Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.

Best Practices and Perspectives for Cross Connections in Twin-

Tube Rail Tunnels.
M. Boitel
HSR Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil, University of Applied Sciences of Eastern Switzerland
(FHO).
S. Rigert
Amberg Engineering Ltd., Regensdorf, Switzerland.
M. Bettelini
Amberg Engineering Ltd., Regensdorf, Switzerland.

ABSTRACT: Cross connections represent a fundamental safety facility for rail tunnels. The key
parameters characterizing cross connections, including maximum distance, minimum dimensions,
technical equipment and level of protection, depend on a number of regulations and vary
significantly from country to country. For this reason, a research study was initiated by Amberg
Engineering Ltd. in cooperation with the Swiss Technical University HSR Hochschule für Technik
Rapperswil (CH) and ITA COSUF for investigating the international state-of-the-art and identifying
best practices. Experiences from former professional fire fighters are used to support the proposed
solutions for best practices. This paper summarizes the main findings from this investigation.

1 INTRODUCTION

Several types of cross connections are used in

different railways tunnels, Figure 1. This paper
mainly focusses on connections between two
single-track rail tunnels. This tunnel concept is
common for new tunnels and was adopted for
all the worldwide longest rail tunnels in the
Alpine range (Boissonnas and Bettelini, 2016).
Many features and requirements are common to
other kinds of cross connections and shall not be
discussed separately.
In spite of their universally recognized
importance for tunnel safety, existing
regulations on cross connections are both
generic and heterogeneous and account for large
international variations. There is furthermore a
large gap between the state-of-the-art adopted
for the new long Alpine tunnels and the
minimum normative requirements.
There is therefore an urgent need for
international unification towards higher
technical standards. This was recognized by
ITA COSUF, who launched an effort for
developing a specific guideline. Figure 1. Common types of cross connections in rail
tunnels.

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 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.

This paper, mainly based on Boitel’s (2016) A key requirement for a successful self-
MS Thesis, focusses on existing regulations, rescue is preventing panic. This aspect shall be
functional requirements and best practices. briefly discussed in the following chapter.
The requirements on cross connections for
supporting intervention are manifold.
2 ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF CROSS Intervention can use the incident or the safe
CONNECTIONS tube. In both cases, cross connections represent
an essential element for the intervention’s
2.1 Overview logistic and safety. The requirements are
Twin-tube rail tunnels are increasingly common manifold: Protection against smoke penetration,
for a number of reasons: increased safety in case water and power supply, space for rescue
of incident, pressure fluctuations related to high operations and rest etc. Some of these topics
speed, maintenance requirements and much will be developed in the following chapters.
more. The main functional requirements for
cross connections can be broadly classified as 2.3 Further requirements
follows:
• Safety (self-rescue and intervention in case of
Installing technical equipment in cross passages
incident, particularly in case of fire) significantly reduces deterioration and
• Technical requirements (technical installa-
simplifies maintenance. Technical equipment is
therefore commonly accommodated in cross
tions, cables transit etc.)
• Maintenance (access, space, ventilation of
connections. The implications are manifold:
• The safety of the escaping persons and of the
tunnel tubes).
rescue teams must be properly accounted for.
• The cables and equipment installed in the
2.2 Safety cross connections shall be protected against
According to the European TSI SRT (2014), voluntary or accidental damage in case of
“The line of defence for the promotion of safety emergency or exercises.
• Forced ventilation and/or cooling could be
in tunnels comprises four successive layers:
Prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue”. required.
• Depending on number and size of cables,
Evacuation and rescue are the most important
functions of cross connections. If a burning train technical floors could be necessary.
• Electrical equipment must be protected
comes to a stop inside the tunnel (rescue
stations within very long tunnels shall not be against dust from the tunnel tubes
discussed in this paper), self-rescue represents
the only realistic option for the up to 1 500
persons on a large train. In this very rare
eventuality, all self-rescue facilities and
concepts are severely challenged:
• Adequate person egress capacity of all self-
rescue facilities, from the train’s exit, through
walkways and cross passages to a safe area.
