International Journal of Public Sector Management

Ensuring good governance in Singapore: Is this experience transferable to other Asian countries?
Jon S.T. Quah
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Good governance
Ensuring good governance in in Singapore
Singapore
Is this experience transferable to other Asian
countries? 401
Jon S.T. Quah
Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore and National University of Singapore,
Singapore

Abstract
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to attribute Singapore’s good governance to the effective
policies implemented by the People’s Action Party (PAP) government and contend that it will be
difficult to transfer Singapore’s experience to other countries because of Singapore’s unique
circumstances and favourable policy context.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyses four policies initiated by the PAP
government: comprehensive reform of the Singapore Civil Service; anti-corruption measures;
decentralization of the Public Service Commission; and payment of competitive salaries to attract and
retain the best candidates to the government. The effectiveness of these policies is assessed by
referring to Singapore’s performance on eight governance indicators.
Findings – The four policies are effective, as reflected in Singapore’s superior rankings and scores on
eight indicators: Global Competitiveness Report’s (GCR’s) competence of public officials; World Bank’s
indicator on government effectiveness; Political Economic Risk Consultancy’s (PERC’s) survey on
bureaucratic effectiveness; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index; PERC’s
survey on corruption; World Bank’s indicator on control of corruption; World Bank’s ease of doing
business survey; and GCR’s public trust of politicians survey. However, as Singapore’s good
governance is the result of the PAP government’s political will and its favourable policy context, it is
difficult to transfer Singapore’s experience elsewhere because of the limited political will and
unfavourable policy contexts in many Asian countries.
Originality/value – This paper will be useful to those interested in learning how Singapore
succeeded in promoting good governance.
Keywords Singapore, Governance, Government policy, Corruption, Good governance,
Government effectiveness, Policy context, Public policy
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
The People’s Action Party (PAP) won the May 30, 1959 general election and assumed
office and attained self-government from Britain on 3 June 1959. Singapore was a
different place then because it was a poor third world country, afflicted with a serious
housing shortage (half the population was living in squatter huts), an unemployment
rate of 14 per cent, political instability, labour unrest, corruption, and a high crime rate.
However, today, after 53 years under the PAP government, Singapore has been International Journal of Public Sector
transformed into a first world country, which is no longer afflicted by the problems it Management
Vol. 26 No. 5, 2013
faced in 1959. pp. 401-420
This article contends that Singapore’s ability to solve the problems it encountered q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3558
after attaining self-government can be attributed to the effectiveness of the various DOI 10.1108/IJPSM-05-2013-0069
 IJPSM policies introduced by the PAP government since 1959. The PAP government created
26,5 the Housing and Development Board (HDB) in February 1960 to tackle the housing
shortage and the Economic Development Board (EDB) in August 1961 to create jobs by
attracting foreign investment to Singapore. These two statutory boards were formed to
reduce the workload of the Singapore Civil Service (SCS), which was not equipped to
solve the housing shortage or create jobs. Apart from being handicapped by rigid
402 regulations and inflexibility, the civil servants also had a “colonial mentality” and were
not attuned to the problems facing Singapore.
Accordingly, the PAP government initiated these four policies to solve the country’s
problems:
(1) Reorganization and attitudinal reform of the SCS.
(2) Enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in June 1960 to empower
the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (2011) to curb corruption
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effectively.
(3) Maintaining the tradition of meritocracy introduced by the British colonial
government by retaining and decentralizing the Public Service Commission
(PSC) to enhance its effectiveness.
(4) Paying competitive salaries to ministers and senior civil servants from 1972 and
benchmarking these salaries from 1995 to private sector salaries to attract the
“best and brightest” citizens to the SCS and government and to minimize the
brain drain to the private sector.

These four policies will be analyzed in turn below before providing the governance
indicators for Singapore and assessing the transferability of Singapore’s experience in
promoting good governance to other Asian countries.

Comprehensive reform of the SCS

The PAP government realized on assuming office in June 1959 that it had to transform
the colonial bureaucracy it inherited in order to ensure the effective implementation of
its socio-economic development programmes. During the 137 years of British colonial
rule[1], the SCS focused on performing the traditional “housekeeping” functions of
maintaining law and order, building public works and collecting taxes. Consequently,
the SCS did not play an important role in national development and did not introduce
administrative reforms until after the Second World War (Quah, 1996a, pp. 62-3).
Its victory in the May 1959 general election gave the PAP government the mandate
to introduce comprehensive reforms to the SCS and to change the civil servants’
“colonial mentality” by making them more sensitive to the needs of the population.
Accordingly, it began by reorganising the SCS into nine ministries including the new
ministries of culture and national development, which were created to deal with
nation-building and economic development respectively (Seah, 1971, pp. 82-3). The
workload of the SCS was reduced by making the HDB and EDB responsible for
providing low-cost public housing and attracting foreign investment to Singapore.
Unlike the SCS, which could not implement the public housing and industrialisation
programmes swiftly because of its regulations and red tape, the HDB and EDB as
statutory boards were better equipped to implement these programmes expeditiously
(Quah, 1985, pp. 124-6).
 In addition to reorganising the SCS, the PAP government realized the necessity of Good governance
changing the civil servants’ attitudes and convincing them to participate in the process in Singapore
of attaining national development goals. The Political Study Centre was opened by
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on August 15, 1959. In his opening speech, he hoped that
the civil servants would change their “colonial mentality” once they were made aware
of the problems facing Singapore. Their responsibility was to ensure the efficiency of
the SCS. The purpose of the two-week part-time and non-residential course conducted 403
by the Political Study Centre for senior civil servants was to change their attitudes and
make them more aware of the local contextual constraints (Quah, 2010, p. 134).
In addition to the Political Study Centre, the PAP government also relied on four
additional methods to change the attitudes and behaviour of the civil servants. First,
civil servants were encouraged to participate voluntarily in mass civic projects during
the weekends to enable them to get better acquainted with the political leaders, and to
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provide them with an opportunity to engage in manual work. Second, Nanyang

University graduates, who were Chinese-educated, were recruited from 1960 for the
education service to reduce the predominance of the English-educated in the SCS.
Third, civil servants who were found guilty of misconduct were disciplined and the
Central Complaints Bureau was formed in 1961 to enable the non-English-educated
public to submit complaints against rude or incompetent civil servants. Finally,
expatriate civil servants who were due for retirement were encouraged to remain in the
SCS if they were competent while their incompetent colleagues were retired
prematurely (Quah, 2010, pp. 134-5).
In short, the PAP government relied on the reorganisation of the SCS and attitudinal
reform to change the “colonial mentality” of the senior civil servants because it needed
their support to implement its policies effectively.

