MALAYSIA-INDONESIA BORDER GOVERNANCE

SEMINAR INTERNASIONAL RISET KOLABORASI

14 NOVEMBOR 2019
IPDN KAMPUS KALBAR
.

Abdul Rahim Anuar (abd182@uum.edu.my)

Director
UUM Research Institute for Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore (UUM-ITS)
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok 06010 UUM, Kedah,
Website: http://its.uum.edu.my/
 MALAYSIA-INDONESIA BORDER GOVERNANCE

Abdul Rahim Anuar

UUM Research Institute for Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore
Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government
Universiti Utara Malaysia
Sintok, Kedah, MALAYSIA

1. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia and Malaysia are two neighbouring countries and have the same boundaries in Borneo / Kalimantan, the
waters of the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea. Although both countries gained independence in different
ways, they had many similarities in terms of geography and socio-culture. In fact, the relationship between the two
countries is like having an Older Brother-Younger Brother relationship. As countries that share direct boundaries, the
two countries have the same aspirations and perceptions in harnessing the potential of the border to be managed for
the harmony and prosperity of border communities in both countries.

2. MALAYSIA-INDONESIA BORDER MANAGEMENT

The border cooperation of both countries began in security/safety since 1967 with the Agreement on Security
Regulations in Border Areas / Agreement on Arrangements in Security Area of Border Areas. This led to the founding
of the Malaysia-Indonesia General Border Committee (GBC-Malindo) mechanism.

In February 1984, Malindo Staff Planning Committee (SPC) Secretariat proposed the establishment of the Malaysia-
Indonesia Socio-Economic Work Committee/Group (JKK/KK Sosek Malindo) at the 16th SPC Malindo Convention. The
objective of the establishment of JKK/KK Sosek Malindo is to develop border areas together for the benefit of both
countries.

The JKK/KK Sosek Malindo vision is to achieve harmony and sustainability of socio-economic development for mutual
benefits and welfare, especially at the border of both countries through the cooperation of Sosek Malindo. Its mission
is to enhance socio-economic cooperation in border areas of both countries to achieve the well-being and harmony of
the people in these border areas.

Under JKK/KK Sosek Malindo, there are also three committees by region:

i) Sarawak – Kalimantan Barat / East Kalimantan / North Kalimantan,

ii) Sabah – North Kalimantan (1996), and
iii) Johor and Malacca – Riau and Riau islands.

Figure 1 summarises the JKK/KK Sosek Malindo organisation, while Figure 2 shows the specific work areas of social
and cultural, economics, trade and relations, and security and border management.

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 GENERAL BORDER COMMITTEE
Chairman : Defence Minister

HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE

Chairman : ATM Commander

SOSEK MALINDO CENTRE

JKLB COCC Chairman : Deputy JPCC
Secretary MKN

SOSEK SARAWAK – SOSEK JOHOR/MELAKA –

SOSEK SABAH-KALTARA
KALBAR/KALTIM/KALTARA RIAU/KEPRI
Chairman : Deputy SUK
Chairman : Deputy SUK Chairman : Deputy SUK
Sabah
Sarawak Johor / Malacca

ATM –Malaysia Armed Forces

SUK – Government Secretariat
JKLB – Joint Training Committee
CoCC - Coordinated Operational Control Committee
JPCC - Joint Police Coordinated Committee
KEPRI –Riau Islands

Figure 1: JKK/KK Sosek Malindo Organisational Structure

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 Technical Team

Economy, Trade, Border Security

Social & Culture
& Relations & Management

West Crossing
Education Trade & Industry
Post (Land)

Border Crossing
Health Agriculture
Post (Sea)

Education
Arts & Culture Tourism
Cooperation

Smuggling
Youth & Sports Investment
Prevention

International Border
Relations Infrastructure

Labor

Natural
Resources

Living
Environment

Figure 2: JKK/KK Sosek Malindo Technical Team Field of Work

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3. POLITICAL ECONOMY FUNDAMENTALS IN BORDER REGIONS

The fundamentals of political economy in border regions shall be described according to the aspects of (i)
safety/security (ii) prosperity, (iii) social stability, and (iv) politics, diplomacy, and bureaucracy.

3.1 Safety/Security (Peace)

The history of the Malaysia-Indonesia border territory management began with the normalisation of relations between
the two neighbouring countries in 1967, taking into account the security threats at that time (Communist Threats).
Malaysia and Indonesia saw the need for a balance of safety and prosperity as the pillar to stability of the border areas.
To date, the need for civil measures has been implemented in conjunction with security measures to enable peace to
be achieved through a holistic and integrated approach, and not merely achieved through military and police action
alone.

