1MRK505399-UEN B en Application Manual Distributed Busbar Protection REB500 8.3 IEC PDF

RELION® REB500
Distributed busbar protection REB500

Version 8.3 IEC
Application manual
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Document ID: 1MRK 505 399-UEN

Issued: May 2019
Revision: B
Product version: 8.3
© Copyright 2019 ABB. All rights reserved

Copyright
This document and parts thereof must not be reproduced or copied without written
permission from ABB, and the contents thereof must not be imparted to a third party, nor
used for any unauthorized purpose.
The software and hardware described in this document is furnished under a license and may
be used or disclosed only in accordance with the terms of such license.
This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for use in theOpenSSL
Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/) This product includes cryptographicsoftware written/
developed by: Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) and Tim Hudson(tjh@cryptsoft.com).
Trademarks
ABB and Relion are registered trademarks of the ABB Group. All other brand or product names
mentioned in this document may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective
holders.
Warranty
Please inquire about the terms of warranty from your nearest ABB representative.
Disclaimer
The data, examples and diagrams in this manual are included solely for the concept or product
description and are not to be deemed as a statement of guaranteed properties. All persons
responsible for applying the equipment addressed in this manual must satisfy themselves that
each intended application is suitable and acceptable, including that any applicable safety or
other operational requirements are complied with. In particular, any risks in applications where
a system failure and /or product failure would create a risk for harm to property or persons
(including but not limited to personal injuries or death) shall be the sole responsibility of the
person or entity applying the equipment, and those so responsible are hereby requested to
ensure that all measures are taken to exclude or mitigate such risks.
This document has been carefully checked by ABB but deviations cannot be completely ruled
out. In case any errors are detected, the reader is kindly requested to notify the manufacturer.
Other than under explicit contractual commitments, in no event shall ABB be responsible or
liable for any loss or damage resulting from the use of this manual or the application of the
equipment.
Conformity
This product complies with the directive of the Council of the European Communities on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC Directive 2004/108/EC) and concerning electrical equipment for use within specified
voltage limits (Low-voltage directive 2006/95/EC). This conformity is the result of tests
conducted by ABB in accordance with the product standards EN 50263 and EN 60255-26 for
the EMC directive, and with the product standards EN 60255-1 and EN 60255-27 for the low
voltage directive. The product is designed in accordance with the international standards of
the IEC 60255 series.
Table of contents
Table of contents
Section 1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 7
1.1 This manual.................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Intended audience........................................................................................................................ 7
1.3 Product documentation.............................................................................................................. 7
1.4 Symbols and conventions........................................................................................................... 7
1.4.1 Symbols........................................................................................................................................ 7
1.4.2 Document conventions............................................................................................................. 8
Section 2 Safety information......................................................................................... 9
Section 3 Overview........................................................................................................ 11
3.1 Application....................................................................................................................................11
3.2 System capacity.......................................................................................................................... 11
Section 4 Software........................................................................................................ 15
4.1 System software REBSYS..........................................................................................................15
4.2 Customer’s database.................................................................................................................15
4.3 Human/machine interface program HMI500....................................................................... 15
4.4 Local human/machine interface (local HMI)......................................................................... 15
4.5 Station monitoring system (SMS)........................................................................................... 15
4.6 Station automation system (SAS)...........................................................................................16
Section 5 Signal acquisition and processing..............................................................17

5.1 Analogue inputs.......................................................................................................................... 17
5.2 Maximum prolongation principle............................................................................................ 17
5.3 Binary inputs................................................................................................................................18
5.4 Binary outputs.............................................................................................................................19
Section 6 Self-supervision............................................................................................ 21
6.1 Diagnostic program................................................................................................................... 21
6.2 Self-supervision system............................................................................................................ 21
6.2.1 Software supervision...............................................................................................................22
6.2.1.1 Supervising the applications............................................................................................ 22
6.2.1.2 Supervision of data transfer via the process bus........................................................ 22
6.2.1.3 Supervision of the protection functions........................................................................ 23
6.2.1.4 Processing and supervising the binary inputs..............................................................23
6.2.1.5 Enabling binary outputs.................................................................................................... 23
6.2.1.6 Error messages in the event list...................................................................................... 23
6.2.1.7 Starting or restarting the system....................................................................................23
6.2.2 Hardware supervision..............................................................................................................23
6.2.2.1 Supervising the auxiliary supply...................................................................................... 23
6.2.2.2 Microprocessor program and main memories.............................................................24
6.2.2.3 Supervision of the tripping relay coils............................................................................24
Distributed busbar protection REB500 1

Application manual
Table of contents
6.2.2.4 Parts not covered by the self-supervision function.....................................................24

6.2.3 Plausibility check...................................................................................................................... 24
6.2.4 Internal analogue measurement supervision..................................................................... 26
6.2.4.1 Wiring of the analogue inputs..........................................................................................26
6.2.4.2 Secondary injection tests..................................................................................................27
Section 7 System Settings........................................................................................... 29

7.1 Intertripping/transfer tripping............................................................................................... 29
7.1.1 Busbar image............................................................................................................................ 29
7.2 Isolator and circuit-breaker positions................................................................................... 30
7.2.1 Supervising isolator and circuit-breaker statuses.............................................................31
7.2.2 Auxiliary contacts..................................................................................................................... 31
7.2.3 Evaluating the isolator and circuit-breaker statuses........................................................ 31
7.2.4 Isolator alarm............................................................................................................................ 32
7.2.5 Delay............................................................................................................................................32
7.2.6 Blocking by the isolator alarm............................................................................................... 32
7.2.7 Switch inhibit............................................................................................................................ 32
7.2.8 Acknowledging the isolator alarm........................................................................................ 33
7.2.9 Note on isolators and circuit-breakers................................................................................34
7.2.10 Response in the event of bay unit failure............................................................................ 34
7.3 Bay unit stand-alone mode...................................................................................................... 34
7.3.1 Emergency bay unit operation.............................................................................................. 35
7.4 Enabling the tripping command............................................................................................. 35
Section 8 Busbar protection.........................................................................................37

8.1 Protection zones.........................................................................................................................37
8.2 Measuring principle....................................................................................................................37
8.2.1 Application example................................................................................................................ 38
8.2.2 Safety aspects of the measuring principle.........................................................................40
8.3 Restrained amplitude comparison..........................................................................................41
8.3.1 Amplitude comparison............................................................................................................41
8.3.2 Restraint current.......................................................................................................................41
8.3.3 Operating characteristic........................................................................................................ 43
8.4 Restrained amplitude comparison with CT saturation......................................................44
8.4.1 Application example................................................................................................................44
8.5 Phase comparison......................................................................................................................46
8.6 Case studies: busbar layouts...................................................................................................48
8.6.1 Busbar with just two bays......................................................................................................48
8.6.2 Busbar with several bays........................................................................................................48
8.6.2.1 Case a: CT circuit fault on Bay 1.......................................................................................48
8.6.2.2 Case b: CT circuit fault on Bay 2...................................................................................... 48
8.6.2.3 Case c: CT circuit fault on Bay 3.......................................................................................48
8.6.2.4 Influence of the phase comparison function................................................................49
8.6.2.5 Summary.............................................................................................................................. 49
8.6.3 Busbar fault with through current........................................................................................49
8.6.3.1 Case a: Through current....................................................................................................49
8.6.3.2 Case b: Loop current.......................................................................................................... 51
2 Distributed busbar protection REB500

Application manual
Table of contents
8.7 Differential current supervision...............................................................................................51
Section 9 Special applications of BBP.........................................................................53

9.1 Neutral current measurement................................................................................................. 53
9.2 Blocking measurement of certain CTs...................................................................................56
9.2.1 Bus-tie breaker functions....................................................................................................... 56
9.2.1.1 When the bus-tie breaker is open................................................................................... 56
9.2.1.2 In the event of a protection function (BBP, BFP or EFP) tripping this CB............... 57
9.2.1.3 Short-circuiting of a CT..................................................................................................... 58
9.2.2 Feeder circuit-breakers.......................................................................................................... 60
9.2.3 Breaker reclaim time................................................................................................................ 61
9.2.3.1 Example of when the reclaim time is set too short..................................................... 62
9.2.4 CB CLOSE command (manual close signal)........................................................................ 62
9.2.4.1 Example of a CLOSE CB signal which was not registered..........................................63
9.3 Check zone protection for release of BBP.............................................................................63
9.3.1 Protection zones...................................................................................................................... 64
9.3.2 Measurement principle........................................................................................................... 64
9.3.2.1 Differential current (IDiff)...................................................................................................65
9.3.2.2 Stabilisation factor (k).......................................................................................................65
9.3.2.3 Operating characteristic................................................................................................... 65
9.3.3 Check zone................................................................................................................................ 66
9.3.4 Application of check zone protection.................................................................................. 67
9.3.5 Substation configuration....................................................................................................... 67
9.3.6 Maintenance conditions in connection with CzBBP......................................................... 68
Section 10 Breaker failure protection (BFP)................................................................ 69

10.1 Current setting........................................................................................................................... 69
10.1.1 Iron core transformers (Class TPX) and transformers with residual flux air gap
(Class TPY).................................................................................................................................69
10.1.2 Linearized current transformers (TPZ).................................................................................71
10.2 Time-grading a single or two-stage BFP................................................................................71
10.2.1 Case 1: Tripping by main protection successful.................................................................71
10.2.2 Case 2: Backup trip by BFP..................................................................................................... 72
10.2.3 Case 3: Intertripping of surrounding circuit-breakers by BFP........................................ 72
10.2.4 Timer t1 setting......................................................................................................................... 73
10.2.5 Timer t2 setting.........................................................................................................................73
10.2.6 Maximum time t1max for backup tripping............................................................................74
10.2.7 Maximum time t2max for intertripping................................................................................. 74
10.3 Logic type.....................................................................................................................................75
10.4 BFP L0 system............................................................................................................................. 75
10.4.1 Current setting BFP L0............................................................................................................75
10.4.1.1 Neutral current I0 caused by CT saturation...................................................................76
10.4.1.2 Neutral current I0 caused by an open CT circuit........................................................... 77
10.4.1.3 CT inaccuracies................................................................................................................... 78
10.4.2 Time grading for BFP L0 system...........................................................................................78
10.5 External start of BFP.................................................................................................................. 78

Application manual
Table of contents
10.6 BFP setting Active for CB open................................................................................................78

10.7 BFP start input supervision...................................................................................................... 79
Section 11 Additional protection features...................................................................81

11.1 Enabling tripping commands ..................................................................................................81
11.1.1 Example 1: BBP function tripping enabled by external undervoltage relay.................. 81
11.1.1.1 Problem.................................................................................................................................81
11.1.1.2 Solution................................................................................................................................. 81
11.1.1.3 Result.....................................................................................................................................82
11.1.2 Example 2: EFP function tripping enabled by the internal undervoltage function.....82
11.1.2.1 Problem.................................................................................................................................82
11.1.2.2 Solution.................................................................................................................................83
11.1.2.3 Result.....................................................................................................................................83
11.1.3 Example 3: BBP tripping enabled by the internal undervoltage function.....................84
11.1.3.1 Problem................................................................................................................................ 84
11.1.3.2 Solution................................................................................................................................ 84
11.1.3.3 Result.................................................................................................................................... 84
11.1.4 Example 4: BBP function tripping enabled by the internal undervoltage
function without VTs on the busbars.................................................................................. 84
11.1.4.1 Problem................................................................................................................................ 84
11.1.4.2 Solution.................................................................................................................................85
11.1.4.3 Result.................................................................................................................................... 85
11.1.5 Example 5: BBP neutral measuring system enabled by the internal
undervoltage functio...............................................................................................................86
11.1.5.1 Problem................................................................................................................................ 86
11.1.5.2 Solution................................................................................................................................ 86
11.1.5.3 Result.................................................................................................................................... 86
Section 12 1½ breaker schemes and duplex stations................................................ 87

12.1 1½ breaker scheme with 3 CTs per diameter....................................................................... 88
12.1.1 T zone protection with isolator Q6 closed..........................................................................88
12.1.2 T zone protection with isolator Q6 open............................................................................ 88
12.1.2.1 Line........................................................................................................................................ 88
12.1.2.2 Transformer feeder............................................................................................................89
12.2 1½ breaker scheme with 6 CTs per diameter.......................................................................89
12.3 1½ breaker scheme with 5 CTs per diameter.......................................................................90
12.4 1½ breaker scheme with 8 CTs per diameter....................................................................... 91
12.5 1½ breaker scheme with only BBP function.......................................................................... 91
12.6 Duplex station............................................................................................................................. 92
12.7 Assignment of bay units........................................................................................................... 93
Section 13 Complex stations......................................................................................... 95

13.1 BBP and BFP in stations with a bypass busbar....................................................................95
13.2 Busbars with bus-ties in series............................................................................................... 95
13.3 Switchgear bays as bus-tie or feeder circuit-breaker........................................................ 98
13.4 Control using 11105_External TRIP......................................................................................... 99
13.4.1 1½ breaker scheme..................................................................................................................99

Application manual
Table of contents
13.4.2 Bypass mode.............................................................................................................................99

13.4.3 Bypass isolator....................................................................................................................... 100

Application manual
6
1MRK 505 399-UEN B Section 1
Introduction
Section 1 Introduction
1.1 This manual GUID-B02860D3-0AEC-4D56-85D1-FE85D66A1042 v2
The Application manual contains application descriptions and setting guidelines for the
REB500. The manual can be used to find out when and for what purpose a typical protection
function can be used. The manual can also be used when calculating settings.
1.2 Intended audience GUID-6E3738BC-FDAB-4ACB-9DBC-442FA6048F2F v1
This manual addresses the protection and control engineer responsible for planning, pre-
engineering and engineering.
The protection and control engineer must be experienced in electrical power engineering and
have knowledge of related technology, such as protection schemes and communication
principles.
1.3 Product documentation GUID-91F0A03F-D1AF-4695-A239-1FC87E7459EE v2
REB500 manuals Document numbers

Product guide 1MRK 505 402-BEN
Application manual 1MRK 505 399-UEN
Technical manual 1MRK 505 400-UEN
Operation manual 1MRK 500 132-UEN
Engineering manual 1MRK 511 452-UEN
Commissioning manual 1MRK 505 401-UEN
Application manual for bay protection functions 1MRK 505 403-UEN
Technical manual for bay protection functions 1MRK 505 406-UEN
Cyber security deployment guideline 1MRK 511 453-UEN
Communication protocol manual IEC61850 1MRK 511 450-UEN
Communication protocol manual IEC60870-5-103 1MRK 511 451-UEN
Getting started guide 1MRK 505 404-UEN
1.4 Symbols and conventions
1.4.1 Symbols GUID-4F7DD10A-DEE5-4297-8697-B8AAB5E3262F v2
The electrical warning icon indicates the presence of a hazard which could
result in electrical shock.

Application manual
Section 1 1MRK 505 399-UEN B
Introduction
The warning icon indicates the presence of a hazard which could result in
personal injury.
The caution icon indicates important information or warning related to the

concept discussed in the text. It might indicate the presence of a hazard which
could result in corruption of software or damage to equipment or property.
The information icon alerts the reader of important facts and conditions.
The tip icon indicates advice on, for example, how to design your project or
how to use a certain function.
Although warning hazards are related to personal injury, it is necessary to understand that
under certain operational conditions, operation of damaged equipment may result in
degraded process performance leading to personal injury or death. Therefore, comply fully
with all warning and caution notices.
1.4.2 Document conventions GUID-37C3ACF4-BD79-43C6-B37E-24B38EE69301 v2
A particular convention may not be used in this manual.
• Abbreviations and acronyms in this manual are spelled out in the glossary. The glossary
also contains definitions of important terms.
• Push button navigation in the LHMI menu structure is presented by using the push button
icons.
For example, to navigate the options, use and .
• HMI menu paths are presented in bold.
For example, select Main menu/Settings.
• Signal names are presented in bold.
The signal 21120_EXT_TEST_TRIP can be set and reset via the LHMI Test Trip menu.
• Parameter names and parameter values are presented in italics.
For example, the default value of the Operation setting is Not inverted.
• Section references are presented with the respective section numbers.
For example, see Section 1.4.2 for more details about document conventions.

Application manual
Safety information
Section 2 Safety information GUID-7CDA9FB7-5CD6-4BD5-A1D2-AAB8E7BF87A3 v2
Dangerous voltages can occur on the connectors, even though the auxiliary
voltage has been disconnected.
Non-observance can result in death, personal injury or substantial property

damage.
Only a competent electrician is allowed to carry out the electrical installation.
National and local electrical safety regulations must always be followed.
The frame of the IEDs has to be carefully earthed.
Whenever changes are made in the IEDs, measures should be taken to avoid
inadvertent tripping.
The IEDs contain components which are sensitive to electrostatic discharge.

Unnecessary touching of electronic components must therefore be avoided.

