Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Persons Class Notes 082219
Persons Class Notes 082219
RELATIONS
ATTY. SAHARA ALIA J. SILONGAN
College of Law
Notre Dame University
References: Persons and Family Relations books by Pineda,
Paras, Tolentino, and Sta. Maria
EFFECT AND APPLICATION
OF LAWS
ARTICLES 1-18
The New Civil Code of the Philippines
Republic Act No. 386
Effective: August 30, 1950
Most of our civil laws are found in the Civil Code but the Civil Code is not the only
repository of our civil laws. We have many civil laws like the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (PD 603), the Family Code (E.O. No. 209), the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA
No. 8552), Inter-Country Adoption Law, etc. which are not found in the Civil Code.
The Civil Law is wider in concept than the Civil Code. The Civil Code is part of the Civil
Law, but not all civil laws are part of the Civil Code.
Article 1
Amended by Executive Order No. 200 dated June 18, 1987. It now reads:
If there is no date specified for its effectivity, the law becomes effective “aaer
fiaeen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation.”
If the law is voluminous and is published in series, the reckoning shall begin from
the release of the last of the series.
If the law provided a specific date for its effectivity (like one year aaer
publication), it becomes effective only upon the lapse of said period following its
complete publication and not before.
A law which provides for its immediate effectivity upon approval becomes
effective only aaer its complete publication and not immediately aaer its signing by
the President.
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation a) Posting in the bulletin board and 2 other
conspicuous places in the province, city,
municipality, or brgy
Statutes have only a prospective operation unless the intention to give them
a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. If there is doubt, the doubt must be resolved against
retrospectivity.
“As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. “
1. If both laws are of same category and they cover the same subject matter, that
which is later in point of time prevails over the prior one.
Ex: Both laws are special laws. RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 repealed RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
2. If the general law is PRIOR to the special law, the latter is considered merely an
exception to the general law.
Ex: Act No. 3815 (RPC, 1930) was repealed by RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972)
3. If the general law is LATER in enactment, the special law prevails except –
a. When there is a clear, necessary and irreconcilable conflict between the two.
b. When the general law covers the whole subject (including the subject matter of
the special law) and is clearly intended to replace the special law.
Revival of a repealed law
Rules:
1. If the first law is repealed by IMPLICATION by the
second law, and the second law is itself repealed by
the third law, the first law is revived unless otherwise
provided in the third law.
2. If the first law is repealed EXPRESSLY by the second
law, and the second law is repealed by third law, the
first law is NOT revived, unless expressly so provided.
In other words, in case of implied repeal, there is revival.
In case of express repealm there is no revival. Exception:
If the contrary is provided.
Disuse, custom, or practice to the
contrary
Although a law has fallen into disuse, or the customs or practices
of the citizenry run against a law – the violation or non-
observance of said is not excused by reason thereof.
Inciong v. De Guia
ISSUE: Whether or not the common practice of assignment of cases
without the benefit of raffle is justified.
HELD: It is not. Even on the assumption that assignment of cases is
"very common" in the Regional Trial Courts where she was assigned,
she should have borne in mind that practice is not the law. The law is
very explicit on this as expressed by Article 7 of the New Civil Code
which provides:
"Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs
or practice to the contrary."
Respondent could not go against Circular No. 20 of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power until it is
repealed or otherwise modified.
HELD: The Operative Fact Doctrine is not applicable. The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has
not been passed.
The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws
remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new
cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as
valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they
remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are
lea undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have
relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration
of their unconstitutionality.
Exceptions:
1. If there is already a decision rendered by the the same court
recognizing the custom, specially of the decision had already been
affirmed on appeal and the decision is already final and executory.
2. When the custom is of public knowledge.
3. If the evidence presented is not sufficient to establish the
existence of a custom, the alleged custom is considered as non-
existing.
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws
of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only
within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of
the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. (Revised Penal Code)
Considering that Ernst is currently living in the Philippines, the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of Ernst in
refusing to support his child with Norma is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
over the offense charged against Ernst. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the Ernst
was acquired upon his arrest.
