Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration

ISSN: 2327-6665 (Print) 2327-6673 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rapa20

Public sector appointments, political influence

and performance: perceptions of the situation in
Pakistan

Junaid Ashraf

To cite this article: Junaid Ashraf (2017) Public sector appointments, political influence and
performance: perceptions of the situation in Pakistan, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration,
39:3, 211-216, DOI: 10.1080/23276665.2017.1365467

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2017.1365467

Published online: 31 Aug 2017.

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Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 2017
Vol. 39, No. 3, 211–216, https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2017.1365467

RESEARCH NOTE
Public sector appointments, political influence and performance:
perceptions of the situation in Pakistan
Junaid Ashraf*

Department of Government and Public Policy, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National

Defence University, Islamabad E9, Pakistan
(Received 11 May 2017; accepted 21 July 2017)

Appointment processes are integral to the performance of an organisation and its

staff, with competent people needing to be appointed and to have their performance
valued and assessed appropriately. Concerning these matters, it is alleged that staff
in the Pakistan public sector are often appointed on the basis of their personal politi-
cal relations more than on their competence, with important implications for their
performance and that of the organisations in which they are employed. Accordingly,
this note explores the allegation drawing on responses to an administered question-
naire and some interviews. The findings, in the form of perceptions, are significant
but equivocal concerning public sector appointments in Pakistan being subject to
considerable political influence in ways that impact negatively on organisational
performance.
Keywords: public sector appointments; political influence; nepotism; performance
management; Pakistan

Introduction
Public sector organisations of various types are often subject to political influence and
nepotism when it comes to the appointment and promotion of their staff. Appointments
can be a powerful personnel instrument available to politicians, although the appoint-
ment of political sympathisers does not guarantee they will follow a political or party
line, just as administratively-determined appointments ostensibly free from political
influence do not necessarily prevent poor performance and the courting of political
favour. As Matheson, Weber, Manning and Arnould (2007) appreciate, political med-
dling in aspects of personnel management is often an indicator of political interference
in other areas of administration involving the immediate discharge of organisational
responsibilities. It can be both subtle and not so subtle in terms of how management
provisions and processes governing appointments, promotions, transfers, dismissals and
performance assessments are interpreted and applied. Where it is pervasive within a
public sector, there is a real possibility of public employment being less attractive than
is desirable in the public interest, especially from the perspective of talented potential
appointees (Campbell & Wilson, 1995).
The public sector in Pakistan has often been criticised significantly for its ineffi-
ciency and ineffectiveness, with deficiencies in appointment processes and performance
management being among the important causes. A core issue concerns the extent of

*Email: junaidashraf87@hotmail.com

© 2017 The University of Hong Kong

212 J. Ashraf

nepotism and political influence in the making of appointments, coupled with the
appropriateness of how performance is valued and assessed. Such matters are
considered in this note, against the background of findings from relevant research in
other contexts.

Some research findings from other contexts

Jahan (2012) studied the recruitment and selection process in the Bangladesh civil ser-
vice using information from various published documents such as research reports,
journal articles, government circulars, newspapers and internet browsing. Significant
problems were identified concerning the quota system in terms of its violating merit
and equity; the examination system which was not well designed and used; and politi-
cal appointments, nepotism and corrupt practices which led to the selection of less
competent people. These problems were seen to have dissuaded quality candidates from
seeking public employment, with a critical response to this situation needing to involve
the introduction and application of effective recruitment and selection policies and
procedures.
Yaro (2014) reviewed recruitment and selection in the Nigerian public service using
documents and reports from the civil service commission, newspapers and blogs to
highlight how the appointment process is often influenced by political activities, with
merit often being ignored. Politicians frequently use their role and status to force recrui-
ters to favour appointees with particular political and/or regional affiliations, resulting
in the appointment of incompetent and less skillful workers in public organisations
which, accordingly, are unable to deliver public services effectively in response to legit-
imate needs and demands.
Ishii, Rohitarachoon and Hossain (2013) analysed two cities each from the Philip-
pines and Thailand in terms of the selection and recruitment of local government
employees. Data were collected particularly via qualitative field research comprising in-
depth interviews with mayors, local civil servants, and participants in focus group dis-
cussions. It was found that one city in each of the two countries appointed employees
on merit, while the other two had appointment processes that were politically influ-
enced in ways that affected staff and organisational performances. Respondents in the
cities in which nepotism was clear referred to the existence of political capture which
impacted negatively on the morale and discipline of employees. By contrast, respon-
dents in the other cities appreciated the extent to which human resource management
rules of recruitment and selection that were aimed at selecting the right people for the
jobs involved resulted in the positive motivation of employees.
Lavigna and Hays (2004) studied developments and trends in the appointment of
public sector staff mostly in Western Europe and the United States but also in some devel-
oped and less developed countries. One conclusion was that devolved and de-restricted
human resource management systems often led to manipulation and misuse, resulting in
appointments and promotions based on nepotism which were harmful to the performance
of organisations as the right people were not matched to the relevant positions. Another,
related conclusion was that the adoption of a private sector contractual model for recruit-
ment and selection without gauging the basic differences between the public and private
sectors was a risk for public sector appointment processes.
All of these studies have highlighted significant alignments of appointments, politi-
cal influence and performance in public sector organisations. They recognise differing
performance implications of political affiliation and merit as contrasting bases of
 Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 213