Application manual
10
Overview
Section 3 Overview GUID-923D7F2A-9F9D-4979-96E0-697D0BF1C484 v2
The digital busbar system REB500 belongs to the generation of fully digital protection devices,
that is, the analogue-to-digital conversion of the input variables takes place immediately after
the input transformers and all further processing of the resulting digital signals is performed
by programmable microprocessors.
The main features which enable the REB500 to fully satisfy the demands placed on a modern
protective device with respect to cost-effectiveness and functionality are compact design, just
a few different types of hardware units, modular software and continuous self-supervision and
diagnosis.
The structure of the protection system is bay-oriented. The bay units may be located close to
the switchgear in control and protection cubicles or in a central relay room. Distributed bay
units are connected to the central unit by an optical fiber process bus. The central unit collects
all the data and executes the protection algorithms and auxiliary functions at station level.
The standard application of the protection system is that of busbar protection. Provision is
made, however for integrating optional functions to detect, for example, breaker failure, end
zone faults, overcurrent and circuit-breaker pole discrepancy.
3.1 Application GUID-5A7BC0AC-5DFF-4843-BF91-C2ABB78ED4D3 v1
The digital busbar protection has been designed for the high-speed selective protection of
MV, HV and EHV busbars in 50 and 60 Hz power systems. Because of the flexible and modular
structure of both hardware and software, the protection can be simply configured to suit the
particular busbar arrangement.
It is thus able to protect all busbar layouts, whether a single set of busbars or quadruple
busbars with a transfer busbar. It is similarly applicable to ring busbars and 1½ breaker
schemes. The maximum capacity for a quadruple busbar system is 60 feeders (60 bay units)
with a maximum of 7 longitudinal breakers, 8 sections of busbars and 32 protection zones.
The protection system detects phase and ground faults in solidly grounded and impedance
grounded power systems. The digital scheme only evaluates the primary system currents. The
main CTs do not have to fulfill any special requirements as is the case, for example, with a
high-impedance scheme. Even in the event of saturation of the main CTs, the protection is still
able to discriminate correctly between internal and external faults.
3.2 System capacity GUID-62AB81BD-ECEA-4C1D-92BF-359861ED5B83 v2
The protection system is applicable to all busbar layouts, whether a single set of busbars or
quadruple busbars with a transfer busbar. It is similarly applicable to 1½ breaker schemes, ring
busbars and duplex stations. The maximum capacity is 60 bay units (one per feeder or one per
set of CTs on a bus-tie breaker; in the case of a longitudinal isolator, either a separate bay unit
is needed or alternatively it is included in an existing bay unit). Up to 32 protection zones can
be selectively protected and tripped.
It is possible to apply REB500 system without making use of its basic busbar protection
function (for example, as an independent breaker failure and end zone protection).

Application manual
Overview
The application of the protection system in complex stations, 1½ breaker

schemes and duplex configurations is described separately in Section 12.
The following are examples of the principal busbar configurations:
12000001-IEC18000251-1-en.vsd
IEC18000251 V1 EN-US
Figure 1: Single busbar
I
II
12000002-IEC18000252-1-en.vsd
Figure 2: Double busbar
I
II
Transfer
busbar
12000003-IEC18000253-1-en.vsd
Figure 3: Double busbar with transfer busbar

Application manual
Overview
II
12000004-IEC18000254-1-en.vsd
Figure 4: 1½ breaker scheme
12000005-IEC18000255-1-en.vsd
Figure 5: Ring busbar

Application manual
Overview
II
12000006-IEC18000256-1-en.vsd
Figure 6: Duplex station

Application manual
Software
Section 4 Software
4.1 System software REBSYS GUID-FC9161CC-B467-47D5-8BE1-BE49A0C0430C v2
This software package is installed on the system processor board. It includes all the system
functions and also the local HMI (see Section 4.4) and the station monitoring system (see
Section 6).
4.2 Customer’s database GUID-87087925-EE82-4AEC-A874-FA48EC5F3ABF v1
The database was created according to the customer’s specification. It is installed on the
master CPU in the central unit and for the most part can be edited using HMI500.
4.3 Human/machine interface program HMI500 GUID-ABE594D4-8183-49D4-9299-87B10C57BB36 v1
The human/machine interface (HMI) program HMI500 provides convenient communication

with the protection system to:
• view measurements and statuses

• set the protection functions
• configure the system
• commission and maintain the system
• download data to the system
• control the integrated disturbance recorder
• control the integrated event recorder
4.4 Local human/machine interface (local HMI) GUID-67D237A5-9087-497F-BD5E-63CC80138D10 v1
The local HMI program forms an integral part of the system software REBSYS. Accessed via the
control unit on the central unit or a bay unit, the local HMI software enables the following to be
viewed, but for safety reasons not changed:
• current and voltage measurements

• statuses of inputs and outputs
• alarms
• system settings
• settings of the protection functions installed
4.5 Station monitoring system (SMS) GUID-D0336E66-95D7-4861-AC55-94F6113C510A v1
The REB500 system can be integrated in a station monitoring system (SMS). Refer to the
description of the station monitoring system (SMS) for further details.

Application manual
Software
4.6 Station automation system (SAS) GUID-5E46D13F-13DB-4B1F-B6D7-A49C9E230C78 v1
The REB500 system can be integrated in a station automation system (SAS). Refer to the
description of the station automation system (SAS) for further details.

Application manual
Signal acquisition and processing
Section 5 Signal acquisition and processing

5.1 Analogue inputs GUID-0228DB2C-12D2-4AF4-9F25-5F3164F76AA7 v2
The protection system processes the current measurements digitally in the bay units. For this
purpose, 80 measurements a period are made of the busbar feeders’ currents. At a power
system frequency of 50 Hz, this corresponds to a sampling rate of 4.0 kHz and at 60 Hz of 4.8
kHz. The analogue/digital converter has a range of 16 Bit.
Should a CT saturate, the signals are compensated by signal processing according to the
maximum prolongation principle (see below). The signals then pass through a Fourier filter,
which separates the real and imaginary fundamental frequency components. All the other
harmonics are suppressed.
These components are evaluated by all the protection functions in the bay unit. The
disturbance recorder monitors the original non-compensated secondary current signals. The
current signals are also transferred to the central unit, which executes the busbar protection
function.
The optionally available voltages are measured essentially the same as currents with the
exception that maximum prolongation is not applied.
5.2 Maximum prolongation principle GUID-864F72C1-1F84-42DD-8727-B62A4217DD96 v2
The maximum prolongation principle is a method patented by the manufacturer for

additionally processing the current signals to enable the protection algorithms to detect faults
discriminatively even if CTs are saturating.
Basically it uses the maximum value detected in the sampling window should a CT saturate.
By prolonging the maximum value, the signal is compensated such that the
best possible approximation of the phase-angle and amplitude of the
unsaturated signal is achieved.

Application manual
60 IN
40
I 20
-20
-40
0 10 20 30 40 ms
ta th t
to
Undistorted current signal (main c.t. primary)
Distorted current signal (main c.t. secondary)
Compensated current
12000028-IEC18000257-1-en.vsd
Figure 7: Maximum prolongation principle in the case of CT

Time t0 is the interval between the last zero crossing before the maximum value is detected
and the end of the prolongation period. At a power system frequency of 50 Hz, this time is 12.5
ms (at 60 Hz, 10.4 ms). The rise time from the zero crossing to the maximum value is defined
as ta. The difference between t0 and ta is time th, which is then the time the maximum value in
the sampling window is prolonged. The longer time ta, the shorter the maximum value is
prolonged.
Consider the following example:
High through-fault currents can cause one or more CTs to saturate and could give rise to a
false differential current, which, if no precautions were taken, might be interpreted as an
internal fault. The maximum prolongation function maintains protection stability and
discrimination in the presence of CT saturation, because the signals transferred are a good
approximation of the phase-angle and amplitude of the unsaturated signals (see Section 8).
5.3 Binary inputs GUID-C1717E66-6BAE-4AD5-8302-06F36D19820D v2
Optocouplers electrically insulate all the binary inputs.
They pick up when the input voltage remains above 80% of the rated auxiliary voltage for at
least 20 ms and reset when it is below 65% for longer than 20 ms.
The standard binary inputs are all equipped with anti-bounce filters. The software anti-bounce
filter has no influence on a signal’s time stamp, that is, the time stamp is determined by the
first occurrence of the signal at the input of the optocoupler.

Application manual
Time stamp
Opto-coupler input signal
Internal REB500 signal after

the anti-bounce filter
Anti- bounce
filter time
12000029-IEC18000258-1-en.vsd
Figure 8: Anti-bounce filter

The anti-bounce time for the special signals below is set to the minimum of 2 ms instead of
the standard time (normally 20 ms) set generally for the system:
• All disturbance recorder input signals 167nn_Start DR_x and 36705_General Start DR.
• Breaker failure input signals 137nn_Start BFP_Lx, 13705_External Start BFP and
138nn_Start BFP Q0 no I_x.
• 31805_External release BB zone and 11605_External release Trip.
• The signals 11510…11525_Supervison aux. voltage_x are set to a fixed anti-bounce time of
10 ms.
Should several signals be configured for a common optocoupler input and one
of them have a minimum anti-bounce time of 2 ms, then 2 ms applies for all the
signals. This kind of configuration should be avoided wherever possible.
Due to system constraints the trigger for the disturbance recorder can be
delayed by a maximum of one base-period.
A distinction is made between input signals with a slow response and those with a fast
response. Internally, REB500 processes the process bus signals in fast and slow cycles
according to their priority.
Table 1: Signal response times

Signal response Description
slow These signals must be maintained at the binary input
for at least 50 ms plus the anti-bounce time and are
processed by the slow cycle.
fast These signals must be maintained at the binary input
for at least 6 ms plus the anti-bounce time and are
processed by the fast cycle.
5.4 Binary outputs GUID-B15ED000-FA5B-4CDD-84B8-C0BEF003BF37 v2
The bay units generate two kinds of binary output signals, tripping commands and logic
signals. The central unit only generates logic signals.

Application manual
Binary output signals are generated by the processors in the central and bay units as
determined by signal logics.
Tripping commands are written in capital letters to distinguish them from logic
signals.
Output signals can be assigned to auxiliary output relays to actuate either a tripping or
signaling circuit. As a safety precaution, it is impossible to assign tripping commands and
logic signals to the same output relay, that is, tripping commands can only be combined with
other tripping commands and logic signals with other logic signals. For example, the signals
21305_Trip and 21105_EXTERNAL TRIP cannot be configured to operate the same output
contact.

Application manual
Self-supervision
Section 6 Self-supervision GUID-9C25E9DF-8F77-4D73-A753-E1B6136FABA9 v2
To ensure the maximum possible reliability, the REB500 is equipped with a selfsupervision
function, which enables it to respond quickly to any hardware (HW) or software (SW) errors.
Some, such as an error in transmission via the process bus, only affect a single data set and
are generally of a transient nature. A serious error would mean, for example, that reliable
operation could no longer be guaranteed. It is important to detect errors of this kind and to
take the appropriate action, which can include blocking the protection functions and tripping
outputs.
The self-supervision and diagnostic function ensures the high availability of the busbar
protection. Errors and defects are immediately detected and signaled so that corrective action
can be taken without delay.
The self-supervision software forms part of the REBSYS system software (see Section 4.1).
6.1 Diagnostic program GUID-CB4FA34D-4DFA-40E8-8B31-E552694008F9 v2
The task of the diagnostic program is to manage (start and stop) all the other applications (for
example, protection functions and binary inputs and outputs) and process the data of the self-
supervision function.
The system SW is divided into sub-systems that perform specific applications (such as,
protection functions, binary inputs and outputs, and database controller). The structure of the
diagnostic program reflects the structure and distributed architecture of the protection
system, that is, it is distributed between every module of the central unit and bay units having
a microprocessor.
Each level in the structure of the diagnostic program reports the status of the applications at
the same or lower levels to the next level up. Enabling (release) signals are distributed from
top to bottom. As soon as the diagnostic program detects a critical fault, it reports the
corresponding status upwards and blocks the downwards distribution of the enabling signal.
The protection system thus propagates the blocking of the enabling signal to block all tripping
outputs. In the case of critical faults, the protection system will shut down and restarts.
6.2 Self-supervision system GUID-C5D70CC0-3421-4EFB-9C2D-166ADB9F846E v2
The self-supervision system covers software and hardware and includes in addition to the
internal signals the monitoring of the external input values such as current values (CT
supervision) and the positions of the auxiliary contacts on isolators and circuit-breakers
(busbar replica).

Application manual
Self-supervision
Supervision of the external input circuits

6
CT
supervision
5 Busbar replica
supervision

4 Internal analogue
measurement supervision
ABB REB 500
Ready Start Trip
3 Plausibility check ABB
Hardware supervision
I ESC 2 Clear
3
2 Menu
L
Help
1 Software supervision
Internal self‐supervision/ diagnosis
12000035-IEC18000259-1-en.vsd
Figure 9: Structure of the self-supervision system

The different layers of the self-supervision system displayed in Figure 9 are described further
in the following sections:
1. Section 6.2.1
2. Section 6.2.2
3. Section 6.2.3
4. Section 6.2.4
5. Section 7.2.1
6. Section 8.7
6.2.1 Software supervision GUID-B21CDCB7-CC44-4CBC-8247-04C196D1F31F v1
6.2.1.1 Supervising the applications GUID-B6EE289E-394A-4A22-9C7A-A6EA0795662F v2
The diagnostic program can control applications by detecting status changes (for example,
initialization and stopping at the right instant). The applications report their statuses (for
example, initialization finished, processing finished or error detected). Using status changes
to supervise the applications means that an application that has been started must report
back to the diagnostic program within a given time.
A hard-wired watchdog per microprocessor which the programs have to reset at regular
intervals supervises the entire SW. Should a watchdog not be reset, the watchdog timer times
out and initiates a hardware reset.
6.2.1.2 Supervision of data transfer via the process bus GUID-C4C663D1-D163-469D-883A-3493047BF770 v1
A number of supervised criteria ensure the integrity of the data transferred via the process
bus. All data transferred via the process bus are subject to cyclic redundancy checks as part of
the Ethernet transmission.

Application manual
Self-supervision
6.2.1.3 Supervision of the protection functions GUID-DD2D0209-AB67-475D-93F9-08C43793633E v2
The operation of every application is synchronized and a time stamp is attached to all
analogue signal samples and binary signals. Before determining a differential current, a check
is performed to make sure the samples have the same time stamp. Should this not be the case,
the samples concerned are not evaluated.
6.2.1.4 Processing and supervising the binary inputs GUID-BFB5BACA-E6E0-4832-9BBE-B83AE9224483 v2
Every binary input is equipped with its own anti-bounce software. As a rule, the status of a
signal is considered valid for processing if it persists 20 ms after its first incidence.
The binary inputs are also supervised with respect to oscillations. If the status of an input
changes five times in 100 ms, the input is marked as invalid. In this case, the signal is
processed such that the reliability of the system is assured, that is, invalid blocking inputs are
assumed to be active.
6.2.1.5 Enabling binary outputs GUID-DC33F7D0-F472-4640-9377-93D60AD6A574 v2
To achieve the maximum reliability of the system, every tripping command has an associated
enabling signal and should the diagnostics program detect an HW or SW error, it suppresses
the enabling signals for the binary outputs, that is, the tripping outputs are inhibited.
6.2.1.6 Error messages in the event list GUID-BA8927D9-0398-4FA8-A46B-2915EFE856F2 v1
All errors and defects detected by the self-supervision function are processed by the
diagnostics program and recorded as events. These are classified as “major errors” if the
proper operation of the protection functions can no longer be guaranteed.
In such cases, the system is automatically restarted. All the output channels are blocked, the
protection devices are no longer standing by and the green LEDs on the local control units
flash.
Errors that do not endanger the proper operation of the protection functions are classified as
“minor errors”.
6.2.1.7 Starting or restarting the system GUID-A5A0D556-0E27-4F04-965F-1128AC5AAA83 v2
When the self-supervision function or the diagnostics program restarts the system or a part of
it, the procedure is signaled on the local control unit. The blocked status of the system is
signaled by the flashing yellow LED on all the units and on the HMI.
While the system is starting, all the LEDs flash and the software applications are indicated by a
designation (for example, MPL and TIM). The successful start-up of the system is ensured
when the main menu is displayed on all the units and that the signal 41810_In service is set.
6.2.2 Hardware supervision GUID-C96DA90F-79BA-4A52-B6EF-1407054DEA2B v1
6.2.2.1 Supervising the auxiliary supply GUID-4FA60E97-31AF-4795-974E-5338AB979C19 v2
The power supply units in the central and bay units are supervised with respect to their
permissible variations. An auxiliary supply voltage that is out of tolerance counts as a major
error, that is, the protection system is shut down and restarted.

Application manual
Self-supervision
6.2.2.2 Microprocessor program and main memories GUID-8EC67EB6-CEE2-4785-B671-89A1EEF29266 v1
All main memories are tested by writing and then reading a test pattern.
6.2.2.3 Supervision of the tripping relay coils GUID-C76E833D-C1A4-4B24-854B-AAE53A38D1B2 v1
Each of the tripping relays in a bay unit is fitted with a circuit for supervising the integrity of
the tripping relay coil.
6.2.2.4 Parts not covered by the self-supervision function GUID-E1C06CDE-8886-4861-9B43-5A8ED4DE0815 v2
It is impossible to supervise all parts of the protection chain, for example, the binary input
circuits. Hence, it is recommended to install an external trip circuit supervision system.
6.2.3 Plausibility check GUID-886DF8F8-3490-4EB8-931D-4B2BBAB90ECD v2
As it was described in Section 6.2.2.1, all analogue inputs of all the bay units are supervised. If
such supervision detects a discrepancy, it blocks the respective bay unit. This is performed
locally and is complemented by a plausibility check carried out by the central unit on the entire
system which includes all the zones of the busbar protection (BBP) application. This involves
evaluating the current changes taking place in all the bay units. The plausibility check is based
on the fact that a change of current (amplitude) caused by a busbar fault must be present in at
least two bay units of a busbar zone. (see Figure 10).

Bay unit without change of current
Bay units with change of current

12000036-IEC18000260-1-en.vsd
Figure 10: Plausibility check releases BBP-TRIP

The busbar protection is not permitted to trip if this condition is not fulfilled.