• Suitable control of environmental conditions
(in terms of visibility, temperature, air quality
etc.) along the whole escape path during the
entire self-rescue time.
• Proper guidance through train staff, fixed and
dynamic signaling and facilities for
Figure 2. Equipped cross connection in the Gotthard Base
communication (conventional SOS phones, Tunnel (Switzerland, 57 km).
loudspeakers, visual panels etc.).
• Full protection of the cross passages against
In the Gotthard Base Tunnel, mechanical
smoke penetration during all phases of the ventilation was installed in each cross
fire incident, including the intervals, when the connection in order to maintain a suitable
fire-protection doors must stay open. temperature of 35°C for sensitive electronic
equipment and technical floors were installed in
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 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
all cross connections to allow for protected
cabling between different electrical facilities.
Cross connections also play an important role
during tunnel construction, particularly for very
long tunnel. Twin-tube tunnels are excavated in
parallel and cross connections are fundamental
for construction-site safety and ventilation as
well as for logistic reasons. These requirements
are in most cases less severe than those resulting
from operational safety.
2.4 How much safety?
Severe fire incidents with train stop and
emergency evacuation inside tunnels are
fortunately very rare events. The need for costly
safety measures, such as cross connections, is
frequently challenged, based on statistical
arguments. One possible consequence are
compromises: larger distances between
emergency exits, narrower escape paths,
reduced thermal protection etc. At first sight,
such approaches could find obvious justification
based on purely quantitative considerations,
such as cost-benefits analyses arising from
quantitative risk analysis.
This view alone would be severely
misleading. What would happen in case of fire
with train stop in the tunnel? Too long escape
times, insufficient control of smoke
propagation, insufficient thermal protection,
panic. A catastrophic disaster with several 100
victims could be a real possibility. In our
opinion, his shall be prevented and a “fair
chance for escape” shall be provided: whenever
incidents occur, the persons affected must have
a fair chance of survival.
The main conclusion is that considerations
based on the statistical quantification of risk
must be integrated by a proper scenario
analysis. ITA COSUF (Reinke and Bettelini
2014) issued a guideline for assessing
performance-based fire safety design of
underground rail systems. Its systematic use is
strongly recommended as an essential
component of safety design.
3 HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Issues related to human behavior play an
increasing role in safety design. Let’s start with
a definition (Wikipedia, 2017): “Panic is a
sudden sensation of fear, which is so strong as
to dominate or prevent reason and logical
3
thinking, replacing it with overwhelming
feelings of anxiety and frantic agitation
consistent with an animalistic fight-or-flight
reaction. Panic may occur singularly in
individuals or manifest suddenly in large groups
as mass panic (closely related to herd
behavior).” It is clear that such behavior must be
prevented at any time for achieving an
acceptable safety level.
Recent investigations (see e.g. Holenstein
and Haller, 2014) show that in case of a
catastrophic event a typical population can be
roughly subdivided in three main groups:
• Most people react in an appropriate manner,
or are at least prepared doing so, if this
behavior is properly supported.
• Part of the population tends to behave in an
inconspicuous manner. Their behavior can be
influenced through appropriate safety
measures.
• It cannot be ruled out, that smaller groups
react in an inappropriate manner. Such
behavior usually develops in time.
This topic is excessively complex for being
treated in a satisfactory manner herein.
However, two conclusions seem important:
• “Research has shown that the concept of
panic and the belief that individuals naturally
engage in other antisocial behaviors during
disaster scenarios is, at best, overexag-
gerated” (Gantt and Gantt, 2012)
• Means for influencing human behavior in a
positive manner can be identified. They
should include proper safety design, proper
safety management and proper information
prior to and during the emergency.
4 REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES
The 57 km long Gotthard Base Tunnel
(Switzerland, in operation since 2016) has in
total 178 cross connections with an average
distance of 312 m. The average distance
between the tunnel tubes is 40 m. Equipment are
installed in the cross connections without
separation from the area used for self-rescue
(Figure 2). The main dimensions of the standard
cross connections are 28 x 3.5 x 3.5 m (length x
width x height).