Security is a key factor in the management of borders of any country as it will always be seen as a basic necessity in
the physical establishment of a country. Discussion on defending and preserving the rights and sovereignty of a nation
cannot be separated from the ability of a country to maintain its internal security and safety. Security issues will directly
and indirectly affect the stability of a country as the people from every country will see security issues as a major factor
in the patriotism and nationalism of a nation. Hence, the territorial integrity of the country is the core and foundation of
any security measures, in particular, involving two neighbouring countries.

In the context of Malaysia-Indonesia relations, the preservation of territorial rights and sovereignty is a big issue and
always attracts attention. This is an issue that will affect the ebb and flow of government relations and the people of
both countries. Their respective national sentiments in relation to the boundaries of their respective countries will be
the biggest challenge in Malaysia-Indonesia’s second relationship in the near future. The maturity and discretion of the
two country leaders to maintain the Kuala Lumpur-Jakarta relationship are highly demanded because the issues
pertaining to borders of the two countries will receive diverse reactions and perceptions, and acceptance levels are
different from the people of both countries.

In this relationship, close collaboration at the level of strategic policy makers and executives between Kuala Lumpur
and Jakarta allows for confidence and trust to be maintained despite the issues that have become thorn in the flesh of
these two neighbours. The Malindo General Border Committee and the High Level Committee, as well as the work
groups under them, bring into fore the confident aspirations of the two countries in the field and operational levels.
Hence this platform is seen to be relevant as the core and drive toward confidence building, particularly in terms of
security of the two countries in general, and in the border areas in particular. Sosek Malindo is under this mechanism
based on the historical and importance factors of stability and security, which need to be addressed before any other
action can be taken. Confidence in the peace and security of the border areas itself will be a requirement for socio-
economic activity to be implemented for the purpose of prospering the border region.

Security issues are a common problem for both parties over the years. Starting with traditional threats in the form of
armed (communist) movements, nowadays security issues have been replaced by non-traditional threats, which
appear to be vague and unclear in determining opponents and actual threats. This is because the threat does not
clearly originate from any particular country, institution or organisation. Security issues on the borders are now more
dynamic and global due to economic demands (smuggling, trafficking, and illegal immigrants), also not forgetting geo-
strategic threats (terrorism, ideological distinction, and super-power influence).

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3.2 Prosperity
Border territory prosperity can be translated with the existence of peace and stability that enable daily activities by
border citizens to be carried out safely without threats. Cross-border economic activity allows for border communities
in both Malaysia and Indonesia to thrive, especially for the survival of residents in the interior regions. Although the
beginning of this activity was for the purpose of survival, it has grown to create demand and supply that generates and
drives the development of two countries’ trade on a larger scale. This economic activity is not only concentrated in the
borders of the region, but spill-over effects affect areas and towns far from the border. This is the factor that will generate
the growth of interaction between the people of both countries and will be a driving force for progress in the regions
that have previously retreated and been left behind from current development flows.

For residents in these land territories, restrictive geographical factors that are far or separated from coastal regions
(landlocked) with long borders in the interior would cause no alternate options, but to ensure that elements of the
border-crossing complement each other. Limited communication lines cause high dependence on parties across the
border to enable daily activities to be performed.

For people living along the sea borders, the competition factor to seize any opportunities gives dynamic choices to the
direction of generating wealth without having to rely on one another. However, based on the factor of closest neighbour
and traditional trading partners, the people of both countries have long enjoyed prosperity and well-being as two
neighbouring countries. The current trade developments and facilities have given greater potential to make each
country a stepping-stone to generate greater and global trade value. Cooperative vehicles, like through Sosek Malindo,
remain relevant and significant to the prosperity of marine bordering territories. Moreover, this is the greatest potential—
from the context of the generation of socio-economic potential—of the two countries in the future.

3.3 Social Stability

The thrust of activities in border regions is the inhabitants of the border region themselves. The survival ability of the
border community will determine whether they can survive or be affected by the next day’s challenges. Without the
support and facilitation factor of the neighbouring country, it would be difficult to achieve survival and there is the
potential to lead to the destabilisation of border communities. Hence, this social instability will lead to threats to the
foundation of the boundary of border regions, thus jeopardised security.

The people on the border have been carrying out activities in the region for hundreds and even thousands of years.
The modern world bureaucracy that creates boundaries and passports for citizens only comes later and causes some
social affairs to be reconciled with the demands of the new world. However the reality is that life goes on, and social
continuity needs to be continued. Social relations, especially familial relationships between the boundary communities
need to continue (the boundary line should not become a separator), which is at the core of social stability in border
areas.