Application manual
Self-supervision

Bay units without change of current
Bay units with change of current

12000037-IEC18000261-1-en.vsd
Figure 11: Plausibility check blocks BBP-TRIP

There are situations and operating conditions in which the plausibility check is bypassed, that
is, it bears no influence on the tripping decision by the busbar protection.
Such situations and operating conditions are:
• The protection zone comprises only a single bay unit, or all other bay units of this
protection zone are not conducting any current (current below 0.075 x In) (see Figure 12).
0 0

Bay units not conducting any current (current<0.075 x In)
Bay unit with change of current

12000038-IEC18000262-1-en.vsd
Figure 12: Plausibility check is bypassed (no influence to BBP-TRIP)

• Approx. 400 ms after the number of current measurements assigned to a protection zone
has changed (change of breaker/isolator position or blocking of coupler measurement,
see Section 9.2.1.2).
• As long as REB500/REB500sys system is in the Test mode.
When testing a system by injecting currents, the plausibility check has no

influence to the test providing a busbar protection zone only has a single
bay unit connected to it. However, if more than one bay unit is connected
to a zone, REB500 should be switched to the Test mode for the duration of
the test. The plausibility check then cannot falsify the test results.

Application manual
Self-supervision
6.2.4 Internal analogue measurement supervision GUID-E7FA33A0-B511-4E56-B353-D126936B127A v2
The correct operation of the analogue inputs and the analogue to digital (A/D) converters is
supervised by the internal comparison of IL1+IL2+IL3= - IL0.
Per default the internal analogue measurement supervision is activated. The

status of this supervision can be changed while engineering the system, or
under the Configurator mode of HMI500, menu item Settings/System. The
activation state applies for the main system function BBP and also for all other
protection functions.
17000045-IEC18000487-1-en.vsdx
Figure 13: System Parameter Analogue Channel Supervision
It is recommended not to change the default activation state of the internal

analogue measurement supervision (with the exceptions of maintenance
situations).
6.2.4.1 Wiring of the analogue inputs GUID-9224C7D9-F573-40C1-BED0-3EBC9A07743D v2
The external wiring shown in the diagram below is mandatory for the internal analogue
measurement supervision.
L1 L2 L3
Bay Unit REB500
IL1 Analogue part

01
A
CT1
02 D
IL2
03
A
CT2
D
04
IL3
05
A
CT3
06
D
IL0
07
A
CT4
D
08
Analogue measurement supervision

IL1 + IL2 + IL3 = -IL0 
? 
14000050-IEC18000350-1-en.vsd
Figure 14: External wiring mandatory for the analogue measurement supervision

Application manual
Self-supervision
Core-balance CT’s must not be used for IL0, if the supervision is activated. The
main current transformers of L1, L2 and L3 shall have the same current ratio
and under the HMI menu current transformer the settings for I1,I2,I3 and I4
shall be identical.
This is not a CT supervision, because the internal analogue supervision does

not check the relation between phases. For details about CT supervision, see
Section 8.7 .
6.2.4.2 Secondary injection tests GUID-2DA1A1B6-13AD-4147-B5E3-8BF49BABEE73 v2
If currents are injected for test purposes on a single phase, for example, during
commissioning, the external wiring must include the neutral path (IL0). If not, the analogue
measurement supervision will block the protection algorithm.
When testing a system by injecting currents, the internal analogue

measurement supervision can be deactivated by switching the REB500 to the
Test mode. The internal analogue measurement supervision then cannot falsify
the test results. The wiring of the neutral path (IL0) is not necessary for this
mode.

Application manual
28
System Settings
Section 7 System Settings

7.1 Intertripping/transfer tripping GUID-DFEDE71C-48E8-469B-B336-990C38AB90AE v2
The intertripping system establishes an image of the busbar configuration and performs
essentially two tasks:
1. The assignment of analogue measurements to the protection zones of the busbar

protection function (assignment is refreshed every 6 ms, that is, fast part, fast signal).
2. Determines the tripping logic according to protection zones for the protection functions:
• busbar protection (the zone containing the fault)
• end zone protection (zone with the end zone fault)
• breaker failure protection (zone with the defective circuit-breaker)
• enabling tripping (external enabling signal, low-voltage check feature)
• intertripping
As an example, consider a fault on busbar 1 of double busbars (see Figure 2).
1. Only those feeders connected to busbar 1 are assigned to the measuring system of
busbar 1. The assignment of the feeders is carried out by the intertripping system, which
evaluates the positions of the isolators.
2. The measuring system on busbar 1 detects the internal fault and issues a tripping
command for busbar 1 to the intertripping system.
The intertripping system knows from the positions of the isolators, which feeders are
connected to busbar 1 and the tripping command to the circuit-breakers of all those
feeders with isolators closed onto busbar 1.
It is, thus, extremely important for the correct isolator positions to be reported to the
protection system.
The intertripping system also detects when protection zones are connected together (for
example, both feeder isolators closed).
7.1.1 Busbar image GUID-E9F9CAF1-29CA-4444-9B13-55600DD40E5E v2
The busbar image is based on a topological principle, that is, it only includes topological items
that are necessary from the point of view of protection. It starts with a busbar section and
checks all its electrical connections and constructs a protection zone bounded by the following
items:
• circuit-breaker/CT pairs
• bus-tie breakers
• CT/feeder pairs
• feeder
This procedure is repeated until all the sections of the busbar have been determined.
Topological items are:
• busbars
• isolators and longitudinal isolators
• circuit-breakers
• CTs
• bus-tie breaker CTs

Application manual
System Settings
• bus-tie breakers
• feeders
• connections
3
6 7
1 IA IB 1
1 IIA IIB 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Protection Zone
Protection Zone
4 5 4 4
5 5
Feeder Bus-tie breaker Feeder
1 Busbar (protection) zones

2 Isolator
3 Longitudinal isolators
4 Circuit-breakers
5 C.t’s
6 Busbar
7 Connection point
12000039-IEC18000263-1-en.vsd
Figure 15: Example of double busbars with longitudinal isolators

The possibilities and advantages of a busbar image, that is, an intertripping system, based on
the topological principle are illustrated for 1½ breaker and duplex schemes in Section 11.1.
7.2 Isolator and circuit-breaker positions GUID-CA92BC21-93B9-42AD-AABF-0704C3F9C520 v2
In addition to correct isolator positions, it is also necessary to know the statuses of the circuit-
breakers that have been configured. The statuses (positions) of the circuit-breakers can
influence the following protection functions:
1. Busbar protection (see Section 8).

2. End zone protection:
The end zone protection function is blocked when the circuit-breaker is closed. Should
signals be incorrectly wired such that an “open” signal is generated when the circuit-
breaker is in fact closed, there is a likelihood of mal-operation in the event of a fault on the
power system.
Where CB positions signals are configured as inputs, it is extremely

important for the CB Close command to be correctly connected (see
Section 9.2.4).
The statuses of the auxiliary contacts on the isolators and circuit-breakers reflect the statuses
of the latter (CLOSED or OPEN). Each of these statuses is represented by an independent
signal (one for CLOSED and one for OPEN).

Application manual
System Settings
The image of the isolators is refreshed every 50 ms and the one for the circuitbreakers every 6
ms.
Where during inspection or maintenance the statuses of isolators or circuit-

breakers are simulated either by a maintenance input or external jumpers, the
system will respond according to the simulated statuses of isolators and
circuit-breakers.
Therefore take care when resorting to such manipulations.
7.2.1 Supervising isolator and circuit-breaker statuses GUID-1FD1F31D-4305-4A5D-B64C-12310F3A2408 v2
A supervision algorithm detects the presence of the auxiliary supply. To be correct, it has to be
measured at either one or the other, that is, corresponding to CLOSED or OPEN. An alarm is
generated, if after a preset delay either both are missing or both present.
The supervision algorithm detects the following faults in the isolator and circuit-breaker return
confirmation circuits:
• Failure of the auxiliary supply in the return confirmation circuits (for example, tripped
miniature circuit-breaker)
• Undefined status of the main isolator contacts (for example, mechanical defect)
• Wiring error
• Undefined status due to incorrect simulation
The supervision system cannot detect exchanged CLOSED and OPEN signals.
This condition may be detected by the differential current supervision function
(see Section 8.7).
7.2.2 Auxiliary contacts GUID-CE722DBF-0FEB-4873-85F2-2315B0AA7D64 v1
A potentially-free N/O and N/C contact must be provided for each isolator and circuit-breaker.
The N/O contact signals that the isolator or circuit-breaker is CLOSED and the N/C contact
that it is OPEN.
The switching sequence and wiring are described in the Commissioning

Manual.
7.2.3 Evaluating the isolator and circuit-breaker statuses GUID-088605A8-4AB8-4260-9AB9-1F9829444184 v1
The isolator and circuit-breaker statuses are evaluated as follows:

Application manual
System Settings
Table 2: Evaluating isolator and circuit-breaker statuses

Return confirmation that Return confirmation that Isolator/CB image
isolator/CB CLOSED isolator/CB OPEN
inactive inactive Last status retained and
delayed for the bus image of
busbar protection
- isolator alarm
- switch inhibit signal
inactive active OPEN
active inactive CLOSED
active active CLOSED and delayed
- isolator alarm
- switch inhibit signal
An active CB CLOSE signal (CB CLOSE command) forces the circuit-breakers into the
CLOSED position.
7.2.4 Isolator alarm GUID-B89A10FC-29F9-4CD8-971A-B4C04CF67672 v1
If the isolator and circuit-breaker supervision function detects an error, it is signaled on the
local HMI and also via the output signal “Isolator alarm” after the set signal delay.
7.2.5 Delay GUID-F496B6F3-7F7C-41C6-A927-82AE0EBB5521 v1
Isolators require a certain time to operate and while they are in motion, the relationship
between the status signals and therefore the integrity of the isolator image may be briefly
disturbed due to the different points at which the auxiliary contacts are actuated. As this is
quite normal, an isolator alarm should not be generated and therefore the alarm has to be
delayed.
7.2.6 Blocking by the isolator alarm GUID-87197CE8-80B7-4E97-BB6F-A6150CA1DC0E v1
If considered necessary, the isolator alarm can be arranged (set) to block the protection. There
are two alternative settings:
• Block protection Operation of the busbar protection and the intertripping system is
completely blocked.
• Discriminative blocking (preferred alternative) Operation of the busbar protection and the
intertripping system is only blocked for the section of busbar (protection zone)
concerned.
7.2.7 Switch inhibit GUID-8BA04886-4DC8-4BC7-8986-3778A2ABF625 v1
If the isolator alarm was initiated by an isolator or circuit-breaker that at the time determined
the assignment of protection zones, the Switch inhibit signal is also set.

Application manual
System Settings
While the Switch inhibit signal is active, it is recommended to avoid operating

isolators or circuit-breakers in the station. On no account is it permitted to
operate an isolator or circuit-breaker in the bay from which the alarm
originates. This is because the last isolator status is retained in the bus image
of busbar protection, which therefore would no longer correspond to the actual
state of the station and would falsify the intertripping system.
A false differential current may result, which if the isolator alarm is not
configured to block the protection would cause mal-operation of the
protection.
The incorrect control of the intertripping logic means that in the event of a
fault the wrong circuit-breakers are tripped.
The Switch inhibit signal is not set, however, if the isolator or circuit-breaker concerned does
not determine the assignment of protection zones. Figure 16 shows an example for a bus-tie
breaker. Isolators Q1, Q2, Q10 and Q20 are open and therefore the bus-tie breaker Q0 is not
assigned to a protection zone and of no consequence for the circuit-breaker image.
Q11
Q21
Q2 Q1 Q20 Q10
Q0
12000041-IEC18000264-1-en.vsd
Figure 16: Circuit-breaker image of no consequence if the isolators are open
7.2.8 Acknowledging the isolator alarm GUID-1C8C3F1D-FCF9-47AC-B2A0-4276BD59B95C v2
Figure 17 shows the responses of the signals in the event of an isolator alarm and switch
inhibit.
The isolator alarm is reset and the blocking of the protection cancelled by applying a signal to
the input Accept bus image alarm. The signal Switch inhibit stays active.
If it is not acknowledged, the signal Isolator alarm is reset and blocking cancelled
automatically should the isolators and the circuit-breakers adopt correct statuses.
If the isolator alarm is set due to the failure of the auxiliary supply for the return
confirmation circuit (for example, MCB. trip or deliberately switched off for
maintenance), it may be acknowledged. Providing no switching operations are
performed on the feeder, a hazardous situation cannot arise because the last
status is retained for busbar protection.
If the isolator alarm is set due to an undefined status of the main isolator
contact (for example, a mechanical defect), a wiring error or incorrect
simulation, station operating guidelines must specify whether the protection
should be blocked (danger of failing to trip) or be reset (danger of mal-
operation).

Application manual
System Settings
Delay
Image supervision defined undefined defined
Isolator alarm
Switch inhibit
Protection blocked
(if safe)
Acknowledge
isolator alarm
12000042-IEC18000265-1-en.vsd
Figure 17: Signal responses for an isolator alarm and switch inhibit
7.2.9 Note on isolators and circuit-breakers GUID-8E9DC6A5-61BA-4E24-A0B5-3ADE4DEB4DF0 v1
Where the REB500 station image includes an isolator or a circuit-breaker and the isolator or
circuit-breaker return confirmations are not configured as binary inputs, the respective switch
is considered to be closed. This only applies to active (unmasked) bays.
7.2.10 Response in the event of bay unit failure GUID-6F61E018-0631-4DB3-A3F1-206B2B560B7B v2
The response of the protection functions in the event of a bay unit failing depends on the
status of the isolators.
If at the instant of failure all the isolators are open, that is, the current is not assigned to a
measuring unit, an isolator alarm is generated immediately and, depending on the system
configuration, the protection zone is blocked (setting: everything blocked or discriminative
blocking) or the busbar protection continues to operate (setting: remain in operation).
If, on the other hand, one or several isolators are closed at the instant of the failure, that is, the
current is being measured, the protection zone concerned is immediately blocked and the
signals Isolator alarm and Switch inhibit activated.
7.3 Bay unit stand-alone mode GUID-D58B3A13-18EE-4BE2-94D8-CD7FC4E7AF65 v1
In the event of a failure of the central unit or an optical fiber cable, a bay unit continues to
perform the local breaker failure, end fault and time overcurrent protection and disturbance
recorder functions. This, however, is an emergency mode subject to limitations:
• Since there is no communication with the central unit, intertripping is impossible.

• Operation of HMI500 running on a PC connected to the bay unit and the local HMI is
limited and they take longer to respond. Events, disturbance recorder records, the binary
inputs and outputs and currents and voltages can be viewed.

Application manual
System Settings
7.3.1 Emergency bay unit operation GUID-3720275F-71AD-4657-82E6-49ED5F3397ED v1
A bay unit can also start without the central unit in an emergency mode. The settings last used
are retained. The local breaker failure, end fault and time overcurrent protection and
disturbance recorder functions are fully functional.
Blocking signals previously set by the central unit are maintained, but can be reset using the
local HMI.
In the emergency mode, the time is held at its value when a bay unit is switched off. Upon
restarting in the emergency mode, the internal time resumes from the value it was held at.
When communication is re-established, a bay unit resumes normal operation without having
to be restarted.
7.4 Enabling the tripping command GUID-751CFBD8-F045-4ABF-B99F-EE9551CB3596 v1
For special applications, tripping commands can be interlocked by enabling signals.

Application manual
36
Busbar protection
Section 8 Busbar protection GUID-B6531DFE-D9D3-4F06-8BE2-4A178BEBBBDD v2
The busbar protection operates according to the differential protection principle. It detects
and trips phase and earth faults in MV, HV and EHV power systems.
The main demands the busbar protection has to fulfill are:
• fast and discriminative isolation of the faulted section of busbar

• high through-fault stability
The busbar protection algorithm is executed by the central unit.
Following pre-processing in the bay units (see Section 5.1), real and imaginary components of
the fundamental frequency are transferred to the central unit for further processing every 6
ms.
8.1 Protection zones GUID-583D8B0F-54C0-4CDF-A5CF-C4DF1666C29D v2
The busbar protection performs a separate measurement for each protection zone and each
phase. A section of busbar that in the event of an internal fault would be tripped as a single
unit (no further subdivision by a circuit-breaker possible) is defined as a protection zone.
The assignment of feeder currents to the individual protection zone measurements is achieved
with the aid of a busbar image in the intertripping system (see Section 7.1).
8.2 Measuring principle GUID-F7505F6B-30C4-48E3-A117-91C4C15A0739 v2
The busbar protection (BBP) operates according to the principle of a combined differential
current measurement with operation and restraint features and a phase comparison function.
In a healthy condition and according to Kirchhoff’s first law, all the currents flowing towards a
busbar section must leave it again.
The busbar protection scheme is based on a measurement algorithm, which compares the
amplitudes of the feeder currents and derives a restraint criterion. The algorithm is executed
independently for each protection zone and phase. In addition to amplitude comparison, their
phase relationship is also compared as a second criterion (see Section 8.5).
The restrained amplitude comparison algorithm detects an internal fault when the settings for
IKmin and k are exceeded. A tripping command is only issued, however, if the phase
comparison function detects an internal fault at the same time.
The pick-up setting for the fault current (IKmin) must be less (80%) than the
lowest fault current that can occur on the busbars (IKMS). There is a risk of the
protection being too insensitive at higher settings.
If the minimum fault current (IKMS) is high enough, IKmin should be set higher
than the maximum load current.
If the CT’s saturate at the minimum fault current, the feeder currents have to be reduced by an
empirically determined factor CR. The corrected current values form the basis for calculating
the setting for IKmin. The reduction factor CR is calculated as follows:

Application manual
Busbar protection
  IK
0.3I N n '
 0.45  0.55  e if TN  120 ms
CR    IK
 0.5I N n '
0.20  0.80  e if 120 ms  TN  300 ms
IECEQUATION18073 V1 EN-US (Equation 1)
In both cases the effective overcurrent factor is calculated as:
PN  PE
n'  n
PB  PE
Where,
IK the vector sum of feeder fault and load currents for an internal fault
IN CT rated current
n rated overcurrent factor
n' effective overcurrent factor
PB power consumption of the burden at rated current
PE CT losses
PN CT rated power
TN power system time constant
8.2.1 Application example GUID-D6AC39B4-15A9-4708-9293-F363E1053F13 v2
The minimum busbar fault current is 1300 A and is supplied by two feeders. The time constant
TN of the power system is 80 ms.
Parameter Feeder 1 Feeder 2

Contribution to minimum fault 800 A 500 A
current
CTs Ratio 200 A / 1 A 400 A / 1 A
Class 5P10 5P20

PB 6 VA 6 VA
PE 5 VA 8 VA
PN 10 VA 20 VA
10 VA+5 VA
n1'  10   13.6
6VA+5 VA

Application manual
Busbar protection
20 VA+8 VA
n '2  20   40
6 VA+8 VA
800 A
CR1  0.45  0.55  e 0.3200 A13.6  0.66
500 A
CR 2  0.45  0.55  e 0.3400 A40
 0.95
Reduced fault current
I KR  800 A  0.66  500 A  0.95  1003 A.
IKmin setting (80% of IKR): 802 A
The factor k is normally set to 0.80. Numerous tests on a network model have shown this
setting to be the most favorable.
k=1
Differential current ksetting

(I∑ I I)
Restraint
(through fault)
IKmin
Restraint current
(∑ I I I)
12000133-IEC18000279-1-en.vsd
Figure 18: Operating characteristic of restrained amplitude comparison

Application manual
Busbar protection
During a through-fault and normal operation, it is impossible for the

differential (operating) current to be higher than the restraint current.
The neutral current has to be separately monitored in power systems with impedance
grounding (optional) (see Section 9.1). It is evaluated independently of the two conductor-
sensitive protection functions.
The logical interlocking of the protection functions (Figure 18) shows that the protection
system can only trip when both protection functions (restrained amplitude and phase
comparisons) detect a fault on the same busbar section and phase.
Phase L1 Phase L2 Phase L3 Neutral current measuring system

measuring system measuring system measuring system (impedance grounded systems)
Inclusion of No
Restrained Restrained Restrained neutral current
amplitude amplitude amplitude permissible?
No No No
comparison comparison comparison
Yes
Internal fault ? Internal fault ? Internal fault ?
Yes Yes Yes

Restrained
amplitude No
comparison
Internal fault ?
Yes
Phase comarison No Phase comarison No Phase comarison No
Internal fault ? Internal fault ? Internal fault ?

