Symposium: ``Qualitative methods''

Symposium: `` MeÂthodes qualitatives''

Ingrid E. Josephs

A psychological analysis of a psychological

phenomenon: the dialogical construction of
meaning

Abstract. It is the task of psychologists to describe and explain psychological

phenomena, though the meaning of both description and explanation varies widely.
One way to deal with psychological phenomena is to transform them as soon as possible
into data (by which is meant quantitative data), which then can be analysed by
ready-made methods (by which is meant inferential statistics). An unfortunate result
of this politically forti®ed procedure is that the availability of methods (for data
``collection'' and analysis) comes to dictate the whole research process, including the
construction of the phenomenon and its operationalization. As a consequence, various
opponents of this non-scienti®c procedure have challenged psychology with a new
dogma: the need to replace quantitative methods by their qualitative counterparts.
Recently appearing ``new turns'' in psychology (as the narrative, the hermeneutic, the
discursive turn, etc.) in particular, de®ne qualitative approaches as the via regia for
psychological analyses. I argue that both ``schools'' are caught in the same trap:
ready-made methods and belief in the superiority of one rather than the other
dominate all other aspects of methodology and psychological inquiry in general.
I suggest that it is the theoretically derived phenomenon that ± depending on the
speci®c research question under consideration ± requires the construction (rather
than the application) of an adequate method for its analysis ± be it qualitative or
quantitative. I give an extended example for a psychological analysis of a
psychological phenomenon ± the construction and reconstruction of meaning ± with
the help of a qualitative experimental approach.

Key words. Development theory ± Dialogical model ± Qualitative methods ±

Quantitative methods

Social Science Information & 2000 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New
Delhi), 39(1), pp. 115±129.
0539-0184[200003]39:1;115±129;011710
116 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

Psychological research is directed to the psychological analysis of

psychological phenomena. In order to gain new knowledge about
a phenomenon, we cannot deal with it as such. Guided by theory,
the ``raw phenomenon'' is transformed into a sign with the help of
psychological methods. In this process of abstraction, speci®c
features of the phenomenon are focused on, others are purposely
ignored. These signs are called data. Both (so-called) hard data
and (so-called) soft data inevitably share this ``soft'' nature: they
are signs, not facts. Without any question, this process of sign-
construction is intellectually challenging. It is not only craftsman-
ship, but involves theoretical knowledge, creativity, common sense
and intuition. There is a large, yet bounded ®eld of adequate ways
to construct signs for a speci®c research question, rather than
``one'' best one. Yet serious mistakes can and do happen easily.
The most devastating ¯aw in this process is to construct an arti®cial
sign that has no longer any linkages to the phenomenon. This
happens quite often. A second, similarly serious ¯aw is to construct
pseudo-signs, that is signs which only minimally or not at all
correspond to the phenomenon..
The reason for both ¯aws lies in the dogmatic, quasi-religious
handling of the sign-construction process, in other words methods.
Very often, research starts with a ready-made, available method
for data-construction (and data analysis) rather than with the
phenomenon under investigation for whose new understanding a
method (be it qualitative, quantitative or mixed) has yet to be
constructed. As a consequence, phenomena get either distorted,
and thus lost, or duplicated.
Proponents of both quantitative and qualitative research get
trapped in one or the other way, as they de®ne themselves largely
by the methods they use. Politics, ideologies, unquestioned tradi-
tions and convictions, plus a strong belief in one's own superiority
(and the other's stupidity), rather than the question directed to the
phenomenon, often guide research activities.
In this article I present an extended example of psychological
(rather than qualitative or quantitative) inquiry into a topic which
is en vogue in current qualitative research: the construction of
meaning. I start with a theoretical analysis of this process before
turning to its empirical investigation with the help of a qualitative
experimental approach.
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 117

The phenomenon: construction and assignment of meaning

Human beings are meaning-makers. For better or for worse, we

constantly and inevitably create and recreate meanings which
guide our movement through our indeterminate lives. Some mean-
ings are fragile and easily overcome, others are stable and rigid.
Some meanings are personally constructed, others are clearly
suggested by culture. Horrors and hopes, desperation and illusions
are created in the process of meaning-making.