The cross connections are protected by
sliding doors with the following key
characteristics: main dimensions 1.6 x 2.2 m,
thermal protection 90 min (EI90), design
pressure fluctuations ±20 kPa. Cross
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
connections have emergency lighting,
emergency phones and dedicated ventilation.
Smoke penetration in case of fire is inhibited
through the overpressure created in the safe
tunnel tube. Additional safety equipment
(including fire detection, loudspeakers and
CCTV) is installed in the two rescue stations in
Faido and Sedrun.
Additional information on the Gotthard Base
Tunnel is available in Ehrbar et al. (2016) or
Bettelini and Rigert (2016).
Figure 3. Typical standard cross-section in the Gotthard
Base Tunnel (Switzerland, 57 km).
The Lyon-Turin Base Tunnel (LTF) between
France and Italy will be about 58 km long. The
distance between the two tunnel tubes is about
30 m and the emergency walkway is 1.2 m
wide. The 135 cross connections are located
every 333 m. 99 of them do not host technical
equipment, while the remaining ones are
connected with physically separated technical
rooms. The main dimensions of the standard
cross connections are 29 x 4.3 x 4.06 m (length
x width x height). The doors size is 2.25 x
2.2 m.
The Brenner Base Tunnel, between Austria
and Italy, will be 55 km long and will be
equipped with 170 cross connections with a
distance of 333 m. The main dimensions of the
standard cross connections are (length x width x
height) 60 x 3.9 x 3.6 m (type 1) and 60 x 6.8 x
4.3 m (type 2: 1 out of 6 cross connections, with
technical equipment).
For all the examples presented in this section,
the escape corridor in the cross connections
measures at least 2.25 x 2.25 m and the door
size is at least 1.6 x 2.2 m.
4
Additional representative examples are
presented in Boitel (2016).
Figure 4. Typical standard cross-section in the Lyon-
Turin Base Tunnel (France-Italy, 58 km).
5 OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL
REGULATIONS
A number of national and international
regulations must be taken into account for
tunnel design and operation. A systematic
overview would exceed the scope of this paper.
Only a short, loose overview of regulations and
their applicability will be provided instead.
Existing regulations can be loosely classified
as follows:
• National laws, directives and the regulations
for their implementation.
• EU regulations, such as the TSI (Technical
Specifications for Interoperability). Based on
the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union, “this Regulation shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States”. National safety rules, which require a
higher level of safety than that mandated in
the TSI, are allowable only concerning the
infrastructure, energy and operation
subsystems.
• National technical regulations, such as NFPA
130 in the USA, SIA 197/1 in Switzerland
and EBA 2008 in Germany.
• Internal regulations from railways operators,
such as SBB’s I-20036 in Switzerland.
• Recommendations from international
organizations, such as UIC and ITA COSUF.
National and EU regulations are binding at
national level but are frequently used also in
other countries. They also form, together with
recommendations from international
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
organizations, the open publications and
realized tunnels, the so-called “state-of-the-art”.
Existing regulations only provide limited
information on cross connections. Moreover,
national regulations for European countries
were not systematically updated after the
introduction of the TSI. Existing tunnels were
designed and built according to these
regulations. Therefore, cross connections in
existing tunnels are very heterogeneous.
A systematic comparison of the regulations
for Switzerland, Germany, France, Austria and
USA is presented in Boitel (2016).
6 WALKWAYS AND EMERGENCY EXITS
6.1 Requirements
The key safety objective is providing a fair
chance of safety to the persons on a train for
most relevant accident and incident scenarios.
Implications and questions arising from this
apparently simple statement can be extremely
controversial and involve a number of ethic
aspects, which are still unsolved.