Phase comarison
No
Yes Yes Yes Internal fault ?
No fault No fault No fault

detected detected detected Yes
Internal fault Internal fault Internal fault Internal

on phase L1 on phase L2 on phase L3 ground fault
Intertripping command No fault

detected
12000046-IEC18000267-1-en.vsd
Figure 19: REB500 protection functions
8.2.2 Safety aspects of the measuring principle GUID-2053FBF6-83EF-44B9-B9DF-6F247E5D38F8 v2
High through-fault currents can drive one or more of the CTs into saturation.
The resulting distorted current signals give rise to a false differential current and an incorrect
phase relationship between the currents. In extreme cases, an internal fault might be
simulated if no precautions were taken.
The preprocessing of the current signals in the bay units enables the protection algorithms to
detect faults discriminatively in all cases (even in the presence of CT saturation).

Application manual
Busbar protection
The maximum prolongation principle (see Section 5.2) achieves a very good approximation
with respect to the real and imaginary components (amplitude and phase-angle) of the
original current signal.
8.3 Restrained amplitude comparison GUID-C63404B3-74ED-4F30-B8F4-102269DF75CB v1
The restrained amplitude comparison function is basically a differential current measurement

Idiff with the sum of all the current amplitudes Irstnt acting in a restraining sense.
8.3.1 Amplitude comparison GUID-76851268-2E64-477C-BE35-6734072EE485 v1
The differential current Idiff is the geometric sum of all the currents flowing towards and away
from the busbar. It is calculated from the fundamental components of the currents conducted
by the feeders and the bus-tie breakers:
N N
I diff   Re  ILn   j   Im  ILn 
n 1 n 1
8.3.2 Restraint current GUID-C73AE084-EE73-4593-8320-DB35B2AD916E v1
The stability factor k is derived from the restraint current Irstnt which is the sum of the currents
of the various feeders. The following is an example for the determination of Irstnt for phase L∈
{L1,L2,L3}:
N
I rstnt   Re  ILn   j  Im  ILn 
n 1
The stability factor k thus becomes:
  Re  I Ln    j   n 1  Im  I Ln  
N N
I diff n 1
k 
 Re  I Ln   j  Im  I Ln 
N
I rstnt
n 1
Where,
k stability factor per protection zone

I_Ln fundamental component after the Fourier filter in phase L of feeder n
N total number of feeders and bus-tie breakers per protection zone

Application manual
Busbar protection
The scheme detects an internal fault on the busbar when the stability factor k exceeds the
setting (typically 0.80) and the differential current Idiff is greater than the setting for the
restraint current IKmin. The differential current in normal operation or during a through-fault is
close to zero. By including the restraint current in the denominator the range for the stability
factor k becomes 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Simplified examples for stability factor k:
I1 = 5 kA I2 = 5 kA
I3 = 10 kA
12000048-IEC18000268-1-en.vsd
Figure 20: Through-fault

Applying the equation above to Figure 20 yields:
5  5  10
k  0.
550
I1 = 5 kA I2 = 5 kA I3 = 0 kA
12000049-IEC18000269-1-en.vsd
Figure 21: Internal fault

550
k  1.
550

Application manual
Busbar protection

I1+ I2
I3
I1 = 5 kA I2 = 5 kA
I Diff
I3 = -2 kA
12000051-IEC18000270-1-en.vsd
Figure 22: Through-fault with CT saturation

552
k  0.67.
5  5  2
8.3.3 Operating characteristic GUID-3EF00DCD-4315-4AA6-8767-7A82A0455327 v1
The following operating characteristic results:
12000053-IEC18000473-1-en.vsdx
Figure 23: Operating characteristic of the restrained differential current measurement in

HMI500
The operating area is above the bold line.

Application manual
Busbar protection
8.4 Restrained amplitude comparison with CT saturation GUID-6A81881A-F887-4504-8CF3-35B4CFE29A35 v1
The restrained amplitude comparison algorithm detects an internal fault when the settings for
IKmin and k are exceeded. A tripping command is only issued, however, if the phase
comparison function detects an internal fault at the same time.
The pick-up setting for the fault current (IKmin) must be less (80%) than the
lowest fault current that can occur on the busbars (IKMS). There is a risk of the
protection being too insensitive at higher settings.
If the minimum fault current (IKMS) is high enough, IKmin should be set higher
than the maximum load current.
If the CT’s saturate at the minimum fault current, the feeder currents have to be reduced by an
empirically determined factor CR. The corrected current values form the basis for calculating
the setting for IKmin. The reduction factor CR is calculated as follows:
  IK
0.3 I N n'
 0.45  0.55  e if TN  120 ms
CR    IK
 0.5 I N n'
0.20  0.80  e if 120 ms  TN  300 ms
Where,
IK the vector sum of feeder fault and load currents for an internal fault
IN CT rated current
n rated overcurrent factor

n′ effective overcurrent factor
PB power consumption of the burden at rated current
PE CT losses
PN CT rated power
TN power system time constant
8.4.1 Application example GUID-C2B0BA99-42F3-4870-944C-D63D485F83FD v1
The minimum busbar fault current is 1300 A and is supplied by two feeders. The time constant
TN of the power system is 80 ms.
Parameter Feeder 1 Feeder 2

Contribution to minimum fault current 800 A 500 A
CTs Ratio 200 A / 1 A 400 A / 1 A
Class 5P10 5P20
PB 6 VA 6 VA
PE 5 VA 8 VA
PN 10 VA 20 VA

Application manual
Busbar protection
10 VA  5 VA
n1'  10   13.6
6VA  5 VA
20 VA  8 VA
n2'  20   40
6 VA  8 VA
800 A
CR1  0.45  0.55  e 0.3200 A13.6
 0.66
500 A
CR 2  0.45  0.55  e 0.3400 A40
 0.95
Reduced fault current:
I KR  800 A  0.66  500 A  0.95  1003 A.
IKmin setting (80% of IKR): 802 A
The factor k is normally set to 0.80. Numerous tests on a network model have shown this
setting to be the most favorable.

Application manual
Busbar protection
k=1
Differential current ksetting

(I∑ I I)
Restraint
(through fault)
IKmin
Restraint current
(∑ I I I)
12000133-IEC18000279-1-en.vsd
Figure 24: Operating characteristic of restrained amplitude comparison
During a through-fault and normal operation, it is impossible for the

differential (operating) current to be higher than the restraint current.
Other parameters may also influence the setting in extreme cases. These are explained in the
following examples.
8.5 Phase comparison GUID-2AC142BE-AF57-4603-B297-B3EF6D2A7302 v2
High stability in the presence of severe CT saturation is characteristic of busbar protection

schemes that compare the phase-angles of the currents. This still applies when re-energizing a
system and adding to the residual flux stored in the CT cores. It is for this reason that phase
comparison was chosen as the principle for the second criterion of the busbar protection
system.
The function compares the phase-angles of the fundamental components of the feeder
currents.

Application manual
Busbar protection
Case 1: external faut 12 = 139°

Diagram of busbar Im
12 = 139°
I1 I2 I2
I1 Re
Operating characteristic
180°
Case 2: internal fault 12 = 40°
Im
external fault
Phase-shift 
74° max = 74° I1 Re
I2 12 = 40°
internal fault
0°
Case 1 2
12000054-IEC18000271-1-en.vsd
Figure 25: Principle of the phase comparison function

Assuming an internal fault on a section of a busbar, the currents of all the feeders connected
to it flow towards the fault and have virtually the same phase-angle. In normal operation or
during a through-fault, on the other hand, at least one of the currents is 180° out of phase with
the others. The phase comparison function therefore compares the phase-angles of all the
currents of each phase individually for each zone of protection. The phase difference for
tripping is 0° to 74°, that is, if the phase-angles of all the feeder currents of a protection zone
lie within a band of 74°, the phase comparison function decides that there is an internal fault.
The pick-up angle Δϕmax of 74° is a fixed setting.
For proper operation, it is necessary to exclude feeders conducting very little or no current
from the comparison to prevent noise generated by them or balancing currents during a fault
from disturbing the measurement. A minimum current is therefore determined when
engineering the scheme for a particular application below which a feeder is excluded from the
phase comparison. Typical settings are 0.8 IN for the phase currents and 0.25 IN for the neutral
current.

Application manual
Busbar protection
8.6 Case studies: busbar layouts
8.6.1 Busbar with just two bays GUID-A322EEC3-FA60-4348-A484-B80D797A2ABA v1
Busbar
I I
B B
Bay 1 Bay 2
12000134-IEC18000280-1-en.vsd
Figure 26: Busbar with two bays

Assuming a fault on the CT secondary of bay 1 or 2 (CT open or short-circuit), false tripping can
be prevented by settings that satisfy the inequality IKmin > IB.
8.6.2 Busbar with several bays GUID-9F16091E-4456-492A-B652-B0C17FA684AB v1
Busbar
I = 2 kA I = 1.7 kA I = 0.3 kA
B1 B2 B3
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3

(infeed)
12000135-IEC18000281-1-en.vsd
Figure 27: Busbar with three bays
8.6.2.1 Case a: CT circuit fault on Bay 1 GUID-F53F7BC0-9440-495B-A700-F85EE7AAF4E4 v2
The CT circuit fault simulates a fault on the busbars with a current ΔI = IB2 + IB3 = 2 kA. False
tripping can be avoided by setting IKmin > 2 kA, for example, the next higher setting 2.1 kA.
8.6.2.2 Case b: CT circuit fault on Bay 2 GUID-A1C8858B-11D5-4694-9EDC-6DEED0A66F6A v1
The CT circuit fault in this case simulates a fault on the busbars with a fault current ΔI =IB2 − IB3
= 1.7 kA and k becomes:
I I I 1.7 kA
k  B1 B 3   0.74
 I I B1  I B3 2.0 kA
False tripping can thus be avoided by setting IKmin> 1.7 kA and/or k > 0.74.
8.6.2.3 Case c: CT circuit fault on Bay 3 GUID-B5016D5C-8CD2-4E33-9FD7-E12DCA536C4B v1
This case corresponds to the previous case, but the values for ΔI and k are lower:

Application manual
Busbar protection
ΔI= IB1 −IB2 = 0.3 kA
I I I 0.3 kA
k  B1 B 2   0.081  k  0.7
 I I B1  I B2 3.7 kA
A CT circuit fault under normal load conditions cannot cause false tripping.
8.6.2.4 Influence of the phase comparison function GUID-E113021F-5C90-4F0D-8395-C1B59EE9413C v1
Tripping can only take place when both functions (restrained amplitude comparison and phase
comparison) detect an internal fault. The decision reached by the phase comparison function
is therefore of no consequence in the cases illustrated in this section.
8.6.2.5 Summary GUID-BA221465-8CE5-4007-8C2A-A025F9477F9F v1
Considering case a, the pick-up setting for the fault current in the example given must be IKmin
> 2 kA. This is the only setting which will prevent tripping in case a. Both settings, k = 0.80 and
IKmin > 1.7 kA prevent tripping in case b, and a dangerous setting is impossible in case c.
Assuming a minimum fault current higher than 2.1 kA, the settings for the above example
become k = 0.80 and IKmin > 2.1 kA. For a minimum fault current lower than 2.1 kA or even lower
than the maximum load current of 2 kA, the setting of IKmin can result in both a failure of the
protection to trip when it should or a false trip:
• With a setting of IKmin > 2 kA, the protection in the above example would not detect a
minimum fault current of 2 kA (excluding a CT fault).
• With a setting of IKmin < 2 kA, a fault in the CT circuit according to case a would cause a
false trip.
The best solution in this situation is to set IKmin to 80% of the minimum fault current IKMS.
8.6.3 Busbar fault with through current GUID-B2504D7B-1854-42BA-9925-B3F26F46F936 v1
In certain circumstances, it is possible for currents to flow away from the busbars during a
busbar fault. Two examples of this are discussed below.
8.6.3.1 Case a: Through current GUID-41C36F39-B87D-4E5B-8403-710D542DA8BF v2
Busbar fault
I K1 I K2 I K3 IR
12000136-IEC18000282-1-en.vsd
Figure 28: Busbar fault with through current IR

Application manual
Busbar protection
I  I K 1  I K 2  I K 3  I R  I K  I R
I  I K1  I K 2  I K 3  I R  I K  I R
I I I
k  K R
 I IK  IR
The busbar protection will only trip if the total fault current IK is n times higher than IR. See
Table 3 for a list of for different k settings.
Table 3: Through current factor

k n
0.90 19.0
0.85 12.4
0.80 9.0
0.75 7.0
0.70 5.7
For the phase comparison function not to prevent tripping, the low current
check for including feeder currents in the phase comparison (see Section 8.5)
must be set higher than the through current IR. This must be determined when
engineering the scheme. An alternative is to disable the phase comparison
function, which also must be determined when engineering the scheme.

Application manual
Busbar protection
8.6.3.2 Case b: Loop current GUID-C60BBC34-D192-4A0D-9A90-CC125EDE9DA6 v1
Busbar fault
I K1 I K2 IQ IQ I K3
12000137-IEC18000283-1-en.vsd
Figure 29: Busbar fault with a loop current
I  I K 1  I K 2  I K 3  I Q  I Q  I K
The busbar protection will only trip if the total fault current IK is n times higher than IQ. See
Table 4for a list of typical values of n.
Table 4: Loop current factor

k n
0.90 18.0
0.85 11.4
0.80 8.0
0.75 6.0
0.70 4.7
For the phase comparison function not to prevent tripping, the low current
check for including feeder currents in the phase comparison must be set higher
than the loop current IQ. This must be determined when engineering the
scheme. An alternative is to disable the phase comparison function, which also
must be determined when engineering the scheme.
8.7 Differential current supervision GUID-14B1EA58-6587-4413-AD89-DA361E975D82 v2
Supervising the differential current is an important supervision algorithm which detects the
following protection system faults:
• short-circuited CTs
• faulty CTs
• wrong CT ratios
• incorrectly wired CT (wrong current directions and therefore phases)
• wrong isolator and circuit-breaker return confirmation signals

Application manual
Busbar protection
Supervising the differential current therefore augments the supervision of the

isolator and circuit-breaker statuses (see Section 7.2.1).
The differential current supervision feature forms part of the busbar protection function and
uses the same setting. Its operating value is set to a percentage of the minimum fault current
Ikmin.
If the differential current exceeds the setting for a time longer than the time setting,
differential current alarm appears on the local HMI and the external signal 41815_Diff. current
alarm is generated.
The alarm and any blocking that has taken place are only reset after the differential current has
disappeared again.
To ensure that faults can still be detected under low load conditions, the operating value of
the differential alarm must be set lower than the lowest possible load current.
Provision is made for the differential current alarm to block the protection (configuration) in
the event of differential alarm. There are two alternative settings:
• Selective blocking (preferred) Operation of the busbar protection is only blocked for the
section of busbar (protection zone) concerned. Intertripping (see Section 7.1) by other
protection functions is still possible.
• Block protection completely Operation of the entire protection system is blocked.

Application manual
Special applications of BBP
Section 9 Special applications of BBP

9.1 Neutral current measurement GUID-A8D433AA-B389-466E-A86E-C19F15138708 v1
Measurement of the neutral current is only enabled for impedance grounded

power systems and at the user’s specific request.
Notes on ground faults in power systems with different types of grounding:
Table 5: Ground fault current for different types of power system grounding
System grounding Consequences for the protection
Solidly grounded Fault current IKmin to Ikmax All faults detected by the
busbar protection.
Ungrounded Capacitive fault currentGround faults detected by
other protection devices. Detection by the busbar
protection impossible.
Impedance grounded Limited ground fault currentGround faults detected by
busbar protection (neutral current measurement)
Petersen coil Only residual ground fault current Faults generally not
detected, because the fault arc is extinguished.
Very often, the resistor (or resistors) limits the ground fault current to a value below the
sensitivity of the phase fault measuring units. The relatively high fault impedance also has the
effect that during a ground fault currents may also flow away from the busbars. The phase
fault units of a directional comparison scheme with current restraint will not trip.
A fourth measuring unit specifically for the neutral current is therefore used to detect ground
faults in impedance grounded systems. For the best results, this is connected to a core-
balance CT that encompasses all three-phase conductors. Where CTs of this type are not
available, the neutral current is derived by vectorially adding the three-phase currents
(Holmgreen circuit).