Minimizing corruption
Corruption was a way of life in Singapore during the British colonial period because of
the British colonial government’s lack of political will and the ineffective
anti-corruption measures adopted. Corruption was made illegal in Singapore with
the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and
Singapore in 1871. However, even though police corruption was rampant and
confirmed by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry, the British colonial
government ignored their findings and delayed the enactment of the Prevention of
Corruption Ordinance (POCO) until December 1937 (Quah, 2007, pp. 9-12).
The POCO was ineffective because it limited the powers of arrest, search and
investigation of police officers as warrants were required before arrests could be made;
and the penalty of two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of S$10,000 for corrupt
offenders did not deter corrupt behaviour (Quah, 1978, p. 9). Similarly, the
Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) was ineffective because of the prevalence of police
corruption. As the ACB was part of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the
Singapore Police Force (SPF), it was not surprising that the ACB was ineffective in
curbing police corruption. Furthermore, the ACB was inadequately staffed with only
17 personnel and had to compete with other branches in the CID for limited manpower
and other resources (Quah, 2007, pp. 14-15).
The British colonial government only realized the folly of making the ACB
responsible for curbing corruption when it was discovered that three police detectives
 IJPSM and some senior police officers were involved in robbing 1,800lbs of opium worth
26,5 S$400,000 (US$133,333) in October 1951 (Tan, 1999, p. 59). The Opium Hijacking
scandal exposed the ACB’s weaknesses and its inability to curb police corruption.
Consequently, the British colonial government formed the CPIB as an independent
agency in October 1952 to replace the ineffective ACB.
During their campaign for the May 1959 general election, the PAP leaders
404 demonstrated their commitment to curbing corruption by exposing the acceptance of
S$700,000 by the Minister for Education, Chew Swee Kee, from some American donors
(Quah, 2010, p. 175). The Labour Front government led by Chief Minister Lim Yew
Hock was described as “being corrupted from head to toe” by a retired architect, Lee
Kip Lin (Yap et al., 2009, p. 555). The PAP’s revelation of the Chew Swee Kee scandal
enabled it to win the May 30, 1959 general election by capturing 43 of the 51 seats and
obtaining 53.4 per cent of the votes cast.
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When the PAP leaders assumed office in June 1959, an immediate priority was to
ensure a clean government by adopting a zero-tolerance policy toward corruption.
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew explained in his memoirs why he and his colleagues
were determined to keep Singapore free from corruption from the outset of their
administration:
We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders. [. . .] We
had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we took the
oath of office [. . .] in June 1959, we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolize purity
and honesty in our personal behaviour and our public life. [. . .] We made sure from the day
we took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly accounted for and
would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots as one dollar, without being siphoned off
along the way. So from the very beginning we gave special attention to the areas where
discretionary powers had been exploited for personal gain and sharpened the instruments
that could prevent, detect or deter such practices (Lee, 2000, pp. 182-4).
As corruption was a way of life in Singapore in June 1959, the PAP leaders learnt from
the mistakes made by the British colonial government in curbing corruption and
demonstrated their commitment by enacting the POCA on June 17, 1960 to replace the
ineffective POCO and to strengthen the CPIB by providing it with more legal powers,
personnel and funding.
The POCA has three important features to rectify the POCO’s weaknesses and to
enhance the CPIB’s legal powers and increase its personnel. First, the penalty for
corruption has been increased to imprisonment for five years and/or a fine of S$10,000
to enhance the POCA’s deterrent effect. Second, according to section 13, a person found
guilty of accepting an illegal gratification has to pay the amount he had taken as a
bribe in addition to any other punishment imposed by a court. The third and most
important feature of the POCA is that it has given the CPIB more powers and a new
lease of life. For example, section 15 gives the CPIB officers powers of arrest and search
of arrested persons. Furthermore, the CPIB’s director and his senior officers are
empowered by section 18 to investigate the bank account, share account or purchase
account of any person suspected of committing a corruption offence. Section 24 is
perhaps the most important asset for the CPIB in its investigation of corruption
offences because “the fact that an accused person is in possession, for which he [or she]
cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to
his [or her] known sources of income” is evidence that he or she had obtained these
 pecuniary resources or property “corruptly as an inducement or reward” (Quah, 2010, Good governance
pp. 176-7). in Singapore
To ensure the POCA’s continued effectiveness, the PAP government has introduced
whenever necessary, amendments or new legislation to deal with unanticipated
problems or to plug legal loopholes. For example, in 1966, the POCA was amended so
that a person could be found guilty of corruption without actually receiving the bribe
as long as he had shown the intention of doing so (section 9). The POCA was also 405
amended in 1966 so that, according to section 37, Singapore citizens working for their
government in embassies and other government agencies abroad would be prosecuted
for corrupt offences committed outside Singapore and would be dealt with as if such
offences had occurred in Singapore. In 1989, the fine for corrupt offences was increased
tenfold from S$10,000 to S$100,000 (US$78,730)[2]. On March 3, 1989, the Corruption
(Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1989 was passed to enable the court to issue a
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confiscation order against the estate of a deceased defendant (Quah, 2010, pp. 177-8).
Unlike the British colonial government, the PAP government has also demonstrated
its political will in curbing corruption not only by enhancing the CPIB’s legal powers
but also by providing the CPIB with more personnel and budget during the past 53
years. Table I shows that the CPIB has grown by 17 times from eight officers in 1959 to
138 officers in 2011. Similarly, as indicated in Table II, the CPIB’s budget has increased
by nearly 20 times from S$1,024,370 in 1978 to S$34,073,400 in 2011 (Quah, 2010,
pp. 179-80; Republic of Singapore, 2011, p. 378).
In contrast to the situation during 1952-1959, the CPIB has adopted a “total
approach to enforcement” by dealing with both “big and small cases” of corruption in
both the public and private sectors, “both giver and receiver of bribes” and “other
crimes uncovered in the course of [the] corruption investigation” (Soh, 2008a, pp. 1-2).
In addition to its emphasis on investigation and enforcement, the CPIB also focuses on
corruption prevention by reviewing the procedures and practices in those government
agencies, where corruption has occurred and makes recommendations to remove the
“loopholes and vulnerabilities.” The CPIB employs this review process to “identify

