7.

3 Habeas Data
One of the earliest cases availing the remedy of Habeas Data was the case of Roxas v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.1 In this case, Melissa Roxas was a volunteer of BAYAN-Tarlac and assisted in the
conduct of an initial health survey for a future medical mission. after the said medical mission, while
resting in one of the houses of the residents, Roxas and her companions were then abducted by fifteen
(15) heavily armed men and they were subjected to torture for five (5) days. After her release from
captivity, she filed a Writ of Habeas Data to protect herself from future harm and to suppress any
existing government files linking her to BAYAN. The writ was issued by the Supreme Court and the case
was referred to the Court of Appeals for its hearing, which eventually granted it. Upon appeal, the Court
ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the Writ in favor of Roxas. It was ruled an indispensable
requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim and that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents
had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of
Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner's ties with the
CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven — considering that the origin of such records were virtually
unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and
photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on
record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In Ampatuan v. Macaraig2, respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against
PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the
subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has
rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the
resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative
case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan
has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the
Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the
police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1
Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his
continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to
the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show
on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the
Constitution.

In MERALCO v. Lim3, Rosario Lim filed for the said Writ, alleging that MERALCO’s unlawful act
and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information
about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and
security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security. The Supreme Court,

1
G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010
2
G.R. No. 182497. June 29, 2010
3
G.R. No. 184769. October 5, 2010
citing Castillo v. Cruz4 and Tapuz v. Del Rosario 5, ruled that the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data will
NOT issue to protect purely property or neither commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent's reservations on
the real reasons for her transfer — a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one's
employment — are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo6, the Court ruled that in view of the recognition of the evidentiary
difficulties attendant to the filing of a petition for the privilege of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data,
not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so
long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. But writ was not
granted to Francis Saez, as his petition was bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or
omissions which violated or threatened his right to life, liberty, or security. He did not specify the
particular documents to be secured, their location, or what particular government office had custody
thereof, and who has possession or control of the same.

In De Lima v. Duterte7, Senator Leila De Lima filed for the said petition due to the number of
public statements made by President Rodrigo Duterte against her, including denunciations of corruption
and immorality. She concluded that taking all the public statements of the President into consideration
the issuance of the writ of habeas data is warranted because there was a violation of her rights to
privacy, life, liberty, and security, and there is a continuous threat to violate her said rights in view of
President Duterte's declaration that he had been "listening to them, with the help of another country."
It was ruled by the Court that the writ cannot be granted due to the presidential immunity granted
under the Constitution, as the said grant does not only pertain to immunity to suit as to the official
functions and duties of the President, but also as to his personal acts.
In NUPL , et al. v. President Duterte, et al. 8, the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas data in favor of
National Union of Peoples’ Lawyer (NUPL). In this petition, NUPL, et al. sought for the issuance of the
writ due to continuous threats and harassment, tagging them as communists. Some members were
subjected to heavy surveillance, while some were also killed, thereby preventing them from purusing
their profession as members of the Bar and from practicing their advocacy as peoples’ lawyers serving
the poor and the marginalized. The Court ordered respondents, including President Duterte, to make a
verified return of the writ of habeas data and to comment on the petition.

4
G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009
5
G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008
6
G.R. No. 183533. September 25, 2012
7
G.R. No. 227635. October 15, 2019
8
G.R. No. 246175. May 3, 2019