Application manual
13000037-IEC18000315-1-en.vsd
Figure 30: Impedance grounded network

Where this solution is chosen, it is necessary to check the performance of the REB500 neutral
current measurement with respect to the main CTs, power system time constant, fault current
levels and power transformer inrush current.
The configuration of the busbar protection in impedance grounded networks must take the
following physical conditions into account:
• Limited single-phase to ground fault current levels (Ikmin 1ph and k-factor values are
possibly lower than the operating range of the phase measurement system).
• For a single-phase fault on the busbar, current can also flow away from the busbar
because of the relatively high fault impedance (Ib). As a consequence, the phase
comparison system may not be able to trip (since the phase-angle between Ib and |Ik + Ib|
exceeds 74°).
At a fault current Ik corresponding to twice the load current Ib, flowing in the affected phase L1,
the restraining factor k is only 0.5. Thus the restrained amplitude comparison function cannot
detect the internal fault at the usual k setting of 0.80. Furthermore, the current is flowing away
from the busbar so the phase comparison measures a phase-angle of approximately 180° thus
preventing the trip command. Therefore the neutral current I0 has to be measured as well and
evaluated together with the restrained amplitude comparison and the phase comparison
functions.
The neutral current evaluation is only necessary by phase-to-ground faults and should only be
used for these faults. The monitoring of the conductor currents serves as the measuring
criteria. Whether it is included in the evaluation or not depends on the levels of the phase
currents. Even if the phase currents do not drive the CTs into saturation, their ratio errors can
still produce an apparent neutral current on the secondary side. The neutral current is
therefore only evaluated when none of the phase currents exceeds a set value (typically 5 IN).
This prevents the neutral current from being evaluated for phase-to-phase and three-phase
faults.
Finally, the harmonic level is monitored to ensure that the neutral current is only evaluated
providing the measurement is uninfluenced by CT saturation. This feature also prevents the
evaluation of the neutral current during transformer inrush currents.

Application manual
To ensure that the neutral current supervision function blocks reliably in the
event of CT saturation, the inductive component of the burden must be a
minimum. Therefore the CT secondary circuit must not include
electromechanical relays or similar devices.
Detailed site data are essential to accurately engineer and set the neutral current measuring
systems.
For each busbar section
IKS3max max. phase fault current for a three-phase fault
TS3max time constant of the DC component of lS3max
IKS3min min. phase fault current for a three-phase fault
TS3min time constant of the DC component of IKS3min
IKS1max max. fault current for a phase-to-ground fault
TS1max time constant of the DC component of IKS1max
IKS1min min. fault current for a phase-to-ground fault
TS1min time constant of the DC component of IKS1min
For each feeder
IKA1max max. fault current for a phase-to-ground fault
TA1max time constant of the DC component of IKA1max
IBAmax max. load current
INprim rated CT primary current
INsec rated CT secondary current
PN rated CT power in VA
n rated CT overcurrent factor

n’ effective CT overcurrent factor
UK CT knee-point voltage
PE CT losses
RCT resistance of the CT secondary winding
l single length (not loop) of the CT leads in Ohm

A gauge of CT leads in mm2
PBG total burdens of all connected devices in VA
RBG total resistive burdens of all connected devices in Ohm
The following points must be checked:
• through-fault stability of the I0 measuring system

• lowest permissible current (operating current) for the differential current measurement
• CT knee-point voltage in relation to the required operating range of the I0 measuring
system (it must not saturate in the operating range).
Instructions for calculation and the requirements to be fulfilled by the CTs are given in detail in
the application description Ground fault protection for high voltage busbars (1KHL020319-
Aen).

Application manual
9.2 Blocking measurement of certain CTs GUID-35E6D3DB-94AC-4FC6-9D13-F9D15A57C3A4 v2
The operation of the busbar protection is explained for simple station

configuration in this section. Its application to complex stations is described in
Section 13.
Blocking the measurement of a CT means that its current is excluded from

evaluation by the busbar protection function even if it was assigned by the
intertripping system.
Blocking is necessary for bus-tie breakers (see Section 9.2.1) and may be necessary for feeders
(see Section 9.2.2).
In certain conditions blocking of the measurement is delayed (reclaim time) (see Section 9.2.3).
Blocking is cancelled as soon as the cause for it has disappeared and the protection system
receives an active CB CLOSE signal (see Section 9.2.4 ).
Blocking the measurement of certain CTs is a basic function of the busbar protection, which,
with the exception of the circuit-breaker reclaim time and the binary inputs for the circuit-
breaker statuses and CB CLOSE signals, must be neither configured nor set.
9.2.1 Bus-tie breaker functions GUID-F591C46A-1C8F-4B60-97BF-B482F577ACD2 v2
In the case of a bus-tie breaker with a single set of CTs, the current
measurement is assigned to both protection zones, to one in an inverted sense.
Blocking this measurement applies to both zones.
Two bay units are necessary in the case of a bus-tie breaker with two sets of
CTs. The current measurements are assigned to the protection zones such that
they overlap. A fault between the sets of CTs thus trips both zones. The
inversion of one of the current signals is achieved by wiring it appropriately to
the REB500 analogue input.
Blocking this measurement applies to both zones.
The busbar protection excludes the bus-tie breaker CT from evaluation under the following
conditions.
• When the bus-tie breaker is open (see Section 9.2.1.1).

• When a station protection function (BBP, BFP or EFP) issues an internal intertripping
command to the respective breaker (see Section 9.2.1.2).
• When the CTs are bridged (see Section 9.2.1.3).
9.2.1.1 When the bus-tie breaker is open GUID-297BFB4F-8ADA-452C-B167-36E7D30E20F1 v1
The bus-tie breaker measurement is blocked when the breaker is open in order to trip the
busbar section effectively concerned for a fault between a single set of CTs and the bus-tie
breaker.
The CTs are not assigned to a protection zone when the bus-tie breaker is open and therefore
the protection zones extend to the bus-tie breaker itself. The correct zone can thus be tripped
for a fault between the CTs and the bus-tie breaker.

Application manual
Bus‐tie breaker
CTs 1 CTs 2
Bus zone I Bus zone II

Protection zone I Protection zone II
12000059-IEC18000273-1-en.vsd
Figure 31: Bus-tie breaker (open) and two sets of CTs

This operation also applies to bus-tie breakers with only a single set of CTs.
9.2.1.2 In the event of a protection function (BBP, BFP or EFP) tripping this CB GUID-69CDEDE0-4070-41E9-8938-7C8EE63806F1 v2
When a bus-tie breaker is closed, its measurement is blocked when a protection function BBP,
BFP or EFP issues a tripping command.
Bus-tie breaker with a single set of CTs

To trip the section of busbar effectively concerned as quickly as possible for a fault between
the closed circuit-breaker and the CTs.
Where a bus-tie breaker is equipped with only one set of CTs, the latter is used for both the
neighboring protection zones and is automatically assigned to them when configuring the
system.
Faults on bus zone II are tripped immediately and discriminatively in protection zone II. Faults
on bus zone I but not between the CTs and the bus-tie breaker are also tripped immediately
and discriminatively in protection zone I.
A fault between the CTs and the bus-tie breaker (that is, on bus zone I but in protection zone II)
trips initially protection zone II (including the bus-tie breaker) immediately, that is, the bus
zone not involved in the fault.
A fault between the CTs and a closed bus-tie breaker is tripped after the
reclaim time.
Bus-tie breaker with one or two sets of CTs

Detecting a possible breaker failure. See Figure 32 Bus-tie breaker (closed) and two sets of
CTs.
In the case of bus-tie breakers with a set of CTs on both sides, both are assigned to measuring
systems. CT 2 is the limit of protection zone I and CT 1 the limit of protection zone II. A bay unit
is needed for each set of CTs.
Both sets of CTs do not have to be used and if only one is configured, the scheme is the same
as described in the section for bus-tie breakers with a single set of CTs.
The function is the same as for bus-tie breakers with a single set of CTs.

Application manual
CTs Bus‐tie breaker
Bus zone I
Bus zone II

Protection zone II
Protection zone II
12000060-IEC18000274-1-en.vsd
Figure 32: Bus-tie breaker (closed) and one set of CTs
Bus‐tie breaker
CTs 1 CTs 2
Bus zone I
Bus zone II
Protection zone I

Protection zone II
12000061-IEC18000275-1-en.vsd
Figure 33: Bus-tie breaker (closed) and two sets of CTs
9.2.1.3 Short-circuiting of a CT GUID-B263A94F-7291-41BF-AF2D-2C131A16B951 v2
The bus-tie breaker is excluded from the measurement when bus zones are also connected by
an isolator, for example:
1. Coupled transversely by parallel isolators

2. Coupled longitudinally by parallel longitudinal isolators
Concerning 1. Coupled transversely by parallel isolators

The current flowing via the coupling between the busbars (Figure 34) is represented in the
busbar protection by two current vectors of opposite direct (V+, V-). The vectors are assigned
according to measuring system S1 (vector V+) and S2 (vector V-).
When switching a feeder from busbar S1 to S2 (load switching), both isolators Q1 and Q2 are
closed for a certain time, that is, busbars S1 and S2 are directly connected.
• During this time, measuring systems S1 and S2 are connected to form one common
measuring system (S1/S2) to match the primary system.
• For the same time the bus-tie breaker measurement is blocked, that is, the two vectors V+
and V- are excluded.
The reasons for blocking the bus-tie breaker measurement are the following:
While the busbar sections are in parallel (Q1 and Q2 closed), the current (Ik1) of any fault that
occurs will divide into a part flowing directly (Ik11) and a part flowing via the bus-tie breaker
(Ik12). If included, the bus-tie breaker current (Ik12) would be represented by the two vectors
with opposing directions (V+, V-) and assigned to the common measuring system (S1/S2). The
consequence would be that the:

Application manual
1. directional comparison of S1/S2 would prevent any tripping because the opposition of the
current vectors (V+, V-) does not point to a fault on the busbars (see Section 8.4).
2. restrained differential current measurement S1/S2 would see a restraint current larger by
double the bus-tie breaker current and this would reduce the stabilization factor K to a
value lower than setting (see Section 8.2.2 ).
Blocking the bus-tie breaker measurement excludes the two vectors V+ and V- from the
measurement so that they cannot prevent tripping.
Ik11
S1
S2
Ik12
Q1 Q2
Ik12
Ik1
V+
V-
12000062-IEC18000276-1-en.vsd
Figure 34: Bus-tie breaker with isolators closed in parallel
Concerning 2. Longitudinal bus-tie breaker with longitudinal isolators

closed in parallel
The bus-tie breaker in Figure 35 connects busbar sections longitudinally together.
In order to connect the sections of busbar 3 to left and right of the longitudinal isolators (3A
and 3B) together, the longitudinal bus-tie breaker has to be closed first. The longitudinal
isolator Q31 can then be closed. The situation is shown in the diagram.
This is analogous to the situation described under 1. Above (transverse bus-tie breaker), that
is, measuring systems 3A and 3B are combined to a single measuring system (3A/3B). The
problem is thus also the same and the bus-tie breaker measurement must also be blocked.

Application manual
12000063-IEC18000474-1-en.vsdx
Figure 35: Longitudinal bus-tie breaker
9.2.2 Feeder circuit-breakers GUID-BA445D13-69D5-45EA-911A-0269641A515F v2
In the case of a feeder circuit-breaker, measurement of the CT for the busbar

protection is blocked when:
• a feeder has the CT on the line side of the circuit-breaker (see Figure 36).
• the auxiliary contacts on the circuit-breaker (see Section 7.2) and the CB
CLOSE signal (see Section 9.2.4) are configured in the protection system.
• the circuit-breaker is opened or a protection function (BBP, BFP or EFP)
issues an internal intertripping command to the circuit-breaker.
In these circumstances (see Figure 36), the measurement by the bay unit has to be blocked to
prevent the busbar protection from tripping for a fault between the circuit-breaker and the
CTs when the circuit-breaker is open, because the fault is in the protection zone of the end
fault protection and not the busbar protection.
Blocking the measurement is unnecessary for a CT on the busbar side of the

circuit-breaker (see Figure 37), because the fault is outside the busbar
protection zone and can only be detected and tripped by the end fault
protection.

Application manual
12000064-IEC18000475-1-en.vsdx
Figure 36: CT on line side of circuit-breaker
12000065-IEC18000476-1-en.vsdx
Figure 37: CT on busbar side of circuit-breaker

In systems that do not include an end fault protection function the statuses of feeder circuit-
breakers are not usually configured and they are considered to be permanently closed. No
blocking is then configured.
9.2.3 Breaker reclaim time GUID-54197939-66F1-4907-98DB-419D1886BDF1 v2
Blocking of the (feeder or bus-tie) measurement is delayed (reclaim time) if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
1. The circuit-breaker is opened (see Section 9.2.1.1).

2. One of the protection functions (BBP, BFP or EFP) issues an internal intertripping
command to the respective circuit-breaker (see Section 9.2.1.2).

Application manual
In both cases, the arc extinction and any re-ignition phenomena after opening the circuit-
breaker are taken into account.
It has to be assured that the CT does not conduct any current after the reclaim
time. If the delay is too short, false tripping of a healthy section of busbar may
result.
The reclaim time has to be set in accordance with the setting instruction under
the Technical Manual.
9.2.3.1 Example of when the reclaim time is set too short GUID-F904CEB2-E079-450D-99C4-F98EF90448D0 v1
Figure 38 illustrates the case of a bus-tie breaker reclaim time setting, which is too short. The
circuit-breaker reports that it is already open but the current is still flowing. The response of
the busbar protection is the following:
The measuring system for bus zone I can no longer measure the current flowing away from the
busbar through CT 2 because the measurement is already blocked. A differential current
corresponding to the fault current results and the measuring system for bus zone I trips
busbar I!
The measuring system for the bus zone can no longer measure the current flowing towards
the busbar through CT 1 because the measurement is already blocked. The other feeders
connected to bus zone II give rise to a differential current (sum of currents flowing towards
the busbar) and the measuring system for bus zone II trips busbar II!
Bus‐tie breaker
CTs 1 CTs 2
Bus zone I
Bus zone II

Protection zone I Protection zone II

12000066-IEC18000277-1-en.vsd
Figure 38: Arc extinction when opening a circuit-breaker
9.2.4 CB CLOSE command (manual close signal) GUID-92EF0930-44EB-4EDD-9C1F-6DDA5E0B1ED2 v2
In order to be prepared for closing the breaker onto an existing fault (for example, closed
grounding isolator or forgotten grounding clamp), the measurement has to be reinstated
before the feeder or bus-tie breaker is actually closed. This is achieved by activating the
busbar protection input signal 11505_Close command CB.
The CLOSE CB command instantly cancels any previous blocking of

measurement regardless of all other criteria.

Application manual
As soon as the circuit-breaker has reached the closed status (auxiliary contacts report
CLOSED), the CLOSE CB command can reset.
The CLOSE CB command must be maintained until the circuit- breaker CLOSED
auxiliary contact has definitely closed (the auxiliary contacts overlap).
To avoid any risk of mal-operation, the protection must register every signal
applied to the circuit-breaker CLOSE coil. These include, for example, local close
commands, close commands from remote control systems, the station
automation system or from autoreclosure schemes.
The simplest way of doing this is to take the CLOSE CB signal directly from the
circuit-breaker CLOSE coil.
The CLOSE CB signal is acquired and processed every 6 ms (fast part and fast signal).
9.2.4.1 Example of a CLOSE CB signal which was not registered GUID-B7CFB3FD-3E1B-4C8B-8EE6-743A17141FC3 v2
Figure 39 shows the case of closing onto an existing fault (for example, closed grounding
isolator or forgotten grounding clamp) when the CLOSE CB command was not registered by
the protection.
The arc ignites before the circuit-breaker can report that it is closed:
The measuring system for bus zone I is unable to measure the outgoing fault current towards
bus zone II, because the measurement of the bus-tie breaker current is still blocked. A
differential current equivalent to the fault current is therefore created and the measuring
system for bus zone I trips busbar I.
The measuring system for bus zone II is unable to measure the incoming fault current flowing
from bus zone I, because the measurement of the bus-tie breaker current is still blocked. Since,
however, there are no other feeders connected to bus zone II that could produce a differential
current, the bus zone II measuring system does not trip.
Bus‐tie‐breaker
CTs 1 CTs 2
Bus zone I Bus zone II
Protection zone I
Protection zone II

12000067-IEC18000278-1-en.vsd
Figure 39: CB CLOSE command
9.3 Check zone protection for release of BBP GUID-6F089717-5F38-4FBC-806F-00D933CD092A v1
The selective zone BBP can be extended to form a check zone protection (CzBBP). This
protection function, which is factory configured, is utilized as release for the trip of BBP.
Similar to the selective zone BBP the CzBBP is operated as a differential protection.

Application manual
9.3.1 Protection zones GUID-62B408A3-44CD-4A40-84B9-08016E5D74B0 v1
The check zone comprises all the outgoing feeders of the busbar, whereby the isolator
positions are not considered. Fundamentally the measurements of the couplings are not
included.
Check zone (CzBBP)

BB1
BB2
13000038-IEC18000316-1-en.vsd
Figure 40: Measurement zone of the check zone protection
9.3.2 Measurement principle GUID-06E56D38-5831-42E8-B040-5C5621012AD2 v2
The principle of the check zone protection (CzBBP) is based on a stabilized differential current
measurement, that is, on the differential current (IDiff) and the stabilizing factor (k).
m
I Diff  I
n 1
Ln of the check zone
m
I rstnt   I Ln of the check zone
n 1

m
I Diff I
n 1 Ln
k  of the check zone

m
I rstnt I Ln
n 1
Before the check zone sends a release signal to the selective zone busbar protection, the
configured values of the check zone (CzBBP) values IDiff , and k must be attained.