The most important parameters affecting
tunnel safety and construction cost at design
stage are the width of the emergency
walkway(s) which goes along the tunnel side(s)
wall, the distance between the cross connections
and the width of the doors and of the cross
connections. Equipment and signing along the
escape paths are not as cost relevant, but are as
important from the point of view of safety:
signalization and visibility of the emergency
exits, proper visibility conditions along the
whole escape path, proper guidance to the
escape persons and appropriate means of
communication.
Further key parameters affecting tunnel
safety are directly related to specific incident
scenarios. An appropriate smoke-management
system must be in place, which allows for
tenable escape conditions during the whole self-
rescue process. This concerns primarily
visibility, concentration of poisonous and
irritant gases as well as thermal and radiant
load. Train capacity, frequency and load in case
of mixed traffic also play an essential role.
Existing trains carry up to 1 000-1 500 persons.
This can rapidly evolve in time, with rapid
increases of train frequency and capacity after a
few years of operation. This can result in very
large self-rescue times.
5
A first very important conclusion is that there
is a clear interdependence between several
aspects of the problem, including in particular
infrastructure, rolling stock and operation.
Optimum design results from a balance between
heterogeneous elements, which might change in
time. It is therefore essential that infrastructural
aspects be accounted for in a manner, which
allows for an appropriate level of safety and
flexibility. It is also clear that tenable conditions
for self-rescue can only be maintained for
limited time.
6.2 Existing regulations
The spread between the different regulations is
large and can be illustrated by a comparison
between the Swiss SIA 197/2 (CH), the
European TSI (EU) and NFPA 130 (USA):
• Minimum width of emergency walkways: 1.0
m (CH), 0.8 m (EU), 0.43-0.76 m (USA).
• Maximum distance between cross
connections: 500 m (CH), 500 m (EU), 244 m
(USA).
• Minimum door dimensions (width x height):
1.4 x 2.0 m (CH), 1.4 x 2.0 m (EU), 0.81 m
(USA).
The new very long tunnels in the Alpine area
(Boissonnas and Bettelini 2016) set new
standards for safety. As an example, cross
connections are generally built at distances
between 300 and 350 m.
It should be noted that several European
countries, such as Switzerland, Germany and
France, had less constraining requirements
before the development of the TSI. Many
existing tunnels were built according to such
requirements. The UIC-Codex 779-9 requires a
minimum width of the walkways of 0.7 m.
Occasionally, safety concepts are developed,
where the passengers should stay in the cross
connections. Reasons for doing this could be
related to train movement in the safe tunnel
tube, intervention or ventilation. Under such
conditions, the overall surface of the cross
connections should be adapted to the expected
number of persons in the train. However,
escaping persons generally should access the
safe tube and wait there for rescue. Therefore,
the length of cross connections is generally
dictated by geotechnical considerations rather
than by safety considerations.
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
6.3 Equipment
The regulations concerning equipment along the
escape path shall be illustrated based on the
Swiss SBB regulation I-20036. The following
elements are required (the numbers refer to
Figure 5):
• Signalization of emergency exits along the
tunnel walls (max. distance 50 m) and at the
entrance of the cross connections (4 & 6)
• Handrail
• Lighting of the escape path, frequently
integrated in the handrail
• Enhanced visibility through green paint (1)
and luminescent frame (5)
• Permanent lighting (2 & 3)
These elements allow for a more rapid and
safe self-rescue. More important, they help
preventing panic by giving the persons clear
information how to get to a safe area. Thereby,
the permanent lighting and the green painting
are important. Consequently applied to all
tunnels, passengers become aware of them and
should guess that there is an emergency exit in
each tunnel. They should also know how they
look and for what they have to search.
Figure 5. Access to an emergency exits (Weinbergtunnel,
source SBB).
6.4 Analysis
In order to be capable to define requirements to
the width of the emergency walkway and the
distance between cross connections, self-rescue
conditions have to be analyzed and evaluated. A
systematic approach for evaluating self-rescue
conditions and assessing the achieved safety
level was issued by ITA COSUF (2014). This
approach is based on the following steps:
• Definition of the safety objectives
• Systematic screening of all relevant incident
and accident scenarios
6
• Detailed investigation of the most relevant
scenarios
• Verification of the safety objectives and
implementation of additional safety measures,
if needed.
