G.R. No.

L-33284 April 20, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO CENTENO, ET AL., defendants. ROLANDO CENTENO, defendant- appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodrigo Law Office for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
It all started, innocuously enough, with a drinking spree. On that afternoon of December 1, 1968, Rolando Santos was enjoying
himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he eventually could not carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a
massive brain hemorrhage. The venue would be the municipal building itself. And the police chief himself, together with one of
his policemen, would be accused of murdering him.
How Santos died is the question we have to settle. The prosecution says he was killed with karate blows dealt by the accused-
appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos drunkenly staggered and fell and hit his head and bled to death.
The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief while absolving his co-accused. 1 Rolando Centeno is
now before us on appeal of his conviction.
The medical evidence is not disputed. It is accepted that Santos died as a result of internal bleeding in the brain due to trauma.
The victim's head showed various contusions and abrasions but not in the nape of the neck where the karate blows were
allegedly delivered. 2
Besides Dr. Plaridel F. Vidal, the NBI medico-legal officer who testified on the autopsy of Santos, two important witnesses who
gave a first-hand version of how Santos was allegedly killed by the accused-appellant were presented by the prosecution. These
were Dionisio Violago and Eulogio Villanueva, who were both friends of the victim.
According to Violago, he and Santos, together with their other companions, were in the store of one Aling Goreng when
Patrolman Valeriano Reyes approached Santos and told the young man to come with him. Santos demurred, protesting that he
had done nothing wrong, whereupon Reyes boxed him in the chest and forcibly brought him to the police station. There Santos
loudly objected to his detention, prompting Police Chief Centeno to say, "Matigas ka yatang talaga," although he relented later
and allowed him to go home. But as Santos was leaving, Centeno had a change of mind and asked Reyes to bring Santos back.
Reyes was holding Santos's arm when Centeno administered the first karate blow on the nape of Santos's neck that made the
victim fall forward on the backrest of a bench. This was followed by two more karate blows that crumpled him to the cement
floor where he lay prostrate and motionless. On Centeno's order, two policemen then picked up Santos and took him inside the
locker room adjacent to the municipal jail. 3
Villanueva corroborated Violago and said he cried out, "Why are you doing this to my friend?" when he saw Santos being
mauled by Centeno. He also declared that Santos was felled with three karate blows from Centeno. This witness claimed he got
a glass of water and gave it to Santos, who could not drink it any more as he was already dying then. He felt Santos's pulse but
there was none. He opened Santos's shirt and put his ear to his chest but could hear no heartbeat. He said that the other
persons who witnessed the killing, besides the policemen, were Violago, Romy Salao and Serafin Punzalan. 4
The theory of the defense was that Santos was so intoxicated that he reeled and fell and hit his head and suffered the internal
brain hemorrhage that killed him. To support this claim, it introduced Mercedes Bautista, chief forensic chemist of the NBI, who
testified that at the time of Santos's death he had 0.21% of alcohol in his blood. She declared on cross-examination that the
effect of such quantity would vary according to the person's physical condition although there would surely be emotional
instability in every case. 5
The defense conjectured that as a result of his inebriation, Santos must have crashed down and hurt his head, resulting in
internal bleeding. Valeriano Reyes, the other accused, testified that after they had brought Santos to the locker room, they
heard a noise ("kalabog") suggesting that Santos had hit something; and sure enough they found him dying on the floor when
they went in to investigate. 6 It is doubtful though how they could have heard the alleged sound, considering the thick concrete
walls of the room and the fact that they were then some ten meters away. 7
There is also the argument that no external injuries were found on the nape of the neck, where the karate blows were
administered although there were abrasions and contusions elsewhere in the victim's head. As Dr. Vidal explained, however,
even if no marks were left on the neck, karate blows thereon could cause the generalized and extensive bleedings that caused
the victim's death. Thus:

1
Q Will you please explain, if a karate blow delivered on the nape of a person without necessarily producing contusions or
abrasions will cause brain hemorrhage?
A Depending on the position of the fist that one will apply on the person. A karate blow will produce inner injury but without
any outside injury especially this portion of the hand, (witness pointing to the hypothenar) unlike this portion (witness pointing
to the knuckles) and especially when the karate blows delivered with the hypothenar on a muscular portion of the body like the
nape, there will be no external injuries but the injury is internal. To further explain, I will cite to you an example. The boxers
who use gloves on their hands and when they will deliver blows on a person, that person will not sustain external injuries but
there is severe injury inside the brain and that could justify that karate blows will not produce external injuries but internal
injuries. 8
The defense itself submitted that Santos shouted drunkenly within hearing distance of Centeno and Reyes, "Putang inang mga
pulis iyan! Walang kuwenta sa akin iyan!" 9 They claimed to be tolerant and simply admonished him to go home, but
subsequent events showed they were really annoyed by his remarks. This was the motive that prompted Reyes to drag Santos
to the municipal building and led Centeno later to kill him.
We are satisfied that Violago and Villanueva were telling the truth about the killing of their friend although there were indeed
inconsistencies in their statements. These were minor lapses only and did not impair the essential truthfulness of their
narrations. As for the defense, its explanation of the death of Santos while he was in the custody of the police is hardly plausible
and mainly speculative. Murder cannot be excused on such improbable conjectures
Murder it was indeed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was alevosia because Santos was suddenly attacked
from behind when in his weakened and intoxicated condition, coupled with the fact that his arm was then being held by Reyes,
he could not defend himself. The accused-appellant had employed means aimed at achieving his purpose without risk to
himself from any defense the victim could have made.
Even assuming there was abuse of superior strength, on which issue we do not have to rule here, this aggravating circumstance
is deemed absorbed by treachery. As for the mitigating circumstances claimed by the defense, the Court holds that they cannot
be allowed. The derogatory statement made by Santos which so irritated Centeno did not constitute such a grave provocation
as to warrant the lessening of his penalty for reacting as he did in punishing the victim to death. Neither can Centeno argue now
that he had not intended to commit so grave a wrong as the actual killing of Santos as he knew, or should have known, that the
karate chops on the nape of the neck would have a lethal effect upon the defenseless and drunken victim.
There being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the term of imprisonment was correctly fixed at reclusion
perpetua, the medium penalty for murder. The civil indemnity is, however, increased to P30,000.00 consistent with present
policy.
It was not only Rolando Santos who was intoxicated when he died at 22 on December 1, 1968. There was another kind of
drunkenness that afflicted the chief of police, who misused his power and lawlessly took a life.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED except as to the civil indemnity, which is increased to P30,000.00. Costs
against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.

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G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with
it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of
multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the
expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest
test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent
call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

3
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively;
(c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No.
26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.
The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition.
On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence
for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether
Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that
a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication.
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation
is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the

4
force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of
course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on
sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the
crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused

5
CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES;
(italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK
IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and
"series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word
we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

6
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more,
di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it
is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a
big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

7
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because
it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first

8
essential of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application
of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is

9
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners
posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled
definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it
does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from
the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster,
Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept.
of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section
3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation.
Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations
in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

10
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because,
say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the
totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so
how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or
₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions
which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then
there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element
of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying
Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

11
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that
you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause
of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be
severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each
and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -

12
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well
as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials,
employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished
in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or
of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice
it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659
is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution
now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its
very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures
are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution

13
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. L-9206            November 25, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN CATANGAY, defendant-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

