Upon Submission To The Hon'Ble Chief Justice of Republic of Amphissa and His Companion Justices of Supreme Court of Republic of Amphissa

5th IILS NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021 (Virtual Mode).
TC 83_R
5th IILS NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021 (Virtual Mode)
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES, DARJEELING
26th June – 27th June, 2021
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA
Under Article 136 & Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950
In the Matter of:
DANIEL & Ors. .......... Petitioner/Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH .......... Respondent
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA

AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

[1]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
 STATEMENT OF FACTS 8
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES 10
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13 – 29
I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IS MAINTAINABLE? 13 – 15
a) No Exceptional or Special Circumstances Shown in the Case by the Petitioner................13
b) The Petitioner has not exhausted Alternative Remedies available to him..........................14
II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE LAW & EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAWS UNDER ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS
VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY PROMULGATING THE SAID ORDINANCE?
16 – 19
a) The Presumption of Constitutionality..................................................................................16
b) Reasonable Classification not prohibited under Article 14…............................................17
c) The Test of Reasonable Classification.................................................................................17
d) State is empowered to make Special Laws for Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe
and Women..........................................................................................................................18
e) Need for Legislation............................................................................................................19
f) Court can’t struck down Ordinance on the ground of its Misuse.......................................19
III. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY GUARANTEED

UNDER ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY
PROMULGATING THE SAID ORDINANCE? 20 – 23
a) Validity of the Ordinance....................................................................................................20

b) The Right to Privacy under Article 21.................................................................................21
c) The Right to Marry under Article 21...................................................................................22
d) Personal Liberty under Article 21.......................................................................................23

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IV. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART. 25 OF

THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY PROMULGATING
THE SAID ORDINANCE? 24 – 27
a) The Fundamental Right to Freedom under Article 25 doesn’t involve the Right
to Unlawful Conversion.......................................................................................................24
b) Ordinance Promulgated to maintain Public Order against the increasing cases
of “Love Jihad”...................................................................................................................25
V. WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE CHARGED
UNDER S. 498A OF APC? 28 – 29
a) Prima facie Case established against Petitioners u/s. 498A of APC..................................28
b) The Matter was judiciously decided by the Magistrate.......................................................29
 PRAYER 30
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Art. Article
HC High Court
Hon'ble Honorable
Ordinance 2020 The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious

Conversion Ordinance, 2020
Ors. Others
p. Page
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SLP Special Leave Petition
U/S. or u/s. Under Section
UOI Union of India
UP Uppam Pradesh
v. or vs. Versus

[3]
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 TABLE OF CASES.
 INDIAN CASES:
1. A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1546.............13
2. Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2006) 9 SCC 425.......................................28
3. Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228.......................................................21
4. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34.........................................................17
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898...............................................................20
6. Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 316.....19
7. Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282....................................................24
8. D v. P, MANU/DE/5450/2017.................................................................................................28
9. Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 181..................25
10. District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496.............20, 22
11. Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2013 (4) RCR 283 (Civil).....27
12. Indrajit Barua v. State of Assam and Ors., AIR 1983 Del 513................................................20
13. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC
214............................................................................................................................................14
14. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 996.................................21
15. Kailas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2011 SC 598.......................................................18
16. Kashinath Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240..............................................................29
17. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404.............................................18
18. L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3SCC 261..........................................................15
19. Lily Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1650........................25
20. M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 376..................................................................23
21. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248............................................................20
22. Mathai v. George and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 358........................................................................14
23. Mh. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 2 SCC 188....................................................17
24. Mr. X v. Hospital, (1998) 8 SCC 296......................................................................................23
25. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196................................................................13
26. Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547...................................................18
27. Narpat Singh and Ors. v. Jaipur Development Authority and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 666...........14
28. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742.......26
29. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417...................................................................18

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30. Noor Jahan Begum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2015(3) ALJ 322.........................18, 24
31. Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 4 SCC 404.....................................................15
32. P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam, (1980) 3 SCC 141.....................................................14
33. P.U.C.L v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 476.........................................................................16
34. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397.............................................................19
35. Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.................................................................................13
36. Punjab Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Kewal Singh Dhillon, (2008) 10 SCC 128.................15
37. R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675......................................................................17
38. Rajender Kumar Jain v. State Through Special Police Establishment and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC
435............................................................................................................................................15
39. Ramjilal Modi v. State of U. P., AIR 1957 SC 620.................................................................26
40. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388..........................................26
41. Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123......................................................................19
42. Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908..................21, 23, 27
43. S.S. Ahluwalia v. Union of India, (2001) 4 SCC 452..............................................................20
44. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1531...............................................................25
45. Saurabh Chaudhari v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 146.....................................................17
46. Shahid Balwa v. Union of India, (2014) 2 SCC 687................................................................15
47. Shin Etsu Chemicals Ltd. v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 3284.............................15
48. Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswati v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 13 SCC 323..........13
49. State of AP v. McDowell and co., MANU/SC/0427/1996......................................................19
50. State of Karnataka v HS Srinivasa, 1996 Cr LJ 3103..............................................................29
51. State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra, (2018) 10 SCC 516.................................................28
52. State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, MANU/SC/0585/2003........................................................14
53. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284.....................................................17
54. State v. Jaspal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1503................................................................................28
55. Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad, MANU/SC/0139/1999.......................14
56. The British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, MANU/SC/0329/1964............14
57. Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575........................17
58. Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide, (1977) 2 SCC 437......................14
59. U. Suvetha v. State and Ors., MANU/SC/0774/2009.............................................................28
60. V. Vasanthakumar v. H.C. Bhatia, (2016) 7 SCC 686.............................................................14
 INTERNATIONAL CASE:
1. Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621............................................................16