The developmental focus. I understand the construction of meaning

as a micro-developmental process. Meanings emerge out of a fuzzy
state. They can ± instantly or slowly ± become structured, general-
ized and integrated. They also can remain fuzzy, quasi-structured
and/or disintegrated. They can be actively maintained over some
time or immediately (or slowly) overcome. These different possible
pathways in the process of meaning-construction need psychological
analysis.

The cultural focus. Without any doubt, the personal construction

of meaning is guided by culture at large. In this dynamic process,
cultural convictions, norms, ideas, values, etc. constrain and
canalize the activity of the person. On the other hand, it is the
person who changes culture through externalizations of many
kinds (language, art, play, etc.). It is inevitable to ®nd intercultural
differences in the meanings persons assign to their worlds and them-
selves. Interesting as they may be, however, these differences do not
tell us anything about the general process of meaning-construction,
which is the focus of the present article. Thus, I do not present a
cross-cultural comparison between data from Germany and the
USA ± implicitly or explicitly treating culture as an independent
variable. I instead focus on the general mechanisms of meaning-
making.

General ways to approach the phenomenon of meaning-construction

There are in principle three different ways to approach the com-

plex phenomenon of meaning-making: (1) trying to remain as
close as possible to the phenomenon (minimal or no abstraction);
118 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

(2) distancing oneself from the phenomenon by distorting it (maxi-

mal abstraction); and (3) distancing oneself from the phenomenon
without losing its distinctive features (adequate abstraction).
Qualitative inquiry into meaning-making often (though not
always) uses the ®rst approach. Often guided by a deep and keen
fascination with the phenomenon rather than by a sound theoretical
framework, the researcher tries to understand as clearly as possible
what the other person means by his or her assignment/construction
of meaning in a certain domain of interest. The deep theoretical
problems of what it means to mean and what it means to understand
± intersubjectivity ± are often overlooked. Intersubjectivity is taken
for granted ± at least it can be if one tries hard enough. Long and
sometimes very impressive narratives are the outcome of this pro-
cess: these are the data. Though the researcher's interpretation is
clearly involved in the analysis of the data, the voice of the research
participant appears to be somewhat ``holy'', as it is the ultimate
proof of the adequacy of interpretation. The speci®city of the respec-
tive case (an individual, an institution, a small group of people) is
celebrated, and attempts to look for generalities ``behind'' speci®c
cases are often avoided, sometimes even strictly (and dogmatically)
refused.
Quantitative research very often works the opposite way. As soon
as possible, the phenomenon is translated into numbers. The ques-
tion of whether these numbers have any substantial link with the
characteristics of the phenomenon is usually not seriously addressed.
As a consequence, the phenomenon itself easily gets lost, while the
sophisticated analysis of the arti®cial signs which no longer stand
for the phenomenon proceeds without hindrance.
I propose a third kind of inquiry. I start with a theoretical outline
of the general process of meaning-construction. Data are con-
structed and analysed in accordance with the theoretical model.
Thus, the phenomenon is still ``there'', yet it becomes abstracted in
light of the theory.

A theoretical model: meaning-making as a dialogical process

In contemporary psychological theorizing, the notion of dialogue

creates an illusion of understanding among scientists which is
based on a mixture of languages and levels of analysis. Inter-
subjectivity (here: among scientists) is immediately established
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 119

through an implicit ``taken-for-grantedness'' of similar perspectives

(Rommetveit, 1974, 1992). One reason for this illusion is that the
obvious ``root phenomenon'' of dialogue is the everyday com-
munication between two partners. This phenomenon has little to
do with scienti®c understanding of formal dialogical models, how-
ever. Furthermore, the speci®c meaning of dialogue varies from
``Bakhtinian'' through ``Hegelian'', ``Buberian'', ``Meadian'', to
contemporary ``Rommetveitian'' or ``Hermansian'' approaches
(the ``list'' could be easily extended). The polyphony (a la Bakhtin)
of this umbrella-concept is obvious in recent publications (e.g.
Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Josephs and Hoppe-Graff, 1997;
Markova and Foppa, 1990, 1991; Wold, 1992). Thus an elaboration
of the speci®c meaning of dialogue is needed.