When Elmar and Tristan married, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce
decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or
abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines
will not recognize such absolute divorce. Thus, Elmar never acquired the legal interest
as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
San Luis v. San Luis
HELD: In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985), the Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against
his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other."
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof
of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. The Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
HELD: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties
of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an
incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
Noveras v. Noveras
HELD: The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of
divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines.
Article 16
Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.
Lex Situs or Lex Rei Sitae
This is the principle which provides that property
shall be governed by the law of the place where it is
situated.
Exceptions: Second paragraph of Article 16 which
refers to incidents of successions – whether
intestate or testamentary. These incidents are
governed by the national law of the deceased
irrespective of the nature of the property involved
and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
References: Persons and Family Relations
books by Pineda, Paras, Tolentino, and Sta.
Maria
Incidents of succession:
1. Order of succession in intestacy
2. Amount of successional rights
3. Intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
4. Capacity to succeed.
ARTICLES 19-36
Article 19
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are oaen called damnum absque injuria. (Far East Bank v. Pacilan)
Far East Bank v. Pacilan
HELD: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and
any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving
that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.
The facts do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank committed an abuse
thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of rights are not aZendant in the
present case.
No malice or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear
out that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his account not
just a few times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be
faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and regulations governing the
current accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the respondent had agreed
to be bound by these terms and conditions.
Uypitching v. Quiamco
HELD: In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at
petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to
the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the
defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the
other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in
any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the
right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly
ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the
prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage
to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.
Cebu Country Club v. Elizagaque
HELD: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles
of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an
application for proprietary membership. But such right should
not be exercised arbitrarily.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless
be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is
exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Calatagan Golf Club v. Clemente
HELD: The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the
Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court
of Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law
for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt
from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The
obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in
good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if
the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform
certain obligations to the corporation.
Ardiente v. Javier
HELD: It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even
require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the
former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to
enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to
the injured party will attach.
Sesbreno v. CA
HELD: There was no abuse of rights. Our holding could be
different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the
intervention of malice or bad faith on the part of Constantino
and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, or any
excessiveness committed by them in the course of the
inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA
correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on
Sesbreño’s residence because the other houses within the area
were similarly subjected to the routine inspection. This, we
think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Saladaga v. Astorga
HELD: Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to
complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his agreement with
complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the
contracting parties.
Having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device
that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be deceirul, the person must either
have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof,
especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the
aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false
statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury. The actions of
respondent in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceirul
conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section 63
of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on
respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
Tan v. Valeriano
HELD: It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution,
of and by itself, does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.
Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of
the suit are part of the judgment and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in
whose favor they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of
court. Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so. Their indifference, if not
negligence, is indicative of lack of interest in executing the decision rendered in their
favor. To remind, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing
judgments or orders is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Indeed,
inaction may be construed as a waiver.
Article 30
When a separate civil action is brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Contemplated in the article is a situation where
no criminal case had been filed during the
pendency of the civil case.
However, the action will be suspended if in the
meantime, the criminal case is filed.
The civil action which was filed ahead of the
criminal action may be consolidated with the
latter case upon motion of the offended party.
Article 31
When the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the laEer.
• The civil action contemplated in the Article is one
which arises not from the act or omission complained
of as a felony. It arises from some other acts such as
contract or a suit based on culpa contractual; legal
obligation to return money malversed, or a suit based
on quasi-delict.
• The civil action, not being based on the crime for which
the defendant is being prosecuted, it can proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In other words,
despite the acquittal of the defendant, a civil action
can still be filed against him.
Frias v. San Diego-Sison
HELD: Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by
respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum
of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner. Petitioner’s act of
trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of
loss of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may
be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
Rule 111, 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded
independently. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Article 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
laEer for damages:
HELD: Yes, reservation was necessary. Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on
June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988, is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
...
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto)
and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously
instituted.