Year Number of personnel

1952 5
1959 8
1963 33
1965 36
1970 50
1976 61
1980 69
1998 79
2000 84
2005 82
2007 89
2008 86
2009 93
2010 138
2011 138 Table I.
Growth of CPIB’s
Sources: Quah, 2010, p. 179 and Republic of Singapore, 2011, p. 378 personnel, 1952-2011
 IJPSM
Year Budget (S$)
26,5
1978 1,024,370
1987 4,147,230
1997 10,225,463
2007 14,619,718
406 2008 15,790,811
2009 16,386,900
2010 20,094,000
Table II. 2011 34,073,400
Budget of the CPIB,
1978-2011 Sources: Quah, 2010, p. 180 and Republic of Singapore, 2011, p. 378

potential problem areas and loopholes” in order to minimize the opportunities for
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corruption (Soh, 2008b, p. 8).

Finally, the CPIB’s extensive outreach programme is implemented by its Public
Education Group, which conducts prevention and education talks for pre-university
students, principals, teachers, newly appointed civil servants, law enforcement
agencies like the police and immigration department, and the management and staff of
major organisations in key industries (Quah, 2010, p. 181). Table III shows that the
number of persons attending the CPIB’s prevention and education talks has increased
from 2,500 in 2005 to 9,193 in 2010. Similarly, the number of foreign visitors to the
CPIB has more than doubled from 1,000 to 2,538 during 2005-2010. The number of
visitors from local organisations has risen from 20 in 2005 to 424 in 2008, and visits by
students also increased from 150 to 791 from 2005-2009.

Decentralizing the PSC

The British introduced meritocracy to its colonies in Africa and Asia with the creation
of the PSC, which is the adapted version of the Civil Service Commission in Britain.
The raison d’être of the PSC is twofold: to insulate the civil service from politics; and to
accelerate its localisation by replacing the expatriate officers with qualified local staff
(Sinker, 1953, p. 206). With the advent of self-government and the increasing control of
the civil service in the hands of the local population, the PSC was established in the
British colonies to insulate appointments, promotions and discipline in the civil service
from politics. Accordingly, the PSC was created in India in 1926, in Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
in 1931, in Pakistan in 1947, in Hong Kong in 1950, in Singapore and Nepal in 1951, in
Malaya in 1957, and in Bangladesh in 1972 (Quah, 2009, p. 810).

Activity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Prevention and education talks 2,500 4,500 7,073 5,823 7,441 9,193
Visits by foreign delegates 1,000 1,500 2,142 2,520 2,358 2,538
Visitors from local organizations 20 200 357 424 403 56
Student visitors 150 200 357 433 791 533
Total 3,670 6,400 10,004 9,200 10,993 12,320
Table III.
Number of visitors to Sources: Information provided by the CPIB for 2005-2006 on 3 July 2008. The 2007-2010 data are
CPIB, 2005-2010 taken from CPIB Report 2010, Singapore, 2011, p. 9
 Meritocracy was introduced in Singapore with the establishment of the PSC on Good governance
January 1, 1951. The PSC’s origins can be traced to the White Paper (Command Paper in Singapore
No. 197) entitled Organisation of the Colonial Service issued by the British government
in 1946. Command Paper No. 197 stressed that progress toward self-government could
only be achieved if the public services of the colonies were adapted to local conditions
and staffed to the maximum possible extent by local people. More importantly, it
recommended the establishment of PSCs in the colonies to ensure that qualified local 407
candidates would be recruited into the public services (Quah, 2010, p. 72).
The PSC in Singapore was formed with these two objectives in mind: to keep
politics out of the SCS and to accelerate the latter’s pace of localisation (Quah, 1982,
p. 50). The PSC’s second objective is no longer important today because the localisation
of the SCS was completed with the attainment of self-government in Singapore in June
1959. However, its primary aim of keeping politics out of the SCS remains relevant as
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the aim of the PSC’s programme as stated in the national budget is “to meet the staffing
requirements of the government in accordance with the merit principle” (Republic of
Singapore, 1980, p. 78).
The PSC’s evolution during the past 60 years can be divided into four stages, as
depicted in Table IV. During its first 31 years, the PSC was the central personnel
agency responsible for selecting and promoting civil servants on the basis of merit,
disciplinary control, and the granting of scholarships and training awards. As the PSC
members and selection boards relied mainly on personal interviews to perform their
functions, their workload increased tremendously during this stage. Indeed, the
number of candidates interviewed by them for appointments and promotions increased
by nearly 19 times from 556 candidates in 1951 to 10,430 candidates in 1982 (Public
Service Commission, 1954, p. 2; Public Service Commission, 1983, p. 5). Similarly, the
number of disciplinary cases completed has also risen from 24 to 169 during 1957 to
1982 (Public Service Commission, 1959, p. 8; Public Service Commission, 1983, p. 18).

