Alejandro G. Vigo (ed.

)
Oikeiosis and the Natural Bases of Morality.
From Classical Stoicism to Modern Philosophy
Reason and Normativity
Razón y Normatividad
Vernunft und Nomativität

A Series on Practical Reason, Morality and Natural Law

Escritos sobre razón práctica, moralidad y ley natural
Schriftenreihe zu praktischer Vernunft, Moralität und Naturrecht
edited by / editados por / herausgegeben von
Ana Marta González – Alejandro G. Vigo

Volume 4 / Volumen 4 / Band 4

Georg Olms Verlag

Hildesheim – Zürich – New York
2012
Alejandro G. Vigo (ed.)

Oikeiosis and the Natural Bases of Morality.

From Classical Stoicism to Modern Philosophy

Georg Olms Verlag

Hildesheim – Zürich – New York
2012
 CONTENTS

Introduction.............................................................................................................. 7
Javier Aoiz
Oijkeivwsi~ y percepción de sí........................................................................... 11
Daniel Doyle
Preservative Oijkeivwsi~: Its Constitution and Consciousness......................... 37
Laura Corso de Estrada
Oijkeivwsi~. Ciceronian Reading and XIII Century Receptions...................... 67
Ricardo Salles
Oijkeivwsi~ in Epictetus............................................................................... 95
Luis Xavier López Farjeat
Self-Awareness (Al-Shu‘Ūr Bi-Al-Dhāt) in Human and Non-Human
Animals in Avicenna’s Psychological Writings......................................... 121
Teresa Santiago
Grotius And The Role of Oijkeivwsi~ in His Doctrine of a Just War............ 141
Luis Placencia
Self-Preservation, Consciousness And Self-Knowledge. Spinoza’s Concept of
Conatus And The Natural Ground Of Morals........................................... 167
Marcelo D. Boeri
Innateness, Universal Reason, and Self-Preservation: Making Room for
Stoicism in John Locke.................................................................................. 193
Ana Marta González
Humean Keys For Social Theory: From Natural Circles of Sympathy to
the Formation of an Impartial Moral Judgment.............................................. 231
Raquel Lázaro
Stoicism in the Moral Thought of Adam Smith.............................................. 263
6 Contents

José M. Torralba
Stoic Katovrqwma, Perfect Duty and Kant’s Notion of Acting aus Pflicht.
The Relevance of the Oijkeivwsi~ Doctrine for the Notions of Moral Good
and Inner Attitude (Gesinnung) in Kantian Ethics..................................... 295
Felipe Schwember
Libertad, corporalidad, impulso y ley moral en la Doctrina de las Cos-
tumbres de Fichte......................................................................................... 347
Name Index.................................................................................................. 377
 OIKEIWSIS IN EPICTETUS

RICARDO SALLES

Introduction

Although the term oijkeivwsi" and its cognates are not frequent in Epicte-
tus,1 he is a significant source of information on the nature of this phe-
nomenon. In Stoicism, oijkeivwsi" is a link of affection that humans and
animals have to themselves. In humans, this affection normally evolves
during each person’s lifetime and ranges over an increasingly wide do-
main of things and persons beyond the self: body, family, friends, neigh-
bors, tribe, city, country, and, in the end, universal humanity. This pro-
cess is best understood as part of a single outward movement of the self
by which it increases its involvement with other people and the social
and external world in general.2 Although the process is mentioned by
Epictetus in some places of the Discourses, we do not find in them a de-
tailed account of its continuity and unity. In this respect, Hierocles, a
contemporary of Epictetus, is a richer source.3 But there is in Epictetus a
close analysis of at least one important form taken by oijkeivwsi", namely,
filostorgiva, the affection for our close relatives: parents, siblings and
children.4 In fact, filostorgiva is the subject-matter of an important Dis-
course reported by Arrian: Diss. 1.11. It is a dialogue between Epictetus
and a man whose daughter was ill. He was so disturbed by her suffering
that he could not bear staying by her bed and, thus, decided to run away
and leave her, claiming that he did so because of his very affection for
the child. At the end, the young girl recovered, but Epictetus suggests

1 Two important passages are Diss. 1.19.13-15 and 2.22. 7 and 15-16 (cf. 1.14.6-7,
2.10.12, 3.3.5-6 and 3.15.11).
2 See Inwood 1985: 184-215 for a classic account of oijkeivwsi" (translated as “orien-
tation” by Inwood).
3 Edited in Bastianini & Long 1992.
4 In addition to Diss. 1.11 see also 1.23.3, 2.17.37-38, 3.17.4, 3.18.5, 3.24.58-59 and
83. An interest on the subject of filostorgiva is also attested for Chrysippus (SVF 3.292
and 731), Antipater (SVF III Antipater Tarsensis 62-63) and Marcus Aurelius (1.9.3,
1.17.8, 2.5.1, 6.30.1, 11.18.4 Dalfen).
96 Ricardo Salles

that her recovery would have come sooner had not the father left her. As
we shall see, this analysis provides valuable information about filostor-
giva that is not developed in detail in any other source on Stoicism.
The prime goal of the dialogue is to establish, against the father’s alle-
gation, that it is wrong to act as he did. It is wrong in two senses. (1)
Firstly, it is against human nature in the sense that it involves false beliefs
about the value of human life, in particular, the belief that the life and
health of her child is a good and that its loss is an evil. (2) Second, the
action is inconsistent with the father’s own bond of affection with the
child. This bond has a normative force. Given his filostorgiva, he
ought to have stayed by her side because filostorgiva requires the de-
sire, or impulse (oJrmhv),5 to preserve the life and health of the person
who is the object of the affection, and, as Epictetus clearly brings out, it
is contradictory for the father to have this desire and yet to desert her
sick daughter. (1) and (2) are two different senses of being right and
wrong, independent from each other. As I shall argue, an action that is
right in sense (2) may nevertheless be wrong in sense (1) inasmuch as
our affection for someone may be motivated by false beliefs about the
value of human life. An action is right in both senses only when it is con-
sistent with filostorgiva and involves nevertheless the belief that hu-
man life is indifferent. An explanation is then required of how such an
action is possible. For how can anyone who endorses Stoic axiology and
believes that any individual human life is indeed indifferent, may still de-
sire to preserve the life of someone else? This sheds light on a general
problem in the interpretation of Stoicism which is how, exactly, the
theory of oijkeivwsi" fits with Stoic axiology. Sections 1-3 of this paper
are devoted to analysing the two senses of right and wrong in Diss. 1.11
and section 4 to showing how in Epictetus oijkeivwsi" is consistent with
Stoic axiology.