ARAULLO, J.:
On March 6, 1913, the following complaint was filed against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas by the fiscal of that province:
The undersigned charges Joaquin Catangay with the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, committed as follows:
On or about December 4, 1912, in the pueblo of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, the said Joaquin Catangay
did, without any precaution whatever, fire from his shotgun a charge that lodged in the left parietal region of Mauricio Ramos,
thereby instantly killing him; an act committed in violation of law.
After due trial the said Court of First Instance, on June 21, 1913, rendered judgment whereby the defendant, who was found
guilty of the crime charged in the complaint was sentenced to the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, to the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased or to suffer, in case of insolvency,
forty days of subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs of the case; and, finally it was therein ordered that the shotgun
mentioned in the complaint should be confiscated and disposed of in accordance with the law.
The trial court, setting forth in the said judgment the facts which he held to have been proven and the grounds upon which he
rendered his decision in the manner aforementioned, said:
"From the evidence introduced at the trial, it has been fully proven that on the night of the crime the deceased, Mauricio
Ramos, taking his shotgun with him went to hunt deer in the barrio of Quinatijan, municipality of Candelaria, Tayabas, first
passing by the house of Santiago Abandia, whom he took along with him and in his company also passed by the house of the
defendant, Joaquin Catangay, whom they both invited to bring his shotgun and go with them for a hunt; that while the three
men were passing along in the middle of a field of talahib (high grass), the deceased in front of the carrying lighted lantern
fastened to his forehead, behind him the defendant, and lastly Santiago Abandia, the first two men saw a deer were all
mounted; that thereupon Santiago Abandia stopped his horse and also dismounted in order that the deer might not become
aware of the presence of the hunters by the noise; that few moments afterwards. two shots were heard in quick succession and
then the light the deceased carried went out; that Santiago Abandia, upon noticing that the said light was extinguished,
approached the deceased; and he found the defendant alongside of him, raising him up, saying: "What can have happened to
my godfather?'; that, as the deceased could not get up, Santiago Abandia asked the defendant for matches and lit a little stick,
by which light witness saw the wound in the back of the head of the deceased, who was already dead; and that the said wound
consisted of a fracture of the left parietal region, the brain being exposed. It has also been proved that there had been no
previous trouble between the defendant and the deceased, but that on the contrary they had always been on intimate terms of
friendship.
The defendant testifying in his own defense stated that upon seeing that the deer, which the deceased had also noticed, might
escape, he made haste to approach the latter, who had his back toward him and was on his left, and that, in taking hurried
steps for that purpose, the defendant stumbled against an embankment or pilapil that lay between him and the deceased; that
thereupon he fell on one knee, an accident which caused the shotgun, which he had already loaded, cocked, and aimed at the
deer, the half of whose body was now lost from sight, to be discharged, this one charge striking the deceased in the head.
The crime charged in the present case should be qualified as one of homicide occasioned by reckless negligence — a crime
provided for and punished by article 568, in connection with article 404, of the Penal Code — for the reason that there was no
malice or criminal intention on the part of the defendant in the discharge of his shotgun which resulted in wounding and
causing the instantaneous death of the deceased, Mauricio Ramos; but that was, however, reckless negligence on the part of
defendant, for, as the deceased whom he was approaching, was almost directly in front of him, he should have taken the
precaution — an elemental one in handling firearms so likely to be discharged by the slightest accident — not to have carried
his shotgun cocked and aimed, as he did on the occasion in question.
The defendant having appealed from said judgment, his counsel accepts the finding therein made of the proved facts, but
contends that the court erred in holding that such facts constitute reckless negligence and, therefore, in applying article 568 of
the Penal Code.