2. Whether or not the requirement of reservation diminishes petitioner’s substantive right.
HELD: Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it
may be brought separately.
Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the
words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to
clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
**Note: Section 1 has already been amended by the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
Be it noted that the second paragraph under the 1985 Rules has been removed. This goes to show
that the Supreme Court recognized the substantive right of parties-litigants to institute an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. The 2000
Amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure has the effect of abandoning decisions of the
Supreme Court to the effect that under Article 33 and the other articles concerning independent
civil actions, there is a need of making reservation. The requirement of reservation had been
deleted in the new Rules. The only limitation is that there shall be no double recovery of damages.
Article 34
When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
The Article covers a situation where:
a) There is a danger to the life or property of a
person;
b) A member of the city or municipal police
force who is present in the scene refused or
failed to render aid or protection to the
person; and
c) Damages are caused either to the person
and/or property of the victim.
Liability of a Police Officer
• The primary liability imposed by this article
upon a member of a local police force for
refusing or failing to render aid or protection
to any person in case of danger to life or
property, is already covered by Article 27.
• The present article, however, creates a
separate civil action to enforce that liability,
independent of any criminal proceedings.
Liability of Municipal Corporation
This Article makes the city or municipality
subsidiarily liable for the omission of its police
officers to render aid or protection to anyone.
This liability, therefore, can be enforced against
the city or municipality only when the guilty
police officer is insolvent.
Article 35
When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace
finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
commiEed, or the prosecuting aEorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the
facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal
case are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad
faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per
diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was
instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations
of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made
in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will
certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed
with the criminal action.
Beltran v. People
HELD: With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a
subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage.
PASI v. Lichauco
HELD: Under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, a complaint at the evaluation stage may be
dismissed outright only for want of palpable merit. Want
of palpable merit obviously means that there is no basis
for the charge or charges. When, in the course of the
actions taken by those to whom the complaint is
endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to
be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
should be applied in a suppletory character. The
proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and
that it may be made only upon petition,and not at the
instance of the judge alone or as in this case, the
investigating officer.
Yap v. Cabales
HELD: There is no prejudicial question. The issue in the criminal cases
is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the
civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect
from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have
rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not
liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.
Dreamwork v. Janiola
HELD: The provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure are clear. i.e. the civil case must precede
the criminal case.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with
which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.
That the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense
charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to
the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to
make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Pimentel v. Pimentel
HELD: Firstly, the rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first
before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for
annulment was filed aaer the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in
case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
Consing, Jr. v. People
HELD: There is no prejudicial question. In the instant case, the Makati
Civil Case for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed
lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
ARTICLES 37-51
Persons; Kinds
The term person refers to any being, whether
natural or artificial susceptible of legal rights and
obligations.
Natural Person – refers to human beings; visible
products of procreation; has physical existence.
Juridical Person – refers to entities created by law
or by a group or association of men for certain
lawful purposes; invisible products of legal fiction;
has no physical existence; exists only in
contemplation of law.
References: Persons and Family Relations
books by Pineda, Paras, Tolentino, and Sta.
Maria
Personality
Personality is the embodiment of a collection of
qualities in a person. The quality of being a person.
• presumptive or provisional personality– while in
the womb of the mother
• actual personality– aaer becoming a person
• artificial personality – aaer death
e.g. estate of deceased is considered artificial or juridical for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate.
Case: People v. Bayotas
Restrictions:
1. He cannot enter into a valid contract of marriage.
2. He cannot make wills.
3. He cannot be witness to a will.
4. He cannot give consent to a contract.
5. He cannot act as an executor or administrator of an
estate.
6. He cannot exercise the right of suffrage.
Instances when minors are still liable
1. Compensation for his torts or quasi-delicts
2. For the necessaries sold and delivered to
him.
3. For contracts entered into in his behalf with
judicial authorization.
4. For contracts he entered into by pretending
to be of legal age.
