
the Constitution, and it is the privilege and duty of this court to uphold these
rights.”
Thus in the instant matter Rachel being a non-citizen of Indistan has the protection
of those basic Fundamental Rights which the constitution of Indistan provides for
any person resident in Indistan. The rights available to Rachel are wide enough to
maintain and protect the dignity of any person.
Marriage plays a very important role in the society . It refers to the union of a
husband and a wife to form a bond between them . In this context there are various
laws and provisions which ensures that that wives of Indistan citizen husband do
not remain stateless. The laws and provisions in this respect are as follows:
 Sec 5 of Citizenship Act, 1955 which makes provision for the persons who
wish to acquire citizenship of Indistan on account of being married to an
Indistan citizen. According to S. 5 it is mandatory for such persons to be
residing continuously in India for at least a period of 7 years including 12
months immediately preceding the application for such registration.
However, the Act is silent on position of such spouse of citizen of Indistan,
where the marriage may have been dissolved before the stated period of
seven years and the person may be left without any nationality. Further, the
precondition for registration under this provision is that the person must not
be an illegal migrant. It excludes, in effect, a person who may not have any
documents to prove her/his nationality, and even after fulfilling all other
criteria under this provision cannot get citizenship by registration under this
provision.
 Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General
Assembly of the United Nations has proclaimed that "everyone has the right
to a nationality" and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality"
20
Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 19061 SC 1457.
RESPONDENT TC-27
 Article 3 of Convention on the Nationality of Married Women:

1. Each Contracting State agrees that the alien wife of one of its nationals
may, at her request, acquire the nationality of her husband through specially
privileged naturalization procedures; the grant of such nationality may be
subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the interests of national
security or public policy.
2. Each Contracting State agrees that the present Convention shall not be
construed as affecting any legislation or judicial practice by which the alien
wife of one of its nationals may, at her request, acquire her husband's
nationality as a matter of right
Thus Stateless person has the protection of basic fundamental rights
essential for living and dignity of any person under the Indistan constitution
and marriage does play a vital role in enforcing the citizenship of a stateless
person.
4. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

PREVAIL OVER DISPUTES OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE ARISING
FROM PERSONAL LAWS, AND SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF
DOMESTIC COURTS THEREOF?
Treaties are frequently described as contracts between nations. As instruments of

international law, they establish obligations with which international law requires the
parties to comply at national level as well as international level. Indistan follows the
concept of Dualist Approach which tells us that :
1. International and municipal laws are considered as totally separate legal systems
2. International law is therefore not a part of the internal legal system
3. Avoid the question of supremacy of the one system over another
4. Each is supreme in its own sphere
However there are some presumption in case of conflicts which are :
1. National courts must apply national law in case of conflict with international law:
but there is a presumption against the existence of such conflict
RESPONDENT TC-27
2. Statutes are not intended to regulate matters outside the territory of the legislating
state
Therefore the courts should be inclined towards a harmonious interpretation of

international conventional law (treaties, conventions etc) with municipal law. But an
important question arises “in medias res” that International conventional do not operate
“in vacuo” and hence if it is to operate through Domestic Law, then there are bound to be
conflicts between the same at times. An answer to this question has been provided by the
Supreme Court when it lays down that “When there is a clear conflict between the law of
India and a treaty, It is the national law that will prevail.”
It is Humbly Submitted before the hon’ble court that in presence of a treaty between
Indistan and the international country , the such laws need to be framed by the legislature
to abide by the terms of treaty. In the instant case it has been implied that Indistan had
entered into a treaty with Israel pertaining to which “Tauhid –The Spiritual Life” filed a
writ petition before the HC for preventing Rachel from leaving Indistan for purpose of
joining the Zionist Movement for the formation of a separate state.
However Indistan which follows the dualist approach of International Public Law follows
the National laws over International Law in situation of conflict between Domestic &
International Law.
Thus Constitutional Principles and Human Rights prevail over disputes of international
nature on personal laws. Also that Domestic Court has no jurisdiction in this matter and is
incompetent to entertain such disputes.
RESPONDENT TC-27
5. WHETHER DIVORCE PETITION CAN BE QUASHED ON THE GROUND

OF JUDGEMENT FILED BY SC THAT ADULTERY IS NO LONGER AN
OFFENCE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that divorce petition cannot be
quashed on the ground that Adultery is no longer an offence.
21
In the case of Joseph Shine v . Union of India five judge bench led by outgoing
Chief Justice of India Justice Dipak Misra said that : "Adultery cannot and should not
be a crime. It can be a ground for a civil offence, a ground for divorce,"
Under S. 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) Adultery was an offence and a convict
could be sentenced to five-year-jail term. S. 497 defined adultery as an offence
committed by a man against a married man if the former engaged in sexual
intercourse with the latter's wife. The law states that only a man can file a case of
adultery and that too against a man with whom his wife has allegedly slept with. So,
in essence, a woman can neither file a case of adultery, nor can she be prosecuted on
the ground of adultery. This cuts gender discrimination both ways, that is, it
discriminates against men and women.
Grounds for declaring Sec 497 of the IPC 1860 unconstitutional are :
21
Joseph Shine v . Union of India ,(2019)3 SCC 39.
RESPONDENT TC-27
 Law discriminates against men.