Stage Period Agencies Functions

1 1951-1982 Public Service Commission Appointment and promotion of Divisions I

2 1983-1989 Public Service Division
3 1990-1994 Education Service
Commission
Police and Civil
Defence Services
Commission
4 1995-2011 Public Service Commission
System of 31 Personnel Boards
Source: Compiled by the author
and II candidates; disciplinary control and
awarding of scholarships
Formulation and review of personnel
policies in the SCS
Appointment and promotion of 21,000
teachers
Appointment and promotion of 10,000
police, narcotics, prisons, and civil defence
officers
ESC and PCDSC were dissolved on 1 April
1998 and their functions were transferred to
PSC and the 31 Personnel Boards
Appointment and promotion of all civil
servants from superscale E1 and below Table IV.
Evolution of the PSC in
Singapore, 1951-2011
 IJPSM The number of scholarships and training fellowships awarded has also increased from
26,5 23 in 1963 to 847 in 1982 (Public Service Commission, 1964, pp. 9, 19; Public Service
Commission, 1983, p. 8). Finally, the heavy workload of Singapore’s PSC becomes
obvious when its output of interviewing 58,712 candidates during 1964-1967 is more
than nine times that of the PSC in Ceylon, which interviewed only 6,485 candidates
during the same period (Quah, 1971, p. 140).
408 The Public Service Division (PSD) was formed on January 3, 1983 on the
recommendation of the Management Services Department to formulate and review
personnel policies in the SCS and to ensure that these policies are implemented
consistently in the various ministries. However, as the PSD was responsible for all
personnel policy matters concerning appraisal, posting, training, schemes of service,
service conditions, and welfare, its creation did not reduce the PSC’s heavy workload of
interviewing 50,274 candidates for appointments and promotions, completing 1,148
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disciplinary cases, and granting 1,543 scholarships and training awards during
1983-1989 (Quah, 2010, p. 83).
In March 1990, the Constitution of Singapore was amended to help the PSC cope
with its heavy workload by increasing its membership from 11 to 15, including the
chairman, and by creating two new sub-commissions namely, the Education Service
Commission (ESC) for education and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission
(PCDSC) for the police and civil defence services. This move was designed to reduce the
PSC’s workload as the ESC would be responsible for appointing and promoting 21,000
teachers, and the PCDSC would take care of the appointment and promotion of 10,000
police, narcotics, prisons, and civil defence officers, thus leaving the PSC to deal with
the remaining 34,000 civil servants. However, in spite of the establishment of the ESC
and PCDSC, the PSC’s workload was not reduced significantly as Table V shows that
the PSC interviewed 9,993 candidates (67.4 per cent) for appointment during 1990-1994,
in contrast to the 4,254 candidates (28.7 per cent) interviewed by the ESC, and the 573
candidates (3.9 per cent) interviewed by the PCDSC.
To enhance the SCS’s ability to compete with the private sector for talented
personnel, the public personnel management system in Singapore was further
decentralized in January 1995 with the establishment of a system of 31 personnel
boards, as shown in Table VI. As the creation of the ESC and PCDSC did not alleviate
significantly the PSC’s workload in appointing candidates to the SCS during 1990-1994,

Education Police and

Public Service Service Civil Defence
Commission Commission Services Commission
Year % % % Total %

1990 2,604 655 30 3,289

1991 2,602 6 102 2,710
Table V. 1992 2,235 1,160 139 3,534
Workloads of the PSC, 1993 1,289 1,272 147 2,708
ESC and PCDSC in 1994 1,263 1,161 155 2,579
appointing and Total 9,993 67.4 4,254 28.7 573 3.9 14,820 100
promoting candidates in
the SCS, 1990-1994 Source: Compiled from the data provided in PSC, 1991-1995
 the ESC and PCDSC were dissolved and amalgamated into a single PSC on 1 April Good governance
1998 (Public Service Commission, 1999, p. 9). in Singapore
Unlike the ESC and PCDSC, the 31 personnel boards have reduced considerably the
PSC’s workload from 1995 to 2010. Table VII shows that the PSC considered 1,724
candidates for appointment, 308 candidates for promotion, completed 832 disciplinary
cases, and granted 2,305 scholarships and training awards from 1995-2010.
Finally, the comparison of the PSC’s workload during its second, third and fourth 409
stages of development in Table VIII shows that the decentralisation of its functions,
which began in 1990 with the formation of the ESC and PCDSC and ended with the
creation of the 31 personnel boards in 1995, has been effective because the PSC’s
workload in interviewing candidates for appointment and promotion has been
drastically reduced from 50,274 candidates during 1983-1989 to 18,463 candidates
during 1990-1994, and to 2,032 candidates during 1995-2010. Similarly, the number of
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disciplinary cases completed by the PSC has declined from 1,148 cases during
1983-1989 to 832 cases during 1995-2010. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the

Organizations Responsibilities

PSC, ESC, PCDSC Superscale officers D and above

Special Personnel Board (four members) Superscale officers up to E1 and timescale
administrative officers
Six Senior Personnel Boards (21 members) Division I officers below superscale status Table VI.
24 Personnel Boards (103 members) Divisions II, III and IV officers The SCS’s Personnel
Management System in
Source: Quah 1996b, p. 502 1995

Candidates considered Officers considered Disciplinary Scholarships and training

Year for appointment for promotion cases completed awards granted

1995 70 45 83 231
1996 47 17 33 231
1997 53 16 45 214
1998 71 21 34 257
1999 96 24 37 332
2000 126 28 52 258
2001 126 9 59 253
2002 134 7 56 74
2003 175 17 52 50
2004 165 13 60 34
2005 192 18 52 49
2006 116 13 31 39
2007 203 18 30 57
2008 102 23 55 72
2009 9 26 69 85
2010 39 13 84 69
Total 1,724 308 832 2,305 Table VII.
Workload of the PSC in
Source: Compiled from PSC, 1996-2011 Singapore, 1995-2010
 IJPSM number of scholarships and training awards granted by the PSC has increased from
26,5 1,543 during 1983-1989 to 2,305 during 1995-2010 because this constitutes the PSC’s
major function today.