5 I use “desire” and “impulse” interchangeably for the Greek oJrmhv. Stoic scholars of-
ten employ “desire” for o[rexi~, and although the terms o[rexi~ and oJrmhv have different
technical meanings in early and Epictetan Stoicism (on which see e.g. Inwood 1985: 116-
7 and 224-242, and Brennan 2000: 172), the difference is not relevant for the purposes of
the present paper.
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 97

1. Right and natural: Diss. 1.11.5-15.

According to the father, he acted rightly because deserting her daughter

was the natural thing to do (he acted naturally: fusikw`~). Epictetus does
not question at all the inference from ‘natural’ to ‘right’ (pa`n to; kata;
fuvsin ginovmenon ojrqw`~ givnetai) and the correlative inference from ‘un-
natural’ to ‘wrong’. In fact, it is well attested elsewhere that these are in-
ferences that Epictetus fully endorses.6 Generally speaking, nature has
normative force in Stoicism: what is natural ought to be done, even if it
is not done, and what is unnatural ought to be avoided, even if it is not
avoided.7
The target of Epictetus’ argument in this Discourse is just the claim
that the action of the father is indeed natural, meaning that if it were natu-
ral then, of course, given the normative force of nature, Epictetus would
grant that it is right. So why does the father claim that he acted naturally?
The specific reason he adduces is that this is how fathers usually act, or
are affected, in this situation: “all, or at least most, of us fathers are af-
fected in the same way” (1.11.6: pavnte~ h] oi{ ge plei`stoi patevre~ pavs-
comen). In other words, whatever occurs always or in most cases given
the same circumstances is natural.
Against this criterion of naturalness, Epictetus argues that it is wholly
inadequate. If frequency were sufficient for naturalness, several activities
that are frequent but contrary to nature would have to be regarded as
natural.
Epictetus offers the example of tumours in 1.11.6-7:

ejpei; touvtou g’ e{neka kai; ta; fuvmata dei` levgein ejp’ ajgaqw` givne-
sqai tou` swvmato~, o{ti givnetai, kai; aJplw`" to; aJmartavnein ei\nai kata;
fuvsin, o{ti pavnte~ scedo;n h] oi{ ge plei`stoi aJmartavnomen.

“For, if we are to follow your reasoning, we would have to say that

tumours develop for the good of the body because they do develop and

6 See for instance Diss. 1.6.18-21 quoted further down in this section. I also deal with

this issue at the end of section 2.

7 This is a conception I have studied elsewhere and to which I shall not return in the
present paper. See Salles 2005: 97-110.
98 Ricardo Salles

even that errors are natural, because all or the most part of us are guilty
of them.”8

Epictetus’ idea seems to be that tumours are activities that take place
at a body, and that are fairly common, but that do not contribute to the
body’s good. They do not presumably because they hinder the adequate
working of its organic parts and of itself as a whole. In general, for any
an activity X that occurs in an entity Y, it is natural for X to occur in Y
depending on whether or not X contributes to the preservation and the
proper function of Y. This is the criterion that ought to be used for
determining the naturalness of something. Tumours would be unnatural
relative to living beings even though all living beings were simultaneously
to suffer tumours.
The other example given in the passage is error in humans (to; aJmar-
tavnein). In Epictetus’ epistemology, error is giving assent to false im-
pressions that seem to be true. The main source of error is our propensi-
ty to giving assent precipitately to impressions, i.e. to impressions that
we have not examined and tested beforehand as to whether they are true
or false. The more often we give assent precipitately, the stronger this
propensity becomes and the harder it becomes to act against it. In conse-
quence, the more we become prone to err. A major goal of Epictetus’
practical ethics is to help us fight and control this propensity. In fact, the
Discourses often portray Epictetus giving advice on this question. To quote
a typical passage (Diss. 1.27.1-2):

Tetracw`~ aiJ fantasivai givnontai hJmi`n. h] ga;r e[sti tina; <kai;> ou{-
tw~ faivnetai h] oujk o[nta oujde; faivnetai o{ti e[stin h] e[sti kai; ouj faivne-
tai h] oujk e[sti kai; faivnetai. loipo;n ejn pa`si touvtoi~ eujstocei`n e[rgon
ejsti; tou` pepaideumevnou.

“Impressions come to us in four ways. For either things are, and ap-
pear so to us, or they are not, and do not appear to be, or they are, and
do not appear to be, or they are not, and yet appear to be. Thus it is the

8 All translations from Epictetus are borrowed (with occasional slight variations)
from Gill & Hard 1995.
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 99

distinctive activity of the person who has completed his philosophical train-
ing to hit the mark in all these cases.”

As the text suggests, once the propensity has been controlled, the
training focuses on the discrimination of true impressions so as to “hit
the mark” by not to assent to anything but true impressions. But most of
the exercise reported in the Discourses are intended for persons in which
precipitation has become very strong. They rest on a detailed theory of
dispositions and of how they may be intensified or relaxed.9
In any case, the exercises reveal how important it is for Epictetus to
control our acts of assent for achieving the human good understood as
the full achievement of our proper function in the cosmos, our distinc-
tive activity (e[rgon) in the scale of nature. What is then our function in
the cosmos? A central text on this question is 1.6.18-21. In it, Epictetus
calls our function (e[rgon), or use (creiva), “understanding” (parakolouv-
qhsi~).10

ejkeivnwn e{kaston kataskeuavzei to; me;n w{st’ ejsqivesqai, to; d’ w{ste

uJphretei`n eij~ gewrgivan, to; d’ w{ste turo;n fevrein, to; d’ a[llo ejp’ a[llh/
creiva/ paraplhsivw/, pro;~ a} tiv~ creiva tou` parakolouqei`n tai`~ fanta-
sivai~ kai; tauvta~ diakrivnein duvnasqai. to;n d’ a[nqrwpon qeath;n eijshv-
gagen aujtou` te kai; tw`n e[rgwn tw`n aujtou`, kai; ouj movnon qeathvn, ajlla;
kai; ejxhghth;n aujtw`n. dia; tou`to aijscrovn ejsti tw/ ajnqrwvpw/ a[rcesqai kai;
katalhvgein o{pou kai; ta; a[loga, ajlla; ma`llon e[nqen me;n a[rcesqai, ka-
talhvgein de; ejf’ o} katevlhxen ejf’ hJmw`n kai; hJ fuvsi~. katevlhxen d’ ejpi;
qewrivan kai; parakolouvqhsin kai; suvmfwnon diexagwgh;n th` fuvsei.