Application manual
9.3.2.1 Differential current (IDiff)

GUID-6B0D22EB-D327-4BD3-9D20-426D1DDAD2E5 v1
The setting of the tripping value of the differential current measurement is based on the
minimum short circuit current of the busbar and in general is the same setting for CzBBP and
BBP.
9.3.2.2 Stabilisation factor (k) GUID-4067E556-F96C-41A5-B1D3-A90C56C279CC v2
Depending on the busbar configuration and the position of the circuit breakers and the
isolators it is possible that one busbar section has a fault, while the other unaffected sections
conduct normal operating current. For the CzBBP, which considers the complete plant as one
bus, this has the effect that simultaneously the short circuit current as well as the normal
operating outflow currents are recorded. The outgoing operating current is further reflected in
the calculation of the stabilization factor (k). The setting value of k-factor of the check zone
lies below the zone selective busbar protection and can be accordingly calculated as per the
following example.

Check zone (CzBBP)
BB1
BB 2
CzBBP Measurement I Kmin=1.5kA I Bmax = 2. 0 kA I Bmax = 2. 0 kA
13000039-IEC18000317-1-en.vsd
Figure 41: Determination of the stabilizing factors (k)
1.5 kA  2.0 kA  2.0 kA 1.5 kA

k   0.27
1.5 kA  2.0 kA  2.0 kA 5.5 kA
In the above example, the stabilization factor setting (k) for the check zone (CzBBP) is k = 0.25
(next setting below the calculated value of k = 0.27). The setting for the selective zone (BBP)
has to be calculated according to Section 8.3 and is typically k = 0.8.
9.3.2.3 Operating characteristic GUID-3BDBF1FD-A6A1-41E5-9DD9-BDC8DC142AF0 v1
This results in the following operating characteristic for CzBBP: The region above the thick line
is the operating zone.

Application manual
13000040-IEC18000477-1-en.vsdx
Figure 42: Operating characteristic for the stabilized differential current measurement
9.3.3 Check zone GUID-0DBE49D3-0F10-4E16-97AE-D8DF96E8F3BC v2
If the check zone (CzBBP) in a REB500 protection system picks up, zone selective tripping of
the busbar protection is permitted in the following cases:
a) Trip CzBBP
Release signal from
b) Bay unit(s) in operation CzBBP
c) Signal release CzBBP 1

d) CzBBP activated in the HMI500
e) Differential alarm CzBBP AND "bypass"

Mode
Trip BBP (BB1) & Trip BB1
Trip BBP (BB2) & Trip BB 2
13000041-IEC18000318-1-en.vsd
Figure 43: Tripping in check zone enabled
• Trip by CzBBP enables tripping of the BBP zone.

• One or more bay units out of operation (that is, switched off, loss of power, or device
error), results in absence of important measurements categories. A complete check zone

Application manual
formation is not possible and thus leads to a release of the zone trip of the BBP (that is,
'the check zone is bypassed').
• If the binary input signal from a bay unit 12605_Bypass Check Zone or from a central unit
32605_Bypass Check Zone has been actuated a release of the BBP zone trip occurs ('the
check zone is bypassed'). An application example is provided in Section 9.3.5.
• If in the configuration software HMI500 (that is, in the configuration database) the check
zone protection is set to not active, then a permanent release of the BBP zone trip occurs
('the check zone is bypassed').
• A differential current of the CzBBP leads to a bypass of the release of the BBP zone trip, in
case the alarm mode Check zone bypass has also been set in the HMI500.
9.3.4 Application of check zone protection GUID-C5E07268-F3A2-4364-BA4A-4D41FE02380B v1
If an incorrect feedback of the isolators / circuit breakers is provided to the selective zone
busbar protection (BBP), which is not in accordance to the actual image of the plant, then the
results of the busbar measurement and the calculation of the protection criteria do not
correspond to the real situation. This adverse situation could lead to an incorrect tripping.
Especially in plants where the activation current of the differential current criteria (Idiff) is set
below the maximum operating currents of the individual feeders, the effect of incorrect
isolator / circuit breaker positions has a very adverse effect.
The use of an overall check zone release criteria (CzBBP) which functions independent of the
position of the isolator / circuit breaker eliminates the danger of undesirable trippings.
Instead of a check zone release criteria (CzBBP) as an alternative the under voltage release
criteria (U<) can also be utilized (see Technical Manual).
9.3.5 Substation configuration GUID-07D7BED4-DEA5-4C64-919E-9719BD792B9F v2
As it is described in the Section 9.3.2, all outgoing feeders of standard single and double
busbar systems can be included in a check zone (CzBBP) measurement, but exclude the
measurements from the couplers.
For complex busbar configurations, for example, 1½ - Breaker systems and complex
multibusbar systems, which measurements have to be used in the check zone protection will
be determined during factory configuration.
For substations with transfer busbars, dependent on the configuration the

following section has to be noted.
Substations with a transfer busbar, depending on the configuration, have to be treated

separately. If switching on a transfer busbar isolator results in bypassing the CT of an
outgoing feeder such that the feeder is connected directly to the busbar (that is, without
measurement no valid check zone measurement (CzBBP) can be performed. In this case the
binary input signal 12605_Bypass Check Zone has to be configured for each bay unit
associated with such an outgoing bypass feeder. The presence of the above signal results in
an instantaneous unblocking (see Section 9.2.3), which should be equated to a bypass of the
check zone system. This binary input should be connected to closing the contact of the
customary selector switch Feeder in bypass operation.

Application manual
I
II
Transfer
busbar
Transfer busbar isolator “ON”
13000042-IEC18000319-1-en.vsd
Figure 44: Double busbar with bypass
9.3.6 Maintenance conditions in connection with CzBBP GUID-5E13E4D7-CF8B-46E3-99C7-FCA73BB557D3 v1
As described under the Technical Manual a signal can be applied to the binary inputs
Inspection and Maintenance which prevents the test injection current from being included in
the differential current measurement of the busbar protection (BBP). This function relies on
the position of the isolator concerned being set to OFF in the busbar image in the REB500.
The check zone protection (CzBBP) does not take any isolator position into consideration. This
means that the test current of an outgoing feeder bay unit in the modification or maintenance
mode is included in the check zone calculation. Depending on the level of the test current, the
check zone (CzBBP) may pick up, however the busbar protection (BBP) is uninfluenced by the
differential current and prevents the pickup of the check zone from having any effect.
If it is desired that the check zone protection be bypassed (enabled) in the modification or
maintenance mode, the signal 12605_Bypass Check Zone must be activated in addition to the
input 11620_Inspection_1-On or 11660_Maintenance- On.

Application manual
Breaker failure protection (BFP)
Section 10 Breaker failure protection (BFP)

10.1 Current setting GUID-BAE06677-8989-4691-97CB-39955F05C213 v2
If the pick-up current of the breaker backup function is set too low there is a risk that BFP will
not reset quickly enough after a circuit-breaker has been successfully tripped. This can be the
result of decaying oscillations in the CT secondary circuit.
Conversely BFP may fail to operate if the setting is too high. This situation could arise, for
example, due to severe CT saturation when the secondary current falls below the setting and
BFP does not start. Recommendations now follow which enable the pick-up current of BFP to
be correctly set in relation to the CT data (n') and the set time.
These setting recommendations apply for the phase measurement system of

BFP only. If the supplemental neutral measurement system of BFP is activated,
the information in Section 10.4 has to be considered in addition.
Basically, the current setting (IE) should be less than the minimum fault current IKmin of the
corresponding feeder (approx. 80%, that is, 0.8). Just to satisfy this condition, the setting
would be:
I E  0.8  I Kmin
This setting may be too high for conventional iron core CTs because the measurement may not
function correctly even at low fault currents due to transient components in the fault current.
A failure of the breaker to operate will always be detected, but tripping could be delayed.
10.1.1 Iron core transformers (Class TPX) and transformers with

residual flux air gap (Class TPY) GUID-E2FE26BF-1E5F-47D0-A148-B491C3B2741F v2
It is necessary to know the transient overcurrent factor (n∗) to design a scheme for operation
with these CTs. This is calculated from the effective overcurrent factor n' as follows:
PN  PE
n'  n 
PB  PE
n'
n* 
1  2  f  TN

Application manual
After obtaining the transient overcurrent factor (n*), the settings are given by:
IE  0.8  I Kmin 
 min  n* , 
IN  IN 
TPX and TPY transformers differ, with respect to transient characteristics, by a

small remanence in the case of the TPY type. With regard to transient over-
dimensioning, TPX and TPY hardly differ.
As an example consider the following values:
CT characteristic Value
Ratio 600/5 A
Rated burden PN 15 VA
Losses PE 7 VA
Rated overcurrent factor n 20

Lead burden PB 10 VA
Bay unit burden <0.1 VA

Rated frequency f: 50 Hz
Power system time constant TN 80 ms
Minimum fault current IKmin 450 A
15VA  7VA
n'  20   25.88
10VA  7VA
25.88 25.88
n*    0.99
1  2  50Hz  0.08s 26.13
IE  0.8  450 A 
 min  0.99,   min  0.99, 0.6   0.6
IN  600 A 
Hence, in this example we could set:

Application manual
I E  0.5  I N
10.1.2 Linearized current transformers (TPZ) GUID-A40338CE-C152-4CD5-AB76-FCE587D378E3 v1
Since these CTs are scarcely subject to saturation, the setting is only based on the minimum
fault current for the feeder:
IE = 0.8 ⋅ IKmin
10.2 Time-grading a single or two-stage BFP GUID-952D1D82-8169-45D9-B51B-FFF6FC98C4BE v1
Timer t1 is started by an overcurrent and a signal from the main protection. A second attempt
to trip the circuit-breaker is made at the end of the set time t1 plus the internal processing
time ta1. Timer t2 is also started at the end t1. Should the circuitbreaker again fail to trip within
the set time of t2 plus the internal processing time ta2, the breakers surrounding the fault are
intertripped.
Table 6: Variables for BFP time calculation for 50 and 60Hz

Variable Description Value
t1 Timer t1 Adjustable
t2 Timer t2 Adjustable
tm Operating time of main protection See main prot. data sheet
tCB CB operating time incl. arc extinction See CB data sheet
tv Overcurrent function reset time 19 ms
tmargin Safety margin (If an adequate safety margin is >20 ms (ABB recommendation)
not included, the correct operation of BFP
cannot be guaranteed.)
ta1 Internal processing time of t1 stage 14 ms
ta2 Internal processing time of t2 stage 22 ms
te Processing time of input signal 10 ms
Configuring a single-stage BFP function can be achieved by set-ting the timer

t2 to zero.
If a breaker failure function is installed, the circuit-breaker can respond in one of three ways.
10.2.1 Case 1: Tripping by main protection successful GUID-ED44444C-F6A3-4CE1-84A8-19B90824505E v1
Overcurrent function and a starting signal from the main protection start the timer t1. The
circuit-breaker successfully interrupts the fault current before the end of this time and the
overcurrent function resets. A backup tripping command is not generated (BFP t1).

Application manual
Fault incidence
Tripping command Successful trip by main

by main protection protection
Case 1: Trip
Ik
tm tCB tv tmargin
BFP (t1)
t1 ta1
tCB
BPP (t2)
12000166-IEC18000295-1-en.vsd
Figure 45: Tripping of the circuit-breaker for case 1
10.2.2 Case 2: Backup trip by BFP GUID-DDE6A946-5E15-43CC-8BB5-E7668E040B57 v1
breaker fails, tripping is unsuccessful and the overcurrent function does not reset. At the end
of the timer setting t1 and the internal processing time ta1, a second attempt is made to trip
the same circuit-breaker which trips successfully before the end of the timer setting t2 and the
current function resets. Intertripping of the surrounding circuit-breakers does not take place
(BFP t2).
Fault incident
Tripping command Tripping command Successful backup trip

By main protection BFP-t1 BFP-t1
Case 2: Backup trip (BFP-t1)
Ik
tm tCB tv tmargin
BFP(t1) t1 ta1 ta1

tCB
t tv tmargin
CB
BFP (t2)
t2
12000167-IEC18000296-1-en.vsd
Figure 46: Tripping of the circuit-breaker for case 2
10.2.3 Case 3: Intertripping of surrounding circuit-breakers by BFP GUID-1403F8CE-3418-471B-8A76-74969FD24A5E v1
breaker fails, tripping and backup tripping are unsuccessful and the overcurrent function does
not reset. At the end of the timer settings t1 + t2 and the internal processing time ta2
intertripping of the surrounding circuit-breakers takes place to isolate the fault.

Application manual
Fault incidence
Tripping command by main Tripping command

protection BFP-t1 Tripping command
BFP-t2
Case 3: Intertripping (BFP t2)

Ik
tm tCB tv tmargin
Inter-
BPF (t1) t1 ta1 tripping
ta1
tCB
tCB tv tmargin
BFP (t2) ta1 ta2

t2
12000168-IEC18000297-1-en.vsd
Figure 47: Intertripping of the circuit-breaker for case 3

Remote tripping of the opposite end of the line can be configured to take place at the end of
time t1 or the end of time t2.
The settings of timers t1 and t2 can be determined according to the examples of Cases 1 and 2
above.
10.2.4 Timer t1 setting

GUID-E9359EF9-19A4-4C73-B99E-7E1277BBDD1E v1
To avoid any risk of a premature tripping command by BFP, the minimum setting of the timer
t1 must be longer than the maximum time required for a successful main protection trip plus
the maximum reset time of the overcurrent function.
t1  tCB  tv  tmargin
As an example, the minimum setting for t1 for a circuit-breaker operating time (tCB) of 40 ms
would be:
t1  40ms  19ms  20ms  79ms
10.2.5 Timer t2 setting

GUID-360574FD-B96C-4183-88D8-25BF2B646B76 v1
To avoid any risk of premature intertripping of the surrounding breakers by BFP in the event of
a successful backup trip at the end of t1, the minimum setting of the timer t2 must be longer
than the maximum time required for a backup trip plus the maximum reset time of the
overcurrent function.

Application manual
t2  tCB  (ta1  tv )  tmargin
As an example, the minimum setting for t1 for a circuit-breaker operating time (tCB) of 40 ms
would be:
t2> 40ms + 33ms + 20ms = 93ms
The correct operation of BFP is assured only if the above guidelines for the
minimum settings of the breaker failure timers are strictly observed.
The maximum tripping time can be calculated on the basis of the settings for t1 and t2, the
recommended safety margin and the internal processing time.
10.2.6 Maximum time t1max for backup tripping

GUID-B897A51D-5BF3-47D1-ABD2-013EEF4257AA v1
(at the minimum t1 setting)
te tCB tV tmargin ta1
1
t1max
Backup tripping
12000169-IEC18000298-1-en.vsd
t1max  tCB  (te  ta1 )  tv  tmargin
As an example, the maximum backup tripping time for a circuit-breaker operating time (tCB) of
40 ms would be:
t1max  40ms  24ms  19ms  20ms  103ms
10.2.7 Maximum time t2max for intertripping

GUID-E885FD25-5A8A-4209-8F10-F73A928AFC1E v1
(at minimum t1 and t2 settings)

Application manual
te tCB tv tmargin
ta1 tCB tv tmargin ta2
t2max
tmargin Intertripping
12000170-IEC18000299-1-en.vsd
t2 max   te  ta1  ta 2   2*(tCB  tv  tmargin )
As an example, the maximum intertripping time for a circuit-breaker operating time (tCB) of 40
ms would be:
t2 max  46ms  2   40ms  19ms  20ms   204ms
10.3 Logic type GUID-861F1E53-0C29-4E33-B36C-1913EE4D4A40 v1
The internal BFP can be changed for special applications. The BFP scheme described here is
the logic-type 1.
Alternative logics are:
1. Reserved for special applications, no description available.