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 LIST OF ARTICLES/ REPORTS.
1. State Law Commission of Uttar Pradesh, “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion”

(November, 2019).
2. Law Commission of India, 47th Report, (1972).
 LIST OF STATUTES, RULES & GUIDELINES.
1. The Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950.
2. The Amphissian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Act of Parliament, 1860 (Amphissa).
3. The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 (Uppam
Pradesh).
 LIST OF BOOKS.
1. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (8th Ed., LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

2018).
2. NARENDER KUMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, [10 th Ed. (Reprint),

2019 Allahabad Law Agency].
3. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, (36th ed. LexisNexis
Publication).
 ONLINE DATABASES.
1. Manupatra - www.manupatra.com
2. SCC OnLine - www.scconline.com

[6]
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa has inherent jurisdiction to try, entertain and
dispose of the instant matter by virtue of Article 136 & Article 32 of The Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa, 1950.
Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa reads as follows: -
136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.
The SLP is at the admission stage before this Hon’ble Court.
Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa reads as follows:
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
Part.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.

[7]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarized as follows:
REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA
1. Republic of Amphissa is a country located in South Asian region having vast cultural
diversity and is one of the most ancient civilizations. It achieved its independence in 1947
and adopted parliamentary system with president as executive head. The 75 percent of
population is Hindu and 24 percent population belongs to Christianity, Islam, Jainism. The
Republic of Amphissa has history of numerous communal conflicts and riots.
PROBLEM OF LOVE JIHAD
2. In 2019, certain news paper has reported love jihad where certain organisation where some
Muslim men wilfully target women belonging to non Muslim girls trap them in love and
converts their religion. Law laid down by the High Court’s and Supreme Court is clear on the
point that conversion is not a usual matter. In 2014, the High Court of Uppam Pradesh stated
in a judgement that if conversion “is resorted to merely with the object of creating a ground
for some claim of right” it would be “a fraud upon the law”. In the case of Lily Thomas vs.
Union of Amphissa in 2000 the Supreme Court nullified the marriage on the basis that if
someone “feigns to have adopted another religion just for some worldly gain or benefit” it
was “religious bigotry”.
UP PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL CONVERSION OF RELIGION ORDINANCE 2020
3. Uppam Pradesh has passed Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion
Ordinance 2020 which makes conversion by misinformation, unlawfully, forcefully,
allurement or other allegedly fraudulent means unlawful. Conversion from marriage has to be
approved by District Magistrate. The law has been criticised for being violative of right to
Liberty of citizens.
CAUSE OF DISPUTE
4. Prabha, a Jain women and Daniel was a man practicing Islamic faith decided to marry on
December 2020. The marriage was objected by Prabha's family however they married under
special marriage act 1956. After marriage Prabha convert her religion into Islam. The
conversion was kept secret from Prabha's family. Couple start living separately from 10
January 2021 and after two months they visited Denial Parents. Meanwhile, Prabha's brother

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fell down from the stairs and Prabha wanted to visit him but Daniels family did not let her
meet his brother citing COVID situation. Being frustrated from behaviour of her-in-laws she
decided to call her parents. Prabha's parents filed a FIR in police and after interference of
police Prabha returned to her home.
CASE BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA
5. Daniel family was arrested in 20th May 2021 and Magistrate has denied their bail and issued
non bailable warrant against Daniel. Daniel family has approached the court through special
leave petition and also filled a writ petition challenging constitutionality of the Uppam
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020.

[9]
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?
II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE LAW & EQUAL

III. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY GUARANTEED

UNDER ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY
PROMULGATING THE SAID ORDINANCE?
IV. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART. 25 OF

THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY PROMULGATING
THE SAID ORDINANCE?
V. WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE CHARGED

UNDER S. 498A OF APC?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE – I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE
THIS COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is most humbly submitted that, Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in
discretion Special leave to Appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
Amphissa. It vests in the Supreme Court a discretionary power to be exercised for satisfying
the demands of justice under exceptional circumstances. It confers discretion on this Court to
grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity
and good conscience require such intervention. In the instant matter SLP is not maintainable
as Special Leave cannot be granted when no exceptional or special circumstances exist for
case to be maintainable. Also, the petitioner has not exhausted other alternative remedies
available to him. Hence, the SLP is maintainable.
ISSUE - II: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE LAW & EQUAL
It is most humbly submitted that the impugned ordinance is not violative of article 14 in any
way as it prescribes uniform laws for all the community and does not discriminate on the
basis of religion the laws are uniform for all. It is most humbly submitted that Article 14
forbids class legislation but it does not prohibit reasonable classification. The Ordinance
clearly passes the test of reasonable classification and also, the Anti Conversion Ordinance
was needed to be enacted in the state as suggested by the reports of State Law Commission
and also various newspapers. Hence, the Ordinance is not violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE - III: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY

GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE
STATE BY PROMULGATING THE SAID ORDINANCE?
It is most humbly submitted that the said ordinance is not violative of right to life and
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution of Amphissa. The said
ordinance has been promulgated in the view of surging unlawful religious conversions in the
state. The said ordinance also satisfies the test of Right to privacy which is again an intrinsic
part of Article 21. Also, the impugned Ordinance doesn’t violate the right to marry of an

[11]
individual. It is pertinent to mention that the test of Article 21 is of fair, just and reasonable
procedure established by law. The said ordinance places fair, just and reasonable
restrictions because it only prohibits unlawful conversion by misrepresentation, force, fraud,
undue influence, coercion, allurement or marriage. The road for voluntary conversion is still
open and legal. Hence, the Ordinance is not violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
ISSUE - IV: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART.