appointment. In doing so, they implicitly confirm the need for very well-designed,
transparent and effective policies and practices concerning the management of human
resources in public sector organisations.

Bases of the present analysis

The analysis hereafter is particularly interested in perceptions of political influence over
public sector appointments in Pakistan, along with related perceptions concerning indi-
vidual and organisational performance and the extent to which it is appropriately
assessed and valued. The data were derived from 144 responses to an administered
questionnaire, which were complemented by responses received during some follow-up
interviews (Ashraf, 2014). The respondents were officials from nine national public sec-
tor organisations comprising a ministry, services, commissions, authority and compa-
nies. The organisations included the Ministry of Textiles, the Office of the Federal
Ombudsman, the Higher Education Commission, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the Pakistan Postal Services, the National Highway Authority, the Pakistan Inter-
national Airline Corporation, the Oil and Gas Development Company, and the Pakistan
Telecommunication Company.
The age, grade levels, experience and educational qualifications of the respondents
varied considerably, providing bases on which a diversity of views could possibly be
expressed concerning appointment processes and performance management. Most were
over 30 and several were over 45, with all being in the grade levels 15 to 22 and most
having worked in the public sector for more than 10 years. Most had university
degrees, with over 60% of them holding postgraduate qualifications. In terms of gender,
20% were female and 80% were male.
In essence, the respondents had experienced similar formal processes of selection,
recruitment and advancement that are applicable throughout the national public sector
within the broad purview of the Federal Public Service Commission (Ashraf, 2014).
Thus, whenever there is a need for staff in ministries and other organisations, advertise-
ments are placed in the national press inviting applications from suitable aspirants in
accordance with the advertised qualifications, experience and related requirements.
First, a draft advertisement is prepared in the light of the forecasted number of staff
required, along with the specification of minimum qualifications and the determination
of the relevant quotas for the positions concerned. The draft is then subject to relevant
approval, leading to advertisement in the national press.
Once applications have been received and documented, they are sent to a recruit-
ment committee for assessment and evaluation. Eligible candidates are shortlisted and
called for written tests. Written tests can be conducted for all scales from BS 1 to 22,
but are generally more common for grade 1 to grade 17, above which internal appoint-
ments as promotions are more the norm. The tests may be conducted by the Commis-
sion or National Testing Service. After gauging the performance of written tests, a
preliminary merit list is prepared for interviews. Then, once the interviews have been
conducted, a final merit list is created for approval by the relevant authority, after
which letters of offer are issued to the successful applicants.
New staff are initially appointed on probation, which normally lasts for one year.
The performance of all new appointees is evaluated and, if a satisfactory report is given
by the evaluating authority at the end of the probation period, the appointment becomes
permanent; or, alternatively, if an unsatisfactory report is given, the probation period
can be extended for a maximum of one more year, leading to permanency or
214 J. Ashraf

termination. Thereafter, all permanent staff are subject to regular performance reporting
and assessment as part of the performance management and promotion systems of
significance to their career advancement and opportunities.