15
According to the trial judge, the reckless negligence on the part of the defendant consists in that latter did not take the
necessary precaution, which the court considered elemental on that occasion in view of the circumstances, not to carry his
shotgun cocked and aimed; but the court also took into account the fact that, as testified by the defendant, the discharge of his
firearm (the shot from which wounded and killed the deceased) was caused by his stumbling against an enbankment or pilapil
that law between him and the victim, causing him to fall to one of his knees.
The accidental cause, then, of the discharge of the arm was not due to the fact of the defendant's having it cocked and aimed,
but to the accident of his stumbling against an embankment in the way. The occurrence was entirely accidental and
involuntary. Consequently, the crime charged in this prosecution lacks the necessary element to allow of its being considered as
reckless negligence under article 568 of the Penal Code, as would have been the case if though through no malice on the part of
the defendant, the damage had been produced, nevertheless, by some voluntary act of his. (U.S. vs. Barnes, 12 Phil. Rep., 93;
and decision of the supreme court of Spain, of June 28, 1881.)
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation
in which he is placed and with the importance of the act which he is to perform. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep., 375.)
In the case of United States vs. Barias (23 Phil. Rep., 434) this court, citing the case of Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone Co., (24
Oreg., 276, 294; 35 Pac., 549), said: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the
failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
In order to determine, therefore, whether there was imprudence or negligence on the part of the defendant, or whether or not
he took the necessary precautions to avoid the unfortunate accident that occurred, the surrounding circumstances, the nature
of the act that he was about to perform or was performing and the situation in which he found himself, must be taken into
account.
In the judgment appealed from the statement is made that the defendant, according to his testimony, when he stumbled
against the enbankment or pilapil and fell to the ground on one knee already had his shotgun cocked and aimed at the deer,
the half of whose body was then lost to sight.
It is shown by the testimony of the defendant himself that when he perceived that there was a deer in sight he was three or
four meters away from the deceased and, with respect to the relative position of the latter and the defendant, at the point
marked No. 3 on the rough sketch (Exhibit 1), that is, behind the deceased, who was at a point a little aside and to the right of a
straight line in the direction of the deer, so that, as appear from the said sketch, the defendant, from where he was, could have
discharged his gun at the animal without serious danger to the deceased, because the latter was not in the direct line of fire,
but some distance away.lawph!1.net
The defendant, explaining what occurred and what he did as soon as he became aware of the presence of the deer, testified as
follows, in answer to various questions:
Q. Tell how the accident that is the subject matter of the information filed against you before this court occurred. — A. One
afternoon of the month of December, one night of the month of December, Mauricio Ramos and Santiago Abandia came to my
house and told me to get ready. I followed them and on my replying "yes," they added "quickly." I hastened to saddle my horse
and when it was saddled mounted it and we rode toward the north. When he arrived at the barrio of Quinatihan and the
irrigated land there, we loaded our shotguns and headed for the north, through this irrigated land, in quest of deer, and we had
not traveled long before he stopped his horse.
Q. Who was "he"? — A. The deceased, Mauricio Ramos. And my horse came up to his horse, behind his horse. On seeing that
he was disamounting, I checked my horse, backed it up, tied it and went to the place where he was; but, on making a turn to
pass around behind his horse, I saw him in the act of leaning forward, taking aim, and, owing to my haste, for I saw that the
deer was about to run, I stumbled against something and slipped, which caused the shotgun I was carrying to go off.
Q. Is this the shotgun you were carrying? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you were hurrying to the place where he was, after you had tied your horse, how was your shotgun? — A. I was going
toward him with the shotgun, pointed upwards and held in both hands, and was pushing the safety catch to release it, when I
saw the deceased in a stooping position, almost on his knees, aiming at the deer.
Q. So that the shotgun of yours was at safety or had the safety catch when you were going toward him? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. and why did you go to him, for what purpose? — A. Because he was stooping and was aiming, and I saw that deer.
xxx     xxx     xxx

16
Q. And for what purpose and why did you run toward the deceased? — A. I saw almost kneeling down on the ground and
aiming, but he had been in this position for some little time and had not fired. I saw the deer, or half of its body. It was about to
escape. I, too, wanted to shoot, and went in his direction so I could shoot the deer.
Q. What did you stumble against? — A. An embankment of earth, for it was in high place.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. Did you say that upon your stumbling against something the shotgun went off? — A. Yes sir.
The court:
Q. When your gun was discharged was the safety catch still closed? — A. No, sir. just at the moment I raised the safety catch I
slipped and did not know how the gun went off, for it was discharged at the moment I stumbled.
The fiscal:
Q. How were you carrying the shotgun when, as you said, you pressed the safety catch to lock it? — A. I had my shotgun with
me. The other man had his shotgun in a horizontal position, almost in aim. He had stopped to fire. I was walking pretty fast and
was pushing up the safety catch when I stimbled and the barrel of the shotgun rose up at the same time I fell.
Q. So that you fell? — A. I did not fall to the ground, but bent toward it so much that I nearly fell down.
Q. Did the shotgun touch the ground? — A. No sir.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. When you saw the deer you got excited, aimed at it, and fired at it, did you not? — A. No sir. My intention was to get nearer
to it or alongside the deceased to take aim afterwards and shoot from there.
The court:
Q. When you were approaching the deceased, did you see where the deer was standing? A. — I saw only a half of the deer's
body and I made haste.
Q. Did you believe that the deer would get away from you without firing at it? — A. I feared that, for he had been aiming some
time and had not fired.
The fiscal:
Q. Immediately after you alighted from your horse and saw the deer, did you aim at it? — A. No, Sir.
Q. At what moment did you aim at it; when you were approaching the deceased? — A. I aimed at the deer when I saw the
deceased kneeling, in a kneeling posture, and when only half of the deers body was in sight.
Q. And you were going along — that is to say, you were aiming at the deer while you were walking? — A. Yes, sir. The muzzle of
the gun was pointing toward the deer.
From the foregoing questions and answers, it is seen that when the defendant became aware of the presence of the deer he
saw the deceased squatting down, almost kneeling on the ground and aiming at the animal; that he had been in this posture for
some little time without shooting, and as the defendant could see only half of the deer's body and the animal was about to run
away, the defendant tried to approach or get beside the deceased, in order to aim and shoot thence; that he did in fact go
toward the decease, holding the shotgun in both hands with the barrel pointing upwards, though in the direction of the deer,
and with the safety catch closed; and that, at the moment he pushed up the safety catch to open it, he stumbled against an
embankment, slipped and fell, and the gun he was holding in his hands was discharged.
Under the circumstances in which the defendant found himself, it was not necessary for him the employ extraordinary caution,
because the danger in which the deceased, who was at one side though some distance ahead of him, might then have been was
not great; it was enough that he should have taken the precaution that he did, and which was that which the circumstances
required in attempting to approach the deceased, to point upwards the gun he was carrying and to take advantage of the
occasion when the deceased was squatting and almost kneeling in this position the latter could not be in danger of being hit if
the gun was fired, while, on the other hand, he would have been free from all danger, had the defendant succeeded in getting
beside him, as he intended to do, in order to shoot thence, as being a point from which he could see the whole of the deer.
Neither can it be held that there was negligence or lack of care in the fact that the defendant tried to open the safety catch of
the gun while he was going toward the deceased and when he was but a short distance from him, for, in view of the nature of
the act which he was about to perform, it was natural that he should have the gun prepared to fire at the game, at once, or as
soon as he should have succeeded in placing himself beside his companion. So, if the gun was discharged through the