25 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY
It is most humbly submitted that the Ordinance promulgated by the state of Uppam Pradesh
doesn’t violate the right to freedom of religion of any individual. The Ordinance contains the
provisions prohibiting the forceful conversion from one religion to another religion by
misrepresentation, force, fraud, undue influence, coercion, or allurement or by marriage.
Article 25 of the Constitution provides every individual the ‘freedom of conscience’ and free
profession, practice and propagation of religion. The expression ‘to propagate’ religion
means to spread and publicise one’s religious views, but to propagate religion indicates
persuasion and exposition without any element of coercion. Thus, it is most humbly
submitted that under Art. 25 of the Constitution, the freedom of conscience doesn’t include
the right to unlawful conversion. Also, the said Ordinance is promulgated by the state of
Uppam Pradesh to maintain public order in the state against the increasing cases of Love
Jihad in Uppam Pradesh. Hence, the Ordinance is not violative of Article 25 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE - V: WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE

CHARGED UNDER S. 498A OF APC?
It is most humbly submitted that the Magistrate court has issued non bailable warrant against
the petitioner and his family under section 498A of APC. In the instant case, the facts clearly
show that Prabha wanted to meet her brother badly but accused family have detained her,
which makes a strong case of mental Cruelty. The Magistrate has acted judiciously in
rejecting the bail as the prime facie case has been established against the Petitioner’s u/s.
498A of the APC. As, the offence u/s. 498A is grave in nature which was enacted with the
object of preventing women from cruelty by her husband and his family members, and instant
case the prima facie case is made out and hence, the petitioner’s are liable to be charged
under this section.

[12]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE – I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE
THIS COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?
Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special leave to Appeal from
any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of Amphissa.1 It vests in the Supreme Court a
discretionary power to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice under exceptional
circumstances. Such power is to be exercised with caution and in accordance with law and set
legal principles. It confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate
cases. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience require such
intervention.2 In the instant matter SLP is not maintainable as Special Leave cannot be
granted when no exceptional or special circumstances exist for case to be maintainable.
Also, the petitioner has not exhausted other alternative remedies available to him.
NO EXCEPTIONAL OR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWN IN THE CASE BY

THE PETITIONER.
Article 136 does not confer a Right of Appeal, but merely, a discretionary power to the
Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice under exceptional
circumstances. 3 The SC observed in the Pritam Singh v. State4, in explaining how the
discretion will be exercised generally in granting SLP: The wide discretionary power with
which this court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only
and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special
leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under article 136. 5
Circumspection and circumscription must induce the Court to interfere with the decision
under challenge only if the extraordinary flaws or grave injustice or other recognised grounds
are made out.6
It is most humbly submitted that the appellant must show that exceptional and special
circumstances exists and that if there is no interference, substantial and grave injustice will
1
Art. 136, Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950.
2
A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. vs. Government of A.P. and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1546.
3
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196.
4
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
5
Ibid. 4(Pritam Singh Case).
6
Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswati v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 13 SCC 323.

[13]
result7 and also, there are compelling and substantial reasons for interference are available8
and the case has features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decision appealed
against on merits9. Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice or
when substantial justice is done, though the decision suffers from some legal errors.10
In the instant case, no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the
petitioner. The Magistrates order denying bail to Daniel’s family and issuing a non-bailable
warrant against Daniel u/s. 498A11 has been very judiciously decided. The offence u/s. 498A
is grave in nature and in the instant case the Magistrates Order was justifiable as Prabha was
subjected to cruelty by Daniel and his family members as she was not allowed to meet her
brother and parents for more than two months 12.
The court does not interfere with the exercise of discretionary power by the High Court under
226 and 227 merely because two views are possible. 13 Although the power under Art. 136
have been held to be discretionary and limitless. It is an exceptional power to be exercised
sparingly, with caution and care and to remedy extra-ordinary situations or situations
occasioning gross failure of justice 14.
THE PETITIONER HAS NOT EXHAUSTED ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

AVAILABLE TO HIM.
The doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies guides the practice and procedure of the
SC in the exercise of its power conferred under Art. 136. As per the principle, all the statutory
remedies would have to be exhausted before approaching the SC under its special
jurisdiction, unless special circumstances can be shown to convince the court that it must
allow the appeal. 15 In the instant matter, the Magistrate denied bail to Daniel’s family and
issued a non-bailable warrant against Daniel u/s. 498A and thereafter the Petitioner’s
approached this Hon’ble Court through a SLP16 without resorting to file a fresh Bail
Application before the court of Session/ HC u/s. 439 of CRPC which was available to him as
7
Para. 2, p. 710, Constitutonal Law of India, Kumar Narender, Allahabad Law Agency.
8
State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (14.08.2003 - SC) : MANU/SC/0585/2003, para. 07.
9
Taherakhatoon (D) by Lrs. vs. Salambin Mohammad (26.02.1999 - SC) : MANU/SC/0139/1999 para. 17.
10
Mathai v. George and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 358; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, Port of
Mumbai and Ors., (2004 ) 3 SCC 214.
11
Para. 14, p. 5, Moot Proposition.
12
13
Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide, (1977) 2 SCC 437.
14
Narpat Singh and Ors. v. Jaipur Development Authority and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 666; P.S.R. Sadhanantham v.
Arunachalam,(1980) 3 SCC 141; V. Vasanthakumar v. H.C. Bhatia, (2016) 7 SCC 686.
15
The British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh (03.02.1964 - SC) : MANU/SC/0329/1964, para.
07.
16