Basic assumptions of the dialogical approach

The dialogical approach formally denies the Aristotelian/Boolean

notion of identity. Instead, dialogical models rely on the duality of
patterning ± the mutual relatedness of opposites.

The role of opposites. Dialogical relations entail the co-presence of

opposites within a single whole at the time of emergence. Thus
meaning arises in the form of complexes of united opposites; a
sign that is constructed immediately co-constructs its opposite,
a countersign. This is the axiomatic claim of the dialogical approach.
This point borrows from dialectical philosophical systems (Rychlak,
1995) and from the traditions of the Prague Linguistic School
(MarkovaÂ, 1992). Furthermore, the origin of conceptualizing mean-
ings in terms of constructed opposites can be traced back to the
philosophical approach to assumptions taken by Alexius Meinong,
an Austrian philosopher who laid the foundations of Gestalt
thought in Graz in the 1880s (Meinong, 1983). The direct roots of
the present model, however, lie within the theory of co-genetic
logic (Herbst, 1995), which formalizes the inevitability of looking
jointly at a form and its immediately (co-genetically) implied context
(for a full outline of the following model, see Josephs and Valsiner,
1998; Josephs et al., 1999).
When a meaning emerges in the course of a person's life in a here-
and-now setting (e.g. ``I am sad'', with sad as the emergent mean-
ing), immediately a fuzzy ®eld of opposites co-emerges (all that
120 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

could ®t adequately into the ®eld of non-sad). The generic form of

such meaning complexes is {A & non-A}. Both {A} and {non-A}
parts of the complex are considered as ®elds rather than as entities.
This complex is foregrounded against the universe of everything else:
{not-A}. {Not-A} is conceptualized as an unbounded ®eld of hetero-
geneity which is not related to by the person at this moment (in our
example, for instance, chairs, carpets, etc.) but could be related to in
the future.

Organization of the ®elds. The two ®elds are different in their

organization. {A} consists of all versions of the sign that are similar
to a (a0 ; a00 ; a000 , etc.). Similarity can be assumed to be of three kinds.
First, it can be based on taxonomic classi®cation. In that case, the
®eld of {A} includes synonyms of the given meaning. Likewise,
the emergence of general categories is possible within the ®eld of
{A}. Second, similarity can be based on functional relationships
(e.g. ``horse'' and ``rider''; see Scheerer, 1959). Third, similarity
can be provided by quali®ers. Thus {A} (e.g. a person claiming
that he or she is ``happy'') could embrace a (``happy''), a0 (``kind
of happy''), a00 (``very happy''), and so on. Finally, personally con-
structed similarity which does not follow the three types outlined
here has to be explained. This process entails the construction of
higher-level signs which focus on certain parts of the given totality
and create belongingness (and in that sense similarity) between
meanings (Liepmann, 1904). The speci®c outcome of this general
process can of course not be known by others than the person
him- or herself.
The ®eld of {non-A} gradually emerges, together with {A}. It
includes all versions of signs that do not belong to the similarity
set for {A}, and those that do not belong to the in®nitely large set
of {not-A}. {Non-A} is a boundary zone between {A} and {not-
A}, and as such is fuzzy from the outset.
It is posited that {non-A} is the locus of major transformations of
the meaning. Thus, {non-A} implies a yet-to-be-differentiated ®eld
of meanings-to-be.