Approach and methodologies to be adopted
for scenario analysis depend on the scenarios to
be considered. In most cases, the most important
scenarios involve fires. A detailed investigation
always requires three main steps:
• Simulation of smoke propagation, usually
using CFD
• Simulation of the self-rescue process using
dedicated tools for microscopic simulation, or
the simplified approach outlined in NFPA
130
• Verification of tenability conditions during
self-rescue
• Safety assessment.
Illustrative practical examples are presented
in Bettelini & Rigert (2013). A handy analytical
correlation for assessing self-rescue times in
dependence of all key parameters was
developed by Bettelini & Rigert (2012) and
validated based on number of microscopic
simulations.
7 LAYOUT AND EQUIPMENT OF CROSS
CONNECTIONS
The requirements to cross connections were
discussed in chapter 2. Technical requirements
result in the installation of equipment and
possibly technical floors for cable installation
(Figure 1). Such installations shall not reduce
the cross connection’s primary safety function.
The minimum dimensions of the part of the
cross connection reserved for emergency
purposes is specified in most regulation and is
quite variable. Representative values (width x
height) are: 2.0 x 2.25 (CH), 1.5 x 2.25 m (EU),
1.12 x 2.1 (USA). Larger values are used in
France, 2.4 m, which corresponds to the space
needed for 4 persons transiting at the same time.
The equipment for self-rescue available
inside cross connections is frequently limited to
emergency lighting. The TSI SRT prescribes a
minimum of facilities for communication only
for safe areas: “Communication shall be
possible, either by mobile phone or by fixed
connection from underground safe areas to the
control centre of the Infrastructure Manager”.
Emergency phones are usually installed in the
tunnel tubes.
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
The capacity of cross connections is
generally not sufficient for hosting all the
occupants of a normal passenger train. It is
therefore important that they immediately leave
the cross connections and wait in the parallel,
safe tunnel tube without blocking the exit of the
cross passages (Figure 6).
Loudspeaker systems, optimized for tunnel
operation, are increasingly used in road tunnels.
They are so far only sporadically used in rail
tunnels and generally at special locations, such
as rescue stations (fire-fighting points in TSI’s
terminology). Their use at least in cross
connections could be very beneficial.
Figure 6. Signs at the exit of cross connections. Left:
warning against traffic, on the inside of the exit door;
Right: direction to be followed in the safe tube (source
SBB).
8 PROTECTION OF CROSS
CONNECTIONS
8.1 Overview
In normal operating conditions, cross
connections shall protect the equipment they
contain, particularly against dust penetration
and excessive pressure fluctuations. They also
shall provide a suitable thermal environment for
the equipment.
In case of emergency, cross connections play
a dual role: they are transit zones for escaping
persons and provide logistic support and
protection for the rescue teams. Escaping
persons in most cases directly access the parallel
tunnel tube, which represents the safe area.
Then, depending on local conditions, they either
directly proceed to the surface or wait for
rescue. As stated in the TSI SRT, “The safe area
shall maintain survivable conditions for
passengers and staff during the time needed for
the complete evacuation from the safe area to a
final place of safety”.
Cross connections need a very high level of
protection against smoke penetration. This is
7
achieved primarily through the combined use of
doors and emergency ventilation.
8.2 Doors
Doors are generally installed at both ends of a
cross connection, but solution with one single
door or with additional intermediate doors
(particularly in case of unusually long cross
connections), are also quite common. Doors
shall protect the persons in the safe tube for all
the time needed for a full evacuation towards
the exterior and at least during part of the fire-
fighting phase. This time typically ranges from
30 to 100 minutes, depending on tunnel length
and accessibility. Doors also shall protect all
safety-relevant equipment and prevent failure
during self-rescue and intervention.