[14]
an alternative forum and another remedy was to approach the Hon’ble HC of Uppam Pradesh
for enforcement of the Fundamental Right and no special circumstances existed to forego the
statutory process of appeal. The Court would not grant leave and entertain appeals against
orders/judgments/decrees of the District Court or Courts subordinate thereto, if remedy by
way of appeal or revision to the High Court or other Court or forum is available. 17 The
petitioner may seek any other remedies available to him such as a review of the decision by
the concerned authority or review under Art. 226.18
The Hon’ble SC in L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India19 held that jurisdiction of Supreme
Court under Article 136 can be invoked only after exhausting remedy before high court. SLP
filed directly before the Hon’ble SC without approaching the respective High Court should
ordinarily be dismissed. 20 The respondents humbly submit that keeping in view the
precedents laid down by the Apex Court21 the petitioner’s sheer failure to exhaust the
available alternative remedies renders the current SLP non-maintainable.
17
Shin Etsu Chemicals Ltd. v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 3284; Punjab Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd.
v. Kewal Singh Dhillon, (2008) 10 SCC 128.
18
Shahid Balwa vs Union of India, (2014) 2 SCC 687.
19
L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3SCC 261.
20
Rajender Kumar Jain v. State Through Special Police Establishment and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 435, Para 22.
21
Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 4 SCC 404.

[15]
ISSUE – II: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE LAW & EQUAL
It is most humbly submitted that the impugned ordinance is not violative of article 14 in any
way as it prescribes uniform laws for all the community and does not discriminate on the
basis of religion the laws are uniform for all. The Article 14 is clearly in two parts – while it
commands the State not to deny to any person ‘equality before law’, it also commands the
State not to deny the ‘equal protection of the laws’. Equality before law prohibits
discrimination. It is a negative concept. The concept of ‘equal protection of the laws’ requires
the State to give special treatment to persons in different situations in order to establish
equality amongst all. It is positive in character. Therefore, the necessary corollary to this
would be that equals would be treated equally, whilst un-equals would have to be treated
unequally.
It is most humbly submitted that Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not prohibit
reasonable classification. The Ordinance clearly passes the test of reasonable classification
and also, the Anti Conversion Ordinance was needed to be enacted in the state as suggested
by the reports of State Law Commission and also various newspapers. Hence, the Ordinance
is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
It is most humbly submitted that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality in the

favour of constitution and any legislation can be struck down only if there is clear violation of
fundamental right conferred in part 3 of the constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
P.U.C.L v. Union of India22, has held that It must be appreciated that a statute carries with it
a presumption of constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in relation to a law,
which has been enacted for imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights.
In Kramer v. Union School District23 United States Supreme Court observed, "The
presumption of constitutionality and the approval given `rational' classifications in other
types of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state government are
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. This is also submitted that while deciding
constitutionality of the provision court will have to take account of overall effect and not
pickup exceptional cases. The Validity of rule has to be judged by assessing its overall effect
22
P.U.C.L v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 476.
23
Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621.

[16]
and not by picking up exceptional cases, what court has to see is, whether after taking all
aspects into consideration the classification is just.24
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION NOT PROHIBITED UNDER ARTICLE 14.
In R.K. Garg v. Union of India25, AIR 1981, the Supreme Court held that Article 14 forbids
class legislation but it does not prohibit reasonable classification. And hence, the Ordinance
clearly pass the test of reasonable classification and hence it is not violative of article 14. In
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust,26 it was held that, “Mere
inequality is not enough to violate Article 14. Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable
classification. Article 14 of the Constitution does not take away from the State or its
instrumentality the power of classification, which to some degree is bound to produce some
inequality”.
Also, Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not "per se" amount to
discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. When a law is challenged
as violative of Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to certain the policy underlying the
statute and the object intended to be achieved by it.27
THE TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.
One of the prime argument of petitioner is that said ordinance fails the test of reasonable
classification laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar28 but it is most humbly submitted that act
doesn't draw discrimination on the basis of religion caste etc which is prohibited by Article
15. The only restriction is people will not able to convert religion by way of force fraud etc.
It is most humbly submitted that the said Ordinance, 2020 clearly pass the test of reasonable
classification and hence it is not in violation of article 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
two conditions as in the case of Saurabh Chaudhari v. Union of India29, are; (i) The
classification must be founded on intelligible differentia, distinguishing grouped together
persons or goods from the left out ones of the group; and, (ii) The differential must be in a
rational relation with the sought object that is to be achieved by the act.
24
Mh. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1971) 2 SCC 188.
25
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675.
26
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575.
27
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 34.
28
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284.
29
Saurabh Chaudhari v. Union of India, (2003) 11 SCC 146.

[17]
A classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete.30 The Ordinance,

2020 clearly provides that is made for the people who are illegally converting their religion.
The object sought to be achieved is prohibition of unlawful conversion from one religion to
another by misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any
fraudulent means or by marriage and for the matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.
Also, in the case of Noor Jahan Begum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.31, in which it was
observed that conversion just for the purpose of marriage is unacceptable. In Noor Aga v.
State of Punjab32, the Supreme Court held that reverse burdens are constitutional, both policy
considerations and social control concerns justifying this extraordinary measure. The
rationale adopted by the legislature, as reflected in the 47th Law Commision Report33, is to
curb the various social & economic offences in the state and in such circumstances burden of
proof can be shifted to the accused.
STATE IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE SPECIAL LAWS FOR SCHEDULE CASTE,

SCHEDULE TRIBE AND WOMEN.
It is most humbly submitted that state is empowered to make special laws for the members of
schedule cast and schedule tribe. The special laws for at sc is not hit by right to equality as
Constitution itself recognise special laws for them and there are plenty of legislation which
provides higher punishment for offence against member of ST SC community. It is also
submitted that member of such community is known to convert more to another religion for
money or other material benefit and hence such punishment are required to check such
unlawful conversion.
In Kailas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra 34 it has been observed by the Hon’ble Court that
disadvantageous groups must be given special protection and help so that they can be uplifted
from their poverty and low social status. Also, in Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh35
the Court again commented on this aspect and said that “the Constitution itself, in no
uncertain terms, demands that the State shall strive, incessantly and consistently, to promote
30
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404.
31
Noor Jahan Begum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2015(3) ALJ 322.
32
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
33
Law Commission of India, 47th Report, (1972). Available at- http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-
50/report47.pdf .
34
Kailas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2011 SC 598, Para. 34.
35
Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547, Para. 12.