2. BFP can also be started by the tripping signals from the time-overcurrent and breaker
pole discrepancy protections. Otherwise logic type 3 corresponds to type 1.
3. The signals 13760_Start BFP L1L2L3_5 and 13765_Start BFP L1L2L3_6 initiate intertripping
after BFP t1 irrespective of the setting for BFP t2. Otherwise logic type 4 corresponds to
type 1.
10.4 BFP L0 system GUID-84DE2225-BB7F-48CA-A5F0-6D20A6B5FDAA v1
In stations with a bypass bus, the behavior with enabled BFP L0 system remains the same as
phase system.
The behavior of the trip redirection remains the same.
10.4.1 Current setting BFP L0 GUID-B6B9C7B3-8DB5-4706-A501-01713C946C38 v1
The current setting for the BFP L0 system may be well below load currents. If
any measured neutral current exceeds the setting while a L0 starting input is
active after time t1 has passed, the BFP L0 system will issue a three phase trip.
There are three options to obtain a neutral current 3I0 for the BFP L0 system :
• Usage of a core balance transformer

Application manual
This option is the preferred one since it yields the highest sensitivity and is least
vulnerable to measurement errors due to CT saturation.
• Holmgreen connection of the phase CTs
This option has a lower sensitivity since measurement errors from all three CTs are
accumulated. Saturation in a one or more CTs may lead to a virtual neutral current that
does not correspond to the actual current flow in the primary system.
• Calculation by internal summation of the phase currents
This option is equal to the Holmgreen connection and leads to similar sensibility and
measurement errors. Further errors might be caused by numerical inaccuracies.
L1 L2 L3
L1 L2 L3 REB500 REB500
01
01
CT CT
IL1 IL1
1 1
02
02
03
03
CT CT
2 IL2
Σ
2 IL2
04
04
05
05
CT CT
3 IL3
Σ
3I0by 3 IL3
06
Holmgreen 06
arrangeme
nt 07
3I0by
or 3I0by CT internal 3I0
core 4 3I0 calculation
balance 08
c.t.
12000174=IEC18000302=1=en-us=Original.vsd
Figure 48: Connection possibilities for derivation of neutral current 3I0
A residual current caused by CT saturation of one or more CTs, an open CT

circuit or CT inaccuracies could exceed the pick-up values of the L0 system. In
combination with an active starting input for L0, the BFP L0 system will in such
cases issue a three phase trip after time t1 has passed. Special attention has to
be paid to the stability of the logical start signals from protection functions
and devices.
Several physical scenarios beyond the area of influence of the BFP L0 system might lead to an
incorrect measurement of the zero sequence current. The major issues are the following:
10.4.1.1 Neutral current I0 caused by CT saturation

GUID-643BE1A9-9429-436F-9B43-0DAF1366D2A8 v1
In case one or more CTs saturate, the summation of the three phase currents will not lead to a
correct representation of the residual current in the primary system:

Application manual
IL1 IL2
IN
t
0
I L3
3I0
I NSet
t
12000175-IEC18000303-1-en.vsd
Figure 49: I0 in case of CT saturation
10.4.1.2 Neutral current I0 caused by an open CT circuit

GUID-1B559715-692F-45BD-B41D-A01CF8CFF23F v1
If a connection to the CT is broken or interrupted, the BU is not able to measure the phase
current and the summation of the phase currents will lead to an incorrect neutral current. In a
symmetrical load situation, the calculated current will equal the missing phase:
Bay Unit REB500

01
CT1 IL1
02
03
CT2 IL2
04
05
CT3 IL3
06
07
CT4 I0
08
IL3 IL1=0
12000176-IEC18000304-1-en.vsd
Figure 50: I0 in case of an open CT connection

Application manual
10.4.1.3 CT inaccuracies GUID-5759AC4B-E80F-40AD-AEA4-3CE5292F32A4 v1
Another aspect to consider while setting the BFP L0 system is the inaccuracy of the individual
CTs, which is specified by the CT class. Depending on the amplitude of the currents, this error
is seen in the protection system as a neutral current (3I0), which might reach tripping levels.
The setting of the pick-up value of the BFP L0 system shall be above the
maximum inaccuracy of the CT.
Per default setting these scenarios are neither detected nor taken into account
by the BFP algorithm. Consideration of such situations (calculation and setting)
is left to the user.
The signal 23340_BFP TRIP L0 is available as an input to bay protection

functions. Further measures to ensure selective tripping can be achieved by
logically releasing the trip signal with additional bay protection functions.
10.4.2 Time grading for BFP L0 system GUID-210335B5-2D17-4795-8B43-AA8D86CF7B16 v1
The time grading characteristics for BFP L0 system is identical to the phase system. Different
settings for BFP phase and neutral system are possible.
Since the time setting for phase faults and ground faults can be different, the
time grading (and setting) has to be done for both the BFP phase and BFP
neutral system separately.
Setting the timer t1-L0 below the timer t1 is usually not necessary and not recommended.
Deviations from this guideline have to be verified by a detailed setting calculation.
10.5 External start of BFP GUID-AD3B4E8B-0D7E-4217-9C1B-7543B946A57D v1
The timers of BFP can also be started independently of the overcurrent check and the main
protection inputs via an external input.
For safety reasons, a normally-open auxiliary contact on the circuitbreaker

should be connected in series with the external control signal applied to this
input.
10.6 BFP setting Active for CB open GUID-19EB6666-E5ED-4187-B2DA-22A9A1146253 v2
The breaker failure function includes the setting Active for CB open. If this setting is enabled,
the timers t1 and t2 are started independent from the circuit-breaker position (this is the
factory configuration).
If Active for CB open is disabled, the timers t1 and t2 are not started when the circuit-breaker is
open, that is, the breaker failure function is disabled.

Application manual
The setting Active for CB open function is determined by ABB when engineering
the system and cannot be changed subsequently. Where breaker failure shall be
disabled when circuit-breaker is open this setting has to be defined when
system is initially engineered.
10.7 BFP start input supervision GUID-B3AC4645-7C4F-43F4-810C-88356FBDB31E v1
The breaker failure function includes a supervision of the BFP start inputs.
Supervised start input signals:
….._Start_BFP_L1L2L3_1..6
….._Start_BFP_L1_1..2
….._BP_Start_BFP_L1L2L3
….._BP_Start_BFP_L1L2L3_5
….._BP_Start_BFP_L1
If this functionality is enabled, a supervision timer is started in case that one of any start input
signal is on. In parallel, the actual BFP function (combination of starting signals and
overcurrent measurement) is running.
Under a normal breaker failure condition, the BFP would detect the error condition. If that is
not the case, the supervision timer exceed the set time and then the BFP function is blocked. In
parallel to this, an extended event (BFP Minor Error 005) is generated for diagnostic purpose.

Application manual
18000079-IEC19000480-1-en.vsdx
Figure 51: Enable BFP start input supervision

Application manual
Additional protection features
Section 11 Additional protection features

11.1 Enabling tripping commands GUID-17835AD3-BB6C-45BD-8F70-C7B8095B7927 v1
11.1.1 Example 1: BBP function tripping enabled by external

undervoltage relay GUID-2B0F9577-FE09-465D-9FFE-66340F883EF4 v1
11.1.1.1 Problem GUID-1D2925EB-6AA2-4D0E-810B-089104B1E55D v1
In a solidly grounded power system, tripping by the BBP has to be interlocked by an external
undervoltage criterion. Every protection zone is correspondingly equipped with a VT and
undervoltage function.
14000001-IEC18000478-1-en.vsdx
Figure 52: Examples 1, 3 and 5: BBP enable
11.1.1.2 Solution GUID-3EECE333-AC4B-42BF-97E8-EB14387F4E79 v1
The enabling signals from the external undervoltage relays are connected to the respective
31805_External release BB zone input signal.

Application manual
14000002-IEC18000479-1-en.vsdx
Figure 53: Settings for example 1
11.1.1.3 Result GUID-A696BCD3-CB02-4C39-9386-6BE16AB2DF52 v2
In the event of a fault on a given busbar section (for example, BB1), the busbar protection
function for BB1 trips, but the tripping signal has to wait for the enabling signal for BB1. A fault
on a busbar section will normally cause a voltage collapse, which is detected by the external
undervoltage relay for BB1. The undervoltage relay thus also trips and transmits its enabling
signal to REB500. REB500 then trips all the feeders connected to busbar section 1.
11.1.2 Example 2: EFP function tripping enabled by the internal

undervoltage function GUID-87BFCF83-E439-40AC-A45A-1E9CE4385D80 v1
11.1.2.1 Problem GUID-113A62AB-81FB-403F-80F4-B126DC5CC7C6 v1
In a solidly grounded power system, transfer tripping by the EFP has to be interlocked by the
internal undervoltage function.

Application manual
14000003-IEC18000480-1-en.vsdx
Figure 54: Example 2: EFP enable
11.1.2.2 Solution GUID-C5165BB7-40C0-4023-B453-32886BF11C60 v1
14000004-IEC18000481-1-en.vsdx
11.1.2.3 Result GUID-06D2EB08-5473-456F-90AB-2E645DA4808A v1
A fault between the open circuit-breaker and the CTs (end fault) generally causes a voltage
collapse which is detected by the internal undervoltage function. The undervoltage function
thus also trips and transmits its enabling signal to the EFP function in the same bay unit,
which sends a transfer tripping command to the protection at the remote end of the line.

Application manual
11.1.3 Example 3: BBP tripping enabled by the internal undervoltage

function GUID-F74E3008-6D7D-4324-8683-1B5660961ED4 v1
11.1.3.1 Problem GUID-50A3C120-E709-47CC-AD34-399F20BA2146 v1
In a solidly grounded power system, tripping by the BBP has to be interlocked by the internal
undervoltage criterion. Every protection zone is correspondingly equipped with a VT and
undervoltage function.
11.1.3.2 Solution GUID-2E950828-E454-47DA-ACBF-E5FEC7C49F12 v1
14000005-IEC18000482-1-en.vsdx
Figure 56: Settings for examples 3 and 4
11.1.3.3 Result GUID-BE050162-BAC3-41D5-83C5-165CA8EAA1FA v2
function for BB1 trips. A fault on a busbar section will normally cause a voltage collapse, which
is detected by the internal undervoltage function for BB1. The undervoltage function thus also
trips and transmits a signal to enable tripping of BB1. REB500 then trips all the feeders
connected to busbar section 1.
11.1.4 Example 4: BBP function tripping enabled by the internal

undervoltage function without VTs on the busbars GUID-EFC053B5-773A-4854-86FF-DCED8D057E3D v1
11.1.4.1 Problem GUID-BA98D1CD-9057-4D30-941B-4CCFC2A7FDDE v1
In a solidly grounded power system, tripping by the BBP has to be interlocked by the internal
undervoltage criterion, but there are no VTs to measure the voltage on the busbars.

Application manual
14000006-IEC18000483-1-en.vsdx
Figure 57: Example 4: Enabling tripping by the BBP function without VTs on the busbars
11.1.4.2 Solution GUID-9BC30C0D-B060-4750-82E5-4899E91CA85C v2
The settings are the same as in example 3.
REB500 evaluates all the VTs assigned to the respective protection zone (see Technical
Manual). Assignment takes place via the intertripping logic, that is, it depends on the statuses
of the isolators. Tripping is only enabled when all the voltage functions assigned to the
protection zone in question generate an enabling signal (AND logic).
This means that an overvoltage function cannot enable tripping of the protection zone should
the voltage be interrupted either due to a tripped m.c.b. or an open-circuit.
This means that an undervoltage function will enable tripping of the protection zone should
the voltage be interrupted either due to a tripped m.c.b. or an open-circuit. Since, however, the
other undervoltage functions assigned to the protection zone are also evaluated; they prevent
tripping from taking place.
An interruption of the VT circuit can be detected in the case of an undervoltage

function by supervising the bay unit output signal 28805_Voltage criterion or
the central unit output signal 48805_Voltage criterion.
By activating the input signal 18205_Fuse failure superv. UV a tripped m.c.b.

can be configured to enable tripping of the respective protection zone in the
case of an overvoltage function.
REB500 is thus able derive the voltage on the busbars, even if there are no VTs to measure it
directly. Tripping of a protection zone to which no VTs are assigned (for example, all the
isolators open) is enabled by the voltage function.
11.1.4.3 Result GUID-5BFFF8E9-F824-430E-854B-B6375234292C v2
function for BB1 trips. A fault on a busbar section will normally cause a voltage collapse, which

Application manual
in this case is detected by all the undervoltage functions in all the bay units assigned to BB1.
Since for all of them the release criterion is fulfilled, intertripping is enabled and REB500
isolates BB1.
11.1.5 Example 5: BBP neutral measuring system enabled by the

internal undervoltage functio GUID-7C3AD5C3-779D-4094-9282-C260F2073759 v1
11.1.5.1 Problem GUID-9F1000AF-BDAF-464C-99E9-951EC7A9064D v2
In stations in which the maximum load current of some feeders can exceed the minimum fault
current of the protection zones (for example, ground fault in impedance grounded power
systems), an interrupted CT circuit can cause a differential current higher than the setting of
the current comparison circuit.
11.1.5.2 Solution GUID-4BFA2360-F905-4708-8C6E-CFAF4DDFC9C7 v2
To guard against this, the internal REB500 undervoltage function can be configured as an
additional neutral current criterion for the BBP function.
14000007-IEC18000484-1-en.vsdx
11.1.5.3 Result GUID-CAB397AF-88EA-493D-901B-FF4C44EC9C54 v2
In the event of a ground fault on a given busbar section (for example, BB1), the neutral
measuring system for BB1 trips. A ground fault on a busbar section will normally cause a
voltage collapse, which is detected by the internal undervoltage function for BB1. REB500 then
isolates BB1.

Application manual
1½ breaker schemes and duplex stations
Section 12 1½ breaker schemes and duplex

stations GUID-BF46C130-5296-436A-B06E-814B5B587E84 v2
This section describes the application of the busbar, breaker failure and end fault protection
functions in 1½ breaker schemes and duplex stations. The description is based on typical
station layouts.
1½ breaker schemes can be divided into five main groups (versions 1 to 5) which have to be
considered separately from the point of view of discrimination, along with one version for the
application of REB500 to duplex stations:
1. 1½ breaker scheme with 3 CTs per diameter

5. 1½ breaker scheme with BBP only
6. Duplex stations
Table 7 lists the characteristics of these 6 versions (* indicates that the characteristic is not
relevant to REB500).
Table 7: 1 ½ breaker scheme groups and duplex stations

Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of CTs 3 6 5 8 * 2
Number of REB500 BUs 3 3 5 8 2 2
Number of REB500 BFP functions 3 3 3 3 0 2
Number of REB500 EFP functions 3 0 3 0 0 2
Number of T-zones protected by REB500 1 1 2 2 0 2
Number of Bay protection devices (LP, TP) 2 2 2 2 * 2
Incidence high high mid low mid low
One advantage of REB500 in the case of a 1½ breaker scheme is that the so-called T-zone is
fully protected.
The T-zone is the section of busbar between the CTs plus the line T up to the open line isolator.
The bay protection (distance protection) does not detect faults in this zone correctly, because
the voltage measured is the wrong one (open line isolator).
This zone is normally protected by an overcurrent function included in the line protection. This
reacts, however, to CT saturation during through-faults (for example, busbar faults) and could
mal-operate.
REB500 uses its current restrained differential protection and phase comparison functions to
protect this zone. The corresponding algorithm operates discriminately even if CTs saturate.
Busbar protection systems are generally used to discriminatively protect main busbars. In
addition to this, however, REB500 is also able to effectively protect the T-zone of a 1½ breaker
scheme, because it creates an image of the topology of the entire station with up to 32
independent protection zones, each processed by the busbar protection algorithms (current
restrained differential and phase comparison protection).

Application manual
For REB500 to protect the T-zone, its image of the station must include all the components of
the 1½ breaker scheme (circuit-breakers, CTs and line isolator). The same applies when
applying the breaker failure and end fault options. The T-zone protection relies on the image of
the station to measure (current restrained differential and phase comparison) at the correct
points and to intertrip the correct breakers after it has detected an internal fault (both
breakers limiting the T-zone).
The breaker failure and end fault functions use the REB500 image of the station to intertrip
the correct breakers, respectively to transfer trip the correct remote breaker (tripping signal
to the remote end of a line, that is, signal 21115_REMOTE TRIP).
In the reverse direction, transfer trip signals from the remote end of a line are distributed to
the bay units of the appropriate feeders (signal 11105_External TRIP). An active External trip
input signal trips the circuit-breakers limiting the T-zone via the REB500 tripping contacts and
starts the appropriate breaker failure function.
In the following explanations and figures, LP refers to line protection (for example, distance
protection) and TP to transformer protection (for example, differential protection).
12.1 1½ breaker scheme with 3 CTs per diameter GUID-08338B70-F196-4B25-AE33-956E1D5E6C06 v1
BU BU BU
1 2 3
S1 S2
X Y
Q6 Q6
LP TP
A1 A2
14000008-IEC18000320-1-en.vsd
Figure 59: T-Zone protection, version 1
12.1.1 T zone protection with isolator Q6 closed GUID-3362E30A-5362-4B7F-B867-C6BB973B0515 v1
When the line isolator Q6 is closed, faults in the T zones (X and Y) are detected and tripped by
the feeder protection (line protection or transformer protection). The T zones are considered
to be part of the line or the transformer feeder.
12.1.2 T zone protection with isolator Q6 open GUID-4D9C852D-A5EC-45B2-A8AE-13A8E9BBBFAA v1
12.1.2.1 Line GUID-191431FC-FA3A-45E9-924C-EFABD065A380 v1
If the VT on A1 is on the line side of the isolator Q6, the distance protection is unable to
protect the T zone (X) when the isolator Q6 is open, because the voltage it needs for
measurement is either missing or wrong.

Application manual
In conventional systems an overcurrent function activated by the isolator status signal Q6

protects the T zone.
In stations equipped with REB500, there is the possibility of it taking over the protection of
the T zone. To this end, the status signal for isolator Q6 is connected to the bay unit (BU1) and
when the isolator is open, a measuring system specifically for the T zone (X) is activated in
REB500. As in the case of the main busbars, measurement is based on the current restrained
differential and phase comparison busbar protection algorithms, which are considerably more
stable during through faults with CT saturation than overcurrent protection and therefore to
be preferred.
12.1.2.2 Transformer feeder GUID-5B5CC882-4617-44E6-971B-FBAFC3219479 v1
The transformer feeder is normally protected by a differential scheme that continues to

protect the T zone even when the isolator Q6 is open. Connecting the isolator Q6 status signal
to REB500 is therefore unnecessary.
Each diameter in version 1 is equipped with three CTs. This arrangement means that in relation
to the circuit-breakers the protection zones cannot overlap and the three short zones between
the circuit-breakers and the respective CTs need to be protected by an optional end fault
function in each of the bay units BU1…BU3.
12.2 1½ breaker scheme with 6 CTs per diameter GUID-56B1C42F-E5DD-4F8E-851F-78C6AF9FAF40 v1
BU BU BU
1 2 3
S1 S2
X Y
Q6 Q6
LP TP
A1 A2
14000009-IEC18000321-1-en.vsd
Figure 60: T zone protection, version 2

With the exception of the end fault function, the same conditions and considerations apply to
version 2 as to version 1. Since each diameter is equipped with 6 CTs, the protection zones can
be arranged to overlap and an additional end fault protection is not needed.