“[God] constitutes each of the animals for some use, one to be eaten,
another to serve in farming, another for the production of cheese, and yet

9 See especially Diss. 2.18 discussed in Salles 2005: 101-110.

10 This passage is commented on in Dobbin 1998: 108-109 and Long 1996: 116-7
and 2002: 172-175. On parakolouv qhsi~ in Epictetus cf. 1.28.19-22, 2.8.5-6 and 2.10.3.
On this central concept in Epictetus and later philosophy, cf. Hahm 1992. On Stoic an-
thropocentrism, cf. the sources collected by von Arnim under SVF 2.1152-1167. As is
noted by Dobbin, a significant antecedent of this form of anthropocentrism is Aristotle,
Pol. 1256b15-22.
100 Ricardo Salles

another for some other similar use; and relative to these uses, what is the
need of understanding impressions, i.e. of being capable to judge them?
But god has introduced humans into the world as spectators of himself
and of his works; and not only as a spectators, but also interpreters of
them. For this reason, it is shameful that humans should begin and end
where the lower animals do. Rather, they ought rather to begin there, but
to end where nature itself has fixed our end. But it has fixed our end in
contemplation, understanding and a way of life in harmony with nature.”

According to this passage, the distinctive feature of humans within

the scale of nature is that although we “use impressions” (crwvmeqa fan-
tasiw`n) as other animals do, we also “understand” this use (parakolouv-
qomen th/̀ crhvsei tw`n fantasiw`n). The gist of the distinction has been
well described by others.11 Animals in general base their action on im-
pressions. But humans, in contrast with other animals, may critically ex-
amine their impressions through the use of reason, which enables them,
in principle, to determine whether or not the impression is true. In the
case of a practical impression (oJrmhtikh; fantasiva) –one that represents
a given course of action F as appropriate and worth performing– this
examination takes the form of an inquiry into whether F is really appro-
priate given that the only appropriate courses of action are those that are
in our power and in accordance with god’s providential plan.
This critical use of reason is referred to in this passage as our “being
capable to judge” (diakrivnein duvnasqai) impressions. In this respect, giv-
ing assent to a false impression, whether factual or practical, is against
human nature. Anyone who uses the critical capacity that defines human
nature, will never assent to a false impression. In some cases, it may be
difficult or impossible to determine whether an impression is true or
false. But in these cases, anyone who uses properly the capacity will not
be carried away by the impression by withholding assent. The present
passage is also good evidence that for Epictetus human nature possesses
a normative force: what is natural ought to be done and what is unnatur-
al ought to be avoided.

11 See notably Bonhöffer 1890: 74-6 and Hahm 1992. For further references, see Sa-
lles 2005: 98 n. 21.
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 101

To return to Diss. 1.11, even though most people do err (oi{ ge

plei`stoi aJmartavnomen), erring is not thereby natural. On the contrary,
it is unnatural because it deviates from the pattern of activity demanded
by our proper function within the cosmos. The analogy with tumours,
which actually interfere with, and threaten, the adequate working of the
body as a whole, may lie in the fact that anyone who errs repeatedly will
develop a propensity to assent to untested impressions, and this propen-
sity will represent a major obstacle to the adequate use of our critical ca-
pacity.

2. Why is the father´s action unnatural and blameworthy?

But why is the father’s action in Diss. 1.11 unnatural according to Epicte-
tus’ criterion? In other words, what is the similarity between the unnatu-
ralness of his action and the unnaturalness of tumours and error? As we
shall see, the similarity resides in that the action is motivated by an emo-
tion and emotions are, in Stoic theory, a case of error.
In Chrysippean Stoicism, endorsed by Epictetus, emotions are errors
because they involve assent to false evaluative impressions: the impres-
sion that there is something good or bad at hand, and the impression
that it is appropriate to react.12 To take two classic cases, fear involves
assent to the impressions that something bad is at hand and that it is ap-
propriate to avoid it, and anger assent to the impressions that someone
has harmed me and that I ought to take revenge. In either case, the error
lies in assenting to impressions that are actually false.
The example of revenge may help to understand this point. A burglar
broke into my house and stole my favorite painting. In order to experi-
ence anger for this fact, I must give assent both to the impression that
the theft is bad and that I should avenge myself by ensuring that the
burglar is caught and punished. The falsity of these two impressions, ac-
cording to Stoic axiology, lies in the fact that whatever is not in our

12 For discussion of the main sources, including Epictetus, cf. Sorabji 2000: 20-1, 29-
54 and 372-84.
102 Ricardo Salles

power (ejf’ hJmi`n) is indifferent, i.e. neither bad nor good,13 and that nei-
ther the theft nor the revenge are in my power: although I may have con-
tributed to prevent the theft (e.g. by using a more effective alarm system)
and I may now contribute to catch the thief (e.g. by helping the police
with any information that I may happen to have about the thief’s where-
abouts), the theft and the revenge also depend on causal factors other
than myself. And given that they are not (fully) in my power, they are in-
different. So, strictly speaking, it is false that the theft is bad and that re-
venge is appropriate. Something similar happens in the case of fear, the
emotion which is at the root of in Diss. 1.11. The father’s desertion of
her daughter is motivated by fear because it is an emotion (6: pavqo~) that
came about through the assent to the impressions that the suffering of
the child is bad and that he must run away from it. But in fact, Stoic axi-
ology tells us, the life of our children is indifferent because it is not in
our power (ejf’ hJmi`n).
Before I move on, I wish to comment on Epictetus’ conception of
what is in our power. There is strong evidence that on his view the only
things that are in our power (ejf’ hJmi`n) are purely mental activities such
as assent and the use of impressions, i.e. activities of the soul that do not
involve the use of the limbs and the bodily organs. For these are the only
activities whose execution cannot, even in principle, be thwarted by ex-
ternal factors. In the case of assent, whether or not I give assent to an
impression solely depends on me. This implies that not even god, as
something other than myself, could prevent me from giving assent to a
given impression or force me to give it. I quote an important passage
dealing with this issue (Diss. 1.6.40):

kaivtoi o{ ge qeo;~ ouj movnon e[dwken hJmi`n ta;~ dunavmei~ tauvta~, kaq’
a}~ oi[somen pa`n to; ajpobai`non mh; tapeinouvmenoi mhde; sugklwvmenoi uJp’
aujtou`, ajll’ o} hjn ajgaqou` basilevw~ kai; tai`~ ajlhqeivai~ patrov~, ajkwvlu-
ton tou`to e[dwken, ajnanavgkaston, ajparapovdiston, o{lon aujto; ejf’ hJmi`n