[18]
fraternity amongst all citizens such that dignity of every citizen is protected, nourished and
promoted.
NEED FOR LEGISLATION.
The Uttar Pradesh State Law Commission had submitted a report last year suggesting a new
law to check the forcible religious conversions. The commission is of the view that existing
legal provisions are not enough to check religious conversion and on this serious matter, a
new law is needed like in some other states. It is also submitted that there are news report of
love jihad and hence there is need to check this kind of conversion.
In Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Ors. 36, it was held that
the intent of the Parliament shall not be defeated merely for the reason that it may operate a
bit harshly on a small section of public where it may be necessary to make such provisions of
achieving the desired objectives to ensure that the nefarious activities of smuggling etc. had
to be necessarily curbed.
COURT CAN’T STRUCK DOWN ORDINANCE ON THE GROUND OF ITS MISUSE.
There is presumption of constitutionality in the favour of legislation. There is also a

presumption that where the legislative officers have been assigned discretionary power they
will discharge their duty honestly and in accordance with the rule of law. 37
Mere the possibility of arbitrary action is not a ground to invalidate the legislation. If there is
arbitrary action the action becomes unconstitutional not the legislation.38 The doctrine of
arbitrariness is for invalidation of executive action and not for invalidation of whole act. It
has been held that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary and
unreasonable. The same position has been previously stated in State of AP v. McDowell and
co.39.
36
Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 316, Para. 50.
37
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397.
38
Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.
39
State of AP v. McDowell and co. MANU/SC/0427/1996.

[19]
ISSUE - III: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY

GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE
STATE BY PROMULGATING THE SAID ORDINANCE?
It is respectfully submitted that the said ordinance is not violative of right to life and personal
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of Amphissa. The said ordinance has
been promulgated in the view of surging unlawful religious conversions in the state. The said
ordinance also satisfies the test of Right to privacy which is again an intrinsic part of Article
21. In S.S. Ahluwalia v. Union of India & others 40, it was held that, it is the duty of the State
to create a climate where members of the society belonging to different faiths, caste and creed
live together and, therefore, the State has a duty to protect their life, liberty, dignity and worth
of an individual which should not be jeopardized or endangered and by promulgating the said
ordinance the state is fulfilling its duty to protect the rights of people who are being
converted unlawfully.
Also in a substantial decision of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab41, the Supreme Court
stated that Article 21 interpreted according to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India42 would
read as: no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to fair,
just, reasonable procedure established by valid law. The said ordinance places reasonable
restrictions because it only prohibits unlawful conversion by misrepresentation, force, fraud,
undue influence, coercion, allurement or marriage. The road for voluntary conversion is still
open.
VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE.
The court in Distt. Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and anr. v. Canara Bank and ors.43
observed that, any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test:
(i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of
the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given
situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.
The said ordinance satisfies the first & second test i.e. it must prescribe a procedure and the
procedure must withstand the test of one or more rights conferred under Article 19, in the
40
S.S. Ahluwalia v. Union of India, (2001) 4 SCC 452.
41
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.
42
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Indrajit Barua v. State of Assam and Ors., AIR 1983
Del 513.
43
Distt. Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and Ors. v. Canara Bank and Ors. (01.11.2004 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0935/2004 Para 57.

[20]
manner that it prescribes a procedure and the said procedure withstands the test of Public
order as the danger of communal conflicts is ever-present and unlikely to wane anytime. The
diverse and often diametrically opposed religious practices often become the point of clashes
among various communities44 and in the instant case, making unlawful conversions by way
of force, fraud, inducement or allurement itself is immoral and tends to breach public order.
Also, in Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh45 it was held that the State was
constitutionally authorized maintain public order by prohibiting and penalizing conversion
including attempt to convert, if force, fraud, inducement or allurement was used by the
person or persons advocating conversion in any particular case. Also, in Arun Ghosh v. State
of West Bengal46 the court held that an endeavour to raise communal passions through
forcible conversions would be a breach of public order and it would be deemed to affect the
community at large. It also said that States under Entry 1 of list 2 of seventh schedule of the
constitution are empowered to exercise its civil power to curb the menace.
The ordinance satisfies the third test i.e. the act must also be tested with reference to Article
14, in the manner that there is no separate provision for any religion everyone here is being
treated equally. Also under Article 14 there is a provision that, “the state shall not deny to any
person equal protection of the laws within the territory of India” and state by promulgating
the said ordinance is fulfilling its duty to protect the people from unlawful conversion
thereby giving equal protection to all.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 21.
The said ordinance also satisfies the test of Right to privacy which is again an intrinsic part of
Article 21. In the leading case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India47, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is protected as a fundamental right under Article
21 of the Constitution and also laid the threefold test for the state in the invasion of someone's
privacy; 1. Legality which postulates the existence of law; 2. Need defined in terms of
legitimate social need; 3. Proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects
and means adopted to achieve that object.
The said ordinance clearly satisfies the test led down here;
44
45
Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908.
46
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228.
47
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 996.