However, this social stability should be viewed and studied from a broader aspect, such as the migration of non-native
citizens into border region, and they begin to reside in these border areas. The entry of citizens from other places in
Indonesia to Malaysia-Indonesia border areas as well as Malaysians from the Peninsular to the provinces of Sabah
and Sarawak will have an impact on the social value changes in the region, especially on the perceptions, cultures,
and forms of thought that are different from original inhabitants of the border regions.

Perceptions and values held by people on the border, who are mostly remote and inland, are considered to be left far
behind in various fields, and they are different from people living in more developed areas, especially in close to the
central government (Kuala Lumpur/Peninsular and Jakarta/Java Island). Hence negative issues and sentiments at the
national level do not necessarily become a big issue viewed through the eyes of the population at the border.

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If in big cities and other regions, the factor of inter-nation rivalry that comes with the feeling of patriotism shapes the
acceptance of the people of both countries; meanwhile the people in border areas see the neighbours directly
cooperating and helping one another based on the survival factor. The basic necessities of education, health, and basic
facilities development are still dependent on the support of the outside world, either from the internal sources of the
country itself, or assistance from neighbours across the border. Thus the social views of cross-border co-operation
tend to vary depending on the observer’s locality.

3.4 Politics, Diplomacy, and Bureaucracy

Political stability in Malaysia and Indonesia will enable good relations between the two countries to be nurtured and
can be translated into close collaboration with subordinate agencies in the border communities. The challenge of both
countries is how perceptions at the central government level (Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta) can be shared at the
State/Province levels. Political power in both countries will also shape foreign policy and determine the approach in
diplomatic relations of the two countries. Malaysia sees its relationship with Indonesia as “Most Important” and always
wants to maintain harmony between the two countries. Indonesia is also seen consistently accepting Malaysia as a
regional strategic partner with a diverse range of shared interests.

The Malaysian administration adopts a centralised mechanism of power and places the Central Government as a
reference to charting the state-level cooperation and engineering team within JKK Sosek Malindo. Any understanding
and agreement must have the blessing and consent from Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia views decentralisation in Indonesian
post-reforms as enablers to the regional / provincial governments in implementing a broader policy and approach,
which is more flexible. Here the situation has not reached the point of agreement and thus delaying the decision making,
because subordinates in Malaysia has to re-refer to the Central Government, while many cases at the provincial/district
level can be seen to have flexibility in determining the policy and direction. This results in delays in decision making,
and progress does not seem proceed well in various fields.

In this context at the state/provincial level, Malaysia is often seen as unable to fulfil its promise and fulfil the period of
execution of the agreed terms. However, the Malaysian side sees the provincial government as not being able to
understand the mechanisms and methods of the Malaysian government function. This has contributed toward suspicion
of Malaysia’s commitment in implementing a mutually-agreed-upon agreement. After all, gradual maturity in the
handling of this issue has been successful when the parties at the provincial level begin to try to understand the
constraints faced by the bordering state rulers in Malaysia.

Malaysia sees prosperity in the border region to be outlined by foreign policies at the Kuala Lumpur-Jakarta level and
balanced with the policies and approaches by governments in the provinces. Consistency and coordination between
direction and approach at the Centre and Provincial levels will enable the planning and execution of programmes and
activities to be coordinated and remain committed. The Indonesian government at the provincial level should better
understand the mechanisms of the Central-State Governments in Malaysia. The willingness of Malaysia to commit to
any effort and initiative at the state level will only be realised if the central government gives consent and commitment.
This should be understood and addressed by the Indonesian government at the provincial level in reaching a mutual
agreement.

In this regard, the diplomacy approach between the two countries will not be able to avoid getting the views and
aspirations of the state and provincial levels. On the part of Malaysia, especially for the states of Sarawak and Sabah,
the aspirations, choices, and direction of the two states are taken into consideration at the national level before a
decision can be made on the relations between the two countries, because it has an immediate impact of both states
on the land-boundary, especially the territories of Indonesia in Kalimantan.

Likewise, the Malaysians should be more willing to accommodate the post-reform system of Indonesian administration
which gives wider room to the provincial government to generate prosperity. The flexibility that comes with this wider

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room actually gives Malaysia the opportunity to explore the potential areas that can benefit both countries. If Malaysia
does not accommodate this distinction, the opportunity to be explored will be grabbed by another entity. Border
provinces in Indonesia cannot and will not wait because their neighbours also compete to get the best for their
respective regional prosperity.