17
defendant's having stumbled against an embankment there, the shot causing the death of his companion, and this
embankment cannot be attributed to a want of caution or precaution on the part of the defendant (he did not see it, for, as he
himself testified, he was going along with his eyes fixed on the deer, and it is also understood that he would not have been
looking down, as he had his companion near at hand), the death of the deceased can only be attributed to an unforeseen and
unfortunate accident, for which the defendant can not be held criminally liable.
The Attorney-General, however, states in his brief that the defendant's liability may reasonable be inferred from his testimony
given in the criminal investigation held before the justice of the peace of Candelaria, Tayabas.
That testimony, which is shown in Exhibit B presented in evidence at the trial, in the part thereof pertinent to the matter in
question, reads as follows: "We were hunting on horseback and had agreed that if the man who was well ahead, that is,
Mauricio, should alight fro his horse, it would be a sign that he had found an animal; and it happened in fact that Mauricio did
alight from his horse. Then I also disamounted and on seeing that there was a deer immediately fired at it, but, owing to the
confusion existing at the time, I am unable to say positively whether or not he fired before I did, or whether I shot the deer or
the deceased."
According to the justice of the peace himself, who testified at the trial, the said testimony was taken down by him in Spanish,
he having translated it from Tagalog, in which language the defendant testified before him. Counsel for the defense, on the
other hand, tried to prove by means of cross-questions addressed to the justice of the peace at the hearing, that the latter, in
taking down the said testimony in Spanish, after translating it from Tagalog — the language used by the defendant — must
have omitted therefrom that part of the statement he made at the trial, relative to the cause of the discharge of the shotgun on
that occasion.
From the aforementioned testimony it merely appears indeed that an agreement had been made between the deceased,
Mauricio Ramos, his other companion and the defendant, that when the man who was well ahead, that is, the deceased, should
alight from his horse, it would be a sign that there was game in sight; and that the defendant, on seeing that Mauricio, the
deceased, had alighted from his horse, also disamounted from his and, on seeing that in fact there was a deer, immediately
fired his shotgun at it.
The lower court described very little importance to this testimony, for it is not mentioned in the decision, but took due account
of that given by the defendant at the trial; he found him guilty upon the ground that, as aforesaid, he did not take the proper
precaution, in view of the circumstances, not to carry his shotgun at that time cocked and aimed. But even though the first
testimony had been taken into account, it could not serve to prove that the defendant acted with negligence or want of
diligence in firing the shot, for the simple reason that there is not a single in the testimony in question as to the positions of the
defendant and the deceased with relation to each other, nor to that of the deceased in relation to the deer, which in sight of
the defendant. Neither can it be affirmed, upon examination of the rough sketch Exhibit 1, that the deceased was in the line of
fire, for, on drawing a straight line from the deer to the defendant, as shown in the sketch, it is seen that the deceased was not
on the line, but at one side of it and at such a distance away from it as to preclude the idea that he would be in such danger as
to have made it necessary for the defendant to have adopted precautions other than those the actual circumstances of the case
required before he fired his gun from that position.
After due consideration, then, of the said testimony, either separately or in relation with the merits of the case, and of that
given by the defendant himself at the trial, also in connection with the same merits, it cannot be held that the defendant is
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the complaint.