[21]
Firstly, the governor under his power to promulgate ordinances during recess of legislature
has lawfully promulgated the said ordinance. Article 213 of Amphissian constitution
prescribes power of governor to promulgate ordinances during the recess of legislature if
such circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action to
promulgate such ordinances.
Secondly, in terms of legitimate social need the said ordinance was promulgated with an
object to curb the unlawful conversion in the state. Also on 21 November 2019, the UP State
Law commission in its “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion”48 recommended to enact
the Uppam Pradesh freedom of Religion Bill, 2019 to check on the cases of religious
conversions that are made in the garb of allurement, misrepresentation or any fraudulent
means. Also, in District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank 49 it was held that in case of
a matter being part of public records, including court records, the right of privacy cannot be
claimed.
Thirdly, proportionality between the object and means to achieve it has been properly
maintained as the object of the said ordinance is to prohibit the unlawful conversion and the
only suitable way to check on unlawful conversion is to make it mandatory to give
conversion declaration in advance so that the authorities can find that the conversion being
done is lawful or not and then can take appropriate actions.
THE RIGHT TO MARRY UNDER ARTICLE 21.
It is most humbly submitted that the said ordinance doesn’t infringe the right of an individual
to marry. The ordinance in Section 6 states that Marriage done for the sole purpose of
unlawful conversion or vice-versa to be declared void, nowhere it is mentioned that the valid
marriage done by voluntary conversion is void. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and
again stated that Right to marry is a integral part of Article 21, indeed we all have the right to
select our partner according to our choice but that right should not be extended to unlawfully
convert the spouse because if done so it’ll defeat the whole purpose of marriage. Marriage is
a culturally recognized union between people called spouses and that union should not be on
the pillar of unlawful conversion.
It is often seen that male youngsters nowadays by promising for marriage to female
youngsters try to induce the female youngsters to convert their religion by unlawful means.
48
State Law Commission of Uttar Pradesh, “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion” (November, 2019),
available at: http://upslc.upsdc.gov.in/MediaGallery/8thReport.pdf (last visited on June 15, 2021).
49
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496.

[22]
Therefore, by promulgating the said ordinance and by inserting section 6 the state is
protecting the rights of those who are being converted unlawfully only on the pretext of
marriage.
Also, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mr. X v. Hospital50 has clearly said that “Right to marry is
not an absolute right”. Every young man or woman has a right to marry but that cannot be
accepted in absolute terms. Any individual cannot claim his right to marry by unlawfully
converting his spouse under the pretext of marriage because by doing so he is infringing the
rights of his spouse under Article 25 of the Amphissian constitution.
PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21.
Conversion through force, coercion, misrepresentation have tendency to incite communal

violence and by converting someone by force, coercion, fraud, one cannot claim that his right
to personal liberty is violated under Article 21. Also, in a leading case of MC Mehta v. Union
of India51 the court held that “Liberty of an individual has to be balanced with his duties and
obligations towards his fellow citizens”. So, it can be said that liberty to propagate one's
religion and to convert should be balanced so that the liberty cannot encroach others right to
follow or believe their own religion peacefully.
The Republic of Amphissa is a diversified country and here some religious groups are in
majority and some in minority. It is often seen that these Minority groups through their
religious institution try to convert others to their religion by means of misrepresentation,
allurement and undue influence. It is also observed that male youngsters of some religion try
to convert the female youngster by feigning love for them or by promising for marriage and
here ultimately the female youngsters suffer.
The constitution of Amphissa has no doubt given everybody to propagate his/her religion but
has not guaranteed right to convert others to their religion. Any religious group by forcing
someone to adopt their religion cannot claim that they are practicing their personal liberty
guaranteed under article 21. Personal liberty guaranteed under article 21 comes with the
reasonable restriction, an individual have his personal liberty protected unless he doesn't
infringe the liberty of others. Also, in Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh52 it held
that, what is freedom for one is freedom for the other in equal measures and there can
therefore be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one's own religion.
50
Mr. X v. Hospital, (1998) 8 SCC 296.
51
M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 376.
52
Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 908.

[23]
ISSUE - IV: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART.

25 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED BY THE STATE BY
It is most humbly submitted that the Ordinance promulgated by the state of Uppam Pradesh
doesn’t violate the right to freedom of religion of any individual. The Ordinance contains the
provisions prohibiting the forceful conversion from one religion to another religion by
misrepresentation, force, fraud, undue influence, coercion, or allurement or by marriage53.
Article 25 of the Constitution provides every individual the ‘freedom of conscience’ and free
profession, practice and propagation of religion54. The expression ‘to propagate’ religion
means to spread and publicise one’s religious views 55, but to propagate religion indicates
persuasion and exposition without any element of coercion56.
Thus, it is most humbly submitted that under Art. 25 of the Constitution, the freedom of
conscience doesn’t include the right to unlawful conversion. Also, the said Ordinance is
promulgated by the state of Uppam Pradesh to maintain public order in the state against the
increasing cases of Love Jihad in Uppam Pradesh.
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM UNDER ARTICLE 25 DOESN’T

INVOLVE THE RIGHT TO UNLAWFUL CONVERSION.
It is most humbly submitted that a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble SC interpreted the
rights under Art. 25 and held that right to practice, profess or propagate religion does not
include a right to convert and upheld the validity of MP and Orissa anti conversion laws. This
view was taken by the Hon’ble SC in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh57. The SC
in this case said that the right to propagate religion did not grant the right to convert another
person to one’s own religion. It merely meant the right to transmit or spread one’s religion by
an exposition of its tenets.
The Hon’ble Court in Noor Jahan Begum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 58 held and
reiterated that, “thus conversion of religion to Islam, in the present set of facts , of the girls
without their faith and belief in Islam and at the instance of the boys, solely for the purpose of
marriage, cannot be said to be a valid conversion to Islam religion.
53
S. 3, Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020.
54
Art. 25, Constitution of Republic of Amphissa. 1950.
55
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
56
p. 457, Kumar Narender, Constitutional Law of India, 10th Ed. (Reprint), 2019 [Allahabad Law Agency].
57
Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 908.
58
Noor Jahan Begum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2015(3) ALJ 322.