13 For a detailed discussion of this classic doctrine in connection with the topic of the
emotions, see Sorabji 2000: 169-180. One central text in Epictetus on the interrelation
between what is in our power (to; ejf j hJmi`n) and value is Diss. 4.1 (passages of which are
discussed in section 4 below). In early Stoicism, Antipater’s formula for the end already
suggests this interrelation (even though the term ejf j hJmi`n is not used in the formula it-
self). See Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.76, 9-15 Wachsmuth (= SVF III Antipater Tarsensis 57).
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 103

ejpoivhsen oujd’ auJtw/̀ tina pro;~ tou`to ijscu;n ajpolipwvn, w{ste kwlu`sai h]
ejmpodivsai.

“And yet god has not only granted us these faculties [viz. those re-
lated to the use of impressions], which enable us to endure everything
that happens without being humiliated or broken by it, but, like a good
king, and a true father, has given them to us free of all restraint, compul-
sion, or hindrance, and has put them under our complete control, nor
even reserving any power for himself to hinder or restrain.”

As Susanne Bobzien and Margaret Graver point out in this and other
similar passages,14 this is not evidence that in Epictetus assent escapes pre-
determination, as if my mind were in a realm beyond the causal network
that unifies the cosmos. Epictetus’ idea here is rather that, even though
my acts of assent are subject to causation, the origin of their causal deter-
mination is myself and nothing else. In this conception, no external fac-
tor can interfere in the process by which I determine my acts of assent.
Therefore, not even god, as something distinct from me, can have a role
to play in these acts. In consequence they are fully in my power. In con-
trast, any activity that requires the use of the body, e.g. walking, is not
fully in my power. For my body –whether and how I use it– is subject to
external coercion. In fact, having a body is a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for being capable of being acted upon by something other than
myself. It is a necessary condition because, as we have seen, we are the
sole cause of our mental activities, therefore, if I perform an activity F
that is thwarted by external factors, then, ex hypothesi, F is not purely
mental, but involves the use of the body. I return to Epictetus’ concep-
tion of what is in our power at the end of section 4. As we shall see
there, an activity that involves the use of the body may be fully in my
power under a certain description that qualifies the action, for example
walking-as-long-as-I-am-not-hindered. Under this description the action
is qualified in such a way that, by the very nature of the qualification, it
cannot find an external obstacle to its execution.
To conclude this section, the father’s desertion of his sick daughter in
Diss. 1.11 is wrong because it involves the assent to false impressions

14 Cf. 1998: 335 and 2003: 351 respectively.

104 Ricardo Salles

about the value of human life and this is something against human na-
ture. Firstly, it deviates from the pattern of activity demanded by our
proper function within the cosmos, namely, to examine critically our
impressions as to whether they are true or false and to withhold assent in
the case of uncertainty. And second, this deviation will only strengthen
the father’s propensity to assent to untested impressions, a propensity
that will actually interfere with, and threaten, the adequate use of our
critical capacity. In this argument, being wrong is entailed by being
against human nature. And this entailment is itself derived from a nor-
mative conception of human nature, according to which whatever is
against nature is wrong and whatever is in accordance with human na-
ture is right.

3. Right and consistent: 1.11.16-26.

The second major argument in Diss. 1.11 seeks to prove that the father’s
action is wrong comes in sections 16-26. It advances a second sense in
which the action is wrong: it is wrong because it is inconsistent with the
father’s affection for his daughter. In this new argument, the wrongness
of the action does not reside in its being against nature, as was the case
in the previous argument, but in its being against the father’s own
filostorgiva. In fact, these are two logically independent criteria: as will
be seen in section 4 an action may manifest filostorgiva and, in general,
oijkeivwsi", and yet be against human nature. The shift from one criterion
to the other is well marked in the text at 1.11.20:

ajfei`nai nosou`n to; paidivon kai; ajfevnta ajpelqei`n o{ti me;n oujk eujlov-
giston oujk oi\maiv s’ ajnterei`n. uJpoleivpetai d’ hJma`~ skopei`n eij filov-
storgon.

“Well, then, I believe you will not deny that to run away and leave a
sick child is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider whether it
be consistent with affection.”

The argument used by Epictetus to bring out the inconsistency be-

tween the father’s action and his filostorgiva has a clearly Socratic char-
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 105

acter that has been well described by some commentators.15 The core of
the inconsistency, the argument shows, is a logical contradiction within
the father between, on the one hand, beliefs necessarily involved in the
action and, on the other, desires necessarily involved in filostorgiva.
The action involves the belief that the young child should have been left
on her own by everybody and, hence, that her death is appropriate. But
this contradicts the desire, necessarily involved in filostorgiva, to pre-
serve its object, in this case, the young girl. To appreciate the contradic-
tion, we may recall that in Stoic theory a desire, or impulse (oJrmh)v , to
perform and action F necessarily requires –and in some sources it is
even identical to– the belief that F is appropriate.16 In our example, the
father’s desire to preserve the life of his daughter requires the belief in
the appropriateness of the preservation of her life. But, if so, the logical
contradiction arises: the father’s action presupposes the belief B1 in the
appropriateness of the child’s death, whereas his filostorgiva presup-
poses the opposite belief B2 in the appropriateness of the child’s pre-
servation. The contradiction between B1 and B2 is logical insofar as their
content are logically incompatible.
Let us consider the text. To begin, Epictetus points out to the father
how absurd it is to say that, given the affection that the mother, the
nurse and the attendant of the child experience for her, they ought to
have deserted her and left her as he did. But if everyone who cares for
her had deserted her, she would have been left to die alone or in alien
hands (1.11.23).

e[dei ou\n kajkei`non ajfevnta ajpelqei`n, ei\q’ ou{tw~ e[rhmon kai; ajbohvqh-
ton ajpoleifqh`nai to; paidivon dia; th;n pollh;n filostorgivan tw`n gonevwn
uJmw`n kai; tw`n peri; aujto; h] ejn tai`~ cersi;n tw`n ou[te stergovntwn ou[te
khdomevnwn ajpoqanei`n;

“Should he not also [i.e. in addition to the mother and the nurse]
have gone away and left her, so that in consequence the child would
have been left alone and helpless because of the great affection of you

15
Cf. Dobbin 1998: 131-2 and Long 2002: 79.
16
A detailed account of this thesis and of Stoic action theory in general is offered in
Inwood 1985: 42-101.
106 Ricardo Salles

her parents and those around her, or would have died, perhaps, in the
hands of people who neither loved her nor cared for her?”