Findings and discussion

Four broad sets of questions and responses are relevant to the analysis. The first set
addressed appointments in terms of formal policies and opportunities; the second, the
significance of appointment processes in relation to organisational and individual
performance; the third, the form and value of individual performance appraisals; and
the fourth, political influence concerning appointments and its effect on organisational
performance.
The first set of questions focused on the formal processes for recruitment and selec-
tion, and whether or not there are equal opportunities for appropriately qualified appli-
cants for appointment. Almost 62% of the respondents agreed that formal processes
were in place, while another 27% were neutral concerning this matter, leaving just over
10% who disagreed. These responses were accompanied by 45% who agreed that there
were equal opportunities, along with 29% being neutral and 27% disagreeing.
These responses indicate that, while a majority of respondents acknowledged the
formality of the appointment system, less than a majority perceived the formal arrange-
ments as facilitating equal opportunities for suitably qualified staff. As some respon-
dents suggested, the concern over equal opportunities had to do with their organisations
being subject to considerable pressure in terms of appointments. The pressure was both
external and internal: external from politicians and military officers, and internal from
senior officials seeking to appoint people closely affiliated to them.
The second set of questions considered the bases and influence of appointment
practices concerning individual and organisational performance and staff turn-over.
Only 35% of the respondents agreed that appointments were based on a proper assess-
ment of performance, while 44% disagreed that this was so. The latter percentage was
matched by 47% who agreed that a lack of consistency in appointment opportunities
had an impact on organisational performance, while only 17% disagreed. Yet, only
31% agreed that staff turn-over was linked to poor appointment practices, with 50%
being neutral concerning a possible link.
An important implication of these responses is that often people who deserve to be
appointed on the basis of merit, do not get appropriate opportunities to secure an
appointment. The idea of the right person for the job is frequently not adhered to in
practice. This inevitably affects the performance of an organisation in terms of its pro-
ductivity, efficiency and effectiveness.
The third set of questions addressed the appraisal system concerning individual per-
formance. Only 29% of the respondents agreed that such performance is determined
with reference to key indicators set out in position descriptions, while 45% disagreed
that this was so. Against this, 36% agreed that the performance appraisal system was
fair, while 38% disagreed. Also, 50% agreed that their recent appraisal accurately
reflected their performance, while only 28% disagreed.
This mix of responses reflected differing views regarding the existence or otherwise
of proper standards to assess and measure individual performance in the public sector.
Some respondents expressed concern about the potentially negative consequences of
promotion-related dependency relationships between staff and their senior reporting
officers. Others, while being content with their own performance assessments and
 Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 215

advancement, appreciated the critical need for sensible, fair and transparent criteria
against which performance could be evaluated.
The fourth set of questions concentrated on political influence and its performance
implications. Of the respondents, 60% agreed that appointments, transfers and
dismissals are subject to political influence, while 18% disagreed that this was so. Simi-
larly, 55% agreed that political influence over appointments has a negative impact on
performance in their organisations, while only 17% disagreed that this was the case.
The rest of the respondents were neutral on these matters.
These responses indicate considerable concern among respondents about appoint-
ments being politically influenced and the effects of this on the efficacy of organisa-
tional operations and goal achievement. Some respondents felt that, too often, political
involvement and influence deny preference being given to people with relevant merit.
They saw this as negatively affecting organisational morale and well-being, as well as
potentially dissuading qualified people from applying for positions for which they are
suitably qualified.
All of these findings are generally consistent with other research over the last two
decades. Shafqat (1999), for example, in addressing the issue of political influence in
the Pakistan public sector, concluded that organisations were politicised in ways that
compromise significantly their neutrality and integrity. More recently, Rehman (2009,
2012) has argued that political influence and the lack of systematic performance assess-
ments have reduced managerial and administrative aptitude in the public sector, with
political interference often making it difficult to select the right person for the right job
at the expense of organisational efficiency and effectiveness. This problem was found
to have been exacerbated by a lack of sound and systematic job analyses as bases of
appointments and promotion, which made it easier for political and other influences to
affect arrangements to the detriment of individual and organisational performance.

Concluding comment
Appointments and the processes involved are critical to organisational capacity and
performance in (and beyond) the public sector and, accordingly, need to be organised
and adhered to very systematically and with integrity. As highlighted by perceptions
addressed in this note, the appointment and performance arrangements in the Pakistan
public sector are wanting in this regard, with political influence being seen as featuring
significantly in appointments and, thereby, negatively affecting organisational perfor-
mance. The perceptions are important and deserve serious attention, including the con-
duct of comprehensive research that explores in detail the nature and efficacy of the
public sector’s appointment processes and performance management approaches.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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