[24]
The freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is such freedom which does not
encroach upon a similar freedom of the other persons. Under the constitutional scheme every
person has a fundamental right not merely to entertain the religious belief of his choice but
also to exhibit his belief and ideas in a manner which does not infringe the religious right and
personal freedom of others59.
Moreover, in Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji v. State of Andhra Pradesh 60, the Apex
Court decided that the right to propagate one’s religion means the right to communicate a
person’s beliefs to another person or to expose the tenets of that faith, but would not include
the right to ‘convert’ another person to the former’s faith.
Furthermore, S. 3 of the Ordinance does not restrain any conversion but it just put prohibition
on conversion from one religion to another by misrepresentation, coercion, or by any
fraudulent means or by marriage. Thus, it can be concluded that the ordinance only prohibits
unlawful conversion and hence, does not violate the fundamental right of any individual to
practice, profess and propagate religion. The ordinance only prohibits forceful and unlawful
conversion because it is the duty of the state to ensure that the freedom is enjoyed and is not
curtailed in any form of force or coercion by any other person.
In addition, S. 6 of the ordinance provides that if any marriage was done for sole purpose of
unlawful conversion that shall be declared void by Family Court or any other authority on
this behalf. The same position was held by the Hon’ble SC in Sarla Mudgal’s case61,
wherein it was held that the conversion done for the sole purpose of marriage shall be void,
and the provision inserted by the state in the impugned Ordinance is just a codification of the
previous judgements by the different court.
It is therefore contended that the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion does
not include the right of forcible conversion and thus the right under Art. 25 of the
Constitution is not violated by the impugned ordinance but it seeks to safeguard the freedom
of conscience and the right to belief and faith in one’s religion.
ORDINANCE PROMULGATED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER AGAINST THE

INCREASING CASES OF “LOVE JIHAD”.
The free exercise of religion is subjected to State regulation imposed to secure public order,
health and morality. Thus, it can be construed that the fundamental right to freedom of
59
Lily Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1650.
60
Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 181.
61
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1531.

[25]
religion must yield to the maintenance of public order, morality and health of the people 62.
Also, in Ramjilal Modi v. State of U. P.,63 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the right
of freedom of religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is expressly made
subject to public order, morality and health.
In the recent times, the cases relating to disturbance of public order on account of forceful
conversion started rising in the state. In March 2019 a newspaper report on “Love Jihad” was
published. As per the newspaper report, “Love Jihad” is an activity of certain Organizations
under which young Muslim men and boys in the state target young girls belonging to non-
Muslim communities for conversion to Islam by feigning love. The news report disclosed that
around 3000–4000 conversions took place in the past four years having the nature of Love
Jihad in the Republic of Amphissa. 64
Also, the State of Uppam Pradesh, the 8th State Law Commission report strongly
recommended for bringing a law in the state of UP to deal with the cases of forceful
conversion and also to prescribe punishment as it has the consequences of disturbing the
balance in the society and the common brotherhood. On 21 November 2019, the U.P. State
Law Commission in its “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion”65 recommended to enact
the Uppam Pradesh Freedom of Religion Bill, 2019 to check on the cases of religious
conversions that are made in the garb of allurement, misrepresentation or any fraudulent
means.
The newspapers showing increase in the number of cases of forceful conversion tends to the
public outcry and was indeed creating a sense of fear in the general public. Also, UP State
Law Commission report provides for enactment of Anti-Conversion Law. Therefore, to
maintain the public order and to prohibit forceful conversion the Ordinance was promulgated
to protect the interest of the citizens so that there may not be any forceful conversion, and this
Ordinance in no sense was intended to curtail any individual’s right to freedom of religion
guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution.
In National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh 66, Chakmas Case,
the Supreme Court noted that it is the duty of the State to protect the threatened group and
also, the State is duty bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being residing in
62
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
63
Ramjilal Modi v. State of U. P., (AIR 1957 SC 620).
64
Para 4, p. 2, Moot Proposition.
65
State Law Commission of Uttar Pradesh, “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion” (November, 2019),
available at: http://upslc.upsdc.gov.in/MediaGallery/8thReport.pdf (last visited on June 15, 2021).
66
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742.

[26]
the State whether he be a citizen or otherwise and if it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its
Constitutional duty as well.
Conversions in our country are permissible if the conversion is by the free will of the
convertee.67 Therefore, if an attempt is made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground
that someone has been ''forcibly" converted to another religion, it would, in all probability,
give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order, affecting the community at
large68. Hence, the Ordinance is promulgated by the state of Uppam Pradesh to avoid
disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another in a
manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community.
67
Evangelical Fellowship of India v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2013 (4) RCR 283 (Civil).
68
Rev. Stainislaus vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (17.01.1977 - SC) : MANU/SC/0056/1977