Paying for the “best and brightest”

410 To balance the budget, a Cabinet Budget Committee on Expenditure recommended in
June 1959 the removal of the variable allowances of Divisions I and II civil servants to
save S$10 million and prevent a budget deficit of S$14 million (Quah, 2010, p. 103). The
government restored the variable allowance in September 1961 with the improvement
of the budgetary situation (Seah, 1971, p. 94).
In 1968, the Harvey Commission recommended salary increases for five grades in
the Division I superscale salaries. However, the government did not implement this
recommendation until 1973 for two reasons: the economy could not afford a major
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salary revision and the private sector was not considered a serious threat in terms of
competing for talent as promotion exercises for senior civil servants were conducted
frequently to retain talented personnel in the SCS (Lee, 1995, pp. 21-2).
However, the improvement of the Singapore economy in the 1970 s resulted in
higher salaries in the private sector and aggravated the brain drain of talented civil
servants to the private sector. The National Wages Council (NWC) was formed in
February 1972 as an advisory body to formulate general guidelines on wage policies, to
recommend annual wage adjustments, and to advise on incentive systems for
improving efficiency and productivity (Then, 1998, pp. 220-1). The NWC recommended
the payment of the Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) or “13th month pay” from 1972 to
minimize the gap between salaries in the public and private sectors.
The PAP government has relied on increasing the salaries of ministers and senior
civil servants in 1973, 1979, 1982, 1989, and 1994 to reduce the growing differential
with private sector salaries. On October 21, 1994, a White Paper on Competitive salaries
for competent and honest government was presented to parliament to justify the
benchmarking of the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants to the average
salaries of the top four earners in six private sector professions namely, accounting,
banking, engineering, law, local manufacturing companies, and multi-national
corporations. The government accepted this recommendation and public sector
salaries were benchmarked accordingly from January 1995 with the salaries of the six
professions in the private sector (Quah, 2010, pp. 110-11).

Candidates
considered for Scholarships and
appointment and Disciplinary cases training awards
promotion completed granted
Period % % %

1983-1989 50,274 71.0 1,148 44.5 1,543 30.5

1990-1994 18,463 26.1 597 23.2 1,207 23.9
1995-2010 2,032 2.9 832 32.3 2,305 45.6
Table VIII. Total 70,769 100 2,577 100 5,055 100
Workload of the PSC in
Singapore, 1983-2010 Source: Compiled from PSC, 1984-2011
 The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the subsequent slowing down of the Singapore Good governance
economy resulted in a 2 per cent decrease in Superscale G and a 7 per cent decrease in in Singapore
Staff Grade I salaries and the reduction of the employers’ contribution to the Central
Provident Fund (CPF) from 20 per cent to 10 per cent for all employees. The purpose of
the CPF reduction was to enhance the Singapore’s competitiveness by lowering the
cost of doing business. In other words, the reduction in the CPF contribution meant an
additional decrease in the salaries of the ministers and senior civil servants. 411
When the Singapore economy recovered in 1999 with a growth rate of 5.4 per cent,
and the reduction of retrenchments from 29,100 in 1998 to 14,600 in 1999, wages in the
private sector began to rise again. Unemployment fell from 4.3 per cent in December
1999 to 3.4 per cent in March 2000. With the tight labour market in Singapore and the
improved conditions in the private sector, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
revealed in parliament on 29 June 2000 that eight administrative officers had resigned
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in 2000. The government increased the performance bonus component in the public
sector salaries and broadened the benchmarking of these salaries to the top eight
earners in the six private sector professions. Consequently, in June 2000, the variable
component of annual salaries was increased from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the total
annual pay of the superscale administrative officers and ministers (Quah, 2010,
pp. 113-14). However, public sector salaries were later reduced by a combined total of
30 per cent in November 2001 and July 2003 because of the recession.
In December 2007, the PSD announced that the salaries of ministers and senior civil
servants would be increased from 4 per cent to 21 per cent from January 2008. Table IX
shows the salaries of the President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Permanent Secretaries,
superscale civil servants at the entry grade, and Members of Parliament in 2007 and
2008. However, on 24 November 2008, the PSD announced that the salaries of
administrative officers, political, judicial and statutory appointment holders would be
decreased by 19 per cent in 2009 because of the economic recession. This means that
the President’s annual salary has been reduced from S$3.87 million to S$3.14 million.
Similarly, the Prime Minister’s annual salary has been decreased from S$3.76 million to