Sliding doors offer a number of advantages
for rail tunnels and should be used whenever
possible. The most important advantage over
other door systems is their stability and the
possibility of opening them also in case of large
pressure differences. As an example, SBB
specifies a maximum opening force of 100 N,
which is difficult to achieve in long rail tunnels
with a hinged door (pressure differences too
high). A much higher value of 220 N is allowed
for by NFPA 130.
According to the European norm EN 1634-1,
fire-protection doors for cross connections are
usually specified as follows: EIxxx-CS (where
“xxx” represents the protection time in
minutes). The corresponding requirements are:
• Protection against smoke penetration
• Thermal insulation
• Mechanism for self-closure.
Figure 7. Minimum requirements on cross-connection
doors according to NFPA 130.
A further very relevant requirement on cross-
connection doors results from the pressure
fluctuations generated by high-speed operation.
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.

In the Gotthard Base Tunnel, pressure should be designed for proper operation also if
fluctuations can be as high as ±10 kPa, resulting all doors in a cross connection are open and
in a total design load of ±20 kPa for the doors. should only be used in combination with an
Minimum normative requirements on overpressure in the safe tunnel tube.
protection time are quite heterogeneous. They
typically range (see Boitel 2016 for a systematic Overpressure in the safe tunnel tube
review) from 30 to 120 minutes. A few
representative values are: 90 min (SBB, CH), 90
min (USA, see also Figure 7). Both TSI and the
Swiss SIA 197/1 provide no fixed figures but
require them to cover the entire time necessary
for full evacuation.
It is interesting observing the requirements Dedicated ventilation of cross passages
applicable in different European countries
before the unification through the TSI SRT: 30
min (Germany and “lignes urbaines” in France),
90 min (Austria), 120 min (France, "hors ligne
urbaine"). This is representative for the doors
installed in existing tunnels.
For future projects it is recommended, in line
External air supply to cross passages
with EU’s TSI SRT and the Swiss SIA 197/1,
adapting the level of thermal protection to the
safety concept devised for each specific tunnel.
Values lower than 90 min should be considered
only in very special cases.

8.3 Ventilation
Doors represent a very effective protection for
cross connections. Nevertheless, ventilation is
required as an additional level of protection.
This is particularly important during self-rescue
and intervention, where both doors in a cross
connection could stay open for substantial
times.
There are practically no normative
requirements for the ventilation of cross
connections. Neither ventilation system, nor
ventilation goals for cross sections are specified.
However, there are three basic ventilation
systems (Figure 8):
• Overpressure in the safe tunnel tube
• Dedicated ventilation installed in the cross
connections
• External fresh-air supply to the cross
connections.
Whenever possible, an overpressure should
always be established in the safe tunnel tube.
This can be achieved by a variety of means,
including jet fans, Saccardo systems or fresh-air
injection and/or smoke extraction. The effect of
train motion shall be accounted for.
Dedicated cross-connection ventilation
systems are generally more expensive, in terms
of both investment and maintenance. They
8
Figure 8. Principles of ventilation of cross connections.
In very long tunnel, thermal requirements
(resulting in particular from electronic
equipment installed in cross connections)
frequently impose the use of dedicated
ventilation systems installed in each cross
connection. As an example, for achieving the
maximum allowable temperature of 35°C inside
the cross connections, a dedicated ventilation
system was installed in the new Gotthard Base
Tunnel. However, this ventilation plays no
significant role for the protection of cross
connections against smoke penetration, which
ensured by an appropriate pressure difference
(Bettelini and Rigert, 2016).
External fresh-air supply to the cross
connections is feasible only in very special
cases.
9 BEST PRACTICE
The optimum design of cross connections
depends on a number of parameters related to
the tunnel itself, traffic characteristics and
operation. A general recommendation in terms
of universally applicable best practice is not
 Proceedings of the World Tunnel Congress 2017 – Surface challenges – Underground solutions. Bergen, Norway.
possible. Nevertheless, we shall point to a few
key issues relevant for achieving best results in
cross-connection design:
• Distance between cross connections: While
the European regulation require a maximum
distance of 500 m between cross connections,
all new very long tunnel in the Alpine range
are characterized by values between 300 and
350 m. These values allow for much shorter
self-rescue times and shall be considered for
future projects. Significantly smaller values
are required by NFPA 130 (244 m), which
also prescribes much smaller cross
connections with lower capacity.