Dialogical transformation of meaning complexes. There are two

ways in which transformation of meaning may occur. The ®rst,
growth, involves the further differentiation of {A}. In case of further
differentiation, a remains as the background in relation to which the
new sign (a0 ) gains meaning. This putting of a into relation with a0
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 121

takes place in different ways. These include differentiation followed

by integration, opposition (where a is still on a detectable level) or
even ``take-over'', where a is no longer mentioned, but necessary
as background for a0 . The second, constructive elaboration, on the
other hand, is viewed as operating on the {non-A} ®eld, bringing
it to a state of differentiation, and possibly to the change of the
nature of {A}. In the tension between {A} and {non-A}, a new struc-
ture {B} may emerge within {non-A}. For example, the indeter-
minate ®eld of ``non-happy'' may include possibilities for
constructing concrete new signs (e.g. ``sad'' ˆ {B}, with its opposite
®eld of {non-B} ± ``non-sad'', which initially is undifferentiated).
The relation between the newly emerged complex and the previous
one leads to a contrast between the two meaning complexes. This
contrast can take different forms. The two opposing complexes
can remain in harmonious co-existence and be maintained as such
(``At times I am happy, and at times I am sad''), or they may
enter into a state of rivalry (``At times I am happy, and at times I
am sad, but . . .''). A state of escalated rivalry is reached in the
case where the newly constructed meaning {B & non-B} takes over
the previously constructed one: {B} takes over the whole ®eld of
{non-A}, and {A & non-A} is overcome by {B & non-B} as in this
continuation of the previous example: ``but, well, most of the time
I am sad''. {A} may remain a version of {non-B}, with the potential
for ``revenge'' (reversal of the take-over).

Implications. The proposed theoretical model is a model of qualita-

tive transformation of meaning. New forms are built, and existing
forms are restructured or overcome by new ones. The empirical set-
ting has to be constructed in a way that allows for the study of the
qualitative characteristics of the process described. What follows
now is not a piece of ``qualitative research'', but a fresh look at
some old experimental, introspective data, which reveal material
that is critical for the dialogical perspective outlined here.

A dialogical look at some old experimental data

The psychological investigation of meaning-making is certainly

not a new domain of interest invented by the 1990s narrative turn
in psychology (Bruner, 1990). In the ®rst decade of the century,
the largely forgotten so-called ``WuÈrzburg School'' in Germany,
122 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

constituted by Oswald KuÈlpe and Karl BuÈhler among others,

attempted to analyse (experimentally and introspectively) the pro-
cess of construction and reconstruction of complex meanings (e.g.
BuÈhler, 1951). The speci®c evidence considered here comes from
Robert Ogden (1917), who studied ± experimentally and intro-
spectively ± the process of constructing the meaning of a stimulus
word. The research participant was told:
Close your eyes and hold yourself as passive as possible, both mentally and
physically. After saying ``Ready, Now'', I shall pronounce a word. Give it your
immediate, full attention with the de®nite purpose of understanding its meaning.
As soon as you are satis®ed that the meaning has been grasped, react with ``Yes''.
Then recount by introspection your complete experience. Be in no hurry to react,
and let your occupation with the word be as natural as possible. (Ogden, 1917: 79;
italics added)

The instruction shows that the person or ``subject'' is taken

seriously as the vantage point of the whole investigation. His or
her satisfaction with the result ± obtained in the time the subject
regarded as adequate ± is of outstanding importance for the results.
I will re-analyse one of Ogden's examples ± the reaction of a
research participant to the word ``pair'' ± in the terminology elabo-
rated above (this analysis is given in brackets):

[after 5.6 seconds]