Yet Epictetus argues that this is exactly a conclusion that father has
to accept in order to be consistent with his belief that it was right for him
to run away from his daughter (1.11.24):

kai; mh;n ejkei`nov ge a[nison kai; a[gnwmon, o{ ti~ auJtw/̀ prosh`kon oi[etai
dia; to; filovstorgo~ ei\nai, tou`to toi`~ oJmoivw~ filostorgou`sin mh; ejfiev-
nai;

“But it is not unreasonable and unfair that what you think is right in
yourself, on account of your affection, should not be allowed to others,
who have the very same affection as you?”

In other words, if the father acted as he did, he must have believed

that the action was right for him and for anyone with the same affection
(filostorgiva). And given that the child would have died as a conse-
quence of being left alone by everyone with the same affection, the fa-
ther’s belief that it was right to leave her alone necessitates the belief that
it was right for her to die. This is B1. Now, this belief, the argument runs,
is inconsistent with the father’s filostorgiva for the child. For given this
belief “we can only conclude that your behaviour was by no means affec-
tionate” (1.11.26: eij de; tau`ta, uJpoleivpetai mhdamw`~ e]ti filovstorgon
ei\nai to; pracqevn).
This part of the argument runs under two assumptions that deserve
attention. One backs up the claim that if the father believes the action is
right (B2) he must also believe that it is right for anyone. This assump-
tion may be spelled out as follows:

(A1) If I love someone S and believe that, given my affection for S, it

is right for me to perform certain action F towards S, I must also believe
that it is right for anyone with this affection to perform F towards S.

The other assumption backs up the claim that if the father believes
that running away is right for anyone with the affection, he must also be-
lieve that death of the child is also right. This assumption concerns the
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 107

logical connection between beliefs whose contents are causally connect-

ed:

(A2) If I believe that a certain action F is right and will cause a certain
event E, it is inconsistent for me not to believe that E is right (if I be-
lieve the causes are right, I must believe that the effects also are).

Another aspect of this argument that also deserves attention is a fur-

ther conclusion drawn by Epictetus about causation. Given the inconsis-
tency between the father’s action and his philostorgia, this affection cannot
be the cause of the action. The asumption may be expressed in the fol-
lowing way:

(A3) If I perform an action F, but I also experience an affection that

requires me to perform an action Y contrary to F, then given the incon-
sistency between F and Y, the affection cannot be the cause of my per-
forming F.

In the example, the father’s deserting his sick daughter cannot be

caused by his affection for her because his affection requires the action
of taking care of her and this action is inconsistent, i.e. incompatible with
running away from her. The term for ‘cause’ in this discussion is to; ki-
nh`san at 1.11.27 and to; ai[tion at 1.11.28 and later in the Discourse. In
general, Diss. 1.11 is a central text for understanding Epictetus’ views on
causation, and (A3) complements well some of other ideas he puts for-
ward on the necessary condition for something to be the cause of anoth-
er.17

4. Is filostorgiva consistent with human nature?

An action motivated by filostorgiva must involve the desire to preserve

the life of its object. In Diss. 1.11, had the father acted otherwise and
stayed by the side of her sick daughter thinking that the preservation of

17 Diss. 1.11 also sheds light on the relation between the causal powers of something
and its capacity for opposite effects. Cf. sections 27-37.
108 Ricardo Salles

her life is appropriate, his action would have been consistent with filo-
storgiva. But how can an action that involves the desire to preserve the
life and health of someone be consistent with Stoic axiology? For, ac-
cording to Stoic axiology, the preservation of any individual human life
and health is not in our power and is, therefore, indifferent. Thus, belief
in Stoic axiology seems to rule the desire to preserve the life and health
of anyone. This reveals a general tension in Stoicism between axiology
and oijkeivwsi". The root of the tension is the theoretical thesis that any-
thing that is not in our power is indifferent and the empirical claim that
the preservation of human life and death is not in our power. For how
can I reasonably seek the preservation of the life and health of other
people, as oijkeivwsi" demands, while thinking that they are not in my
power? In the present section, I intend to point out in Epictetus one
possible answer of reply to this question. The key lies in the notion of
impulse “with reservation” and the idea, implicit in this notion, that one
may believe that a certain action F is not one’s power and yet consis-
tently exercise the impulse with reservation for F-ing.
What is, then, an impulse with reservation? The term I translate as
“reservation”, uJpexaivresi~, is rare in Stoicism.18 But it is nevertheless a
central notion in Stoic action theory and, according to one source, reser-
vation affects all the desires or impulses of the Stoic sage.19 In general
terms, reservation is a strategy, or plan, aimed at avoiding the frustration
and pain that may result from the non-satisfaction of a desire. Passages
dealing with this strategy or plan, but in which the term uJpexaivresi~
does not occur, are abundant in the Discourses. In the recent scholarly and
philosophical literature on Stoic reservation, has centered on how this
avoidance is supposed to be achieved. Regarding this question, there are
two different interpretations that need comment. I begin with a short ac-
count of each, and then propose a third interpretation, which differs in
some crucial respects from these two.

18 For a close analysis of the sources, cf. Brennan 2000: 152-5 and 170. Brennan’s
paper is the fullest account of Stoic reservation nowadays. I discuss his interpretation be-
low. See also Inwood 1985 (esp. 120-2), Long & Sedley 1987 (esp. vol. 2, 417), Nuss-
baum 1994 (esp. 399) and Stephens 2007 (esp. 102-6). Also important is Sorabji 2000:
53-4, 219-20, 317 and 329.
19 Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.115, 5 Wachsmuth (= SVF 3.564).
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 109

On one interpretation, developed by William Stephens, an impulse or

desire with reservation is one which may fail to attain its object, but in
which the agent’s frustration is reduced to a minimum.20 The frustration
is milder than in unsuccessful impulses without reservation, because the
impulse with reservation is not as phenomenologically intense as an impulse
without reservation. This phenomenological intensity is described by Ste-
phens as a question emotional abandon:

“[b]ut even if a greater gratification were afforded by this unchecked

absorption in an external, the Stoic would consider such enhanced pres-
ent pleasure not to be worth the future anguish resulting from the inevi-
table absence of the external that will accompany that pleasure. By not
soberly reminding oneself that one’s loved one may at any moment
leave, one is recklessly indulging in the external with such emotional
abandon that one is unnecessarily risking the security of one’s happiness.
One is inviting the mental pain that will result from separation from the
external to which one has imprudently allowed oneself to become deep-
ly, and so dangerously, attached.”21

This emotional abandon explain why agents who desire without res-
ervation experience mental pain when the desire fails. Reservation, in
contrast with this emotional abandon, is a process by which the agent
himself limits the phenomenological intensity of the impulse in such a
way as to be able to limit his involvement with the impulse and, hence,
to mitigate the pain resulting from its non-satisfaction.
The other interpretation is offered by Tad Brenann.22 It is earlier than
Stephens’ and similar to it in some respects. In particular, Brennan also

20 See Stephens 2007: 97-109. Although Stephens himself does not use the term “res-
ervation” in this section of his book, reservation is clearly the subject matter of the pas-
sages he discusses here.
21 Stephens 2007: 193.
22 In Brennan 2000 (esp. 161-7). His interpretation is intended as a revision of earlier
interpretations and notably of Inwood 1985 (esp. 120-122). Against Inwood (discussed in
detail on pp. 156-161), Brennan contends that reservation does not rule out the non-
satisfaction of the impulse, and is not a qualification to the content of the impulse, but a
belief that accompanies it and whose function is to facilitate its elimination with a view to
avoid pain. See below.
110 Ricardo Salles

believes that Stoic reservation is not aimed at securing the satisfaction of

the impulse, but at becoming able to avoid successfully the negative
emotional impact of its eventual failure. For a desire with reservation,
even exercised by the Stoic sage, may fail. In contrast with Sthephens,
however, Brennan argues that the frustration is not reduced or mitigated,
but eliminated. This is achieved through the elimination of the impulse
itself before its non-satisfaction causes the frustration and pain. Once the
agent foresees that his desire will not be satisfied because a certain state
of affairs, contrary to his desire, will obtain, he extinguishes the desire
entirely and substitutes it with a new desire, compatible with this state of
affairs. This is why reservation is not an act that diminishes or mitigates
the phenomenological intensity of the desire, as in Stephens, but a much
more radical process consisting in eliminating a desire and creating an-
other that substitutes it. To give an example given by Brennan (and
based on Epictetus, Diss. 2.9.6-7):

“True, yesterday the Sage had the impulse to be healthy today, and
today something opposed to that has befallen him: he is sick. Since
something opposed to his earlier desire has befallen him, that earlier
desire has been frustrated, and things have not gone as he wished. But
nothing that is now happening is contrary to the desires and impulses he
now has, exactly because, as soon as he realized that he was sick, he ex-
tinguished his impulse not to be sick, and replaced it with an impulse to
be sick (...) In consequence, the doctrine of impulse with reservation
does nothing to prevent the frustration of the impulse, in the sense of its
non-satisfaction. Reservation is, however, a necessary step towards elimi-
nating what we might call ‘phenomenological frustration’, that is, a cer-
tain painful psychic reaction to the non-satisfaction of the impulse. Phe-
nomenological frustration arises from the retention of the original im-
pulse, in the face of its evident non-satisfaction; still wanting not to be
sick, even once one has obviously gotten sick.”23

Brennan does not say much about the details of the mental process
by which this elimination is carried out. But one crucial component is a
certain belief about the fallibility of the original impulse. For example, if

23 Brennan 2000: 163 and 167.

 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 111

my original impulse is the impulse to F, the corresponding belief is that I

shall F unless it is fated that I will not F. Given this belief, it becomes
easier to eliminate the original impulse. According to Brennan:

“...this responsiveness to the turn of events was facilitated by his hav-

ing foreseen that he might get sick, even at the time that he had the im-
pulse to remain healthy”.24

I believe that both interpretations may find strong support in the evi-
dence and that the differences between them reveal that the sources are
not always fully consistent with each other. Even if we limit ourselves to
texts where the term uJpexaivresi~, or its Latin equivalent exceptio, occur,
there is evidence for either position. The same occurs if we take into
consideration texts where the term does not occur, but in which it is
clear that the phenomenon is implicitly dealt with.25 Now, as I shall ar-
gue, if we focus on the texts that deal implicitly with reservation, there is
room for yet another interpretation, different from Stephen’s and Bren-
nan’s. I call it I3 in contrast with these two, which I call I1 (Stephens) and
I2 (Brennan). The distinctive claim of I3 is that it holds, against I1 and I2,
that the satisfaction of an impulse with reservation is always guaranteed,
and it is guaranteed thanks to a qualification of the object of the impulse.
In this case, the frustration is avoided, not through its mitigation as in I1,
nor by the elimination of the impulse as in I2, but by securing the attain-
ment of its object. Evidence for this comes from Epictetus himself at
Diss. 3.24.84-87, a passage dealing with moral training.

tiv~ ou\n hJ pro;~ tou`to a[skhsi~; prw`ton me;n hJ ajnwtavtw kai; kuriwtav-
th kai; eujqu;~ w{sper ejn puvlai~, o{tan tini; prospavsch~, oujdeni; tw`n ajna-
fairevtwn, ajllav tini toiouvtw/ gevnei, oi|ovn ejsti cuvtra, oi|on uJavlinon

24 Brennan 2000: 163.

25 The strongest evidence in favour of Stephens comes mainly from Diss. 3.24.84-7
and 88 (cited by Stephens on pp. 102-103, although see my argument below), and from
Seneca, de tranquillitate animi 13.2-3 Rosenbach (cited and discussed by Brennan). The
strongest evidence in favour of Brennan’s thesis that reservation does not rule out non-
satisfaction and the original desire is eliminated and substituted comes from Stobaeus,
Ecl. 2.115, 5 Wachsmuth (= SVF 3.564) and Chrysippus ap. Epictetus, Diss. 2.6.9, both
cited on pp. 152-5.
112 Ricardo Salles