2007 salary 2008 salary

Appointment Grade Currency Monthly Annual Monthly Annual

President – S$ 104,840 3,187,000 119,520 3,870,000

US$ 69,564 2,114,657 84,478 2,735,369
Prime Minister – S$ 101,680 3,091,200 115,920 3,760,000
US$ 67,467 2,051,092 81,934 2,657,619
Minister/permanent secretary MR4 S$ 52,420 1,593,500 59,760 1,940,000
US$ 34,782 1,057,329 42,239 1,371,219
Superscale civilservant (entry) SR9 S$ 17,530 384,000 18,240 398,000
US$ 11,632 254,794 12,892 281,312
Member of Parliament – S$ 13,200 216,300 13,710 225,000
US$ 8,759 143,521 9,690 159,033 Table IX.
Salaries of key
Notes: The exchange rate in 2007 was US$1=S$1.5071 and in 2008, US$1=S$1.4148 appointments in
Source: Lee, 2007 Singapore, 2007-2008
 IJPSM S$3.04 million (PSD 2008, pp. 1-2). Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s annual salary of
26,5 US$2,183,516 in 2010 made him the best paid political leader in the world (Economist,
2010a, b).
The policy of paying competitive public sector salaries has been effective in curbing
the brain drain of political leaders to the private sector as none of them have resigned
from political office to work in the private sector before their retirement. The attractive
412 remuneration for the permanent secretaries has also been effective in retaining them in
the SCS as none of them have left for private sector jobs before their retirement.
However, paying competitive public sector salaries has been less effective in
preventing Division I officers from leaving the SCS. An analysis of the resignation rate
of Division I officers in the SCS from 1971-1984 shows that the salary increases in 1972,
1973, 1979 and 1982 had failed to curb the exodus of senior civil servants to the private
sector (Quah, 2010, pp. 93, 119-20).
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Governance indicators for Singapore

Have the above policies of changing the attitudes of civil servants, minimizing
corruption, maintaining meritocracy in the SCS by decentralizing the PSC, and paying
competitive salaries to attract the “best and brightest” citizens to the SCS, resulted in
good governance in Singapore? The short answer is “Yes” as will be demonstrated in
Singapore’s rankings and scores on eight governance indicators.

Government effectiveness
Singapore has been ranked first for the competence of its public officials from 1999 to
2002 by the Global Competitiveness Report[3]. Singapore was ranked first among 59
countries in 1999 and 2000 (Schwab et al., 1999, p. 242; Porter et al., 2000, p. 238).
Singapore’s civil servants were also ranked first among their counterparts in 75
countries in 2001-2002 and 80 countries in 2002-2003 (Schwab et al., 2002, p. 399;
Cornelius, 2003, p. 604).
The effectiveness of Singapore’s government has also been confirmed by
Singapore’s consistently high ranking on the World Bank’s governance indicator on
government effectiveness, which is defined as “the quality of public service provision,
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2004, p. 3). Table X shows that government
effectiveness in Singapore is very high from 1996 to 2010 and ranges from 93.2
percentile rank in 2002 to 100 percentile rank in 1996, 1998, 2008 and 2010.
Similarly, a 2010 survey of 12 Asian countries conducted by the Hong Kong-based
Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) found that the bureaucracy in Singapore is
the most effective, followed by the bureaucracy in Hong Kong SAR. At the other extreme,
the least effective bureaucracies are those in the Philippines, Indonesia and India in
descending order. Table XI confirms that Singapore has the most effective bureaucracy
among 12 Asian countries from 1998 to 2010. In short, Singapore’s government and civil
servants are effective and performed well according to the above indicators.

Effectiveness in curbing corruption

The effectiveness of the POCA and CPIB in curbing corruption is reflected in
Singapore’s consistently high rankings and scores on these five indicators:
 Good governance
Year Percentile rank (0-100) Governance score (2 2.5 to þ 2.5)
in Singapore
1996 100.0 þ 2.12
1998 100.0 þ 2.09
2000 99.5 þ 2.09
2002 93.2 þ 1.84
2003 96.6 þ 1.95 413
2004 96.1 þ 2.02
2005 98.5 þ 1.96
2006 99.0 þ 2.14
2007 99.5 þ 2.33
2008 100.0 þ 2.37
2009 99.5 þ 2.27
2010 100.0 þ 2.25 Table X.
Government effectiveness
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Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp of Singapore, 1996-2010

Country 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2007 2009 2010

Singapore 2.73 2.80 1.70 0.57 1.63 2.42 2.45 2.53

Hong Kong 2.89 4.00 3.26 3.39 3.50 2.60 3.87 3.49
Thailand 6.88 7.90 7.56 7.60 7.83 6.15 4.66 5.53
South Korea 8.27 5.00 5.50 5.00 6.33 5.61 5.83 6.13
Japan 7.13 4.00 4.33 4.25 2.05 5.51 5.92 6.57
Malaysia 6.14 6.00 6.86 5.67 7.00 6.50 6.21 6.97
Taiwan 6.25 5.71 6.17 5.50 5.50 5.43 6.77 6.60
Vietnam 9.25 9.75 7.88 8.25 8.14 7.41 7.60 8.13
China 7.63 6.50 7.67 7.67 6.03 6.83 8.17 7.93
Philippines 7.00 6.50 8.25 7.33 7.42 7.60 8.33 8.37
Indonesia 7.91 9.50 8.33 8.50 7.25 8.65 8.50 8.59 Table XI.
India 9.00 6.80 7.83 8.00 8.15 8.47 9.34 9.41 PERC’s evaluation of the
effectiveness of
Note: The score ranges from 0 ¼ most effective to 10 ¼ least effective bureaucracy in 12 Asian
Sources: Hussain, 2009, p. C5, Wong, 2004, and Lanka Business Online, 2010 countries, 1998 to 2010

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995-2011;

Political Economic PERC’s annual surveys of corruption from 1995-2011; World
Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator from 1996-2010; World Bank’s Doing Business
Surveys from 2007-2012; and the Global Competitiveness Report’s indicator on public
trust of politicians from 1999 to 2010-2011.
Table XII shows that first, Singapore has been consistently ranked as the least
corrupt country in Asia from 1995-2009 and 2011, and the least corrupt country in the
world in 2010 with Denmark and New Zealand. Second, PERC’s annual surveys of
corruption from 1995-2011 also confirm Singapore’s status as the least corrupt country
in Asia. Third, the World Bank’s control of corruption indicator from 1996-2010 shows
that Singapore has the highest percentile rank among all the Asian countries included
in the surveys
Fourth, Table XIII confirms that red tape is not a problem at all in Singapore as the
World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys show that Singapore is ranked first among the
 IJPSM
PERC rank and Control of corruption
26,5 Year CPI rank and scorea scoreb percentile rank