[27]
ISSUE - V: WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE

CHARGED UNDER S. 498A OF APC?
It is most humbly submitted that the Magistrate court has issued non bailable warrant against
the petitioner and his family under section 498A of APC. In the instant case, the facts clearly
show that Prabha wanted to meet her brother badly but accused family have detained her,
which makes a strong case of mental Cruelty. In U. Suvetha v. State and Ors.69, the
ingredients of S. 498A of the APC were reiterated which are as follows; a) The woman must
be married; b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and c) Such cruelty or
harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by the relative of her
husband. It is most humbly submitted that the Magistrate has acted judiciously in rejecting
the bail as the prime facie case has been established against the Petitioner’s u/s. 498A of
the APC. Thus, it is most humbly submitted that Daniel and his family members are liable to
be charged u/s. 498A of APC.
PRIMA FACIE CASE ESTABLISHED AGAINST PETITIONERS U/S. 498A OF APC.
In Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of Uttar Pradesh70, the SC opined that, before granting bail
in non-bailable offences various circumstances are to be considered and gravity and nature of
offence is one of the considerations in granting bail in such offences. Also, the power of
granting bail is discretionary but court has to balance individual liberty and societal interest 71.
For the purpose of granting bail the Court has to see whether prima facie case is made out. In
the instant case, the accused hide Prabha’s conversion72 and detained her for two months
which is not justifiable and establishes a prima facie case of cruelty u/s. 498A against him. A
wife is certainly entitled to visit her parents' home 73.
In State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra74 it was clearly and convincingly said that the
court must not go deep into merits of the matter while considering an application for bail and
all that needs to be established from the record is the existence of a prima facie case against
the accused. Court will only have to consider the prima facie case; the complainant has strong
case against the accused. Hence, bail should not be given to the petitioners as there is enough
evidence to make prima facie case.
69
U. Suvetha v. State and Ors. (06.05.2009 - SC) : MANU/SC/0774/2009
70
Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2006) 9 SCC 425.
71
State v. Jaspal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1503.
72
73
D vs. P (15.12.2017 - DELHC) : MANU/DE/5450/2017.
74
State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra, (2018) 10 SCC 516.

[28]
Accused and his family members have been charged u/s. 498A for the offence of cruelty.
Section 498-A of APC provides that the cruelty includes, “any wilful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman”.
In order to decide the question of cruelty the relevant factors are the matrimonial relationship
between the husband and wife, their cultural and temperamental state of life, state of health
and their interaction in daily life. The expression cruelty postulates such a treatment as to
cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that her living with the husband will
be harmful and injurious to her life.75 Accused has hide Prabha’s conversion from family and
trapped her in their house for more than 2 months and also did not let her meet her brother
without any satisfactory justification. Thus, it amounts to strong case of cruelty.
THE MATTER WAS JUDICIOUSLY DECIDED BY THE MAGISTRATE.
The Magistrates order denying bail to Daniel’s family and issuing a non-bailable warrant
against Daniel u/s. 498A76 has been very judiciously decided and as it was well within the
powers and discretion of the magistrate he did not commit any error in not granting the bail
and issuing the non-bailable warrant as also the prima facie case was established against the
accused. The Supreme Court in Kashinath Roy v. State of Bihar77 pointed out that court
exercising bail jurisdiction should refrain from giving elaborate reasons in their order for
justifying the grant or refusal of bail.
It is therefore most humbly submitted that, the Court while dealing with Bail matters have to
consider the facts and circumstances of the case, gravity of the offence, impact in the society
and whether the case has been prima facie established. In the instant case, the magistrate
while rejecting the Bail has considered all those aspects and has acted judiciously. As, the
offence u/s. 498A is grave in nature which was enacted with the object of preventing women
from cruelty by her husband and his family members, and instant case the prima facie case is
made out and hence, the petitioner’s are liable to be charged under this section.
75
State of Karnataka v HS Srinivasa 1996 Cr LJ 3103.
76
77
Kashinath Roy v. State of Bihar AIR 1996 SC 3240.

[29]
PRAYER
Therefore, in the light of the Issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most humbly pray before this Hon’ble Court
to be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That the SLP is not maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Amphissa.
2. That the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance,

2020 is constitutionally valid & doesn’t violate the Fundamental Rights of the
individuals.
3. That Daniel & his family members are liable to be charged u/s. 498A of APC.
AND/OR
Pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the Counsel for the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for Respondent)

[30]

Upon Submission To The Hon'Ble Chief Justice of Republic of Amphissa and His Companion Justices of Supreme Court of Republic of Amphissa

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Upon Submission To The Hon'Ble Chief Justice of Republic of Amphissa and His Companion Justices of Supreme Court of Republic of Amphissa

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5th IILS NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021 (Virtual Mode).

5th IILS NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021 (Virtual Mode)

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES, DARJEELING

26th June – 27th June, 2021

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA

In the Matter of:

DANIEL & Ors. .......... Petitioner/Appellant

STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH .......... Respondent

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

III. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY GUARANTEED

a) Validity of the Ordinance....................................................................................................20

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

IV. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART. 25 OF

Ordinance 2020 The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SLP Special Leave Petition

U/S. or u/s. Under Section

UOI Union of India

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

 LIST OF ARTICLES/ REPORTS.

1. State Law Commission of Uttar Pradesh, “Eighth Report on Freedom of Religion”

2. Law Commission of India, 47th Report, (1972).

 LIST OF STATUTES, RULES & GUIDELINES.

1. The Constitution of Republic of Amphissa, 1950.

1. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (8th Ed., LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

2. NARENDER KUMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, [10 th Ed. (Reprint),

2. SCC OnLine - www.scconline.com

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

Article 136 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa reads as follows: -

136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.

The SLP is at the admission stage before this Hon’ble Court.

Article 32 of the Constitution of Republic of Amphissa reads as follows:

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

PROBLEM OF LOVE JIHAD

UP PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL CONVERSION OF RELIGION ORDINANCE 2020

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

CASE BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF AMPHISSA

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY BEFORE LAW & EQUAL

III. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY GUARANTEED

IV. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART. 25 OF

V. WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE CHARGED

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

ISSUE - III: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

ISSUE - IV: WHETHER THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ART.

ISSUE - V: WHETHER DANIEL & HIS FAMILY MEMBERS LIABLE TO BE

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

NO EXCEPTIONAL OR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWN IN THE CASE BY

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

THE PETITIONER HAS NOT EXHAUSTED ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.

It is most humbly submitted that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality in the

Memorial on Behalf of the Respondent

REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION NOT PROHIBITED UNDER ARTICLE 14.

THE TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.