pothvrion, i{n’ o{tan katagh/̀, memnhmevvo~ [mh;n] mh; taracqh`~. ou{tw~ kai;
ejnqavd’, eja;n paidivon sautou` katafilh/̀~, eja;n ajdelfovn, eja;n fivlon, mhdev-
pote ejpidw/̀~ th;n fantasivan eij~ a{pan mhde; th;n diavcusin ejavsh/~ proel-
qei`n ejf’ o{son aujth; qevlei, ajll v ajntivspason, kwvluson, oi|on oiJ toi`~ qri-
ambeuvousin ejfestw`te~ o[pisqen kai; uJpomimnhv/skonte~, o{ti a[nqrwpoiv
eijsin. toiou`tovn ti kai; su; uJpomivmnh/ske seautovn, o{ti qnhto;n filei`~, ouj-
de;n tw`n seautou` filei`~ ejpi; tou` parovnto~ soi devdotai, oujk ajnafaivre-
ton oujd’ eij~ a{pan, ajll’ wJJ~ su`kon, wJ~ stafulhv, th/̀ tetagmevnh/ w{ra/ tou`
e[tou~ a]n de; ceimw`no~ ejpipoqh/̀~, mwro;~ ei\. ou{tw~ ka]n to;n uiJo;n h] to;n fiv-
lon tovte poqh/̀~, o{te ouj devdotaiv soi, i[sqi, o{ti ceimw`no~ su`kon ejpipo-
qei`~. oi|on gavr ejsti ceimw;n pro;~ su`kon, toiou`tovn ejsti pa`sa hJ ajpo; tw`n
o{lwn perivstasi~ pro;~ ta; kat vaujth;n ajnairouvmena.

“What, then, is the proper training for this? Firstly, the highest and
principal form of training, and one that stands, so to speak, right at the
entrance way to the enterprise, is that, when you become attached to
something, let it not be as though it were to something like an earthen-
ware pot or crystal goblet, so that if it happens to be broken, you may re-
member what kind of thing it was and not be distressed. So in this, too,
when you kiss your child, or your brother, or your friend, never entirely
give way to your imagination, nor allow your elation to progress as far as
it will; but curb it in, restrain it, like those who stand behind generals
when they ride in triumph and remind them that they are men. In a simi-
lar way, you too should remind yourself that what you love is mortal,
that what you love is not your own. It is granted to you for the present
while, and not irrevocably, nor forever, but like a fig or a bunch of
grapes in the appointed season; and if you long for it in the winter, you
are a fool. So if you long for your son or your friend when he is not grant-
ed to you, know that you are longing for a fig in winter. For as winter is
to a fig, so is very state of affairs that arises from the order of things in
relation to what is destroyed in accordance with that state of affairs.”

The argument focuses on love and, in fact, on filostorgiva, as was

made clear earlier in this Discourse (sections 58-60). The moral training in
question requires a discipline regarding how I must deal with my desires
in order to avoid frustration and trouble (tarach)v . To avoid frustration,
Epictetus argues, I must treat the object of desire –spouse, children or
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 113

parents– as something that may be taken away from me. Notice that the
object of desire is not out of reach. On the contrary: it is something that
the agent may fully attain. The only proviso is that its attainment is tem-
porally limited – “it is granted to you for the present while” (ejpi; tou` parovn-
to~). In consequence, to avoid frustration, we should not behave as if
our present control and enjoyment of the object were to last forever.
Notice how the success of the desire is contingent upon the way in
which its object is qualified. In the case of filostorgiva, the qualification
concerns the duration of the possession. If the duration is restricted to
the present moment, the success is certain: my desire to be with my
loved ones now will not be subject to failure. In this example, the tempo-
ral operator “now” should modify the propositional content of the de-
sire “to be with my loved ones”. Otherwise, if the object of my desire is
not so restricted and, notably, if I desire to be with my loved ones forever,
the desire will not be satisfied and this failure will trouble my mind.
The claim above is not restricted to filostorgiva. It also applies to
desires and impulses that have nothing to do with it, for example, my de-
sire or impulse for eating grapes or figues. In this case too, the qualifica-
tion that guarantees success is temporal. My impulse for eating grapes in
summer will succeed in contrast with my impulse for eating grapes in win-
ter, which will certainly fail. It is unlikely that for Epictetus the desires
considered in these examples cannot possibly be thwarted by external
factors. It is plain that other qualifications to the proposition “to eat
grapes” –in addition to temporal ones– are plainly needed to guarantee
its success. I suggest some of them below. In any case, the idea is clear.
Whether a desire or impulse will succeed or fail wholly depends on how
its object is qualified. In this interpretation I3, reservation is a process by
which the agent qualifies the object of his desire in such a way that it will
not fail, and it is a necessary condition for the desire to succeed.26

26 I am not convinced by Brennan’s thesis (2000: 170-1) that reservation is never a

second-order desire. If by “reservation” (uJpexaivresi~) we understand a plan aimed at
avoiding the frustration and pain that may result from the non-satisfaction of a desire –
and the evidence that Brennan himself examines (2000: 151-5) suggests that what the
Stoics meant was at least this – then my belief that a certain desire (e.g. my desire to be
with my loved ones forever) is inappropriate and that I should avoid it may perfectly be
part of my reservation. Here reservation is expressed through a second-order desire (my
desire not to desire a certain thing) just as much as it may be expressed through a first-
order desire (e.g. my desire to be with my loved ones, not forever, but now). The exam-
114 Ricardo Salles

From the evidence examined so far in favour of I3, there appears to

be a close connection in Epictetus between the topic of impulse with re-
servation and the topic of what is in our power (ejf’ hJmi`n). An impulse
that will succeed is one whose object is an action that is in the agent’s
power to perform, and reservation is a process by which the agent qual-
ifies the object of his impulse in such a way that the action is –with the
appropriate qualification– fully in his power to perform. To find exam-
ples of this we may look at the central sections of Diss. 4.1, Epictetus’
lengthy discourse On Freedom (Peri; ejleuqeriva~). For instance, in section
67 Epictetus suggests some qualifications one may think of in order for
the object of an impulse to be fully in our power:

to;n ajgro;n d’ ejpi; soiv ejstin e[cein, o{tan qevlh/~ kai; ejf’ o{son qevlei~
kai; oi|on qevlei~; – ou[. [...] – a]n de; ta; tevkna sou ζh`n qevlh~ ex a{panto~
h] th;n gunai`ka h] to;n ajdelfo;n h] tou;~ fivlou~, ejpi; soiv ejstin; – oujde;
tau`ta.

“Well is it in your own power to have land when you please, and as
long as you please, and such as you please? –No [...] Well, if you wish
ever so much for your children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or
your friends, is it in your own power?– No, nor this.”