18
G.R. No. L-24084             November 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO RAMIREZ, defendant-appellant.
Vicente Llanes for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, for the crime of homicide, to the penalty of fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay
the costs.
On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the
deceased, and Agustin Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three
last named proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the place where the act
complained of took place. Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying the
shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there and
watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus Victoriano Ranga and Agusto Menor were waiting when
suddenly the report of the shotgun was heard hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on
that night as a result of the wounds.
It does not appear that the matter was judicially investigated until the month of October, 1924, when the complaint was filed
which initiated this proceedings.
The only witness who could testify upon the act complained of is naturally Agustin Menor who was near the deceased when the
latter was shot. According to Agustin Menor, the defendant, after having gotten the first prey, told his companions to stay
there, while he (Pedro Ramirez) was leaving them to go on hunting , and "when he was far away, he fired the shotgun," hitting
the deceased Victoriano Ranga. It must be noted that the witness Agustin Menor changed his first testimony that "when he was
far away, he fired the shotgun," by saying afterwards, "When Pedro Ramirez was a little away, he turned toward us and fired."
And to make it more specific, the defense moved that the translation of the testimony of the witness be corrected and the
interpreter of the court caused it to be stated in the record that the true testimony of the witness was as follows: "Pedro
Ramirez caused me and Victoriano Ranga to stay in the mount , telling us: 'Brothers, you stay here and I am going up to hunt
with the lamp' and then after he has gone ways, he (Pedro Ramirez) turned toward us and fired."
On the other hand the defendant, testifying as witness in his behalf, admits being the author of the shot which caused the
death of Victoriano Ranga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told his companions to stay there, watching over the
prey, while he was going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it would have been hard for them to find
the prey, if no one would have been left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to have seen with his
lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on
approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion Victoriano Ranga. The same witness says that he did
not expect to find his companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but they left, the place.lawph!1.net
The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of the accused from them when he fired the gun for the second time is
contradictory. On the other hand, there is not in the record any circumstances as to whether or not the deceased and the
witness Agustin Menor were in the same place where they were left by the defendant, when the latter fired. The night being
dark like that when the event took place, the hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get confused as to his
relative situation; and after walking around, he may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the point of
departure. and so, judging the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and
taking into account that there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended
party, we are compelled to conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide through reckless imprudence. The
defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions,
should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that unfortunately
occurred on the person of Victoriano Ranga.
While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered to the mother of the deceased a carabao and a horse
by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it
shows that he performed that act without criminal intent and only through a real imprudence.

19
The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant. After considering
carefully the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion and so hold that the defendant is guilty of
the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code.
Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by the law, must be
imposed upon him, and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

20
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were
charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided
purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani
Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision
finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating
the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors committed by the
court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE
ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO
ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF
THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay
and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario,
Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

21
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his
friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as
they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter
was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of
him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also
poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police
Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the
two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the
written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision
of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the police. The
accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the
contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of
note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were extracted
by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a
concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of the
court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said
court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident. They
claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an
eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on record
(pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and
imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by
Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies
would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the
mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about the
incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first
time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to
testify falsely against them.

22
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then
Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling
Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body
was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline
unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that
correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour
gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline
unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then later you
said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the
can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the body of
Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the
group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of
the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the
deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is
liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the
engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the
can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the

23
same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that
may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if
not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all
those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson,
the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left
completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the
incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.
For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was
gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.
Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's
clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause
at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into
a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of
the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in
his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is
evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and
Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization,
wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is
increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00
as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

24
C.A. No. 384             February 21, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of
which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and
eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of
preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her
brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she
should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the
authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City
of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the
evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month
before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was
being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love,
which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which
Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself,
until the following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife,
whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and surreptitiously entered
the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed
for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed
in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made
an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was
doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning.
Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue
was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood
of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her,
she would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day
Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend religious
services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were electric lights.