4. CASE STUDY: TEBEDU-ENTIKONG – ECONOMIC COOPERATION AT THE BORDER

The economic border of Tebedu-Entikong at the Malaysia (Sarawak)-Indonesia (Kalimantan) border is used here as a
case study to illustrate the governance relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia and in the same process,
translates the concept of Sosek Malindo at the border region.

Cross-border trade between the Sarawak-Kalimantan informally occurred before the existence of the Malaysia
Indonesia Border Traffic Agreement in 1967. Under this 1967 agreement, the Sarawak/Malaysia Immigration issued
border passes to those who settled along the border to allow visiting relatives in Kalimantan within 5 km of the border.
Similarly, the Indonesian Immigration issued cross-border passes (PLB) to local residents who want to visit Sarawak
within 5 km of the border.

Under the Malaysia-Indonesia Border Trade Agreement 1970 (BTA 1970), both sides agreed to establish barter trade,
provided service to their local community to carry out the purposes of trade in goods, and create overland routes along
the border.

4.1 Tebedu

The Tebedu-Entikong international entrance began operations on 1 October 1989 and upgraded to an international
gateway on 27 May 1995. It was the first between Malaysia (Sarawak) with Kalimantan. Tebedu-Entikong now has the
facilities and infrastructures including very well maintained Customs, Immigration, Quarantine and Security, and CIQS.

Under the 1970 agreement, the communities in both countries is only allowed to bring in goods worth RM600 (maximum
value) every month without taxes for every border pass holder. The type of goods that can be brought into Malaysia is
temporary agricultural products, while entering Indonesia; any household goods are accepted, except for electronics.
However, this requirement does not generate growth in cross-border trade because the trade is limited. Negotiations
related to the expenses are currently being performed between Malaysia and Indonesia to boost cross-border economic
activity (Jakarta Post, 2010).

In terms of trade, although the Sarawak foreign trade with Indonesia is small, 90% of the total trade with the Sarawak-
Kalimantan is through Tebedu-Entikong. Type of products exported through Tebedu is snack food, electrical
appliances, and electronic household goods, and construction materials (such as nails). Meanwhile, major imports from
Kalimantan is seafood, vegetables, and fruits (Bernama, 2011).

Tebedu also is one of the five entrances for timber trade that is endorsed by the Sarawak state government, while the
other main entrances are Sematan, Biawak, Batu Lintang, and Lubuk Antu. Import-export activity of timbre through
Tebedu is managed by Harwood Timber Sdn. Bhd., which is a subsidiary of Sarawak Timber Industry Development
Corporation (STIDC).

4.2 Entikong

Entikong is Transboundary Postal Inspection (Pos Pemeriksaan Lintas Batas – PPLB) which is the first of its kind in
Kalimantan for entry and exit of individuals and export-import goods. PPLB Entikong also has other functions
 Entry-exit gate for traditional border crossers and population in border areas;
 Valid entry-exit gate for non-traditional border crossers;

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  Gateway for international vehicles; and
 Main border gateway.

Entikong also has economic functions along with security functions, which is performing as a:
 Border area growth centre that functions as the National Strategic Activity Centre (Pusat Kegiatan
Strategi Nasional – PKSN).
 The back district service centre that functions as an economic centre that a product seller in the rural
area of Entikong can market their wares to Entikong village. Entikong also provides other services
including education, health, recreation, entertainment, and religion.
 Inter-district relations centre where rural products that are marketed in Entikong will be marketed
elsewhere.
 Industrial centre where Entikong will become a raw material processing centre.

The PPLB Entikong development has gone through several phases, which are (www.setda.sanggau.go.id)
 Level 1 implemented on 1 October 1989 with PPLB Entikong operating daily from 05.00 West
Indonesia Time (WIB) to 17.00 WIB and allowed vehicles are government owned vehicles (Dinas)
and private vehicles.
 Level 2 implemented on 2 January 1993 and allowed vehicles include public vehicles like taxis,
rented buses, tourist buses, and international express buses.
 Level 3 implemented on 27 May 1995 which established that international trade can be performed
through PPLB Entikong. Other allowed vehicles were trucks/goods cars, box cars, pickups, and
tankers.

On 25 May 2005, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, together with his delegation
visited and reviewed Entikong PPLB situation and its surrounding areas. From the result of the visit, the location of the
PPLB Entikong will be moved back ± 500 metres from the Indonesia-Malaysia border, to serve as a Free Trade Zone
(Gatra, 23 June 2005). However, the construction of a new Entikong PPLB has yet to be implemented. The purpose of
moving back the PPLB location is to create a free trade zone and provide visitor facilities from Malaysia and Brunei to
shop at Entikong.