1. I was waiting for the word. When it came it associated almost immediately two
meanings: pair, as a pair of something, boots or shoes,
[{A ˆ pair & non-A ˆ non-pair}]
2. and pear, brie¯y, not visualized.
[constructive elaboration and dominance of B=pear ! {B ˆ pear & non-B ˆ
non-pear} in non-A]
3. I came back to pair, which was probably present all the time.
[immediate dominance reversal to {A & non-A}]
4. This experience was very active and pleasant. I resumed in a very brief thought a
problem in PoincareÂ's book having to do with a certain theory of logic.
[constructive elaboration of C, ``PoincareÂ's logic'', into non-A ! {C & non-C}]
5. Lingered over the thought for a moment while some imagery developed,
possibly a vague image of a printed page and the peculiar type of the French ±
not visualized, I think. There was something about the appearance of the
numbers ± many numbers are scattered through the book.
[growth of C]
6. With the reaction came a visual image of a pear.
[re-emergence of B in non-C, dominance of {B & non-B}]
7. It seemed ¯oating in the air. I could see part of the stem, like tobacco smoke,
vibrating. (Ogden, 1917: 98)
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 123

Summarizing, the move from ``pair'' to ``pear'' entailed a {non-A}

take-over (change from {A ˆ pair & non-A ˆ non-pair} to the con-
structive elaboration of ``pear'' in {non-A}, followed by dominance
of {B ˆ pear & non-B ˆ non-pear}). This dominance was reversed
back to ``pair'' ({A & non-A}), only to be moved away (by construc-
tive elaboration of {C}, ``PoincareÂ's logic'', in {non-A}) which took
over the thought movement. The imagery of the printed page ®lled
with numbers would amount to growth within {C}. Subsequently
{B & non-B}, ``pear'', re-emerged in {non-C}, and once again domi-
nated. Within approximately ®ve seconds, the process proceeded
through four take-over events (including one reversal), and one
growth example. The {non-A} (or {non-B}, or {non-C}) ®elds
entailed a syncretic emergence of both words and images, in
different mutual con®gurations.

The role of circumvention strategies in the transformation of

meaning

Shifts of meaning or maintenance of meaning still appear to be a

somehow miraculous process. Further elaboration is necessary.
This will be done by the introduction of the notion of circumvention
strategies, which operate as semiotic regulators of dialogic relations
between meaning complexes (Josephs and Valsiner, 1998). They
change the ``outcome'' of the person's reasoning (e.g. conduct,
internal feelings), irrespective of whether the established meaning
itself changes (e.g. ``I am generally sad, but today the sun is shining!''
± meaning is maintained, but the person has circumvented the mean-
ing by distancing himself or herself ). In this process, a ``fragile''
meaning can (but need not) be strengthened by a circumvention
strategy or, alternatively, be overcome. Likewise, logically mutually
contradictory meanings can remain next to each other without
creating any tension.
It is the hierarchic organization of meaning-construction which
allows for this ¯exibility. Circumvention strategies allow the
operation of higher-level signs on the construction of meanings.
Evaluative organizers of the {non-A} ®elds ± ill-de®ned feelings of
the opposite which may lead to tension (``I am sad but I should
not be'') ± can both set up the tensions (contrasts, rivalries, etc.)
and mediate their elimination. Different kinds of fuzzy quali®ers
124 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

(``generally'', ``sometimes'', etc.) are a second kind of semiotic regu-

lator of the {A & non-A} complex (``I am sad, but well, I am not so
sad''). Different from the evaluative organizers, fuzzy quali®ers
operate upon {A}. An empirical illustration of the operation of
circumvention strategies follows.