 When sexual intercourse takes place with the consent of both parties, there is
no good reason to exclude the wife and prosecute only her adulterer. Thus, S.
burdens man alone for the offence and grants immunity to wife by treating her
as a victim according to prevalent social norms. Violation of Article 14, 15
and 21.
 Arbitrary distinction is made between man and woman without any reasonable
grounds.
 Not in consonance with changing Social Conditions.
 Today both women and men move shoulder to shoulder with each other. So
any biasness in the law towards any gender is like not evolving the law with
the ever changing society.
 Promotes subordination of women.
 The s. encourages the notion of treating wife as a commodity under the
subjugation of husband. It harms the individual independent identity of
women whose prosecution depends on husband’s consent.
The court in case of Joseph Shine v Union Of India also referred to cases which are
Yusuf Aziz v. State of Bombay22 , Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India23 , V Revathy v.
Union of India24 also laid emphasis on violation of Fundamental Right of Equality and
states regarding the inequality between men and women regarding criminal
punishment .
Therefore it is humbly submitted before the hon’ble supreme court that petition of
divorce cannot be quashed on the ground of Supreme Court passing in the judgment
of Joseph Shine v. Union Of India that Adultery is no more an offence as the
judgment expressly signifies that it sets aside Adultery as a criminal offence by
declaring S. 497 of the IPC and S. 198 of the CrPC as unconstitutional and has made
22
Yusuf Aziz v. State of Bombay , 1954 AIR 321.

23
Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India , 985 AIR 1618.

24
V Revathy v. Union of India , 1988 AIR 835.
RESPONDENT TC-27
it clear that adultery still remains a ground in case of civil matters i.e. in the instant
matter it can be used as ground for divorce under Hindu Marriage Act , 1955.
1.
RESPONDENT TC-27
PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel for the
respondent humbly prays that the hon’ble court be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That the PIL filed by NGO Rakshakdayini and the special leave petition filed by
Tauhid- the Spiritual life are not maintainable in the hon’ble court,
2. That the hon’ble family court didn’t err in passing the decree of divorce,
3. That the respondent Rachel David being stateless be allowed to travel to the state of
Israel,
4. That the conversion into another religion is a valid ground for divorce,
And/or
Pass any order that this hon’ble court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsels for
The respondents as in duty bound
Shall ever pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for Respondents)

Constitutional Principles and Human Rights in Citizenship, Marriage and Religious Disputes

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TC-27

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDISTAN

W.P. No. ___/2019

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 & 136(1) OF

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE APPEALANT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………..………3

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

AIR All Indistan Reporter

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure (1973)

FIR First Information Report

IPC Indian Penal Code(1860)

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PIL Public Interest Litigation

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SLP Special Leave Petition

T.P. transfer Petition

U.S. United States

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Right

1. A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 2007 SC 154. 15

2. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port (2004) 3 SCC 214. 15

3. Baldota Brothers v. Libra Mining Works AIR 1961 SC 100. 15

4. Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of AIR 1964 SC 1372 15

5. Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceuticals Works Limited AIR 1959 SC 633. 15

6. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. (1989) 4 SCC 635 16

7. State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan AIR 1992 SC 16

8. Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 568 16

9. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 17

10. Shubhash Kumar v. State of Bihar 1991 AIR 420 17

11. S.P. Gupta V Union Of India 1982 SC 149 17

12. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 17

13. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. Writ Petition (crl.) 17

15. Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650 21

16. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 S.C. 23

18. Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 19061 SC 24

19. Joseph Shine v . Union of India (2019)3 SCC 39. 28

20. Yusuf Aziz v. State of Bombay 1954 AIR 321 29

21. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India 985 AIR 1618 29

22. V Revathy v. Union of India 1988 AIR 835 29

1. W.P. No. ___/2019

2. SLP No. ___/2019

3. T.P. (Civil) No. ___/2019

FACTS ABOUT RACHEL :

EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER :

I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?

II. WHETHER A HINDU MARRIAGE CAN BE DISSOLVED BY THE

III. WHETHER A STATELESS PERSON HAS THE PROTECTION OF

IV. WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

V. WHETHER DIVORCE PETITION CAN BE QUASHED ON THE GROUND

1. Whether the petitions are maintainable before Supreme Court of Indistan or

2. Whether a Hindu marriage can be dissolved by the requesting party on the

4. Whether constitutional principles and human rights prevail over disputes of

5. Whether divorce petition can be quashed on the ground of judgment filed by SC

1. WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE SUPREME

A.V. Papayya Sastri v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 2007 SC 154.

Baldota Brothers v. Libra Mining Works ,AIR 1961 SC 100.

Tungabhadra Industries v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372.

their rights. Justice Krishna Iyer in Fertilser Kamgar Union8 made a

Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568.

S.P Gupta v. Union of India, 1982 SC 149.