1995 3rd 9.26 1st 1.20 N/A

1996 7th 8.80 1st 1.09 96.6
1997 9th 8.66 1st 1.05 N/A
414 1998 7th 9.1 1st 1.43 96.1
1999 7th 9.1 1st 1.55 N/A
2000 6th 9.1 1st 0.71 96.6
2001 4th 9.2 1st 0.83 N/A
2002 5th 9.3 1st 0.90 98.5
2003 5th 9.4 1st 0.38 98.0
2004 5th 9.3 1st 0.50 98.5
2005 5th 9.4 1st 0.65 98.0
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2006 5th 9.3 1st 1.30 98.0

2007 4th 9.3 1st 1.20 98.1
2008 4th 9.2 1st 1.13 98.5
2009 3rd 9.2 1st 1.07 98.6
2010 1st 9.3 1st 1.42 98.6
2011 5th 9.2 1st 0.37 N/A
Table XII. Notes: aThe CPI score ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt); bthe PERC score ranges from
Singapore’s performance 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt)
on CPI, PERC and control Sources: www.transparency.org; PERC, 2001; PERC, 2008, p. 7; ABS-CBN News.com, 2010, 2011;
of corruption 1995-2011 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp

Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

n 175 178 181 183 183 183

Ease of doing business (rank) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Starting a business (rank) 11 9 10 4 4 4
No. of procedures 6 5 4 3 3 3
Time (days) 6 5 4 3 3 3
Dealing with construction permits (rank) 8 5 2 2 2 3
No. of procedures 11 11 11 11 11 11
Time (days) 129 102 38 25 25 26
Table XIII. Registering property (rank) 12 13 16 16 15 14
Singapore’s rank on the No. of procedures 3 3 3 3 3 3
World Bank’s ease of Time (days) 9 9 9 5 5 5
doing business,
2007-2012 Sources: World Bank, 2006, p. 140; 2007, p. 149; 2008, p. 133; 2009, p. 150; 2010, p. 192; 2011, p. 125

175-183 economies included from 2007-2012. The relative absence of red tape in
Singapore is an important factor responsible for its low level of corruption.
Fifth, Table XIV shows that Singapore has been consistently ranked first in the
Global Competitiveness Report’s indicator on the public trust of politicians among the
59 to 139 countries included in the surveys from 1999 to 2010/2011. Singapore’s
superior ranking on this indicator also reflects its high level of public trust in
politicians and its low level of corruption.
 Good governance
Year Rank Scorea No. of countries
in Singapore
1999 1st 6.36 59
2000 1st 6.50 59
2001-2002 1st 6.40 75
2002-2003 1st 6.40 80
2003-2004 1st 6.50 102 415
2007-2008 1st 6.40 131
2008-2009 1st 6.50 134
2009-2010 1st 6.40 133
2010-2011 1st 6.40 139
Note: aThe score ranges from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) for the respondent’s answer to this question:
“How would you rate the level of public trust in the ethical standards of politicians in your country?” Table XIV.
Sources: Compiled from: Schwab et al., 1999, p. 327; Porter et al., 2000, p. 253; Schwab et al., 2002, Public trust of politicians
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p. 408; Cornelius, 2003, p. 619; Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 499; Schwab and Porter, 2007, p. 379; Schwab and in Singapore,
Porter, 2008, p. 367; Schwab, 2009, p. 349; 2010, p. 369 1999-2010/2011

In short, the four policies introduced by the PAP government after assuming office in
June 1959 have been effective in promoting good governance in Singapore as
demonstrated by Singapore’s consistently high rankings and scores on the
abovementioned eight governance indicators.

Transferability of Singapore’s experience

Is Singapore’s experience in promoting good governance transferable to other Asian
countries? As Singapore’s success in ensuring good governance is the combined
influence of the political will of the PAP government to solve the problems facing the
country for the past 53 years and its favourable policy context, it will be difficult to
transfer Singapore’s experience in toto to other Asian countries because of the lack of
political will and the unfavourable policy contexts in many Asian countries.
Apart from good leadership, Singapore’s favourable policy context has enabled its
political leaders to stretch the constraints imposed by its small size and lack of
resources by formulating and implementing effective policies to solve its problems
during the past 53 years. As public administration Singapore-style is the product of the
local policy context and the policies implemented by the PAP government, it would be
difficult to replicate these policies to other Asian countries in view of the significant
contextual differences between Singapore and these countries (Quah, 2010, pp. 246, 51).
Table XV shows clearly the significant contextual differences between Singapore
and the other 25 Asian countries. First, in terms of size, Singapore is the second
smallest country after the Macao Special Administrative Region, which has a land area
of 29.2 sq. km. At the other extreme, are the larger countries of China and India, which
are 13,466 and 4,630 times larger respectively than Singapore. A second important
contextual difference is Singapore’s population, which is only larger than those of
Mongolia’s population of 2.7 million, Timor-Leste’s population of 1.2 million, Bhutan’s
population of 0.7 million, Macao’s population of 0.5 million, and Brunei’s population of
0.4 million. On the other hand, Singapore’s population of 5.1 million in 2010 is dwarfed
by the huge populations of China, India, and Indonesia.
 IJPSM
Population GDP per capita Government effectiveness
26,5 Land area (2010) (2010) (2010)
Country (sq km) (million) (US$) (% rank)

Afghanistan 652,230 30.6 517 4.8

Bangladesh 143,998 164.4 640 21.5
416 Bhutan 47,000 0.7 1,920 68.9
Brunei 5,765 0.4 31,238 77.5
Cambodia 181,035 14.1 760 22.5
China 9,560,900 1,338.3 4,260 59.8
Hong Kong SAR 1,104 7.0 32,900 94.7
India 3,287,263 1,170.9 1,340 55.0
Indonesia 1,904,443 232.5 2,580 47.8
Japan 377,727 127.4 42,150 88.5
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Laos 237,000 6.4 1,010 16.7