• The width of the lateral walkways generally
allows for the transit of one person at the
time. Overpassing is difficult and is not
desirable. A width between 0.8 and 1.0 m
appears sufficient also for persons on
wheelchair.
• Common practice for lighting, signing,
handrail etc. represents a quite good standard.
Dynamic signing, indicating the
recommended escape direction, could be
useful e.g. in case of longitudinal ventilation
in the tunnel tubes but are not recommended
as a general standard.
• Green color, in line with the practice
commonly applied for road tunnel, is
recommended for fire-protection doors and all
the related signing.
• Sliding doors reached an excellent standard
and allow for excellent functionality and
safety under all ventilation conditions. They
are recommended for generalized use.
• Minimum door dimensions allow for the
transit of at least two persons coming from
both directions at any time. A minimum
width of 1.4 m, as prescribed in the TSI SRT,
appears reasonable.
• It is recommended adapting the protection
time of the doors (as well as of the full safety
system) to the specific characteristics of a
given tunnel. 90 min. can be seen as an
approximate minimum applicable for most
tunnels.
• Mechanical ventilation is frequently useful
also in rail tunnels. This shall provide an
adequate level of smoke control during the
whole self-rescue time. As primary
aerodynamic protection of cross connections
against smoke penetration, an overpressure in
the safe tunnel tube is required. Additional
specific ventilation systems installed in each
cross connection could provide additional
9
protection, depending on the specific
conditions.
• Hosting technical equipment in cross
connections is perfectly acceptable and
separate technical rooms are not necessarily
required, as long as the equipment is
protected. An unhindered and straight
walkway through the cross connections with a
clear section of 2.25 x 2.25 m is well adapted
for most situations.
• Appropriate signing at the exit of cross
connections should warn against possible
dangers from train movement but at the same
time to encourage persons to enter the safe
tunnel moving away from the cross-
connection exit (in order to give room for
persons behind). The creation of holding
surfaces of 11-15 m2 in front of the cross
connections could help preventing congestion
on this delicate areas.
• Communication by means of emergency
phones is essential inside cross connections. It
is also recommended proofing the usefulness
of loudspeakers inside and in the immediate
vicinity of cross connections.
Figure 9. Recommended cross-connection layout.
10 CONCLUSION
Normative specifications for cross connections
are quite heterogeneous and generally not very
detailed. This leads to a high level of
heterogeneity for existing tunnels. With the
introduction of the TSI, the situation is
improving, at least for the European countries.
Nevertheless, there is still a significant vacuum
in terms of technical specifications for cross
connections. The upcoming ITA COSUF
guideline shall help to fill this vacuum. .
Minimum requirements on the maximum
allowable distance between cross connections
and on the minimum dimensions of escape
facilities show a wide spread which is only
partly justified by national differences in rail
transportation systems. Moreover, these
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minimum requirements are only sporadically
adapted to the specific characteristics of the
tunnel at hand. The systematic application of
scenario analysis according to ITA COSUF’s
guideline (ITA COSUF, 2014) is recommended.
Based on this, all requirements related to tunnel
safety can be integrated based on specific tunnel
and traffic data, including train frequency,
capacity and type.
Several suggestions on best practice for the
layout and appearance of cross connections
were provided in chapter 9 of this paper. This
shall help achieving a high, homogeneous level
of safety for cross connections.
These and other aspects shall be treated in a
systematic manner in the planned ITA COSUF
guideline on cross connections, in preparation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank HSR Hochschule für Technik
Rapperswil and its staff, particularly Stefan
Maurhofer, responsible teacher for tunneling,
for the excellent cooperation on this project.
They also thank ITA COSUF for initiating its
work on cross connections, which was at the
origin of this project.
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infrastructure for passenger transportation of federal
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the Gotthard. Swiss Tunneling Society.
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