Empirical evidence: constructing self-related meanings through

body modi®cations

The excerpt below is taken from a quasi-experimental study on the

ways in which people relate modi®cations of their bodies, speci®cally
tattoos, to themselves (Josephs et al., 1999; Surgan, 1997). The
project was carried out in parallel in the United States and Germany,
on young adults (university students).
The study involved a sequence of questions put to the research
participant about different graphic designs, which could be located
in different places relative to the person's body. At ®rst, the research
participant was shown a selection of different graphic designs by the
researcher. The research participant's task was to discuss the general
qualities of these designs. Then the research participant had to select
one design and to imagine its location on a T-shirt. The person had
to elaborate why this design ®tted in a speci®c place on the T-shirt,
and was asked in which different social situations she or he would
wear the T-shirt. The location of the graphic design was ``moved''
closer to the subject's body by suggesting that it be drawn on the
subject's arm. Finally, the subjects were interviewed about their pre-
vious or current feelings about tattoos, their desire (or lack of desire)
to wear these on different parts of their bodies, and about previous
feelings about being tattooed. At each step of this transformation,
the person's aesthetic choices, changing self-feelings and expected
social reactions were assessed.
The research task was purposely set up in an arti®cial (versus
natural), quasi-experimental setting. The aim here was to slow
down the meaning-making process in order to gain access to it.

Historical and theoretical roots of the empirical approach

The empirical approach described above shares a notable similarity

to micro-developmental theories of meaning-construction in the
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 125

German tradition of Ganzheitspsychologie (CataÂn, 1986; Draguns,

1984). The focus on the step-by-step formation ± in other words:
the genesis and development ± of the structure of the whole was
basically developed within the German ``Second Leipzig School'',
led by Felix Krueger (1874±1948), Wilhelm Wundt's successor.
From a truly developmental point of view (curiously established
outside developmental psychology), all psychological structures
are interpreted as time- or process-Gestalts (Volkelt, 1962: 148).
The need for empirical study on process-Gestalts led to the develop-
ment of method-construction, which was labelled Aktualgenese by
its principal inventor, Friedrich Sander (Sander, 1927). Aktualgenese
means the constructive emergence of the psychological whole in its
fullness of personal subjectivity. Thus, the whole is not a rationally
completed Gestalt (as the Berlin Gestalt psychologists liked to
think), but a subjectively felt, personal whole that can come into
existence due to the psychological relation between the active-
constructive person and the environment.

Heinz Werner's understanding of micro-genesis. A parallel version

to Sander's Aktualgenese ± micro-genesis ± was developed by
Heinz Werner, both as a theoretical stance and as a method for
studying psychological phenomena (Werner, 1940, 1956; Werner
and Kaplan, 1963). The close relation to the present approach is
visible in particular in his article, Change of Meaning (Werner,
1954). Werner developed the micro-genetic method in intimate con-
nection with his theoretical framework. He argued that seemingly
unitary phenomena, occurring over short periods of time, in fact
undergo development (in terms of his well-known ``orthogenetic
principle'') and should be analysed accordingly.

Example from the study. The following example from the US

sample (Surgan, 1997) shows how meaning is circumvented by the
introduction of a higher-level organizer. The female research parti-
cipant, who has emphasized her religious background before,
dislikes all tattoos. The excerpt proceeds as follows:

R: Would you be OK with drawing that on your arm or hand?

RP: Ehh . . . but I don't draw very well.
R: Do you want to give it a shot?
RP: If you're asking me if I like it enough to just put on me, no. I would do it
because it's an experiment, but just to draw or have me.. No. I don't draw
126 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

things on myself, no matter what it is. I just don't. Same thing as I would never
get a tattoo.
R: You would never get a tattoo?
RP: Mmm-mm. Nooo.
R: Why not?
RP: I just don't like them.
R: Why not?
RP: First of all, you know, it's something that I think ± ®rst of all, it's something
that I just don't like. Other people it's ®ne. But I don't want to, anyway. And
most importantly, I don't see how it would, in any way, glorify God . . .
R: Even if you put like a cross or something?
RP: Uh-huh. I know what you're saying. I mean, some Christians might choose
to do that, and if they feel called and moved by God that that's what He
wants them to do, that's ®ne, but I just wouldn't. Unless God wanted me
to. I doubt He would want me to do something like that, but if He wanted
me to, I would.
R: . . . what if you were having some trouble or you felt like you were losing your
faith, or whatever, and you were talking about it and somebody said,
``Would you consider wearing a cruci®x or you should get a little golden
cross on your ankle or somewhere where you could easily see it''. How
would you react?
RP: Well, I would pray about it and if God told me that He wants me to do it,
I would. I wouldn't just ± they tell me that? OK. I would pray about it.
``God, do you really want me to get the tattoo?'' If He says yes, OK. Then
I'll do it. I'd have a tattoo all over my body if that's what He wants me to
do. (Surgan, 1997)