Insanity
Legal term for mental disorder
Restrictions:
1. He cannot make a valid will or testament.
2. He cannot validly give consent to contracts.
3. He cannot act as an executor or
administrator of an estate.
Imbecility
Manifestation of mental deficiency or mental retardation.
Degrees:
Restrictions:
1. He cannot give consent to contracts if he does not
know how to read and write.
2. He cannot personally accept or repudiate inheritance
if he does not know how to read and write.
3. He cannot be a witness to a notarial will if he does
not know how to read and write. Although he can
make a will under the conditions set forth by law.
4. He cannot be naturalized.
Prodigality
A prodigal or spendthria is a squandered of his
money and property without regard to the
needs and future of his family which he is bound
to protect and support under the law.
The act of prodigality must show a morbid mind
and disposition to spend or waste his estate so
as to expose his family to want or deprive his
forced heirs of their inheritances.
Restrictions:
If placed under guardianship, the prodigal’s
capacity to act will be restricted because then
he could only act with binding effect through his
guardian. Until he is placed under guardianship,
his capacity to act is not affected.
Civil Interdiction
This is a mandatory accessory penalty deemed imposed whenever the
sentence rendered is within the range of reclusion temporal to death,
if the latter is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon.
Restrictions:
1. The convict during the term of his sentence is deprived of the
following rights – a) parental authority or guardianship over the
person or property of his children or ward; b) marital rights or
authority; c) management of his property; d) disposition of his
property by act or conveyance inter vivos.
2. The offender cannot enter into a marriage settlement, without
the assistance of a competent guardian appointed by the court.
Liabilities
While minors, insane and imbeciles may be
exempted from criminal liability, nonetheless,
they may be made liable with their own
property to compensate for the civil damages
they have caused.
Article 39
The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is
qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified
by law.
Circumstances that limit capacity to act
Penalty – There are penalties imposable in crimes which restrict or
1.
modify a person’s capacity to act.
Example: perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification to hold public office;
suspension of the right of suffrage.
Restrictions:
a. A person cannot file a complaint against a close family relative
without having first exerted efforts towards a compromise
agreement.
b. Relatives who fall under Art. 37 and par. 1 of Art. 38 of the FC
could not marry each other.
References: Persons and Family Relations
books by Pineda, Paras, Tolentino, and Sta.
Maria
c. Husband and wife cannot donate properties to each other except only moderate gias
during family rejoicing; they cannot sell or lease properties to one another unless the
sale or lease unless excepted under the law.
d. There are situations when relatives cannot testify against each other. E.g. spouses,
descendant against parents or grandparents.
3. Alienage
Restrictions:
a. Aliens cannot exercise political rights.
b. They cannot acquire lands except through succession.
c. They cannot operate public utilities.
d. They cannot engage in coastwise trade.
e. They cannot practice some professions exclusive to Filipinos like practice of law save in
exceptional cases, and medicine.
f. They cannot own and manage mass media.
g. They cannot engage in retail trade.
Restriction: Aaer an assignee has been appointed by the court, the insolvent could not
dispose of his property as the assignee takes over the management and control over
the property as representative of the creditors to whom the proceeds shall be
distributed.
6. Trusteeship – This is a legal relationship concerning the property which obliges the
person holding it to deal with the property for the benefit of another.
Restrictions:
1. A trustee cannot acquire by prescription the property he holds under the express
trust for another unless he repudiates the trust.
2. A trustee cannot appropriate for himself the property under trust which he
merely holds for the benefit of another.
References: Persons and Family Relations
books by Pineda, Paras, Tolentino, and Sta.
Maria
3. A trustee is not allowed to become the buyer of the trust property.
4. If the trust is express, the trustee is restricted by the provisions of the trust
agreement and the law.
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
Xxx
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fiaeen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fiaeen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fiaeen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be
the same, the older;
5. If one be under fiaeen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
Xxx
• The above rule applies whenever the parties who died are not call to succeed each other.
References: Persons and Family Relations
books by Pineda, Paras, Tolentino, and Sta.
Maria
Article 44