In addition to the time and the duration of the fulfillment, mentioned

in both examples, Epictetus also refers to the condition in which the ob-
ject is – a qualification captured by the oi|on. This condition is not in our
power. And further down in the text, in sections 72-73, a new example is
given: the manner in which we perform a given action may or may not be
in my power. For instance, although walking unhindered is not in my
power, it strongly suggests that something like walking-as-long-as-noth-
ing-external-hinders is entirely in my power.

tiv ou\n, a]n ejmou` oJrmhvsanto~ peripath`sai ejkei`nov~ me kwluvsh/; – tiv

sou kwluvsei; mhv ti th;n sugkatavqesin; – ou[ ajlla; to; swmavtion. – naiv,

ple cited by Brennan from Marcus Aurelius 6.50 is difficult because it seems to be of a
desire for reservation (what the agent desires is to be reserved).
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 115

wJ~ livqon. – e[stw ajll’ oujkevti ejgw; peripatw`. – tiv~ dev soi ei\pen to; peri-
path`sai so;n e[rgon ejsti;n ajkwvluton;

“Yes, but what if my impulse is to walk freely and another person

hinders me? –What part of you can he hinder? Not your assent, surely?–
No, but my poor body. Yes, as he could a stone –So be it; but I can no
longer go for my walk– And who told you that walking was an action of
your own that cannot be hindered?”

If the interpretation I have been developing is correct, there would be

some desires that do not need reservation in order to guarantee their
success. They are those whose object are purely mental activities. These
activities, as I argued in section 1, are fully in our power. For they are the
only ones whose execution is not susceptible, not even in principle, to be
thwarted by external factors. In consequence, there is no need to qualify
a purely mental activity in order for it to be fully in my power. In fact, a
purely mental activity cannot be qualified in the way non-mental activities
such as walking can be. For example, it would be absurd to qualify the
activity of assenting to a given impression F in order for it to be in my
power. For this qualification –“assenting-to-F-as-long-as-nothing-exter-
nal-hinders”– is self-contradictory given the idea that mental activities
are not liable, not even in principle, to external hindrance. Therefore,
purely mental activities are necessarily in my power without qualification.
Another way of expressing this idea is by saying that they are in my
power by definition. For by definition an activity is in my power if and only
if I am the only factor involved in its causation and, hence, if and only if
nothing other than myself has anything to contribute to bringing it
about. And by definition purely mental activities cannot be hindered by
external factors. This marks off these activities from activities that do
involve the use of the body. These do require some qualification in order
to be fully in my power. Walking is in my power, but provided that it is
qualified thus: walking-as-long-as-nothing-external-hinders. With this qual-
ification walking is necessarily in my power, but in contrast with mental
activities, the qualification is needed in order for it to be in my power. It
is for this reason that the success of desires whose object are activities
that involve the use of the body requires reservation as a necessary con-
dition.
116 Ricardo Salles

In sum, the evidence considered so far in favour of I3 shows how re-

servation may secure the satisfaction of desires and impulses. It modifies
their content by qualifying their object in such a way that it becomes
something fully in our power. This evidence also helps to explain how an
agent who believes that a certain action F is not in his power may con-
sistently exercise an impulse for F-ing. He may do so if, knowing that F-
ing simpliciter is not in his power, he also knows that it is an action that
may become in his power with certain qualifications, and he desires to F
with these qualifications. And, according to I3, reservation is the act by
which the agent qualifies the action.
This conclusion is the key to the problem of how in Epictetus oijkeiv-
wsi" and axiology are mutually consistent. The problem was how I can
reasonably seek the preservation of the life and health of other people, as
oijkeivwsi" requires, while thinking that their life and health are not in my
power and hence indifferent? The answer is that this is reasonable pro-
vided that my action is guided by an impulse with reservation in the
sense envisaged by I3. The desire is directed at an action that is fully in my
power, namely, something like “preserving-the-life-and-health-of-my-re-
latives-as-long-as-I-am-not-hindered”. In contrast, the action that, accord-
ing to my belief, is not in my power is an action without the proper qual-
ification, namely, preserving-the-health-of-my-relatives tout court. In other
words, my belief and my desire have different objects: one is the action
without the qualifications needed for it to in my power, whereas the
other is the action with the qualifications in virtue which it is fully in my
power. Thus, reservation is the key to our initial problem.

5. Final remarks

Although we do not find in Epictetus a systematic theoretical treatment

of oijkeivwsi" such as the one we find in Hierocles or in early Stoicism,
Epictetus sheds light on several phenomena related to one important
form of oijkeivwsi" – filostorgiva – and, thus indirectly on oijkeivwsi" it-
self. More than any other ancient source, Epictetus brings out necessary
and sufficient conditions for an impulse or desire to be consistent with
this form of oijkeivwsi". His argument comes in detailed discussion of a
particular case in Diss. 1.11, which also establishes a precise connection
 Oijkeivwsi" in Epitectus 117

between the conditions under which a desire is consistent with human

nature and those under which it is consistent with oijkeivwsi". In so
doing, Epictetus addresses a central problem in Stoic ethics, namely, how
can I reasonably seek the preservation of the life and health of other
people, as oijkeivwsi" requires, while thinking that their life and health are
not in my power and hence indifferent, as human nature requires?
This problem affects the relation in Stoic ethics between two of its
constitutive components: the theory of oijkeivwsi", on the one hand, and
axiology, on the other. For Stoic axiology is precisely the theory that
establishes a close connection between value and what is our power. As I
have argued, they key to this tension is Epictetus’ concept of reservation
(uJpexaivresi~). I offered an interpretation of this concept according to
which anyone who acts with the belief or knowledge that a given action
is not in his power may still consistently desire with reservation to per-
form it, i.e. to perform it under a description in which it is qualified it in
such a way that it becomes something that is fully in his power.27

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Mexico City

27 I wish to thank the editor of this volume for his invitation to participate in this
project and for his comments on an earlier version of the paper. The research for the
paper was undertaken thanks to the financial support of projects CONACYT CB2008-01
100539 and UNAM-PAPIIT IN401408. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the Séminaire Léon Robin (Université de Paris IV - ENS Ulm) in April 2010 and I am
thankful to the audience for discussion of some of the ideas developed here.
118 Ricardo Salles

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greci e latini, vol. I,1, Florence: Olschki.
Bobzien, S. 1998: Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bonhöffer, A. 1890: Epictet und die Stoa, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann
Verlag.
Brennan, T. 2000: “Reservation in Epictetus”, Archiv für Geschichte der Phi-
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