25
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of
attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other
side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was
sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the
upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue,
conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a
pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches,
saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he
approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore."
Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel,
approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin,"
meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives
might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately,
to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and
daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the
municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them
about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said
policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already
stated above, and went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which
were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has been
entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the only true
nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when
brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the
circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a
country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive the
protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right
to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed.,
pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch
as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a
woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such
killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great
an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus,
where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from
behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and
that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife
in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of
defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she
happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the
deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the
purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and, believing that
some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said
person with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient
provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the
beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person,

26
who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered
as an attempt against her honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house late at night on
September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his
previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown
by the authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by
the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper
portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several
people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave
Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his
death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the
facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant
in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly
thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of
reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People
vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his
offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another
mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz,
15 Phil., 123).
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the defendant and
appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be
legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered
the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a
God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so
many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first
assignment of error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and
form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no
aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered
in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one
or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant
and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391;
United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the
penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No.
4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium
degree. Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to
exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given
the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered.

27
G.R. Nos. 86883-85 January 29, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER
BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER BENDAÑO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless foreign religious minister was riddled
with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around
their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate,
miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader
picked up pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts swear that
acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the
gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly
killed for no apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the
hinterlands of Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted in the capture of the
perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed against those responsible for the frenzied
orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato.6
After trial, the court a quo held —
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio
Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and treachery, hereby sentences
each of them to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME)
Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for every day
the case was set for trial; moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Arson and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of P19,000.00 representing the value of the motorcycle and to pay
the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero,
Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, and minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant
Rufino Robles the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day of trial and to pay
proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order of their respective severity in accordance
with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with
respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither
did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.

28
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers Norberto
Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the
eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr.,
private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the
following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is
Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a
Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the
others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should
they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a placard on a street-post
beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the
additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the
same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery.9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms,
proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were
met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead,
he asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the
forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit.
Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he
was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the house of a
certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that
"Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face
and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite.
Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter
and ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside,
Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the
gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced.
12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a
thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto
mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the
head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if
that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3)
times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter
on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to
the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño contend
that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to
establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that
there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the
shooting of the victim despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting palay the whole day of 11
April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger Bedaño alleges that he was on an errand for the
church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for
medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed to the house of
Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-
accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.

29
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at the crime scene, as can be
readily deduced from the proximity between the places where accused-appellants were allegedly situated at the time of the
commission of the offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it has been the
consistent ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen to
twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where he
allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there can be no
physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-
settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that they were both inside the
eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first
discussed their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the
company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that
same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali was
brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00
o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is
negative in nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all
doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore removed. There was
direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. 22 It is not
essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused
participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as evidenced by the concerted
acts of all the accused. Thus —
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified with Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto
Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together.
Later that morning, they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again with
Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil)
when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left
when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez'
house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the
road when Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in their
enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact
vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers
and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide
assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from
leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the
commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr.
Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots
themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group
targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this,
the conspirators expressly agreed. As witness Manuel Bantolo explained 28 —
Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were there other persons who were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?

30
A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that paper then they will (sic) kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an
Italian and if they could not kill the persons they like to kill they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian priest in the event that Fr. Peter
Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29 —
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?
A All of them in the group.
Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan to kill Fr. Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him ahead."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What about Efren Pleñago?
A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to that suggestion that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody
provided he is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades an example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the act of all the other
conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission
(PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil
relations with his family, or that he disinherited any member thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of
fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious
family belongs to the natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to moral
damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages may be awarded.
Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to
par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered
mental anguish; much less did they take the witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal relation to
the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be
awarded there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended
with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the
victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though
not proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount is increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus
exemplary damages of P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.SO ORDERED.

31
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka
na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka
bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. " Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

32
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan
okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
"An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly
record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information
based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in
its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

33
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A.
4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now,
suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is
made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation
of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or
special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and
then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may
be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between one person and
another person — not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx

34
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores
the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,
and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited,
and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use
of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19
following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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