Macao SAR 29.2 0.5a 39,036a 88.0
Malaysia 332,665 27.9 7,900 82.3
Mongolia 1,565,000 2.7 1,890 32.1
Myanmar 676,578 48.1 NA 2.4
Nepal 147,181 29.9 490 25.4
North Korea 120,538 22.6 N/A 0.5
Pakistan 803,940 173.4 1,050 25.8
Philippines 300,000 93.6 2,050 51.7
Singapore 710.3 5.1 40,920 100.0
South Korea 99,274 48.9 19,890 84.2
Sri Lanka 65,610 20.5 2,290 49.3
Taiwan 36,179 23.2 18,458 84.7
Thailand 513,115 68.1 4,210 58.4
Timor-Leste 14,874 1.2 2,200 10.0
Vietnam 331,114 88.4 1,100 44.0
Table XV. Note: a2009 figures
Policy contexts of 26 Sources: Compiled from Schwab, 2009, pp. 341-2; Economist, 2010b; World Bank, 2011; Government
Asian countries Information Bureau, 2010, pp. 8, 639; and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp

The third contextual difference between Singapore and the other Asian countries is its
economic affluence as manifested in its GDP per capita of US$40,920 in 2010, which is
the second highest among all the 26 countries listed in Table XV. In contrast, the GDP
per capita of these four countries are less than US$1,000 namely, Cambodia (US$760),
Bangladesh (US$640), Afghanistan (US$517), and Nepal (US$490).
In short, Singapore is a city-state, which is richer and smaller in terms of land area
and population for the PAP government to govern than most of the other Asian
countries. Singapore’s favourable policy context has enabled the PAP government,
which has been in power since June 1959, to implement policies effectively, to curb
corruption, and to ensure the ease of doing business in Singapore, as demonstrated in
Singapore’s superior ranking on the World Bank’s governance indicator on
government effectiveness from 1996-2010, the Doing Business Surveys from
2007-2012, Transparency International’s CPI from 1995-2011, and PERC’s corruption
surveys from 1995-2011.
 Conclusion Good governance
In his National Day Rally speech on 19 August 1984, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan in Singapore
Yew attributed Singapore’s success to the quality of its political leadership:
In the end, whatever the system, it is the quality of the men who run it, that is decisive. For
they will decide what to make of the society, and how to get the people to give of their best.
The Singapore system has worked. It will continue to work if you vote for honest, able and
dedicated men, and you give them your best, for the good of all (Lee, 1984, p. 18).
417
More recently, Lee acknowledged the importance to Singapore’s development of
attracting the “best and brightest” citizens to join the government and the SCS thus:
My experience of developments in Asia has led me to conclude that we need good men to have
good government. [. . .] The single most decisive factor that made for Singapore’s
development was the ability of its ministers and the high quality of the civil servants who
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supported them. [. . .] It was Singapore’s good fortune that we had, for a small, developing
country, a fair share of talent, because our own [talent] had been reinforced by the talented
men and women who came here for their education, and stayed on for employment or
business opportunities (Lee, 2000, pp. 735-6).
In the same vein, Edgar H. Schein (1996, pp. 221-2) has identified the policy of having
“the best and brightest” citizens in government as “probably one of Singapore’s major
strengths” because “they are potentially the most able to invent what the country needs
to survive and grow.” Furthermore, he has described Singapore as “one of the few
models existing in the world of how a society can progress with a government that
attempts to maximize intelligence, skill, and honesty.”
In sum, Singapore’s transformation from a poor third world country in 1959 to an
affluent and politically stable first world country today is the result of the ability of its
political leaders and civil servants to formulate and implement policies to solve the
country’s problems during the past 53 years. First, the PAP leaders reorganised the
SCS and changed the attitudes of the civil servants by convincing them to contribute to
the attainment of national development goals. Second, they continued with the
tradition of meritocracy introduced by the British by retaining and enhancing the
PSC’s effectiveness by reducing its heavy workload by decentralizing its functions of
appointment and promotion to the ESC and PCDSC in 1990, and the 31 personnel
boards in 1995. Third, they learnt from the mistakes made by the British in curbing
corruption by enacting the POCA in June 1960 to enhance the CPIB’s effectiveness in
combating corruption. Fourth, the PAP government’s success in promoting economic
growth enabled it to compete for talented personnel with the private sector by paying
competitive salaries to ministers and senior civil servants from 1972 onwards to
prevent them from leaving for private sector jobs.
In the final analysis, whether these four elements of Singapore’s success –
institutional and attitudinal reform of civil servants; zero-tolerance for corruption;
meritocracy in appointing and promoting civil servants; and paying competitive
salaries to attract the “best and brightest” citizens to join the government and civil
service – can be replicated in other Asian countries depends mainly on whether their
political leaders and senior civil servants have the political will and are prepared to pay
the high economic and political costs of implementing these policies.
 IJPSM Notes
26,5 1. Except for the Japanese Occupation from February 1942 to August 1945, British colonial rule
in Singapore began from the founding of Singapore in January 1819 by Stamford Raffles
until the attainment of self-government in June 1959.
2. The exchange rate was US$1 ¼ S$1.27016 on November 2, 2011 (see www.xe.com).
3. This indicator was not included in the Global Competitiveness Report from 2003 onwards.
418
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Further reading
Public Service Division (PSD) (2008), Civil Servants’ Annual Pay to Fall, Public Service Division
(PSD), Singapore, 24 November, pp. 1-2.

About the author

Jon S.T. Quah was a Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore until
his retirement in June 2007. He is now an Anti-Corruption Consultant based in Singapore. His
latest books include: Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (Emerald
Group Publishing, Bingley, 2011) and Public Administration Singapore-style (Emerald Group
Publishing, Bingley, 2010). Jon S.T. Quah can be contacted at: jonstquah@gmail.com

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