The research participant starts with a clear and focused {A & non-
A} duality: {dislike of drawing something on the arm & non-A}, out
of which the {A} part is growing {dislike of tattoos & non-A}, which
then is ®rmly established by circular reasoning (I don't like it
because I don't like it). The researcher suggests a higher-level
semiotic organizer (God's will), which immediately challenges the
participant's meaning complex. This challenge does not (necessarily)
imply a change of meaning (though we do not know that with
certainty here), but a circumvention of it. We can assume that she
would still not like to have a tattoo, but would wear one anyway
if this was God's will (meaning is maintained, but action can
happen otherwise).
In the following elaboration she introduces another means of
semiotic regulation, namely praying (i.e. circumvention of meaning
by symbolic action, see Josephs and Valsiner, 1998). If somebody
suggested a tattoo (interpersonal realm) she would enter into an
imaginative interpersonal (more exactly, an intrapersonal inter-
personal) realm (asking God through praying), waiting for His
Josephs Symposium: ``Qualitative methods'' 127

answer and only then wear a tattoo in the most general sense,
namely all over her body.
Thus the suggestions from the social side were mediated by this
higher-level organizer, namely God. The latter is completely
immunized to challenges from the social and intrapersonal world ±
God's will stands above everything else and leads to radical changes
(tattoos all over the body).
This example nicely shows that the same mechanism ± operation
of higher signs on the meaning complex qua circumvention strate-
gies ± entails both ¯exibility and rigidity as possible outcomes.
The ¯exibility is demonstrated by the fact that the {A & non-A}
complex, despite its stability, can be overcome in the action
domain (eventually wearing a tattoo) by the catalysing power of
the organizer. The complex itself is not changed, but remains in
the background, defocused by the application of the organizer.
The rigidity is clearly visible in the power of the organizer itself ±
which can eventually be applicable in all domains (that is, the
research participant would do everything if she thought it was for
God).

Conclusions

Meaning-making can and does have potentially in®nite outcomes.

Yet this immense variety can be grounded in a general process
which generates the obvious variability. The basic constituents of
this process are assumed to be: growth, constructive elaboration
and the operation of higher-level signs through circumvention
strategies. These constructs help us to distance ourselves from the
phenomenon and to make sense of it from a theoretical perspective.
The goal of this research project was certainly not to understand
other people and to feel empathy with them in their meanders
through the world of meaning, but to understand the process of
meaning-construction itself. The methodological implications one
can draw from this work are paradoxical. To study the messy pro-
cess of meaning-making requires, for instance, a puri®ed, experi-
mental method in contrast to discourse or narrative analysis. This,
however, does not imply rigid application of an already existing
method, but of a method that remains to be constructed in view of
answering the questions under consideration. This insight was
familiar at the beginning of the century, but has been forgotten
128 Social Science Information Vol 39 ± no 1

in contemporary qualitative approaches, with their respective

discursive or narrative ``turns'' and moralistic contrasting of
ErklaÈren and Verstehen (explaining vs understanding) and their
clear preference for ``understanding'' in the domain of meaning-
making (e.g. Bruner, 1990). Further elaboration of the present
theory will necessarily imply an empirical elaboration of the
historical experimental methods.

Ingrid E. Josephs studied psychology at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany,

where she obtained her PhD in 1993. After work in developmental psychology at
the Otto-von-Guericke-University in Magdeburg, she is currently a Feodor-Lynen
Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at Clark University, USA.
Her main area of interest is the development of the self within a cultural psycho-
logical framework. Author's address: Department of Psychology, Clark Univer-
sity, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01510-1477, USA.
[email: ijosephs@clarku.edu]

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