The number of tourists to KALBAR showed an increasing trend of 22,262 tourists (2007) to 30,619 tourists (2011).
Malaysia is a major tourist provider with visitors comprising almost 80% of the total number of tourists to KALBAR. In
addition, 24,237 Malaysian tourists (2011), about 81%, used the Entikong entrance, as compared to 19% who use
Bandara Supadio to KALBAR. This shows Entikong, thus Tebedu, to be the main gateway for Malaysian travellers to
KALBAR (Pemprov Kalbar, 2012).

4.3 Border Development Comparison

There exists a significant development gap between Tebedu/Sarawak and Entikong/KALBAR towns. Entikong can be
viewed to be less developed and backward as compared to Tebedu. Thus, two major projects were planned under the
Sosek Malindo to recover and generate economic growth at the boundary, which are to develop inland ports and build
industrial estates.

Projects under the Indonesian government include creating a free trade zone in the Entikong border. The proposed
project is to take advantage of the wealth of raw material resources and manpower available in their respective areas.
The wealth generated in the future can be shared by local residents of both townships.

For Inland Port, TIP Malaysia has begun to operate while EIP Indonesia has not been developed. This is because the
PT Borneo Putra Lestari developer withdrew because the view is not yet clear in the legal form from Jakarta in
connection with inland port relations with foreign countries, whether from the aspect of law and legality, regulation, or

8
government regulation of central government ministries. EIP Indonesia’s absence has affected the capacity of TIP’s
ability to operate cargo throughput in full or at the level of 100% (Equator, 2012).

For industrial estate, the Sarawak government has prepared a light industrial estate infrastructure for Tebedu (EPRT)
in 2012. The major investor in the EPRT was SM Inland Port Sdn. Bhd. (SMIP), which operates the TIP and liaises
with important investors in the industrial estate. Now, the Sarawak government actively promotes the Tebedu industrial
estate to domestic and foreign investors in order to attract investment to Tebedu and create employment opportunities
for the local population, as well as Indonesian workers (TKI). Even the KALBAR workers have built settlements
(rusunawa) to put migrant workers to work at the Tebedu industrial estate.

On the Indonesian side, the Entikong industrial estate still has not been realised. Under the BDC Master Plan, the
estate has an area of 33 hectares with development costs of US$103 million. Its function, in addition to carrying out
manufacturing/processing of product, it also is a terminal for goods, which is also in-line with the proposal to establish
the EIP (Indonesia-Middle East Update, n.d.).

The proposal by Indonesia to withdraw the PPLB Entikong approximately ± 500 metres from the Tebedu border
entrance is so as to create a free trade zone. It is a positive step to revive the Entikong economy and attract new
businesses from the Entikong and KALBAR to trade in this zone. Zones can also take advantage of the number of
Malaysian tourists bustling through the Entikong entrance en route to KALBAR. However, relocation of PPLB Entikong
thus the formation of the free business zone has not been realised yet.

4.4 Border Development Rubrics

The development in Entikong is backward compared to in Tebedu. Planned development in Entikong needs to be
facilitated by the KALBAR to improve the implementation commitment and attract local investment for cross-border
economic development. In the meantime, the Indonesian authorities should expedite the development of industrial
estates, land investment, and free trade zones as planned under the BDC and Sosek Malindo. Development issues in
cross-border Tebedu-Entikong can be discussed under the platform of JKK/KK Sosek Malindo.

Tebedu-Entikong economic border villages have the potential to be developed because it is related to the Sarawak
Corridor of Renewable Energy 2008-2020 (SCORE), Borneo West Economic Corridor (WBEC) under BIMP-EAGA
2012-2016 Master Plan, and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) under ASEAN by the year 2015. It is important
that there is a link between development at the border and central places to prevent the development gap between
regions in Sarawak and KALBAR. In the meantime EIP projects, Entikong industrial estates, and free trade zones can
be freely put into motion.

5. CONCLUSION

The Work Committee/Work Group of Sosek Malindo is the best and most proven workable tool in managing the
territorial boundaries of Malaysia-Indonesia. It balances the demands on security management, generating economic
activities, fulfilling the community’s livelihood and, most importantly, enabling close collaboration in a broader context
between the two neighbouring countries. It has the great potential to continue to grow, but their objectives will only be
achieved when the two sides understand each other better, accommodate and appreciate the differences of each
other, and work together to achieve prosperity. There is a difference in values held by the leaders and the people of
both countries, but despite these differences, there are many similarities and they still strongly depend on each other.
Hence, with the existence of Sosek Malindo platform in the management of the two Border States under the auspices
of GBC and HLC MALINDO, the difference gap can be reduced and understanding can be nurtured to generate the
prosperity of Malaysia and Indonesia.

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