Application manual
12.3 1½ breaker scheme with 5 CTs per diameter GUID-4E056D07-3D19-46CC-91B4-4F1869032A8C v2
BU BU BU
1 2 3
S1 S2
X Y
BU BU
4 5
LP TP
A1 A2
14000010-IEC18000322-1-en.vsd

Because of the additional CTs in the feeders, a clear distinction can be made between T zone
and line on the one hand and T zone and transformer feeder on the other. Regardless of the
location of any line isolator, the T zones are always protected.
In conventional systems, the T zones in this case are normally protected by highimpedance
(circulating current) schemes, that is, each T zone has its own high-impedance protection.
REB500 can protect the T zones in this kind of arrangement as well. To this end, a REB500 bay
unit is installed for each T zone which is also connected to the line CT, respectively the
transformer feeder CT As in the case of the main busbars, measurement is based on the
current restrained differential and phase comparison busbar protection algorithms and always
effectively protects the T zones in all operating modes.
The three short zones between the circuit-breakers and the respective CTs need to be
protected by an optional end fault function in each of the bay units BU1…BU3.
In this arrangement of the primary plant, REB500 treats the three circuit-breakers and
associated CTs as bus-tie breakers:
• Bus-tie breaker 1 (BU1) Zone (S1) ↔ Zone (X)

• Bus-tie breaker 2 (BU2) Zone (X) ↔ Zone (Y)
• Bus-tie breaker 3 (BU3) Zone (Y) ↔ Zone (S2)
REB500 provides the following advantages with regard to the protection of the T zone
compared with a conventional high-impedance scheme:
• Only one additional bay unit is needed per T zone instead of a complete high impedance
scheme.
• Compared with a high-impedance scheme, REB500 does not require the main CTs to fulfill
such high demands.
• Less wiring because busbar, breaker failure, end fault and T zone protection functions are
all in the same unit.

Application manual
12.4 1½ breaker scheme with 8 CTs per diameter GUID-EB16112D-9FDD-4241-9DA4-90F51AACA08C v1
BU BU BU BU BU BU
1 2 3 4 5 6
S1 S2
X Y
BU BU
7 8
LP TP
A1 A2
14000011-IEC18000323-1-en.vsd

With the exception of the end fault function, the same conditions and considerations apply to
Version 4 as to Version 3.
The three extra CTs (3 bay units) in each diameter create “bus-tie breakers” each with two sets
of CTs. By overlapping the zones, faults between the sets of CTs can be tripped without delay.
12.5 1½ breaker scheme with only BBP function GUID-A9FCFF31-7195-4DDD-8737-D0CD0E959F83 v2

S1 S1
BU BU BU
1 2 3
S2
BU BU BU
S2 4 5 6
14000012-IEC18000324-1-en.vsd

Where REB500 is only acting as busbar protection (that is, T zone, breaker failure and end fault
protection functions are not required), an image of the T zone is not created in REB500. In this
case, a 1½ breaker scheme is considered as two single busbars.
Generally, all the REB500 bay units are connected to the same central unit for this type of
configuration. Both busbars S1 and S2 belong then to the same protection system.
On occasions, the user specifies that busbars S1 and S2 shall be protected by independent
systems, in which case, two central units are needed and the bay units of one busbar assigned
to one and the bay units of the other busbar to the other. The advantage is that the failure of a
system or during maintenance only one protection system is affected. Safe operation of the

Application manual
station can be maintained by transferring all the feeders conducting load current to the
busbar system, which is still operating.
12.6 Duplex station GUID-4949730C-2DA5-499B-93E2-39BBC45FF19E v2
The possibility of protecting small ancillary sections of busbar in addition to the main busbars
is not limited to 1½ breaker schemes. Based on the locations and CTs and isolators, complex
bus-tie or feeder layouts can frequently be broken down into sections of busbar. Figure 63
shows an example of this.
S1
S2
Q1 Q2
Q6
X Y
BU BU
1 2
LP TP
A1 A2
14000013-IEC18000325-1-en.vsd
Figure 64: Duplex station

Those busbar protection measuring systems are activated in REB500 that are needed to
reflect the prevailing operating conditions (isolator statuses).
Table 8: Measuring systems in duplex stations

Q1 Q2 Q6 Measuring system 1 Measuring system 2 Measuring system 3
● ● ○ S1//X S2//Y
● ● ● S1// X//Y//S2
● ○ ● S1//X//Y S2
○ ● ● S1 S2//X//Y
○ ○ ● S1 S2 X//Y
The symbol // indicates measuring systems determined by the isolator statuses which are
linked to form a single measuring system, for example, X//Y.
For operating mode 5, the feeder isolators Q1 and Q2 are open and isolator Q6 is closed and
therefore, a single measuring system X//Y is formed that discriminatively protects zone X-Y.

Application manual
12.7 Assignment of bay units GUID-692F534E-C81D-4BD1-9583-4003B7F3B038 v1
The number of bay units needed in a particular station is in most cases the greater of the total
number of circuit-breakers or the total number of CTs in the REB500 image.
The example below shows the assignment of bays to bay units based on version 1 of the T
zone protection. The two feeder bays which contain neither circuit-breakers nor CTs are each
assigned to the bay unit for the CT and circuit-breaker going to the busbar on their side. The
circuit-breaker and CT in the center are assigned to a bay unit of their own.
If there are CTs in the feeders or on both sides of the circuit-breakers and these are included in
the busbar protection, the number of bay units needed increases in accordance with the above
relationship.
BU 1 BU 2 BU 3
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay 4 Bay 5

S1 S2
X Y
Q6 Q6
A1 A2
14000014-IEC18000326-1-en.vsd
Figure 65: Assignment of bay units

Application manual
94
Complex stations
Section 13 Complex stations GUID-17D42D40-88FE-45DF-B54C-BEF077DCB601 v1
In practice, complex bus-tie arrangements are frequently necessary to meet all the
requirements with respect to reliability of supply and switching adaptability to suit operating
circumstances.
13.1 BBP and BFP in stations with a bypass busbar GUID-463FF313-C2CB-4A08-A593-0FD408047237 v1
If the breaker failure function in BU1 is started by an external device when operating via the
bypass busbar, the entire busbar 2 is tripped instead of just circuitbreaker Q9.
This can be prevented if circuit-breaker Q9 in BU2 is equipped with its own CT, thus enabling
an additional protection zone to be defined for the busbar protection.
Busbar 1
Busbar 2
Q0 Q9
Bypass
Busbar
BU1 BU2
14000015-IEC18000327-1-en.vsd
Figure 66: Operation via a bypass busbar
13.2 Busbars with bus-ties in series GUID-1799F435-2722-4953-AAFB-6877AEFFBB7D v2
The term series tie is used when referring to the connection of busbars or busbar sections via
two or more bus-tie breakers in series. A typical example of a series tie is a 1½ breaker scheme.
In an arrangement of this kind, each circuit-breaker/CT pair is treated as a bus-tie breaker
(bus-tie A S1-Sx , bus-tie B Sx-Sy , bus-tie C Sy-S2). When all three breakers are closed, busbars
S1 and S2 are connected via a series tie A-B-C.
Providing all the feeders are part of a 1½ breaker scheme, the necessity to block a bus-tie
breaker when there is a parallel connection between the busbars as discussed previously is
irrelevant, because there are no feeders with isolators to each of the main busbars and
therefore no possibility of the 1½ breaker diameters being paralleled.

Application manual
Complex stations
S1
S2
A C
SX SY
B
14000016-IEC18000328-1-en.vsd
Figure 67: 1 ½ breaker scheme
Ik11
S1
S2
Ik12
Q1 Q2
A Ik12 C
SX SY
B

Ik2 Ik3 Ik1
14000017-IEC18000329-1-en.vsd
Figure 68: 1½ breaker scheme with parallel connection between the busbars
In a mixed system, the response of the system with respect to the parallel connection has to
be considered.
When there is a parallel connection between the busbars (Q1 and Q2 closed), the busbar
protection measuring systems S1 and S2 are combined to form a single measuring system (S1/
S2).
Assuming the three circuit-breakers of the diameter are closed, the current of a busbar fault
(Ik1) divides into a direct portion (Ik11) and a portion via the series tie A-B-C (Ik12). The T zone
feeders Sx and Sy can also make fault current contributions (Ik2) and (Ik3). In relation to the
main busbars (S1 and S2) in parallel, the current (Ik12) flows out through bus-tie C and back
through bus-tie A. For a fault on the busbars, the combined measuring system (S1/S2) is thus
presented with two opposing current vectors indicating an external fault and the phase
comparison blocks tripping.
To overcome this possibility, REB500 has a special blocking logic which can be configured for
series ties. This consists in defining the starting and finishing points of series ties and not
evaluating measurements between them when both are in the same measuring zone.

Application manual
Complex stations
In the example shown, the starting point (busbar connection to bus-tie A) and the finishing
point (busbar connection to bus-tie C) belong to the same measuring zone (S1/S2) and
therefore the measurements of the three bus-tie breakers A, B and C are not evaluated.
In normal operation, that is, when the main busbars are not in parallel, the two T zones Sx and
Sy treated discriminatively as independent protection zones. When the busbars are paralleled
and the series ties excluded from evaluation, the feeder currents (Ik2 and Ik3) are still
measured, but not those into and out of the two T zones through their respective bus-ties. The
T zone measurements are therefore invalid. For this reason, not only are the measurements of
the series tie excluded from evaluation, but in addition the diameter CTs are short-circuited.
This means that the two T zones Sx and Sy are connected to the main busbars S1/S2 and a
measuring zone S1/Sx/Sy/S2 is created, which correctly includes the two feeder currents (Ik2,
Ik3).
Application of the extended bus-tie blocking logic is only possible providing the feeders in the
T zones are equipped with protection CT cores connected to REB500 bay units.
It can only be configured for a bus-tie breaker during initial engineering of the system. By
opening the HMI500 “Configuration” menu and selecting “Circuit-breakers”, it is possible to
see whether the logic is active for a particular bus-tie breaker or not, but the setting cannot be
changed.
14000018-IEC18000485-1-en.vsdx
Figure 69: Status of the bus-tie blocking logic

Figure 70 shows a reduced 1½ breaker scheme. With the additional bus-tie logic, the
measurements of bus-ties A and B are excluded from evaluation and their CTs short-circuited
while the main busbars S1 and S2 are connected in parallel (Q1 and Q2 closed). A combined
measuring zone S1/Sx/S2 is created in which all faults are correctly detected.
Figure 71 shows a multiple busbar configuration in which the bus-ties A and B count as series
ties from the point of view of busbars S1 and S3. With the additional bus-tie logic, the
measurements of bus-ties A and B are excluded from evaluation and their CTs short-circuited
while the main busbars S1 and S3 are connected in parallel (Q1 and Q3 closed). A combined
measuring zone S1/S2/S3 is created in which all faults are correctly detected. A drawback,
however, is that discrimination is lost for busbar S2 while S1 and S3 are in parallel.

Application manual
Complex stations
Ik11
S1
S2
Ik12
Q1 Q2
A Ik12 B
SX
Ik2 Ik1
14000019-IEC18000330-1-en.vsd
Figure 70: Reduced 1½ breaker scheme with parallel connection between the busbars
Ik11
S1
S2
S3
Ik13 Q1 Q2 Q3
Ik13 Ik13
Ik1
14000020-IEC18000331-1-en.vsd
Figure 71: Multiple busbars with parallel connection between the busbars
Excluding the bus-tie measurement only functions absolutely reliably providing the auxiliary
contacts reliably reflect the statuses of the bus-tie breakers, which necessarily be assumed
unless the auxiliary contacts have a fail-safe mechanical linkage.
13.3 Switchgear bays as bus-tie or feeder circuit-breaker GUID-98077D4D-CF3F-46A8-A2CF-298A7CD29BF4 v2
Some circuit-breakers are designed to be used both as a bus-tie and feeder circuitbreaker.
Figure 72 shows an example.

Application manual
Complex stations
14000021-IEC18000486-1-en.vsdx
Figure 72: Bus-tie breaker that can also serve as a feeder circuit-breaker
If Q1, Q0, and Q20 are closed while Q2 and Q7 are open we have a bus-tie breaker.
If Q1 or Q2, and Q0 and Q7 are closed, while Q20 is open, we have a feeder circuit- breaker.
Exclusion of the measurement of one or both protection zones is made selective when
engineering the system, that is, the one that is not excluded remains active.
13.4 Control using 11105_External TRIP GUID-B9DED535-A1FF-4BCB-8980-D4C83EE89740 v1
This signal is generated when an external protection device trips (including one in the remote
station) and isolates fault on transmission lines or transformer feeders by operating the
REB500 tripping contact.
On normal feeders, the External TRIP signal only trips the circuit-breaker of the respective
feeder. Its effect for special configurations is as follows:
13.4.1 1½ breaker scheme GUID-B9D8A98B-CE50-4375-AF8E-0AB1F3E9A373 v1
Both circuit-breakers controlling the feeder are tripped.
13.4.2 Bypass mode GUID-A5AD1522-AAA9-4410-B9BC-FCCFB69882E5 v1
An External TRIP signal applied to circuit-breaker Q0 controlling Feeder 1 does not isolate the
fault when isolator Q7 is closed (bypass mode). For this reason, circuit- breaker Q0 controlling
Coupler 2 is automatically opened. Through-faults can now be correctly tripped.

Application manual
Complex stations
Busbar 1
Busbar 2
Busbar 3
Bypass busbar
Q7
Q0 Q0

Feeder 1
Coupler 2
14000022-IEC18000332-1-en.vsd
Figure 73: Bypass busbar
13.4.3 Bypass isolator GUID-3C47147C-7473-4873-912D-D1AC5DA6B62B v1
The External TRIP signal trips circuit-breaker Q0 of Feeder 1, but the fault is still not cleared
because the bypass isolator Q7 is closed. The busbar protection then intertrips busbar 3 to
finally clear the fault.
Busbar 1
Busbar 2
Busbar 3
Q0 Q7

Feeder 1
14000023-IEC18000333-1-en.vsd
Figure 74: Bypass isolator

Application manual
101
ABB AB
Grid Automation Products
SE-721 59 Västerås, Sweden
Phone +46 (0) 21 32 50 00
Scan this QR code to visit our website
www.abb.com/protection-control
1MRK 505 399-UEN
© Copyright 2019 ABB.

All rights reserved.

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RELION® REB500

Distributed busbar protection REB500

Document ID: 1MRK 505 399-UEN

© Copyright 2019 ABB. All rights reserved

Section 2 Safety information......................................................................................... 9

Section 5 Signal acquisition and processing..............................................................17

Distributed busbar protection REB500 1

6.2.2.4 Parts not covered by the self-supervision function.....................................................24

Section 7 System Settings........................................................................................... 29

Section 8 Busbar protection.........................................................................................37

2 Distributed busbar protection REB500

8.7 Differential current supervision...............................................................................................51

Section 9 Special applications of BBP.........................................................................53

Section 10 Breaker failure protection (BFP)................................................................ 69

Distributed busbar protection REB500 3

10.6 BFP setting Active for CB open................................................................................................78

Section 11 Additional protection features...................................................................81

Section 12 1½ breaker schemes and duplex stations................................................ 87

Section 13 Complex stations......................................................................................... 95

4 Distributed busbar protection REB500

13.4.2 Bypass mode.............................................................................................................................99

Distributed busbar protection REB500 5

1.2 Intended audience GUID-6E3738BC-FDAB-4ACB-9DBC-442FA6048F2F v1

1.3 Product documentation GUID-91F0A03F-D1AF-4695-A239-1FC87E7459EE v2

REB500 manuals Document numbers

1.4 Symbols and conventions

1.4.1 Symbols GUID-4F7DD10A-DEE5-4297-8697-B8AAB5E3262F v2

Distributed busbar protection REB500 7

The caution icon indicates important information or warning related to the

1.4.2 Document conventions GUID-37C3ACF4-BD79-43C6-B37E-24B38EE69301 v2

A particular convention may not be used in this manual.

8 Distributed busbar protection REB500

Section 2 Safety information GUID-7CDA9FB7-5CD6-4BD5-A1D2-AAB8E7BF87A3 v2

Non-observance can result in death, personal injury or substantial property

Only a competent electrician is allowed to carry out the electrical installation.

National and local electrical safety regulations must always be followed.

The frame of the IEDs has to be carefully earthed.

The IEDs contain components which are sensitive to electrostatic discharge.

Distributed busbar protection REB500 9

Section 3 Overview GUID-923D7F2A-9F9D-4979-96E0-697D0BF1C484 v2

3.1 Application GUID-5A7BC0AC-5DFF-4843-BF91-C2ABB78ED4D3 v1

3.2 System capacity GUID-62AB81BD-ECEA-4C1D-92BF-359861ED5B83 v2

Distributed busbar protection REB500 11

The application of the protection system in complex stations, 1½ breaker

The following are examples of the principal busbar configurations:

Figure 1: Single busbar

Figure 2: Double busbar

Figure 3: Double busbar with transfer busbar

12 Distributed busbar protection REB500

Figure 4: 1½ breaker scheme

Figure 5: Ring busbar

Distributed busbar protection REB500 13

Figure 6: Duplex station

14 Distributed busbar protection REB500

4.2 Customer’s database GUID-87087925-EE82-4AEC-A874-FA48EC5F3ABF v1

4.3 Human/machine interface program HMI500 GUID-ABE594D4-8183-49D4-9299-87B10C57BB36 v1

The human/machine interface (HMI) program HMI500 provides convenient communication

• view measurements and statuses

4.4 Local human/machine interface (local HMI) GUID-67D237A5-9087-497F-BD5E-63CC80138D10 v1

• current and voltage measurements

4.5 Station monitoring system (SMS) GUID-D0336E66-95D7-4861-AC55-94F6113C510A v1

Distributed busbar protection REB500 15

4.6 Station automation system (SAS) GUID-5E46D13F-13DB-4B1F-B6D7-A49C9E230C78 v1